The enemy captured seven of our guns on Sunday, but on Monday we

recovered seven; not the identical guns we had lost, but enough in

number to balance the account. At the time of recovering our camps

our men were so fatigued that we could not follow the retreating

masses of the enemy; but on the following day I followed up with

Buckland's and Hildebrand's brigade for six miles, the result of

which I have already reported.

Of my personal staff, I can only speak with praise and thanks. I

think they smelled as much gunpowder and heard as many cannon-balls

and bullets as must satisfy their ambition. Captain Hammond, my

chief of staff, though in feeble health, was very active in

rallying broken troops, encouraging the steadfast and aiding to

form the lines of defense and attack. I recommend him to your

notice. Major Sanger's intelligence, quick perception, and rapid

execution, were of very great value to me, especially in bringing

into line the batteries that cooperated so efficiently in our

movements. Captains McCoy and Dayton, aides-de-camp, were with me

all the time, carrying orders, and acting with coolness, spirit,

and courage. To Surgeon Hartshorne and Dr. L'Hommedieu hundreds of

wounded men are indebted for the kind and excellent treatment

received on the field of battle and in the various temporary

hospitals created along the line of our operations. They worked

day and night, and did not rest till all the wounded of our own

troops as well as of the enemy were in safe and comfortable

shelter. To Major Taylor, chief of artillery, I feel under deep

obligations, for his good sense and judgment in managing the

batteries, on which so much depended. I inclose his report and

indorse his recommendations. The cavalry of my command kept to the

rear, and took little part in the action; but it would have been

madness to have exposed horses to the musketry-fire under which we

were compelled to remain from Sunday at 8 a.m. till Monday at

4 p.m. Captain Kossack, of the engineers, was with me all the time,

and was of great assistance. I inclose his sketch of the

battlefield, which is the best I have seen, and which will enable

you to see the various positions occupied by my division, as well as

of the others that participated in the battle. I will also send in,

during the day, the detailed reports of my brigadiers and colonels,

and will indorse them with such remarks as I deem proper.

I am, with much respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Brigadier-General commanding Fifth Division.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION

Tuesday, April 8,1862

Sir: With the cavalry placed at my command and two brigades of my

fatigued troops, I went this morning out on the Corinth road. One

after another of the abandoned camps of the enemy lined the roads,

with hospital flags for their protection; at all we found more or

less wounded and dead men. At the forks of the road I found the

head of General T. J. Wood's division of Buell's Army. I ordered

cavalry to examine both roads leading toward Corinth, and found the

enemy on both. Colonel Dickey, of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry,

asking for reenforcements, I ordered General Wood to advance the

head of his column cautiously on the left-hand road, while I

conducted the head of the third brigade of my division up the

right-hand road. About half a mile from the forks was a clear

field, through which the road passed, and, immediately beyond, a

space of some two hundred yards of fallen timber, and beyond that

an extensive rebel camp. The enemy's cavalry could be seen in this

camp; after reconnoisance, I ordered the two advance companies of

the Ohio Seventy-seventh, Colonel Hildebrand, to deploy forward as

skirmishers, and the regiment itself forward into line, with an

interval of one hundred yards. In this order we advanced

cautiously until the skirmishers were engaged. Taking it for

granted this disposition would clear the camp, I held Colonel

Dickey's Fourth Illinois Cavalry ready for the charge. The enemy's

cavalry came down boldly at a charge, led by General Forrest in

person, breaking through our line of skirmishers; when the regiment

of infantry, without cause, broke, threw away their muskets, and

fled. The ground was admirably adapted for a defense of infantry

against cavalry, being miry and covered with fallen timber.

As the regiment of infantry broke, Dickey's Cavalry began to

discharge their carbines, and fell into disorder. I instantly sent

orders to the rear for the brigade to form line of battle, which

was promptly executed. The broken infantry and cavalry rallied on

this line, and, as the enemy's cavalry came to it, our cavalry in

turn charged and drove them from the field. I advanced the entire

brigade over the same ground and sent Colonel Dickey's cavalry a

mile farther on the road. On examining the ground which had been

occupied by the Seventy-seventh Ohio, we found fifteen of our men

dead and about twenty-five wounded. I sent for wagons and had all

the wounded carried back to camp, and caused the dead to be buried,

also the whole rebel camp to be destroyed.

Here we found much ammunition for field-pieces, which was

destroyed; also two caissons, and a general hospital, with about

two hundred and eighty Confederate wounded, and about fifty of our

own wounded men. Not having the means of bringing them off,

Colonel Dickey, by my orders, took a surrender, signed by the

medical director (Lyle) and by all the attending surgeons, and a

pledge to report themselves to you as prisoners of war; also a

pledge that our wounded should be carefully attended to, and

surrendered to us to-morrow as soon as ambulances could go out. I

inclose this written document, and request that you cause wagons or

ambulances for our wounded to be sent to-morrow, and that wagons'

be sent to bring in the many tents belonging to us which are

pitched along the road for four miles out. I did not destroy them,

because I knew the enemy could not move them. The roads are very

bad, and are strewed with abandoned wagons, ambulances, and

limber-boxes. The enemy has succeeded in carrying off the guns,

but has crippled his batteries by abandoning the hind limber-boxes

of at least twenty caissons. I am satisfied the enemy's infantry

and artillery passed Lick Creek this morning, traveling all of last

night, and that he left to his rear all his cavalry, which has

protected his retreat; but signs of confusion and disorder mark the

whole road. The check sustained by us at the fallen timber delayed

our advance, so that night came upon us before the wounded were

provided for and the dead buried, and our troops being fagged out

by three days' hard fighting, exposure, and privation, I ordered

them back to their camps, where they now are.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W.T. SHERMAN

Brigadier-General commanding Division.

General Grant did not make an official report of the battle of

Shiloh, but all its incidents and events were covered by the

reports of division commanders and Subordinates. Probably no

single battle of the war gave rise to such wild and damaging

reports. It was publicly asserted at the North that our army was

taken completely by surprise; that the rebels caught us in our

tents; bayoneted the men in their beds; that General Grant was

drunk; that Buell's opportune arrival saved the Army of the

Tennessee from utter annihilation, etc. These reports were in a

measure sustained by the published opinions of Generals Buell,

Nelson, and others, who had reached the steamboat-landing from the

east, just before nightfall of the 6th, when there was a large

crowd of frightened, stampeded men, who clamored and declared that

our army was all destroyed and beaten. Personally I saw General

Grant, who with his staff visited me about 10 a.m. of the 6th,

when we were desperately engaged. But we had checked the headlong

assault of our enemy, and then held our ground. This gave him

great satisfaction, and he told me that things did not look as well

over on the left. He also told me that on his way up from Savannah

that morning he had stopped at Crump's Landing, and had ordered Lew

Wallace's division to cross over Snake Creek, so as to come up on

my right, telling me to look out for him. He came again just

before dark, and described the last assault made by the rebels at

the ravine, near the steamboat-landing, which he had repelled by a

heavy battery collected under Colonel J. D. Webster and other

officers, and he was convinced that the battle was over for that

day. He ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the

morning, saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at the

crisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever

assumed the offensive was sure to win. General Grant also

explained to me that General Buell had reached the bank of the

Tennessee River opposite Pittsburg Landing, and was in the act of

ferrying his troops across at the time he was speaking to me.

About half an hour afterward General Buell himself rode up to where

I was, accompanied by Colonels Fry, Michler, and others of his

staff. I was dismounted at the time, and General Buell made of me

a good many significant inquiries about matters and things

generally. By the aid of a manuscript map made by myself, I

pointed out to him our positions as they had been in the morning,

and our then positions; I also explained that my right then covered

the bridge over Snake Creek by which we had all day been expecting

Lew Wallace; that McClernand was on my left, Hurlbut on his left,

and so on. But Buell said he had come up from the landing, and had

not seen our men, of whose existence in fact he seemed to doubt. I

insisted that I had five thousand good men still left in line, and

thought that McClernand had as many more, and that with what was

left of Hurlbut's, W. H. L. Wallace's, and Prentiss's divisions, we

ought to have eighteen thousand men fit for battle. I reckoned

that ten thousand of our men were dead, wounded, or prisoners, and

that the enemy's loss could not be much less. Buell said that

Nelson's, McCook's, and Crittendens divisions of his army,

containing eighteen thousand men, had arrived and could cross over

in the night, and be ready for the next day's battle. I argued

that with these reenforcements we could sweep the field. Buell

seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not like the

looks of things, especially about the boat-landing,--and I really

feared he would not cross over his army that night, lest he should

become involved in our general disaster. He did not, of course,

understand the shape of the ground, and asked me for the use of my

map, which I lent him on the promise that he would return it. He

handed it to Major Michler to have it copied, and the original

returned to me, which Michler did two or three days after the

battle. Buell did cross over that night, and the next day we

assumed the offensive and swept the field, thus gaining the battle

decisively. Nevertheless, the controversy was started and kept up,

mostly to the personal prejudice of General Grant, who as usual

maintained an imperturbable silence.

After the battle, a constant stream of civilian surgeons, and

sanitary commission agents, men and women, came up the Tennessee to

bring relief to the thousands of maimed and wounded soldiers for

whom we had imperfect means of shelter and care. These people

caught up the camp-stories, which on their return home they

retailed through their local papers, usually elevating their own

neighbors into heroes, but decrying all others: Among them was

Lieutenant-Governor Stanton, of Ohio, who published in Belfontaine,

Ohio, a most abusive article about General Grant and his

subordinate generals. As General Grant did not and would not take

up the cudgels, I did so. My letter in reply to Stanton, dated

June 10, 1862, was published in the Cincinnati Commercial soon

after its date. To this Lieutenant-Governor Stanton replied, and I

further rejoined in a letter dated July 12, 1862. These letters

are too personal to be revived. By this time the good people of

the North had begun to have their eyes opened, and to give us in

the field more faith and support. Stanton was never again elected

to any public office, and was commonly spoken of as "the late Mr.

Stanton." He is now dead, and I doubt not in life he often

regretted his mistake in attempting to gain popular fame by abusing

the army-leaders, then as now an easy and favorite mode of gaining

notoriety, if not popularity. Of course, subsequent events gave

General Grant and most of the other actors in that battle their

appropriate place in history, but the danger of sudden popular

clamors is well illustrated by this case.

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, was one of the most

fiercely contested of the war. On the morning of April 6, 1862,

the five divisions of McClernand, Prentiss, Hurlbut, W. H. L.

Wallace, and Sherman, aggregated about thirty-two thousand men. We

had no intrenchments of any sort, on the theory that as soon as

Buell arrived we would march to Corinth to attack the enemy. The

rebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston, was,

according to their own reports and admissions, forty-five thousand

strong, had the momentum of attack, and beyond all question fought

skillfully from early morning till about 2 a.m., when their

commander-in-chief was killed by a Mini-ball in the calf of his

leg, which penetrated the boot and severed the main artery. There

was then a perceptible lull for a couple of hours, when the attack

was renewed, but with much less vehemence, and continued up to

dark. Early at night the division of Lew Wallace arrived from the

other side of Snake Creek, not having fired a shot. A very small

part of General Buell's army was on our side of the Tennessee River

that evening, and their loss was trivial.

During that night, the three divisions of McCook, Nelson, and

Crittenden, were ferried across the Tennessee, and fought with us

the next day (7th). During that night, also, the two wooden

gunboats, Tyler, commanded by Lieutenant Groin, and Lexington,

Lieutenant Shirk, both of the regular navy, caused shells to be

thrown toward that part of the field of battle known to be occupied

by the enemy. Beauregard afterward reported his entire loss as ten

thousand six hundred and ninety-nine. Our aggregate loss, made up

from official statements, shows seventeen hundred killed, seven

thousand four hundred and ninety-five wounded, and three thousand

and twenty-two prisoners; aggregate, twelve thousand two hundred

and seventeen, of which twenty-one hundred and sixty-seven were in

Buell's army, leaving for that of Grant ten thousand and fifty.

