Section III of the Hague Convention, entitled “The Military Authority

over the Territories of the Enemy State,” relates to economic questions.

These clauses are very clear and need not be discussed. If the Tribunal

will allow me to recall them in reading, here is Section III of the

Hague Convention which I put into the document book as Document Number

RF-114, and which is entitled, “The Military Authority over the

Territories of the Enemy State”:

“Article 42: A territory is considered occupied when it is

placed actually under the authority of the hostile army. The

occupation extends only to the territories where this authority

has been established and can be exercised.

“Article 43: The authority of the legitimate power having in

fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter. . .”

THE PRESIDENT: I think we can take judicial notice of these articles of

the Convention.

M. GERTHOFFER: I shall therefore not read this article, since the

Tribunal knows the Convention, and shall simply limit myself to certain

juridical remarks.

These texts of the Hague Convention show in a very clear way that the

Germans could seize in occupied countries only what was necessary for

the maintenance of troops indispensable in the occupation of the

territories. All items which were levied beyond these limits were in

violation of the texts which you know, and consequently these acts were

acts of plundering.

Counsel for the Defense may contend that all these prescriptions must be

put aside, because Germany had set herself the goal of continuing the

war against Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the United States of America. The

Defense may claim that, because of this, Germany was in a state of need

and had to counter the prescriptions of the Hague Convention, trying to

interpret the Article 23 G as allowing destruction or seizure even of

private property.

I shall immediately answer that this text does not lay down rules

relating to the conduct of the occupant in enemy territory. These last

prescriptions are contained, I repeat, in Articles 42 to 56, but they

referred to the conduct, which the belligerents must observe in the

course of the combat.

The words “to seize” in the sentence, “. . . to seize enemy property

except in cases where . . . these seizures are absolutely demanded by

military necessity,” mean—and there can be no discussion as to

translation because actually the French text is binding—the words “to

seize” mean not to appropriate a thing, but to put it under the

protection of the law with a view to leaving it unused, in the state in

which it was found, and keeping it for its true owner or for whoever can

show right to it. Such a seizure permits the military authority, as long

as the action lasts, to prevent the owner from using the property

against its troops, but it does not authorize the military authority in

any case to appropriate it for itself.

Acts of economic plunder are all contrary to the principles of

international law and furthermore are formally provided for by Article

6b of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of August 1945.

These constant violations of the Hague Convention had the result of

enriching Germany and permitted her to continue the war against Britain,

the Soviet Union, and the United States, while they ruined the invaded

countries, the populations of which, subjected to a regime of slow

famine, are now physically weakened and, but for the victory of the

Allies, would be on the road to progressive extermination.

These inhuman deeds therefore constitute War Crimes which come within

the competency of the International Military Tribunal as far as the

leaders of the Reich are concerned.

Before finishing this rapid summary of juridical questions, the Tribunal

will permit me to refute in advance an argument which will certainly be

presented by the Defense, especially as far as economic plunder is

concerned. They will claim that your high jurisdiction did not exist,

that international penal law had not yet been formulated in any text

when the defendants perpetrated the acts with which they are at present

charged, and that therefore they could not be condemned to any sentence

whatsoever by virtue of the principle of non-retroactivity of penal

laws.

Why, Gentlemen, is this principle adopted by modern legislation? It is

indisputable that any person who is conscious of never having violated

any legal prescription could not be condemned because of acts which were

committed in such circumstances.

For example, somebody issues a check without funds to cover it, before

his country had adopted a penalty for such an offense. But the case

which is submitted to you is quite different. The defendants cannot

maintain that they were not conscious of having violated legislation of

any kind. First of all, they violated international conventions: The

Hague Convention of 1907, the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 27 August 1938, and

then they violated all the penal laws of the invaded countries.

How, in these proceedings, shall economic plunder be qualified? Theft,

swindling, blackmail, and even, I will add, murder—since, in order to

attain their aims, the Germans have premeditated and committed numerous

murders which enabled them to intimidate the population in order to

plunder them better.

From the point of view of domestic law, these deeds certainly fall under

the application of Articles 295 and the following ones of the French

penal code, and especially of Article 303, which stipulates as guilty of

murder all offenders, of whatever category, who, to execute their

crimes, resort to torture or perpetrate barbarous acts. I will add that

the defendants violated even the German criminal code, in particular

under Articles 249 and following.

Counsel for the Defense will certainly stress that some leaders of the

invaded countries were in agreement with the Reich Government as to the

economic collaboration, and that consequently the Reich Government

cannot be charged with acts which derive from these agreements.

Such arguments must be refuted:

1.) If, in all the invaded countries, patriots resisted with more or

less courage, it is true that some of them, out of inertia, fear, or

self interest, turned traitors to their country. They have been or will

be condemned. But the crimes committed by certain of them cannot be

exonerating or even extenuating circumstances in favor of the

defendants, especially since the latter had very often put these

traitors in to manage the occupied countries. The fact of having brought

individuals to turn traitor to their country only aggravates, on the

contrary, the heavy charges against the defendants.

2.) These so-called agreements had all been obtained by pressure or by

threat. The concluded contracts show that they were solely in favor of

Germany, who, as a matter of fact, never brought any compensation or

illusory benefits—very often their burdensome nature is seen from the

mere reading of such contracts, as I will have the honor to show in

certain particular cases.

With these explanations my general observations on the economic pillage

are concluded, and if the Tribunal is willing we can examine the

particular case of Denmark.

When the Germans invaded Denmark, contrary to all the prescriptions of

the law of nations and to their engagements, they were not certain of

rapidly dominating Western Europe. At first they laid down the principle

that they would not take anything in the country, but after their

success of May 1940 their attitude changed; and little by little they

treated Denmark more or less like the other occupied countries.

Nevertheless, they sought to achieve annexation pure and simple, and

took rigorous measures against the population only in the course of

1942, when they saw that they would not be able to win Denmark over.

From the economic point of view, and to assure their domination, they

tried to have at their disposal the majority of the Danish means of

payment, and they used to this effect two methods which to a great

extent were used by them in other countries: (1) The levying of a

veritable tribute of war, under the pretext of maintaining their army of

occupation; (2) the functioning of the so-called clearing agreement to

their almost exclusive benefit. These two methods should be studied in

Chapter I of this statement.

Chapter I, German seizure of the means of payment; costs of occupation.

Article 49 of the Hague Convention stipulates that if the occupant

levies a tax the money will only be for the army of occupation or for

the administration of the territory.

The occupant can therefore levy a tax for the maintenance of its army,

but this tax must not exceed the sum strictly necessary. The needs of

the army of occupation mean, not the costs of armament and equipment,

but only the costs of billeting, food, and pay. I say normal expenses,

which exclude luxuries.

Article 52 authorizes the occupying power to exact from the communes or

inhabitants, for the needs of the army, requisitions in kind and

services, with the express condition that they should be proportionate

with the resources of the country and of such a nature that they should

not imply for the population the obligation to take part in operations

against their own country.

The same Article 52 stipulates that levies in kind shall be paid as far

as possible in cash; otherwise they are to be confirmed by receipts and

the sums due paid as soon as possible.

In other words, the Hague Convention allows the occupying army to

requisition in occupied territories what is necessary for the

maintenance of the troops but under two conditions, apart from

contributions in kind: 1) That the requisitions and the services should

be proportionate to the resources of the country, that is to say, that

sufficient should be left over for the inhabitants, to enable them at

least to live; 2) that the levies should be paid as soon as possible.

This is not a question of fictitious payment made with funds extorted

from occupied countries, but actual payment, which implies supplying

real equivalents.

Article 53 of the Convention of The Hague which permits the occupying

powers to seize everything which could be turned against them—and in

particular, cash, funds, and securities of all kinds belonging to the

state of the occupied country—does not authorize the occupying power to

appropriate them.

According to information furnished by the Danish Government, when the

Germans entered Denmark they declared that they would not demand

anything from the country, but that supplies for the German Army would

come from the Reich.

Nevertheless, instead of buying Danish crowns to permit their troops to

spend money in Denmark, as early as 9 May 1940 they imposed the

circulation of notes of the Reichskreditkasse, which is shown in Number

26 of the VOBIF, which I have already submitted under Document Number

RF-93.

Upon the protestations of the National Danish Bank against the issuing

of foreign paper money, the Germans withdrew these notes from

circulation, but demanded the opening of an account at the National

Bank, promising to draw upon it only for sums which were essential for

the maintenance of their army in Denmark.

But the Germans did not lose time in violating their promises and in

levying on their account, in spite of the Danish protests, sums

infinitely superior to the needs of the army of occupation.

According to the information given by the Danish Government, the Germans

levied, per month, an average of 43 million crowns in 1940; 37 million

crowns in 1941; 39 million crowns in 1942; 83 million crowns in 1943;

157 million crowns in 1944; 187 million crowns in 1945. The total of

these levies amounts, according to the Danish Government, to 4,830

million crowns.

I submit, as Document Number RF-115, the financial report of the Danish

Government concerning this, a report to which I shall refer again in the

course of this statement.

The indications of the Danish Government are corroborated by a German

document discovered by the United States Army, Document EC-86, Page 11,

which I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-116.

This is a secret report of 10 October 1944, written by the Arbeitsstab

Ausland, and concerns the requisition of funds of the occupied

territories.

On Page 11 the following is said:

“Denmark is not considered as occupied territory, and therefore

does not pay occupation expenses. The means necessary for the

German troops are placed at the disposal of the central

administration of the Reichskreditkasse by the Central Danish

Bank, through channels of ordinary credit. In any case, for the

duration of the war uniform payment by Denmark is assured.”

The writer of this report says that the levies to 31 March 1944, for

occupation expenses, amount to: 1940-1941, 531 million crowns;

1941-1942, 437 million crowns; 1942-1943, 612 million crowns; 1943-1944,

1,391 million crowns; which represents, up to 31 March 1944, levies

amounting to 2,971 million crowns. This corresponds to the information

given by the Danish Government for approximately the same period—2,723

million crowns.

