When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this:

the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth; the line

of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north of

that river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were

held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande.

East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphis

and Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the

line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the

State of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands; and that part of

old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also

held. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia;

Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly

and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in South

Carolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola

in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent,

was still in the hands of the enemy.

Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of

the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the

Alleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force about

Chattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but the

commanders all reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders. This

arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of

communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these

different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden

or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without

awaiting the orders of the division commander.

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the same

relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war

began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. It

is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia

and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been

gained by either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity as

had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and

Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in

Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the

National army, sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance,

I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press if

not by the Southern generals. The Northern press, as a whole, did not

discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success

and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in

their desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelming

success of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally express

dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were

not more complete.

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines of

communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army of

Northern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river,

was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general

in the Confederate army. The country back to the James River is cut up

with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except

where bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow,

and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy was not, of course,

unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the

way back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position

they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into.

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through

such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System and

discipline were both essential to its accomplishment.

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four

of them in the West had been concentrated into a single military

division. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had no

territorial limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders.

Before this time these various armies had acted separately and

independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of

depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively

engaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of

the Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the line

described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing;

the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and all

the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. Some of these latter

were occupying positions from which they could not render service

proportionate to their numerical strength. All such were depleted to

the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against

blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were

abandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to the

Army of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore in

command. It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave his

department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active

service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so.

Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands,

were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of

the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest

moment the roads would permit was the problem.

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of

it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General

Burnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was an

admirable position for such a reinforcement. The corps could be brought

at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it

could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North

Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In fact

Burnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intended

for such an expedition up to the last moment.

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against

the Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as we

have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of

Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south

bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second,

under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to

Sherman who was still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies the

Confederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to

feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond

to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the

West with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what

we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any

territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the

Northern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was

the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it

was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the

James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as

when remaining at them. Better indeed, for they forced the enemy to

guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and

with a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well be sent out

to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a

storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arranged

for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move

from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective

points. (*23) Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from the

mouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, the

Virginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy

would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see

them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so

much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley of

Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an

invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining

near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of

stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River,

having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective.

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This was

the first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order as to

the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views.

They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct

(*24), in writing, before leaving.

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general

shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not

yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against his

confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his

services had been such that he should be rewarded. My wishes were now

reluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of

the corps under General Butler. I was not long in finding out that the

objections to Smith's promotion were well founded.

In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my

dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the

cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of

accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. I

said I wanted the very best man in the army for that command. Halleck

was present and spoke up, saying: "How would Sheridan do?" I replied:

"The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted.

Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned

to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac. This

relieved General Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on that

officer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient

as any other cavalry commander.

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the

troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile

to be his objective.

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the

Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left.

Each plan presented advantages. (*25) If by his right--my left--the

Potomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling

distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the

James River. But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army

north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in

following. A movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but

all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition

we started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned

when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was

considered. The country over which we would have to pass was so

exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry

everything with us.

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle.

In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern

border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union

City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks

of the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city he failed to capture

the forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of

Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against

him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.

Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got

my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort

Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the

Mississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored

troops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troops

fought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in his

dispatches to tell what he did with them.

"The river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for

two hundred yards. The approximate loss was upward of five hundred

killed, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twenty

killed. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern

people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." Subsequently

Forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks

humanity to read.

At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to Halleck that

Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. It

would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's

command. If success attended our arms both places, and others too,

would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by

Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the

Executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my

views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the

garrison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, but

directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was essential

because New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter.

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my

promotion to general command. I had opposed the movement strenuously,

but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. By

direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten

thousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted back

badly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far

that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and

turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas,

to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas. Orders were given

accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended

in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged

and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the

general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get back

in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smith

returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun.

The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number

required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf,

were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his

expedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsible

except for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. He

opposed the expedition.

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in

fixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis to

occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock. Meade

was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance.

On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the

4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and

get as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on from

there to accomplish the task given him. He was also notified that

reinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would be

forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at

Richmond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready

to advance on the 5th. Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to move

in conjunction with the others.

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidan

to the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated by

moving the army there on transports. Richmond was fortified and

intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than

equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession of

Lee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his army

Richmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outside

of his stronghold than in it. If the Army of the Potomac had been moved

bodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of his

forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to reinforce

it, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then, too, I ordered a

move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the James

River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river.

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the

4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with

the Secretary of War and President. On the last occasion, a few days

before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my

part in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a long

time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in

the rear of the Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on this

occasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud of

dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on

a charge. Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries

made as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station,

and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full

speed in pursuit of Federal cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, no

doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. I

was on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard.

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally,

and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I had

supposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could

endure any amount of physical exercise. He is able, and thoroughly

honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who

could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of

an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he

did without losing his entire command.

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with the

President before reaching the James River. He had of course become

acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all

along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. I

explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops

to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent

incursions into the Northern States. These troops could perform this

service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by

advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them

back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. His answer was:

"Oh, yes! I see that. As we say out West, if a man can't skin he must

hold a leg while somebody else does."

There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign of

which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression

further on I will mention it here.

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B.

Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some

distance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I think, to

Spottsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as

a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of

writing a history of the war when it was over. He assured me--and I

have no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present as

a correspondent of the press. I expressed an entire willingness to have

him (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as

a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the

information he could give. We received Richmond papers with about as

much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers

were received with equal regularity by the Confederates. It was

desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies

of the enemy within our lines.

