All men get set in a way of living, and it is as little in human nature

to give up cheerfully in the middle of life a familiar method of dealing

with things in favor of a new and untried one as it is to change one's

language or emigrate to an entirely different land. I realize what this

proposal means to diplomatists when I try to suppose myself united to

assist in the abolition of written books and journalism in favor of the

gramophone and the cinematograph. Or united to adopt German as my means

of expression. It is only by an enormous pressure of opinion in the

world behind these monarchs, ministers, and representatives that they

will be induced even to consider the possibility of adapting themselves

to this novel style of international dealing through a permanent

congress. It is only the consideration of its enormous hopefulness for

the rest of the world that gives one the courage to advocate it.

In the question of the possible abolition of the present diplomatic

system, just as in the case of the possible abolition of war, while on

the side for abolition there must be a hugely preponderating interest

and a hugely preponderating majority, it is, nevertheless, a dispersed

interest and an unorganized, miscellaneous majority. The minority is, on

the other hand, compact, more intensively and more immediately

interested and able to resist such great changes with a maximum of

efficiency. There is a tremendous need, therefore, for a world congress

organization propaganda if this advantageously posted minority is to be

overcome.

And from such countries as the American States in particular, and from

the small liberal neutrals in Europe, whose diplomacy is least developed

and least influential, liberal-minded people through the world are most

disposed to expect, and do expect, a lead in this particular matter. The

liberal forces in Britain, France, and Russia are extraordinarily

embarrassed and enslaved by the vast belligerent necessities into which

their lives have been caught. But they would take up such a lead with

the utmost vigor and enthusiasm.

No one who has followed the diplomatic history of the negotiations that

led to this war can doubt that if there had been no secret treaties, but

instead open proclamations of intentions and an open discussion of

international ambitions, the world might have been saved this

catastrophe. It is no condemnation of any person or country to say this.

The reserves and hesitations and misconceptions that led Germany to

suppose that England would wait patiently while France and Belgium were

destroyed before she herself received attention were unavoidable under

the existing diplomatic conditions. What reasonable people have to do

now is not to recriminate over the details in the working of a system

that we can now all of us perceive to be hopelessly bad, but to do our

utmost in this season of opportunity to destroy the obscurities in which

fresh mischief may fester for our children.

Let me restate this section in slightly different words. At the end of

this war there must be a congress of adjustment. The suggestion in this

section is to make this congress permanent, to use it as a clearing

house of international relationships and to abolish embassies.

Instead of there being a British Ambassador, for example, at every

sufficiently important capital, and an ambassador from every important

State in London, and a complex tangle of relationships, misstatements,

and misconceptions arising from the ill-co-ordinated activities of this

double system of agents, it is proposed to send one or several

ambassadors to some central point, such as The Hague, to meet there all

the ambassadors of all the significant States in the world and to deal

with international questions with a novel frankness in a collective

meeting.

This has now become a possible way of doing the world's business because

of the development of the means of communication and information. The

embassy in a foreign country, as a watching, remonstrating, proposing

extension of its country of origin, a sort of eye and finger at the

heart of the host country, is now clumsy, unnecessary, inefficient, and

dangerous. For most routine work, for reports of all sorts, for legal

action, and so forth, on behalf of traveling nationals, the consular

service is adequate, or can easily be made adequate. What remains of the

ambassadorial apparatus might very well merge with the consular system

and the embassy become an international court civility, a ceremonial

vestige without any diplomatic value at all.

IV.

Given a permanent world congress developed out of the congress of

settlement between the belligerents, a world alliance, with as a last

resort a call upon the forces of the associated powers, for dealing with

recalcitrants, then a great number of possibilities open out to humanity

that must otherwise remain inaccessible. But before we go on to consider

these it may be wise to point out how much more likely a world congress

is to effect a satisfactory settlement at the end of this war than a

congress confined to the belligerents.

The war has progressed sufficiently to convince every one that there is

now no possibility of an overwhelming victory for Germany. It must end

in a more or less complete defeat of the German and Turkish alliance,

and in a considerable readjustment of Austrian and Turkish boundaries.

Assisted by the generosity of the doomed Austrians and Turks, the

Germans are fighting now to secure a voice as large as possible in the

final settlement, and it is conceivable that in the end that settlement

may be made quite an attractive one for Germany proper by the crowning

sacrifice of suicide on the part of her two subordinated allies.

There can be little doubt that Russia will gain the enormous advantage

of a free opening into the Mediterranean and that the battle of the

Marne turned the fortunes of France from disaster to expansion. But the

rest of the settlement is still vague and uncertain, and German

imperialism, at least, is already working hard and intelligently for a

favorable situation at the climax, a situation that will enable this

militarist empire to emerge still strong, still capable of recuperation

and of a renewal at no very remote date of the struggle for European

predominance. This is a thing as little for the good of the saner German

people as it is for the rest of the world, but it is the only way in

which militant imperialism can survive at all.

