THE ENGLISH MILITARY SYSTEM
In event of a great war the United States would suffer the same
military experience as England. The positions and policy of the two
countries are somewhat analogous and our military course has been
shaped along lines that closely follow the English system. For this
reason, the change brought about in military matters in the British
Empire, under pressure of war, is of especial interest to Americans.
I do not hesitate to say the First Hundred Thousand, as they are
now designated--the expeditionary army England sent to Flanders and
France in August, 1914--as a fighting force--has never been excelled.
The battalions were professional soldiers. Their training had been
practical. Their equipment was excellent. Their physical condition
superb. What added highly to the effectiveness of these battalions
was the standard of marksmanship maintained in the English army. The
splendid shooting ability of the British soldiers saved them from
annihilation. The discipline that had become part of their nervous
reactions made it possible for them to carry out with small loss, a
retreat that has since become historic. Superior numbers overwhelmed
the British at Mons and Le Cateau. Yet, despite two severe defeats, the
army was extricated from an almost impossible situation and suffered
no deterioration in morale. In the same predicament, any save highly
trained and efficient units would have probably repeated the famous
maneuver of the Northern army at the battle of Bull Run.
The fact that stands out in this initial campaign is, the finest type
of professional soldiers were defeated by superior numbers of trained
citizen battalions. Man for man, I do not consider that the German
troops of the first line equaled, in soldierly qualities, the British
army forced back in Belgium. German officers are more professional
than English and the invaders had a smoothly working staff--a factor
lacking with their opponents--but in the rank and file, the Englishman
outclassed the Prussian. Nevertheless, the professional soldier went
down to defeat before the trained citizen in superior numbers. From
this circumstance we draw the lesson that the day of the mercenary
soldier is over. Under the policy of the nation, in arms, which has
been forced on the world by Germany and her allies, it is impossible
for any country to pay enough professional soldiers to take the entire
responsibility for the protection of the nation. Such an arrangement
would also be highly detrimental to moral standards.
In England, as would be the case in the United States, the regular army
was but a stop-gap. When the real test of battle came, the nation had
to fall back on the citizens to furnish fighting material. Additional
forces were supplied under two heads, territorials, who are militia in
its strictest sense, and volunteers.
It would be a tedious technical discussion to go into the reasons why
the army formed from this material failed of its object. What is of
importance is the fact that the English people--the most reluctant in
the world to break with tradition--realized the necessity of compulsory
service.
Had the measure of conscription been put into effect at the very
outbreak of war, who can say how many useful lives might have been
saved? Who can reckon how the conflict might have been shortened?
Unlike England, the United States has no “Grand Fleet” equal to the
task of guarding its coasts. Should an invader disembark in the numbers
that sifted through Belgium in 1914, the American regular army could be
counted upon to make as heroic a stand as the First Hundred Thousand,
but it would, in the end, be swept away.
Until the opening of hostilities the organization of the British army
was divided into the regular army and a territorial army. A large part
of the regular army was stationed in British dominions oversea. The
territorial army serves at home in peace time, but in event of war,
becomes an auxiliary reserve. Recruits for all forces are obtained by
voluntary enlistment.
In time of peace the regular army embraces the standing army, the army
reserve and a special reserve. In the standing army and army reserve
the period of enlistment is for twelve years, with the permission to
extend to twenty-one years under certain circumstances. Of the original
twelve years, from three to nine are spent with the colors--that is
on active service--the remainder of the enlistment is passed in the
army reserve. As a rule, the majority of men serve seven years in the
permanent force and five years in the reserve. Thus the English recruit
for the regular army chooses soldiering as his lifework. Men enlist
between eighteen and twenty-five years of age.
In peace time the establishment is never kept up to full strength
and, upon the outbreak of the European war, difficulty was experienced
in bringing the units up to the requirements, from the army and the
special reserve forces.
Including all ranks, the peace total of the regular army is about
250,000. Roughly, these are divided as follows: 135,000 for service in
the British Isles, 45,000 stationed in Egypt and the Colonies, with
75,000 English troops in India. The native army in India, at peace
strength, numbers 159,000. The war strength of the English army, on
paper, exclusive of all auxiliary and territorial forces, is 391,000.
The territorial army in 1914 was 312,000. In the army estimates of
1914-15, before the outbreak of war, the total of the English home and
colonial military establishments was reckoned at the high figure of
727,000. And this did not include the regular troops in India (75,000).
After the standing army (regular troops) England relies first on the
special reserve, which might be classified under the convenient German
term, _Landwehr_.
The special reserve consists in the main of troops not permanently
embodied in the standing army, but its units act as regular depot
battalions. Special reservists enlist for six years. The recruits, with
certain exceptions, are put through five months’ preliminary training.
The trained men of this force are called out annually for three weeks,
with an additional six days’ musketry practice for infantry.
Officers are for the most part non-professional, and although the
enlisted force includes some ex-regular army men, the special reserve
still retains the flavor of militiaism, out of which it was created in
1907. In 1914 it was 80,000 strong. These numbers have been largely
augmented and the reserve has been used to supply drafts both of
officers and men for the regular army serving in the field.
The home defense force of the British Empire is the territorial army.
This corresponds in purpose to the German _Landsturm_, although in
composition it is entirely different. While an engagement in this body
only involves duty in the British Isles, over 20,000 officers and men
accepted liability for service abroad. The term of enlistment is for
four years. Recruits must be from seventeen to thirty-five years old.
The training of the territorials consists in two weeks in camp
annually, a certain number of prescribed drills varying with the
branch, and a course in rifle shooting. Unless the soldier spends at
least eight days in camp and passes an efficiency test, he is fined
$25. All officers in the territorial army are non-professional, except
certain generals and the staff.
While the establishment of the territorial army, on paper, in 1914 was
312,000 officers and men, the actual strength did not exceed 250,000.
At once the original establishment was doubled. Although, as stated,
the force was destined for home defense alone, as the war progressed,
an overwhelming preponderance of the territorial army volunteered
for foreign service. Immediately a number of battalions were sent to
India to replace regular forces. During the first year of the war
they continued relieving troops stationed in the various British
possessions. Lately territorials have been sent directly to the theater
of operations.
According to the budget, previous to the war, the cost of the English
army in 1914-15 was $143,321,000.
It is very informing to review these figures, in the light of
subsequent events. They show most forcibly how, during long periods
of peace, the establishments of the military forces are allowed to
shrink. The special reserve and the territorial army consisted of mere
skeleton battalions, in no way fit to take the field. So, when the
test came, the country had to rely alone on the regular army. Soon
it was discovered that the volunteer system of recruiting--in time
of peace--had not kept the units up to full quota. The plan of the
English general staff decreed that on mobilization for war, the bulk
of the regular army stationed in England would be organized into an
“expeditionary force” consisting of a cavalry division, six infantry
divisions with certain train and communication troops, making in all
an aggregate of 165,000 officers and men. Service regulations put the
infantry divisions at about 18,000 strong, with the cavalry division
numbering under 10,000.
Yet when the British Isles were raked and scraped for soldiers, in
August, 1914, the aggregate available for service was between 60,000
and 80,000, the estimated strength of the first British army sent to
Flanders. Possibly a support of 20,000 followed the first contingents.
So, of the regular army, when the note of war sounded, not half
were present for duty. But before we criticize the English military
authorities, let us ask ourselves how many of the units of the American
army would be available in emergency, and how near their paper strength
would these units be? It is safe to assume that the United States
would find itself in a much more serious predicament than Britain did
under similar conditions.
While the “expeditionary force” was as fine a body of fighting men
as the world will see, they, as I have indicated, could not hope to
accomplish the task set before them. And it was found--as will always
be the case where a military establishment must depend upon the grace
of a legislative body for its maintenance--that the standing army was
far below the required standard of enlistment.
Under war conditions the territorial army organizations broke down.
What might have been the consequences if England were compelled to
rely upon this force in case of invasion, is appalling to contemplate.
Luckily, it was possible to reorganize the whole of the territorial
establishment and--though for a long time many units were without
rifles and equipment--it was possible to mobilize and stiffen them
through preliminary training. As for taking the field, few, if any, of
the battalions were fit for active service when war broke.
It is only fair to state that prevailing conditions were not wholly
the fault of territorial officers and soldiers. The substitute for a
citizen army was a good deal scoffed at in former times in England, and
_Punch_ leveled many of its jokes at the ignorance of the territorials.
In time of stress the British press and public were glad to turn to
these despised “toy soldiers” for aid.
The lessons from the experience of our mother country are obvious.
First, it is seen a country that relies on a limited--although highly
trained--professional army cannot cope in combat with a state that
follows the “nation in arms” principle.
The English army served an excellent purpose. Without it a large part
of the British Empire would have had to depend upon local forces
for protection. In brief, the function of the regular army in Great
Britain, as in the United States, was primarily to garrison distant
possessions. It was a sort of sublimated police. To expect such a force
to meet any other hostile menace, successfully, is outside military
reason. Mobilization is the first activity of defense, and it is
obviously impossible to concentrate quickly, troops scattered over a
large area of the earth’s surface.
Second, reserves cannot be improvised.
With the best will and spirit in the world, the English people could
not throw into the field a proper supporting force for the first
line. It was clearly demonstrated that the training of supplementary
forces cannot be left to the moment of the outbreak of hostilities
without entailing heavy and unnecessary losses in the first line.
That the organization of new forces under the stress of war is always
a difficult and demoralizing process was sharply shown. In this
connection it was discovered that a haphazard system of second-line
training in time of peace gave the minimum of efficiency in time of war.
Third, universal liability to service, certainly in event of war, is
the only just and efficient system of defense organization.
Only after the bitterest lessons did England and the English people
consent to conscription. It cannot be said the nation embraced the
change in its military ideals, save in a spirit of resentment against
Germany for making the measure necessary. But the government and the
people realized it was no longer an abstract discussion between the
principles of volunteering and conscription. Opposed as the body of
the populace were to any measure in the smallest degree tainted with
Prussianism, yet under the soul-testing ordeal of battle they took
their lesson from the enemy and prepared to meet him on nearly equal
terms.
How much of the material resources of England and how many of the lives
of her gallant sons were lost because these pregnant lessons were not
learned in time of peace, will never be computed. Today Great Britain
is laboring heart and soul to remedy the military sins of the past.
With characteristic doggedness Britannia is welding into being an army
worthy of the nation. But present activity will not bring back the
dead from the fields of Flanders. As we sow, so must we reap. It were
well if the United States took the experience of England to heart and
pondered deeply thereon.