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters,

and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all events

he was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with some

paper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either

expressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as

to the character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day of

our introduction to the present that I recollect. He accompanied us,

however, for a time at least.

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th of

May) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at

my headquarters. A short time before midnight I gave him verbal

instructions for the night. Three days later I read in a Richmond paper

a verbatim report of these instructions.

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the

second, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my tent

for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. Both

his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the

tent, thinking our conversation should be private. There was a stump a

little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire.

One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a man

seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the

conversation between Meade and myself. He called the attention of

Colonel Rowley to it. The latter immediately took the man by the

shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he

was doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the "historian," and his

replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was

warned against further eaves-dropping.

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General Meade came

to my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton,

who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him

to be shot that afternoon. I promptly ordered the prisoner to be

released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to

return again on pain of punishment.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION

--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID.

The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single

object. They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible

over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, was

the main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an

important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at,

and was therefore almost an independent objective. It was of less

importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would not

produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as

would the possession of Richmond, Lee and his army. All other troops

were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. This was

the plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, the

method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor

detached but co-operative columns.

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do

on the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans

whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand

with Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile.

Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true,

according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work

being done in the valley I received instead the following announcement

from Halleck: "Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will do

nothing but run; never did anything else." The enemy had intercepted

him about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six

guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand.

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two columns.

Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other

proved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell his western column

advanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, and

with more happy results. They reached the Virginia and Tennessee

Railroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up

several miles of road and burning the bridge over New River. Having

accomplished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs and

there awaited further orders.

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalry

and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River.

His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if

threatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, and

Butler by daylight was far up the James River. He seized City Point and

Bermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much

to the surprise of the enemy.

This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my

instructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as

his objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim to

fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but should

Lee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of the

armies of the Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directed

to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at

as early a date as possible.

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, and

on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the Weldon

Railroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between

Petersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latter

efforts. He made no great effort to establish himself on that road and

neglected to attack Petersburg, which was almost defenceless. About the

11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff,

about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the mean time

Beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. On the 16th he attacked

Butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very

materially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinct

factor in the campaign. I afterward ordered a portion of it to join the

Army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man his

works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a

threatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital.

The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, the

James and Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a

large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single

intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent

of territory which it thoroughly protected. His right was protected by

the James River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by their

junction--the two streams uniting near by. The bends of the two streams

shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it

increased the area which the line inclosed.

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer,

General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James to

inspect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safely

make an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine,

now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his

position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his

troops and having them brought round by water to White House to join me

and reinforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported the

position very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do the

latter with great security; but that General Butler could not move from

where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. He said that the

general occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers which

was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it

for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could

do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out

from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad to

the rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it was

impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across

the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his pencil

and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like

a bottle and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neck

represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line

immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if

Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but,

as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a

small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as being

very expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hasty

sketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent

report I used that expression without adding quotation marks, never

thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--as

this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler and, I

know, very much to my own. I found afterwards that this was mentioned

in the notes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown to

me, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though

against my wishes.

I make this statement here because, although I have often made it

before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it

will correct history; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may

have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly

serving their country during the trying period of the war for the

preservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his very

earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally

to the suppression of the rebellion.

The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of

in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so

intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in

which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged.

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great Atlanta campaign,

which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements

preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, I

will briefly mention Sheridan's first raid upon Lee's communications

which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not

specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant

execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign.

By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectly

observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when I

shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapidan.

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and when we

were moving on Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose

from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army and

attack his cavalry: to cut the two roads--one running west through

Gordonsville, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and,

when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to

the James River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This move took

him past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given in

writing through Meade.

The object of this move was three-fold. First, if successfully

executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of

supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own

use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would draw

the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear

and trains than by remaining with the army. Third, his absence would

save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from

Fredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylight

the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. It was

sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac.

The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond. Before night Stuart,

commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command.

But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a

station on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Union

prisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road and used and

destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores.

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards Richmond, abandoned

the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an

exhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at Yellow

Tavern, only about six miles north of the city. Sheridan destroyed the

railroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in

Stuart's front. A severe engagement ensued in which the losses were

heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally

wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured.

Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and could, no

doubt, have passed through the inner ones. But having no supports near

he could not have remained. After caring for his wounded he struck for

the James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to rest

his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them.

He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in the

morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. He

then turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by Meadow

Bridge. He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry,

reorganized, occupying the opposite side. The panic created by his

first entrance within the outer works of Richmond having subsided troops

were sent out to attack his rear.

He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could

have extricated themselves. The defences of Richmond, manned, were to

the right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and

the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Richmond. This

force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, while

Sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily

built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced

a crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemy

was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in

bridge building.

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chickahominy. On

the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the

James River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself into

communication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies he

wanted to be furnished.

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did not

know where either this or Lee's army was now. Great caution therefore

had to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, after resting his

command for three days, he started on his return. He moved by the way

of White House. The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by the

enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed

over it. On the 22d he was at Aylett's on the Matapony, where he

learned the position of the two armies. On the 24th he joined us on the

march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield.

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army:

encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all;

recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many of

the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war;

destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance

by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks.

CHAPTER XLIX.

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF GENERAL

MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to Washington, as

already stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties of

his new command. His military division was now composed of four

departments and embraced all the territory west of the Alleghany

Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State of

Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was the

Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next was the

Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding; the third the

Department of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding; and General

Steele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas.

