CHAPTER VI. CAUSES OF THE WAR

_National and Race Prejudices--The Triple Alliance--The Triple

Entente--Teuton vs. Slav--Influence of Russian Diplomacy--Russia vs.

Austria--Control of Balkan Seaports--England's Commercial Supremacy

Challenged by Germany--Assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand of

Austria by a Serb_.

Within the space of less than a week from August 1, 1914, five of the

six "great powers" of Europe became involved in a war that quickly

developed into the greatest and most sanguinary struggle of all time.

The European conflagration, long foreseen by statesmen and diplomats,

and dreaded of all alike, had broken out.

Beginning with the thunder of Austrian guns at Belgrade, the

reverberations of war were heard in every capital of the Old World.

Austria's declaration of war against Servia was followed by the

alignment of Germany with its Teuton neighbor against the forces of

Russia, France and England. Italy alone, of the six great powers,

declined to align itself with its formal allies and made a determined

effort at the outset to maintain its neutrality.

Soon the highways of Europe resounded with the hoof-beats and the tramp

of marching hosts, with the rattle of arms and the rumble of artillery.

Of such a war, once begun, no man could predict the end. But the world

realized that it was a catastrophe of unparalleled proportions, a

failure of civilization in its stronghold, a disaster to humanity.

For more than forty years the great powers of Europe had been at peace

with one another. Though war had threatened now and then, diplomacy

had avoided the actual outbreak. But that the dreaded conflict was

inevitable had long been recognized. For its coming immense armaments

had been prepared, until the burdens of taxation laid upon the people

had become in themselves a source of danger. But behind it all lay the

sinister influence of the "junker" element of Germany--the military

party, swollen with pride in the development of the German army by more

than forty years of preparation for conflict, and the naval party, eager

for "der Tag" which should bring a trial of the new German navy

against the battle fleets of an enemy. Fostering and encouraging these

militaristic sentiments was the growing desire of Germany for "a

place in the sun," which was translatable only as a desire for world

domination. Greater and wider markets for German commerce were urgently

demanded, and visions of Germany as mistress of the seas, with a great

colonial empire, and of the Kaiser as the undisputed military overlord

of Europe, already filled and fired the Teuton imagination.

The political alignment of the great powers prior to the war was as

follows: On the one side was the Triple Alliance, including Germany,

Austria-Hungary, and Italy; while on the other was the Triple Entente,

comprising Great Britain, France and Russia. As the event proved, the

uncertain element in this line-up was Italy, which had a real grievance

against Austria in the latter's possession of the former Italian

territory known as the Trentino, and which was not consulted by Germany

and Austria prior to the outbreak of hostilities. She therefore declined

to enter the war as a member of the Triple Alliance, but was later found

in the field against Austria, and thenceforth rendered powerful aid to

the cause of "the Allies," as the members of the Triple Entente and

their supporters soon came to be known.

It was in the Balkans, long regarded as the zone of danger to European

peace, that the war-clouds gathered and darkened rapidly. For

generations Austria and Russia had struggled diplomatically for the

control of Balkan seaports, with the Balkan states acting as buffers in

the diplomatic strife. Servia acted as a bar to Austria's commercial

route to the Ægean, by way of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar to Saloniki,

while Russia was Servia's great ally and stood stoutly behind the little

Slav kingdom in its opposition to Austrian aggression.

AMBITIONS OF SERVIA

Then came the recent Balkan Wars, and their outcome was viewed with

alarm. Austria uneasily watched the approach of Servia to the Adriatic

and the Aegean. The formation of the new new autonomous state of

Albania, between Servia and the Adriatic, was all that prevented Austria

from attacking Servia during that crisis. The terms of peace left the

situation, as it concerned Austria and Russia, practically as it had

been. Austria made no further progress toward the sea, and Russia

remained the ally of Servia. Bulgaria had failed in its efforts to reach

Salonica.

