IMMORTAL VERDUN
France was revealed to herself, to Germany and to the world as the
heroic defender of civilization, as a defender defying death in the
victory of Verdun. There, with the gateway to Paris lying open at its
back, the French army, in the longest pitched battle in all history,
held like a cold blue rock against the uttermost man-power and
resources of the German army.
General von Falkenhayn, Chief of the German General Staff and military
dictator of the Teutonic allies, there met disaster and disgrace. There
the mettle of the Crown Prince was tested and he was found to be merely
a thing of straw, a weak creature whose mind was under the domination
of von Falkenhayn.
For the tremendous offensive which was planned to end the war by one
terrific thrust, von Falkenhayn had robbed all the other fronts of
effective men and munitions. Field Marshal von Hindenburg and his
crafty Chief of Staff, General Ludendorff, had planned a campaign
against Russia designed to put that tottering military Colossus out
of the war. The plans were upon a scale that might well have proved
successful. The Kaiser, influenced by the Crown Prince and by von
Falkenhayn, decreed that the Russian campaign must be postponed and
that von Hindenburg must send his crack troops to join the army of the
Crown Prince fronting Verdun. Ludendorff promptly resigned as Chief
of Staff to von Hindenburg and suggested that the Field Marshal also
resign. That grim old warrior declined to take this action, preferring
to remain idle in East Prussia and watch what he predicted would be a
useless effort on the western front. His warning to the General Staff
was explicit, but von Falkenhayn coolly ignored the message.
[Illustration: IMMORTAL VERDUN, WHERE THE FRENCH HELD THE GERMANS WITH
THE INSPIRING SLOGAN, “THEY SHALL NOT PASS”]
Why did Germany select this particular point for its grand offensive?
The answer is to be found in a demand made by the great Junker
associations of Germany in May, 1915, nine months before the attack
was undertaken. That demand was to the effect that Verdun should be
attacked and captured. They declared that the Verdun fortifications
made a menacing salient thrust into the rich iron fields of the Briey
basin. From this metalliferous field of Lorraine came the ore that
supplied eighty per cent of the steel required for German and Austrian
guns and munitions. These fields of Briey were only twenty miles from
the great guns of Verdun. They were French territory at the beginning
of the war and had been seized by the army of the Crown Prince,
co-operating with the Army of Metz because of their immense value to
the Germans in war making.
As a preliminary to the battle, von Falkenhayn placed a semicircle of
huge howitzers and rifles around the field of Briey. Then assembling
the vast forces drained from all the fronts and having erected
ammunition dumps covering many acres, the great battle commenced with
a surprise attack upon the village of Haumont on February 21, 1916.
The first victory of the Germans at that point was an easy one. The
great fort of Douaumont was the next objective. This was taken on
February 25th after a concentrated bombardment that for intensity
surpassed anything that heretofore had been shown in the war.
Von Falkenhayn, personally superintending the disposition of guns and
men, had now penetrated the outer defenses of Verdun. The tide was
running against the French, and shells, more shells for the guns of all
caliber; men, more men for the earthworks surrounding the devoted city
were needed. The narrow-gauge railway connecting Verdun with the great
French depots of supplies was totally inadequate for the transportation
burdens suddenly cast upon it. In this desperate emergency a transport
system was born of necessity, a system that saved Verdun. It was fleet
upon fleet of motor trucks, all sizes, all styles; anything that could
pack a few shells or a handful of men was utilized. The backbone of
the system was a great fleet of trucks driven by men whose average
daily rest was four hours, and upon whose horizon-blue uniforms the
stains of snow and sleet, of dust and mud, were indelibly fixed
through the winter, spring, summer and fall of 1916, for the glorious
engagement continued from February 21st until November 2d, when the
Germans were forced into full retreat from the field of honor, the
evacuation of Fort Vaux putting a period to Germany’s disastrous plan
and to von Falkenhayn’s military career.