The same German report shows that the rate of exchange for the mark, as

compared to the rate of exchange for the crown, had been fixed by the

occupying powers at 47.7, then at 53.1 marks per 100 crowns.

Even though the Germans claim, against all evidence, that Denmark was

not an occupied territory, they levied in this country the total sum of

4,830 million crowns, an enormous sum in view of the number of

inhabitants and the resources of the country. In reality, this was

nothing other than a war tribute which Germany imposed under the pretext

of furnishing means of payment to her army stationed in Denmark.

The maintenance of the army necessary for occupying Denmark did not

necessitate such large expenses. It is evident that the Germans used, as

in other countries, the majority of the funds extorted from Denmark to

finance their war effort.

Chapter II, clearing.

In 1931 Germany faced financial difficulties, which she used as a

pretext to declare a general moratorium on all her foreign obligations.

Nevertheless, to be able to continue, to a certain extent, her

commercial operations with foreign countries, she concluded with most of

the other nations agreements permitting the payment of her commercial

debts, and even of certain financial debts, on the basis of a system of

compensation called “clearing”.

Ever since the beginning of the occupation, 9 April 1940, and for its

duration, the Danish authorities did everything they could, but in vain,

to counteract German activity in this direction.

Under the pressure of occupying forces Denmark could not prevent her

credit in the clearing balance from constantly increasing, owing to the

German purchases which were made without the guarantee of any

equivalent. According to the Danish Government, the credit balance of

the account progressed in the following way: 31 December 1940,

388,800,000 crowns; 31 December 1941, 784,400,000 crowns; 31 December

1942, 1,062,200,000 crowns; 31 December 1943, 1,915,800,000 crowns; 31

December 1944, 2,694,600,000 crowns; 30 April 1945, 2,900 million

crowns.

These data are corroborated by those of the German report which I

submitted a few minutes ago under Exhibit Number RF-116 (Document Number

EC-86), and according to which, on 31 March 1944, the Germans had

procured for themselves means of payment, through clearing, amounting to

a total sum of 2,243 million crowns.

It has not been possible to establish the use the occupants made of the

sum of 7,730 million crowns which they obtained fraudulently, to the

detriment of Denmark, with the help of the indemnity of occupation and

of clearing.

The information which we have up to now does not enable us to estimate

the extent of the operations carried out by the Germans on the black

market. Nevertheless, the writer of the report of 10 October 1944,

presented previously, indicates; and I quote:

“An estimate of the amounts spent on the black market must not

be made. Of course, one may assume that members of the Wehrmacht

are buying at top prices butter and other products in Denmark.

But it is impossible to fix these sums even approximately, for

the black market seems to be less widespread and less well

co-ordinated than in the other occupied territories of the West,

and is closer to the structure of the German black market with

its fluctuating prices. Nevertheless, the prices of the Danish

black market can generally be considered as much lower than the

German prices. It is, therefore, not possible to speak of an

average high price, as for instance in France, Belgium, and

Holland.”

It is worth noting that the Germans, and especially members of the

Wehrmacht, used to operate on the black market and that payment was

effected with funds extorted from Denmark.

Concerning the apparently regular requisitions, we also lack the

necessary information to be able to give precise details. Nevertheless,

according to a secret report of 15 October 1944, addressed by the German

officer of the Economic Staff for Denmark to his superiors in Frankfurt

an der Oder, a document discovered by the United States Army and which I

submit as Document Number RF-117, the following goods were requistioned

by his department:

“From January to July 1943, 30,000 tons of turf; in May 1944,

6,000 meters of wood. . . .”

The writer adds that they tried to push this production to 10,000 cubic

meters per month.

“. . . in September 1944, 5,785 cubic meters of cut timber,

1,110 meters of uncut timber, 1,050 square meters of plywood,

119 tons of paint for ships, and special wood for the navy.”

Gentlemen, this is but an enumeration of the requisitions which just one

German section happened to make within a short time.

Denmark had to furnish large quantities of cement. Germany furnished

her, in exchange, with the coal necessary for this manufacture.

According to this report which I have mentioned, in August 1944 the

Germans bought in Denmark foodstuffs for over 8,312,278 crowns. These

figures are less than the truth. According to the last information we

have received from the Danish Government, the requisitions of

agricultural items alone amounted, on an average, to 70 million crowns

per month; which represents, for 60 months of occupation, requisitions

to a value of 4,200 million crowns.

Chapter III, requisitions not followed by payment.

Apart from that which they managed to buy with the help of crowns which

were deposited in their accounts under the pretext of the maintenance of

the army of occupation and of clearing, the Germans appropriated an

important quantity of things without having paid for them in any

seemingly regular manner.

It was in this way that they appropriated supplies from the Danish Army

and Navy—lorries, horses, means of transport, furniture, clothing, the

amount of which to date has not been evaluated but might be estimated at

about 850 million crowns. Many requisitions and secret or even apparent

purchases have not yet been estimated exactly.

The same report, submitted under Document Number RF-115, contains, on

the part of the Danish Government, an approximate and provisional

estimate of the damages sustained by Denmark and of the German plunder,

which amounts to 11,600 million crowns.

The information which we have to date does not permit me to give any

more particulars concerning Denmark. I will, therefore, if the Tribunal

will permit me, begin with the particular case of Norway.

The economic plundering of Norway.

The German troops had only arrived in Norway when Hitler declared, on 18

April 1940, that the economic exploitation of that country should be

proceeded with, and for that reason Norway must be considered as an

enemy state.

The information which we have on the economic plundering of Norway is

rather brief; but it is, nevertheless, sufficient to estimate the German

activity in this country during the entire period of the occupation.

Norway was subjected to a regime of most severe rationing. As soon as

they entered the country, the Germans tried—and this was contrary to

the most elementary principles of International Law—to draw from Norway

the maximum resources possible.

In a document discovered by the United States Army, Document Number

ECH-34, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-118, a document which

consists of the _Journal de Marche_ of the economy and armament service

in Norway, written in April 1940, we have excerpts of the directives

relative to administration and economy in the occupied territories.

Here are some excerpts from this document:

“Directive of Armament Economy:

“Norwegian industry, to the extent to which it does not directly

supply the population, is, in its essential branches, of

particular importance for the German war industry. That is why

its production must be put, as soon as possible, at the disposal

of the German armament industry, if this has not already been

done. This production consists mainly of intermediate products,

which require a certain amount of time to be turned into useful

products, and of raw materials which—such as aluminum, for

example—can be used while we wait for our own factories, which

are being built, to be in a position to produce.

“In this connection, above all, the following industrial

branches must be taken into consideration:

“Mining plants for the production of copper, zinc, nickel,

titanium, wolfram, molybdenum, silver, pyrites.

“Furnaces for the production of alumina, aluminum, copper,

nickel, zinc.

“Chemical industries for the production of explosives, synthetic

nitrogen, calcium nitrate, superphosphate, calcium carbide, and

sodium products.

“Armament industries, naval dockyards, power stations,

especially those which are supplying electric current to the

above-named industries.

“The production capacities of these industries must be

maintained at the highest possible level for the duration of the

occupation.

“A certain measure of assistance by the Reich will, at times, be

necessary to overcome industrial bottlenecks which are to be

expected on account of the cutting off of English and overseas

imports.

“Of particular importance is the guaranteeing of raw material

industries which to a considerable part depend on overseas

imports.

“For the moment it may be left undecided whether a future supply

of bauxite from the German stocks is necessary for utilizing the

capacities of the aluminum plants.”

As soon as the troops entered Norway, Germany issued notes of the

Reichskreditkasse which were legal tender only in Norway and which could

not be used in Germany. As in the other occupied countries, this was a

means of pressure to obtain financial advantages, which were supposedly

freely given by the brutally enslaved countries.

The Germans did their best to become masters of the means of payment and

of Norwegian credit by the two methods which have become classic:

Imposition of a veritable war tribute, on the pretext of the maintenance

of the army of occupation, and also the working of a system of clearing

to their profit.

German seizure of the means of payment.

First, indemnities for the maintenance of the army of occupation.

At the beginning of the occupation, the Germans used for their purchases

notes of the Reichskreditkasse. The Norwegian holders of this paper

money used to change it at the Bank of Norway, but this financial

institution could not obtain from the Reichskreditkasse any real

equivalent. In July 1940 the Bank of Norway had to absorb 135 million

Reichsmark from the Reichskreditkasse. To avoid losing control over

monetary circulation, the Bank of Norway was obliged to put the

Norwegian notes at the disposal of the Germans, who drew checks on the

Reichskreditkasse which the Bank of Norway was obliged to discount.

The debit account of the Bank of Norway, following the German levies,

amounted to:

1,450 million crowns at the end of 1940; 3,000 million crowns at the end

of 1941; 6,300 million crowns at the end of 1942; 8,700 million crowns

at the end of 1943; 11,676 million crowns at the liberation of the

country.

All the Norwegian protests were in vain in the face of German

extortions. The constant threat of the new issuing of notes of the

Reichskreditkasse as instruments of obligatory payment beside the

Norwegian currency obliged the local financial authorities to accept the

system of levies on account, without actual cover, which was less

dangerous than the issuing of paper money over the circulation of which

the Norwegian administration had no power of control.

This may be seen in particular from a secret letter sent on 17 June 1941

by General Von Falkenhorst, Commander-in-Chief in Norway, to the Reich

Commissioner, Reichsleiter Terbeven, a copy of which was found not long

ago in Norway and which I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number

RF-119. In this document, after having stated that one could not reduce

the expenses of the Wehrmacht in Norway, Von Falkenhorst writes:

“I am, however, of the opinion that the problem cannot be solved

at all in this manner. The only remedy is to abandon completely

the actual monetary system by introducing Reich currency. But of

course this does not come into my domain. I regret, therefore,

that I am not able to propose any other remedies to you,

although I am fully conscious of the seriousness of the

situation in which you find yourself.”