At this stage another element exerted its influence. Servia awoke to the

possibility of a Greater Servia. An Empire of the Slavs had long been

dreamed of. In Austria-Hungary itself millions of Slavs were dreaming of

it and awaiting the disruption of Austria-Hungary, held together now,

as they argue, only by the indomitable will of the old Emperor, Franz

Joseph. The hatred between the Slavs and the Teutonic Austrians is

intense. The annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which

Servians predominate, increased the Servian hatred and the indignation

of the whole Slav world to the point of violence. A conflict was avoided

with difficulty. These principalities had hoped to form part of a

Greater Servia. Had not Russia been exhausted by the war with Japan,

Servia would have called upon her ally and the crisis would have come

then. As it was, the Balkans teemed with plots and counterplots against

the Austrians, culminating in the assassination of the Arch-Duke and

heir-apparent to the Austrian throne, Francis Ferdinand, known for his

anti-Slav principles, and therefore feared and hated as the king to

be. The assassination occurred at Serajevo in Bosnia, where Servian

disaffection was seething. Austria immediately laid the crime on the

Servian government.

AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR

Failing in her peremptory demands for satisfaction, Austria declared

war, July 28, 1914, apparently for revenge, but behind her righteous

indignation she still held in view her traditional ambition, a port on

the Mediterranean, to be secured by the complete control of the

Novi Bazar route to Salonica, a route which, besides its commercial

importance, is of tremendous strategic value to the nation which

commands it. The treaty of Berlin of 1878, after the Russo-Turkish War,

had given Austria the military, political, and commercial control of the

route within the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, then a part of Turkey.

But now, in the division of spoils following the Balkan Wars, Servia

gained control of Novi Bazar, Pristina, Uskub, and Istip, or practically

the entire route to a short distance north of Salonica, where the new

boundaries of Greece had been extended. This meant that Austria saw

herself shut out from the Sanjak, and only by the destruction and

subsequent occupation of Servia could Austria regain her ascendancy over

the route. Victory would mean a long step by Austria toward the sea.

PLOTS AND COUNTERPLOTS

The "balance of power" among European nations has hitherto been

maintained because the formation of a single nation out of the Balkan

States has not been possible. Although the people of these states

have similar pursuits, and live much alike in all regions, they have

preserved their original racial differences. A village of Albanians may

be within a few miles of a village of Greeks. Yet through centuries both

have remained racially distinct. Here and there the barriers have given

way somewhat, but in general the races persist side by side, sometimes

peaceably, more often in mutual distrust or open feud. Such division has

been fostered by the great nations, and new states have been created, as

recently Albania, since the formation of a great state in the Balkans by

the union of all or the absorbing greatness of one, would overthrow

the balance of power, and besides interpose an insurmountable obstacle

between Austria and Russia, and the sea.

Thus the states have been played against each other. Sometimes the game

has been one of diplomacy, or one of force, hurling the states at each

other's throats.

HOW WAR WAS DECLARED

_Ultimatum, by Austria to Servia--War Declared by Austria--

Russia Mobilizes--Germany Declares War on Russia

August 1--France and England Involved--Germans

Enter Belgium--Scenes in European Capitals_.

On Sunday, June 28, 1914, a Servian student named Prinzep shot

and killed the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the thrones of

Austria-Hungary, and his morganatic wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, in

the streets of Serajevo, a town in Bosnia which the royal couple were

visiting.

Nearly four weeks later, on July 23, the Austro-Hungarian government,

fixing responsibility for the assassination upon Servian intrigues,

presented to Servia a number of demands which formed a very drastic

ultimatum, requiring compliance within forty-eight hours, with the

alternative of war. Servia was required to condemn "the propaganda

directed against Austria" and to take proceedings against all

accessories to the plot against the Archduke Francis Ferdinand who were

in Servia. Austrian delegates were to supervise the proceedings, and

Servia was also to arrest certain Servian officials whose guilt was

alleged. These exorbitant conditions made it quite obvious that no

concessions on Servians part would be accepted. It was a plain prelude

to war.