The last-named department was so far away that Sherman could not

communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign,

and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that

of the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was in

command.

The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, were

to be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when the season should be

far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition

for the troops to march.

General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which

was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. McPherson lay at

Huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of

Tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with over

sixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga;

and Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville. With

these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all,

Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a

view of destroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta. He visited

each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it

was found to be, speaking generally, good.

One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting,

before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies

forward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. He

found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track

railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time,

were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without

bringing forward any surplus of any kind. He found, however, that

trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the

cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. He at

once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses,

and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and

used the road exclusively for transporting supplies. In this way he was

able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for

the move, the 4th of May.

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearly

one-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is

mountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some

of them of considerable volume. Dalton is on ground where water drains

towards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from

there and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which all

the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering

into them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during

the entire winter. The best positions for defence had been selected all

the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so

that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would

have another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so

very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped,

to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. With a

less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubt

that he would have succeeded.

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days

in advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton.

Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's intention to

cross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, and

move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running

from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point

Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that

McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the

latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the

army. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veteran

divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to

have a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not

back.

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, the

winter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this

with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so

as to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to say

they were not returned. That department continued to absorb troops to

no purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that the

part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was therefore

brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of

Thomas--the two coming together about Dalton. The three armies were

abreast, all ready to start promptly on time.

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was

useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it

by regular approaches was impracticable. There was a narrowing up in

the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which

a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. Besides, the stream had been

dammed so that the valley was a lake. Through this gorge the troops

would have to pass. McPherson was therefore sent around by the right,

to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy.

This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided to

abandon his position at Dalton.

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our cavalry

having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's

rear. Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The pursuit was

continued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little

fighting, except that Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston's

army and engaged it. Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of

bringing up his railroad trains. He was depending upon the railroad for

all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed

as Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. This work was pushed

forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons

would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many

bridges to be rebuilt.

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the

enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there.

It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting

--some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important

battles--neither were single positions gained in a day. On the

contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about Atlanta more than a month

was consumed.

It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the rear of

Sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. This pursuit brought him up to

the vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very strongly intrenched, and

naturally a very defensible position. An assault upon it was not thought

of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. This was

done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of Dallas, to

reach the rear of the enemy. Before reaching there, however, they found

the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for

about a week at a place called New Hope Church. On the left our troops

also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get.

They kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad.

This was the case more particularly with the cavalry. By the 4th of

June Johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew

off and Allatoona was left in our possession.

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for

occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary

base of supplies. The railroad was finished up to that point, the

intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got

in readiness for a further advance. The rains, however, were falling in

such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads

which they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his

new position.

While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it,

bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on

furlough.

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where strong

intrenchments awaited him. At this latter place our troops made an

assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close

to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. But during the

progress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the

cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear.

These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found

that Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at once. Sherman

had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong

guard in his intrenchments. He had intended, moving out with twenty

days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again

at the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himself

starting back as above stated. This time he fell back to the

Chattahoochee.

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easy

possession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him. The

enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by

flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the

river.

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tactics

prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began. Johnston

was now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him.

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much

favor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond, or of the

people of that section of the South in which he was commanding. The

very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such

circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they

would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted.

For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anything

that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did

finally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extent

that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a

separation.

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle

about a mile and a half outside of the city. In addition to this, there

were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege

could be commenced.

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was

about to assume the offensive. On the 20th he came out and attacked the

Army of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker's corps, and Newton's and

Johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest,

which lasted more than an hour; but the Confederates were then forced to

fall back inside their main lines. The losses were quite heavy on both

sides. On this day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, was

very badly wounded. During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines,

and our troops were advanced. The investment had not been relinquished

for a moment during the day.

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by our left

flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of

him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the

22d. At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates,

our troops being somewhat surprised. While our troops were advancing

they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. But they had

become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by

an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order

and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their

antagonist was. The field of battle continued to expand until it

embraced about seven miles of ground. Finally, however, and before

night, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26).

It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one column

to another, was instantly killed. In his death the army lost one of its

ablest, purest and best generals.

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east

of Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta. He was successful

in this, and returned about the time of the battle. Rousseau had also

come up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed

the Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally,

when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of

Sherman, and reported to him about this time.

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta,

although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of September.

Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position.

The work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very

long. Our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they

struck the road between Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were strongly

fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as close

up to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the

smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to

move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of

Atlanta.

On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. On the 28th the

enemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding, with great

vigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled

to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the

enemy. These assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon,

and resumed once or twice still later in the day. The enemy's losses in

these unsuccessful assaults were fearful.

During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the town.

This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate lines,

extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and

west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line

being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there.

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the

railroads to the south, about Macon. He was then to go east and, if

possible, release our prisoners about Andersonville. There were painful

stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners

had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which

they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. Great sympathy

was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned

loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. But the

attempt proved a failure. McCook, who commanded a small brigade, was

first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted

a good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also taken some prisoners;

but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was

obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what

men he had left. He had lost several hundred men out of his small

command. On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little

brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all but

himself as lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of

Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received. The rumor was

confirmed there, also, from other sources. A few days after Colonel

Adams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment and

confirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less than

a thousand men.

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was

impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. He

covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of

about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this

detachment to the commanding Confederate. In this raid, however, much

damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars,

locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc.

