EXECUTIVE MANSION, _December 6, 1897_.
* * * * *
The most important problem with which this Government is now called upon
to deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns its duty toward
Spain and the Cuban insurrection. Problems and conditions more or less
in common with those now existing have confronted this Government at
various times in the past. The story of Cuba for many years has been one
of unrest, growing discontent, an effort toward a larger enjoyment of
liberty and self-control, of organized resistance to the mother country,
of depression after distress and warfare, and of ineffectual settlement
to be followed by renewed revolt. For no enduring period since the
enfranchisement of the continental possessions of Spain in the Western
Continent has the condition of Cuba or the policy of Spain toward Cuba
not caused concern to the United States.
The prospect from time to time that the weakness of Spain's hold upon
the island and the political vicissitudes and embarrassments of the home
Government might lead to the transfer of Cuba to a continental power
called forth between 1823 and 1860 various emphatic declarations of
the policy of the United States to permit no disturbance of Cuba's
connection with Spain unless in the direction of independence or
acquisition by us through purchase, nor has there been any change of
this declared policy since upon the part of the Government.
The revolution which began in 1868 lasted for ten years despite the
strenuous efforts of the successive peninsular governments to suppress
it. Then as now the Government of the United States testified its grave
concern and offered its aid to put an end to bloodshed in Cuba. The
overtures made by General Grant were refused and the war dragged on,
entailing great loss of life and treasure and increased injury to
American interests, besides throwing enhanced burdens of neutrality upon
this Government. In 1878 peace was brought about by the truce of Zanjon,
obtained by negotiations between the Spanish commander, Martinez de
Campos, and the insurgent leaders.
The present insurrection broke out in February, 1895. It is not
my purpose at this time to recall its remarkable increase or to
characterize its tenacious resistance against the enormous forces massed
against it by Spain. The revolt and the efforts to subdue it carried
destruction to every quarter of the island, developing wide proportions
and defying the efforts of Spain for its suppression. The civilized code
of war has been disregarded, no less so by the Spaniards than by the
Cubans.
The existing conditions can not but fill this Government and the
American people with the gravest apprehension. There is no desire on the
part of our people to profit by the misfortunes of Spain. We have only
the desire to see the Cubans prosperous and contented, enjoying that
measure of self-control which is the inalienable right of man, protected
in their right to reap the benefit of the exhaustless treasures of their
country.
The offer made by my predecessor in April, 1896, tendering the friendly
offices of this Government, failed. Any mediation on our part was not
accepted. In brief, the answer read: "There is no effectual way to
pacify Cuba unless it begins with the actual submission of the rebels
to the mother country." Then only could Spain act in the promised
direction, of her own motion and after her own plans.
The cruel policy of concentration was initiated February 16, 1896. The
productive districts controlled by the Spanish armies were depopulated.
The agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about the garrison
towns, their lands laid waste and their dwellings destroyed. This policy
the late cabinet of Spain justified as a necessary measure of war and as
a means of cutting off supplies from the insurgents. It has utterly
failed as a war measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was
extermination.
Against this abuse of the rights of war I have felt constrained on
repeated occasions to enter the firm and earnest protest of this
Government. There was much of public condemnation of the treatment of
American citizens by alleged illegal arrests and long imprisonment
awaiting trial or pending protracted judicial proceedings. I felt it my
first duty to make instant demand for the release or speedy trial of all
American citizens under arrest. Before the change of the Spanish cabinet
in October last twenty-two prisoners, citizens of the United States, had
been given their freedom.
For the relief of our own citizens suffering because of the conflict
the aid of Congress was sought in a special message,[1] and under
the appropriation of May 24, 1897,[2] effective aid has been given to
American citizens in Cuba, many of them at their own request having been
returned to the United States.