This result is a fair measure of the amount of fighting done by

each army.

CHAPTER XI.

SHILOH TO MEMPHIS.

APRIL TO JULY, 1862.

While, the "Army of the Tennessee," under Generals Grant and C. F.

Smith, was operating up the Tennessee River, another force, styled

the "Army of the Mississippi," commanded by Major-General John

Pope, was moving directly down the Mississippi River, against that

portion of the rebel line which, under Generals Polk and Pillow,

had fallen back from Columbus, Kentucky, to Island Number Ten and

New Madrid. This army had the full cooperation of the gunboat

fleet, commanded by Admiral Foote, and was assisted by the high

flood of that season, which enabled General Pope, by great skill

and industry, to open a canal from a point above Island Number Ten

to New Madrid below, by which he interposed between the rebel army

and its available line of supply and retreat. At the very time

that we were fighting the bloody battle on the Tennessee River,

General Pope and Admiral Foote were bombarding the batteries on

Island Number Ten, and the Kentucky shore abreast of it; and

General Pope having crossed over by steamers a part of his army to

the east bank, captured a large part of this rebel army, at and

near Tiptonville.

General Halleck still remained at St. Louis, whence he gave general

directions to the armies of General Curtis, Generals Grant, Buell,

and Pope; and instead of following up his most important and

brilliant successes directly down the Mississippi, he concluded to

bring General Pope's army around to the Tennessee, and to come in

person to command there. The gunboat fleet pushed on down the

Mississippi, but was brought up again all standing by the heavy

batteries at Fort Pillow, about fifty miles above Memphis. About

this time Admiral Farragut, with another large sea-going fleet, and

with the cooperating army of General Butler, was entering the

Mississippi River by the Passes, and preparing to reduce Forts

Jackson and St, Philip in order to reach New Orleans; so that all

minds were turned to the conquest of the Mississippi River, and

surely adequate means were provided for the undertaking.

The battle of Shiloh had been fought, as described, on the 6th and

7th of April; and when the movement of the 8th had revealed that

our enemy was gone, in full retreat, leaving killed, wounded, and

much property by the way, we all experienced a feeling of relief.

The struggle had been so long, so desperate and bloody, that the

survivors seemed exhausted and nerveless; we appreciated the value

of the victory, but realized also its great cost of life. The

close of the battle had left the Army of the Tennessee on the

right, and the Army of the Ohio on the left; but I believe neither

General Grant nor Buell exercised command, the one over the other;

each of them having his hands full in repairing damages. All the

division, brigade, and regimental commanders were busy in

collecting stragglers, regaining lost property, in burying dead men

and horses, and in providing for their wounded. Some few new

regiments came forward, and some changes of organization became

necessary. Then, or very soon after, I consolidated my font

brigades into three, which were commanded: First, Brigadier-General

Morgan L: Smith; Second, Colonel John A. McDowell; Third,

Brigadier-General J. W. Denver. About the same time I was promoted

to major-general volunteers.

The Seventy-first Ohio was detached to Clarksville, Tennessee, and

the Sixth and Eighth Missouri were transferred to my division.

In a few days after the battle, General Halleck arrived by

steamboat from St. Louis, pitched his camp near the steamboat-

landing, and assumed personal command of all the armies. He was

attended by his staff, composed of General G. W. Cullum, U. S.

Engineers, as his chief of staff; Colonel George Thom, U. S.

Engineers; and Colonels Kelton and Kemper, adjutants-general. It

soon became manifest that his mind had been prejudiced by the

rumors which had gone forth to the detriment of General Grant; for

in a few days he issued an order, reorganizing and rearranging the

whole army. General Buell's Army of the Ohio constituted the

centre; General Pope's army, then arriving at Hamburg Landing, was

the left; the right was made up of mine and Hurlbut's divisions,

belonging to the old Army of the Tennessee, and two new ones, made

up from the fragments of the divisions of Prentiss and C. F. Smith,

and of troops transferred thereto, commanded by Generals T. W.

Sherman and Davies. General George H. Thomas was taken from Buell,

to command the right. McClernand's and Lew Wallace's divisions

were styled the reserve, to be commanded by McClernand. General

Grant was substantially left out, and was named "second in

command," according to some French notion, with no clear,

well-defined command or authority. He still retained his old

staff, composed of Rawlins, adjutant-general; Riggin, Lagow, and

Hilyer, aides; and he had a small company of the Fourth Illinois

Cavalry as an escort. For more than a month he thus remained,

without any apparent authority, frequently visiting me and others,

and rarely complaining; but I could see that he felt deeply the

indignity, if not insult, heaped upon him.

General Thomas at once assumed command of the right wing, and,

until we reached Corinth, I served immediately under his command.

We were classmates, intimately acquainted, had served together

before in the old army, and in Kentucky, and it made to us little

difference who commanded the other, provided the good cause

prevailed.

Corinth was about thirty miles distant, and we all knew that we

should find there the same army with which we had so fiercely

grappled at Shiloh, reorganized, reenforced, and commanded in chief

by General Beauregard in place of Johnston, who had fallen at

Shiloh. But we were also reenforced by Buell's and Pope's armies;

so that before the end of April our army extended from Snake Creek

on the right to the Tennessee River, at Hamburg, on the left, and

must have numbered nearly one hundred thousand men.

Ample supplies of all kinds reached us by the Tennessee River,

which had a good stage of water; but our wagon transportation was

limited, and much confusion occurred in hauling supplies to the

several camps. By the end of Aril, the several armies seemed to be

ready, and the general forward movement on Corinth began. My

division was on the extreme right of the right wing, and marched

out by the "White House," leaving Monterey or Pea Ridge to the

south. Crossing Lick Creek, we came into the main road about a

mile south of Monterey, where we turned square to the right, and

came into the Purdy road, near "Elams." Thence we followed the

Purdy road to Corinth, my skirmishers reaching at all times the

Mobile & Ohio Railroad. Of course our marches were governed by the

main centre, which followed the direct road from Pittsburg Landing

to Corinth; and this movement was provokingly slow. We fortified

almost every camp at night, though we had encountered no serious

opposition, except from cavalry, which gave ground easily as we

advanced. The opposition increased as we neared Corinth, and at a

place called Russell's we had a sharp affair of one brigade, under

the immediate direction of Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith,

assisted by the brigade of General Denver. This affair occurred on

the 19th of May, and our line was then within about two miles of

the northern intrenchments of Corinth.

On the 27th I received orders from General Halleck "to send a force

the next day to drive the rebels from the house in our front, on

the Corinth road, to drive in their pickets as far as possible, and

to make a strong demonstration on Corinth itself;" authorizing me

to call on any adjacent division for assistance.

I reconnoitred the ground carefully, and found that the main road

led forward along the fence of a large cotton-field to our right

front, and ascended a wooded hill, occupied in some force by the

enemy, on which was the farm-house referred to in General Halleck's

orders. At the farther end of the field was a double log-house,

whose chinking had been removed; so that it formed a good block

house from which the enemy could fire on any person approaching

from our quarter.

General Hurlbut's division was on my immediate left, and General

McClernand's reserve on our right rear. I asked of each the

assistance of a brigade. The former sent General Veatch's, and the

latter General John A. Logan's brigade. I asked the former to

support our left flank, and the latter our right flank. The next

morning early, Morgan L. Smith's brigade was deployed under cover

on the left, and Denver's on the right, ready to move forward

rapidly at a signal. I had a battery of four twenty-pound Parrott

guns, commanded by Captain Silversparre. Colonel Ezra Taylor,

chief of artillery, had two of these guns moved up silently by hand

behind a small knoll, from the crest of which the enemy's

block-house and position could be distinctly seen; when all were

ready, these guns were moved to the crest, and several quick rounds

were fired at the house, followed after an interval by a single

gum. This was the signal agreed on, and the troops responded

beautifully, crossed the field in line of battle, preceded by their

skirmishers who carried the position in good style, and pursued the

enemy for half a mile beyond.

The main line halted on the crest of the ridge, from which we could

look over the parapets of the rebel works at Corinth, and hear

their drum and bugle calls. The rebel brigade had evidently been

taken by surprise in our attack; it soon rallied and came back on

us with the usual yell, driving in our skirmishers, but was quickly

checked when it came within range of our guns and line of battle.

Generals Grant and Thomas happened to be with me during this

affair, and were well pleased at the handsome manner in which the

troops behaved. That night we began the usual entrenchments, and

the next day brought forward the artillery and the rest of the

division, which then extended from the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, at

Bowie Hill Out, to the Corinth & Purdy road, there connecting with

Hurlbut's division. That night, viz., May 29th, we heard unusual

sounds in Corinth, the constant whistling of locomotives, and soon

after daylight occurred a series of explosions followed by a dense

smoke rising high over the town. There was a telegraph line

connecting my headquarters with those of General Halleck, about

four miles off, on the Hamburg road. I inquired if he knew the

cause of the explosions and of the smoke, and he answered to

"advance with my division and feel the enemy if still in my front"

I immediately dispatched two regiments from each of my three

brigades to feel the immediate front, and in a very short time

advanced with the whole division. Each brigade found the rebel

parapets abandoned, and pushed straight for the town, which lies in

the northeast angle of intersection of the Mobile & Ohio and

Memphis & Charleston Railroads. Many buildings had been burned by

the enemy on evacuation, which had begun the night before at 6

p.m., and continued through the night, the rear-guard burning their

magazine at the time of withdrawing, about daybreak. Morgan L.

Smith's brigade followed the retreating rear-guard some four miles

to the Tuacumbia Bridge, which was found burned. I halted the

other brigades at the college, about a mile to the southwest of the

town, where I was overtaken by General Thomas in person.

The heads of all the columns had entered the rebel lines about the

same time, and there was some rather foolish clamor for the first

honors, but in fact there was no honor in the event. Beauregard

had made a clean retreat to the south, and was only seriously

pursued by cavalry from General Pope's flank. But he reached

Tupelo, where he halted for reorganization; and there is no doubt

that at the moment there was much disorganization in his ranks, for

the woods were full of deserters whom we did not even take

prisoners, but advised them to make their way home and stay there.

We spent the day at and near the college, when General Thomas, who

applied for orders at Halleck's headquarters, directed me to

conduct my division back to the camp of the night before, where we

had left our trains The advance on Corinth had occupied all of the

month of May, the most beautiful and valuable month of the year for

campaigning in this latitude. There had been little fighting, save

on General Pope's left flank about Farmington; and on our right. I

esteemed it a magnificent drill, as it served for the instruction

of our men in guard and picket duty, and in habituating them to

out-door life; and by the time we had reached Corinth I believe

that army was the best then on this continent, and could have gone

where it pleased. The four subdivisions were well commanded, as

were the divisions and brigades of the whole army. General Halleck

was a man of great capacity, of large acquirements, and at the time

possessed the confidence of the country, and of most of the army.

I held him in high estimation, and gave him credit for the

combinations which had resulted in placing this magnificent army of

a hundred thousand men, well equipped and provided, with a good

base, at Corinth, from which he could move in any direction.