Lord Northcliffe, describing the early days of the immortal battle,
wrote:
“Verdun is, in many ways, the most extraordinary of battles. The
mass of metal used on both sides is far beyond all parallel; the
transformation on the Douaumont Ridge was more suddenly dramatic than
even the battle of the Marne; and, above all, the duration of the
conflict already looks as if it would surpass anything in history. More
than a month has elapsed since, by the kindness of General Joffre and
General Pétain, I was able to watch the struggle from various vital
viewpoints. The battle had then been raging with great intensity for
a fortnight, and, as I write, four to five thousand guns are still
thundering round Verdun. Impossible, therefore, any man to describe the
entire battle. The most one can do is to set down one’s impressions of
the first phases of a terrible conflict, the end of which cannot be
foreseen.
“My chief impression is one of admiration for the subtle powers of
mind of the French High Command. General Joffre and General Castelnau
are men with especially fine intellects tempered to terrible keenness.
Always they have had to contend against superior numbers. In 1870,
when they were subalterns, their country lost the advantage of its
numerous population by abandoning general military service at a time
when Prussia was completely realizing the idea of a nation in arms. In
1914, when they were commanders, France was inferior to a still greater
degree in point of numbers to Prussianized Germany. In armament, also,
France was inferior at first to her enemy. The French High Command
has thus been trained by adversity to do all that human intellect can
against almost overwhelming hostile material forces. General Joffre,
General Castelnau--and, later, General Pétain, who at a moment’s notice
displaced General Herr--had to display genius where the Germans were
exhibiting talent, and the result is to be seen at Verdun. They there
caught the enemy in a series of traps of a kind hitherto unknown in
modern warfare--something elemental, and yet subtle, neo-primitive, and
befitting the atavistic character of the Teuton. They caught him in a
web of his own unfulfilled boasts.
“The enemy began by massing a surprising force on the western front.
Tremendous energy and organizing power were the marks of his supreme
efforts to obtain a decision. It was usually reckoned that the Germans
maintain on all fronts a field army of about seventy-four and a half
army corps, which at full strength number three million men. Yet, while
holding the Russians from Riga to the south of the Pripet Marshes,
and maintaining a show of force in the Balkans, Germany seems to have
succeeded in bringing up nearly two millions and a half of men for her
grand spring offensive in the west. At one time her forces in France
and Flanders were only ninety divisions. But troops and guns were
withdrawn in increasing numbers from Russia and Serbia in December,
1915, until there were, it is estimated, a hundred and eighteen
divisions on the Franco-British-Belgian front. A large number of
six-inch and twelve-inch Austrian howitzers were added to the enormous
Krupp batteries. Then a large proportion of new recruits of the 1916
class were moved into Rhineland depots to serve as drafts for the
fifty-nine army corps, and it is thought that nearly all the huge shell
output that had accumulated during the winter was transported westward.
“The French Staff reckoned that Verdun would be attacked when the
ground had dried somewhat in the March winds. It was thought that the
enemy movement would take place against the British front in some of
the sectors of which there were chalk undulations, through which the
rains of winter quickly drained. The Germans skilfully encouraged this
idea by making an apparent preliminary attack at Lions, on a five-mile
front with rolling gas-clouds and successive waves of infantry. During
this feint the veritable offensive movement softly began on Saturday,
February 19, 1916, when the enormous masses of hostile artillery west,
east, and north of the Verdun salient started registering on the French
positions. Only in small numbers did the German guns fire, in order not
to alarm their opponents. But even this trial bombardment by shifts
was a terrible display of power, calling forth all the energies of
the outnumbered French gunners to maintain the artillery duels that
continued day and night until Monday morning, February 21st.
