THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION: MORRIS IN THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS.
During the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Revolution,
almost all people were utterly in the dark as to what their future
conduct should be. No responsible leader thought seriously of separation
from the mother country, and the bulk of the population were still
farther from supposing such an event to be possible. Indeed it must be
remembered that all through the Revolutionary War not only was there a
minority actively favorable to the royal cause, but there was also a
minority--so large that, added to the preceding, it has been doubted
whether it was not a majority--that was but lukewarm in its devotion to
the American side, and was kept even moderately patriotic almost as much
by the excesses of the British troops and blunders of the British
generals and ministers, as by the valor of our own soldiers, or the
skill of our own statesmen. We can now see clearly that the right of
the matter was with the patriotic party; and it was a great thing for
the whole English-speaking race that that section of it which was
destined to be the most numerous and powerful should not be cramped and
fettered by the peculiarly galling shackles of provincial dependency;
but all this was not by any means so clear then as now, and some of our
best citizens thought themselves in honor bound to take the opposite
side,--though of necessity those among our most high-minded men, who
were also far-sighted enough to see the true nature of the struggle,
went with the patriots.
That the loyalists of 1776 were wrong is beyond question; but it is
equally beyond question that they had greater grounds for believing
themselves right than had the men who tried to break up the Union three
quarters of a century later. That these latter had the most hearty faith
in the justice of their cause need not be doubted; and he is but a poor
American whose veins do not thrill with pride as he reads of the deeds
of desperate prowess done by the confederate armies; but it is most
unfair to brand the "tory" of 1776 with a shame no longer felt to
pertain to the "rebel" of 1860. Still, there is no doubt, not only that
the patriots were right, but also that they were as a whole superior to
the tories; they were the men with a high ideal of freedom, too fond of
liberty, and too self-respecting, to submit to foreign rule; they
included the mass of hard-working, orderly, and yet high-spirited yeomen
and freeholders. The tories included those of the gentry who were
devoted to aristocratic principles; the large class of timid and
prosperous people (like the Pennsylvania Quakers); the many who feared
above all things disorder; also the very lowest sections of the
community, the lazy, thriftless, and vicious, who hated their
progressive neighbors, as in the Carolinas; and finally the men who were
really principled in favor of a kingly government.
Morris was at first no more sure of his soundings than were the rest of
his companions. He was a gentleman of old family, and belonged to the
ruling Episcopalian Church. He was no friend to tyranny, and he was a
thorough American, but he had little faith in extreme democracy. The
Revolution had two sides; in the northern Atlantic States at least it
was almost as much an uprising of democracy against aristocracy as it
was a contest between America and England; and the patriotic Americans,
who nevertheless distrusted ultra-democratic ideas, suffered many
misgivings when they let their love for their country overcome their
pride of caste. The "Sons of Liberty," a semi-secret society originating
among the merchants, and very powerful in bringing discontent to a head,
now showed signs of degenerating into a mob; and for mobs Morris, like
other clear-headed men, felt the most profound dislike and contempt.
Throughout 1774 he took little part in the various commotions, which
kept getting more and more violent. He was angered by the English
encroachments, and yet was by no means pleased with the measures taken
to repel them. The gentry, and the moderate men generally, were at their
wits' ends in trying to lead the rest of the people, and were being
pushed on farther and farther all the time; the leadership, even of the
revolutionary party, still rested in their hands; but it grew
continually less absolute. Said Morris: "The spirit of the English
constitution has yet a little influence left, and but a little. The
remains of it, however, will give the wealthy people a superiority this
time; but, would they secure it, they must banish all schoolmasters and
confine all knowledge to themselves.... The gentry begin to fear this.
Their committee will be appointed; they will deceive the people, and
again forfeit a share of their confidence. And if these instances of
what with one side is policy, with the other perfidy, shall continue to
increase and become more frequent, farewell, aristocracy. I see, and see
it with fear and trembling, that if the dispute with Britain continues,
we shall be under the worst of all possible dominions; we shall be under
the dominion of a riotous mob. It is the interest of all men, therefore,
to seek for reunion with the parent state." He then goes on to discuss
the terms which will make this reunion possible, and evidently draws
ideas from sources as diverse as Rousseau and Pitt, stating, as
preliminaries, that when men come together in society, there must be an
implied contract that "a part of their freedom shall be given up for the
security of the remainder. But what part? The answer is plain. The least
possible, considering the circumstances of the society, which constitute
what may be called its political necessity;" and again: "In every
society the members have a right to the utmost liberty that can be
enjoyed consistent with the general safety;" while he proposes the
rather wild remedy of divorcing the taxing and the governing powers,
giving America the right to lay her own imposts, and regulate her
internal police, and reserving to Great Britain that to regulate the
trade for the entire empire.