Had he held his force as a unit, he could have gone to Mobile, or

Vicksburg, or anywhere in that region, which would by one move have

solved the whole Mississippi problem; and, from what he then told

me, I believe he intended such a campaign, but was overruled from

Washington. Be that as it may, the army had no sooner settled down

at Corinth before it was scattered: General Pope was called to the

East, and his army distributed among the others; General Thomas was

relieved from the command of the right wing, and reassigned to his

division in the Army of the Ohio; and that whole army under General

Buell was turned east along the Memphis & Charleston road, to march

for Chattanooga. McClernand's "reserve" was turned west to Bolivar

and Memphis. General Halleck took post himself at Corinth,

assigned Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson to take charge of the

railroads, with instructions to repair them as far as Columbus,

Kentucky, and to collect cars and locomotives to operate them to

Corinth and Grand Junction. I was soon dispatched with my own and

Hurlbut's divisions northwest fourteen miles to Chewalla, to save

what could be of any value out of six trains of cars belonging to

the rebels which had been wrecked and partially burned at the time

of the evacuation of Corinth.

A short time before leaving Corinth I rode from my camp to General

Halleck's headquarters, then in tents just outside of the town,

where we sat and gossiped for some time, when he mentioned to me

casually that General Grant was going away the next morning. I

inquired the cause, and he said that he did not know, but that

Grant had applied for a thirty days' leave, which had been given

him. Of course we all knew that he was chafing under the slights

of his anomalous position, and I determined to see him on my way

back. His camp was a short distance off the Monterey road, in the

woods, and consisted of four or five tents, with a sapling railing

around the front. As I rode up, Majors Rawlins, Lagow, and Hilyer,

were in front of the camp, and piled up near them were the usual

office and camp chests, all ready for a start in the morning. I

inquired for the general, and was shown to his tent, where I found

him seated on a camp-stool, with papers on a rude camp-table; he

seemed to be employed in assorting letters, and tying them up with

red tape into convenient bundles. After passing the usual

compliments, I inquired if it were true that he was going away. He

said, "Yes." I then inquired the reason, and he said "Sherman, you

know. You know that I am in the way here. I have stood it as long

as I can, and can endure it no longer." I inquired where he was

going to, and he said, "St. Louis." I then asked if he had any

business there, and he said, "Not a bit." I then begged him to

stay, illustrating his case by my own.

Before the battle of Shiloh, I had been cast down by a mere

newspaper assertion of "crazy;" but that single battle had given me

new life, and now I was in high feather; and I argued with him

that, if he went away, events would go right along, and he would be

left out; whereas, if he remained, some happy accident might

restore him to favor and his true place. He certainly appreciated

my friendly advice, and promised to wait awhile; at all events, not

to go without seeing me again, or communicating with me. Very soon

after this, I was ordered to Chewalla, where, on the 6th of June, I

received a note from him, saying that he had reconsidered his

intention, and would remain. I cannot find the note, but my answer

I have kept:

Chewalla, Jane 6, 1862.

Major-General GRANT.

My DEAR SIR: I have just received your note, and am rejoiced at

your conclusion to remain; for you could not be quiet at home for a

week when armies were moving, and rest could not relieve your mind

of the gnawing sensation that injustice had been done you.

My orders at Chewalla were to rescue the wrecked trains there, to

reconnoitre westward and estimate the amount of damage to the

railroad as far as Grand Junction, about fifty miles. We camped

our troops on high, healthy ground to the south of Chewalla, and

after I had personally reconnoitred the country, details of men

were made and volunteer locomotive engineers obtained to

superintend the repairs. I found six locomotives and about sixty

cars, thrown from the track, parts of the machinery detached and

hidden in the surrounding swamp, and all damaged as much by fire as

possible. It seems that these trains were inside of Corinth during

the night of evacuation, loading up with all sorts of commissary

stores, etc., and about daylight were started west; but the

cavalry-picket stationed at the Tuscumbia bridge had, by mistake or

panic, burned the bridge before the trains got to them. The

trains, therefore, were caught, and the engineers and guards

hastily scattered the stores into the swamp, and disabled the

trains as far as they could, before our cavalry had discovered

their critical situation. The weather was hot, and the swamp

fairly stunk with the putrid flour and fermenting sugar and

molasses; I was so much exposed there in the hot sun, pushing

forward the work, that I got a touch of malarial fever, which hung

on me for a month, and forced me to ride two days in an ambulance,

the only time I ever did such a thing during the whole war. By the

7th I reported to General Halleck that the amount of work necessary

to reestablish the railroad between Corinth and Grand Junction was

so great, that he concluded not to attempt its repair, but to rely

on the road back to Jackson (Tennessee), and forward to Grand

Junction; and I was ordered to move to Grand Junction, to take up

the repairs from there toward Memphis.

The evacuation of Corinth by Beauregard, and the movements of

General McClernand's force toward Memphis, had necessitated the

evacuation of Fort Pillow, which occurred about June 1st; soon

followed by the further withdrawal of the Confederate army from

Memphis, by reason of the destruction of the rebel gunboats in the

bold and dashing attack by our gun-boats under command of Admiral

Davis, who had succeeded Foote. This occurred June 7th. Admiral

Farragut had also captured New Orleans after the terrible passage

of Forts Jackson and St. Philip on May 24th, and had ascended the

river as high as Vicksburg; so that it seemed as though, before the

end of June, we should surely have full possession of the whole

river. But it is now known that the progress of our Western armies

had aroused the rebel government to the exercise of the most

stupendous energy. Every man capable of bearing arms at the South

was declared to be a soldier, and forced to act as such. All their

armies were greatly reenforced, and the most despotic power was

granted to enforce discipline and supplies. Beauregard was

replaced by Bragg, a man of more ability--of greater powers of

organization, of action, and discipline--but naturally exacting and

severe, and not possessing the qualities to attract the love of his

officers and men. He had a hard task to bring into order and

discipline that mass of men to whose command he succeeded at

Tupelo, with which he afterward fairly outmanoeuvred General Buell,

and forced him back from Chattanooga to Louisville. It was a fatal

mistake, however, that halted General Halleck at Corinth, and led

him to disperse and scatter the best materials for a fighting army

that, up to that date, had been assembled in the West.

During the latter part of June and first half of July, I had my own

and Hurlbut's divisions about Grand Junction, Lagrange, Moscow, and

Lafayette, building railroad-trestles and bridges, fighting off

cavalry detachments coming from the south, and waging an

everlasting quarrel with planters about their negroes and fences

--they trying, in the midst of moving armies, to raise a crop of

corn. On the 17th of June I sent a detachment of two brigades,

under General M. L. Smith, to Holly Springs, in the belief that I

could better protect the railroad from some point in front than

by scattering our men along it; and, on the 23d, I was at

Lafayette Station, when General Grant, with his staff and a very

insignificant escort, arrived from Corinth en route for Memphis, to

take command of that place and of the District of West Tennessee.

He came very near falling into the hands of the enemy, who infested

the whole country with small but bold detachments of cavalry. Up

to that time I had received my orders direct from General Halleck

at Corinth, but soon after I fell under the immediate command of

General Grant and so continued to the end of the war; but, on the

29th, General Halleck notified me that "a division of troops under

General C. S. Hamilton of 'Rosecrans's army corps,' had passed the

Hatchie from Corinth," and was destined for Holly Springs, ordering

me to "cooperate as far as advisable," but "not to neglect the

protection of the road." I ordered General Hurlbut to leave

detachments at Grand Junction and Lagrange, and to march for Holly

Springs. I left detachments at Moscow and Lafayette, and, with

about four thousand men, marched for the same point. Hurlbut and I

met at Hudsonville, and thence marched to the Coldwater, within

four miles of Holly Springs. We encountered only small detachments

of rebel cavalry under Colonels Jackson and Pierson, and drove them

into and through Holly Springs; but they hung about, and I kept an

infantry brigade in Holly Springs to keep them out. I heard

nothing from General Hamilton till the 5th of July, when I received

a letter from him dated Rienzi, saying that he had been within

nineteen miles of Holly Springs and had turned back for Corinth;

and on the next day, July 6th, I got a telegraph order from General

Halleck, of July 2d, sent me by courier from Moscow, "not to

attempt to hold Holly Springs, but to fall back and protect the

railroad." We accordingly marched back twenty-five miles--Hurlbut

to Lagrange, and I to Moscow. The enemy had no infantry nearer

than the Tallahatchee bridge, but their cavalry was saucy and

active, superior to ours, and I despaired of ever protecting a

railroad, preventing a broad front of one hundred miles, from their

dashes.

About this time, we were taunted by the Confederate soldiers and

citizens with the assertion that Lee had defeated McClellan at

Richmond; that he would soon be in Washington; and that our turn

would come next. The extreme caution of General Halleck also

indicated that something had gone wrong, and, on the 16th of July,

at Moscow, I received a dispatch from him, announcing that he had

been summoned to Washington, which he seemed to regret, and which

at that moment I most deeply deplored. He announced that his

command would devolve on General Grant, who had been summoned

around from Memphis to Corinth by way of Columbus, Kentucky, and

that I was to go into Memphis to take command of the District of

West Tennessee, vacated by General Grant. By this time, also, I

was made aware that the great, army that had assembled at Corinth

at the end of May had been scattered and dissipated, and that

terrible disasters had befallen our other armies in Virginia and

the East.

I soon received orders to move to Memphis, taking Hurlbut's

division along. We reached Memphis on the 21st, and on the 22d I

posted my three brigades mostly in and near Fort Dickering, and

Hurlbut's division next below on the river-bank by reason of the

scarcity of water, except in the Mississippi River itself. The

weather was intensely hot. The same order that took us to Memphis

required me to send the division of General Lew Wallace (then

commanded by Brigadier-General A. P. Hovey) to Helena, Arkansas, to

report to General Curtis, which was easily accomplished by

steamboat. I made my own camp in a vacant lot, near Mr. Moon's

house, and gave my chief attention to the construction of Fort

Pickering, then in charge of Major Prime, United States Engineers;

to perfecting the drill and discipline of the two divisions under

my command; and to the administration of civil affairs.

At the time when General Halleck was summoned from Corinth to

Washington, to succeed McClellan as commander-in-chief, I surely

expected of him immediate and important results. The Army of the

Ohio was at the time marching toward Chattanooga, and was strung

from Eastport by Huntsville to Bridgeport, under the command of

General Buell. In like manner, the Army of the Tennessee was

strung along the same general line, from Memphis to Tuscumbia, and

was commanded by General Grant, with no common commander for both

these forces: so that the great army which General Halleck had so

well assembled at Corinth, was put on the defensive, with a

frontage of three hundred miles. Soon thereafter the rebels

displayed peculiar energy and military skill. General Bragg had

reorganized the army of Beauregard at Tupelo, carried it rapidly

and skillfully toward Chattanooga, whence he boldly assumed the

offensive, moving straight for Nashville and Louisville, and

compelling General Buell to fall back to the Ohio River at

Louisville.

The army of Van Dorn and Price had been brought from the

trans-Mississippi Department to the east of the river, and was

collected at and about Holly Springs, where, reenforced by

Armstrong's and Forrests cavalry, it amounted to about forty

thousand brave and hardy soldiers. These were General Grant's

immediate antagonists, and so many and large detachments had been

drawn from him, that for a time he was put on the defensive. In

person he had his headquarters at Corinth, with the three divisions

of Hamilton, Davies, and McKean, under the immediate orders of

General Rosecrans. General Ord had succeeded to the division of

McClernand (who had also gone to Washington), and held Bolivar and

Grand Junction. I had in Memphis my own and Hurlbut's divisions,

and other smaller detachments were strung along the Memphis &

Charleston road. But the enemy's detachments could strike this

road at so many points, that no use could be made of it, and

General Grant had to employ the railroads, from Columbus, Kentucky,

to Corinth and Grand Junction, by way of Jackson, Tennessee, a

point common to both roads, and held in some force.

