FINANCES: THE TREATY OF PEACE.
At the end of 1779 Morris was thus retired to private life; and, having
by this time made many friends in Philadelphia, he took up his abode in
that city. His leaving Congress was small loss to himself, as that body
was rapidly sinking into a condition of windy decrepitude.
He at once began working at his profession, and also threw himself with
eager zest into every attainable form of gayety and amusement, for he
was of a most pleasure-loving temperament, very fond of society, and a
great favorite in the little American world of wit and fashion. But
although in private life, he nevertheless kept his grip on public
affairs, and devoted himself to the finances, which were in a most
wretched state. He could not keep out of public life; he probably agreed
with Jay, who, on hearing that he was again a private citizen, wrote him
to "remember that Achilles made no figure at the spinning-wheel." At any
rate, as early as February, 1780, he came to the front once more as the
author of a series of essays on the finances. They were published in
Philadelphia, and attracted the attention of all thinking men by their
soundness. In fact it was in our monetary affairs that the key to the
situation was to be found; for, had we been willing to pay honestly and
promptly the necessary war expenses, we should have ended the struggle
in short order. But the niggardliness as well as the real poverty, of
the people, the jealousies of the states, kept aflame by the
states-rights leaders for their own selfish purposes, and the foolish
ideas of most of the congressional delegates on all money matters,
combined to keep our treasury in a pitiable condition.
Morris tried to show the people at large the advantage of submitting to
reasonable taxation, while at the same time combating some of the
theories entertained as well by themselves as by their congressional
representatives. He began by discussing with great clearness what money
really is, how far coin can be replaced by paper, the interdependence of
money and credit, and other elementary points in reference to which most
of his fellow-citizens seemed to possess wonderfully mixed ideas. He
attacked the efforts of Congress to make their currency legal tender;
and then showed the utter futility of one of the pet schemes of
revolutionary financial wisdom, the regulation of prices by law. Hard
times, then as now, always produced not only a large debtor class, but
also a corresponding number of political demagogues who truckled to it;
and both demagogue and debtor, when they clamored for laws which should
"relieve" the latter, meant thereby laws which would enable him to
swindle his creditor. The people, moreover, liked to lay the blame for
their misfortunes neither on fate nor on themselves, but on some
unfortunate outsider; and they were especially apt to attack as
"monopolists" the men who had purchased necessary supplies in large
quantities to profit by their rise in price. Accordingly they passed
laws against them; and Morris showed in his essays the unwisdom of such
legislation, while not defending for a moment the men who looked on the
misfortunes of their country solely as offering a field for their own
harvesting.
He ended by drawing out an excellent scheme of taxation; but,
unfortunately, the people were too short-sighted to submit to any
measure of the sort, no matter how wise and necessary. One of the pleas
he made for his scheme was, that something of the sort would be
absolutely necessary for the preservation of the Federal Union, "which,"
he wrote, "in my poor opinion, will greatly depend upon the management
of the revenue." He showed with his usual clearness the need of
obtaining, for financial as well as for all other reasons, a firmer
union, as the existing confederation bade fair to become, as its enemies
had prophesied, a rope of sand. He also foretold graphically the misery
that would ensue--and that actually did ensue--when the pressure from a
foreign foe should cease, and the states should be resolved into a
disorderly league of petty, squabbling communities. In ending he
remarked bitterly: "The articles of confederation were formed when the
attachment to Congress was warm and great. The framers of them,
therefore, seem to have been only solicitous how to provide against the
power of that body, which, by means of their foresight and care, now
exists by mere courtesy and sufferance."
Although Morris was not able to convert Congress to the ways of sound
thinking, his ability and clearness impressed themselves on all the best
men; notably on Robert Morris,--who was no relation of his, by the
way,--the first in the line of American statesmen who have been great in
finance; a man whose services to our treasury stand on a par, if not
with those of Hamilton, at least with those of Gallatin and John
Sherman. Congress had just established four departments, with
secretaries at the head of each. The two most important were the
Departments of Foreign Affairs and of Finance. Livingstone was given the
former, while Robert Morris received the latter; and immediately
afterwards appointed Gouverneur Morris as Assistant Financier, at a
salary of eighteen hundred and fifty dollars a year.