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our

right, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failed

utterly. General Palmer was charged with being the cause of this

failure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and General

Schofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a question seems

to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right to

command him. If he did raise this question while an action was going

on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible.

About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of Resaca and

destroyed it nearly up to Dalton. This cut Sherman off from

communication with the North for several days. Sherman responded to

this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs.

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Macon

road about Jonesboro. He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around

the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his former

position on our left by the 22d. These little affairs, however,

contributed but very little to the grand result. They annoyed, it is

true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition

is soon repaired.

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for

a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some

point in the enemy's rear. Sherman commenced this last movement on the

25th of August, and on the 1st of September was well up towards the

railroad twenty miles south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardee

intrenched, ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but he was unable to

drive Hardee away before night set in. Under cover of the night,

however, Hardee left of his own accord. That night Hood blew up his

military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and

decamped.

The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was commanding

north of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and notified

Sherman. Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to

reach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the left

to Atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for

some distance to the right.

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most

memorable in history. There was but little if anything in the whole

campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to

criticise severely. It was creditable alike to the general who

commanded and the army which had executed it. Sherman had on this

campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose

alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command.

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy

a little rest after their arduous campaign. The city of Atlanta was

turned into a military base. The citizens were all compelled to leave.

Sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of

sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the

field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting

the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and

for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited the

number of these traders to one for each of his three armies.

The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously, and set

the country all aglow. This was the first great political campaign for

the Republicans in their canvass of 1864. It was followed later by

Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns

probably had more effect in settling the election of the following

November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading

with banners and bands of music in the North.

CHAPTER L.

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE RAPIDAN

--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.

Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out from

its position north Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign,

destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and the

army defending it. This was not to be accomplished, however, without as

desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be

consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. The losses

inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now

confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period

of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness,

captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress

accomplishing the final end. It is true the Confederates had, so far,

held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. But

previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture

Philadelphia, New York, and the National Capital, and had made several

attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making

their boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal

North. They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one

occasion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign now begun was destined

to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any

previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year,

and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the

beginning in that time. We had to have hard fighting to achieve this.

The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any

decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip.

Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in

wagons. Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as

wanted. Three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds

of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier.

The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan to the

crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous

streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The crossings of

these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water,

and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of

troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. The country

roads were narrow and poor. Most of the country is covered with a dense

forest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy,

almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. All

bridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came to

them.

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry

corps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren,

(*27) John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery was commanded by

General Henry J. Hunt. This arm was in such abundance that the fourth

of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were

destined to pass through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up as

it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the

forage and other stores brought up by the trains.

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right,

and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one division of

cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. General Sedgwick followed Warren

with the 6th corps. Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the right

of Lee's line. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road,

farther east, directly upon Ely's Ford, six miles below Germania,

preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery.

Torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for the

time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and

getting into our rear. The cavalry seized the two crossings before

daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six

o'clock A.M. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the

infantry and artillery. This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee. The

fact that the movement was unopposed proves this.

Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton, guarding the

railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case our

crossing the Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed, however,

to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a

dispatch was sent to him a little after one P.M. giving the information

that our crossing had been successful.

The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing,

particularly on the south side of the river. The battle-field from the

crossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from the Wilderness

toward Spottsylvania was of the same character. There were some

clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field;

but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. The roads

were narrow and bad. All the conditions were favorable for defensive

operations.

There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running from Orange

Court House to the battle-field. The most southerly of these roads is

known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the northern one as the

Orange Turnpike. There are also roads from east of the battle-field

running to Spottsylvania Court House, one from Chancellorsville,

branching at Aldrich's; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church,

Alsop's, thence by the Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goes

by Gates's, thence to Spottsylvania. The Brock Road runs from Germania

Ford through the battle-field and on to the Court House. As

Spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads,

some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the

farms with roads going there.

Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House. From there to

Fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running

nearly parallel to the Wilderness. This gave him unusual facilities,

for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. These

roads strike the road from Germania Ford in the Wilderness.

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed

forward, Wilson's division by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's store, on

the Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left towards Chancellorsville.

Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took

position there and intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He was across

the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by

sundown. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren and

camped about six miles east of him. Before night all the troops, and by

the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons,

were safely on the south side of the river.

There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster's

corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train that

would have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, stretched along in

single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving,

we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve

days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. To overcome all

difficulties, the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked

on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of

the brigade. At a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon

belonged could be told. The wagons were also marked to note the

contents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage,

whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice,

sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. Empty wagons were never allowed

to follow the army or stay in camp. As soon as a wagon was empty it

would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same

article that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged to leave

the road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the army they would be

parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. Issues,

except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. By this system

the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed

with. They consumed theirs at the depots.

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion,

and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance of

Sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and

night in a deserted house near the river.

Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the

baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible.

Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper to

Germania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by

the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence I had never

witnessed before.

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very

early hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the Army of the

Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in

the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. This I judge

from the fact that at 1.15 P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren had

reached Old Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signals

which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy

their intrenchments at Mine Run.

Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman, Butler

and Crook had moved according to programme.

On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill,

Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to

attack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet to follow on the

same road. Longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--at

Gordonsville, twenty or more miles away. Ewell was ordered by the

Orange Pike. He was near by and arrived some four miles east of Mine

Run before bivouacking for the night.

My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance on the

morning of the 5th. Warren was to move to Parker's store, and Wilson's

cavalry--then at Parker's store--to move on to Craig's meeting-house.

Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in on his right. The Army of the

Potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the

south, except when facing the enemy. Hancock was to move south-westward

to join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church.

At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's store, Warren discovered the

enemy. He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and

prepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division of Sedgwick's

corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren's

right, and Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps, was

ordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get on his left. This was

the speediest way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy on

both the Orange plank and turnpike roads.

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the Army

of the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan. By making a night march,

although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river,

he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the

5th. Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, four

miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the

road. I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in

position. Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command, and was

his senior in rank. Getting information of the proximity of the enemy,

I informed Meade, and without waiting to see Burnside, at once moved

forward my headquarters to where Meade was.

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the

initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if

we were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet reached the point

where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. Neither

party had any advantage of position. Warren was, therefore, ordered to

attack as soon as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock was

ordered to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived at

Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear.

Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved.

About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not

decisive results. Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in a

precarious condition for a time. Wilson, with his division of cavalry,

was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. At two

o'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered

to join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and narrow

roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as

he generally did when receiving such orders. At four o'clock he again

received his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders from

Meade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not.

He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards.

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and Mott,

and later two brigades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty.

This was timely and saved Getty. During the battle Getty and Carroll

were wounded, but remained on the field. One of Birney's most gallant

brigade commanders--Alexander Hays--was killed.

I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served with

him through the Mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment.

He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever

ordered. With him it was "Come, boys," not "Go."

Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent

to reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the intervening

forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not

get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they

were without getting into position.

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's division of cavalry to Todd's

Tavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He found Wilson

engaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported by

infantry, and falling back before it. Together they were strong enough

to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive.

They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge.

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close to

it. Neither side made any special progress.

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were given for

the following morning. We knew Longstreet with 12,000 men was on his

way to join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and might arrive during

the night. I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative

in the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4.30

o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to his

wishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five was

fixed as the hour to move.

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworth

with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line

perpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock. He was

directed to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left.

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in

between Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in

position to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in their

front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take

advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnside

was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to

swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancock

was informed of all the movements ordered.

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--was

sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July.

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his

right until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact that

notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both

for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before

Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. His

purpose was evident, but he failed.

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time

that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road,

thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded

by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by

which Longstreet was expected. This disposition was made in time to

attack as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road,

and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for about

an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion.

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if

the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen

the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been

taken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made another

stand outside of his Richmond defences.

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not

able to accomplish much.

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock's

left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left

and rear. He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brock

roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them at both places. Later he

was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed.

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking the

enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position

guarding the entrance to the Brock Road. Another incident happened

during the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column.

Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the

direction of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's brigade was detached to meet

this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred

convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had

advanced upon, to join their respective commands. At 6.50 o'clock A.M.,

Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was ordered

to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with the

remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. The

difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnside

from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the

sixth.

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or

more. He maintained this position until, along in the afternoon,

Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of Hill meeting

reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and

returned with them. They were enabled, from the density of the forest,

to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being

discovered. Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to the

advance, they swept it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up his

advantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in great

confusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but

after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had

held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. In this engagement

the intrepid Wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally

wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up,

but made no immediate attack.

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriously

wounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave the field, not to

resume command for many weeks. His loss was a severe one to Lee, and

compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions,

which had fallen to our lot during the day.

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his right

in person. He was not able, however, to rally his men to attack

Hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of

reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants

that might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's commands. This brigade

having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by

Hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to

right. A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it

broke and disappeared without a contest.

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside had not

yet been able to get up to render any assistance. But it was now only

about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock's

right.

At 4.15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved up to

within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status was

maintained for about half an hour. Then a part of Mott's division and

Ward's brigade of Birney's division gave way and retired in disorder.

The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed through

our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on

fire. But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was but

temporary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with

his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. Fighting

had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line,

at other times only in places. The ground fought over had varied in

width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. The killed, and many of

the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was

impossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the bursting

shells, and the conflagration raged. The wounded who had not strength

to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. Finally

the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. Being

constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. But the battle still

raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to

remain longer.

Lee was now in distress. His men were in confusion, and his personal

efforts failed to restore order. These facts, however, were learned

subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no

doubt gained a decisive success. His troops were withdrawn now, but I

revoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, for

Hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and

did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some

distance.

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during all

this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the

enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front.

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken

up except one at Germania Ford.

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. This

left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from

all present base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his right and

intrenched it for protection against attack. But late in the afternoon

of the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and got

in upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and

created considerable confusion. Early captured several hundred

prisoners, among them two general officers. The defence, however, was

vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much

confusion as our troops, engaged, were. Early says in his Memoirs that

if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought

fresh troops to his great discomfort. Many officers, who had not been

attacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even after

Sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news

of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was

pushing on and would soon be upon me.

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments.

On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry from

Catharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets and skirmishers were sent

along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. Some went as

far as a mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed no

disposition to come out of his Works. There was no battle during the

day, and but little firing except in Warren's front; he being directed

about noon to make a reconnoissance in force. This drew some sharp

firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back.

This ended the Battle of the Wilderness.

CHAPTER LI.

AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT

FLANK.

More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than

that of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in having

successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an

enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. We gained an

advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up,

must have proven very decisive. In the evening the enemy gained an

advantage; but was speedily repulsed. As we stood at the close, the two

armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as

when the river divided them. But the fact of having safely crossed was

a victory.

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe. Those of the

Confederates must have been even more so; but I have no means of

speaking with accuracy upon this point. The Germania Ford bridge was

transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of the

wounded to Washington.