“The enemy seems to have maintained a bombardment all round General
Herr’s lines on February 21, 1916, but this general battering was
done with a thousand pieces of field artillery. The grand masses of
heavy howitzers were used in a different way. At a quarter past seven
in the morning they concentrated on the small sector of advanced
intrenchments near Brabant and the Meuse; twelve-inch shells fell
with terrible precision every few yards, according to the statements
made by the French troops. I afterwards saw a big German shell, from
at least six miles distant from my place of observation, hit quite a
small target. So I can well believe that, in the first bombardment of
French positions, which had been photographed from the air and minutely
measured and registered by the enemy gunners in the trial firing, the
great, destructive shots went home with extraordinary effect. The
trenches were not bombarded--they were obliterated. In each small
sector of the six-mile northward bulge of the Verdun salient the work
of destruction was done with surprising quickness.
“After the line from Brabant to Haumont was smashed, the main fire
power was directed against the other end of the bow at Herbebois,
Ornes, and Maucourt. Then when both ends of the bow were severely
hammered, the central point of the Verdun salient, Caures Woods, was
smothered in shells of all sizes, poured in from east, north and west.
In this manner almost the whole enormous force of heavy artillery was
centered upon mile after mile of the French front. When the great guns
lifted over the lines of craters, the lighter field artillery, placed
row after row in front of the wreckage, maintained an unending fire
curtain over the communicating saps and support intrenchments.
“Then came the second surprising feature in the new German system of
attack. No waves of storming infantry swept into the battered works.
Only strong patrols at first came cautiously forward, to discover if
it were safe for the main body of troops to advance and reorganize the
French line so as to allow the artillery to move onward. There was thus
a large element of truth in the marvelous tales afterwards told by
German prisoners. Their commanders thought it would be possible to do
all the fighting with long-range artillery, leaving the infantry to
act as squatters to the great guns and occupy and rebuild line after
line of the French defenses without any serious hand-to-hand struggles.
All they had to do was to protect the gunners from surprise attack,
while the guns made an easy path for them and also beat back any
counter-attack in force.
“But, ingenious as was this scheme for saving the man-power of
Germany by an unparalleled expenditure of shell, it required for full
success the co-operation of the French troops. But the French did not
co-operate. Their High Command had continually improved their system
of trench defense in accordance with the experiences of their own
hurricane bombardments in Champagne and the Carency sector. General
Castelnau, the acting Commander-in-Chief on the French front, was
indeed the inventor of hurricane fire tactics, which he had used for
the first time in February, 1915, in Champagne. When General Joffre
took over the conduct of all French operations, leaving to General
Castelnau the immediate control of the front in France, the victor of
the battle of Nancy weakened his advance lines and then his support
lines, until his troops actually engaged in fighting were very little
more than a thin covering body, such as is thrown out towards the
frontier while the main forces connect well behind.
“We shall see the strategical effect of this extraordinary measure in
the second phase of the Verdun battle, but its tactical effect was to
leave remarkably few French troops exposed to the appalling tempest
of German and Austrian shells. The fire-trench was almost empty, and
in many cases the real defenders of the French line were men with
machine guns, hidden in dugouts at some distance from the photographed
positions at which the German gunners aimed. The batteries of light
guns, which the French handled with the flexibility and continuity of
fire of Maxims, were also concealed in widely scattered positions. The
main damage caused by the first intense bombardment was the destruction
of all the telephone wires along the French front. In one hour the
German guns plowed up every yard of ground behind the observing
posts and behind the fire-trench. Communications could only be slowly
re-established by messengers, so that many parties of men had to fight
on their own initiative, with little or no combination of effort with
their comrades.
“Yet, desperate as were their circumstances, they broke down the German
plan for capturing trenches without an infantry attack. They caught the
patrols and annihilated them, and then swept back the disillusioned
and reluctant main bodies of German troops. First, the bombing parties
were felled, then the sappers as they came forward to repair the line
for their infantry, and at last the infantry itself in wave after wave
of field-gray. The small French garrison of every center of resistance
fought with cool, deadly courage, and often to the death.
“Artillery fire was practically useless against them, for though
their tunnel shelters were sometimes blown in by the twelve-inch
shells, which they regarded as their special terror by reason of their
penetrative power and wide blast, even the Germans had not sufficient
shells to search out all their underground chambers, every one of which
have two or three exits.