Morris accepted this appointment, and remained in office for three years
and a half, until the beginning of 1785. He threw himself heart and soul
into the work, helping his chief in every way; and in particular giving
him invaluable assistance in the establishment of the "Bank of North
America," which Congress was persuaded to incorporate,--an institution
which was the first of its kind in the country. It was of wonderful
effect in restoring the public credit, and was absolutely invaluable in
the financial operations undertaken by the secretary.
When, early in 1782, the secretary was directed by Congress, to present
to that body a report on the foreign coins circulating in the country,
it was prepared and sent in by Gouverneur Morris, and he accompanied it
with a plan for an American coinage. The postscript was the really
important part of the document, and the plan therein set forth was made
the basis of our present coinage system, although not until several
years later, and then only with important modifications, suggested, for
the most part, by Jefferson.
Although his plan was modified, it still remains true that Gouverneur
Morris was the founder of our national coinage. He introduced the system
of decimal notation, invented the word "cent" to express one of the
smaller coins, and nationalized the already familiar word "dollar." His
plan, however, was a little too abstruse for the common mind, the unit
being made so small that a large sum would have had to be expressed in a
very great number of figures, and there being five or six different
kinds of new coins, some of them not simple multiples of each other.
Afterwards he proposed as a modification a system of pounds, or dollars,
and doits, the doit answering to our present mill, while providing also
an ingenious arrangement by which the money of account was to differ
from the money of coinage. Jefferson changed the system by grafting on
it the dollar as a unit, and simplifying it; and Hamilton perfected it
further.
To understand the advantage, as well as the boldness, of Morris's
scheme, we must keep in mind the horrible condition of our currency at
that time. We had no proper coins of our own; nothing but hopelessly
depreciated paper bills, a mass of copper, and some clipped and
counterfeited gold and silver coin from the mints of England, France,
Spain, and even Germany. Dollars, pounds, shillings, doubloons, ducats,
moidores, joes, crowns, pistareens, coppers, and sous, circulated
indifferently, and with various values in each colony. A dollar was
worth six shillings in Massachusetts, eight in New York, seven and
sixpence in Pennsylvania, six again in Virginia, eight again in North
Carolina, thirty-two and a half in South Carolina, and five in Georgia.
The government itself had to resort to clipping in one of its most
desperate straits; and at last people would only take payment by weight
of gold or silver.
Morris, in his report, dwelt especially on three points: first, that the
new money should be easily intelligible to the multitude, and should,
therefore, bear a close relation to the coins already existing, as
otherwise its sudden introduction would bring business to a stand-still;
and would excite distrust and suspicion everywhere, particularly among
the poorest and most ignorant, the day-laborers, the farm servants, and
the hired help. Second, that its lowest divisible sum, or unit, should
be very small, so that the price and the value of little things could be
made proportionate; and third, that as far as possible the money should
increase in decimal ratio. The Spanish dollar was the coin most widely
circulated, while retaining everywhere about the same value. Accordingly
he took this, and then sought for a unit that would go evenly into it,
as well as into the various shillings, disregarding the hopelessly
aberrant shilling of South Carolina. Such a unit was a quarter of a
grain of pure silver, equal to the one fourteen hundred and fortieth
part of a dollar; it was not, of course, necessary to have it exactly
represented in coin. On the contrary, he proposed to strike two copper
pieces, respectively of five and eight units, to be known as _fives_ and
_eights_. Two _eights_ would then make a penny in Pennsylvania, and
three _eights_ one in Georgia, while three _fives_ would make one in New
York, and four would make one in Massachusetts. Morris's great aim was,
while establishing uniform coins for the entire Union, to get rid of the
fractional remainders in translating the old currencies into the new;
and in addition his reckoning adapted itself to the different systems in
the different states, as well as to the different coins in use. But he
introduced an entirely new system of coinage, and moreover used therein
the names of several old coins while giving them new values. His
originally proposed table of currency was as follows:--
One crown = ten dollars, or 10,000 units.
One dollar = ten bills, or 1,000 "
One bill = ten pence, or 100 "
One penny = ten quarters, or 10 "
One quarter = 1 "
But he proposed that for convenience other coins should be struck, like
the copper _five_ and _eight_ above spoken of, and he afterwards altered
his names. He then called the bill of one hundred units a _cent_, making
it consist of twenty-five grains of silver and two of copper, being thus
the lowest silver coin. Five _cents_ were to make a _quint_, and ten a
_mark_.