In the early part of September the enemy in our front manifested

great activity, feeling with cavalry at all points, and on the 13th

General Van Dorn threatened Corinth, while General Price seized the

town of Iuka, which was promptly abandoned by a small garrison

under Colonel Murphy. Price's force was about eight thousand men,

and the general impression was that he was en route for Eastport,

with the purpose to cross the Tennessee River in the direction of

Nashville, in aid of General Bragg, then in full career for

Kentucky. General Grant determined to attack him in force,

prepared to regain Corinth before Van Dorn could reach it. He had

drawn Ord to Corinth, and moved him, by Burnsville, on Iuka, by the

main road, twenty-six miles. General Grant accompanied this column

as far as Burnsville. At the same time he had dispatched Rosecrans

by roads to the south, via Jacinto, with orders to approach Iuka by

the two main roads, coming into Iuka from the south, viz., they

Jacinto and Fulton roads.

On the 18th General Ord encountered the enemy about four miles out

of Iuka. His orders contemplated that he should not make a serious

attack, until Rosecrans had gained his position on the south; but,

as usual, Rosecrans had encountered difficulties in the confusion

of roads, his head of column did not reach the vicinity of Iuka

till 4 p.m. of the 19th, and then his troops were long drawn out

on the single Jacinto road, leaving the Fulton road clear for

Price's use. Price perceived his advantage, and attacked with

vehemence the head of Rosecrans's column, Hamilton's division,

beating it back, capturing a battery, and killing and disabling

seven hundred and thirty-six men, so that when night closed in

Rosecrans was driven to the defensive, and Price, perceiving his

danger, deliberately withdrew by the Fulton road, and the next

morning was gone. Although General Ord must have been within four

or six miles of this battle, he did not hear a sound; and he or

General Grant did not know of it till advised the next morning by a

courier who had made a wide circuit to reach them. General Grant

was much offended with General Rosecrans because of this affair,

but in my experience these concerted movements generally fail,

unless with the very best kind of troops, and then in a country on

whose roads some reliance can be placed, which is not the case in

Northern Mississippi. If Price was aiming for Tennessee; he

failed, and was therefore beaten. He made a wide circuit by the

south, and again joined Van Dorn.

On the 6th of September, at Memphis, I received an order from

General Grant dated the 2d, to send Hurlbut's division to

Brownsville, in the direction of Bolivar, thence to report by

letter to him at Jackson. The division started the same day, and,

as our men and officers had been together side by side from the

first landing at Shiloh, we felt the parting like the breaking up

of a family. But General Grant was forced to use every man, for he

knew well that Van Dorn could attack him at pleasure, at any point

of his long line. To be the better prepared, on the 23d of

September he took post himself at Jackson, Tennessee, with a small

reserve force, and gave Rosecrans command of Corinth, with his

three divisions and some detachments, aggregating about twenty

thousand men. He posted General Ord with his own and Hurlbut'a

divisions at Bolivar, with outposts toward Grand Junction and

Lagrange. These amounted to nine or ten thousand men, and I held

Memphis with my own division, amounting to about six thousand men.

The whole of General Grant's men at that time may have aggregated

fifty thousand, but he had to defend a frontage of a hundred and

fifty miles, guard some two hundred miles of railway, and as much

river. Van Dom had forty thousand men, united, at perfect liberty

to move in any direction, and to choose his own point of attack,

under cover of woods, and a superior body of cavalry, familiar with

every foot of the ground. Therefore General Grant had good reason

for telegraphing to General Halleck, on the 1st of October, that

his position was precarious, "but I hope to get out of it all

right." In Memphis my business was to hold fast that important

flank, and by that date Fort Dickering had been made very strong,

and capable of perfect defense by a single brigade. I therefore

endeavored by excursions to threaten Van Dorn's detachments to the

southeast and east. I repeatedly sent out strong detachments

toward Holly Springs, which was his main depot of supply; and

General Grierson, with his Sixth Illinois, the only cavalry I had,

made some bold and successful dashes at the Coldwater, compelling

Van Dorn to cover it by Armstrong's whole division of cavalry.

Still, by the 1st of October, General Grant was satisfied that the

enemy was meditating an attack in force on Bolivar or Corinth; and

on the 2d Van Dorn made his appearance near Corinth, with his

entire army. On the 3d he moved down on that place from the north

and northwest, General Roseerana went out some four miles to meet

him, but was worsted and compelled to fall back within the line of

his forts. These had been began under General Halleck, but were

much strengthened by General Grant, and consisted of several

detached redoubts, bearing on each other, and inclosing the town

and the depots of stores at the intersection of the two railroads.

Van Dorn closed down on the forts by the evening of the 3d, and on

the morning of the 4th assaulted with great vehemence. Our men,

covered by good parapets, fought gallantly, and defended their

posts well, inflicting terrible losses on the enemy, so that by

noon the rebels were repulsed at all points, and drew off, leaving

their dead and wounded in our hands. Their losses, were variously

estimated, but the whole truth will probably never be known, for in

that army reports and returns were not the fashion. General

Rosecrans admitted his own loss to be three hundred and fifteen

killed, eighteen hundred and twelve wounded, and two hundred and

thirty-two missing or prisoners, and claimed on the part of the

rebels fourteen hundred and twenty-three dead, two thousand and

twenty-five prisoners and wounded. Of course, most of the wounded

must have gone off or been carried off, so that, beyond doubt, the

rebel army lost at Corinth fully six thousand men.

Meantime, General Grant, at Jackson, had dispatched Brigadier-

General McPherson, with a brigade, directly for Corinth, which

reached General Rosecrans after the battle; and, in anticipation of

his victory, had ordered him to pursue instantly, notifying him

that he had ordered Ord's and Hurlbut's divisions rapidly across to

Pocahontas, so as to strike the rebels in flank. On the morning of

the 5th, General Ord reached the Hatchie River, at Davies bridge,

with four thousand men; crossed over and encountered the retreating

army, captured a battery and several hundred prisoners, dispersing

the rebel advance, and forcing the main column to make a wide

circuit by the south in order to cross the Hatchie River. Had

General Rosecrans pursued promptly, and been on the heels of this

mass of confused and routed men, Van Dorn's army would surely have

been utterly ruined; as it was, Van Dom regained Holly Springs

somewhat demoralized.

General Rosecrans did not begin his pursuit till the next morning,

the 5th, and it was then too late. General Grant was again

displeased with him, and never became fully reconciled. General

Rosecrans was soon after relieved, and transferred to the Army of

the Cumberland, in Tennessee, of which he afterward obtained the

command, in place of General Buell, who was removed.

The effect of the battle of Corinth was very great. It was,

indeed, a decisive blow to the Confederate cause in our quarter,

and changed the whole aspect of affairs in West Tennessee. From

the timid defensive we were at once enabled to assume the bold

offensive. In Memphis I could see its effects upon the citizens,

and they openly admitted that their cause had sustained a

death-blow. But the rebel government was then at its maximum

strength; Van Dorn was reenforced, and very soon Lieutenant-General

J. C. Pemberton arrived and assumed the command, adopting for his

line the Tallahatchie River, with an advance-guard along the

Coldwater, and smaller detachments forward at Grand Junction and

Hernando. General Grant, in like manner, was reenforced by new

regiments.

Out of those which were assigned to Memphis, I organized two new

brigades, and placed them under officers who had gained skill and

experience during the previous campaign.

CHAPTER XII.

MEMPHIS TO ARKANSAS POST.

JULY, 1882 TO JANUARY, 1883

When we first entered Memphis, July 21,1862, I found the place

dead; no business doing, the stores closed, churches, schools, and

every thing shut up. The people were all more or less in sympathy

with our enemies, and there was a strong prospect that the whole

civil population would become a dead weight on our hands. Inasmuch

as the Mississippi River was then in our possession northward, and

steamboats were freely plying with passengers and freight, I caused

all the stores to be opened, churches, schools, theatres, and

places of amusement, to be reestablished, and very soon Memphis

resumed its appearance of an active, busy, prosperous place. I

also restored the mayor (whose name was Parks) and the city

government to the performance of their public functions, and

required them to maintain a good civil police.

Up to that date neither Congress nor the President had made any

clear, well-defined rules touching the negro slaves, and the

different generals had issued orders according to their own

political sentiments. Both Generals Halleck and Grant regarded the

slave as still a slave, only that the labor of the slave belonged

to his owner, if faithful to the Union, or to the United States, if

the master had taken up arms against the Government, or adhered to

the fortunes of the rebellion. Therefore, in Memphis, we received

all fugitives, put them to work on the fortifications, supplied

them with food and clothing, and reserved the question of payment

of wages for future decision. No force was allowed to be used to

restore a fugitive slave to his master in any event; but if the

master proved his loyalty, he was usually permitted to see his

slave, and, if he could persuade him to return home, it was

permitted. Cotton, also, was a fruitful subject of controversy.

The Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Chase, was extremely anxious at

that particular time to promote the purchase of cotton, because

each bale was worth, in gold, about three hundred dollars, and

answered the purpose of coin in our foreign exchanges. He

therefore encouraged the trade, so that hundreds of greedy

speculators flocked down the Mississippi, and resorted to all sorts

of measures to obtain cotton from the interior, often purchasing it

from negroes who did not own it, but who knew where it was

concealed. This whole business was taken from the jurisdiction of

the military, and committed to Treasury agents appointed by Mr.

Chase.

Other questions absorbed the attention of military commanders; and

by way of illustration I here insert a few letters from my

"letter-book," which contains hundreds on similar subjects:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION

Memphis, Tennessee, August 11, 1862

Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.

Sir: Your letter of August 2d, just received, invites my discussion

of the cotton question.

I will write plainly and slowly, because I know you have no time to

listen to trifles. This is no trifle; when one nation is at war

with another, all the people of the one are enemies of the other:

then the rules are plain and easy of understanding. Most

unfortunately, the war in which we are now engaged has been

complicated with the belief on the one hand that all on the other

are not enemies. It would have been better if, at the outset, this

mistake had not been made, and it is wrong longer to be misled by

it. The Government of the United States may now safely proceed on

the proper rule that all in the South are enemies of all in the

North; and not only are they unfriendly, but all who can procure

arms now bear them as organized regiments, or as guerrillas. There

is not a garrison in Tennessee where a man can go beyond the sight

of the flag-staff without being shot or captured. It so happened

that these people had cotton, and, whenever they apprehended our

large armies would move, they destroyed the cotton in the belief

that, of course, we world seize it, and convert it to our use.

They did not and could not dream that we would pay money for it.

It had been condemned to destruction by their own acknowledged

government, and was therefore lost to their people; and could have

been, without injustice, taken by us, and sent away, either as

absolute prize of war, or for future compensation. But the

commercial enterprise of the Jews soon discovered that ten cents

would buy a pound of cotton behind our army; that four cents would

take it to Boston, where they could receive thirty cents in gold.

The bait was too tempting, and it spread like fire, when here they

discovered that salt, bacon, powder, fire-arms, percussion-caps,

etc., etc., were worth as much as gold; and, strange to say, this

traffic was not only permitted, but encouraged. Before we in the

interior could know it, hundreds, yea thousands of barrels of salt

and millions of dollars had been disbursed; and I have no doubt

that Bragg's army at Tupelo, and Van Dorn's at Vicksburg, received

enough salt to make bacon, without which they could not have moved

their armies in mass; and that from ten to twenty thousand fresh

arms, and a due supply of cartridges, have also been got, I am

equally satisfied. As soon as I got to Memphis, having seen the

effect in the interior, I ordered (only as to my own command) that

gold, silver, and Treasury notes, were contraband of war, and

should not go into the interior, where all were hostile. It is

idle to talk about Union men here: many want peace, and fear war

and its results; but all prefer a Southern, independent government,

and are fighting or working for it. Every gold dollar that was

spent for cotton, was sent to the seaboard, to be exchanged for

bank-notes and Confederate scrip, which will buy goods here, and

are taken in ordinary transactions. I therefore required cotton to

be paid for in such notes, by an obligation to pay at the end of

the war, or by a deposit of the price in the hands of a trustee,

viz., the United States Quartermaster. Under these rules cotton is

being obtained about as fast as by any other process, and yet the

enemy receives no "aid or comfort." Under the "gold" rule, the

country people who had concealed their cotton from the burners, and

who openly scorned our greenbacks, were willing enough to take

Tennessee money, which will buy their groceries; but now that the

trade is to be encouraged, and gold paid out, I admit that cotton

will be sent in by our open enemies, who can make better use of

gold than they can of their hidden bales of cotton.