To the indemnities for the alleged maintenance of the army of occupation

must be added a sum of 3,600 million crowns paid by the Norwegian

Treasury for the billeting of German troops. This information comes to

us from a report from the Norwegian Government, which I submit as

Document Number RF-120.

From the sum of approximately 12,000 million crowns levied for the

alleged maintenance of the occupation troops, a large part was used for

other purposes; for the police and propaganda, in particular, the

occupation spent 900 million crowns. This comes from a second report of

the Norwegian Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-121.

Secondly, clearing.

The clearing agreement of 1937 for the barter of goods between Norway

and Germany remained in force during the occupation but it was the Bank

of Norway which had to advance the necessary funds for the Norwegian

exporters. The Germans also concluded clearing agreements in the name of

Norway with other occupied countries, neutral countries, and with Italy.

At the liberation, the credit balance of Norwegian clearing amounted to

90 million crowns but this balance does not show the actual situation.

In fact:

1) The imports destined to the German military needs in Norway were

handled through clearing in a very improper manner;

2) For certain goods especially (pelts, furs, and fish) the Germans had

demanded that exportation should be made to the Reich. Then they sold

these products again in other countries, especially Italy as far as fish

was concerned;

3) The Germans, who controlled the fixing of prices, systematically

raised the price of all products imported into Norway which, moreover,

were used for the greater part for the military needs of the occupation.

On the other hand, they systematically lowered the prices of the

products exported from Norway.

In spite of all their efforts and sacrifices, and owing to the

fraudulent operations of the occupiers, the Norwegian authorities could

not prevent a very dangerous inflation.

From the report of the Norwegian Government, which I submitted under

Document Number RF-120 a few moments ago, it is seen that the paper

currency which in April 1940 amounted to 712 million crowns, rose

progressively to reach, on 7 May 1945, 3,039 million crowns. An

inflation of this extent, resulting from the activities of the

occupiers, enables us to measure the impoverishment of the country. The

same report indicates that the Germans did not manage to seize the gold

of the Norwegian Bank, as that had been hidden in good time.

Let us now, Gentlemen, examine the levies in kind.

The Germans proceeded, in Norway, to make numerous requisitions which

were or were not followed by so-called regular payments. According to

the report of the Norwegian Government, here is the list of

requisitioned goods: Meat, 30,000 tons; dairy products and eggs, 61,000

tons; fish, 26,000 tons; fruit and vegetables, 68,000 tons; potatoes,

500,000 tons; beverages and vinegar, 112,000 tons; fats, 10,000 tons;

wheat and flour, 3,000 tons; other foodstuffs, 5,000 tons; hay and

straw, 300,000 tons; other fodder, 13,000 tons; soap, 8,000 tons.

But this list which I have just read to the Tribunal includes only the

official purchases, which were made with Norwegian currency and paid for

through clearing; it does not include the illicit purchases.

At present, it is not yet possible to make estimates. As an example, we

can say, however, that the export of fish, most of which went to

Germany, for 1 year only (1942) came to about 202,400 tons, whereas the

official requisitions during the whole occupation amounted only to

26,000 tons.

As in other occupied territories, the Germans forced the continuation of

work under threat of arrest.

Most of the Norwegian merchant fleet escaped from the Germans;

nevertheless, they requisitioned all the ships they could, especially

most of the fishing boats.

Even if the occupier could not seize all railway rolling stock, trams,

as well as about 30,000 motor vehicles, were transported to Germany.

If we refer to the report of 10 October 1944 of the German Economic

Service, which I submitted under Exhibit RF-116 (Document Number EC-86),

we will see that the writer of the report himself estimates that the

effort demanded from Norway was beyond her possibilities; and he writes:

“. . . Norwegian economy is especially heavily burdened by the

demands of the occupation Forces. For this reason the cost of

occupation had to be limited to cover only a part of the

expenses of the Wehrmacht. . . .”

After having mentioned that the cost of occupation which had been

collected up to January 1943 amounted to 7,535 million crowns, which

corroborates the data given by the Norwegian Government, the writer of

the German report says:

“This sum of more than 5,000 million Reichsmark is, indeed, very

high for Norway. Much richer countries, as for example, Belgium,

pay hardly more, and Denmark does not even supply half of this

sum. These large payments can only be made possible by German

additions. It is, therefore, not surprising that the

German-Norwegian trade is in Germany’s favor—that is, it is

subsidized. Norway, owing to her very small population, can

hardly put labor at the disposal of the German war economy. She

is, therefore, one of the few countries which owe us certain

amounts in clearing.”

Further on, the writer adds:

“. . . If we deduct approximately 140 million Reichsmark from

the expenses of the occupation and the various credits

calculated above, we have Norwegian payments to the still

considerable amount of approximately 4,900 million Reichsmark.”

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

M. GERTHOFFER: I had the honor, this morning, of relating to you how the

occupiers were able to exact great quantities of the means of payment

from Norway. We shall now see, from the first data which have been given

us, the use to which the occupiers put these means of payment.

The Germans seized, as in the other occupied countries, considerable

private property on some pretext or other—property belonging to Jews,

Freemasons, or Scout associations. It has been impossible, so far, to

make a very exact evaluation of this spoliation. We can therefore only

give some indication from memory. According to the report of the

Norwegian Government, submitted under Document Number RF-121, in 1941

the Germans seized all the radio sets. . .

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any evidence to support the facts you are

stating now?

M. GERTHOFFER: This is based on information contained in the report of

the Norwegian Government which I have submitted under Document Number

RF-121.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

M. GERTHOFFER: According to that report, in 1941 the Germans seized

almost all the radio sets belonging to private individuals. The value of

these radio sets is approximately 120 million kroner. The Germans

imposed heavy fines on the Norwegian communities under the most varied

pretexts, notably Allied bombing raids and acts of sabotage.

In the report presented under Document Number RF-121 the Norwegian

Government gives two or three examples of these collective fines: on 4

March 1941, after a raid on Lofoten, the population of the small

community of Ostvagoy had to pay 100,000 kroner. Communities also had to

support German families and families of “Quislings.”

On 25 September 1942, after a British raid on Oslo, one hundred citizens

were obliged to pay 3,500,000 kroner. In January 1941 Trondheim,

Stavanger, and Vest-Opland had to pay 60,000, 50,000, and 100,000

kroner, respectively. In September 1941 the municipality of Stavanger

was obliged to pay 2 million kroner for an alleged sabotage of telegraph

lines. In August 1941 Rogaland had to pay 500,000 kroner, and Aalesund

had to pay 100,000 kroner.

It can thus be stated in principle that, by various procedures which

differed hardly from those employed in other countries, the Germans

during the occupation of Norway not only exhausted all the financial

resources of that country but placed it considerably in debt.

It has not been possible to furnish a detailed account of German

extortions, whether made after requisitions, followed or not by

indemnities, or by purchase, apparently conducted by mutual agreement

fictitiously settled with those very means of payment extorted from

Norway.

In the report which I have submitted under Document Number RF-121, the

Norwegian Government tabulated the damages and losses suffered by its

country. I shall give a summary of this table to the Tribunal.

The Norwegian Government estimates that the damages suffered by industry

and commerce amount to a total of 440 million kroner, of which the

Germans have paid, fictitiously of course, only 7 million kroner;

merchant vessels to the value of 1,733 million kroner, for which Germany

has made no settlement; damage to ports and installations amounts to 74

million kroner, for which Germany has settled fictitiously only to the

extent of 1 million kroner; for railroads, canals, airports, and their

installations, the spoliation represents the sum of 947 million, for

which Germany has fictitiously paid 490 million kroner; roads and

bridges, 199 million kroner, for which the settlement amounts to 67

million; spoliation of agriculture reached 242 million kroner, of which

only 46 million have been settled; personal property, 239 million, of

which nothing has been settled; various requisitions, not included in

the preceding categories, amount to 1,566 million kroner, for which the

occupier, fictitiously, has settled up to the amount of 1,154 million

kroner. The Norwegian Government estimates that the years of man-labor

applied to the German war effort represent a sum of 226 million kroner.

It estimates, on the other hand, that the years of man-labor lost to the

national economy by deportation to Germany and forced labor by the order

of Germany amounts to 3,122 million kroner. Forced payments to German

institutions amount to 11,054 million kroner, for which Germany has made

no settlement whatsoever. The grand total, according to the Norwegian

Government, is 21,086 million kroner, which represents 4,700 million

dollars.

Norway suffered particularly during the German occupation. Indeed,

though her resources are considerable, notably timber from the forests,

minerals such as nickel, wolfram, molybdenum, zinc, copper, and

aluminum, nevertheless Norway must import indispensable food products

for feeding her population.

As the Germans had absolute control over maritime traffic, nothing could

come into Norway without their consent. They could therefore, by

pressure, as they had to do in France by means of the line of

demarcation between the two zones, impose their demands more easily. The

rations, as fixed by the occupiers, were insufficient to insure the

subsistence of the Norwegian population. The continued undernourishment

over a period of years resulted in very serious consequences: Disease

multiplied, mortality likewise increased, and the future of the

population has been jeopardized by the physical deficiencies of its

younger element.

These are the few observations which I had to make on the subject of

Norway. I shall, if the Tribunal will permit, now deal with the part

which relates to the Netherlands.

Economic pillage of the Netherlands.

In invading the Netherlands in contravention of all the principles of

the law of nations, the Germans installed themselves in a country

abundantly provided with the most varied wealth, in a country in which

the inhabitants were the best nourished of Europe and which, in

proportion to the population, was one of the wealthiest in the world.

The gold reserve of Holland exceeded the amount of bills in circulation.

Four years later when the Allies liberated that country, they found the

population afflicted by a veritable famine; and apart from the

destruction resulting from military operations, a country almost

entirely ruined by the spoliation of the occupation.