The instructions given to our new minister to Spain before his departure
for his post directed him to impress upon that Government the sincere
wish of the United States to lend its aid toward the ending of the war
in Cuba by reaching a peaceful and lasting result, just and honorable
alike to Spain and to the Cuban people. These instructions recited the
character and duration of the contest, the widespread losses it entails,
the burdens and restraints it imposes upon us, with constant disturbance
of national interests, and the injury resulting from an indefinite
continuance of this state of things. It was stated that at this juncture
our Government was constrained to seriously inquire if the time was not
ripe when Spain of her own volition, moved by her own interests and
every sentiment of humanity, should put a stop to this destructive war
and make proposals of settlement honorable to herself and just to her
Cuban colony. It was urged that as a neighboring nation, with large
interests in Cuba, we could be required to wait only a reasonable time
for the mother country to establish its authority and restore peace and
order within the borders of the island; that we could not contemplate an
indefinite period for the accomplishment of this result.
No solution was proposed to which the slightest idea of humiliation to
Spain could attach, and, indeed, precise proposals were withheld to
avoid embarrassment to that Government. All that was asked or expected
was that some safe way might be speedily provided and permanent peace
restored. It so chanced that the consideration of this offer, addressed
to the same Spanish administration which had declined the tenders of
my predecessor, and which for more than two years had poured men and
treasure into Cuba in the fruitless effort to suppress the revolt, fell
to others. Between the departure of General Woodford, the new envoy,
and his arrival in Spain the statesman who had shaped the policy of his
country fell by the hand of an assassin, and although the cabinet of the
late premier still held office and received from our envoy the proposals
he bore, that cabinet gave place within a few days thereafter to a new
administration, under the leadership of Sagasta.
The reply to our note was received on the 23d day of October. It is in
the direction of a better understanding. It appreciates the friendly
purposes of this Government. It admits that our country is deeply
affected by the war in Cuba and that its desires for peace are just.
It declares that the present Spanish government is bound by every
consideration to a change of policy that should satisfy the United
States and pacify Cuba within a reasonable time. To this end Spain has
decided to put into effect the political reforms heretofore advocated by
the present premier, without halting for any consideration in the path
which in its judgment leads to peace. The military operations, it is
said, will continue, but will be humane and conducted with all regard
for private rights, being accompanied by political action leading to
the autonomy of Cuba while guarding Spanish sovereignty. This, it is
claimed, will result in investing Cuba with a distinct personality, the
island to be governed by an executive and by a local council or chamber,
reserving to Spain the control of the foreign relations, the army and
navy, and the judicial administration. To accomplish this the present
government proposes to modify existing legislation by decree, leaving
the Spanish Cortes, with the aid of Cuban senators and deputies, to
solve the economic problem and properly distribute the existing debt.
In the absence of a declaration of the measures that this Government
proposes to take in carrying out its proffer of good offices, it
suggests that Spain be left free to conduct military operations and
grant political reforms, while the United States for its part shall
enforce its neutral obligations and cut off the assistance which it is
asserted the insurgents receive from this country. The supposition of an
indefinite prolongation of the war is denied. It is asserted that the
western provinces are already well-nigh reclaimed, that the planting of
cane and tobacco therein has been resumed, and that by force of arms and
new and ample reforms very early and complete pacification is hoped for.
The immediate amelioration of existing conditions under the new
administration of Cuban affairs is predicted, and therewithal the
disturbance and all occasion for any change of attitude on the part
of the United States. Discussion of the question of the international
duties and responsibilities of the United States as Spain understands
them is presented, with an apparent disposition to charge us with
failure in this regard. This charge is without any basis in fact. It
could not have been made if Spain had been cognizant of the constant
efforts this Government has made, at the cost of millions and by the
employment of the administrative machinery of the nation at command,
to perform its full duty according to the law of nations. That it has
successfully prevented the departure of a single military expedition or
armed vessel from our shores in violation of our laws would seem to be
a sufficient answer. But of this aspect of the Spanish note it is not
necessary to speak further now. Firm in the conviction of a wholly
performed obligation, due response to this charge has been made in
diplomatic course.
Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own peace this
Government has never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of
reserving to itself the determination of its policy and course according
to its own high sense of right and in consonance with the dearest
interests and convictions of our own people should the prolongation of
the strife so demand.
Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents
as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral
intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between
the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party.
I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be thought of.
That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.
Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often
been canvassed as a possible, if not inevitable, step both in regard
to the previous ten years struggle and during the present war. I am
not unmindful that the two Houses of Congress in the spring of 1896
expressed the opinion by concurrent resolution that a condition of
public war existed requiring or justifying the recognition of a state
of belligerency in Cuba, and during the extra session the Senate voted
a joint resolution of like import, which, however, was not brought
to a vote in the House of Representatives. In the presence of these
significant expressions of the sentiment of the legislative branch it
behooves the Executive to soberly consider the conditions under which
so important a measure must needs rest for justification. It is to be
seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond
dispute the attributes of statehood, which alone can demand the
recognition of belligerency in its favor. Possession, in short, of
the essential qualifications of sovereignty by the insurgents and the
conduct of the war by them according to the received code of war are
no less important factors toward the determination of the problem of
belligerency than are the influences and consequences of the struggle
upon the internal polity of the recognizing state.
The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of
December 7, 1875, are signally relevant to the present situation in
Cuba, and it may be wholesome now to recall them. At that time a ruinous
conflict had for seven years wasted the neighboring island. During all
those years an utter disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and
of the just demands of humanity, which called forth expressions of
condemnation from the nations of Christendom, continued unabated.
Desolation and ruin pervaded that productive region, enormously
affecting the commerce of all commercial nations, but that of the United
States more than any other by reason of proximity and larger trade and
intercourse. At that juncture General Grant uttered these words, which
now, as then, sum up the elements of the problem:
A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, in my opinion,
impracticable and indefensible, the question which next presents itself
is that of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the
contest.
In a former message to Congress[3] I had occasion to consider this
question, and reached the conclusion that the conflict in Cuba,
dreadful and devastating as were its incidents, did not rise to the
fearful dignity of war. * * * It is possible that the acts of foreign
powers, and even acts of Spain herself, of this very nature, might be
pointed to in defense of such recognition. But now, as in its past
history, the United States should carefully avoid the false lights
which might lead it into the mazes of doubtful law and of questionable
propriety, and adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule, which has been
its guide, of doing only that which is right and honest and of good
report. The question of according or of withholding rights of
belligerency must be judged in every case in view of the particular
attending facts. Unless justified by necessity, it is always, and
justly, regarded as an unfriendly act and a gratuitous demonstration
of moral support to the rebellion. It is necessary, and it is
required, when the interests and rights of another government or of
its people are so far affected by a pending civil conflict as to
require a definition of its relations to the parties thereto. But
this conflict must be one which will be recognized in the sense of
international law as war. Belligerence, too, is a fact. The mere
existence of contending armed bodies and their occasional conflicts do
not constitute war in the sense referred to. Applying to the existing
condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recognized by publicists and
writers on international law, and which have been observed by nations
of dignity, honesty, and power when free from sensitive or selfish and
unworthy motives, I fail to find in the insurrection the existence of
such a substantial political organization, real, palpable, and
manifest to the world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary
functions of government toward its own people and to other states,
with courts for the administration of justice, with a local
habitation, possessing such organization of force, such material, such
occupation of territory, as to take the contest out of the category of
a mere rebellious insurrection or occasional skirmishes and place it
on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency
would aim to elevate it. The contest, moreover, is solely on land; the
insurrection has not possessed itself of a single seaport whence it
may send forth its flag, nor has it any means of communication with
foreign powers except through the military lines of its adversaries.
No apprehension of any of those sudden and difficult complications
which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate upon the vessels,
both commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of other
powers calls for the definition of their relations to the parties to
the contest. Considered as a question of expediency, I regard the
accordance of belligerent rights still to be as unwise and premature
as I regard it to be, at present, indefensible as a measure of right.
Such recognition entails upon the country according the rights which
flow from it difficult and complicated duties, and requires the
exaction from the contending parties of the strict observance of their
rights and obligations. It confers the right of search upon the high
seas by vessels of both parties; it would subject the carrying of arms
and munitions of war, which now may be transported freely and without
interruption in the vessels of the United States, to detention and to
possible seizure; it would give rise to countless vexatious questions,
would release the parent Government from responsibility for acts done
by the insurgents, and would invest Spain with the right to exercise
the supervision recognized by our treaty of 1795 over our commerce on
the high seas, a very large part of which, in its traffic between the
Atlantic and the Gulf States and between all of them and the States on
the Pacific, passes through the waters which wash the shores of Cuba.