Nevertheless, a virtual acceptance by Servia followed. Acting on the

advice of Russia, Servia acceded to all that was required of her,

making only two reservations of the most reasonable character. These

reservations were found enough to serve as an excuse for war. Austria at

once declared herself dissatisfied and though the actual declaration of

war was delayed for a brief period, a state of war practically existed

between the two countries from Saturday evening, July 25.

EFFORTS TO LOCALIZE THE WAR

Then began efforts on the part of Great Britain to localize the war.

Sir Edward Grey, the able foreign secretary in Mr. Asquith's cabinet,

repeated solemn warnings in every chancellery of Europe. According to

the English "white book," the very day that he was notified of the

violent tone of Austria's note to Servia--the day it was presented--he

warned the Austrian Ambassador in London that if as many as four of

the Great Powers of Europe were to engage in war, it would involve the

expenditure of such a vast sum of money and such interference with

trade, that a complete collapse of European credit and industry would

follow. The reply of Russia to this warning was quite conciliatory. The

Russian foreign minister, M. Sazonoff, assured the British minister that

Russia had no aggressive intentions, and would take no action unless

forced. Austria's action, M. Sazonoff added, in reality aimed at

over-throwing Russia's influence in the Balkans.

Thus, on Monday, July 27, Sir Edward Grey was able to state in the House

of Commons that his suggestion of a joint conference, composed of the

Ambassadors of Germany, France and Italy, and himself, with a view to

mediation between Austria and Russia, had been accepted by all except

Germany, which power had expressed its concurrence with the plan in

principle, but opposed the details on the ground that there was a

prospect of direct "conversations" (diplomatic exchanges) between

Austria and Russia. This statement was believed in England to lack

sincerity. On that Monday afternoon the Russian Ambassador at Vienna

warned Austria that Russia would not give way and expressed his hope

that some arrangement might be arrived at before Servia was invaded.

Austria's reply came next day in the shape of a formal declaration of

war against Servia.

GERMANY'S ATTITUDE PRO-AUSTRIAN

On July 30 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, made the

following statement to Sir Edward Grey regarding the attitude of Germany

in the crisis: "Although I am not able to verify it, I have private

information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the

Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched, and telegraphed

it to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself that

he endorses every line of it."

Naturally enough the Russian foreign minister complained that

"conversations" with Austria were useless in the face of such facts.

Russia then declared that her forces would be mobilized the day that

Austria crossed the Servian frontier. The attitude of Germany at once

stiffened and it became evident that Germany meant to regard even the

partial mobilization of Russia as a ground for war, not only against

Russia, but also against the latter's ally, France.

In vain Russia protested that her partial mobilization was merely a

precaution. In vain did the Czar himself offer to give his word that no

use would be made of any of his forces. Germany was aware, as subsequent

facts have proved, that her own state of mobilization was very much

further advanced than that of Russia.

GERMAN ULTIMATUM TO RUSSIA

By Friday, July 31, Germany was ready for the fray and a final ultimatum

to St. Petersburg was launched. On the same day Russia declared war

against Austria. By six o'clock on Saturday evening, August 1, war

between Germany and Russia began, when Germany dismissed the Russian

Ambassador, and by Sunday morning Germany was invading France. The

next day, August 3, the German Ambassador left Paris and the French

Ambassador at Berlin was ordered to demand his passports.

At this point Great Britain passed from the position of general

peacemaker to that of a principal. In the House of Commons on Monday,

August 3, Sir Edward Grey stated that the question whether Austria

or Russia should dominate the Southern Slav races was no concern of

England, nor was she bound by any secret alliance to France. She was

absolutely free to choose her course with regard to the crisis which had

overtaken her. But there were two cardinal points in the situation

which had arisen which ultimately concerned Great Britain. The first

essential feature of British diplomacy, said Sir Edward, was that France

should not be brought into such a condition in Europe that she became

a species of vassal state to Germany. On the morning of July 31,

therefore, he had informed the German Ambassador that if the efforts to

maintain peace failed and France became involved Great Britain would be

drawn into the conflict.

In his speech of August 3 the British foreign minister also stated that

he had given France on the previous day the written assurance that if

the German fleet came into the English Channel or through the North Sea

to assail her, the British fleet would protect her to the uttermost.

TO PROTECT BELGIAN AUTONOMY

On the same afternoon, in the same place, Sir Edward Grey reiterated the

other dominant principle of British foreign policy--that England can

never look with indifference on the seizure by a great continental power

of any portion of Belgium and Holland. More than a hundred years ago it

was declared by Napoleon, who was a master of political geography, that

Antwerp was "a pistol leveled at the head of London."

When on July 31 the British foreign minister inquired by telegraph both

at Paris and Berlin whether the two governments would engage to respect

the neutrality of Belgium, France replied with an assurance that she was

resolved to do so unless compelled to act otherwise by reason of the

violation of Belgium's neutrality at the hands of another power. The

German secretary of state, Herr von Jagow, replied that he could give no

such assurance until he had consulted the Emperor and Chancellor, and

doubted whether he could give any answer without revealing the German

plan of campaign. He furthermore alleged the commission of hostile acts

by Belgium.

Developments quickly followed. The German government proposed that

Belgium should grant its armies free passage through Belgian territory.

The proposal was accompanied by an intimation that Belgium would be

crushed out of existence if it refused to comply. In fact, it was an

ultimatum presented at 7 o'clock on Sunday evening, August 2, to expire

within twelve hours.

Then came Sir Edward Grey's speech in parliament on August 3, when it

was fully realized that Germany and England were on the verge of war.

What followed was related in the House of Commons next day.

SCENES IN PARLIAMENT

Germany's reply to the speech by Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign

secretary, indicating the attitude of Great Britain in regard to the

contemplated violation of Belgian territory by Germany was a second

ultimatum from Berlin to Brussels, saying Germany was prepared to carry

through her plans by force of arms if necessary.

The British government was officially informed by Belgium on August

that German troops had invaded Belgium and that the violation of that

country's neutrality, which the British, foreign secretary had intimated

must be followed by action on the part of the British, had become an

accomplished fact.

Definite announcement of Great Britain's intentions under these

circumstances was expected in the house of commons that afternoon.

TELEGRAM SENT TO BERLIN

On the assembly of the house the premier, Mr. Asquith, said that a

telegram had been sent early in the morning to Sir Edward Goschen,

British ambassador in Berlin, to the following effect:

"The king of the Belgians has appealed to His Britannic Majesty's

government for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. The British

government is also informed that the German government has delivered to

the Belgian government a note proposing friendly neutrality pending a

free passage of German troops through Belgium and promising to maintain

the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions on the

conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as

an enemy." Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, had requested

an answer within twelve hours.

Premier Asquith then read a telegram from the German foreign minister,

which the German ambassador in London had sent to Sir Edward Grey. It

was as follows:

"Please dispel any distrust that may subsist on the part

of the British government with regard to our intentions by

repeating most positively the formal assurance that even in

case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will under no

pretensions whatever annex Belgian territory."

The reading of this telegram was greeted with derisive laughter by the

members of the house.

Premier Asquith continued:

"We understand that Belgium categorically refused to

assent to a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

"His majesty's government was bound to protest against

this violation of a treaty to which Germany was a party in

common with England and must request an assurance that

the demand made upon Belgium by Germany be not proceeded

with and that Belgium's neutrality be respected by Germany

and we have asked for an immediate reply.

"We received this morning from our minister in Brussels

the following telegram:

"'The German minister has this morning addressed a

note to the Belgian minister for foreign affairs stating that as

the Belgian government has declined a well intentioned proposal

submitted to it by the imperial German government

the latter, deeply to its regret, will be compelled to carry out,

if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable

in view of the French menace.'"

ENGLAND AND GERMANY AT WAR

By 11 o'clock that evening England and Germany were at war. Their

respective ambassadors were handed their passports and Great Britain

braced herself for a conflict that was felt to threaten her very

existence as a nation.

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