The dishonest intentions of Germany appear in a secret report by

Seyss-Inquart on his governorship. This report, dating from 29 May to 19

July 1940, was discovered by the United States Army. It has been

registered under the number Document 997-PS, and I submit it to the

Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-122. These are the chief extracts from

this report:

“It was clear that with the occupation of the Netherlands a

large number of economic and also police measures had to be

taken, the first ones of which were for the purpose of reducing

the consumption of the population in order to obtain supplies

for the Reich, on the one hand, and to secure a just

distribution of the remaining supplies, on the other hand. With

regard to the task assigned, endeavors had to be made for all

these measures to bear the signature of Dutchmen. The Reich

Commissioner therefore authorized the Secretaries General to

take all the necessary measures through legal channels.

“In fact, to date, nearly all orders concerning the seizure of

supplies and their distribution to the population and all

decrees regarding restrictions on the moulding of public opinion

have been issued. But agreements concerning the transport of

extraordinarily large supplies to the Reich have also been made,

all of which bear the signatures of the Dutch Secretaries

General or the competent economic leaders, so that all of these

measures have the character of being voluntary. It should be

mentioned in this connection that the Secretaries General were

told in the first conference that loyal co-operation was

expected of them, but that they were entitled to resign if

something should be ordered which they felt they could not

endorse. Up to date none of the Secretaries General have made

use of this privilege, so that one may reasonably conclude that

they have complied with all requests of their own free will.

“The seizure and distribution of food supplies and textiles have

been almost completed. At least all the appropriate orders have

been issued and are being executed.

“A series of instructions concerning the reorientation of

agriculture have been issued and are being executed. The

essential point is to use the available fodder in such a way

that as large a stock as possible of horned cattle, about 80

percent, will be carried over into the next farming season, at

the expense of the disproportionately high stock of chickens and

hogs. Rules and restrictions have been introduced in the

organization of traffic, and the rationing of gasoline was

applied on the same lines as in the Reich.

“Restriction of the right to give notice at work, as well as to

cancel leases, has been issued in order to curb the liberal and

capitalistic habits of the Dutch employers and to avoid unrest.

In the same way the terms for repayment of debts have been

extended under certain circumstances. . . .

“. . . the ordinance concerning registration and control of

enemy property, as well as confiscation of the property of

persons who show hostility to the Reich and to Germans, were

issued in the name of the Reich Commissioner. On the basis of

this ordinance an administrator has already been appointed for

the property of the royal family.

“Stocks of raw materials have been seized and, with the consent

of the General Field Marshal, distributed in such a way that the

Dutch have enough raw materials to maintain their economy for

half a year, so that they receive the same allocation quotas as

obtain in the Reich. The same principle of equal treatment is

being used in the supply of food, et cetera. This enabled us to

secure considerable supplies of raw materials for the Reich, as

for instance 70,000 tons of industrial fats, which is about half

the amount which the Reich is lacking. Legislation concerning

exchange has been introduced on the same pattern as in the

Reich.

“Finally we succeeded in causing the Dutch Government to supply

all the amounts which the Reich and the German administration in

the Netherlands need, so that these expenses do not burden the

Reich budget in any way.

“Sums of guilders have been made available to redeem the

occupation marks to the amount of about 36 million; an

additional 100 million for the purposes of the occupation army,

especially for extension of the airports; 50 million for the

purchase of raw materials to be shipped to the Reich, so far as

they are not booty; and amounts to guarantee the unrestricted

transfer of the savings of the Dutch workers brought into the

Reich, to their families, _et cetera_. Finally, the rate of

exchange of the occupation marks, set at first by the Army High

Command in the proportion of 1 guilder to 1.50 Reichsmark, has

been reduced to the correct proportion of 1 guilder to 1.33

Reichsmark.

“Above all, however, it was possible to obtain the consent of

the President of the Bank of The Netherlands, Trip, to a measure

suggested by Commissioner General Fischböck and approved by the

General Field Marshal, namely the unrestricted mutual obligation

of accepting each other’s currency. That means that the Bank of

The Netherlands is bound to accept any amount of Reichsmark

offered to it by the Reich Bank and in return to supply Dutch

guilders at the rate of 1.33, that is, 1 Reichsmark equals 75

cents. The Reich Bank alone has control in these matters, not

the Bank of The Netherlands, which will be notified only of

individual transactions.

“This ruling goes far beyond all pertinent rulings hitherto made

with the political economies of neighboring countries, including

the Protectorate, and actually represents the first step towards

a currency union. In consideration of the significance of the

agreement, which already affects the independence of the Dutch

State, it is of special weight that the President of the Bank,

Trip, who is very well-known in western banking and financial

circles, signed this agreement of his own free will in the above

sense.”

As you will see from the explanations which I shall have the honor of

submitting to you, it was chiefly in the Netherlands that the Germans

used all their ingenuity in extorting the means of payment. This

spoliation will form the subject of the first chapter.

We shall then examine the use made by the occupiers of these means of

payment. In a second chapter we shall discuss the black market; in a

third, we shall consider the acquisition made in a manner only outwardly

regular; a fourth chapter will be devoted to various kinds of

spoliation. Finally, we shall touch upon the chief consequences to the

Netherlands of this economic pillage.

Chapter 1, German seizure of means of payment.

A.) Indemnity for occupation costs.

I have already had the privilege, Gentlemen, of explaining under what

conditions and within what limit, by virtue of the Hague Convention, the

occupying power may raise contributions in money for the maintenance of

its army of occupation.

I shall confine myself to reminding the Tribunal that these costs which

are charged to the occupied countries can include only the costs of

billeting, feeding, and possibly of paying those soldiers strictly

necessary for the occupation of territories.

The Germans knowingly ignored these principles by imposing upon the

Netherlands the payment of an indemnity for the maintenance of their

troops which was far out of proportion to the needs of the latter.

According to information furnished by the Netherlands Government, which

is contained in three reports (the reports of Trip, Hirschfeld, and the

Minister of Finance) which I submit as Document Number RF-123, the

following sums were exacted on the pretext of being indemnity for the

maintenance of occupation troops: 1940 (7 months), 477 million guilders;

1941, 1,124 million guilders; 1942, 1,181 million guilders; 1943, 1,328

million guilders; 1944, 1,757 million guilders; 1945 (4 months only),

489 million guilders. That makes a total of 6,356 million guilders.

A sum as considerable as this constitutes a veritable war tribute raised

on the pretext of the maintenance of an army of occupation. Germany thus

fraudulently circumvented the regulations of the Hague Convention to

seize a considerable amount of means of payment.

B.) Clearing.

In 1931 Germany, faced with economic and financial difficulties,

declared a general moratorium on her previous commitments. Nevertheless,

in order to be able to continue her foreign commercial operations, she

had concluded with most of the other countries, notably with the

Netherlands, agreements making possible the settling of commercial debts

and, to a certain extent, of financial debts, on the basis of the

exchange system called “clearing.”

Before the war there existed on the Netherlands “clearing” an excess of

imports from Germany. But after the first months of occupation there

was, on the contrary, a considerable excess of exports to Germany,

whereas the receipts coming from that country dropped perceptibly.

From the month of June 1940 onward the Germans exacted from the Dutch

declarations of foreign currency, gold, precious metals, securities, and

foreign credits, as can be seen from the Ordinance of 24 June 1940,

submitted as Document Number RF-95. Moreover, the Dutch could, by virtue

of the same ordinance, be obliged to sell their stocks to the Bank of

The Netherlands.

The German Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, forced the Bank of The

Netherlands to make advances in guilders to maintain equilibrium in

clearing, since Germany could furnish no equivalent in merchandise. On

the other hand, it was decided that the clearing system should be

utilized for the delivery of merchandise as well as for the payment of

any debts.

In fact the Germans could buy merchandise and transferable securities in

Holland without furnishing any equivalent. The credits in marks of the

Dutch sellers were blocked in the Bank of The Netherlands which, on its

part, had been obliged to make an equivalent advance on the clearing

exchange.

To attempt to limit the fall of the Dutch account on the clearing

exchange, and to avoid the transfer by this means of guilders or of

transferable stock into Germany, on 8 October 1940, the Secretary

General of Netherlands Finance imposed a large tax on the marks that

were blocked on the clearing exchange.

However, under date of 31 March 1941, the credit of the Netherlands

exceeded 400 million guilders, which in fact had been advanced by the

Netherlands Government. At this point the occupiers demanded:

1) That a sum of 300 million guilders be withdrawn from the balance of

400 million and deposited in the German Treasury under the heading of

“Military Occupation Costs Incurred ‘Outside’ The Netherlands,” and this

was independent of payments already made by that country for the

occupation costs.

2) By a decision of the Reich Commissioner, under date of 31 March 1941,

reported in the _Verordnungsblatt_ in France, Number 14, which I submit

to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-124, payment operations with the

Reich were no longer to pass through the clearing exchange but to be

operated directly from bank to bank, which would create direct credits

of the Netherlands banks on the German banks at the imposed exchange of

100 Reichsmark for 75.36 guilders.

3) By a decree of the same date, 31 March 1941, which I submit as

Document Number RF-125, the tax on blocked marks, created on 8 October

1940 by the Netherlands authorities, was abolished.

Faced with this situation, particularly dangerous to the Netherlands

treasury, Mr. Trip resigned his position as Secretary General for

Finance and President of The Netherlands Bank.

The Reich Commissioner replaced him with Rost von Tonningen, a notorious

collaborator who complied with all the demands of the occupying power.

As the private banks were unwilling to keep credits in marks at a rate

very disadvantageous to the real parity of 100 Reichsmark to 75.36

guilders, they transferred their credits in marks to the Bank of The

Netherlands. The credit account of the Institute of Exports to Germany,

through operations with that country, rose considerably; while the

credit balance as of 1 April 1941 amounted to 235 million guilders, it

was to rise by 1 May 1945, to 4,488 million guilders.

According to information given by the Netherlands Government, this

credit was accounted for by purchases of all kinds of merchandise made

by the Germans in Holland, of transferable stock or other valuable

papers, by payment of services imposed upon Dutch enterprises, the wages

of workers deported to Germany, and the liquidation debts incurred by

the occupiers.

