GEN. PERSHING'S OWN STORY
_American Operations in France Described by the Commander-in-
Chief--Glowing Tribute to His Men_.
A remarkable summary of the operations of the American Expeditionary
Force in France from the date of its organization, May 26, 1917, to the
signing of the armistice November 11, 1918, was cabled to the Secretary
of War by General Pershing on November 20, 1918. His account of the
active military operations was as follows:
COMBAT OPERATIONS
During our period of training in the trenches some of our divisions had
engaged the enemy in local combats, the most important of which was
Seicheprey by the 26th on April 20, 1918, in the Toul sector, but none
had participated in action as a unit. The 1st Division, which had passed
through the preliminary stages of training, had gone to the trenches for
its first period of instruction at the end of October, and by March 21,
when the German offensive in Picardy began, we had four divisions with
experience in the trenches, all of which were equal to any demands of
battle action. The crisis which this offensive developed was such that
our occupation of an American sector must be postponed.
On March 28 I placed at the disposal of Marshal Foch, who had been
agreed upon as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, all of our
forces to be used as he might decide. At his request the 1st Division
was transferred from the Toul sector to a position in reserve at
Chaumont en Vexin. As German superiority in numbers required prompt
action, an agreement was reached at the Abbeville conference of the
allied Premiers and commanders and myself on May 2 by which British
shipping was to transport ten American divisions to the British Army
area, where they were to be trained and equipped and additional British
shipping was to be provided for as many divisions as possible for use
elsewhere.
On April 26 the 1st Division had gone into the line in the Montdidier
salient on the Picardy battle-front. Tactics had been suddenly
revolutionized to those of open warfare, and our men, confident of the
results of their training, were eager for the test. On the morning of
May 28 this division attacked the commanding German position in its
front, taking with splendid dash the town of Cantigny and all other
objectives, which were organized and held steadfastly against vicious
counterattacks and galling artillery fire. Although local, this
brilliant action had an electrical effect, as it demonstrated our
fighting qualities under extreme battle conditions, and also that the
enemy's troops were not altogether invincible.
The German Aisne offensive, which began on May 27, had advanced rapidly
toward the River Marne and Paris, and the Allies faced a crisis equally
as grave as that of the Picardy offensive in March. Again every
available man was placed at Marshal Foch's disposal, and the 3d
Division, which had just come from its preliminary training: in the
trenches, was hurried to the Marne. Its motorized machine-gun battalion
preceded the other units and successfully held the bridgehead at the
Marne, opposite Chateau-Thierry. The 2d Division, in reserve near
Montdidier, was sent by motor trucks and other available transport to
check the progress of the enemy toward Paris. The division attacked and
retook the town and railroad station at Bouresches and sturdily held
its ground against the enemy's best guard divisions. In the battle of
Belleau Wood, which followed, our men proved their superiority and
gained a strong tactical position, with far greater loss to the enemy
than to ourselves. On July 1, before the Second was relieved, it
captured the village of Vaux with most splendid precision.
Meanwhile our 2d Corps, under Major-General George W. Read, had been
organized for the command of our divisions with the British, which were
held back in training areas or assigned to second-line defences. Five of
the ten divisions were withdrawn from the British area in June, three
to relieve divisions in Lorraine and in the Vosges and two to the Paris
area to join the group of American divisions which stood between the
city and any further advance of the enemy in that direction.
AMERICAN DIVISIONS IN THE FIGHTING
The great June, July troop movement from the States was well under way,
and, although these troops were to be given some preliminary training
before being put into action, their very presence warranted the use of
all the older divisions in the confidence that we did not lack reserves.
Elements of the 42d Division were in the line east of Rheims against the
German offensive of July 15, and held their ground unflinchingly. On the
right flank of this offensive four companies of the 28th Division were
in position in face of the advancing waves of the German infantry. The
3d Division was holding the bank of the Marne from the bend east of the
mouth of the Surmélin to the west of Mézy, opposite Château-Thierry,
where a large force of German infantry sought to force a passage under
support of powerful artillery concentrations and under cover of smoke
screens. A single regiment of the 3d wrote one of the most brilliant
pages in our military annals on this occasion. It prevented the crossing
at certain points on its front while, on either flank, the Germans,
who had gained a footing, pressed forward. Our men, firing in three
directions, met the German attacks with counterattacks at critical
points and succeeded in throwing two German divisions into complete
confusion, capturing 600 prisoners.