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with

all movements of the Army of the Potomac: first, in every change of

position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not,

the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. For this

purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be

found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the

timber. Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to

stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. It was

wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of

considerable strength. When a halt was made with the view of assaulting

the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their

positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. The second

was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. Nothing could be

more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave

and intelligent men. Insulated wires--insulated so that they would

transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were wound

upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel.

Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. The pack-saddle on

which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed

crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its

wire, would revolve freely. There was a wagon, supplied with a

telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division,

each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. There were wagons

also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent

pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up

when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. The

mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the

command they were assigned to. The operators were also assigned to

particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders.

The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men

connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their

wires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of

the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a

line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and

uncoil it as the mule was led off. When he had walked the length of the

wire the whole of it would be on the ground. This would be done in rear

of every brigade at the same time. The ends of all the wires would then

be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. The

men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once

raising the wires with their telegraph poles. This was done by making a

loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a

perpendicular position. At intervals the wire would be attached to

trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient

at a place. In the absence of such a support two poles would have to be

used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in

its place. While this was being done the telegraph wagons would take

their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be

established, and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minutes

longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil,

telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters

of the army. No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph.

The signal service was used on the march. The men composing this corps

were assigned to specified commands. When movements were made, they

would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of

ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would

climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote,

by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often

the movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of the

enemy and transmit them. It would sometimes take too long a time to

make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any

benefit from them. But sometimes they gave useful information.

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcing

that Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler

had reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. I

had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Lee

might move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there.

My order for this movement was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S., May 7, 1864, 6.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position

at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd's Tavern with one,

and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania

road with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House. If this move is

made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny

River.

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock

where he is until Warren passes him. He could then follow and become

the right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church.

Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to his

destination. Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection

of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow

Sedgwick to his place of destination.

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops

move, and then move off quietly.

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack

on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared to

resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole

force. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd's

Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were

to go by that route at night. Soon after dark Warren withdrew from the

front of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick. Warren's march

carried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's command lay on

the Brock Road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded

the troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatest

enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by. No doubt it

was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated to

them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the

battle just fought. The cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have

taken it for a night attack. At all events it drew from him a furious

fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.

Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed but a little way beyond our

left when the road forked. We looked to see, if we could, which road

Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. It seemed to be the

right-hand one, and accordingly we took it. We had not gone far,

however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of

the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into

the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a

rapid gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reported

that Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into

his lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the road,

left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren's column

when it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern,

where we arrived after midnight.

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold: first, I did not

want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler

before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and

Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. But

Lee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania. Our wagon trains had been

ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the

movement commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army

of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government.

Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps--now commanded by Anderson--to

move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania. But the woods being

still on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly

on to his destination that night. By this accident Lee got possession

of Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been the

result if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that

we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital.

My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to

see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would

have had the shorter line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we

came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from

the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure was

caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps on

the morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when fires

caused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of

the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th.

But accident often decides the fate of battle.

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of

the 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field his

at the close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvania

and holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee's troops would have

to cross to get to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's orders

to Merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at Todd's Tavern,

and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson,

who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry;

but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had not

been detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but for

the unfortunate change in Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted to

execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with

two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had

to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren to

reinforce Wilson and hold the town.

Anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not

already made--immediately across Warren's front. Warren was not aware of

his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt had

engaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. He

soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made

a second attack, this time with his whole corps. This time he succeeded

in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he

intrenched. His right and left divisions--the former Crawford's, the

latter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cutler--drove the enemy back some

distance.

At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church.

I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to his

support. To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney Branch Church, was

ordered to Warren's support. Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, was

notified of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to

come up. Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on our

extreme left, received the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow in

getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never

at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night

before the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all of

Sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. Warren led the last

assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed.

Warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to do

anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the

army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. His ideas

were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him

orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner,

when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent

instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division,

holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements

in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an

order without his presence. His difficulty was constitutional and

beyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quick

perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be

done with a small command.

Lee had ordered Hill's corps--now commanded by Early--to move by the

very road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in the

morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but

still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg.

Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond he had possession of

Spottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson was in possession of

Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however. Early only found

that he had been following us when he ran against Hancock at Todd's

Tavern. His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field of

Spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept Early back and

forced him to move by another route.

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it

would have put Hancock in the lead. It would also have given us an hour

or earlier start. It took all that time for Warren to get the head of

his column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out of

their line confronting the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity to

use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to

crush Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made was

tactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the

enemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the

right passed. If an attack had been made by the enemy he would have

found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and

6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed.

By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still

passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by

it would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet learned

the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. At that

time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed

Meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from

the field. As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able

man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and

importance of the duty he had to perform.

CHAPTER LII.

BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OF WARREN'S AND

WRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM BUTLER AND

SHERIDAN.

The Mattapony River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the Ta, the Po

and the Ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. It

takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the Wilderness

Tavern. The Po rises south-west of the place, but farther away.

Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they

are but a few miles apart. The Brock Road reaches Spottsylvania without

crossing either of these streams. Lee's army coming up by the Catharpin

Road, had to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge. Warren and Hancock came by

the Brock Road. Sedgwick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Furnace. Burnside

coming by Aldrich's to Gates's house, had to cross the Ny near the

enemy. He found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by

a brigade of Willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. This

brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming

up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it.