Apart from these two methods—indemnities for the occupation troops and

clearing—the Germans procured resources for themselves in another

way—by imposing collective fines, and this in violation of the

provisions of Article 50 of the Hague Convention.

In the course of the occupation, under every pretext, the Germans

imposed, by way of reprisal or intimidation, considerable fines upon the

municipalities. These fines had to be paid by the inhabitants, with the

exception of persons of German nationality, members of pro-Nazi

associations (NSB, Waffen-SS, NSKK, Society for Technical Aid Services

of the Dutch-German cultural community), and persons working for the

Germans. According to information which has been obtained up to the

present, of only 62 municipalities the total fines thus imposed amounted

to a minimum of 20,243,024 guilders. This is based on testimony of the

Netherlands Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-126.

From the same testimony, in the archives forgotten by the Germans at The

Hague, there have been discovered two copies of letters relative to

these collective fines. According to the first of these copies, which is

a letter of 8 March 1941, collective fines amounting to 18 million

guilders had been raised at the beginning of the year 1941. From the

second, we learn that Hitler had given the order to employ this sum for

National Socialist propaganda in the Netherlands. I quote:

“Reich Commissioner, The Hague, 1808, 8 March 1941.

“To Liaison Headquarters, Berlin, 1720 hours; to be submitted

immediately to Reichsleiter M. Bormann.

“A sum of 18.5 million guilders representing contributions

exacted as reprisals from some Dutch cities, will arrive in the

next few days. The Reich Commissioner is inquiring whether the

Führer has earmarked this sum for a special purpose or if it is

to be used in the same way as the Führer has previously ordered

in the case of confiscated enemy property. At that time the

Führer stipulated that these sums should be spent in the

Netherlands for the needs of the community under the proper

political considerations.

“Heil Hitler!”—Signed—“Schmidt, Münster, Commissioner

General.”

This, then, is the translation of the answer, Document Number RF-126:

“Obersalzberg, 19 March 1941, 1000; Number 4.

“Reichsleiter M. Bormann. . . .”

THE PRESIDENT: One moment! Some of the copies which you have just

submitted to us don’t seem to be accurate and the passage which you have

just been reading is omitted from some of them.

[_Another copy of the document was presented to the President._]

I now have another copy of the document from which you have read. The

two copies which have been handed up are not identical.

M. GERTHOFFER: The document has possibly been improperly numbered. There

are two documents, Number RF-126, which should have been indicated as

RF-126(1), and RF-126(2). The representative of the Government of The

Netherlands certifies the accuracy of the translation of the first copy;

and in the second RF-126 document the same representative of the

Netherlands Government certifies the existence of the copy of the answer

from the headquarters of the Führer.

THE PRESIDENT: The first document is the one you have just read out. The

second document begins with the words, “J’ai soumis aujourd’hui.” Is

that the second document to which you are referring?

M. GERTHOFFER: It is the second document.

THE PRESIDENT: Could we see the originals? They are two different

documents, are they? But they both begin in exactly the same way.

M. GERTHOFFER: The two documents have been submitted by the Netherlands

Government. The representative of the Government of The Netherlands who

has delivered them certifies that these two documents were found in the

Netherlands among German papers.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.

M. GERTHOFFER: The Dutch Government was obliged to make important

payments into the German account; and in the reports submitted as

Document Number RF-123, it is clearly stated that:

1) The Germans required that a sum of 300 million guilders, which was

written to the credit of the Bank of The Netherlands, be used for the

needs of their army of occupation outside the Netherlands and that a sum

of 76 million guilders in gold be deposited for the same use. The total

which the Netherlands had to pay under this pretext, namely, the

maintenance of armies of occupation in other countries, was 376 million

guilders.

2) From June 1941 on, the Netherlands was obliged to pay, as a

contribution to the expenses of the war against Russia, a monthly sum of

37 million guilders, of which a part was payable in gold. The total of

the sum that Germany raised under this heading is 1,696 million

guilders.

3) The Bank of The Netherlands was obliged to undertake the redemption

of Reichskreditkasse notes to the sum of 133 million guilders.

4) The costs of the civilian German government in Holland were charged

to that country and amounted to 173 million guilders.

5) The Dutch Treasury was, moreover, obliged to pay 414 million guilders

to the Reich account, covering divers expenses, such as wages of Dutch

workers deported to Germany, the costs of evacuation of certain regions,

costs of the demolition of fortifications, so-called costs for guarding

railroads, funds placed at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner, and

for various industries utilized by the Germans.

6) The Germans in July 1940 seized 816 bars of gold bullion belonging to

the Bank of The Netherlands, which were in the wreck of a Dutch ship

sunk at Rotterdam, which represented, including costs of recovery, 21

million guilders.

7) The Government of The Netherlands was obliged to bear annual expenses

of 1,713 million guilders to assure the financing of new administrative

services imposed on Holland by the occupying power.

In this way, Holland lost 8,565 million guilders. Altogether, including

the raising of the gold from a ship sunk in the Meuse, the payments

actually made to Germany amount to 11,380 million guilders. If these

costs are added to the costs of occupation and clearing, the total of

the financial charges imposed on Holland during the occupation amounts

to the sum of 22,224 million guilders.

These operations had serious consequences for the economy of the

Netherlands. Indeed, the gold supply, which on 1 April 1940 amounted to

1,236 million guilders, had, by 1 April 1945, fallen to 932 million

guilders, owing to German levies.

The paper money in circulation, on the contrary, had risen from 1,127

million guilders on 1 April 1940, to 5,468 million guilders on 1 April

1945.

When the Germans occupied the Netherlands, a great portion of the gold

of the Bank of The Netherlands had been sent abroad.

However, the Germans, under various pretexts, seized all the gold that

was found in the vaults of the bank. I recall that, under the heading of

indemnity for occupation, they collected 75 million gold guilders; and

for the forced contribution of the Netherlands in the war against

Russia, they demanded about 14.4 million gold guilders.

Rost von Tonningen, Secretary General of Finance and President of the

Bank of The Netherlands, appointed by the Germans, wrote on 18 December

1943 to the Reich Commissioner that there had not been any gold in

Holland since the preceding March. The copy of this letter is submitted

as Document Number RF-127.

A document discovered by the United States Army, listed under Number

ECR-174, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-128, consists of a report

of the Commissioner of the Bank of The Netherlands of 12 June 1941. It,

too, states that the gold reserve of the Bank of The Netherlands

amounted, on 12 June 1941, to 1,021.8 million guilders, of which only

134.6 million guilders were in Holland, the rest being either in

England, South Africa, or the United States. The same report specifies

that all the gold in Holland had been removed.

Not only did the Germans seize the gold of the Bank of The Netherlands,

but they also made requisitions of the gold and other means of foreign

payment in the possession of the population. The occupying power obliged

private individuals to deposit gold which was in their possession with

the Bank of The Netherlands, after which this gold was requisitioned and

handed over to the Reichsbank. A sum of approximately 71.3 million

guilders was paid in this way to the public in exchange for the

requisitioned gold.

In the same way also the Germans bought from the public various foreign

stocks to a sum of 13,224,000 guilders, and Swedish Government

securities to a sum of 4,623,000 guilders.

With important financial means which they had at their disposal, the

Germans proceeded to make large purchases in Holland. Such purchases,

made with funds extorted from the Netherlands, cannot be considered as

having been made in exchange for a real equivalent, but realized only by

fictitious payments.

The Germans, in addition to numerous cases of requisitions which were

followed by no kind of settlement, proceeded to illicit purchases on the

black market and purchases outwardly regular. They thus procured a

quantity of things of all kinds, leaving to the population only a

minimum of products insufficient to insure their vital needs.

In the second chapter of this presentation we shall examine the illicit

purchases on the black market; and in a third chapter, the purchases

that were carried out in seemingly regular ways.

Chapter 2, the black market.

As in all other occupied countries, in Holland the Germans seized

considerable quantities of merchandise on the black market, in violation

of the legislation on rationing which they themselves had imposed.

It has not been possible, in view of the clandestine nature of the

operations, to determine even approximately the quantities of all kinds

of objects which the Germans seized by this dishonest means. However,

the secret report of the German Colonel Veltjens, which I had the honor

of submitting this morning under Exhibit Number RF-112 (Document Number

PS-1765) gives us for a period of 5 months, from July to the end of

November, some indications of the scope of the German purchases. I quote

a passage from the Veltjens report:

“In the Netherlands, since the beginning of the action, the

following purchases were made and paid for by ordinary bank

remittances: Non-ferrous metals, 6,706,744 Reichsmark; textiles,

55,285,568 Reichsmark; wool, 753,878 Reichsmark; leather, skins,

and hides, 4,723,130 Reichsmark; casks, 254,982 Reichsmark;

furniture, 272,990 Reichsmark; food and comestibles, 590,859

Reichsmark; chemical and cosmetic products, 152,191 Reichsmark;

various iron and steel wares, 3,792,166 Reichsmark; rags,

543,416 Reichsmark; motor oil, 52,284 Reichsmark; uncut

diamonds, 25,064 Reichsmark; sundries, 531,890 Reichsmark.

Total: 73,685,162 Reichsmark.”

These purchases were paid for by checks on the banks. A large quantity

of other merchandise, the amount of which it has not been possible to

determine, was paid for by cash with guilders coming from the so-called

occupation indemnity.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

M. GERTHOFFER: In Chapter 3, which deals with the economic plundering of

the Netherlands, we will treat the question of purchases of apparent

regularity from information provided for us by the Government of The

Netherlands.

Industrial production.

From testimony given by the representative of the Dutch Government,

which I submit as Document Number RF-129, it is clear that the Germans

utilized to their own profit the greater part of the industrial

potential of the Netherlands; all important stocks which were in the

factories were thus absorbed. The value of these stocks was not less

than 800 million guilders. Moreover, the occupants proceeded to the

removal of a large amount of machinery. In certain cases these

requisitions were not even followed by fictitious settlements. It has

not yet been possible to establish a balance sheet of these spoliations,

which often included all the machinery of an industry.