The exercise of this supervision could scarce fail to lead, if not to
abuses, certainly to collisions perilous to the peaceful relations
of the two States. There can be little doubt to what result such
supervision would before long draw this nation. It would be unworthy
of the United States to inaugurate the possibilities of such result by
measures of questionable right or expediency or by any indirection.
Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency
and reviewing its inconveniences and positive dangers, still further
pertinent considerations appear. In the code of nations there is no
such thing as a naked recognition of belligerency, unaccompanied by the
assumption of international neutrality. Such recognition, without more,
will not confer upon either party to a domestic conflict a status not
theretofore actually possessed or affect the relation of either party to
other states. The act of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn
proclamation of neutrality, which recites the _de facto_ condition
of belligerency as its motive. It announces a domestic law of neutrality
in the declaring state. It assumes the international obligations of a
neutral in the presence of a public state of war. It warns all citizens
and others within the jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they violate
those rigorous obligations at their own peril and can not expect to be
shielded from the consequences. The right of visit and search on the
seas and seizure of vessels and cargoes and contraband of war and good
prize under admiralty law must under international law be admitted
as a legitimate consequence of a proclamation of belligerency. While
according the equal belligerent rights defined by public law to each
party in our ports disfavors would be imposed on both, which, while
nominally equal, would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain herself.
Possessing a navy and controlling the ports of Cuba, her maritime rights
could be asserted not only for the military investment of the island,
but up to the margin of our own territorial waters, and a condition of
things would exist for which the Cubans within their own domain could
not hope to create a parallel, while its creation through aid or
sympathy from within our domain would be even more impossible than now,
with the additional obligations of international neutrality we would
perforce assume.
The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would
only be influential within our own jurisdiction by land and sea and
applicable by our own instrumentalities. It could impart to the United
States no jurisdiction between Spain and the insurgents. It would give
the United States no right of intervention to enforce the conduct of the
strife within the paramount authority of Spain according to the
international code of war.
For these reasons I regard the recognition of the belligerency of the
Cuban insurgents as now unwise, and therefore inadmissible. Should that
step hereafter be deemed wise as a measure of right and duty, the
Executive will take it.
Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has been frequently suggested and
has not failed to receive my most anxious and earnest consideration.
But should such a step be now taken, when it is apparent that a hopeful
change has supervened in the policy of Spain toward Cuba? A new
government has taken office in the mother country. It is pledged in
advance to the declaration that all the effort in the world can not
suffice to maintain peace in Cuba by the bayonet; that vague promises of
reform after subjugation afford no solution of the insular problem; that
with a substitution of commanders must come a change of the past system
of warfare for one in harmony with a new policy, which shall no longer
aim to drive the Cubans to the "horrible alternative of taking to the
thicket or succumbing in misery;" that reforms must be instituted in
accordance with the needs and circumstances of the time, and that these
reforms, while designed to give full autonomy to the colony and to
create a virtual entity and self-controlled administration, shall yet
conserve and affirm the sovereignty of Spain by a just distribution of
powers and burdens upon a basis of mutual interest untainted by methods
of selfish expediency.
The first acts of the new government lie in these honorable paths.
The policy of cruel rapine and extermination that so long shocked the
universal sentiment of humanity has been reversed. Under the new
military commander a broad clemency is proffered. Measures have already
been set on foot to relieve the horrors of starvation. The power of the
Spanish armies, it is asserted, is to be used not to spread ruin and
desolation, but to protect the resumption of peaceful agricultural
pursuits and productive industries. That past methods are futile to
force a peace by subjugation is freely admitted, and that ruin without
conciliation must inevitably fail to win for Spain the fidelity of a
contented dependency.