About the time I received the news of this attack, word came from

Hancock that Early had left his front. He had been forced over to the

Catharpin Road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and again at Wooden Bridge.

These are the bridges Sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy

on the 8th, while one division should occupy Spottsylvania. These

movements of the enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make the

attempt to get to, or towards, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. I

made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and Richmond

if he should try to execute this design. If he had any such intention

it was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south of the Ny.

The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt

banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time we

were there--and difficult to cross except where bridged. The country

about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. It

was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an

offensive one.

By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows: Lee

occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosing

the town. Anderson was on his left extending to the Po, Ewell came

next, then Early. Warren occupied our right, covering the Brock and

other roads converging at Spottsylvania; Sedgwick was to his left and

Burnside on our extreme left. Hancock was yet back at Todd's Tavern,

but as soon as it was known that Early had left Hancock's front the

latter was ordered up to Warren's right. He formed a line with three

divisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the afternoon, and was

ordered to cross the Po and get on the enemy's flank. The fourth

division of Hancock's corps, Mott commanding, was left at Todd's when

the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and

placed to the left of Sedgwick's--now Wright's--6th corps. In the

morning General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his

intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. His loss was a severe one to the

Army of the Potomac and to the Nation. General H. G. Wright succeeded

him in the command of his corps.

Hancock was now, nine P.M. of the 9th of May, across the left flank of

Lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of

Meade's army, by the Po River. But for the lateness of the hour and the

darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again

at Wooden Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both

friend and foe.

The Po at the points where Hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east.

Just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--it

turns due south, and after passing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes a

more easterly direction. During the night this corps built three

bridges over the Po; but these were in rear.

The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced Lee to reinforce his left

during the night. Accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when Hancock

renewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, he found himself

confronted by some of Early's command, which had been brought from the

extreme right of the enemy during the night. He succeeded in effecting

a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched

in his front, no more were crossed.

Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view

of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be

gained. The enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground

overlooking the river, and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery.

Anderson's left rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore, for

Hancock to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of

the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate him

from it. The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the

enemy to unite with the main body. The idea of crossing was therefore

abandoned.

Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of

Hancock's, and I determined to take advantage of it. Accordingly in the

morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre

by Warren's and Wright's corps, Hancock to command all the attacking

force. Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Po.

Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as a

reserve. Barlow's division was left south of the stream, and Mott of

the same corps was still to the left of Wright's corps. Burnside was

ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity

presented, to attack with vigor. The enemy seeing Barlow's division

isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury.

Barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerable

loss to himself. But the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault.

Birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings

built by our troops, and covered the crossings. The second assault was

repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and Barlow was withdrawn

without further molestation. General T. G. Stevenson was killed in this

move.

Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to take place, there was a

ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost

impenetrable by man. The slopes on both sides were also covered with a

heavy growth of timber. Warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front

twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. He

was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the

ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault.

Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced

position from the one he started from. He then organized a storming

party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned Colonel Emory Upton,

of the 121st New York Volunteers, to the command of it. About four

o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, Warren's and Wright's

corps, with Mott's division of Hancock's corps, to move simultaneously.

The movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles

began. The battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but

little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. Meade

and I occupied the best position we could get, in rear of Warren.

Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being among the

killed. He was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby

enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of

the enemy. To the left our success was decided, but the advantage was

lost by the feeble action of Mott. Upton with his assaulting party

pushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. Turning to the

right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners.

Mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. So much time was

lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to

reinforce, that I ordered Upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of

his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained

that I withdrew the order. To relieve them, I ordered a renewal of the

assault. By this time Hancock, who had gone with Birney's division to

relieve Barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. His corps

was now joined with Warren's and Wright's in this last assault. It was

gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the

enemy; but they were not able to hold them. At night they were

withdrawn. Upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had

captured he was obliged to abandon. Upton had gained an important

advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him

lost it to us. Before leaving Washington I had been authorized to

promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. By this

authority I conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon Upton on the

spot, and this act was confirmed by the President. Upton had been badly

wounded in this fight.

Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of

Spottsylvania Court House, completely turning Lee's right. He was not

aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and I, being

with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the

time. He had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost

without loss. Burnside's position now separated him widely from

Wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. At night he was ordered to

join on to this. This brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an

important advantage. I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I do

to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me

his position.

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow

up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on Barlow.

Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire

corps against two brigades. Barlow took up his bridges in the presence

of this force.

On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by

Mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in

the enemy's line.

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 11, 1864--8.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.

We have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. The result up to

this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy as well

as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven general

officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men.

I think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four

thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except

a few stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons

for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it

out on this line if it takes all summer.

The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men,

and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great

numbers. My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use them

as an escort to our supply trains. If it is more convenient to send

them out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain or

Fredericksburg, send them so.

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the

mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by

keeping them intrenched in every position they take.

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army

being detached for the defence of Richmond.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

And also, I received information, through the War Department, from

General Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the railroad south

of Petersburg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and had whipped

Hill, killing, wounding and capturing many. Also that he was

intrenched, and could maintain himself. On this same day came news from

Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad

and telegraph between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations,

and most of the medical stores for his army.

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army

of the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his

cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the

manner I have already described.

CHAPTER LIII.

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT-LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED

--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK-REDUCING THE ARTILLERY.

In the reconnoissance made by Mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered

at the right centre. I determined that an assault should be made at that

point. (*28) Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to move

his command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, to

Wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next

morning. The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was

difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he

was to halt. It took most of the night to get the men in position for

their advance in the morning. The men got but little rest. Burnside

was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour.