As an example, we may indicate that on a requisition order of 4 March

1943, coming from the Reich Commissioner, all the machinery and

technical equipment, including the drawings and blueprints of all the

workshops and accessories of the blast furnaces of an important factory,

were removed without any indemnity and transported to the vicinity of

Brunswick for the Hermann Göring Works. This is shown in the document I

submit as Document Number RF-130.

The Germans had set up in all the occupied countries a certain number of

organizations charged specially with the pillaging of machines. They had

given them the name of Machine Pool Office. These organizations, which

were under the armament inspection, received demands from German

industry for means of production and had to fulfill these demands by

requisitions on the occupied countries.

Moreover, groups of technicians were charged with locating, dismantling,

and transporting the machinery to Germany. The organization of these

official groups of pillagers can be learned from German documents which

are to be brought to your attention when the special case of Belgium

will be outlined to you.

We learn from the report of 1 March 1944, addressed to the military

commandant, that the Machine Pool Office of The Hague could satisfy only

a small proportion of the demands. Thus, under date of 1 January 1944,

these demands totalled 677 million Reichsmark, whereas in the month of

January only 61 million marks worth of machinery had been delivered as

against the new demands of 87 million which made a total demand for

machinery of 703 million Reichsmark at the end of January 1944. This is

shown in a document submitted as Document Number RF-131.

Before leaving the Netherlands the Germans effected large-scale

destruction with a strategic aim, so they said, but above all with the

desire to do damage. When they demolished factories, they removed

beforehand and transported to Germany the machinery which they could

dismantle, as well as the raw materials. They acted in this manner

particularly with respect to the Phillips factories in Eindhoven,

Hilversum, and Bussum; the oil dumps of Amsterdam and Pernes; the

armament factories of Breda, Tilburg, Berg-op-Zoom, and Dordrecht. These

facts are dealt with in the report of the economic officer attached to

the German military commander in Holland, under date of 9 October 1944,

which I submit as Document Number RF-132.

The same report gives some information on the organization of German

looters specialized in the removal of machinery. I give here some

extracts:

“The Phillips Works at Eindhoven was the first and the most

important military objective to be dealt with.”

A little farther on the writer continues:

“Before the invasion by the enemy we succeeded in destroying

these important continental works for the manufacture of radio

valves, lamps, and radio apparatus. This was done after

Volunteer Commando 7”—Fwi.Kdo. 7—“had previously removed the

most valuable metals and special machines.”

Farther on he writes:

“Already on 7 September a commando unit transported in trucks to

the Reich most important non-ferrous metals (wolfram, manganese,

copper) and very valuable apparatus from the Phillips Works.

Volunteer Commando 7 continued to participate in the transfer of

finished and semi-finished products as well as machines from the

Phillips Works. Due to the enemy’s occupation of Eindhoven, the

removal came to a stop. Then the clearing out of the branch

factories of Phillips at Hilversum and Bussum took place. Here

it was possible to remove completely all stocks of non-ferrous

metal products, finished and semi-finished goods, machinery, and

blueprints and designs necessary for production.

“At the same time removal commandos were detailed to the heads

of the various provincial branch offices under the

representative of the Reich Ministry of Armaments and War

Production in the Netherlands.

“In agreement with the forementioned services and the competent

civil offices, these commandos carried through the removal of

important raw materials and products, as well as machinery.

Through the unswerving and commendable zeal of officers,

officials, Sonderführer, and enlisted men it was possible,

during the month of September, to remove to the Reich

considerable stocks of raw materials and products and to supply

the troops with useful material. This action was initiated and

directed in the western and southern districts of the

Netherlands by the officer in charge of volunteers in the

Netherlands.”

Then the writer ends, by saying:

“For the task of evacuation and for the preparation of the ARLZ

measures within the area of 15th Army Command, a squad under the

command of Captain Rieder was detached by Volunteer Commando 7

which also had to act as liaison with the quartermaster staff of

the 15th Army Command. In this case, too, in close co-operation

with the civil officers and Department IVa of 15th Army Command,

good work was done by the removal of raw materials and scarce

goods as well as machinery. These actions commenced only at the

end of the month covered by this report.”

Requisition of raw materials.

Together with the removal of machinery the Government of The Netherlands

gives us exact figures on the stocks of raw materials and manufactured

articles. Apart from the stocks located in the factories, the Germans

acquired considerable quantities of raw materials and manufactured

articles amounting to not less than 1,000 million guilders. This

evaluation does not include the destruction resulting from military

operations, which ranges around 300 million guilders.

Agriculture.

The Germans proceeded to make requisitions and wholesale purchases of

agricultural produce and livestock. A final estimate of these

requisitions, amounting to a minimum of 300 million guilders, is as yet

impossible. To give an idea of their magnitude we point out that at the

end of the year of 1943 the Germans had seized 600,000 hogs, 275,000

cows, and 30,000 tons of preserved meats, as is given in the testimony

of the representative of the Netherlands Government, which I submit as

Document Number RF-133.

In passing, we point out—although this question will be taken up again

by my colleague in his presentation of war crimes against persons—that

on 17 April 1944, without any apparent strategic reason, 20 hectares of

cultivated lands were flooded at Wieringermeer.

Transport and communications.

The Germans made enormous requisitions of transport and communication

material. It is not yet possible to draw up an exact inventory of them.

Nevertheless, the information given by the Netherlands Government makes

it possible to form an idea of the magnitude of these spoliations.

I submit as Document Number RF-134 information given by the

representative of the Netherlands Government concerning transport and

communication. This is a summary of it:

(a) Railways—of 890 locomotives, 490 were requisitioned; of 30,000

freight cars, 28,950 were requisitioned; of 1,750 passenger cars, 1,446

were requisitioned; of 300 electric trains, 215 were requisitioned; of

37 Diesel-engine trains, 36 were requisitioned. In general, the little

material left by the Germans was badly damaged either by wear and tear,

by military operations, or by sabotage. In addition to rolling stock,

the Germans sent to the Reich considerable quantities of rails, signals,

cranes, turntables, repair cars, _et cetera_.

(b) Tramways—the equipment was removed from The Hague and Rotterdam to

German cities. Thus, for example, some 50 tramcars with motors and 42

trailers were sent to Bremen and Hamburg. A considerable amount of

rails, cables, and other accessories were removed and transported to

Germany. The motor buses of the tramway companies were likewise taken by

the occupying power.

(c) The Germans seized the greater part of the motorcars, motorcycles,

and about 1 million bicycles. They left the population only those

machines which would not run.

(d) Navigation—the Germans seized a considerable number of barges and

river boats, as well as a considerable part of the merchant fleet,

totalling about 1.5 million tons.

(e) Postal equipment—the Germans seized a large quantity of telephone

and telegraph apparatus, cables, and other accessories, which has not

yet been computed; 600,000 radio sets were confiscated.

I now come to Chapter 49, miscellaneous spoliation.

Forced labor demanded by the occupier.

From information given by the Netherlands Government, which I submit as

Document Number RF-135, a great number of Dutch workers were obliged to

work either in Holland or in Germany. About 550,000 were deported to the

Reich, which represents a considerable number of hours of work lost to

the national production of the Netherlands.

Plunder of the royal palaces.

The furniture, private archives, stable equipment and carriages, and

wine cellars of the royal house were plundered by the Germans. In

particular, the Palace of Noordeinde was completely looted of its

contents, including furniture, linen, silverware, paintings, tapestries,

art objects, and household utensils. A certain number of similar objects

were removed from the Palace of Het Loo and were to be used in a

convalescent home for German generals.

The archives of the royal family likewise were stolen. This is shown by

a report given by the representative of the Netherlands Government,

which I submit as Document Number RF-136.

Pillage of the city of Arnhem.

Besides numerous cases of individual looting, which are not dealt with

in this present statement, there was a systematically organized pillage

of entire cities. In this manner the town of Arnhem was despoiled in

October and November 1944. The Germans brought in miners from Essen who,

under military orders, proceeded in specialized gangs to dismantle all

the removable furniture and send it and objects of all kinds to Germany.

This is shown in the testimony given by the representative of the

Netherlands Government, which I submit as Document Number RF-137.

The consequences of economic plundering in the Netherlands are

considerable. We shall just mention that the enormous decrease of the

national capital will result in production being below the needs of the

country for many years yet to come. But the gravest consequence is that

affecting the public health, which is irreparable.

The excessive rationing, over many years, of food, clothing, and fuel,

ordered by the occupiers to increase the amount of spoliation, has

brought about an enfeeblement of the population. The average calorie

consumption by the inhabitant, which varied between 2,800 and 3,000,

dropped in large proportions to about 1,800 calories, finally to fall

even to 400 calories in April 1945.

Starting from the summer of 1944, the food situation became more and

more serious. The Reich Commissioner, Seyss-Inquart, forbade the

transport of foodstuffs between the western and northern zones of the

country. This measure, which was not justified by any military

operations, seems only to have been dictated by hatred for the

population, only to persecute and intimidate them, to weaken and

terrorize them.

Not until about December 1944 was this inhuman measure lifted; but it

was too late. Famine had already become general. The death rate in the

cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, Leyden, Delft and Gouda

increased considerably, rising from 198 to 260 percent. Diseases which

had almost been eliminated from these regions reappeared. Such a

situation will have irreparable consequences for the future of the

population. These facts are given in two reports which I submit as

Documents Numbers RF-139 and 140.

By ordering such severe rationing measures in order to get for

themselves products which were indispensable to the existence of the

Netherlands, which is contrary to all principles of international law, I

may say that the German leaders committed one of their gravest crimes.

My statements concerning Holland are concluded. My colleague, M.

Delpech, will now state the case for Belgium.

M. HENRY DELPECH (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr.

President, Gentlemen, I have the honor of presenting to the Tribunal a

statement on the economic plundering of Belgium.

As early as 1940 the National Socialist leaders intended to invade

Belgium, Holland, and northern France. They knew that they should find

there raw materials, equipment, and the factories which would enable

them to increase their war potential.

