Euripides--and this is the solution of the riddle just propounded--felt

himself, as a poet, undoubtedly superior to the masses, but not to

two of his spectators: he brought the masses upon the stage; these

two spectators he revered as the only competent judges and masters

of his art: in compliance with their directions and admonitions, he

transferred the entire world of sentiments, passions, and experiences,

hitherto present at every festival representation as the invisible

chorus on the spectators' benches, into the souls of his stage-heroes;

he yielded to their demands when he also sought for these new

characters the new word and the new tone; in their voices alone he

heard the conclusive verdict on his work, as also the cheering promise

of triumph when he found himself condemned as usual by the justice of

the public.

Of these two, spectators the one is--Euripides himself, Euripides _as

thinker,_ not as poet. It might be said of him, that his unusually

large fund of critical ability, as in the case of Lessing, if it did

not create, at least constantly fructified a productively artistic

collateral impulse. With this faculty, with all the clearness and

dexterity of his critical thought, Euripides had sat in the theatre and

striven to recognise in the masterpieces of his great predecessors, as

in faded paintings, feature and feature, line and line. And here had

happened to him what one initiated in the deeper arcana of Æschylean

tragedy must needs have expected: he observed something incommensurable

in every feature and in every line, a certain deceptive distinctness

and at the same time an enigmatic profundity, yea an infinitude, of

background. Even the clearest figure had always a comet's tail attached

to it, which seemed to suggest the uncertain and the inexplicable.

The same twilight shrouded the structure of the drama, especially the

significance of the chorus. And how doubtful seemed the solution of

the ethical problems to his mind! How questionable the treatment of

the myths! How unequal the distribution of happiness and misfortune!

Even in the language of the Old Tragedy there was much that was

objectionable to him, or at least enigmatical; he found especially

too much pomp for simple affairs, too many tropes and immense things

for the plainness of the characters. Thus he sat restlessly pondering

in the theatre, and as a spectator he acknowledged to himself that he

did not understand his great predecessors. If, however, he thought the

understanding the root proper of all enjoyment and productivity, he had

to inquire and look about to see whether any one else thought as he

did, and also acknowledged this incommensurability. But most people,

and among them the best individuals, had only a distrustful smile for

him, while none could explain why the great masters were still in the

right in face of his scruples and objections. And in this painful

condition he found _that other spectator,_ who did not comprehend,

and therefore did not esteem, tragedy. In alliance with him he could

venture, from amid his lonesomeness, to begin the prodigious struggle

against the art of Æschylus and Sophocles--not with polemic writings,

but as a dramatic poet, who opposed _his own_ conception of tragedy to

the traditional one.

12.

Before we name this other spectator, let us pause here a moment in

order to recall our own impression, as previously described, of the

discordant and incommensurable elements in the nature of Æschylean

tragedy. Let us think of our own astonishment at the _chorus_ and

the _tragic hero_ of that type of tragedy, neither of which we could

reconcile with our practices any more than with tradition--till we

rediscovered this duplexity itself as the origin and essence of Greek

tragedy, as the expression of two interwoven artistic impulses, _the

Apollonian and the Dionysian_.

To separate this primitive and all-powerful Dionysian element from

tragedy, and to build up a new and purified form of tragedy on the

basis of a non-Dionysian art, morality, and conception of things--such

is the tendency of Euripides which now reveals itself to us in a clear

light.

In a myth composed in the eve of his life, Euripides himself most

urgently propounded to his contemporaries the question as to the

value and signification of this tendency. Is the Dionysian entitled

to exist at all? Should it not be forcibly rooted out of the Hellenic

soil? Certainly, the poet tells us, if only it were possible: but the

god Dionysus is too powerful; his most intelligent adversary--like

Pentheus in the "Bacchæ"--is unwittingly enchanted by him, and

in this enchantment meets his fate. The judgment of the two old

sages, Cadmus and Tiresias, seems to be also the judgment of the

aged poet: that the reflection of the wisest individuals does not

overthrow old popular traditions, nor the perpetually propagating

worship of Dionysus, that in fact it behoves us to display at least a

diplomatically cautious concern in the presence of such strange forces:

where however it is always possible that the god may take offence

at such lukewarm participation, and finally change the diplomat--in

this case Cadmus--into a dragon. This is what a poet tells us, who

opposed Dionysus with heroic valour throughout a long life--in order

finally to wind up his career with a glorification of his adversary,

and with suicide, like one staggering from giddiness, who, in order

to escape the horrible vertigo he can no longer endure, casts himself

from a tower. This tragedy--the Bacchæ--is a protest against the

practicability of his own tendency; alas, and it has already been

put into practice! The surprising thing had happened: when the poet

recanted, his tendency had already conquered. Dionysus had already

been scared from the tragic stage, and in fact by a demonic power

which spoke through Euripides. Even Euripides was, in a certain sense,

only a mask: the deity that spoke through him was neither Dionysus nor

Apollo, but an altogether new-born demon, called _Socrates._ This is

the new antithesis: the Dionysian and the Socratic, and the art-work of

Greek tragedy was wrecked on it. What if even Euripides now seeks to

comfort us by his recantation? It is of no avail: the most magnificent

temple lies in ruins. What avails the lamentation of the destroyer,

and his confession that it was the most beautiful of all temples? And

even that Euripides has been changed into a dragon as a punishment by

the art-critics of all ages--who could be content with this wretched

compensation?

Let us now approach this _Socratic_ tendency with which Euripides

combated and vanquished Æschylean tragedy.

We must now ask ourselves, what could be the ulterior aim of the

Euripidean design, which, in the highest ideality of its execution,

would found drama exclusively on the non-Dionysian? What other form of

drama could there be, if it was not to be born of the womb of music, in

the mysterious twilight of the Dionysian? Only _the dramatised epos:_

in which Apollonian domain of art the _tragic_ effect is of course

unattainable. It does not depend on the subject-matter of the events

here represented; indeed, I venture to assert that it would have been

impossible for Goethe in his projected "Nausikaa" to have rendered

tragically effective the suicide of the idyllic being with which he

intended to complete the fifth act; so extraordinary is the power of

the epic-Apollonian representation, that it charms, before our eyes,

the most terrible things by the joy in appearance and in redemption

through appearance. The poet of the dramatised epos cannot completely

blend with his pictures any more than the epic rhapsodist. He is still

just the calm, unmoved embodiment of Contemplation whose wide eyes see

the picture _before_ them. The actor in this dramatised epos still

remains intrinsically rhapsodist: the consecration of inner dreaming

is on all his actions, so that he is never wholly an actor.

How, then, is the Euripidean play related to this ideal of the

Apollonian drama? Just as the younger rhapsodist is related to the

solemn rhapsodist of the old time. The former describes his own

character in the Platonic "Ion" as follows: "When I am saying anything

sad, my eyes fill with tears; when, however, what I am saying is awful

and terrible, then my hair stands on end through fear, and my heart

leaps." Here we no longer observe anything of the epic absorption

in appearance, or of the unemotional coolness of the true actor,

who precisely in his highest activity is wholly appearance and joy

in appearance. Euripides is the actor with leaping heart, with hair

standing on end; as Socratic thinker he designs the plan, as passionate

actor he executes it. Neither in the designing nor in the execution is

he an artist pure and simple. And so the Euripidean drama is a thing

both cool and fiery, equally capable of freezing and burning; it is

impossible for it to attain the Apollonian, effect of the epos, while,

on the other hand, it has severed itself as much as possible from

Dionysian elements, and now, in order to act at all, it requires new

stimulants, which can no longer lie within the sphere of the two unique

art-impulses, the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The stimulants are

cool, paradoxical _thoughts_, in place of Apollonian intuitions--and

fiery _passions_--in place Dionysean ecstasies; and in fact, thoughts

and passions very realistically copied, and not at all steeped in the

ether of art.