Congress, according to its custom, received the report, applauded it,
and did nothing in the matter. Shortly afterwards, however, Jefferson
took it up, when the whole subject was referred to a committee of which
he was a member. He highly approved of Morris's plan, and took from it
the idea of a decimal system, and the use of the words "dollar" and
"cent." But he considered Morris's unit too small, and preferred to take
as his own the Spanish dollar, which was already known to all the
people, its value being uniform and well understood. Then, by keeping
strictly to the decimal system, and dividing the dollar into one hundred
parts, he got cents for our fractional currency. He thus introduced a
simpler system than that of Morris, with an existing and
well-understood unit, instead of an imaginary one that would have to be,
for the first time, brought to the knowledge of the people, and which
might be adopted only with reluctance. On the other hand, Jefferson's
system failed entirely to provide for the extension of the old
currencies in the terms of the new without the use of fractions. On this
account Morris vehemently opposed it, but it was nevertheless adopted.
He foretold, what actually came to pass, that the people would be very
reluctant to throw away their local moneys in order to take up a general
money which bore no special relation to them. For half a century
afterwards the people clung to their absurd shillings and sixpences, the
government itself, in its post-office transactions, being obliged to
recognize the obsolete terms in vogue in certain localities. Some
curious pieces circulated freely up to the time of the Civil War. Still,
Jefferson's plan worked admirably in the end.
All the time he was working so hard at the finances, Morris nevertheless
continued to enjoy himself to the full in the society of Philadelphia.
Imperious, light-hearted, good-looking, well-dressed, he ranked as a wit
among men, as a beau among women. He was equally sought for dances and
dinners. He was a fine scholar and a polished gentleman; a capital
story-teller; and had just a touch of erratic levity that served to
render him still more charming. Occasionally he showed whimsical
peculiarities, usually about very small things, that brought him into
trouble; and one such freak cost him a serious injury. In his capacity
of young man of fashion, he used to drive about town in a phaeton with a
pair of small, spirited horses; and because of some whim, he would not
allow the groom to stand at their heads. So one day they took fright,
ran, threw him out, and broke his leg. The leg had to be amputated, and
he was ever afterwards forced to wear a wooden one. However, he took his
loss with most philosophic cheerfulness, and even bore with equanimity
the condolences of those exasperating individuals, of a species by no
means peculiar to revolutionary times, who endeavored to prove to him
the manifest falsehood that such an accident was "all for the best." To
one of these dreary gentlemen he responded, with disconcerting vivacity,
that his visitor had so handsomely argued the advantage of being
entirely legless as to make him almost tempted to part with his
remaining limb; and to another he announced that at least there was the
compensation that he would be a _steadier_ man with one leg than with
two. Wild accounts of the accident got about, which rather irritated
him, and in answer to a letter from Jay he wrote: "I suppose it was
Deane who wrote to you from France about the loss of my leg. His account
is facetious. Let it pass. The leg is gone, and there is an end of the
matter." His being crippled did not prevent him from going about in
society very nearly as much as ever; and society in Philadelphia was at
the moment gayer than in any other American city. Indeed Jay, a man of
Puritanic morality, wrote to Morris somewhat gloomily to inquire about
"the rapid progress of luxury at Philadelphia;" to which his younger
friend, who highly appreciated the good things of life, replied
light-heartedly: "With respect to our taste for luxury, do not grieve
about it. Luxury is not so bad a thing as it is often supposed to be;
and if it were, still we must follow the course of things, and turn to
advantage what exists, since we have not the power to annihilate or
create. The very definition of 'luxury' is as difficult as the
suppression of it." In another letter he remarked that he thought there
were quite as many knaves among the men who went on foot as there were
among those who drove in carriages.
Jay at this time, having been successively a member of the Continental
Congress, the New York Legislature, and the State Constitutional
Convention, having also been the first chief justice of his native
state, and then president of the Continental Congress, had been sent as
our minister to Spain. Morris always kept up an intimate correspondence
with him. It is noticeable that the three great revolutionary statesmen
from New York, Hamilton, Jay, and Morris, always kept on good terms, and
always worked together; while the friendship between two, Jay and
Morris, was very close.