As soon as Belgium had been occupied, the German military administration

did its best to reap the maximum benefit. To this end the German leaders

took a series of measures to block all existing resources and to seize

all means of payment. Important supplies built up during the years 1936

to 1938 were the object of enormous requisitions. The machines and

equipment of numerous enterprises were dismantled and sent to Germany,

bringing about the closing down of numerous factories and in many

sectors an enforced consolidation.

Given the highly industrial character of this country, the occupying

authorities imposed, under threats of various kinds, a very heavy

tribute upon Belgian industries. Nor was agriculture spared.

The third part of the French economic exposé deals with a study of all

these measures. This will be the subject of four chapters.

Chapter 1 deals with the German seizure of the means of payment. The

second chapter will be devoted to clandestine purchases and an account

of the black market. Chapter 3 will deal with purchases of apparent

regularity while the fourth chapter will concern impressment.

In a fifth chapter the acquisition of Belgian investments in foreign

concerns will be presented to the Tribunal, before concluding and

emphasizing the effect of the German intrusion on the public health.

Finally, a few remarks will be presented concerning the conduct of the

Germans after they had annexed the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

Chapter 1, German seizure of means of payment.

To enslave the country from an economic point of view, the most simple

procedure was to secure the possession of the greater part of the means

of payment and to make impossible the export of currency and valuables

of all kinds.

There is an ordinance of 17 June 1940 which forbids the export of

currency and valuables of all kinds. This ordinance was published in the

_Verordnungsblatt_ for Belgium, Northern France, and Luxembourg and will

hereafter be called by its usual abbreviated form VOBEL. This ordinance

was published in VOBEL, Number 3, and was submitted under Document

Number RF-99. In the VOBEL of the same day appeared a notice dated 9 May

1940, which regulated the issuing of Reichskreditkasse notes to provide

the occupation troops with legal tender. By this means the Germans made

possible the buying, without supplying any equivalent, all they desired

in a country abounding with products of all kinds, without the

inhabitants being able to protect their possessions against the invader.

The occupier used, in addition, three other methods for securing the

greater part of the means of payment. These three methods were: The

creation of an issuing bank, the imposition of war tribute under the

pretext of maintaining occupation troops, and the working of a system of

clearing to their profit alone. These measures will be fully dealt with

in three sections which now follow.

Establishment of an issuing bank.

As soon as they arrived in Belgium the Germans established an office for

supervising banks, which was entrusted at the same time with the control

of the National Bank of Belgium. This was ordered on 14 June

1940—VOBEL, Number 2, which is submitted as Document Number RF-141.

At this time the directorate of the National Bank of Belgium was outside

the occupied territories; but the amount of notes on hand would have

been insufficient to insure normal circulation, as a great number of

Belgians had fled before the invasion, taking with them a large quantity

of paper money. These are, at least, the reasons which the Germans put

forward for establishing an issuing bank by the ordinance of 27 June

1940, published in VOBEL, Numbers 4 and 5, which I submit as Document

Number RF-142.

By virtue of this last ordinance, 27 June 1940, the new issuing bank

with a capital of 150 million Belgian francs, 20 percent of which had

been issued in coin, received the monopoly for issuing paper money in

Belgian francs. As a matter of fact, the National Bank of Belgium no

longer had the right to issue money. The cover of the issuing bank was

not represented by a gold balance but: 1) by credits from discount

operations and loans granted in conformity with Article 8 of the new

statutes; 2) monies owed to the National Bank of Belgium, as well as

coin which was in circulation for the account of the public treasury; 3)

finally, the third means of cover—foreign currency and francs,

particularly German money, including Reichskreditkasse notes as well as

assets at the Reichsbank, at the Office of Compensation for the Reich,

and the Reichskreditkasse.

The German Commissioner who had been appointed by a decree of 26 June

1940 became the controller of the issuing bank—decree of 26 June 1940,

published in VOBEL, Number 3, Page 88, and submitted as Document Number

RF-143.

After the return to Belgium of the directors of the National Bank, on 10

July 1940, an agreement between this bank and the new issuing bank was

effected by the nomination of the head of the new issuing bank to the

position of director of the National Bank of Belgium.

The issuing bank proceeded to put out a large amount of notes, so much

so that on 8 May 1940 the currency in circulation amounted to 29,800

million Belgian francs. On 29 December 1943 it amounted to 83,200

million Belgian francs, and on 31 August 1944 it was 100,200 million

Belgian francs, that is to say, an increase of 236 percent.

The issuing bank functioned; but not without certain difficulties,

either with the military command, its own staff, or with the National

Bank of Belgium. Actually, besides its function of issuing, the new bank

had as a principal function operations relating to postal orders and to

currency, as well as operations with German authorities, notably as

concerned the occupation indemnity and, above all, clearing.

The National Bank of Belgium lost its right to issue paper money but

resumed its traditional operations for private as well as state

accounts, particularly transactions on the open market.

These data, Gentlemen, are corroborated by the final report of the

German military administration in Belgium, ninth part, dealing with

currency and finance. This final report of the German military

administration in Belgium was discovered by the United States Army, and

it is a document to which we shall refer many times. It is Document

Number ECH-5 and is submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-144.

The ninth part, which is of interest here, was written by three chiefs

of the administration section of Brussels: Wetter, Hofrichter, and Jost.

In spite of the establishment of the issuing bank, Reichskreditkasse

notes were valid in Belgium until August 1942; but it was the National

Bank of Belgium that was obliged to absorb these notes in September

1944, and on account of this, Belgian economy suffered a loss of 3,567

million Belgian francs. This number is given by Wetter in the foregoing

report, Page 112, the excerpt of the report being submitted as Document

Number RF-145.

Moreover, from information given by the Belgian Government, the issuing

bank had in hand at the moment of liberation of the territory a sum

totalling 644 million in Reichskreditkasse notes; and further, it had

assets in a transfer account of 12 million Reichsmark on the books of

the Reichskreditkasse, that is to say, a total loss of 656 million

Belgian francs—the figure given in a report of the Belgian Government,

which is submitted as Document Number RF-146.

Occupation costs.

Let us now take the occupation costs. Article 49 of the Hague Convention

stipulates that if the occupier makes a levy in money, it will be only

for the needs of the army of occupation or for the administration of the

territory. The occupier can, therefore, impose a tax for the maintenance

of his army; but this must not exceed the effective force strictly

necessary. On the other hand, the words “needs of the army of

occupation” do not mean the expenses of armament and equipment but

solely the costs of billeting, food, and normal pay, which excludes, in

all cases, luxury expenses.

Moreover, Article 52 authorizes the occupying authority to exact, for

the use of its army, requisitions in kind and in service on the express

condition that they shall be proportionate to the resources of the

country and that they should not involve the population with the

obligation to take part in military operations against their own

country. The same Article 52 stipulates, moreover, that levies in kind

will be, as far as possible, paid in cash.

Consequently the Germans exacted a monthly indemnity of 1,000 million up

to August 1941. On that date the indemnity was increased to 1,500

million per month. By the end of August 1944, the payments under that

designation totaled 67,000 million Belgian francs. This number cannot be

contested by the Defense, since in the report quoted, Pages 103 and

following, the said Wetter wrote in June 1944 that the total sum of

Belgian francs paid for the army of occupation was 64,181 million—the

passage in the report is submitted as Document Number RF-147.

But this sum of 64,000 million was completely disproportionate to the

needs of the occupying army. This is shown in the report of Wetter, in a

passage which is submitted as Exhibit Number RF-148. On Page 245 of this

report it is said that on 17 January 1941 the general who was

Commander-in-Chief in Belgium had asked the High Command of the Army if

the indemnity covered only the expenses of occupation. This point of

view was not accepted by the commanding general, who, by order of 29

October 1941, specified that the indemnity of occupation was to be used

not only for the needs of the occupying army but also for those of the

operating armies. Moreover, on Page 11 of the original German text of

the same report it is written—and I shall read to the Tribunal an

excerpt which will be found in the document book under Document Number

RF-149, the second paragraph:

“As the increase in the expenses of the Wehrmacht made it clear

that it would be impossible to manage with this amount, the

military administration demanded that the calculation of the

occupation costs should be straightened out by deducting all

expenses foreign to the occupation proper. This concerned

especially the larger purchases of all kinds which the military

services made in Belgium, such as horses, motor vehicles,

equipment, all of which was designated for other territories and

was written off as occupation costs.

“By a decision of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, dated 11

June 1941, the financing of other than true occupation costs was

to be met by clearing. To comply with this decree, beginning in

July 1941, the administration of the military commander ordered

a monthly report to be rendered of all expenses other than those

required for the occupation but which so far had been paid under

the account of occupation costs, in order to have these expenses

refunded through clearing. Thanks to this, large sums could be

recovered and put into the account of occupation costs.”

Before concluding the examination of this point concerning war tribute,

that tribute called occupation costs, it is necessary to point out that

the Germans had already demanded, by the decree of 17 December 1940,

submitted as Document Number RF-150, that the costs of billeting their

troops should be charged to Belgium. Owing to this, the country had to

meet expenses totalling 5,900 million francs, which went for billeting

German troops, costs of installation, supplies, and furniture.

In his report Wetter writes on Page 104—the excerpt submitted as

Document Number RF-147—that at the end of June 1944 the Belgian

payments for billeting troops totalled 5,423 million francs.

Clearing.

We now come to the third part of German plundering—clearing. The

issuing of Reichskreditkasse notes and the war tribute, called

“occupation costs,” were not sufficient for Germany. Her leaders created

a system of clearing which enabled them to procure, unduly, means of

payment totalling 62,200 million Belgian francs.

As soon as they arrived in Belgium, by the decrees of 10 July, 2 August,

and 5 December, 1940—which appear in the document book under the

Numbers RF-151, RF-152, and RF-153—the Germans specified:

1) That all payments on debts of people resident in Belgium to their

creditors in Germany had to be paid into an account called the “Deutsche

Verrechnungskasse, Berlin.” This was an open account on the books of the

National Bank of Belgium in Brussels, an account kept in belgas in spite

of the prohibition on currency of 17 June 1940, the prohibition to which

I have already referred concerning the blocking of means of payment in

the country.