Accordingly, if we have perceived this much, that Euripides did not

succeed in establishing the drama exclusively on the Apollonian, but

that rather his non-Dionysian inclinations deviated into a naturalistic

and inartistic tendency, we shall now be able to approach nearer to

the character _æsthetic Socratism._ supreme law of which reads about

as follows: "to be beautiful everything must be intelligible," as

the parallel to the Socratic proposition, "only the knowing is one

virtuous." With this canon in his hands Euripides measured all the

separate elements of the drama, and rectified them according to his

principle: the language, the characters, the dramaturgic structure, and

the choric music. The poetic deficiency and retrogression, which we

are so often wont to impute to Euripides in comparison with Sophoclean

tragedy, is for the most part the product of this penetrating critical

process, this daring intelligibility. The Euripidian _prologue_ may

serve us as an example of the productivity of this, rationalistic

method. Nothing could be more opposed to the technique of our stage

than the prologue in the drama of Euripides. For a single person to

appear at the outset of the play telling us who he is, what precedes

the action, what has happened thus far, yea, what will happen in

the course of the play, would be designated by a modern playwright

as a wanton and unpardonable abandonment of the effect of suspense.

Everything that is about to happen is known beforehand; who then

cares to wait for it actually to happen?--considering, moreover, that

here there is not by any means the exciting relation of a predicting

dream to a reality taking place later on. Euripides speculated quite

differently. The effect of tragedy never depended on epic suspense, on

the fascinating uncertainty as to what is to happen now and afterwards:

but rather on the great rhetoro-lyric scenes in which the passion and

dialectics of the chief hero swelled to a broad and mighty stream.

Everything was arranged for pathos, not for action: and whatever

was not arranged for pathos was regarded as objectionable. But what

interferes most with the hearer's pleasurable satisfaction in such

scenes is a missing link, a gap in the texture of the previous history.

So long as the spectator has to divine the meaning of this or that

person, or the presuppositions of this or that conflict of inclinations

and intentions, his complete absorption in the doings and sufferings

of the chief persons is impossible, as is likewise breathless

fellow-feeling and fellow-fearing. The Æschyleo-Sophoclean tragedy

employed the most ingenious devices in the first scenes to place in

the hands of the spectator as if by chance all the threads requisite

for understanding the whole: a trait in which that noble artistry is

approved, which as it were masks the _inevitably_ formal, and causes

it to appear as something accidental. But nevertheless Euripides

thought he observed that during these first scenes the spectator was

in a strange state of anxiety to make out the problem of the previous

history, so that the poetic beauties and pathos of the exposition

were lost to him. Accordingly he placed the prologue even before the

exposition, and put it in the mouth of a person who could be trusted:

some deity had often as it were to guarantee the particulars of the

tragedy to the public and remove every doubt as to the reality of the

myth: as in the case of Descartes, who could only prove the reality

of the empiric world by an appeal to the truthfulness of God and His

inability to utter falsehood. Euripides makes use of the same divine

truthfulness once more at the close of his drama, in order to ensure to

the public the future of his heroes; this is the task of the notorious

_deus ex machina._ Between the preliminary and the additional epic

spectacle there is the dramatico-lyric present, the "drama" proper.

Thus Euripides as a poet echoes above all his own conscious

knowledge; and it is precisely on this account that he occupies such

a notable position in the history of Greek art. With reference to his

critico-productive activity, he must often have felt that he ought

to actualise in the drama the words at the beginning of the essay of

Anaxagoras: "In the beginning all things were mixed together; then

came the understanding and created order." And if Anaxagoras with his

"νοῡς" seemed like the first sober person among nothing but drunken

philosophers, Euripides may also have conceived his relation to

the other tragic poets under a similar figure. As long as the sole

ruler and disposer of the universe, the νοῡς, was still excluded

from artistic activity, things were all mixed together in a chaotic,

primitive mess;--it is thus Euripides was obliged to think, it is thus

he was obliged to condemn the "drunken" poets as the first "sober" one

among them. What Sophocles said of Æschylus, that he did what was

right, though unconsciously, was surely not in the mind of Euripides:

who would have admitted only thus much, that Æschylus, _because_ he

wrought unconsciously, did what was wrong. So also the divine Plato

speaks for the most part only ironically of the creative faculty of the

poet, in so far as it is not conscious insight, and places it on a par

with the gift of the soothsayer and dream-interpreter; insinuating that

the poet is incapable of composing until he has become unconscious and

reason has deserted him. Like Plato, Euripides undertook to show to the

world the reverse of the "unintelligent" poet; his æsthetic principle

that "to be beautiful everything must be known" is, as I have said,

the parallel to the Socratic "to be good everything must be known."

Accordingly we may regard Euripides as the poet of æsthetic Socratism.

Socrates, however, was that _second spectator_ who did not comprehend

and therefore did not esteem the Old Tragedy; in alliance with him

Euripides ventured to be the herald of a new artistic activity. If,

then, the Old Tragedy was here destroyed, it follows that æsthetic

Socratism was the murderous principle; but in so far as the struggle is

directed against the Dionysian element in the old art, we recognise in

Socrates the opponent of Dionysus, the new Orpheus who rebels against

Dionysus; and although destined to be torn to pieces by the Mænads of

the Athenian court, yet puts to flight the overpowerful god himself,

who, when he fled from Lycurgus, the king of Edoni, sought refuge in

the depths of the ocean--namely, in the mystical flood of a secret

cult which gradually overspread the earth.

13.

That Socrates stood in close relationship to Euripides in the tendency

of his teaching, did not escape the notice of contemporaneous

antiquity; the most eloquent expression of this felicitous insight

being the tale current in Athens, that Socrates was accustomed to help

Euripides in poetising. Both names were mentioned in one breath by the

adherents of the "good old time," whenever they came to enumerating the

popular agitators of the day: to whose influence they attributed the

fact that the old Marathonian stalwart capacity of body and soul was

more and more being sacrificed to a dubious enlightenment, involving

progressive degeneration of the physical and mental powers. It is in

this tone, half indignantly and half contemptuously, that Aristophanic

comedy is wont to speak of both of them--to the consternation of

modern men, who would indeed be willing enough to give up Euripides,

but cannot suppress their amazement that Socrates should appear in

Aristophanes as the first and head _sophist,_ as the mirror and epitome

of all sophistical tendencies; in connection with which it offers the

single consolation of putting Aristophanes himself in the pillory, as a

rakish, lying Alcibiades of poetry. Without here defending the profound

instincts of Aristophanes against such attacks, I shall now indicate,

by means of the sentiments of the time, the close connection between

Socrates and Euripides. With this purpose in view, it is especially to

be remembered that Socrates, as an opponent of tragic art, did not

ordinarily patronise tragedy, but only appeared among the spectators

when a new play of Euripides was performed. The most noted thing,

however, is the close juxtaposition of the two names in the Delphic

oracle, which designated Socrates as the wisest of men, but at the same

time decided that the second prize in the contest of wisdom was due to

Euripides.

Sophocles was designated as the third in this scale of rank; he who

could pride himself that, in comparison with Æschylus, he did what

was right, and did it, moreover, because he _knew_ what was right. It

is evidently just the degree of clearness of this _knowledge,_ which

distinguishes these three men in common as the three "knowing ones" of

their age.

The most decisive word, however, for this new and unprecedented

esteem of knowledge and insight was spoken by Socrates when he

found that he was the only one who acknowledged to himself that he

_knew nothing_ while in his critical pilgrimage through Athens, and

calling on the greatest statesmen, orators, poets, and artists, he

discovered everywhere the conceit of knowledge. He perceived, to his

astonishment, that all these celebrities were without a proper and

accurate insight, even with regard to their own callings, and practised

them only by instinct. "Only by instinct": with this phrase we touch

upon the heart and core of the Socratic tendency. Socratism condemns

therewith existing art as well as existing ethics; wherever Socratism

turns its searching eyes it beholds the lack of insight and the

power of illusion; and from this lack infers the inner perversity and

objectionableness of existing conditions. From this point onwards,

Socrates believed that he was called upon to, correct existence;

and, with an air of disregard and superiority, as the precursor

of an altogether different culture, art, and morality, he enters

single-handed into a world, of which, if we reverently touched the hem,

we should count it our greatest happiness.