Naturally there was no hope of any compromise of this sort. The British
ministry grew more imperious, and the Colonies more defiant. At last
the clash came, and then Morris's thorough Americanism and inborn love
of freedom and impatience of tyranny overcame any lingering class
jealousy, and he cast in his lot with his countrymen. Once in, he was
not of the stuff to waver or look back; but like most other Americans,
and like almost all New Yorkers, he could not for some little time
realize how hopeless it was to try to close the breach with Great
Britain. Hostilities had gone on for quite a while before even
Washington could bring himself to believe that a lasting separation was
inevitable.
The Assembly, elected as shown in the previous chapter, at a moment of
reaction, was royalist in tone. It contained several stanch patriots,
but the majority, although unwilling to back up the British ministers in
all their doings, were still more hostile to the growing body of
republican revolutionists. They gradually grew wholly out of sympathy
with the people; until the latter at last gave up all attempts to act
through their ordinary representatives, and set about electing delegates
who should prove more faithful. Thereupon, in April, 1775, the last
colonial legislature adjourned for all time, and was replaced by
successive bodies more in touch with the general sentiment of New York;
that is, by various committees, by a convention to elect delegates to
the Continental Congress, and then by the Provincial Congress. The lists
of names in these bodies show not only how many leading men certain
families contributed, but also how mixed the lineage of such families
was; for among the numerous Jays, Livingstons, Ludlows, Van Cortlandts,
Roosevelts, Beekmans, and others of Dutch, English, and Huguenot
ancestry appear names as distinctly German, Gaelic-Scotch, and Irish,
like Hoffman, Mulligan, MacDougall, Connor.[1]
[1] The habit of constantly importing indentured Irish servants, as well
as German laborers, under contract, prevailed throughout the colonies;
and the number of men thus imported was quite sufficient to form a
considerable element in the population, and to add a new, although
perhaps not very valuable, strain to our already mixed blood. In taking
up at random the file of the _New York Gazette_ for 1766, we find among
the advertisements many offering rewards for runaway servants; such as
"three pounds for the runaway servant Conner O'Rourke," "ten pounds for
the runaway Irish servant, Philip Maginnis," "five pounds apiece for
certain runaway German miners--Bruderlein, Baum, Ostmann, etc.--imported
under contract;" all this mixed in with advertisements of rewards of
about the same money value for "the mulatto man named Tom," or the
"negroes Nero and Pompey." Still, in speaking of the revolutionary
armies, the word "Irish" must almost always be understood as meaning
Presbyterian Irish; the Catholic Irish had but little hand in the war,
and that little was limited to furnishing soldiers to some of the
British regiments. The Presbyterian Irish, however, in the revolutionary
armies, played a part as manful and valiant as, and even more important
than, that taken by the Catholic Irish soldiers who served so bravely
during the great contest between the North and South. The few free
Catholic Irish already in America in 1776 were for the most part
heartily loyal; but they were not numerous enough to be of the least
consequence.
To the Provincial Congress, from thenceforth on the regular governmental
body of the colony, eighty-one delegates were elected, including
Gouverneur Morris from the county of Westchester, and seventy were
present at the first meeting, which took place on May 22 at New York.
The voting in the Congress was done by counties, each being alloted a
certain number of votes roughly approximating to its population.
Lexington had been fought, and the war had already begun in
Massachusetts; but in New York, though it was ablaze with sympathy for
the insurgent New Englanders, the royal authority was still nominally
unquestioned, and there had been no collision with the British troops.
Few, if any, of the people of the colony as yet aimed at more than a
redress of their grievances and the restoration of their rights and
liberties; they had still no idea of cutting loose from Great Britain.