The alternative of an imperialism shorn of the glamour of aggression,

becoming constitutional and democratic--the alternative, that is to say,

of a great liberal Germany--is one that will be as distasteful almost to

the people who control the destinies of Germany today, and who will

speak and act for Germany in the final settlement, as a complete

submission to a Serbian conqueror would be.

At the final conference of settlement Germany will not be really

represented at all. The Prussian militarist empire will still be in

existence, and it will sit at the council, working primarily for its own

survival. Unless the Allies insist upon the presence of representatives

of Saxony, Bavaria, and so forth, and demand the evidence of popular

sanctions--a thing they are very unlikely to demand--that is what

"Germany" will signify at the conference. And what is true of Germany

will be true, more or less, of several other of the allied powers.

A conference confined purely to the belligerents will be, in fact, a

conference not even representative of the belligerents. And it will be

tainted with all the traditional policies, aggressions, suspicions, and

subterfuges that led up to the war. It will not be the end of the old

game, but the readjustment of the old game, the old game which is such

an abominable nuisance to the development of modern civilization. The

idealism of the great alliance will certainly be subjected to enormous

strains, and the whole energy of the Central European diplomatists will

be directed to developing and utilizing these stresses.

This, I think, must be manifest even to the foreign offices most

concerned. They must see already ahead of them a terrible puzzle of

arrangement, a puzzle their own bad traditions will certainly never

permit them to solve. "God save us," they may very well pray, "from our

own cleverness and sharp dealing," and they may even welcome the promise

of an enlarged outlook that the entry of the neutral powers would bring

with it.

Every foreign office has its ugly, evil elements, and probably every

foreign office dreads those elements. There are certainly Russian fools

who dream about India, German fools who dream about Canada and South

America, British fools who dream about Africa and the East;

aggressionists in the blood, people who can no more let nations live in

peace than kleptomaniacs can keep their hands in their own pockets. But

quite conceivably there are honest monarchs and sane foreign ministers

very ready to snatch at the chance of swamping the evil in their own

Chancelleries.

It is just here that the value of neutral participation will come in.

Whatever ambitions the neutral powers may have of their own, it may be

said generally that they are keenly interested in preventing the

settlement from degenerating into a deal in points of vantage for any

further aggressions in any direction. Both the United States of America

and China are traditionally and incurably pacific powers, professing and

practicing an unaggressive policy, and the chief outstanding minor

States are equally concerned in securing a settlement that shall settle.

And moreover, so wide reaching now are all international agreements that

they have not only a claim to intervene juridically, but they have the

much more pressing claim to participate on the ground that no sort of

readjustment of Europe, Western Asia, and Africa can leave their own

futures unaffected. They are wanted not only in the interests of the

belligerent peoples, but for their own sakes and the welfare of the

world all together.

V.

Now a world conference, once it is assembled, can take up certain

questions that no partial treatment can ever hope to meet. The first of

the questions is disarmament. No one who has watched the politics of the

last forty years can doubt the very great share the business and finance

of armament manufacture has played in bringing about the present

horrible killing, and no one who has read accounts of the fighting can

doubt how much this industry has enhanced the torment, cruelty, and

monstrosity of war.

In the old warfare a man was either stabbed, shot, or thrust through

after an hour or so of excitement, and all the wounded on the field were

either comfortably murdered or attended to before the dawn of the next

day. One was killed by human hands, with understandable and tolerable

injuries. But in this war the bulk of the dead--of the western Allies,

at any rate--have been killed by machinery, the wounds have been often

of an inconceivable horribleness, and the fate of the wounded has been

more frightful than was ever the plight of wounded in the hands of

victorious savages. For days multitudes of men have been left mangled,

half buried in mud and filth, or soaked with water, or frozen, crying,

raving between the contending trenches. The number of men that the war,

without actual physical wounds, has shattered mentally and driven insane

because of its noise, its stresses, its strange unnaturalness, is

enormous. Horror in this war has overcome more men than did all the

arrows of Cressy.

Almost all this enhanced terribleness of war is due to the novel

machinery of destruction that science has rendered possible. The

wholesale mangling and destroying of men by implements they have never

seen, without any chance of retaliation, has been its most constant

feature. You cannot open a paper of any date since the war began without

reading of men burned, scalded, and drowned by the bursting of torpedoes

from submarines, of men falling out of the sky from shattered

aeroplanes, of women and children in Antwerp or Paris mutilated

frightfully or torn to ribbons by aerial bombs, of men smashed and

buried alive by shells. An indiscriminate, diabolical violence of

explosives resulting in cruelties for the most part ineffective from the

military point of view is the incessant refrain of this history.