I may not appreciate the foreign aspect of the question, but my

views on this may be ventured. If England ever threatens war

because we don't furnish her cotton, tell her plainly if she can't

employ and feed her own people, to send them here, where they

cannot only earn an honest living, but soon secure independence by

moderate labor. We are not bound to furnish her cotton. She has

more reason to fight the South for burning that cotton, than us for

not shipping it. To aid the South on this ground would be

hypocrisy which the world would detect at once. Let her make her

ultimatum, and there are enough generous minds in Europe that will

counteract her in the balance. Of course her motive is to cripple

a power that rivals her in commerce and manufactures, that

threatens even to usurp her history. In twenty more years of

prosperity, it will require a close calculation to determine

whether England, her laws and history, claim for a home the

Continent of America or the Isle of Britain. Therefore, finding us

in a death-struggle for existence, she seems to seek a quarrel to

destroy both parts in detail.

Southern people know this full well, and will only accept the

alliance of England in order to get arms and manufactures in

exchange for their cotton. The Southern Confederacy will accept no

other mediation, because she knows full well that in Old England

her slaves and slavery will receive no more encouragement than in

New England.

France certainly does not need our cotton enough to disturb her

equilibrium, and her mediation would be entitled to a more respect

consideration than on the part of her present ally. But I feel

assured the French will not encourage rebellion and secession

anywhere as a political doctrine. Certainly all the German states

must be our ardent friends; and, in case of European intervention;

they could not be kept down.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION, ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, Memphis, July

23, 1862

Dr. E. S. PLUMMER and others, Physician in Memphis, Signers to a

Petition.

GENTLEMEN: I have this moment received your communication, and

assure you that it grieves my heart thus to be the instrument of

adding to the seeming cruelty and hardship of this unnatural war.

On my arrival here, I found my predecessor (General Hovey) had

issued an order permitting the departure south of all persons

subject to the conscript law of the Southern Confederacy. Many

applications have been made to me to modify this order, but I

regarded it as a condition precedent by which I was bound in honor,

and therefore I have made no changes or modifications; nor shall I

determine what action I shall adopt in relation to persons

unfriendly to our cause who remain after the time limited by

General Hovey's order had expired. It is now sunset, and all who

have not availed themselves of General Hovey's authority, and who

remain in Memphis, are supposed to be loyal and true men.

I will only say that I cannot allow the personal convenience of

even a large class of ladies to influence me in my determination to

make Memphis a safe place of operations for an army, and all people

who are unfriendly should forthwith prepare to depart in such

direction as I may hereafter indicate.

Surgeons are not liable to be made prisoners of war, but they

should not reside within the lines of an army which they regard as

hostile. The situation would be too delicate.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS, MEMPHIS, July 24, 1862

SAMUEL SAWYER, Esq., Editor Union Appeal, Memphis.

DEAR SIR: It is well I should come to an understanding at once

with the press as well as the people of Memphis, which I am ordered

to command; which means, to control for the interest, welfare; and

glory of the whole Government of the United States.

Personalities in a newspaper are wrong and criminal. Thus, though

you meant to be complimentary in your sketch of my career, you make

more than a dozen mistakes of fact, which I need not correct, as I

don't desire my biography to be written till I am dead. It is

enough for the world to know that I live and am a soldier, bound to

obey the orders of my superiors, the laws of my country, and to

venerate its Constitution; and that, when discretion is given me, I

shall exercise it wisely and account to my superiors.

I regard your article headed "City Council--General Sherman and

Colonel Slack," as highly indiscreet. Of course, no person who can

jeopardize the safety of Memphis can remain here, much less

exercise public authority; but I must take time, and be satisfied

that injustice be not done.

If the parties named be the men you describe, the fact should not

be published, to put them on their guard and thus to encourage

their escape. The evidence should be carefully collected,

authenticated, and then placed in my hands. But your statement of

facts is entirely qualified; in my mind, and loses its force by

your negligence of the very simple facts within your reach as to

myself: I had been in the army six years in 1846; am not related by

blood to any member of Lucas, Turner & Co.; was associated with

them in business six years (instead of two); am not colonel of the

Fifteenth Infantry, but of the Thirteenth. Your correction, this

morning, of the acknowledged error as to General Denver and others,

is still erroneous. General Morgan L. Smith did not belong to my

command at the battle of Shiloh at all, but he was transferred to

my division just before reaching Corinth. I mention these facts in

kindness, to show you how wrong it is to speak of persons.

I will attend to the judge, mayor, Boards of Aldermen, and

policemen, all in good time.

Use your influence to reestablish system, order, government. You

may rest easy that no military commander is going to neglect

internal safety, or to guard against external danger; but to do

right requires time, and more patience than I usually possess. If

I find the press of Memphis actuated by high principle and a sole

devotion to their country, I will be their best friend; but, if I

find them personal, abusive, dealing in innuendoes and hints at a

blind venture, and looking to their own selfish aggrandizement and

fame, then they had better look out; for I regard such persons as

greater enemies to their country and to mankind than the men who,

from a mistaken sense of State pride, have taken up muskets, and

fight us about as hard as we care about. In haste, but in

kindness, yours, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, July 27, 1882.

JOHN PARK, Mayor of Memphis, present.

Sir: Yours of July 24th is before me, and has received, as all

similar papers ever will, my careful and most respectful

consideration. I have the most unbounded respect for the civil

law, courts, and authorities, and shall do all in my power to

restore them to their proper use, viz., the protection of life,

liberty, and property.

Unfortunately, at this time, civil war prevails in the land, and

necessarily the military, for the time being, must be superior to

the civil authority, but it does not therefore destroy it. Civil

courts and executive officers should still exist and perform

duties, without which civil or municipal bodies would soon pass

into disrespect--an end to be avoided. I am glad to find in

Memphis a mayor and municipal authorities not only in existence,

but in the co-exercise of important functions, and I shall endeavor

to restore one or more civil tribunals for the arbitration of

contracts and punishment of crimes, which the military have neither

time nor inclination to interfere with. Among these, first in

importance is the maintenance of order, peace, and quiet, within

the jurisdiction of Memphis. To insure this, I will keep a strong

provost guard in the city, but will limit their duty to guarding

public property held or claimed by the United States, and for the

arrest and confinement of State prisoners and soldiers who are

disorderly or improperly away from their regiments. This guard

ought not to arrest citizens for disorder or minor crimes. This

should be done by the city police. I understand that the city

police is too weak in numbers to accomplish this perfectly, and I

therefore recommend that the City Council at once take steps to

increase this force to a number which, in their judgment, day and

night can enforce your ordinances as to peace, quiet, and order; so

that any change in our military dispositions will not have a

tendency to leave your people unguarded. I am willing to instruct

the provost guard to assist the police force when any combination

is made too strong for them to overcome; but the city police should

be strong enough for any probable contingency. The cost of

maintaining this police force must necessarily fall upon all

citizens equitably. I am not willing, nor do I think it good

policy, for the city authorities to collect the taxes belonging to

the State and County, as you recommend; for these would have to be

refunded. Better meet the expenses at once by a new tax on all

interested. Therefore, if you, on consultation with the proper

municipal body, will frame a good bill for the increase of your

police force, and for raising the necessary means for their support

and maintenance, I will approve it and aid you in the collection of

the tax. Of course, I cannot suggest how this tax should be laid,

but I think that it should be made uniform on all interests, real

estate, and personal property, including money, and merchandise.

All who are protected should share the expenses in proportion to

the interests involved. I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,

MEMPHIS, August 7, 1862.

Captain FITCH, Assistant Quartermaster, Memphis, Tennessee.

SIR: The duties devolving on the quartermaster of this post, in

addition to his legitimate functions, are very important and

onerous, and I am fully aware that the task is more than should

devolve on one man. I will endeavor to get you help in the person

of some commissioned officer, and, if possible, one under bond, as

he must handle large amounts of money in trust; but, for the

present, we most execute the duties falling to our share as well as

possible. On the subject of vacant houses, General Grant's orders

are: "Take possession of all vacant stores and houses in the city,

and have them rented at reasonable rates; rent to be paid monthly

in advance. These buildings, with their tenants, can be turned

over to proprietors on proof of loyalty; also take charge of such

as have been leased out by disloyal owners."

I understand that General Grant takes the rents and profits of this

class of real property under the rules and laws of war, and not

under the confiscation act of Congress; therefore the question of

title is not involved simply the possession, and the rents and

profits of houses belonging to our enemies, which are not vacant,

we hold in trust for them or the Government, according to the

future decisions of the proper tribunals.

Mr. McDonald, your chief agent in renting and managing this

business, called on me last evening and left with me written

questions, which it would take a volume to answer and a Webster to

elucidate; but as we can only attempt plain, substantial justice, I

will answer these questions as well as I can, briefly and to the

point.

First. When ground is owned by parties who have gone south, and

have leased the ground to parties now in the city who own the

improvements on the ground?

Answer. The United States takes the rents due the owner of the

land; does not disturb the owner of the improvements.

Second. When parties owning houses have gone south, and the tenant

has given his notes for the rent in advance?

Answer. Notes are mere evidence of the debt due landlord. The

tenant pays the rent to the quartermaster, who gives a bond of

indemnity against the notes representing the debt for the

particular rent.

Third. When the tenant has expended several months' rent in

repairs on the house?

Answer. Of course, allow all such credits on reasonable proof and

showing.

Fourth. When the owner has gone south, and parties here hold liens

on the property and are collecting the rents to satisfy their

liens?

Answer. The rent of a house can only be mortgaged to a person in

possession. If a loyal tenant be in possession and claim the rent

from himself as due to himself on some other debt, allow it; but,

if not in actual possession of the property, rents are not good

liens for a debt, but must be paid to the quartermaster.

Fifth. Of parties claiming foreign protection?

Answer. Many claim foreign protection who are not entitled to it.

If they are foreign subjects residing for business in this,

country, they are entitled to consideration and protection so

long as they obey the laws of the country. If they occupy

houses belonging to absent rebels, they must pay rent to the

quarter-master. If they own property, they must occupy it by

themselves, tenants, or servants.

Eighth. When houses are occupied and the owner has gone south,

leaving an agent to collect rent for his benefit?

Answer. Rent must be paid to the quartermaster. No agent can

collect and remit money south without subjecting himself to arrest

and trial for aiding and abetting the public enemy.

Ninth.. When houses are owned by loyal citizens, but are

unoccupied?

Answer. Such should not be disturbed, but it would be well to

advise them to have some servant at the house to occupy it.

Tenth. When parties who occupy the house are creditors of the

owner, who has gone south? Answer. You only look to collection of

rents. Any person who transmits money south is liable to arrest

and trial for aiding and abetting the enemy; but I do not think it

our business to collect debts other than rents.

Eleventh. When the parties who own the property have left the city

under General Hovey's Order No. 1, but are in the immediate

neighborhood, on their plantations?

Answer. It makes no difference where they are, so they are absent.

Twelfth. When movable property is found in stores that are closed?

Answer. The goods are security for the rent. If the owner of the

goods prefers to remove the goods to paying rent, he can do so.

Thirteenth. When the owner lives in town, and refuses to take the

oath of allegiance?

Answer. If the house be occupied, it does not fall under the

order. If the house be vacant, it does. The owner can recover his

property by taking the oath.