The great force of the German Château-Thierry offensive established
the deep Marne salient, but the enemy was taking chances, and the
vulnerability of this pocket to attack might be turned to his
disadvantage. Seizing this opportunity to support my conviction, every
division with any sort of training was made available for use in a
counteroffensive. The place of honor in the thrust toward Soissons on
July 18 was given to our 1st and 2d Divisions in company with chosen
French divisions. Without the usual brief warning of a preliminary
bombardment, the massed French and American artillery, firing by the
map, laid down its rolling barrage at dawn while the infantry began
its charge. The tactical handling of our troops under these trying
conditions was excellent throughout the action. The enemy brought up
large numbers of reserves and made a stubborn defense, both with machine
guns and artillery, but through five days' fighting the 1st Division
continued to advance until it had gained the heights above Soissons and
captured the village of Berzy-le-Sec. The 2d Division took Beau Repaire
farm and Vierzy in a very rapid advance and reached a position in front
of Tigny at the end of its second day. These two divisions captured
7,000 prisoners and over 100 pieces of artillery.
The 26th Division, which, with a French division, was under command of
our 1st Corps, acted as a pivot of the movement toward Soissons. On the
18th it took the village of Torcy while the 3d Division was crossing the
Marne in pursuit of the retiring enemy. The 26th attacked again on the
21st, and the enemy withdrew past the Château-Thierry-Soissons road. The
3d Division, continuing its progress, took the heights of Mont St. Père
and the villages of Chartèves and Jaulgonne in the face of both machine
gun and artillery fire.
On the 24th, after the Germans had fallen back from Trugny and Epieds,
our 42d Division, which had been brought over from the Champagne,
relieved the Twenty-sixth, and fighting its way through the Foret de
Fère, overwhelmed the nest of machine guns in its path. By the 27th it
had reached the Ourcq, whence the 3d and 4th Divisions were already
advancing, while the French divisions with which we were cooperating
were moving forward at other points.
The 3d Division had made its advance into Roncheres Wood on the 29th
and was relieved for rest by a brigade of the Thirty-second. The
Forty-second and Thirty-second undertook the task of conquering the
heights beyond Cierges, the Forty-second capturing Sergy and the
Thirty-second capturing Hill 230, both American divisions joining in the
pursuit of the enemy to the Vesle, and thus the operation of reducing
the salient was finished. Meanwhile the Forty-second was relieved by the
Fourth at Chery-Chartreuve, and the Thirty-second by the Twenty-eighth,
while the 77th Division took up a position on the Vesle. The operations
of these divisions on the Vesle were under the 3d Corps, Maj.-Gen.
Robert L. Bullard commanding.
BATTLE OF ST. MIHIEL
With the reduction of the Marne salient, we could look forward to
the concentration of our divisions in our own zone. In view of the
forth-coming operation against the St. Mihiel salient, which had long
been planned as our first offensive action on a large scale, the First
Army was organized on August 10 under my personal command. While
American units had held different divisional and corps sectors along the
western front, there had not been up to this time, for obvious reasons,
a distinct American sector; but, in view of the important parts the
American forces were now to play, it was necessary to take over a
permanent portion of the line. Accordingly, on August 30, the line
beginning at Port sur Seille, east of the Moselle and extending to the
west through St. Mihiel, thence north to a point opposite Verdun, was
placed under my command. The American sector was afterward extended
across the Meuse to the western edge of the Argonne Forest, and included
the 2d Colonial French, which held the point of the salient, and the
17th French Corps, which occupied the heights above Verdun.
The preparation for a complicated operation against the formidable
defenses in front of us included the assembling of divisions and of
corps and army artillery, transport, aircraft, tanks, ambulances, the
location of hospitals, and the molding together of all of the elements
of a great modern army with its own railroads, supplied directly by our
own Service of Supply, The concentration for this operation, which
was to be a surprise, involved the movement, mostly at night, of
approximately 600,000 troops, and required for its success the most
careful attention to every detail.
The French were generous in giving us assistance in corps and army
artillery, with its personnel, and we were confident from the start of
our superiority over the enemy in guns of all calibers. Our heavy guns
were able to reach Metz and to interfere seriously with German rail
movements. The French Independent Air Force was placed under my command
which, together with the British bombing squadrons and our air forces,
gave us the largest assembly of aviation that had ever been engaged in
one operation on the Western front.