The two men, in their correspondence, now and then touched on other than
state matters. One of Jay's letters which deals with the education of
his children would be most healthful reading for those Americans of the
present day who send their children to be brought up abroad in Swiss
schools, or English and German universities. He writes: "I think the
youth of every free, civilized country should be educated in it, and not
permitted to travel out of it until age has made them so cool and firm
as to retain their national and moral impressions. American youth may
possibly form proper and perhaps useful friendships in European
seminaries, but I think not so _probably_ as among their
fellow-citizens, with whom they are to grow up, whom it will be useful
for them to know and be early known to, and with whom they are to be
engaged in the business of active life.... I do not hesitate to prefer
an American education." The longer Jay stayed away, the more devoted he
became to America. He had a good, hearty, honest contempt for the
miserable "cosmopolitanism" so much affected by the feebler folk of
fashion. As he said he "could never become so far a citizen of the world
as to view every part of it with equal regard," for "his affections were
deep-rooted in America," and he always asserted that he had never seen
anything in Europe to cause him to abate his prejudices in favor of his
own land.
Jay had a very hard time at the Spanish court, which, he wrote Morris,
had "little money, less wisdom, and no credit." Spain, although fighting
England, was bitterly jealous of the United States, fearing most justly
our aggressive spirit, and desiring to keep the lower Mississippi valley
entirely under its own control. Jay, a statesman of intensely national
spirit, was determined to push our boundaries as far westward as
possible; he insisted on their reaching to the Mississippi, and on our
having the right to navigate that stream. Morris did not agree with him,
and on this subject, as has been already said, he for once showed less
than his usual power of insight into the future. He wrote Jay that it
was absurd to quarrel about a country inhabited only by red men, and to
claim "a territory we cannot occupy, a navigation we cannot enjoy." He
also ventured the curiously false prediction that, if the territory
beyond the Alleghanies should ever be filled up, it would be by a
population drawn from the whole world, not one hundredth part of it
American, which would immediately become an independent and rival
nation. However, he could not make Jay swerve a handsbreadth from his
position about our western boundaries; though on every other point the
two were in hearty accord.
In relating and forecasting the military situation, Morris was more
happy. He was peculiarly interested in Greene, and from the outset
foretold the final success of his Southern campaign. In a letter written
March 31, 1781, after the receipt of the news of the battle of Guilford
Court-house, he describes to Jay Greene's forces and prospects. His
troops included, he writes, "from 1,500 to 2,000 continentals, many of
them raw, and somewhat more of militia than regular troops,--the whole
of these almost in a state of nature, and of whom it ought to be said,
as by Hamlet to Horatio, 'Thou hast no other revenue but thy good
spirits to feed and clothe thee.'" The militia he styled the "_fruges
consumere nati_ of an army." He then showed the necessity of the battle
being fought, on account of the fluctuating state of the militia, the
incapacity of the state governments to help themselves, the poverty of
the country ("so that the very teeth of the enemy defend them,
especially in retreat,"), and above all, because a defeat was of little
consequence to us, while it would ruin the enemy. He wrote: "There is no
loss in fighting away two or three hundred men who would go home if they
were not put in the way of being knocked on the head.... These are
unfeeling reflections. I would apologize for them to any one who did not
know that I have at least enough of sensibility. The gush of sentiment
will not alter the nature of things, and the business of the statesman
is more to reason than to feel." Morris was always confident that we
should win in the end, and sometimes thought a little punishment really
did our people good. When Cornwallis was in Virginia he wrote: "The
enemy are scourging the Virginians, at least those of Lower Virginia.
This is distressing, but will have some good consequences. In the mean
time the delegates of Virginia make as many lamentations as ever
Jeremiah did, and to as good purpose perhaps."
The war was drawing to an end. Great Britain had begun the struggle with
everything--allies, numbers, wealth--in her favor; but now, towards the
close, the odds were all the other way. The French were struggling with
her on equal terms for the mastery of the seas; the Spaniards were
helping the French, and were bending every energy to carry through
successfully the great siege of Gibraltar; the Dutch had joined their
ancient enemies, and their fleet fought a battle with the English,
which, for bloody indecisiveness, rivaled the actions when Van Tromp and
De Ruyter held the Channel against Blake and Monk. In India the name of
Hyder Ali had become a very nightmare of horror to the British. In
America, the centre of the war, the day had gone conclusively against
the Island folk. Greene had doggedly fought and marched his way through
the Southern States with his ragged, under-fed, badly armed troops; he
had been beaten in three obstinate battles, had each time inflicted a
greater relative loss than he received, and, after retiring in good
order a short distance, had always ended by pursuing his lately
victorious foes; at the close of the campaign he had completely
reconquered the Southern States by sheer capacity for standing
punishment, and had cooped up the remaining British force in
Charleston. In the Northern States the British held Newport and New
York, but could not penetrate elsewhere; while at Yorktown their ablest
general was obliged to surrender his whole army to the overwhelming
force brought against him by Washington's masterly strategy.