The increased dreadfulness of war due to modern weapons is, however,

only one consequence of their development. The practicability of

aggressive war in settled countries now is entirely dependent on the use

of elaborate artillery on land and warships at sea. Were there only

rifles in the world, were an ordinary rifle the largest kind of gun

permitted, and were ships specifically made for war not so made, then it

would be impossible to invade any country defended by a patriotic and

spirited population with any hopes of success because of the enormous

defensive capacity of entrenched riflemen not subjected to an unhampered

artillery attack.

Modern war is entirely dependent upon equipment of the most costly and

elaborate sort. A general agreement to reduce that equipment would not

only greatly minimize the evil of any war that did break out, but it

would go a long way toward the abolition of war. A community of men

might be unwilling to renounce their right of fighting one another if

occasion arose, but they might still be willing to agree not to carry

arms or to carry arms of a not too lethal sort, to carry pistols instead

of rifles or sticks instead of swords. That, indeed, has been the

history of social amelioration in a number of communities; it has led

straight to a reduction in the number of encounters. So in the same way

the powers of the world might be willing to adopt such a limitation of

armaments, while still retaining the sovereign right of declaring war

in certain eventualities. Under the assurances of a world council

threatening a general intervention, such a partial disarmament would be

greatly facilitated.

And another aspect of disarmament which needs to be taken up and which

only a world congress can take up must be the arming of barbaric or

industrially backward powers by the industrially and artillery forces in

such countries as efficient powers, the creation of navies Turkey,

Servia, Peru, and the like. In Belgium countless Germans were blown to

pieces by German-made guns, Europe arms Mexico against the United

States; China, Africa, Arabia are full of European and American weapons.

It is only the mutual jealousies of the highly organized States that

permit this leakage of power. The tremendous warnings of our war should

serve to temper their foolish hostilities, and now, if ever, is the time

to restrain this insane arming of the less advanced communities.

But before that can be done it is necessary that the manufacture of war

material should cease to be a private industry and a source of profit to

private individuals, that all the invention and enterprise that blossoms

about business should be directed no longer to the steady improvement of

man-killing. It is a preposterous and unanticipated thing that

respectable British gentlemen should be directing magnificently

organized masses of artisans upon the Tyneside in the business of making

weapons that may ultimately smash some of those very artisans to

smithereens.

At the risk of being called "Utopian" I would submit that the world is

not so foolish as to allow that sort of thing to go on indefinitely. It

is, indeed, quite a recent human development. All this great business of

armament upon commercial lines is the growth of half a century. But it

has grown with the vigor of an evil weed, it has thrown out a dark

jungle of indirect advertisement, and it has compromised and corrupted

great numbers of investors and financial people. It is perhaps the most

powerful single interest of all those that will fight against the

systematic minimization and abolition of war, and rather than lose his

end it may be necessary for the pacifist to buy out all these concerns,

to insist upon the various States that have sheltered them taking them

over, lock, stock, and barrel, as going businesses.

From what we know of officialism everywhere, the mere transfer will

involve almost at once a decline in their vigor and innovating energy.

It is perhaps fortunate that the very crown of the private armaments

business is the Krupp organization and that its capture and suppression

is a matter of supreme importance to all the allied powers. Russia, with

her huge population, has not as yet developed armament works upon a very

large scale and would probably welcome proposals that minimized the

value of machinery and so enhanced that of men. Beyond this and certain

American plants for the making of rifles and machine guns only British

and French capital is very deeply involved in the armaments trade. The

problem is surely not too difficult for human art and honesty.

It is not being suggested that the making of arms should cease in the

world, but only that in every country it should become a State monopoly

and so completely under Government control. If the State can monopolize

the manufacture and sale of spirits, as Russia has done, if it can,

after the manner of Great Britain, control the making and sale of such a

small, elusive substance as saccharin, it is ridiculous to suppose that

it cannot keep itself fully informed of the existence of such elaborated

machinery as is needed to make a modern rifle barrel. And it demands a

very minimum of alertness, good faith, and good intentions for the

various manufacturing countries to keep each other and the world

generally informed upon the question of the respective military

equipments. From this state of affairs to a definition of a permissible

maximum of strength on land and sea for all the high contracting powers

is an altogether practicable step. Disarmament is not a dream; it is a

thing more practicable than a general hygienic convention and more

easily enforced than custom and excise.

