WHAT SHALL WE DO?
“A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined, to
which end an uniform and well-digested plan is requisite.”--GEORGE
WASHINGTON.
A plan put forward to solve the defense problem of the United States
can be simple in outline, but must become complex in detail. Yet the
skein of detail will be readily disentangled if the outlined plan
rests upon sound principles. Any departure from proved and accepted
postulates of military development will end in disaster.
Today, happily, the majority of the American people are alive to the
pressure of preparedness against war. Moreover, they are not likely to
be gulled by the inertia or the trickery of politicians. In the end the
citizens will demand a system of national defense commensurate with the
peril of the republic.
Heretofore, owing to the fact that the greater part of the uninformed
public confuse valor with efficiency, it has been difficult to
arouse sentiment in favor of increasing the United States military
establishment. The old tradition that the farmer would drop his
plowshare in the furrow, grasp his fowling piece, rush to the defense
of his country and triumph, dies hard. If there still exists in this
nation anyone who cherishes this delusion let him discard it forever.
You cannot fight against machine guns with pitchforks.
Conditions prevailing in this republic since the presidency of
Jefferson have colored the subsequent trend of military development.
The people, for some inexplicable reason, have never trusted the
regular army. During the Jeffersonian régime the army was reduced
almost to the vanishing point--about 3,000 aggregate. Senators and
Congressmen gloried in the fact that thus the Treasury of the United
States was saved the sum of $522,000 annually, and proclaimed from
the capitol the boast that in practically eliminating its armed force
this young republic had set a standard for the world, and, because no
army existed, all cause for war ceased. Eight years later the Senate
and the members of the House of Representatives made an exceedingly
hasty and undignified exit before the invader. A concourse of ribald
enemy-soldiery seated in the very halls where the solemn lawmakers
propounded their sophisms was the answer to the policy of army
suppression. Will history repeat itself?
Every plan of national defense must proceed from a discussion of the
size of the navy. The peculiar geographical position of the United
States makes the naval program of the nation a matter of supreme
importance. Wisely Congress has brought into being a body of officers
technically trained, and turned over to them the duty of examining
the American naval situation in all aspects and furnishing Congress
with the result of these investigations, with their recommendations.
Unwisely the national legislators have never fully accepted the
recommendations of the Naval Board. Battleships bring no votes. In
consequence, United States naval strength is entirely unequal to the
task of defending the country against an enemy of the first class.
Our naval needs can be stated in two sentences. On the Atlantic coast
the United States must at all times possess a fleet superior in speed
and guns to that which the German nation keeps afloat. On the Pacific
seaboard American ships must be greater in number and more efficient
than those of Japan. Until this standard is reached, the Panama Canal
notwithstanding, United States shores are open to invasion.
Throughout this book it has been the intention to confine the
discussion to measures for evolving sufficient land forces for national
defense, so no further elaboration of the naval situation will be
attempted. But for all those Americans who would inform themselves
on the fate of ships in conflict, the author recommends a study of
the sea encounters in the present war, and most earnestly suggests a
thoughtful perusal of the story of the battle of the Straits of Japan.
Herein is a lesson that the United States should take seriously to
heart.
The regular army is the only force which could be thrown against an
invader. It is the only force approximately ready for the defense of
the nation. I say approximately, for the army is sadly deficient in
artillery and ammunition.
It is to be regretted that the regular organization of the United
States is a mercenary force.
To depend upon hireling troops to repel invasion makes the average
citizen shirk the whole question of individual defensive duty. The
taxpayer considers he has bought immunity from attack. Certain sums are
appropriated each year out of the Treasury for the support of the army
and navy. The ordinary citizen takes little interest in the history of
these appropriations. That the American citizen is satisfied with the
huge cuts made by wrong-headed Congressmen, in both naval and army
estimates (carefully prepared by trained officers) is proved by the
return of these Congressmen term after term to Washington.
Thus the average voter fails twice in his duty to his country. First,
by tacitly denying that it is incumbent upon each citizen of the
commonwealth to share in the task of national defense, and second, by
indifference to measures which vitally affect national security.
However, so long as the people of the United States put their reliance
upon the regular army to secure to them the uninterrupted enjoyment
of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, let their first care be to
see that the force is equal to the task. The highest authorities agree
that an army approximately 250,000 strong would be sufficient for
the work. It has been said that under the present opportunities for
employment in the United States it would be difficult to recruit the
army up to the figure quoted. Whether this is fact or opinion can be
determined by test. These handicaps of recruitment would be greatly
modified if the army increase contained a sufficiently high proportion
of technical troops. In this mechanical age war is highly scientific.