All persons in Memphis residing within our military lines are

presumed to be loyal, good citizens, and may at any moment be

called to serve on juries, posses comitatua, or other civil service

required by the Constitution and laws of our country. Should they

be called upon to do such duty, which would require them to

acknowledge their allegiance and subordination to the Constitution

of the United States, it would then be too late to refuse. So long

as they remain quiet and conform to these laws, they are entitled

to protection in their property and lives.

We have nothing to do with confiscation. We only deal with

possession, and therefore the necessity of a strict accountability,

because the United States assumes the place of trustee, and must

account to the rightful owner for his property, rents, and profits.

In due season courts will be established to execute the laws, the

confiscation act included, when we will be relieved of this duty

and trust. Until that time, every opportunity should be given to

the wavering and disloyal to return to their allegiance to the

Constitution of their birth or adoption. I am, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN.

Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, August 26,1862

Major-General GRANT, Corinth, Mississippi.

Sir: In pursuance of your request that I should keep you advised of

matters of interest here, in addition to the purely official

matters, I now write.

I dispatched promptly the thirteen companies of cavalry, nine of

Fourth Illinois, and four of Eleventh Illinois, to their respective

destinations, punctually on the 23d instant, although the order was

only received on the 22d. I received at the same time, from

Colonel Dickey, the notice that the bridge over Hatchie was burned,

and therefore I prescribed their order of march via Bolivar. They

started at 12 m. of the 23d, and I have no news of them since.

None of the cavalry ordered to me is yet heard from.

The guerrillas have destroyed several bridges over Wolf Creek; one

at Raleigh, on the road by which I had prescribed trade and travel

to and from the city. I have a strong guard at the lower bridge

over Wolf River, by which we can reach the country to the north of

that stream; but, as the Confederates have burned their own

bridges, I will hold them to my order, and allow no trade over any

other road than the one prescribed, using the lower or Randolph

road for our own convenience. I am still satisfied there is no

large force of rebels anywhere in the neighborhood. All the navy

gunboats are below except the St. Louis, which lies off the city.

When Commodore Davis passes down from Cairo, I will try to see him,

and get him to exchange the St. Louis for a fleeter boat not

iron-clad; one that can move up and down the river, to break up

ferry-boats and canoes, and to prevent all passing across the

river. Of course, in spite of all our efforts, smuggling is

carried on. We occasionally make hauls of clothing, gold-lace,

buttons, etc., but I am satisfied that salt and arms are got to the

interior somehow. I have addressed the Board of Trade a letter on

this point, which will enable us to control it better.

You may have been troubled at hearing reports of drunkenness here.

There was some after pay-day, but generally all is as quiet and

orderly as possible. I traverse the city every day and night, and

assert that Memphis is and has been as orderly a city as St. Louis,

Cincinnati, or New York.

Before the city authorities undertook to license saloons, there was

as much whiskey here as now, and it would take all my command as

customhouse inspectors, to break open all the parcels and packages

containing liquor. I can destroy all groggeries and shops where

soldiers get liquor just as we would in St. Louis.

The newspapers are accusing me of cruelty to the sick; as base a

charge as was ever made. I would not let the Sanitary Committee

carry off a boat-load of sick, because I have no right to. We have

good hospitals here, and plenty of them. Our regimental hospitals

are in the camps of the men, and the sick do much better there than

in the general hospitals; so say my division surgeon and the

regimental surgeons. The civilian doctors would, if permitted,

take away our entire command. General Curtis sends his sick up

here, but usually no nurses; and it is not right that nurses should

be taken from my command for his sick. I think that, when we are

endeavoring to raise soldiers and to instruct them, it is bad

policy to keep them at hospitals as attendants and nurses.

I send you Dr. Derby's acknowledgment that he gave the leave of

absence of which he was charged. I have placed him in arrest, in

obedience to General Halleck's orders, but he remains in charge of

the Overton Hospital, which is not full of patients.

The State Hospital also is not full, and I cannot imagine what Dr.

Derby wants with the Female Academy on Vance Street. I will see

him again, and now that he is the chief at Overton Hospital, I

think he will not want the academy. Still, if he does, under your

orders I will cause it to be vacated by the children and Sisters of

Mercy. They have just advertised for more scholars, and will be

sadly disappointed. If, however, this building or any other be

needed for a hospital, it must be taken; but really, in my heart, I

do not see what possible chance there is, under present

circumstances, of filling with patients the two large hospitals now

in use, besides the one asked for. I may, however, be mistaken in

the particular building asked for by Dr. Derby, and will go myself

to see.

The fort is progressing well, Captain Jenney having arrived.

Sixteen heavy guns are received, with a large amount of shot and

shell, but the platforms are not yet ready; still, if occasion

should arise for dispatch, I can put a larger force to work.

Captain Prime, when here, advised that the work should proceed

regularly under the proper engineer officers and laborers.

I am, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, September 4, 1862

Colonel J. C, KELTON, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters of

the army, Washington, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL: Please acknowledge to the major-general commanding

the receipt by me of his letter, and convey to him my assurances

that I have promptly modified my first instructions about cotton,

so as to conform to his orders. Trade in cotton is now free, but

in all else I endeavor so to control it that the enemy shall

receive no contraband goods, or any aid or comfort; still I feel

sure that the officers of steamboats are sadly tempted by high

prices to land salt and other prohibited articles at waypoints

along the river. This, too, in time will be checked. All seems

well here and hereabout; no large body of the enemy within striking

distance. A force of about two thousand, cavalry passed through

Grand Junction north last Friday, and fell on a detachment of the

Bolivar army at Middleburg, the result of which is doubtless

reported to you. As soon as I heard of the movement, I dispatched

a force to the southeast by way of diversion, and am satisfied that

the enemy's infantry and artillery fell back in consequence behind

the Tallahatchie. The weather is very hot, country very dry, and

dust as bad as possible. I hold my two divisions ready, with their

original complement of transportation, for field service. Of

course all things most now depend on events in front of Washington

and in Kentucky. The gunboat Eastport and four transports loaded

with prisoners of war destined for Vicksburg have been lying before

Memphis for two days, but are now steaming up to resume their

voyage. Our fort progresses well, but our guns are not yet

mounted. The engineers are now shaping the banquette to receive

platforms. I expect Captain Prime from Corinth in two or three

days.

I am, with great respect, yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, September 21, 1862

Editor Bulletin.

SIR: Your comments on the recent orders of Generals Halleck and

McClellan afford the occasion appropriate for me to make public the

fact that there is a law of Congress, as old as our Government

itself, but reenacted on the 10th of April, 1806, and in force ever

since. That law reads:

"All officers and soldiers are to behave themselves orderly in

quarters and on the march; and whoever shall commit any waste or

spoil, either in walks of trees, parks, warrens, fish-ponds, houses

and gardens, cornfields, inclosures or meadows, or shall

maliciously destroy any property whatever belonging to the

inhabitants of the United States, unless by order of the

commander-in-chief of the armies of said United States, shall

(besides such penalties as they are liable to by law) be punished

according to the nature and degree of the offense, by the judgment

of a general or regimental court-martial."

Such is the law of Congress; and the orders of the commander-

in-chief are, that officers or soldiers convicted of straggling and

pillaging shall be punished with death. These orders have not come

to me officially, but I have seen them in newspapers, and am

satisfied that they express the determination of the commander-

in-chief. Straggling and pillaging have ever been great military

crimes; and every officer and soldier in my command knows what

stress I have laid upon them, and that, so far as in my power lies,

I will punish them to the full extent of the law and orders.

The law is one thing, the execution of the law another. God

himself has commanded: "Thou shalt not kill," "thou shalt not

steal," "thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods," etc. Will

any one say these things are not done now as well as before these

laws were announced at Sinai. I admit the law to be that "no officer

or soldier of the United States shall commit waste or destruction

of cornfields, orchards, potato-patches, or any kind of pillage on

the property of friend or foe near Memphis," and that I stand

prepared to execute the law as far as possible.

No officer or soldier should enter the house or premises of any

peaceable citizen, no matter what his politics, unless on business;

and no such officer or soldier can force an entrance unless he have

a written order from a commanding officer or provost-marshal, which

written authority must be exhibited if demanded. When property

such as forage, building or other materials are needed by the

United States, a receipt will be given by the officer taking them,

which receipt should be presented to the quartermaster, who will

substitute therefor a regular voucher, to be paid-according to the

circumstances of the case. If the officer refuse to give such

receipt, the citizen may fairly infer that the property is

wrongfully taken, and he should, for his own protection, ascertain

the name, rank, and regiment of the officer, and report him in

writing. If any soldier commits waste or destruction, the person

whose property is thus wasted must find out the name, company, and

regiment of the actual transgressor. In order to punish there must

be a trial, and there must be testimony. It is not sufficient that

a general accusation be made, that soldiers are doing this or that.

I cannot punish my whole command, or a whole battalion, because one

or two bad soldiers do wrong. The punishment must reach the

perpetrators, and no one can identify them as well as the party who

is interested. The State of Tennessee does not hold itself

responsible for acts of larceny committed by her citizens, nor does

the United Staten or any other nation. These are individual acts

of wrong, and punishment can only be inflicted on the wrong-doer.

I know the difficulty of identifying particular soldiers, but

difficulties do not alter the importance of principles of justice.

They should stimulate the parties to increase their efforts to find

out the actual perpetrators of the crime.

Colonels of regiments and commanders of corps are liable to severe

punishment for permitting their men to leave their camps to commit

waste or destruction; but I know full well that many of the acts

attributed to soldiers are committed by citizens and negroes, and

are charged to soldiers because of a desire to find fault with

them; but this only reacts upon the community and increases the

mischief. While every officer would willingly follow up an

accusation against any one or more of his men whose names or

description were given immediately after the discovery of the act,

he would naturally resent any general charge against his good men,

for the criminal conduct of a few bad ones.

I have examined into many of the cases of complaint made in this

general way, and have felt mortified that our soldiers should do

acts which are nothing more or less than stealing, but I was

powerless without some clew whereby to reach the rightful party. I

know that the great mass of our soldiers would scorn to steal or

commit crime, and I will not therefore entertain vague and general

complaints, but stand, prepared always to follow up any reasonable

complaint when the charge is definite and the names of witnesses

furnished.

I know, moreover, in some instances when our soldiers are

complained of, that they have been insulted by sneering remarks

about "Yankees," "Northern barbarians," "Lincoln's hirelings,"

etc. People who use such language must seek redress through some

one else, for I will not tolerate insults to our country or cause.

When people forget their obligations to a Government that made them

respected among the nations of the earth, and speak contemptuously

of the flag which is the silent emblem of that country, I will not

go out of my way to protect them or their property. I will punish

the soldiers for trespass or waste if adjudged by a court-martial,

because they disobey orders; but soldiers are men and citizens as

well as soldiers, and should promptly resent any insult to their

country, come from what quarter it may. I mention this phase

because it is too common. Insult to a soldier does not justify

pillage, but it takes from the officer the disposition he would

otherwise feel to follow up the inquiry and punish the wrong-doers.

Again, armies in motion or stationary must commit some waste.

Flankers must let down fences and cross fields; and, when an attack

is contemplated or apprehended, a command will naturally clear the

ground of houses, fences, and trees. This is waste, but is the

natural consequence of war, chargeable on those who caused the war.

So in fortifying a place, dwelling-houses must be taken, materials

used, even wasted, and great damage done, which in the end may

prove useless. This, too, is an expense not chargeable to us, but

to those who made the war; and generally war is destruction and

nothing else.

We must bear this in mind, that however peaceful things look, we

are really at war; and much that looks like waste or destruction is

only the removal of objects that obstruct our fire, or would afford

cover to an enemy.

This class of waste must be distinguished from the wanton waste

committed by army-stragglers, which is wrong, and can be punished

by the death-penalty if proper testimony can be produced.