“The new organization of the French Machine-gun Corps was a fine factor
in the eventual success. One gun fired ten thousand rounds daily for
a week, most of the positions selected being spots from which each
German infantry advance would be enfiladed and shattered. Then the
French 75’s which had been masked during the overwhelming fire of the
enemy howitzers, came unexpectedly into action when the German infantry
attacks increased in strength. Near Haumont, for example, eight
successive furious assaults were repulsed by three batteries of 75’s.
One battery was then spotted by the Austrian twelve-inch guns, but it
remained in action until all its ammunition was exhausted. The gunners
then blew up their guns and retired, with the loss of only one man.
[Illustration: AMMUNITION FOR THE GUNS
Canadian narrow-gauge line taking ammunition up the line through a
shattered village.]
[Illustration: HOW VERDUN WAS SAVED
The motor transport never faltered when the railroads were put out of
action.]
“Von Falkenhayn had increased the Crown Prince’s army from the fourteen
divisions--that battled at Douaumont Fort--to twenty-five divisions.
In April he added five more divisions to the forces around Verdun by
weakening the effectives in other sectors and drawing more troops from
the Russian front. It was rumored that von Hindenburg was growing
restive and complaining that the wastage at Verdun would tell against
the success of the campaign on the Riga-Dvinsk front, which was to open
when the Baltic ice melted.
“Great as was the wastage of life, it was in no way immediately
decisive. But when the expenditure of shells almost outran the highest
speed of production of the German munition factories, and the wear
on the guns was more than Krupp and Skoda could make good, there was
danger to the enemy in beginning another great offensive likely to
overtax his shellmakers and gunmakers.”
Immortal and indomitable France had won over her foe more power than
she had possessed even after the battle of the Marne. If her Allies,
with the help of Japan and the United States, could soon overtake
the production of the German and Austrian munition factories, it
was possible that Verdun, so close to Sedan, might become one of the
turning points of the war.
Throughout the entire summer Verdun, with the whole population of
France roused to the supreme heights of heroism behind it, held like a
rock. Wave after wave of Germans in gray-green lines were sent against
the twenty-five miles of earthworks, while the French guns took their
toll of the crack German regiments. German dead lay upon the field
until exposed flesh became the same ghastly hue of their uniforms. No
Man’s Land around Verdun was a waste and a stench.
General Joffre’s plan was very simple. It was to hold out. As was
afterwards revealed, much to the satisfaction of the French people, Sir
Douglas Haig had placed himself completely at the service of the French
Commander-in-Chief, and had suggested that he should use the British
army to weaken the thrust at Verdun. But General Joffre had refused the
proffered help. No man knew better than he what his country, with its
exceedingly low birthrate, was suffering on the Meuse. He had but to
send a telegram to British Headquarters, and a million Britons, with
thousands of heavy guns, would fling themselves upon the German lines
and compel Falkenhayn to divide his shell output, his heavy artillery,
and his millions of men between Verdun and the Somme. But General
Joffre, instead of sending the telegram in question, merely dispatched
officers to British Headquarters to assure and calm the chafing
Scotsman commanding the military forces of the British Empire.
Throughout that long summer the battle cry of Verdun, “_Ne passeront
pas!_” (“They shall not pass!”), was an inspiration to the French army
and to the world. Then as autumn drifted its red foliage over the
heights surrounding the bloody field, the French struck back. General
Nivelle, who had taken command at Verdun under Joffre, commenced a
series of attacks and a persistent pressure against the German forces
on both sides of the Meuse. These thrusts culminated in a sudden
sweeping attack which on October 24th, resulted in the recapture by
Nivelle’s forces of Fort Douaumont and on November 2d, in the recapture
of Fort Vaux.
Thus ended in glory the most inspiring battle in the long and honorable
history of France.
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES:
Italicized text is surrounded by underscores: _italics_.
Obvious typographical errors have been corrected.
Inconsistencies in hyphenation have been standardized.
Archaic or variant spelling has been retained.
New original cover art included with this eBook is granted to the
public domain.