I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of

pushing forward vigorously. Hancock was notified of this. Warren and

Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the

assault if circumstances made it advisable. I occupied a central

position most convenient for receiving information from all points.

Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to his

right. Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve.

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half

an hour.

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was

ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the

enemy's intrenchments. In front of Birney there was also a marsh to

cross. But, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed

on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five

hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a

rush went up to and over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered

almost simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took

place. The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but

used their guns as clubs. The hand conflict was soon over. Hancock's

corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a

brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and

ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. Hancock,

as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the

enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About six

o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside,

on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of

the enemy. Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was

not able to remain there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the

enemy; but not without loss in return.

This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leave

us in full possession of. He made the most strenuous efforts to regain

the position he had lost. Troops were brought up from his left and

attacked Hancock furiously. Hancock was forced to fall back: but he

did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss,

until behind the breastworks he had captured. These he turned, facing

them the other way, and continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to

reinforce Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. He was wounded soon

after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps,

although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. At

eight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his

dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with

emphasis. At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to relieve

Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placed

batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy,

firing over the heads of his own troops.

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but

negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his centre from

that quarter. If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had been as prompt

as Wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been

obtained.

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line.

Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging

our troops from their new position. His losses must have been fearful.

Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. In one

place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by

musket balls. All the trees between the lines were very much cut to

pieces by artillery and musketry. It was three o'clock next morning

before the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been twenty

hours under fire. In this engagement we did not lose a single

organization, not even a company. The enemy lost one division with its

commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses

elsewhere.(*30) Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company

was captured. At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one,

and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it.

Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler's division sent to

Wright, and Griffin's to Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff,

General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the remaining division, and

authorized him to give it orders in his name.

During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing

continuously. About the centre stood a house which proved to be

occupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such unmistakable

signs of being strongly Union that I stopped. She said she had not seen

a Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon

it again. She said her husband and son, being, Union men, had had to

leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, if

alive. She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued

to her, and promised to find out if I could where the husband and son

were.

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing

between Mott's division and the enemy. I was afraid that Lee might be

moving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. The

indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only

taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured.

Our dead were buried this day. Mott's division was reduced to a

brigade, and assigned to Birney's division.

During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and Meade

(*31) for promotion to the grade of Major-General in the regular army;

Hancock for Brigadier-General; Wright, Gibbon and Humphreys to be

Major-Generals of Volunteers; and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers.

Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be

confirmed by the Senate on the nomination of the President.

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear to the

left of Burnside. The night was very dark and it rained heavily, the

roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road

a part of the way, to get through. It was midnight before they got to

the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could

be organized to advance to their position in line. They gained their

position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in

Wright's front. Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which we

wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton first drove

the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to his support

with his brigade (of Griffin's division, Warren's corps), the position

was secured and fortified. There was no more battle during the 14th.

This brought our line east of the Court House and running north and

south and facing west.

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new front.

This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him. He was brought to

the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might

be wanted.

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill. The former reported the

capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and

that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on

the Danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot of

supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge

on the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The next day news came from

Sherman and Sheridan. Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton,

Georgia, and was following him south. The report from Sheridan embraced

his operations up to his passing the outer defences of Richmond. The

prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph

were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in

every direction from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cut

off from all communication with the outside except by courier. This

condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration.

I wrote Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 16, 1864, 8 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.:

We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of

it clearing up. The roads have now become so impassable that ambulances

with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. All

offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four

hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits, and feel the

greatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * *

* * You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the

elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner

due to weakness or exhaustion on our part.

U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.

The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th.

But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night march back to

their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the

morning. Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the

assault was unsuccessful. On this day (18th) the news was almost as

discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital.

As stated above, Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful

assault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly,

and was retreating down the valley. Not two hours before, I had sent

the inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to stop

supplies coming from there to Lee. I asked at once that Sigel might be

relieved, and some one else put in his place. Hunter's name was

suggested, and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler reported

him driven from Drury's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg

road. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in

his place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion. All this

news was very discouraging. All of it must have been known by the enemy

before it was by me. In fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have

been known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair, and his

anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed

discomfiture, But this was no time for repining. I immediately gave

orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards Richmond, to

commence on the night of the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure the

cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from

Fredericksburg to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock.

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousand

raw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived. They

had not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were on our

right. This corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to

move in any direction. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part,

and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved Ewell's corps about five

o'clock in the afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us in

that quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been

halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade of

Warren's corps. Tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they

maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of

veterans.

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to

do it without waiting to make dispositions. Birney was thrown to

Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve; and

Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss.

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut

him off from his intrenchments. But his efforts were so feeble that

under the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a few

hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. The army being

engaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by our

left flank that night.

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I

naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. The

withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from

Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies.

This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by General

Ferrero, belonging to Burnside's corps. Ferrero was therefore promptly

notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and

be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to

do so towards Fredericksburg. The enemy did detach as expected, and

captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few

days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be.

Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the

Confederate capital when it was in danger. Butler being driven back,

most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed in

North Carolina; and Sigel's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek,

whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more

artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. It

occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing

up forage. Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action,

but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. Before

leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences of

Washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and

caissons. This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more

than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than

could be advantageously used. In fact, before reaching the James River

I again reduced the artillery with the army largely.

I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to

Richmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor to

attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which

case the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had time

to intrench. So I issued the following orders: