THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
“The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that, contrary
to the order of human events, they will forever keep at a distance
those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other
nation abounds.”--GEORGE WASHINGTON.
It is the fashion to say that the world is growing smaller. This figure
of speech is deep with significance for the United States. No people
know the fact of world shrinkage so well as our own, because of the
characteristic passion of Americans for foreign travel. As a corollary,
there is one subject that will always hold the interest of the United
States citizen, whether the subject be looked at in the light of
pleasure or profit, and that is transportation.
Step by step, the American republic has advanced in prosperity and
prominence in stride with the progress of freight and passenger
carriage. Present wealth in the United States is built upon the
railroads. At the same time, the American people envy other nations
their great sea tonnage.
While the citizens of the United States have studied the transportation
problem extensively from the business point of view, few have examined
its bearing upon the strategic position of the country. At the
present stage of world development, no subject is more worthy of hard
thought than the probable contraction of globe-encircling lines of
communication.
It is a curious circumstance that the paths of war follow the paths
of commerce. Still, if we go into the reasons for this phenomenon,
they are seen to be consistently logical. The conflicts of commerce
are often the precursors of warfare, so it is but natural the two
conditions run along the same channels.
Thus, every point where the lines of transportation impinge upon the
coast of the United States holds a danger--intimate or remote--to this
country. In other words, the United States is open to attack at every
point on the coast, except where local defenses protect individual
cities. The coast of the United States includes not only the seaboard
line of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, with the Gulf of Mexico, but
the shores of Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines and our
Achilles heel, the Panama Canal Zone. The most remote possessions must
be carefully considered in all plans of defense.
While more frequent and more rapid transportation will tend to bring
outlying American dependencies into closer relations with the mother
country, yet by their positions they will always be under the menace of
potential enemies. Such menace increases in direct ratio to the lack of
transports and shipping units in the United States.
In the exposition that follows bear constantly in mind the fact that
the figures given for the time required to transport troops from point
to point, is the maximum. Remember that each year shows an improvement
in tonnage and speed in ocean-going ships. As a gauge of such
advancement, compare the speed and displacement of the Mauretania with
any ship considered an ocean leviathan twenty years ago. The comparison
will give you an insight into the rate of world shrinkage.
The safeguard of isolation no longer exists. The oceans, instead of
being barriers to possible enemies, are now convenient carriers of
striking power. The number, speed and carrying capacity of ocean-going
vessels make the sea lanes of peace easy avenues of attack in time of
hostilities. The most conclusive demonstration of this fact was the
British Expedition to the Dardanelles. Incident to this campaign, it
was shown that sea transport was the safest and most convenient method
of moving troops and material between distant points.
And as a supplement to ocean transport we must consider the aeroplane,
the submarine and wireless telegraphy, with the increased radii of
action of these elements and the possibilities of their further
development. From my own experience, I expect to see improved Zeppelins
sailing between Europe and the United States within ten years. If
you want to arrive at a parallel which gives a hint of future aerial
advancement, compare the “Claremont” of Fulton’s voyage down the Hudson
in 1807 with the superdreadnaught “Pennsylvania.” The first successful
steam vessel would not be fit for dingy work on the battleship. The
improvement that has taken place within the last one hundred years in
ocean-going transportation puts a very different complexion upon the
American political status from that which inspired the actions of the
fathers of the nation.
As the years pass, both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the
United States will become more and more within the sphere of hostile
activities of over-seas nations. So in planning for national defense
let us not build only for today.
All American citizens know enough of the geographical circle of
American influence to realize the many points of weakness it presents.
On one side we offer the whole Atlantic seaboard, the coast line of the
Gulf of Mexico, and the Colon entrance to the Panama Canal. Also Puerto
Rico and the islands of the Caribbean Sea may be regarded as in the
sphere of hostile activities, and readily assailable.
Because of the Monroe Doctrine, it can be accurately stated that the
United States is liable to attack at any part of the Atlantic side
of the Western Hemisphere, from Portland, Maine, to Punta Arenas,
Patagonia.
The Pacific sphere of American influence is the open door to all
enemies. It is conceded by military students that the island
possessions of the United States could not be defended in case of
attack, under the present army program. It is not necessary to enlarge
upon this situation. What more nearly concerns the integrity of the
Union is the undefended condition of Alaska. Finally, the entire
western area of the country is exposed to aggression.
Here also the entrance to the Panama Canal is a strategic objective
sure to receive prompt attention from any enemy. Again, on the Pacific
side of the American continent, the prohibition of the Monroe Doctrine
can be challenged. One sword-prick and this paper rampart will be
breached. In order to get the strategic outline of the United States
in your mind, try to imagine all possessions girdled by a fortress
wall. Remember, we have no troops to man more than an infinitesimal
section of this imaginary bulwark, and guns are placed only at rare
and immense intervals along it. That it lacks the first essential of a
fortress, positions of mutual support, is immediately observed. Again
it is at once evident that the lines of communication, another basic
element of defense, are from every angle, outside immediate boundaries,
assailable. The measure of defense to be expected at points of probable
assault can be approximately estimated by the number of troops present
at the points. It is assumed the forces have the requisite amount
of ammunition and artillery to meet initial operations of an enemy.
Figures obtained from the War Department give the usual peace time
distribution of the fighting forces of the army as follows:
In the United States (including Coast Artillery) 51,000
In the Philippines:
Regular troops 13,500
Native scouts 6,000
In Puerto Rico 700
In Alaska 800
In Hawaii 9,600
In Panama 6,200
------
87,800
From this table it is possible to estimate what effectives can
be placed in the field at the immediate outbreak of hostilities.
No allowance is made for “war strength,” which, under the system
prevailing in the United States army, is largely a myth. To add a
thousand untrained men to an infantry unit does not double the fighting
ability of that unit, although it doubles its numerical strength. Such
a proceeding is more likely to demoralize a dependable force. The worst
feature of the whole American plan is the war-expansion idea. Stop a
moment to analyze what the scheme means.
In peace, regiments are homogeneous aggregations of disciplined,
equipped and trained soldiers. They are fighting teams. Think what
will happen when the team is suddenly doubled in size, by adding
undisciplined and unarmed, untrained elements. Admitting that it were
possible to absorb these troops into the original regiment (a result in
itself impossible, because the rifles for the supplementary troops are
not made), how would the fighting value of the force be affected? Any
army officer, and there are many who have approximated the experience
outlined during the Spanish-American war, will tell you that the
original efficiency of the unit suffers a distinct loss. The theory
that it is possible to strengthen armies with undigested recruits added
to veteran forces is a fallacy often proved on the battlefield.
As our subject is preparedness against war, defenses must be considered
in the light of deterrents from attack. Let us see what forces could be
mobilized to meet a foe on the East.
Officers of the General Staff have agreed that, in case of war with a
first-class power on the Atlantic, the portion of the country lying
between and including Maine and Virginia would undoubtedly be the
primary objective of an invader. While all other points along the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts and all points on our land frontiers would
undoubtedly be in danger, the danger would be secondary to that of the
Atlantic states named. Roughly, any one of the first-class powers could
transport 150,000 to 350,000 soldiers to American shores within fifteen
days. This result is worked out from what is known of the troops
available and the serviceable transport at the disposition of the great
European powers and the time needed to load the assumed expeditionary
army and cross the ocean. The factor of naval interference is not
considered.
It must be taken for granted that the enemy would not be able to gain a
foothold in any of the coastal fortified areas by direct naval attack,
and in consequence, would be forced to choose some suitable place on
the Atlantic seaboard from which land operations could be conducted
against both the important coast cities and the rich commercial centers
in the interior. Between the fortified positions on the coast, long
stretches lie open to the enemy. The only cure for this weakness is a
mobile land force sufficient to deter a potential aggressor from making
the attempt at landing.
There is a simple test to determine how rapidly units can be moved
and how many troops can be concentrated at some designated point on
the periphery of the United States. Such a maneuver--which would be a
splendid object lesson--could be planned to follow closely probable
political and military sequences.
The War Department would assume that diplomatic relations with a
certain first-class European power were at the breaking point.
A confidential order is then issued to the Chief of Staff. It is
supposed, in stating the problem, that cabinet conferences and
congressional agitation have no material bearing on the course of
events. Hardly has the head of the army received his admonitory
order, when a special agent in the certain hostile European power
reports mobilization activities in the vicinity of a named port. This
information, confirmed from other sources, is assumed to come to hand
on June 1st. However, diplomatic negotiations continue, so the American
government, ever hopeful of avoiding war, does not act upon the
information received until the 4th of June. On this day the American
ambassador in the certain first-class European power is handed his
passports. War against the United States is declared at midnight.
Before the last echoes of the striking hour have died away over the
waters of the named port, a fleet of fifty transports carrying the
first hostile expedition puts to sea. The enemy fleet is already in
position on the Atlantic.
In our maneuver, news of the sailing of the transports is supposed
to arrive in Washington the morning of June 5th. Immediately the War
Department issues the necessary orders for mobilizing the regular army.
National Guard and militia forces are also called upon. At this time it
is unknown at which point the enemy may choose to attempt a landing.
Therefore the available forces can only be moved to positions in rear
of salient points.
It is assumed the American and enemy fleet meet, and, owing to superior
organization on the part of the invader, the American ships are sunk
or scattered. The naval battle takes place June 12th. Now the hostile
transports are half way across the Atlantic Ocean. News of the naval
defeat reaches the United States on June 13th. From the course and
position of the transports, as reported by an American destroyer,
the enemy is seen to be moving to strike at either New York or
Washington. Orders from the War Department and the General Staff follow
fast. On June 18th the enemy squadron is sighted steaming directly
towards New York. On the night of June 20th (the time calculated
for the sea-crossing having elapsed) the enemy is supposed to begin
disembarking at Fort Pond, Long Island. Here our experiment ends.
To furnish the answer to the question of preparedness all that is
now necessary to reckon is the aggregate number of American troops,
regulars, National Guard and militia, in position to oppose the
assumed landing. Granting that the enemy has 150,000 troops on the
transports--a moderate estimate in view of the forces available in
the first-class powers of Europe--how many American soldiers will be
fighting the invader and what are our chances of driving him back to
his ships?
Could the War Department be allowed the money necessary for carrying
out the experiment outlined above, the result would be a stunning
object lesson for the citizens of the United States.
Without putting the maneuver into actual practice, we can deduce
certain facts. From the table furnished by the War Department we know
that there are in the United States (when not diverted to follow a
Mexican bandit) a few over 50,000 regular troops. In our problem,
however, we must subtract 15,000 coast defense soldiers from this
total, as these are not mobile. So we are left with 35,000 soldiers
to defend 3,000,616 square miles of territory and 20,000 miles of
continental coast. We know that these troops are scattered over the
United States from Maine to California, from the Great Lakes to the
Gulf of Mexico. The time necessary to transport them from their posts
to the Atlantic seaboard can be approximately computated. But what
cannot be ascertained is the help the railroads will be able to give in
meeting an unexampled situation. How long it will take to mobilize the
rolling stock necessary for the movement of the troops is a time factor
we must allow for with a large margin.
The records of the past performances of the army in time of war are
available, and they contain nothing calculated to inspire the hope
that more than half the total forces posted in the United States could
be mobilized on the Atlantic coast within fifteen days. Allowing a
little grace, the greatest number of regular troops that could be
thrown against the landing invader is 20,000. It needs no extraordinary
military knowledge to estimate how long such a force could stand
against 150,000. The regulars will be supplemented by a large force of
militia, as the attack is supposed to take place in New York, where the
National Guard organization is strongest. But anyone in the smallest
degree familiar with the limitations of the citizen regiments, as at
present organized, equipped and trained, knows that they will only be
available as a supporting line of doubtful value. To throw the state
troops into action against the soldiers of any first-class European
power, under the conditions that now hold, would be murder.
Ammunition, the vital necessity of fighting units, is not considered,
but from the lessons learned in Europe it is known that the rate
of expenditure far surpasses the measure of supply. It would be
interesting to discover how much and what class of ammunition could be
supplied the artillery of the United States defensive force. Calculated
according to the expenditure of artillery ammunition during daily
battles along the Buzra River in Russia, the American army could rely
for support from its batteries for half a day.
Transferring the scene of activities to the Pacific coast, the same
general conditions will prevail. Only, from the peculiar geographical
outline of the country and the difficulty of transportation, this part
of the United States is far weaker, strategically, than the eastern
seaboard. This is the fact, in spite of the distance separating the
Pacific coast from the ports of a possible enemy. To load 150,000
troops and cross the Pacific Ocean would require not less than
twenty-two days. But once a hostile force was landed on the west sector
of the Union, the utmost difficulty would be experienced in dislodging
it.
Washington State offers a particularly inviting objective to an
enemy in the Puget Sound district. This corner of the United States
is completely cut off from the rest of the country by great natural
obstacles. At the same time, it presents a long stretch of coast open
to attack. It would be no difficult matter for a first-class Pacific
power to strike at Puget Sound, enter western Washington, seize and
destroy the important bridges and tunnels linking the state with
the rest of the country, and establish an army so securely that a
great force and a long time would be necessary to dislodge it. The
natural resources, as well as the industrial condition, of this region
are calculated to maintain an invading army of 150,000 men for an
indefinite period.
The situation in California is even more perilous. There are so many
points along the extended coast of this state an enemy would be in a
quandary as to the best for his purposes. While the transportation
facilities are somewhat better than in Washington State, this advantage
is offset by the enormous area of California. To mobilize enough
troops to meet invasion at the many possible landing places would be
a task beyond the power of an army numbering less than 250,000 men.
The peril of California is increased because of its border adjoining
Mexico. Nothing at present stops hostile forces from entering the
state over the southern border. The little strip of Lower California
offers an enemy a suitable position upon which to establish an
advanced base of operations. Once admit a hostile army into this great
western commonwealth, and all the resources of the nation, in men and
money, would be needed to drive him out. His expulsion would only be
accomplished after years of effort and the loss of thousands of lives.
It follows that the military preparation of the West must be such as to
forbid any potential enemy the thought of invasion.
Passing to the oversea possessions of the United States, it is
discovered that each distant territory presents a special military
problem. The forces that would garrison the Philippines, Hawaii,
Panama, Alaska, not to mention Guantanamo and Puerto Rico, in case of
war, would perform a distinct tactical and strategic mission. Dependent
upon long sea communication for aid from the home country, they would
have to be in all ways self-supporting and able to maintain themselves
for long periods of isolation. It is impossible to maintain a force
strong enough to hold the entire island territory of the United States.
All that can be hoped for is to keep some point that is a key position,
while allowing the enemy to have his way over the undefended area. The
Hawaiian Islands and Panama present a strategic problem that cannot
be treated in this manner. The former would offer a convenient base
for an enemy operating against the Pacific coast, and tend to nullify
the advantages accruing from the possession of the Panama Canal. The
question of their defense is largely technical and does not depend so
much on the size of the force assigned as the organization of defenses
and the co-operation of the navy.
The Panama Canal is the most important strategic position within the
domain of the United States. The whole foundation of American military
and naval strength is based upon the control of this highway connecting
the Atlantic with the Pacific Oceans. It follows that no effort is too
great to secure this point from capture. The complicated machinery of
the locks, spillways and basins of the canal call for extraordinary
precautions in safeguarding them, and demand an organization large
enough and efficient enough to protect these easily destroyed
mechanisms, under all circumstances. A resolute commander with a picked
force could land at a point outside the range of the sea-coast guns
and with skill find his way to some vulnerable sector of the canal and
destroy its usefulness for an indefinite period. The most pressing
problem confronting the American nation is to provide immediately for
the safety of the canal.
The strategic problems of the United States are so many and so
intricate that they lead us far into the domain of the technical
soldier. But omitting the highly specialized quality of knowledge
needed, when the last professional soldier has had his say, the problem
of defense depends upon the number of troops available in time of
attack.
The officers of the American general staff have compiled a plan of
preparedness. In all probability, this plan would insure the United
States against war. Surely the well-considered conclusions of our
professional soldiers merit the respectful consideration of the
non-military population. In passing, let me correct a wrong impression
prevalent among people unacquainted with the army officers. American
officers are not hungering for war. They know the consequences of
conflict better than the civilian. To suggest that the leaders of
the United States army desire war in order to exercise knowledge,
is a scandalous indictment based upon ignorance or thoughtlessness.
The majority of army officers are family men who work hard at their
vocation, and have as much to lose through warfare as other citizens.
To return to the strategic problems, it is next to impossible to
arouse all of the inhabitants of the United States to the serious
consideration of the problem of preparedness against war. While the
coast states are keenly interested in the discussion, citizens living
in the interior scoff at talk of danger. All of which operates against
the evolution of a sound military policy. Another factor militating in
opposition to the plans of defense is the wrong conclusion drawn from
the past experiences of the United States in war. Providence has been
kind to the American republic. We have emerged from many conflicts
successfully. But when the military student analyzes the reasons for
our success, he is amazed. The fact that the United States exists
today is due in the first instance to the timely aid of the French at
a critical stage of the Revolutionary War, and to a wonderful sequence
of events, classified only under the head of luck. Is it good policy to
depend upon luck to save us in the future?