Yours, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

Satisfied that, in the progress of the war, Memphis would become an

important depot, I pushed forward the construction of Fort

Pickering, kept most of the troops in camps back of the city, and

my own headquarters remained in tents on the edge of the city, near

Mr. Moon's house, until, on the approach of winter, Mrs. Sherman

came down with the children to visit me, when I took a house nearer

the fort.

All this time battalion and brigade drills were enforced, so that,

when the season approached for active operations farther south, I

had my division in the best possible order, and about the 1st of

November it was composed as follows:

First Brigade, Brigadier-General M. L. SMITH--Eighth Missouri,

Colonel G. A. Smith; Sixth Missouri, Colonel Peter E. Bland; One

Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, Colonel George B. Hoge;

Fifty-fourth Ohio, Colonel T. Kilby Smith; One Hundred and

Twentieth Illinois, Colonel G. W. McKeaig.

Second Brigade, Colonel JOHN ADAIR McDOWELL.--Sixth Iowa,

Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Corse; Fortieth Illinois, Colonel J. W.

Booth; Forty-sixth Ohio, Colonel O. C. Walcutt; Thirteenth United

States Infantry, First Battalion, Major D. Chase.

Third Brigade, Brigadier-General J. W. DENVER.--Forty-eighth Ohio,

Colonel P. J. Sullivan; Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel W. S. Jones;

Seventieth Ohio, Colonel J. R. Cockerill.

Fourth Brigade, Colonel DAVID STUART.--Fifty-fifth Illinois,

Colonel O. Malmburg; Fifty-seventh Ohio, Colonel W. Mungen;

Eighty-third Indiana, Colonel B. Spooner; One Hundred and Sixteenth

Illinois, Colonel Tupper; One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois,

Lieutenant-Colonel Eldridge.

Fifth Brigade, Colonel R. P. BUCKLAND.--Seventy-second Ohio,

Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. C. Loudon; Thirty-second Wisconsin,

Colonel J. W. Howe; Ninety-third Indiana, Colonel Thomas;

Ninety-third Illinois, Major J. M. Fisher.

Subsequently, Brigadier-General J. G. Lauman arrived at Memphis,

and I made up a sixth brigade, and organized these six brigades

into three divisions, under Brigadier-Generals M. L. Smith, J. W.

Denver, and J. G. Lauman.

About the 17th of November I received an order from General Grant,

dated:

LAGRANGE, November 16, 1862.

Meet me at Columbus, Kentucky, on Thursday next. If you have a

good map of the country south of you, take it up with you.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

I started forthwith by boat, and met General Grant, who had reached

Columbus by the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee. He explained to

me that he proposed to move against Pemberton, then intrenched on a

line behind the Tallahatchie River below Holly Springs; that he

would move on Holly Springs and Abberville, from Grand Junction;

that McPherson, with the troops at Corinth, would aim to make

junction with him at Holly Springs; and that he wanted me to leave

in Memphis a proper garrison, and to aim for the Tallahatchie, so

as to come up on his right by a certain date. He further said that

his ultimate object was to capture Vicksburg, to open the

navigation of the Mississippi River, and that General Halleck had

authorized him to call on the troops in the Department of Arkansas,

then commanded by General S. R. Curtis, for cooperation. I

suggested to him that if he would request General Curtis to send an

expedition from some point on the Mississippi, near Helena, then

held in force, toward Grenada, to the rear of Pemberton, it would

alarm him for the safety of his communications, and would assist us

materially in the proposed attack on his front. He authorized me

to send to the commanding officer at Helena a request to that

effect, and, as soon as I reached Memphis, I dispatched my aide,

Major McCoy, to Helena, who returned, bringing me a letter from

General Frederick Steele, who had just reached Helena with

Osterhaus's division, and who was temporarily in command, General

Curtis having gone to St. Louis. This letter contained the

assurance that he "would send from Friar's Point a large force

under Brigadier-General A. P. Hovey in the direction of Grenada,

aiming to reach the Tallahatchie at Charleston, on the next Monday,

Tuesday, or Wednesday (December 1st) at furthest." My command was

appointed to start on Wednesday, November 24th, and meantime

Major-General S. A. Hurlbut, having reported for duty, was assigned

to the command of Memphis, with four regiments of infantry one

battery of artillery, two companies of Thielman's cavalry and the

certain prospect of soon receiving a number of new regiments, known

to be en route.

I marched out of Memphis punctually with three small divisions,

taking different roads till we approached the Tallahatchie, when we

converged on Wyatt to cross the river, there a bold, deep stream,

with a newly-constructed fort behind. I had Grierson's Sixth

Illinois Cavalry with me, and with it opened communication with

General Grant when we were abreast of Holly Springs. We reached

Wyatt on the 2d day of December without the least opposition, and

there learned that Pemberton's whole army had fallen back to the

Yalabusha near Grenada, in a great measure by reason of the

exaggerated reports concerning the Helena force, which had reached

Charleston; and some of General Hovey's cavalry, under General

Washburn, having struck the railroad in the neighborhood of

Coffeeville, naturally alarmed General Pemberton for the safety of

his communications, and made him let go his Tallahatchie line with

all the forts which he had built at great cost in labor. We had to

build a bridge at Wyatt, which consumed a couple of days, and on

the 5th of December my whole command was at College Hill, ten miles

from Oxford, whence I reported to General Grant in Oxford.

On the 8th I received the following letter:

OXFORD MISSISSIPPI, December 8, 1862--Morning

General SHERMAN, College Hill.

DEAR GENERAL: The following is a copy of dispatch just received

from Washington:

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1862--12M

General GRANT:

The capture of Grenada may change our plans in regard to Vicksburg.

You will move your troops as you may deem best to accomplish the

great object in view. You will retain, till further orders, all

troops of General Curtis now in your department. Telegraph to

General Allen in St. Louis for all steamboats you may require. Ask

Porter to cooperate. Telegraph what are your present plans.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in.-Chief.

I wish you would come over this evening and stay to-night, or come

in the morning. I would like to talk with you about this matter.

My notion is to send two divisions back to Memphis, and fix upon a

day when they should effect a landing, and press from here with

this command at the proper time to cooperate. If I do not do this

I will move our present force to Grenada, including Steele's,

repairing road as we proceed, and establish a depot of provisions

there. When a good ready is had, to move immediately on Jackson,

Mississippi, cutting loose from the road. Of the two plans I look

most favorably on the former.

Come over and we will talk this matter over.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

I repaired at once to Oxford, and found General Grant in a large

house with all his staff, and we discussed every possible chance.

He explained to me that large reenforcements had been promised,

which would reach Memphis very soon, if not already there; that the

entire gunboat fleet, then under the command of Admiral D. D.

Porter, would cooperate; that we could count on a full division

from the troops at Helena; and he believed that, by a prompt

movement, I could make a lodgment up the Yazoo and capture

Vicksburg from the rear; that its garrison was small, and he, at

Oxford, would so handle his troops as to hold Pemberton away from

Vicksburg. I also understood that, if Pemberton should retreat

south, he would follow him up, and would expect to find me at the

Yazoo River, if not inside of Vicksburg. I confess, at that moment

I did not dream that General McClernand, or anybody else, was

scheming for the mere honor of capturing Vicksburg. We knew at the

time that General Butler had been reenforced by General Banks at

New Orleans, and the latter was supposed to be working his way

up-stream from New Orleans, while we were working down. That day

General Grant dispatched to General Halleck, in Washington, as

follows:

OXFORD, December 8, 1862.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

General Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi.

He will have a force of about forty thousand men; will land above

Vicksburg (up the Yazoo, if practicable), and out the Mississippi

Central road and the road running east from Vicksburg, where they

cross Black River. I will cooperate from here, my movements

depending on those of the enemy. With the large cavalry force now

at my command, I will be able to have them show themselves at

different points on the Tallahatchie and Yalabusha; and, when an

opportunity occurs, make a real attack. After cutting the two

roads, General Sherman's movements to secure the end desired will

necessarily be left to his judgment.

I will occupy this road to Coffeeville.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

I was shown this dispatch before it was sent, and afterward the

general drew up for me the following letter of instructions in his

own handwriting, which I now possess:

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS

DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,

OXFORD, Mississippi, December 8, 1862.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Right Wing Army In the

Field, present.

GENERAL: You will proceed with as little delay as practicable to

Memphis, Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present

command. On your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all

the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at

present east of the Mississippi River, and organize them into

brigades and divisions in your own way.

As soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity

of Vicksburg, and, with the cooperation of the gunboat fleet under

command of Flag-Officer Porter, proceed to the reduction of that

place in such manner as circumstances and your own judgment may

dictate.

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary

to take, will be left entirely to yourself.

The quartermaster in St. Louis will be instructed to send you

transportation for thirty thousand men. Should you still find

yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make

up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of

Memphis.

On arriving in Memphis put yourself in communication with Admiral

Porter, and arrange with him for his cooperation.

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will

embark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold the

forces here in readiness to cooperate with you in such manner as

the movements of the enemy may make necessary.

Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient

officer and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the

siege-guns, and what ever cavalry force may be there.

One regiment of infantry and at least a section of artillery will

also be left at Friar's Point or Delta, to protect the stores of

the cavalry post that will be left there. Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

I also insert here another letter, dated the 14th instant, sent

afterward to me at Memphis, which completes all instructions

received by me governing the first movement against Vicksburg:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE

OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, December 14, 1862

Major-General SHERMAN, commanding, etc.,

Memphis, Tennessee.

I have not had one word from Grierson since he left, and am getting

uneasy about him. I hope General Gorman will give you no

difficulty about retaining the troops on this side the river, and

Steele to command them. The twenty-one thousand men you have, with

the twelve thousand from Helena, will make a good force. The enemy

are as yet on the Yalabusha. I am pushing down on them slowly, but

so as to keep up the impression of a continuous move. I feel

particularly anxious to have the Helena cavalry on this side of the

river; if not now, at least after you start. If Gorman will send

them, instruct them where to go and how to communicate with me. My

headquarters will probably be in Coffeeville one week hence.... In

the mean time I will order transportation, etc.... It would be well

if you could have two or three small boats suitable for navigating

the Yazoo. It may become necessary for me to look to that base for

supplies before we get through....

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

When we rode to Oxford from College Hill, there happened a little

circumstance which seems worthy of record. While General Van Dorn

had his headquarters in Holly Springs, viz., in October, 1862, he

was very short of the comforts and luxuries of life, and resorted

to every possible device to draw from the abundant supplies in

Memphis. He had no difficulty whatever in getting spies into the

town for information, but he had trouble in getting bulky supplies

out through our guards, though sometimes I connived at his supplies

of cigars, liquors, boots, gloves, etc., for his individual use;

but medicines and large supplies of all kinds were confiscated, if

attempted to be passed out. As we rode that morning toward Oxford,

I observed in a farmer's barn-yard a wagon that looked like a city

furniture-wagon with springs. We were always short of wagons, so I

called the attention of the quartermaster, Colonel J. Condit Smith,

saying, "There is a good wagon; go for it." He dropped out of the

retinue with an orderly, and after we had ridden a mile or so he

overtook us, and I asked him, "What luck?" He answered, "All

right; I have secured that wagon, and I also got another," and

explained that he had gone to the farmer's house to inquire about

the furniture-wagon, when the farmer said it did not belong to him,

but to some party in Memphis, adding that in his barn was another

belonging to the same party. They went to the barn, and there

found a handsome city hearse, with pall and plumes. The farmer

said they had had a big funeral out of Memphis, but when it reached

his house, the coffin was found to contain a fine assortment of

medicines for the use of Van Dorn's army. Thus under the pretense

of a first-class funeral, they had carried through our guards the

very things we had tried to prevent. It was a good trick, but

diminished our respect for such pageants afterward.