Even such an avowedly popular and revolutionary body as the Provincial
Congress contained some few out and out tories and very many
representatives of that timid, wavering class, which always halts midway
in any course of action, and is ever prone to adopt half-measures,--a
class which in any crisis works quite as much harm as the actively
vicious, and is almost as much hated and even more despised by the
energetic men of strong convictions. The timid good are never an element
of strength in a community; but they have always been well represented
in New York. During the Revolutionary War it is not probable that much
more than half of her people were ever in really hearty and active
sympathy with the patriots.
Morris at once took a prominent place in the Congress, and he showed the
national bent of his mind when he seconded a resolution to the effect
that implicit obedience ought to be rendered to the Continental Congress
in all matters pertaining to the general regulation of the associated
colonies. The Assembly, however, was by no means certain how far it
would be well to go; and the majority declined either to approve or
disapprove of the proceedings of the late Continental Congress. They
agreed to subscribe to the association, and recommended the same course
to their constituents; but added that they did not believe the latter
should be forced to do so.
Still, with all their doubting and faint-heartedness, they did set about
preparing for resistance, and for at least the possibility of concerted
action with the other colonies. The first step, of course, was to
provide for raising funds; this was considered by a committee of which
Morris was a member, and he prepared and drew up their report. In the
state of public feeling, which was nearly a unit against "taxation
without representation" abroad, but was the reverse of unanimous as to
submitting even to taxation with representation at home, it was
impossible to raise money by the ordinary method; indeed, though the
mass of active patriots were willing to sacrifice much, perhaps all, for
the cause, yet there were quite as many citizens whose patriotism was
lukewarm enough already, and could not stand any additional chilling.
Such people are always willing to face what may be called a staved-off
sacrifice, however; and promises to pay in the future what they can, but
will not pay in the present, come under this head. Besides, there would
have been other difficulties in the way, and in fact it was impossible
to raise the amount needed by direct taxation. Accordingly Morris, in
his report on behalf of the committee, recommended an issue of paper
money, and advised that this should not be done by the colony itself,
but that the Continental Congress should strike the whole sum needed,
and apportion the several shares to the different colonies, each of them
being bound to discharge its own particular part, and all together to be
liable for whatever any particular colony was unable to pay. This plan
secured a wide credit and circulation to the currency, and, what was
equally desirable, created throughout the colonies a common interest and
common responsibility on a most important point, and greatly
strengthened the bonds of their union. Morris even thus early showed the
breadth of his far-seeing patriotism; he was emphatically an American
first, a New Yorker next; the whole tone of his mind was thoroughly
national. He took the chief part in urging the adoption of the report,
and made a most telling speech in its favor before the Assembly, a mixed
audience of the prominent men of the colony being also present. The
report was adopted and forwarded to the Continental Congress; Morris was
felt on all sides to have already taken his place among the leaders, and
from thenceforth he was placed on almost every important committee of
the Provincial Congress.
This body kept on its course, corresponding with the other colonies,
exchanging thinly veiled threats with the Johnsons, the powerful Tory
over-lords of the upper Mohawk, and preparing rather feebly for defense,
being hampered by a total lack of funds or credit until the continental
currency was coined. But they especially busied themselves with a plan
of reconciliation with England; and in fact were so very cautions and
moderate as to be reproached by their chosen agent in England, Edmund
Burke, for their "scrupulous timidity." The Congress, by the way, showed
some symptoms of an advance in toleration, at least so far as the
Protestant sects went; for it was opened and closed by ministers of the
Episcopalian, Dutch Reformed, Presbyterian, Baptist, and other sects,
each in turn; but, as will shortly be seen, the feeling against
Catholics was quite as narrow-minded and intense as ever. This was
natural enough in colonial days, when Protestantism and national
patriotism were almost interchangeable terms; for the hereditary and
embittered foes of the Americans, the French and Spaniards, were all
Catholics, and even many of the Indians were of the same faith; and
undoubtedly the wonderful increase in the spirit of tolerance shown
after the Revolution was due in part to the change of the Catholic
French into our allies, and of the Protestant English into our most
active foes. It must be remembered, however, that the Catholic gentry
of Maryland played the same part in the Revolution that their Protestant
neighbors did. One of the famous Carroll family was among the signers of
the Declaration of Independence; and on the other hand, one of the
Cliftons was a noted loyalist leader.