Decrees in application of the foreshadowed reforms have already been
promulgated. The full text of these decrees has not been received, but
as furnished in a telegraphic summary from our minister are: All civil
and electoral rights of peninsular Spaniards are, in virtue of existing
constitutional authority, forthwith extended to colonial Spaniards. A
scheme of autonomy has been proclaimed by decree, to become effective
upon ratification by the Cortes. It creates a Cuban parliament, which,
with the insular executive, can consider and vote upon all subjects
affecting local order and interests, possessing unlimited powers save as
to matters of state, war, and the navy, as to which the Governor-General
acts by his own authority as the delegate of the central Government.
This parliament receives the oath of the Governor-General to preserve
faithfully the liberties and privileges of the colony, and to it the
colonial secretaries are responsible. It has the right to propose to the
central Government, through the Governor-General, modifications of the
national charter and to invite new projects of law or executive measures
in the interest of the colony.
Besides its local powers, it is competent, first, to regulate electoral
registration and procedure and prescribe the qualifications of electors
and the manner of exercising suffrage; second, to organize courts of
justice with native judges from members of the local bar; third, to
frame the insular budget, both as to expenditures and revenues, without
limitation of any kind, and to set apart the revenues to meet the Cuban
share of the national budget, which latter will be voted by the national
Cortes with the assistance of Cuban senators and deputies; fourth, to
initiate or take part in the negotiations of the national Government for
commercial treaties which may affect Cuban interests; fifth, to accept
or reject commercial treaties which the national Government may have
concluded without the participation of the Cuban government; sixth,
to frame the colonial tariff, acting in accord with the peninsular
Government in scheduling articles of mutual commerce between the mother
country and the colonies. Before introducing or voting upon a bill the
Cuban government or the chambers will lay the project before the central
Government and hear its opinion thereon, all the correspondence in such
regard being made public. Finally, all conflicts of jurisdiction arising
between the different municipal, provincial, and insular assemblies, or
between the latter and the insular executive power, and which from their
nature may not be referable to the central Government for decision,
shall be submitted to the courts.
That the government of Sagasta has entered upon a course from which
recession with honor is impossible can hardly be questioned; that in
the few weeks it has existed it has made earnest of the sincerity of its
professions is undeniable. I shall not impugn its sincerity, nor should
impatience be suffered to embarrass it in the task it has undertaken.
It is honestly due to Spain and to our friendly relations with Spain
that she should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations
and to prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things to which
she stands irrevocably committed. She has recalled the commander whose
brutal orders inflamed the American mind and shocked the civilized
world. She has modified the horrible order of concentration and has
undertaken to care for the helpless and permit those who desire to
resume the cultivation of their fields to do so, and assures them of the
protection of the Spanish Government in their lawful occupations. She
has just released the _Competitor_ prisoners, heretofore sentenced
to death, and who have been the subject of repeated diplomatic
correspondence during both this and the preceding Administration.
Not a single American citizen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba of
whom this Government has any knowledge. The near future will demonstrate
whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to
the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all our interests so
intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If
not, the exigency of further and other action by the United States will
remain to be taken. When that time comes, that action will be determined
in the line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without
misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this Government
owes to itself, to the people who have confided to it the protection of
their interests and honor, and to humanity.
Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated
only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion
nor selfishness, the Government will continue its watchful care over
the rights and property of American citizens and will abate none of
its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall
be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty
imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization, and humanity
to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only
because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the
support and approval of the civilized world.
* * * * *
WILLIAM McKINLEY.
JOINT RESOLUTION appropriating $50,000 for the relief of destitute
citizens of the United States in the island of Cuba.
_Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled_, That the sum of $50,000 be,
and the same is hereby, appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, for the relief of destitute citizens of the
United States in the island of Cuba, said money to be expended at the
discretion and under the direction of the President of the United States
in the purchase and furnishing of food, clothing, and medicines to such
citizens, and for transporting to the United States such of them as so
desire and who are without means to transport themselves.
Approved, May 24, 1897.
[Footnote 1: See p. 127.]
[Footnote 2: See p. 136.]
[Footnote 3: See Vol. VII, pp. 64-69.]