Here is the extraordinary hesitancy which always seizes upon us with

regard to Socrates, and again and again invites us to ascertain the

sense and purpose of this most questionable phenomenon of antiquity.

Who is it that ventures single-handed to disown the Greek character,

which, as Homer, Pindar, and Æschylus, as Phidias, as Pericles, as

Pythia and Dionysus, as the deepest abyss and the highest height, is

sure of our wondering admiration? What demoniac power is it which would

presume to spill this magic draught in the dust? What demigod is it to

whom the chorus of spirits of the noblest of mankind must call out:

"Weh! Weh! Du hast sie zerstört, die schöne Welt, mit mächtiger Faust;

sie stürzt, sie zerfällt!"[17]

A key to the character of Socrates is presented to us by the surprising

phenomenon designated as the "daimonion" of Socrates. In special

circumstances, when his gigantic intellect began to stagger, he got

a secure support in the utterances of a divine voice which then

spake to him. This voice, whenever it comes, always _dissuades._

In this totally abnormal nature instinctive wisdom only appears in

order to hinder the progress of conscious perception here and there.

While in all productive men it is instinct which is the creatively

affirmative force, consciousness only comporting itself critically

and dissuasively; with Socrates it is instinct which becomes critic;

it is consciousness which becomes creator--a perfect monstrosity

_per defectum!_ And we do indeed observe here a monstrous _defectus_

of all mystical aptitude, so that Socrates might be designated as

the specific _non-mystic,_ in whom the logical nature is developed,

through a superfoetation, to the same excess as instinctive wisdom

is developed in the mystic. On the other hand, however, the logical

instinct which appeared in Socrates was absolutely prohibited from

turning against itself; in its unchecked flow it manifests a native

power such as we meet with, to our shocking surprise, only among the

very greatest instinctive forces. He who has experienced even a breath

of the divine naïveté and security of the Socratic course of life in

the Platonic writings, will also feel that the enormous driving-wheel

of logical Socratism is in motion, as it were, _behind_ Socrates, and

that it must be viewed through Socrates as through a shadow. And

that he himself had a boding of this relation is apparent from the

dignified earnestness with which he everywhere, and even before his

judges, insisted on his divine calling. To refute him here was really

as impossible as to approve of his instinct-disintegrating influence.

In view of this indissoluble conflict, when he had at last been brought

before the forum of the Greek state, there was only one punishment

demanded, namely exile; he might have been sped across the borders as

something thoroughly enigmatical, irrubricable and inexplicable, and so

posterity would have been quite unjustified in charging the Athenians

with a deed of ignominy. But that the sentence of death, and not mere

exile, was pronounced upon him, seems to have been brought about by

Socrates himself, with perfect knowledge of the circumstances, and

without the natural fear of death: he met his death with the calmness

with which, according to the description of Plato, he leaves the

symposium at break of day, as the last of the revellers, to begin a new

day; while the sleepy companions remain behind on the benches and the

floor, to dream of Socrates, the true eroticist. _The dying Socrates_

became the new ideal of the noble Greek youths,--an ideal they had

never yet beheld,--and above all, the typical Hellenic youth, Plato,

prostrated himself before this scene with all the fervent devotion of

his visionary soul.

[17]

Woe! Woe!

Thou hast it destroyed,

The beautiful world;

With powerful fist;

In ruin 'tis hurled!

_Faust,_ trans. of Bayard Taylor.--TR.

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The Birth of Tragedy; or, Hellenism and Pessimism · 第 7 / 13 段