Morris took a prominent part, both in and out of committee, in trying to
shape the plan of reconciliation, although utterly disapproving of many
of the ways in which the subject was handled; for he had all the
contempt natural to most young men of brains, decision, and fiery
temper, for his timid, short-sighted, and prolix colleagues. The report
was not all to his taste in the final shape in which it was adopted. It
consisted of a series of articles recommending the repeal of the
obnoxious statutes of the Imperial Parliament, the regulation of trade
for the benefit of the whole empire, the establishment of triennial
colonial legislatures, and also asserting the right of the colonies to
manage their internal polity to suit themselves, and their willingness
to do their part, according to their capacities, for the general defense
of the empire. The eighth article contained a denial of the right of
"Great Britain, or any other earthly legislature or tribunal, to
interfere in the ecclesiastical or religious concerns of the colonies,"
together with a "protest against the indulgence and establishment of
popery all along their interior confines;" this being called forth by
what was known as the "Quebec Bill," whereby the British Parliament had
recently granted extraordinary powers and privileges to the Canadian
clergy, with the obvious purpose of conciliating that powerful
priesthood, and thereby converting--as was actually done--the recently
conquered French of the St. Lawrence valley into efficient allies of the
British government against the old Protestant colonies.
This eighth article was ridiculous, and was especially objected to by
Morris. In one of his vigorous, deliciously fresh, and humorous letters,
dated June 30, 1775, and addressed to John Jay, then in the Continental
Congress, he writes:--
The foolish religious business I opposed until I was weary; it was
carried by a very small majority, and my dissent entered.... The
article about religion is most arrant nonsense, and would do as
well in a high Dutch Bible as the place it now stands in.
I drew a long report for our committee, to which they could make no
objections excepting that none of them could understand it.... I
was pleased at the rejection, because, as I observed to you before,
I think the question ought to be simplified.
I address this letter to you, but I shall be glad [if] you will
read it to Livingstone, for I intend it for both of you; make my
compliments to him, and tell him that I shall write to him when I
have time to write a good letter--this is a damned bad one, and
would not exist, if I did not think it a duty to myself to show my
friends that I had no hand in that foolish religious business, I
am, as you well know, your friend, etc.
Morris did not believe in a colonial assembly making overtures for a
reconciliation, as he thought this was the province of the Continental
Congress. The majority was against him, but he was a clever politician
and parliamentary tactician, as well as a great statesman, and he fairly
outwitted and hoodwinked his opponents, persuading them finally to adopt
the report in the form of a mere expression of opinions to be sent to
their congressional delegates, with a prayer that the latter would "use
every effort for the compromising of this unnatural quarrel between the
parent and child." In this shape it was forwarded to the delegates, who
answered that they would do all in their power to compromise the
quarrel, and added a postscript, written by Jay himself, to the effect
that they deemed it better not to make any mention of the religious
article before the Congress, as they thought it wise to bury "all
disputes on ecclesiastical points, which have for ages had no other
tendency than that of banishing peace and charity from the world."
While all this was pending, and though Bunker Hill had been fought, and
the war was in full progress round Boston, New York yet maintained what
might almost be described as an attitude of armed neutrality. The city
was so exposed to the British war-ships in the bay, and the surrounding
population was so doubtful, that the patriot party dared not take the
deciding steps, especially as so many of its members still clung to the
hope of a peaceful settlement. Morris announced frankly that he did not
believe in breaking the peace until they were prepared to take the
consequences. Indeed, when the few British troops left the city to join
the garrison in Boston, he strongly opposed the action of the Sons of
Liberty, who gathered hastily together, and took away the cartloads of
arms and ammunition that the soldiers were taking with them. The
Congress, to their honor, discouraged, to the best of their power, the
rioting and mobbing of Tories in the city.
In fact, New York's position was somewhat like that of Kentucky at the
outbreak of the Civil War. Her backwardness in definitely throwing in
her lot with the revolutionists was clearly brought out by a rather
ludicrous incident. General Washington, on his way to take command of
the continental army round Boston, passed through New York the same day
the royal governor, Tryon, arrived by sea, and the authorities were cast
into a great quandary as to how they should treat two such kings of
Brentford when the one rose was so small. Finally they compromised by
sending a guard of honor to attend each; Montgomery and Morris, as
delegates from the Assembly, received Washington and brought him before
that body, which addressed him in terms of cordial congratulation, but
ended with a noteworthy phrase,--that "when the contest should be
decided by an accommodation with the mother country, he should deliver
up the important deposit that had been confided to his hands."