Yet England, hemmed in by the ring of her foes, fronted them all with a
grand courage. In her veins the Berserker blood was up, and she hailed
each new enemy with grim delight, exerting to the full her warlike
strength. Single-handed she kept them all at bay, and repaid with
crippling blows the injuries they had done her. In America alone the
tide ran too strongly to be turned. But Holland was stripped of all her
colonies; in the East, Sir Eyre Coote beat down Hyder Ali, and taught
Moslem and Hindoo alike that they could not shake off the grasp of the
iron hands that held India. Rodney won back for his country the
supremacy of the ocean in that great sea-fight where he shattered the
splendid French navy; and the long siege of Gibraltar closed with the
crushing overthrow of the assailants. So, with bloody honor, England
ended the most disastrous war she had ever waged.
The war had brought forth many hard fighters, but only one great
commander,--Washington. For the rest, on land, Cornwallis, Greene,
Rawdon, and possibly Lafayette and Rochambeau, might all rank as fairly
good generals, probably in the order named, although many excellent
critics place Greene first. At sea Rodney and the Bailli de Suffren won
the honors; the latter stands beside Duquesne and Tourville in the roll
of French admirals; while Rodney was a true latter-day buccaneer, as
fond of fighting as of plundering, and a first-rate hand at both.
Neither ranks with such mighty sea-chiefs as Nelson, nor yet with Blake,
Farragut, or Tegethof.
All parties were tired of the war; peace was essential to all. But of
all, America was most resolute to win what she had fought for; and
America had been the most successful so far. English historians--even so
generally impartial a writer as Mr. Lecky--are apt greatly to exaggerate
our relative exhaustion, and try to prove it by quoting from the
American leaders every statement that shows despondency and suffering.
If they applied the same rule to their own side, they would come to the
conclusion that the British empire was at that time on the brink of
dissolution. Of course we had suffered very heavily, and had blundered
badly; but in both respects we were better off than our antagonists. Mr.
Lecky is right in bestowing unstinted praise on our diplomatists for
the hardihood and success with which they insisted on all our demands
being granted; but he is wrong when he says or implies that the military
situation did not warrant their attitude. Of all the contestants,
America was the most willing to continue the fight rather than yield her
rights. Morris expressed the general feeling when he wrote to Jay, on
August 6, 1782: "Nobody will be thankful for any peace but a very good
one. This _they_ should have thought on who made war with the Republic.
I am among the number who would be extremely ungrateful for the grant of
a bad peace. My public and private character will both concert to render
the sentiment coming from me unsuspected. Judge, then, of others, judge
of the many-headed fool who can feel no more than his own sorrowing....
I wish that while the war lasts it may be real war, and that when peace
comes it may be real peace." As to our military efficiency, we may take
Washington's word (in a letter to Jay of October 18, 1782): "I am
certain it will afford you pleasure to know that our army is better
organized, disciplined, and clothed than it has been at any period since
the commencement of the war. This you may be assured is the fact."
Another mistake of English historians--again likewise committed by Mr.
Lecky--comes in their laying so much stress on the help rendered to the
Americans by their allies, while at the same time speaking as if England
had none. As a matter of fact, England would have stood no chance at all
had the contest been strictly confined to British troops on the one
hand, and to the rebellious colonists on the other. There were more
German auxiliaries in the British ranks than there were French allies in
the American; the loyalists, including the regularly enlisted loyalists
as well as the militia who took part in the various Tory uprisings, were
probably more numerous still. The withdrawal of all Hessians, Tories,
and Indians from the British army would have been cheaply purchased by
the loss of our own foreign allies.
The European powers were even a shade more anxious for peace than we
were; and to conduct the negotiations for our side, we chose three of
our greatest statesmen,--Franklin, Adams, and Jay.
Congress, in appointing our commissioners, had, with little regard for
the national dignity, given them instructions which, if obeyed, would
have rendered them completely subservient to France; for they were
directed to undertake nothing in the negotiations without the knowledge
and concurrence of the French cabinet, and in all decisions to be
ultimately governed by the advice of that body. Morris fiercely
resented such servile subservience, and in a letter to Jay denounced
Congress with well-justified warmth, writing: "That the proud should
prostitute the very little dignity this poor country is possessed of
would be indeed astounding, if we did not know the near alliance between
pride and meanness. Men who have too little spirit to demand of their
constituents that they do their duty, who have sufficient humility to
beg a paltry pittance at the hands of any and every sovereign,--such men
will always be ready to pay the price which vanity shall demand from the
vain." Jay promptly persuaded his colleagues to unite with him in
disregarding the instructions of Congress on this point; had he not done
so, the dignity of our government would, as he wrote Morris, "have been
in the dust." Franklin was at first desirous of yielding obedience to
the command; but Adams immediately joined Jay in repudiating it.
We had waged war against Britain, with France and Spain as allies; but
in making peace we had to strive for our rights against our friends
almost as much as against our enemies. There was much generous and
disinterested enthusiasm for America among Frenchmen individually; but
the French government, with which alone we were to deal in making
peace, had acted throughout from purely selfish motives, and in reality
did not care an atom for American rights. We owed France no more
gratitude for taking our part than she owed us for giving her an
opportunity of advancing her own interests, and striking a severe blow
at an old-time enemy and rival. As for Spain, she disliked us quite as
much as she did England.
The peace negotiations brought all this out very clearly. The great
French minister Vergennes, who dictated the policy of his court all
through the contest, cared nothing for the revolutionary colonists
themselves; but he was bent upon securing them their independence, so as
to weaken England, and he was also bent upon keeping them from gaining
too much strength, so that they might always remain dependent allies of
France. He wished to establish the "balance of power" system in America.
The American commissioners he at first despised for their blunt,
truthful straightforwardness, which he, trained in the school of deceit,
and a thorough believer in every kind of finesse and double-dealing,
mistook for boorishness; later on, he learned to his chagrin that they
were able as well as honest, and that their resolution, skill, and
far-sightedness made them, where their own deepest interests were
concerned, over-matches for the subtle diplomats of Europe.
America, then, was determined to secure not only independence, but also
a chance to grow into a great continental nation; she wished her
boundaries fixed at the great lakes and the Mississippi; she also asked
for the free navigation of the latter to the Gulf, and for a share in
the fisheries. Spain did not even wish that we should be made
independent; she hoped to be compensated at our expense, for her failure
to take Gibraltar; and she desired that we should be kept so weak as to
hinder us from being aggressive. Her fear of us, by the way, was
perfectly justifiable, for the greatest part of our present territory
lies within what were nominally Spanish limits a hundred years ago.
France, as the head of a great coalition, wanted to keep on good terms
with both her allies; but, as Gerard, the French minister at Washington,
said: if France had to choose between the two, "the decision would not
be in favor of the United States." She wished to secure for America
independence, but she wished also to keep the new nation so weak that it
would "feel the need of sureties, allies, and protectors." France
desired to exclude our people from the fisheries, to deprive us of half
our territories by making the Alleghanies our western boundaries, and
to secure to Spain the undisputed control of the navigation of the
Mississippi. It was not to the interest of France and Spain that we
should be a great and formidable people, and very naturally they would
not help us to become one. There is no need of blaming them for their
conduct; but it would have been rank folly to have been guided by their
wishes. Our true policy was admirably summed up by Jay in his letters to
Livingston, where he says: "Let us be honest and grateful to France, but
let us think for ourselves.... Since we have assumed a place in the
political firmament, let us move like a primary and not a secondary
planet." Fortunately, England's own self-interest made her play into our
hands; as Fox put it, it was necessary for her to "insist in the
strongest manner that, if America is independent, she must be so of the
whole world. No secret, tacit, or ostensible connection with France."
Our statesmen won; we got all we asked, as much to the astonishment of
France as of England; we proved even more successful in diplomacy than
in arms. As Fox had hoped, we became independent not only of England,
but of all the world; we were not entangled as a dependent subordinate
in the policy of France, nor did we sacrifice our western boundary to
Spain. It was a great triumph; greater than any that had been won by our
soldiers. Franklin had a comparatively small share in gaining it; the
glory of carrying through successfully the most important treaty we ever
negotiated belongs to Jay and Adams, and especially to Jay.