As soon as I was in possession of General Grant's instructions of

December 8th, with a further request that I should dispatch Colonel

Grierson, with his cavalry, across by land to Helena, to notify

General Steele of the general plan, I returned to College Hill,

selected the division of Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith to

return with me to Memphis; started Grierson on his errand to

Helena, and ordered Generals Denver and Lauman to report to General

Grant for further orders. We started back by the most direct

route, reached Memphis by noon of December 12th, and began

immediately the preparations for the Vicksburg movement. There I

found two irregular divisions which had arrived at Memphis in my

absence, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General A. J. Smith

and Brigadier-General George W. Morgan. These were designated the

First and Third Divisions, leaving the Second Division of Morgan Z.

Smith to retain its original name and number.

I also sent orders, in the name of General Grant, to General

Gorman, who meantime had replaced General Steele in command of

Helena, in lieu of the troops which had been east of the

Mississippi and had returned, to make up a strong division to

report to me on my way down. This division was accordingly

organized, and was commanded by Brigadier-General Frederick Steele,

constituting my Fourth Division.

Meantime a large fleet of steamboats was assembling from St. Louis

and Cairo, and Admiral Porter dropped down to Memphis with his

whole gunboat fleet, ready to cooperate in the movement. The

preparations were necessarily hasty in the extreme, but this was

the essence of the whole plan, viz., to reach Vicksburg as it were

by surprise, while General Grant held in check Pemberton's army

about Grenada, leaving me to contend only with the smaller garrison

of Vicksburg and its well-known strong batteries and defenses. On

the 19th the Memphis troops were embarked, and steamed down to

Helena, where on the 21st General Steele's division was also

embarked; and on the 22d we were all rendezvoused at Friar's Point,

in the following order, viz.:

Steamer Forest Queen, general headquarters, and battalion

Thirteenth United States Infantry.

First Division, Brigadier-General A. J. SMITH.--Steamers Des Arc,

division headquarters and escort; Metropolitan, Sixth Indiana; J.

H. Dickey, Twenty-third Wisconsin; J. C. Snow, Sixteenth Indiana;

Hiawatha, Ninety-sixth Ohio; J. S. Pringle, Sixty-seventh Indiana;

J. W. Cheeseman, Ninth Kentucky; R. Campbell, Ninety-seventh

Indiana; Duke of Argyle, Seventy-seventh Illinois; City of Alton,

One Hundred and Eighth and Forty-eighth Ohio; City of Louisiana,

Mercantile Battery; Ohio Belle, Seventeenth Ohio Battery; Citizen,

Eighty-third Ohio; Champion, commissary-boat; General Anderson,

Ordnance.

Second Division,, Brigadier-General M. L. SMITH.--Steamers

Chancellor, headquarters, and Thielman's cavalry; Planet, One

Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois; City of Memphis, Batteries A and B

(Missouri Artillery), Eighth Missouri, and section of Parrott guns;

Omaha, Fifty-seventh Ohio; Sioux City, Eighty-third Indiana; Spread

Eagle, One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois; Ed. Walsh, One

Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois; Westmoreland, Fifty-fifth

Illinois, headquarters Fourth Brigade; Sunny South, Fifty-fourth

Ohio; Universe, Sixth Missouri; Robert Allen, commissary-boat.

Third Division, Brigadier-General G. W. MORGAN.--Steamers Empress,

division headquarters; Key West, One Hundred and Eighteenth

Illinois; Sam Gaty, Sixty-ninth Indiana; Northerner, One Hundred

and Twentieth Ohio; Belle Peoria, headquarters Second Brigade, two

companies Forty-ninth Ohio, and pontoons; Die Vernon, Third

Kentucky; War Eagle, Forty-ninth Indiana (eight companies), and

Foster's battery; Henry von Phul, headquarters Third Brigade, and

eight companies Sixteenth Ohio; Fanny Bullitt, One Hundred and

Fourteenth Ohio, and Lamphere's battery; Crescent City,

Twenty-second Kentucky and Fifty-fourth Indiana; Des Moines,

Forty-second Ohio; Pembina, Lamphere's and Stone's batteries; Lady

Jackson, commissary-boat.

Fourth Division, Brigadier-General FREDERICK STEELE--Steamers

Continental, headquarters, escort and battery; John J. Roe, Fourth

and Ninth Iowa; Nebraska, Thirty-first Iowa; Key West, First Iowa

Artillery; John Warner, Thirteenth Illinois; Tecumseh, Twenty-sixth

Iowa; Decatur, Twenty-eighth Iowa; Quitman, Thirty-fourth Iowa;

Kennett, Twenty ninth Missouri; Gladiator, Thirtieth Missouri;

Isabella, Thirty-first Missouri; D. G. Taylor, quartermaster's

stores and horses; Sucker State, Thirty-second Missouri; Dakota,

Third Missouri; Tutt, Twelfth Missouri Emma, Seventeenth Missouri;

Adriatic, First Missouri; Meteor, Seventy-sixth Ohio; Polar Star,

Fifty-eighth Ohio.

At the same time were communicated the following instructions:

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING, THIRTEENTH ARMY Corps

FOREST QUEEN, December 23, 1882.

To Commanders of Divisions, Generals F. STEELE, GEORGE W. MORGAN,

A.J. SMITH, and M. L. SMITH

With this I hand to each of you a copy of a map, compiled from the

best sources, and which in the main is correct. It is the same

used by Admiral Porter and myself. Complete military success can

only be accomplished by united action on some general plan,

embracing usually a large district of country. In the present

instance, our object is to secure the navigation of the Mississippi

River and its main branches, and to hold them as military channels

of communication and for commercial purposes. The river, above

Vicksburg, has been gained by conquering the country to its rear,

rendering its possession by our enemy useless and unsafe to him,

and of great value to us. But the enemy still holds the river from

Vicksburg to Baton Rouge, navigating it with his boats, and the

possession of it enables him to connect his communications and

routes of supply, east and west. To deprive him of this will be a

severe blow, and, if done effectually, will be of great advantage

to us, and probably, the most decisive act of the war. To

accomplish this important result we are to act our part--an

important one of the great whole. General Banks, with a large

force, has reinforced General Butler in Louisiana, and from that

quarter an expedition, by water and land, is coming northward.

General Grant, with the Thirteenth Army Corps, of which we compose

the right wing, is moving southward. The naval squadron (Admiral

Porter) is operating with his gunboat fleet by water, each in

perfect harmony with the other.

General Grant's left and centre were at last accounts approaching

the Yalabusha, near Grenada, and the railroad to his rear, by which

he drew his supplies, was reported to be seriously damaged. This

may disconcert him somewhat, but only makes more important our line

of operations. At the Yalabusha General Grant may encounter the

army of General Pemberton, the same which refused him battle on the

line of the Tallahatchie, which was strongly fortified; but, as he

will not have time to fortify it, he will hardly stand there; and,

in that event, General Grant will immediately advance down the high

ridge between the Big Black and Yazoo, and will expect to meet us

on the Yazoo and receive from us the supplies which he needs, and

which he knows we carry along. Parts of this general plan are to

cooperate with the naval squadron in the reduction of Vicksburg; to

secure possession of the land lying between the Yazoo and Big

Black; and to act in concert with General Grant against Pemberton's

forces, supposed to have Jackson, Mississippi, as a point of

concentration. Vicksburg is doubtless very strongly fortified,

both against the river and land approaches. Already the gunboats

have secured the Yazoo up for twenty-three miles, to a fort on the

Yazoo at Haines's Bluff, giving us a choice for a landing-place at

some point up the Yazoo below this fort, or on the island which

lies between Vicksburg and the present mouth of the Yazoo. (See

map [b, c, d], Johnson's plantation.)

But, before any actual collision with the enemy, I purpose,

after our whole land force is rendezvoused at Gaines's Landing,

Arkansas, to proceed in order to Milliken's Bend (a), and there

dispatch a brigade, without wagons or any incumbrances whatever, to

the Vicksburg & Shreveport Railroad (at h and k), to destroy that

effectually, and to cut off that fruitful avenue of supply; then to

proceed to the mouth of the Yazoo, and, after possessing ourselves

of the latest and most authentic information from naval officers

now there, to land our whole force on the Mississippi side, and

then to reach the point where the Vicksburg & Jackson Railroad

crosses the Big Black (f); after which to attack Vicksburg by land,

while the gun-boats assail it by water. It may be necessary

(looking to Grant's approach), before attacking Vicksburg, to

reduce the battery at Haine's Bluff first, so as to enable some of

the lighter gunboats and transports to ascend the Yazoo and

communicate with General Grant. The detailed manner of

accomplishing all these results will be communicated in due season,

and these general points are only made known at this time, that

commanders may study the maps, and also that in the event of

non-receipt of orders all may act in perfect concert by following

the general movement, unless specially detached.

You all now have the same map, so that no mistakes or confusion

need result from different names of localities. All possible

preparations as to wagons, provisions, axes, and intrenching-tools,

should be made in advance, so that when we do land there will be no

want of them. When we begin to act on shore, we must do the work

quickly and effectually. The gunboats under Admiral Porter will do

their full share, and I feel every assurance that the army will not

fall short in its work.

Division commanders may read this to regimental commanders, and

furnish brigade commanders a copy. They should also cause as many

copies of the map to be made on the same scale as possible, being

very careful in copying the names.

The points marked e and g (Allan's and Mount Albans) are evidently

strategical points that will figure in our future operations, and

these positions should be well studied.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

The Mississippi boats were admirably calculated for handling

troops, horses, guns, stores, etc., easy of embarkation and

disembarkation, and supplies of all kinds were abundant, except

fuel. For this we had to rely on wood, but most of the wood-yards,

so common on the river before the war, had been exhausted, so that

we had to use fence-rails, old dead timber, the logs of houses,

etc. Having abundance of men and plenty of axes, each boat could

daily procure a supply.

In proceeding down the river, one or more of Admiral Porter's

gunboats took the lead; others were distributed throughout the

column, and some brought up the rear. We manoeuvred by divisions

and brigades when in motion, and it was a magnificent sight as we

thus steamed down the river. What few inhabitants remained at the

plantations on the river-bank were unfriendly, except the slaves;

some few guerrilla-parties infested the banks, but did not dare to

molest so, strong a force as I then commanded.

We reached Milliken's Bend on Christmas-day, when I detached one

brigade (Burbridge's), of A. J. Smith's division, to the southwest,

to break up the railroad leading from Vicksburg toward Shreveport,

Louisiana. Leaving A. J. Smith's division there to await the

return of Burbridge, the remaining three divisions proceeded, on

the 26th, to the mouth of the Yazoo, and up that river to

Johnson's plantation, thirteen miles, and there disembarked

Steele's division above the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou, Morgans

division near the house of Johnson (which had been burned by the

gunboats on a former occasion), and M. L. Smith's just below. A.

J. Smith's division arrived the next night, and disembarked below

that of M. L. Smith. The place of our disembarkation was in fact

an island, separated from the high bluff known as Walnut Hills, on

which the town of Vicksburg stands, by a broad and shallow

bayou-evidently an old channel of the Yazoo. On our right was

another wide bayou, known as Old River; and on the left still

another, much narrower, but too deep to be forded, known as

Chickasaw Bayou. All the island was densely wooded, except

Johnson's plantation, immediately on the bank of the Yazoo, and a

series of old cotton-fields along Chickasaw Bayou. There was a

road from Johnson's plantation directly to Vicksburg, but it

crossed numerous bayous and deep swamps by bridges, which had been

destroyed; and this road debouched on level ground at the foot of

the Vicksburg bluff, opposite strong forts, well prepared and

defended by heavy artillery. On this road I directed General A. J.

Smith's division, not so much by way of a direct attack as a

diversion and threat.