These words give us the key to the situation. Even the patriots of the
colony could not realize that there was no hope of an "accommodation";
and they were hampered at every step by the fear of the British
frigates, and of the numerous Tories. The latter were very bold and
defiant; when Congress tried to disarm them, they banded themselves
together, bade the authorities defiance, and plainly held the upper land
on Staten Island and in Queens County. New York furnished many excellent
soldiers to the royal armies during the war, and from among her gentry
came the most famous of the Tory leaders,--such as Johnson and De
Lancey, whose prowess was felt by the hapless people of their own native
province; De Peyster, who was Ferguson's second in command at King's
Mountain; and Cruger, who, in the Carolinas, inflicted a check upon
Greene himself. The Tories were helped also by the jealousy felt towards
some of the other colonies, especially Connecticut, whose people took
the worst possible course for the patriot side by threatening to "crush
down" New York, and by finally furnishing an armed and mounted mob which
rode suddenly into the city, and wrecked the office of an obnoxious
loyalist printer named Rivington. This last proceeding caused great
indignation, and nearly made a split in the revolutionary camp.
New York had thus some cause for her inaction; nevertheless, her lack of
boldness and decision were not creditable to her, and she laid herself
open to just reproaches. Nor can Morris himself be altogether freed from
the charge of having clung too long to the hope of a reconciliation and
to a policy of half measures. He was at that time chairman of a
legislative committee which denounced any projected invasion of Canada
(therein, however, only following the example of the Continental
Congress), and refused to allow Ethan Allen to undertake one, as that
adventurous partisan chieftain requested. But Morris was too
clear-sighted to occupy a doubtful position long; and he now began to
see things clearly as they were, and to push his slower or more timid
associates forward along the path which they had set out to tread. He
was instrumental in getting the militia into somewhat better shape; and,
as it was found impossible to get enough continental money, a colonial
paper currency was issued. In spite of the quarrel with Connecticut, a
force from that province moved in to take part in the defense of New
York.
Yet, in the main, the policy of the New York Congress still continued
both weak and changeable, and no improvement was effected when it was
dissolved and a second elected. To this body the loyalist counties of
Richmond and Queens refused to return delegates, and throughout the
colony affairs grew more disorderly, and the administration of justice
came nearly to a standstill. Finding that the local congress seemed
likely to remain unable to make up its mind how to act, the continental
leaders at last took matters into their own hands, and marched a force
into New York city early in February, 1776. This had a most bracing
effect upon the provincial authorities; yet they still continued to
allow the British war-ships in the bay to be supplied with provisions,
nor was this attitude altered until in April Washington arrived with the
main continental army. He at once insisted that a final break should be
made; and about the same time the third Provincial Congress was elected.
Morris, again returned for Westchester, headed the bolder spirits, who
had now decided that the time had come to force their associates out of
their wavering course, and to make them definitely cast in their lot
with their fellow Americans. Things had come to a point which made a
decision necessary; the gathering of the continental forces on Manhattan
Island and the threatening attitude of the British fleet and army made
it impossible for even the most timid to keep on lingering in a state of
uncertainty. So the Declaration of Independence was ratified, and a
state constitution organized; then the die was cast, and thereafter New
York manfully stood by the result of the throw.
The two Provincial Congresses that decided on this course held their
sessions in a time of the greatest tumult, when New York was threatened
hourly by the British; and long before their work was ended they had
hastily to leave the city. Before describing what they did, a glance
should be taken at the circumstances under which it was done.
The peaceable citizens, especially those with any property, gradually
left New York; and it remained in possession of the raw levies of the
continentals, while Staten Island received Howe with open arms, and he
was enabled without difficulty to disembark his great force of British
and German mercenaries on Long Island. The much smaller, motley force
opposed to him, unorganized, ill armed, and led by utterly inexperienced
men, was beaten, with hardly an effort, in the battle that followed, and
only escaped annihilation through the skill of Washington and the supine
blundering of Howe. Then it was whipped up the Hudson and beyond the
borders of the State, the broken remnant fleeing across New Jersey; and
though the brilliant feats of arms at Trenton and Princeton enabled the
Americans to reconquer the latter province, southern New York lay under
the heel of the British till the close of the war.