By the decision of 4 August 1940, it was moreover prescribed that the

carrying out of clearing would henceforth no longer be entrusted to the

National Bank of Belgium but to the issuing bank in Brussels, which, as

I have already had the honor of pointing out, had been established by

the occupying power and was under their absolute control.

2) The Germans laid down a second measure whereby all debtors resident

in the Reich should pay their Belgian creditors by way of the open

account at the issuing bank in Brussels, at the following rate of

exchange; 100 belgas to 40 marks, that is to say, 1 mark for 12.50

Belgian francs.

These arrangements, moreover, were extended to the countries occupied by

Germany with a view to facilitating their operations in those countries;

they were even extended to certain neutral countries by various similar

decrees appearing in the ordinance book.

The mission of the issuing bank in Brussels consisted, therefore, on the

one hand, of receiving payments from all persons or agencies established

in Belgium which had foreign engagements and, on the other hand, to pay

those persons or agencies established in Belgium which had foreign

credit.

In other words, every time an exporter delivered goods to an importer of

another country which belonged to the clearing system, it was the

issuing bank which settled the invoice and which entered as equivalent,

in the ledgers, a corresponding credit at the Deutsche Verrechnungskasse

in Berlin—the German Clearing Institute in Berlin. In the case of

imports, the inverse procedure was followed.

In fact, under the German direction, this system functioned to the

detriment of the Belgian community which, at the moment of the

liberation, was creditor in clearing to the extent of 62,665 million

Belgian francs. It was the National Bank of Belgium which had been

forced to make advances to the issuing bank to balance the account of

the German Clearing Institute.

A large number of operations made through clearing had no commercial

character whatever but were purely and simply military and political

expenses.

From information given by the Belgian Government, the clearing

operations could be summarized in the following manner—and I take the

figures from a report of the Belgian Government previously cited, which

has been presented as Document Number RF-146: Of the total transactions,

93 percent were Belgium-German clearing operations; merchandise amounted

to 93 percent, and services 91 percent.

If one considers the part taken respectively by merchandise, services,

or capital, one obtains a very significant picture. The entire clearing

transactions of Belgium with foreign countries totalled, on 2 September

1944, the sum of 61,636 million Belgian francs, of which 57,298 million

were for Belgium-German operations, 4,000 million only with France,

1,000 million with the Netherlands, and 929 million with other

countries.

It is only in the sector of goods and services that the want of

equilibrium is apparent due in large measure to requisitions of property

and services made by Germany for her own account. It is known that the

so-called exports affected especially metals and metal products,

machines, and textile products, nine-tenths of which were seized by the

Reich, which made itself thereby guilty of real spoliation.

As to the transfer of capital, during the first period of the occupation

it was particularly intense. It concerned the forced realization of

Belgian capital in foreign countries, as well as the forced cession to

German groups of Belgian assets blocked in Germany. No effective

compensation was given in exchange. The transfers made for services were

principally for payments for Belgian labor in foreign countries.

The credit balance of these services on 2 September 1944 is as follows,

in Belgian francs: Total clearing operations dealing with services,

20,016 million—that is to say, for payment of labor 73 percent of the

total. For Germany alone, 18,227 million—that is, 72 percent of the

total amount. For France only 1,621 million Belgian francs—that is to

say, a very small part.

Not content with requisitioning workers for forced labor in Germany or

in the occupied territories, the Germans compelled Belgium to bear the

financial burden and imposed it either through the liquidation of the

transferred savings in clearing or by the remittance of Belgian notes to

the Directorate of the Reich Bank in Berlin for payment of workers in

national currency.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary to go into these clearing

operations again? In each case of the various countries which have been

dealt with, the same clearing operations have taken place, have they

not? Then perhaps it is really unnecessary to do it over again for

Belgium.

M. DELPECH: Very well, Your Honor. At all events, the Germans recognized

the fact, and the figures taken from the report previously cited support

the conclusions of our statement.

Before ending this chapter concerning German seizure of the means of

payment, it is fitting that the attention of the Tribunal be brought to

the order of 22 July 1940, by which the Germans fixed the rate of the

Belgian franc at 8 Reichspfennig, that is to say 12.50 francs per mark;

and in the forementioned report Wetter writes concerning this matter, on

Pages 37 and 38, a passage which I ask the Tribunal’s permission to read

and which is in the document book as Document Number RF-158.

“The _de facto_ maintenance of the pre-war parity was moreover

of considerable political importance because a large group of

the population would have considered a sharp devaluation or a

repeated change of parity as a maneuver of exploitation.”

The following observation in connection with this conception must be

made: The occupiers had no need in Belgium to decree, with the view of

promoting their economic exploitation, that the Belgian franc should

have a lesser value when, as a matter of fact—contrary to what occurred

in France—they had, at the moment they entered Belgium, instituted new

currency over which they had the control.

Lastly, let us mention that Germany obliged the Vichy Government to

deliver 221,730 kilos of gold amounting, at the 1939 value, to 9,500

million francs; but as France had returned this gold to the Bank of

Belgium, this question will be treated under the economic exploitation

of France.

Recapitulation.

To sum up, the means of payment seized by the army of occupation may be

seen from the following figures:

Reichskreditkasse notes, 3,567 million; various bills and accounts on

the books of the Reichskreditkasse, 656 million; war tribute under the

pretext of occupation costs, 67,000 million; to which may be added the

credit balance of clearing 62,665 million; total (in Belgian francs),

133,888 million.

The Germans thus seized no less than 130,000 million Belgian francs,

which they used for outwardly regular purchases, for payment of their

requisitions, and to make clandestine purchases on the black market.

These so-called purchases and requisitions will be treated in the

following chapters.

Chapter 2, clandestine purchases, black market.

As in all the other occupied territories, the Germans organized a black

market in Belgium as early as October 1941.

According to a secret report on the black market, called “Final Report

of the Control Office of the Military Commander in Belgium and in the

North of France, Concerning the Legalized Emptying of the Black Market

in Belgium and in the North of France,” a report covering the period

from 13 March 1942 to 31 May 1943—Exhibit Number RF-159 (Document

Number ECH-7) in the document book—the reasons given by the Germans for

this organization of the black market are three in number:

1) To check competition on the black market between various German

buyers; 2) to make the best use of the Belgian resources for the

purposes of German war economy; 3) to do away with the pressure

exercised on the general standard of prices and by this to avoid all

danger of inflation which would result in endangering German currency

itself.

This same report tells us, Pages 3 and following, that an actual

administrative organization was set up by the Germans for carrying out

this policy. The bookkeeping was done by the Clearing Institute of the

Wehrmacht, which combined all the operations in its books. The direction

of purchases was regulated by a central organization, the name of which

changed as the years went by and which had a certain number of

organizations subordinate to it, particularly a whole series of

purchasing offices.

The central organization was set up in accordance with the decree of the

military commander in Belgium, dated 20 February 1942. It was formed on

the 13th of the following March; and as soon as it was created it

received special directives from the delegate of the Reich Marshal,

Defendant Göring. This delegate was Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens, of whom

we spoke this morning.

This organization was only established to co-ordinate the legalization

and direction of the black market, as had been determined upon, and

planned following conferences between the Commissioner General and the

Military Commander of Belgium with the Chief of the Armament Inspection.

According to the terms of that agreement, which reinforced a declaration

of 16 February 1942 emanating from the Reich Minister for Economics, the

aim was to drain the black market and in accordance with directives, in

a legal form, with the main idea of safeguarding the supply requirements

of the German Reich.

This organization had its offices in Brussels. The purchases themselves

were regulated by a certain number of specialized offices, the list of

which is given on Page 5 of the forementioned report. These organisms

received their orders from the Rohstoffhandelsgesellschaft, which has

already been mentioned at the beginning of the statement on the economic

exploitation of Western Europe.

The role of Roges was very important in the organization of the black

market. In effect it was four-fold:

1) The purchasing directives, once the authorization had been given by

the central office in Brussels, were transmitted by Roges to the proper

purchasing office.

2) The delivery of goods bought and marked for the Reich were made

through Roges which took charge of their distribution in Germany. Pg578

3) Roges financed the operations.

4) It was Roges which was entrusted with paying the difference between

the rate of purchase—generally very high because of the black market

rate—and the fixed official rate of sale on the German domestic market.

The difference was covered by an equalizing fund, supplied from the

occupation costs account, to which the Reich Minister of Finance put

sums at the disposal of Roges through the channel of the Ministry of

Armament.

The forementioned report furnishes a complete series of interesting

particulars on the functioning of the central organization itself. It is

interesting to note that the central office in Brussels was instructed

by order of the Military Commander in Belgium, dated 3 November 1942, to

have a branch at Lille set up for the north of France. At the same time,

the Brussels office was authorized to instruct its branch office at

Lille. In the document book, under Document Number RF-160, a final

report of the Lille office is mentioned. This report, drawn up on 20 May

1943, gives a whole series of interesting particulars on the functioning

of this organization.

THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o’clock now. M. Delpech, I think it would be the

wish of the Tribunal, if it were possible, for you to omit any parts of

this document which are on precisely the same principles with those

which have already been submitted to us in connection with the other

countries. If you could, I think that would be convenient for the

Tribunal. Of course, if there are any essential differences in the

treatment of Belgium then, no doubt, you would draw our attention to

them.

M. DELPECH: Certainly, Your Honor.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 22 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]

TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious

printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for

periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document;

however, American spellings are the rule, hence, ‘Defense’ versus

‘Defence’. Unlike prior Blue Series volumes I and II, all French, German

and eastern European names and terms include accents and umlauts: hence

Führer and Göring, etc. throughout.

Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb

tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the

tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations

between the German, English, Russian and French documents presented in

the trial.

An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as

possible to the original document's presentation and layout.

[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International

Military Tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946 (Vol. 5)_,

by Various.]