Now none of this really involves the abandonment of armies or uniforms

or national service. Indeed, to a certain extent it restores the

importance of the soldier at the expense of machinery. A world

conference for the suppressing of the peace and the preservation of

armaments would neither interfere with such dear incorrigible squabbles

as that of the orange and green factions in Ireland, (though it might

deprive them of their more deadly weapons,) nor absolutely prohibit war

between adjacent States. It would, however, be a very powerful delaying

force against the outbreak of war, and it would be able to insist with a

quite novel strength upon the observation of the rules of war.

It is no good pretending that mere pacifism will end war; what will end

war, what, indeed, may be ending war at the present time, is

war--against militarism. Force respects itself and no other power. The

hope for a world of peace in the future lies in that, in the possibility

of a great alliance, so powerful that it will compel adhesions, an

alliance prepared to make war upon and destroy and replace the

Government of any State that became aggressive in its militarism. This

alliance will be in effect a world congress perpetually restraining

aggressive secession, and obviously it must regard all the No-Man's

Lands--and particularly that wild waste, the ocean--as its highway. The

fleets and marines of the allied world powers must become the police of

the wastes and waters of the earth.

VI.

Now, such a collective control of belligerence and international

relations is the obvious common sense settlement of the present world

conflict, it is so manifest, so straight-forward that were it put

plainly to them it would probably receive the assent of nineteen sane

men out of twenty in the world. This, or some such thing as this, they

would agree, is far better than isolations and the perpetual threat of

fresh warfare.

But against it there work forces, within these people and without, that

render the attainment of this generally acceptable solution far less

probable than a kind of no-solution that will only be a reopening of all

our hostilities and conflicts upon a fresh footing. Some of these forces

are vague and general, and can only be combated by a various and

abundant liberal literature, in a widely dispersed battle in which each

right-thinking man must do as his conscience directs him. There are the

vague national antagonisms, the reservations in favor of one's own

country's righteousness, harsh religious and social and moral cant of

the Carlyle type, greed, resentment, and suspicion. The greatest of

these vague oppositions is that want of faith which makes man say war

has always been and must always be, which makes them prophesy that

whatever we do will become corrupted and evil, even in the face of

intolerable present evils and corruptions.

When at the outbreak of the war I published an article headed "The War

That Will End War," at once Mr. W.L. George hastened to reprove my

dreaming impracticability. "War there has always been." Great is the

magic of a word! He was quite oblivious to the fact that war has changed

completely in its character half a dozen times in half a dozen

centuries; that the war we fought in South Africa and the present war

and the wars of mediaeval Italy and the wars of the Red Indians have

about as much in common as a cat and a man and a pair of scissors and a

motor car--namely, that they may all be the means of death.

If war can change its character as much as it has done it can change it

altogether; if peace can be kept indefinitely in India or North America,

it can be kept throughout the world. It is not I who dream, but Mr.

George and his like who are not yet fully awake, and it is their

somnolence that I dread more than anything else when I think of the

great task of settlement before the world.

It is this rather hopeless, inert, pseudo-sage mass of unbelievers who

render possible the continuation of war dangers. They give scope for

the activities of the evil minority which hates, which lives by pride

and grim satisfactions, and which is therefore anxious to have more war

and more. And it is these inert half-willed people who will obstruct the

disentanglement of the settlement from diplomatic hands. "What do we

know about the nuance of such things?" they will ask, with that laziness

that apes modesty. It is they who will complain when we seek to buy out

the armaments people. Probably all the private armament firms in the

world could be bought up for seventy million pounds, but the unbelievers

will shake their heads and say: "Then there will only be something else

instead."

Yet there are many ungauged forces on the side of the greater

settlement. Cynicism is never more than a half-truth, and because man is

imperfect it does not follow that he must be futile. Russia is a land of

strange silences, but it is manifest that whatever the innermost quality

of the Czar may be, he is no clap-trap vulgar conqueror of the

Wilhelm-Napoleon pattern. He began his reign, and he may yet crown his

reign, with an attempt to establish peace on a newer, broader

foundation. His religion, it would seem, is his master and not his

servant. There has been no Russian Bernhardi.

And there has been much in America, much said and much done, since the

war broke out that has surprised the world. I may confess for myself,

and I believe that I shall speak for many other Europeans in this

matter, that what we feared most in the United States was levity. We

expected mere excitement, violent fluctuations of opinion, a confused

irresponsibility, and possibly mischievous and disastrous interventions.

It is no good hiding an open secret. We judged America by the peace

headline. It is time we began to offer our apologies to America and

democracy. The result of reading endless various American newspapers and

articles, of following the actions of the American Government, of

talking to representative Americans, is to realize the existence of a

very clear, strong national mentality, a firm, self-controlled,

collective will, far more considerable in its totality than the world

has ever seen before.

New York Times Current History: The European War, Vol 2, No. 1, April, 1915 April-September, 1915 · 第 6 / 28 段