From Les Eparges around the nose of the salient at St. Mihiel to the
Moselle River the line was roughly forty miles long and situated on
commanding ground greatly strengthened by artificial defenses. Our 1st
Corps (82d, 90th, 5th and 2d Divisions), under command of Major-Gen.
Hunter Liggett, restrung its right on Pont-a-Mousson, with its left
joining our 3d Corps (the 89th, 42d and 1st Divisions), under Major-Gen.
Joseph T. Dickman, in line to Xivray, were to swing toward Vigneulles on
the pivot of the Moselle River for the initial assault. From Xivray to
Mouilly the 2d Colonial French Corps was in line in the center, and our
5th Corps, under command of Major-Gen. George H. Cameron, with our 26th
Division and a French division at the western base of the salient, were
to attack three different hills--Les Eparges, Combres and Amaramthe.
Our 1st Corps had in reserve the 78th Division, our 4th Corps the 3d
Division, and our First Army the 35th and 91st Divisions, with the 80th
and 33d available. It should be understood that our corps organizations
are very elastic, and that we have at no time had permanent assignments
of divisions to corps.
After four hours' artillery preparations, the seven American divisions
in the front line advanced at 5 a.m. on September 12, assisted by a
limited number of tanks manned partly by Americans and partly by French.
These divisions, accompanied by groups of wire cutters and others armed
with bangalore torpedoes, went through the successive bands of barbed
wire that protected the enemy's front line and support trenches, in
irresistible waves on schedule time, breaking down all defense of an
enemy demoralized by the great volume of our artillery fire and our
sudden approach out of the fog.
Our 1st Corps advanced to Thiaucourt, while our 4th Corps curved back
to the southwest through Nonsard. The 2d Colonial French Corps made the
slight advance required of it on very difficult ground, and the 5th
Corps took its three ridges and repulsed a counterattack. A rapid march
brought reserve regiments of a division of the 5th Corps into Vigneulles
in the early morning, where it linked up with patrols of our 4th Corps,
closing the salient and forming a new line west of Thiaucourt to
Vigneulles and beyond Fresnes-en-Woevre. At the cost of only 7,
casualties, mostly light, we had taken 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns, a
great quantity of material, released the inhabitants of many villages
from enemy domination, and established our lines in a position to
threaten Metz. This signal success of the American First Army in its
first offensive was of prime importance. The Allies found they had a
formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had
one to reckon with.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, FIRST PHASE
On the day after we had taken the St. Mihiel salient, much of our corps
and army artillery which had operated at St. Mihiel, and our divisions
in reserve at other points, were already on the move toward the area
back of the line between the Meuse River and the western edge of the
forest of Argonne. With the exception of St. Mihiel, the old German
front line from Switzerland to the east of Rheims was still intact.
In the general attack all along the line, the operation assigned the
American Army as the hinge of this allied offensive was directed toward
the important railroad communications of the German armies through
Mézières and Sedan. The enemy must hold fast to this part of his lines
or the withdrawal of his forces with four years' accumulation of plants
and material would be dangerously imperiled.
The German Army had as yet shown no demoralization, and, while the mass
of its troops had suffered in morale, its first-class divisions, and
notably its machine-gun defense, were exhibiting remarkable tactical
efficiency as well as courage. The German General Staff was fully aware
of the consequences of a success on the Meuse-Argonne line. Certain that
he would do everything in his power to oppose us, the action was
planned with as much secrecy as possible and was undertaken with the
determination to use all our divisions in forcing decision. We expected
to draw the best German divisions to our front and to consume them while
the enemy was held under grave apprehension lest our attack should break
his line, which it was our firm purpose to do.
Our right flank was protected by the Meuse, while our left embraced the
Argonne Forest, whose ravines, hills, and elaborate defense, screened by
dense thickets, had been generally considered impregnable. Our order of
battle from right to left was the 3d Corps from the Meuse to Malancourt,
with the 33d, 80th and 4th Divisions in line, and the 3d Division as
corps reserve; the 5th Corps from Malancourt to Vauquois, with 79th,
87th and 91st Divisions in line, and the 32d in corps reserve, and the
1st Corps, from Vauquois to Vienne le Château, with 35th, 28th and
77th Divisions in line, and the 92d in corps reserve. The army reserve
consisted of the 1st, 29th and 82d Divisions.
On the night of September 25 our troops quietly took the place of the
French, who thinly held the line of this sector, which had long been
inactive. In the attack which began on the 26th we drove through the
barbed wire entanglements and the sea of shell craters across No Man's
Land, mastering all the first-line defences. Continuing on the 27th and
28th, against machine guns and artillery of an increasing number of
enemy reserve divisions, we penetrated to a depth of from three to seven
miles and took the village of Montfaucon and its commanding hill and
Exermont, Gercourt, Cuisy, Septsarges, Malancourt, Ivoiry, Epinonville,
Charpentry, Very and other villages. East of the Meuse one of our
divisions, which was with the 2d Colonial French Corps, captured
Marcheville and Rieville, giving further protection to the flank of our
main body. We had taken 10,000 prisoners, we had gained our point of
forcing th$ battle into the open, and were prepared for the enemy's
reaction, which was bound to come, as he had good roads and ample
railroad facilities for bringing up his artillery and reserves.
In the chill rain of dark nights our engineers had to build new roads
across spongy shell-torn areas, repair broken roads beyond No Man's
Land, and build bridges. Our gunners, with no thought of sleep, put
their shoulders to wheels and drag-ropes to bring their guns through the
mire in support of the infantry, now under the increasing fire of the
enemy's artillery. Our attack had taken the enemy by surprise, but
quickly recovering himself, he began to fire counterattacks in strong
force, supported by heavy bombardments, with large quantities of gas.
From September 28 until October 4 we maintained the offensive against
patches of woods defended by snipers and continuous lines of machine
guns, and pushed forward our guns and transport, seizing strategical
points in preparation for further attacks.
OTHER UNITS WITH ALLIES
Other divisions attached to the allied armies were doing their part.
It was the fortune of our 2d Corps, composed of the 27th and 30th
Divisions, which had remained with the British, to have a place of honor
in cooperation with the Australian Corps on September 29 and October
in the assault on the Hindenburg Line where the St. Quentin Canal passes
through a tunnel under a ridge. The 30th Division speedily broke through
the main line of defense for all its objectives, while the 27th pushed
on impetuously through the main line until some of its elements reached
Gouy. In the midst of the maze of trenches and shell craters and under
crossfire from machine guns the other elements fought desperately
against odds. In this and in later actions, from October 6 to October
19, our 2d Corps captured over 6,000 prisoners and advanced over
thirteen miles. The spirit and aggressiveness of these divisions have
been highly praised by the British Army commander under whom they
served.
On October 2-9 our 2d and 36th Divisions were sent to assist the French
in an important attack against the old German positions before Rheims.
The 2d conquered the complicated defense works on their front against a
persistent defense worthy of the grimmest period of trench warfare
and attacked the strongly held wooded hill of Blanc Mont, which they
captured in a second assault, sweeping over it with consummate dash and
skill. This division then repulsed strong counterattacks before the
village and cemetery of Ste. Etienne and took the town, forcing the
Germans to fall back from before Rheims and yield positions they had
held since September, 1914. On October 9 the 36th Division relieved
the 2d, and in its first experience under fire withstood very severe
artillery bombardment and rapidly took up the pursuit of the enemy, now
retiring behind the Aisne.
MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE, SECOND PHASE
The allied progress elsewhere cheered the efforts of our men in
this crucial contest, as the German command threw in more and more
first-class troops to stop our advance. We made steady headway in the
almost impenetrable and strongly held Argonne Forest, for, despite this
reinforcement, it was our army that was doing the driving. Our aircraft
was increasing in skill and numbers and forcing the issue, and our
infantry and artillery were improving rapidly with each new experience.
The replacements fresh from home were put into exhausted divisions with
little time for training, but they had the advantage of serving
beside men who knew their business and who had almost become veterans
overnight. The enemy had taken every advantage of the terrain, which
especially favored the defense by a prodigal use of machine guns manned
by highly trained veterans and by using his artillery at short ranges.
In the face of such strong frontal positions we should have been unable
to accomplish and progress according to previously accepted standards,
but I had every confidence in our aggressive tactics and the courage of
our troops.
On October 4 the attack was renewed all along our front. The 3d Corps,
tilting to the left, followed the Brieulles-Cunel Road; our 5th Corps
took Gesnes, while the 1st Corps advanced for over two miles along
the irregular valley of the Aire River and in the wooded hills of the
Argonne that bordered the river, used by the enemy with all his art and
weapons of defense. This sort of fighting continued against an
enemy striving to hold every foot of ground and whose very strong
counterattacks challenged us at every point. On the 7th the 1st Corps
captured Chatel-Chénéry and continued along the river to Cornay. On the
east of the Meuse sector one of the two divisions coöperating with the
French, captured Consenvoye and the Haumont Woods. On the 9th the 5th
Corps, in its progress up the Aire, took Fléville, and the 3d Corps,
which had continuous fighting against odds, was working its way through
Briueulles and Cunel. On the 10th we had cleared the Argonne Forest of
the enemy.
It was now necessary to constitute a second army, and on October 9 the
immediate command of the First Army was turned over to Lieut.-Gen.
Hunter Liggett. The command of the Second Army, whose divisions occupied
a sector in the Woevre, was given to Lieut.-Gen. Robert L. Bullard,
who had been commander of the 1st Division and then of the 3d Corps.
Major-Gen. Dickman was transferred to the command of the 1st Corps,
while the 5th Corps was placed under Major-Gen. Charles P. Summerall,
who had recently commanded the 1st Division. Major-Gen. John L. Hines,
who had gone rapidly up from regimental to division commander, was
assigned to the 3d Corps. These four officers had been in France from
the early days of the expedition and had learned their lessons in the
school of practical warfare.
Our constant pressure against the enemy brought day by day more
prisoners, mostly survivors from machine-gun nests captured in fighting
at close quarters. On October 18 there was very fierce fighting in the
Caures Woods east of the Meuse and in the Ormont Woods. On the 14th 1st
Corps took St. Juvin, and the 5th Corps, in hand-to-hand encounters,
entered the formidable Kriemhilde line, where the enemy had hoped to
check us indefinitely. Later the 5th Corps penetrated further the
Kriemhilde line, and the 1st Corps took Champignuelles and the important
town of Grandpre. Our dogged offensive was wearing down the enemy,
who continued desperately to throw his best troops against us, thus
weakening his line in front of our Allies and making their advance less
difficult.
DIVISIONS IN BELGIUM
Meanwhile we were not only able to continue the battle, but our 37th and
31st Divisions were hastily withdrawn from our front and dispatched
to help the French Army in Belgium. Detraining in the neighborhood of
Ypres, these divisions advanced by rapid stages to the fighting line and
were assigned to adjacent French corps. On October 31, in continuation
of the Flanders offensive, they attacked and methodically broke down
all enemy resistance. On Nov. 3 the 37th had completed its mission in
dividing the enemy across the Escaut River and firmly established itself
along the east bank included in the division zone of action. By a
clever flanking movement troops of the 91st Division captured Spitaals
Bosschen, a difficult wood extending across the central part of the
division sector, reached the Escaut, and penetrated into the town of
Audenarde. These divisions received high commendation from their corps
commanders for their dash and energy.
MEUSE-ARGONNE--LAST PHASE
On the 23d the 3d and 5th Corps pushed northward to the level of
Bantheville. While we continued to press forward and throw back the
enemy's violent counterattacks with great loss to him, a regrouping of
our forces was under way for the final assault. Evidences of loss of
morale by the enemy gave our men more confidence in attack and more
fortitude in enduring the fatigue of incessant effort and the hardships
of very inclement weather.
With comparatively well-rested divisions, the final advance in the
Meuse-Argonne front was begun on November 1. Our increased artillery
force acquitted itself magnificently in support of the advance, and the
enemy broke before the determined infantry, which, by its persistent
fighting of the past weeks and the dash of this attack, had overcome his
will to resist. The 3d Corps took Ancrevlle, Doulcon and Andevanne, and
the 5th Corps took Landres et St. Georges and passed through successive
lines of resistance to Bayonville and Chennery. On the 2d the 1st Corps
joined in the movement, which now became an impetuous onslaught that
could not be stayed.
On the 3d advance troops surged forward in pursuit, some by motor
trucks, while the artillery pressed along the country roads close
behind. The 1st Corps reached Authe and Châtillon-Sur-Bar, the 5th
Corps, Fosse and Nouart, and the 3d Corps, Halles, penetrating the
enemy's lines to a depth of twelve miles. Our large-caliber guns had
advanced and were skilfully brought into position to fire upon the
important lines at Montmedy, Longuyon and Conflans. Our 3d Corps crossed
the Meuse on the 5th and the other corps, in the full confidence that
the day was theirs, eagerly cleared the way of machine guns as they
swept northward, maintaining complete coordination throughout. On the
6th, a division of the 1st Corps reached a point on the Meuse opposite
Sedan, twenty-five miles from our line of departure. The strategical
goal which was our highest hope was gained. We had cut the enemy's main
line of communications, and nothing but surrender or an armistice could
save his army from complete disaster.
In all forty enemy divisions had been used against us in the
Meuse-Argonne battle. Between September 26 and November 6 we took 26,
prisoners and 468 guns on this front. Our divisions engaged were the
1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 32d, 33d, 35th, 37th, 42d,
77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 82d, 89th, 90th and 91st. Many of our divisions
remained in line for a length of time that requires nerves of steel,
while others were sent in again after only a few days of rest. The 1st,
5th, 26th, 77th, 80th, 89th, and 90th were in the line twice. Although
some of the divisions were fighting their first battle, they soon became
equal to the best.
OPERATIONS EAST OF THE MEUSE
On the three days preceding November 10, the 3d, the 2d Colonial and the
17th French Corps fought a difficult struggle through the Meuse Hills
south of Stenay and forced the enemy into the plain. Meanwhile my plans
for further use of the American forces contemplated an advance between
the Meuse and the Moselle in the direction of Longwy by the First Army,
while, at the same time, the Second Army should assure the offensive
toward the rich coal fields of Briey. These operations were to be
followed by an offensive toward Château-Salins east of the Moselle, thus
isolating Metz. Accordingly, attacks on the American front had been
ordered, and that of the Second Army was in progress on the morning of
November 11, when instructions were received that hostilities should
cease at 11 o'clock A.M.
At this moment the line of the American sector, from right to left,
began at Port-sur-Seille, thence across the Moselle to Vandieres and
through the Woevre to Bezonvaux, in the foothills of the Meuse, thence
along to the foothills and through the northern edge of the Woevre
forests to the Meuse at Mouzay, thence along the Meuse connecting with
the French under Sedan.
RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIES
Coöperation among the Allies has at all times been most cordial. A far
greater effort has been put forth by the allied armies and staffs to
assist us than could have been expected. The French Government and Army
have always stood ready to furnish us with supplies, equipment and
transportation and to aid us in every way. In the towns and hamlets
wherever our troops have been stationed or billeted the French people
have everywhere received them more as relatives and intimate friends
than as soldiers of a foreign army. For these things words are quite
inadequate to express our gratitude. There can be no doubt that the
relations growing out of our associations here assure a permanent
friendship between the two peoples. Although we have not been so
intimately associated with the people of Great Britain, yet their troops
and ours when thrown together have always warmly fraternized. The
reception of those of our forces who have passed through England and
of those who have been stationed there has always been enthusiastic.
Altogether it has been deeply impressed upon us that the ties of
language and blood bring the British and ourselves together completely
and inseparably.
STRENGTH
There are in Europe altogether, including a regiment and some sanitary
units with the Italian Army and the organizations at Murmansk, also
including those en route from the States, approximately 2,053,347 men,
less our losses. Of this total there are in France 1,338,169 combatant
troops. Forty divisions have arrived of which the infantry personnel
of ten have been used as replacements, leaving thirty divisions now in
France organized into three armies of three corps each.
The losses of the Americans up to November 18 are: Killed and wounded,
36,145; died of disease, 14,811; deaths unclassified, 2,204; wounded,
179,625; prisoners, 2,163; missing, 1,160. We have captured about 44,
prisoners and 1,400 guns, howitzers and trench mortars.
[General Pershing then highly praised the work of the General Staff, the
Service of Supply, Medical Corps, Quartermaster Department, Ordnance
Department, Signal Corps, Engineer Corps, and continued:]
Our aviators have no equals in daring or in fighting ability, and have
left a record of courageous deeds that will ever remain a brilliant
page in the annals of our army. While the Tank Corps has had limited
opportunities, its personnel has responded gallantly on every possible
occasion, and has shown courage of the highest order.
The navy in European waters has at all times most cordially aided the
army, and it is most gratifying to report that there has never before
been such perfect coöperation between these two branches of the service.
Finally, I pay supreme tribute to our officers and soldiers of the line.
When I think of their heroism, their patience under hardships, their
unflinching spirit of offensive action, I am filled with emotion which I
am unable to express. Their deeds are immortal, and they have earned the
eternal gratitude of our country.
I am, Mr. Secretary, very respectfully,
JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, Commander-in-Chief,
American Expeditionary Forces.
To the Secretary of War.