One of the great needs of our present organization is the expansion of
the engineer corps, signal corps and aeronautical section. The American
army is without railway or balloon units and no adequate train corps
exists. If the scope of the organization were enlarged as it should
be, undoubtedly the popularity of the technical branches, which appeal
to the ambitions of the average young man, would attract a sufficient
number of recruits gradually to bring the service up to required
strength.
The enlargement of the field artillery, with the adoption of an
additional heavier type of mobile cannon, in view of the lessons of
the European war, is a matter that should receive immediate attention.
The present artillery complement of the army is sadly inadequate
for the usual duties assigned to this arm. It is under-armed and
under-munitioned. The artillery, excepting coastal divisions, is
the most neglected branch of the service, in view of its military
importance. Yet in personnel, it is a true _corps d’elite_. No officers
of the army surpass our “gunners” in professional knowledge and pride
in their work.
The present issue of field-piece is an excellent type. It approaches in
model the famous French field-gun. But, all told, there are only six
regiments of mobile artillery. If in case of emergency it were possible
to concentrate the whole of the force against an invader, under the
accepted standard organization of foreign armies, our defending cannon
would be outnumbered and outranged. With but six artillery regiments,
comprising all the batteries in the army of the United States, it is
difficult to decide if the situation is more absurd than sad.
In the evolution of warfare brought about by the present conflict it
has been found that the heavier type of field-gun, 4.9, or a similar
caliber, is absolutely necessary to meet battle conditions. No battery
of field artillery in the United States contains such a gun. As for
mobile howitzers of the Skoda type, eleven-inch pieces of enormous
power and effect, that such guns will be provided is beyond the dreams
of the most sanguine enthusiast for United States army improvement.
The above details are only dwelt upon in order to give the citizen
a suggestion of the pressing wants of the army. Any scheme of
organization should be left in entirety to the decision of the officers
who devote their lives to the study of the subject. As has often been
said, the United States government pays a number of specialists to
draw up plans to meet the problem of defense, and Congress immediately
scraps the whole material. Such a proceeding would wreck any ordinary
business organization, and it is obvious that it will run this republic
on the rocks of military disaster unless remedied. What the regular
army needs is more men and more and heavier guns. Let the citizen
stand on the broad platform of a correctly proportioned regular army
of 250,000 men. Let him impress his views firmly upon his Congressman.
Then, at least, the citizen will have fulfilled a large part of his
duty to his country.
Before passing to a discussion of the required army reserve, let us
consider two points which from personal experience seem to be of
importance.
First, in all that I have seen in the different theaters of war,
nothing has so much impressed me as the effectiveness of the machine
gun. The value of this weapon in defense is well recognized by all
belligerents. The English staff have gone to the length of organizing
a separate machine-gun corps. As this is essentially a weapon of
defense--which is the military problem of the United States--let
us follow the lead of England in this matter and create sufficient
machine-gun regiments to protect the thousand and one points on
American shores where an enemy may be expected to land. The machine
gun is cheap and effective. Besides, this measure can be put into
operation in a comparatively short time.
My second suggestion is more radical. It deals with the promotion of
officers from the ranks in the regular army. The army is the only
“business” in the United States that does not offer encouraging chances
of advancement from the bottom up. It is possible for an enlisted
man to obtain a commission, but experience shows that this method of
gaining shoulder straps is the exception rather than the rule. It
may not be exact to say West Point is undemocratic in effect, but
certainly it is undemocratic in principle. Let it be made a rule that
all graduates serve a certain specified time in the ranks before being
commissioned, and also make provision for helping the enlisted men to
seek advancement in the service. Take innumerable examples of business
success and in many instances it will be found that the head of the
organization has risen from the humblest position. He knows his work
from the closest contact with it and intimate experience. No one thinks
of looking askance because the president of the Federal Iron and Steel
Company began his career as office boy. Why should not the steps of
promotion be as accessible to the private in the army as they are in
civil life. Let the young men of the country be stimulated to enter the
service, in order to gain commissions. In case of war, a large number
of officers would have to be improvised (it is laughable to state
that there are 16,000 efficient officers now available in the United
States), and although doubling the capacity of West Point is a splendid
remedy for officer shortage, it savors of political expediency. Give
the self-respecting enlisted man the chance he is entitled to, make the
regular army a career, and at once you bring the army closer to the
people.
Under the conditions that prevail in the United States, a regular
army is the only force that can be considered as first-line troops
available for mobilization against invaders. As it is impossible,
because of political and economic considerations, to maintain a
standing army large enough and strong enough to meet potential foes and
definitely defeat them, at all points of the periphery of the United
States, and as all potential enemies have armies vastly superior to
that of the United States, it is imperative that the regular forces be
supplemented by a certain class of reserves.
Granting the building up of the standing army will be properly carried
out, the question of national existence depends upon the correct
solution of the problem of the American secondary army. The author is
firmly of the opinion that universal service is the only democratic
and logical solution of the problem. For some reason the average man
in civil life confounds universal military training with “militarism.”
From a study of the chapters dealing with the French, Australian
and Swiss systems it is seen that the two ideas can be sharply
differentiated. Militarism--or, to give it the correct designation,
Prussianism--exists in Germany because it is fostered by an autocratic
government. Conditions in France are absolutely the reverse. In
Switzerland the army is a most popular institution. If the American
people could divest themselves of the preconceived notion that military
service is servile, and that the liberties guaranteed them under the
Constitution were infringed by submitting to discipline, the problem of
defense would solve itself.
The great fault of militarism is the creation of officer privilege. The
officer caste is a relic of feudalism. In the middle ages it was the
knight and lord who, by divine right, commanded troops in battle and it
is a suspicion that somehow this condition still holds which prejudices
Americans as a class against military discipline. If this prejudice
could be overcome, every United States citizen would surely bear his
share in the defense of national integrity. To do so efficiently he
would have to perfect himself in certain military duties. In practice
he would have to become an integral part of the national army. When
all is said, the army approximates any other business. It is not given
to every man to be a boss. Some must be employees. Every American
recognizes the reasons for discipline in his business. A little
familiarity with army life will show him the imperative need of this
same quality in a properly organized system of defense. Gradually,
it is to be hoped, the civilian fear of military regulation will
fade. Then, with the awakening to the unpreparedness of our country,
universal service will be a fact instead of a remote dream.
Meanwhile let us examine what substitute scheme will fill the want of
general liability to military training.
Two projects present themselves: First, the utilization of the National
Guard as a federal reserve, and, second, the organization of federal
volunteers. Before entering into the merits of either plan let us
remember the broad lines upon which the European armies are organized.
Turning back to the chapters dealing with the various forces, we see
that all have, first, the standing army; second, the reserve army
(_Landwehr_); and, third, the Home Guard (_Landsturm_). With minor
modifications this is the standard arrangement in all the armies.
Do we not get the hint for the solution of our difficulties from
this scheme? From the foundation of the republic the National Guard
and the militia have been the home-guard troops. This function has
been traditional. In those states that have made an effort to bring
guard regiments up to a high standard of efficiency, considerable
local pride is lavished on the various organizations. Under existing
conditions it would seem that we have here the answer to one part of
the preparedness problem. Let the National Guard and militia be the
force corresponding to the _Landsturm_ in the foreign armies. With the
present units as a basis it would be a comparatively simple expedient
to bring all the National Guard regiments under central control and
establish interstate standards that would insure a homogeneous force.
Federal command of all guard and militia units is essential in this
plan. But such command need not in ordinary times interfere with state
military development. The function of the state authority would be to
bring the guard force up to perfection in line duties. This involves
a change in administration and some modifications of present systems;
but no serious obstacle blocks the path to the development of efficient
battalions properly trained, armed and equipped, under their own
officers. Incidentally, it should be exacted of all guard and militia
officers, that they serve a specified period with the regular army.
It is unnecessary to elaborate the many details governing the
establishment of this third-line defense force. Suffice to say that in
all particulars it should be made to conform to regular army standards
in so far as possible.
There are three suggestions, nevertheless, that may be put forward:
First: The strength of the National Guard in each state to be
proportionate to population and federal aid to be strictly apportioned
according to the number of guardsmen actually undergoing training.
Second: All training to be in the field, following the Swiss plan,
armory training to be reduced to a minimum.
Third: All officers in time of war above the rank of major to be
assigned from a supplementary reserve of the regular army.
In accordance with this third clause, when called into federal service,
the state battalions will retain their own line officers, but will be
furnished staff and general officers from the regular establishment.
In time of peace, certain officers of the United States army will, in
addition to their other duties, be assigned to regiments, brigades
and divisions of the guard. Whenever the guard is united for federal
service, during such periods of training as may be determined upon,
these regular officers will officiate in their superior capacities.
Otherwise the guard will be under state command.
Such, in outline, is a plan for utilizing the present forces pertaining
to the various states and encouraging the establishment of other state
troops. The principle of this organization is that state troops are
primarily a home guard. They are, in fact and tradition, the third
line. Any radical departure from the original plan of service will
certainly bring complications sure to impair the strength of the
national-defense control.
More difficult in every way is the solving of the problem of creating a
second-line force. In principle the troops supplementing the standing
army should be the bulk of the fighting strength of the nation. In
numbers it should conform to the size of potential expeditionary forces
of invasion. Any strength less than 500,000 cannot be considered. In
the author’s opinion only a force of such size could save the capital
from capture or prevent the capitulation of New York. On the Pacific
seaboard, eliminating the question of the defense of the insular
possessions, no smaller force could hold the coast and retain Alaska.
Thus the immediate task of the United States is to bring into being
500,000 armed and disciplined fighting men. How can this be done?
Compulsory service being out of the question for the time, the safety
of the nation must rest upon volunteers. Here we are at once confronted
with the query, Can the nation recruit such a number of volunteers in
time of peace? In the opinion of certain authorities such recruitment
is impossible. But this is opinion, not fact. Before condemning the
plan for raising a force that of its own volition comes to the defense
of the country, some test should be made of its practicability. The
plan means sacrifice, but it would be a sad indictment of American
loyalty to take it for granted that the majority of United States
citizens are so ignorant or indifferent to the question of defense that
they put personal safety before national security.
In order to bring into existence the second line of the American army,
the country must be aroused to a sense of its helplessness, and the
individual duty each man owes to the commonwealth. To accomplish this I
frankly suggest advertising.
Let the facts be known. Put the question squarely up to the young men
upon whose shoulders the responsibility of defense rests and let them
decide the matter for themselves. Obviously the advertising material
must be honest on all counts and scrupulously exact. Nothing of an
alarming nature should be emphasized. Simply state the case of the
country as now situated; give the strength of the armies of neighboring
nations, reproduce the bald statements of what these armies could do if
so disposed, and finally, without boasting, indicate the ideals of the
United States, the responsibility for maintaining the Monroe Doctrine,
and how this responsibility might conflict with the ambitions of other
nations.
A volunteer force to be successfully maintained must be popular.
This fact must be kept in mind in considering the organization of the
suggested second-line army. You have seen, in the chapters dealing with
the Swiss and Australian systems, how service is looked upon as an
honor. Such an ideal can be built up with an American volunteer force.
Let us follow the minute-men tradition. Indicate a standard up to which
all who serve must live. Make the second line a _corps d’elite_. Create
a spirit of self-respect as the first requisite of the minute man. Make
it a moral as well as a military force. Herein is the germ of success
for the army of defense.
Before many years the effect of the training and discipline obtained
in such a force would make itself felt in national economic life.
Employers will quickly discern the advantages of employees who know the
significance of obedience, promptness, neatness and self-respect. In
time, a discharge from the minute-men army would be a recommendation
bringing preferential employment to all who hold it. As help for
entrance into positions where military qualities are necessary, such
as express messengers, policemen and watchmen in the great industrial
plants and similar occupations, there is no better preliminary training.
To model a working plan for the volunteer army is not the purpose of
this book. Systems that have been successfully employed abroad are
explained in detail. From the data in hand a competent board of officer
and civilian experts can devise a scheme suitable for the United
States. Only one prayer is offered in this connection--preserve the
whole organization from any taint of partisan politics.
In the arrangement of a volunteer army plan the author has but two
suggestions which he puts forward as the result of personal experience:
First: Initiate a course of musketry practice in public schools. Such
a course need only be elementary, and include a knowledge of handling
and caring for the army rifle, with some gallery practice. It would
have for its object the familiarizing of the boy with the weapon which
some day he might have to use in defense of his home. No longer does
the average boy in the United States have the chance to “go hunting,”
as was the case a generation ago. Thus the familiarity with firearms,
which was a characteristic of the American people, is gradually being
lost. It is to offset this that the suggestion is made.
The second recommendation is that the naturalization laws be changed so
that no foreigner can have the right of suffrage until he has served
the allotted term in the volunteer army. The right of the vote is the
highest privilege of a citizen of this republic. It invests every
American with a responsibility in national life. Through the exercise
of his vote the citizen shares the weal or woe of his country. No
stranger should be granted this exalted right until he is grounded
in habits of loyalty to his adopted land. It is not wise to delude
ourselves about the standard of patriotism of the average immigrant.
He comes to this country from motives of self-interest. His later acts
spring from the same causes and not from a sense of obligation to the
foster nation.
There is much more that could be written on this subject of
preparedness against war. Here the author has only tried to embody
certain suggestions on the question that have been the result of a
number of years’ study and observation of things military. If he has
in some slight way turned the thoughts of his fellow citizens into
channels of reflection, the object of this book is fulfilled. Yet
before writing _finis_ the author must once more record his opinion
that national integrity and the opportunity for maintaining American
world standards lie solely in the adoption of universal liability to
military or naval training. In the councils of nations, a power is
respected only in proportion to its strength.
TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES
Page 97: misspelling "Landstrum" corrected.
Page 164: typo "stil lexists" corrected.
Inconsistencies in hyphenation have been left unchanged.