Thus Morris, Jay, and the other New York leaders were obliged for six
years to hold up their cause in a half-conquered State, a very large
proportion of whose population was lukewarm or hostile. The odds were
heavy against the patriots, because their worst foes were those of
their own household. English writers are fond of insisting upon the
alleged fact that America only won her freedom by the help of foreign
nations. Such help was certainly most important, but, on the other hand,
it must be remembered that during the first and vital years of the
contest the revolutionary colonists had to struggle unaided against the
British, their mercenary German and Indian allies, Tories, and even
French Canadians. When the French court declared in our favor the worst
was already over; Trenton had been won, Burgoyne had been captured, and
Valley Forge was a memory of the past.
We did not owe our main disasters to the might of our foes, nor our
final triumph to the help of our friends. It was on our own strength
that we had to rely, and it was with our own folly and weakness that we
had to contend. The revolutionary leaders can never be too highly
praised; but taken in bulk the Americans of the last quarter of the
eighteenth century do not compare to advantage with the Americans of the
third quarter of the nineteenth. In our Civil War it was the people who
pressed on the leaders, and won almost as much in spite of as because of
them; but the leaders of the Revolution had to goad the rank and file
into line. They were forced to contend not only with the active
hostility of the Tories, but with the passive neutrality of the
indifferent, and the selfishness, jealousy, and short-sightedness of the
patriotic. Had the Americans of 1776 been united, and had they possessed
the stubborn, unyielding tenacity and high devotion to an ideal shown by
the North, or the heroic constancy and matchless valor shown by the
South, in the Civil War, the British would have been driven off the
continent before three years were over.
It is probable that nearly as great a proportion of our own people were
actively or passively opposed to the formation of our union originally
as were in favor of its dissolution in 1860. This was one of the main
reasons why the war dragged on so long. It may be seen by the fact,
among others, that when in the Carolinas and Georgia a system of
relentless and undying partisan warfare not only crushed the Tories, but
literally destroyed them from off the face of the earth, then the
British, though still victorious in almost every pitched battle, were at
once forced to abandon the field.
Another reason was the inferior military capacity of the revolutionary
armies. The continental troops, when trained, were excellent; but in
almost every battle they were mixed with more or less worthless militia;
and of the soldiers thus obtained all that can be said is that their
officers could never be sure that they would fight, nor their enemies
that they would run away. The revolutionary troops certainly fell short
of the standard reached by the volunteers who fought Shiloh and
Gettysburg. The British rarely found them to be such foes as they
afterwards met at New Orleans and Lundy's Lane. Throughout the
Revolution the militia were invariably leaving their posts at critical
times; they would grow either homesick or dejected, and would then go
home at the very crisis of the campaign; they did not begin to show the
stubbornness and resolution to "see the war through" so common among
their descendants in the contending Federal and Confederate armies.
The truth is that in 1776 our main task was to shape new political
conditions, and then to reconcile our people to them; whereas in 1860 we
had merely to fight fiercely for the preservation of what was already
ours. In the first emergency we needed statesmen, and in the second
warriors; and the statesmen and warriors were forthcoming. A comparison
of the men who came to the front during these, the two heroic periods of
the Republic, brings out this point clearly.
Washington, alike statesman, soldier, and patriot, stands alone. He was
not only the greatest American; he was also one of the greatest men the
world has ever known. Few centuries and few countries have ever seen his
like. Among the people of English stock there is none to compare with
him, unless perhaps Cromwell, utterly different though the latter was.
Of Americans, Lincoln alone is worthy to stand even second.
As for our other statesmen: Franklin, Hamilton, Jefferson, Adams, and
their fellows, most surely stand far above Seward, Sumner, Chase,
Stanton, and Stevens, great as were the services which these, and those
like them, rendered.
But when we come to the fighting men, all this is reversed. As a mere
military man Washington himself cannot rank with the wonderful war-chief
who for four years led the Army of Northern Virginia; and the names of
Washington and Greene fill up the short list of really good
Revolutionary Generals. Against these the Civil War shows a roll that
contains not only Lee, but also Grant and Sherman, Jackson and Johnson,
Thomas, Sheridan, and Farragut,--leaders whose volunteer soldiers and
sailors, at the end of their four years' service, were ready and more
than able to match themselves against the best regular forces of
Europe.