CHAPTER VII.

OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH INTELLECT FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE

SIXTEENTH TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

It is difficult for an ordinary reader, living in the middle of the

nineteenth century, to understand, that only three hundred years before

he was born, the public mind was in the benighted state disclosed in the

preceding chapter. It is still more difficult for him to understand that

the darkness was shared not merely by men of an average education, but

by men of considerable ability, men in every respect among the foremost

of their age. A reader of this sort may satisfy himself that the

evidence is indisputable; he may verify the statements I have brought

forward, and admit that there is no possible doubt about them; but even

then he will find it hard to conceive that there ever was a state of

society in which such miserable absurdities were welcomed as sober and

important truths, and were supposed to form an essential part of the

general stock of European knowledge.

But a more careful examination will do much to dissipate this natural

astonishment. In point of fact, so far from wondering that such things

were believed, the wonder would have been if they were rejected. For in

those times, as in all others, every thing was of a piece. Not only in

historical literature, but in all kinds of literature, on every

subject--in science, in religion, in legislation--the presiding

principle was a blind and unhesitating credulity. The more the history

of Europe anterior to the seventeenth century is studied, the more

completely will this fact be verified. Now and then a great man arose,

who had his doubts respecting the universal belief; who whispered a

suspicion as to the existence of giants thirty feet high, of dragons

with wings, and of armies flying through the air; who thought that

astrology might be a cheat, and necromancy a bubble; and who even went

so far as to raise a question respecting the propriety of drowning every

witch and burning every heretic. A few such men there undoubtedly were;

but they were despised as mere theorists, idle visionaries, who,

unacquainted with the practice of life, arrogantly opposed their own

reason to the wisdom of their ancestors. In the state of society in

which they were born, it was impossible that they should make any

permanent impression. Indeed, they had enough to do to look to

themselves, and provide for their own security; for, until the latter

part of the sixteenth century, there was no country in which a man was

not in great personal peril if he expressed open doubts respecting the

belief of his contemporaries.

Yet it is evident, that until doubt began, progress was impossible. For,

as we have clearly seen, the advance of civilization solely depends on

the acquisitions made by the human intellect, and on the extent to which

those acquisitions are diffused. But men who are perfectly satisfied

with their own knowledge, will never attempt to increase it. Men who are

perfectly convinced of the accuracy of their opinions, will never take

the pains of examining the basis on which they are built. They look

always with wonder, and often with horror, on views contrary to those

which they inherited from their fathers; and while they are in this

state of mind, it is impossible that they should receive any new truth

which interferes with their foregone conclusions.

On this account it is, that although the acquisition of fresh knowledge

is the necessary precursor of every step in social progress, such

acquisition must itself be preceded by a love of inquiry, and therefore

by a spirit of doubt; because without doubt there will be no inquiry,

and without inquiry there will be no knowledge. For knowledge is not an

inert and passive principle, which comes to us whether we will or no;

but it must be sought before it can be won; it is the product of great

labour and therefore of great sacrifice. And it is absurd to suppose

that men will incur the labour, and make the sacrifice, for subjects

respecting which they are already perfectly content. They who do not

feel the darkness, will never look for the light. If on any point we

have attained to certainty, we make no further inquiry on that point;

because inquiry would be useless, or perhaps dangerous. The doubt must

intervene, before the investigation can begin. Here, then, we have the

act of doubting as the originator, or, at all events, the necessary

antecedent, of all progress. Here we have that scepticism, the very name

of which is an abomination to the ignorant; because it disturbs their

lazy and complacent minds; because it troubles their cherished

superstitions; because it imposes on them the fatigue of inquiry; and

because it rouses even sluggish understandings to ask if things are as

they are commonly supposed, and if all is really true which they from

their childhood have been taught to believe.

The more we examine this great principle of scepticism, the more

distinctly shall we see the immense part it has played in the progress

of European civilization. To state in general terms, what in this

Introduction will be fully proved, it may be said, that to scepticism we

owe that spirit of inquiry, which, during the last two centuries, has

gradually encroached on every possible subject; has reformed every

department of practical and speculative knowledge; has weakened the

authority of the privileged classes, and thus placed liberty on a surer

foundation; has chastized the despotism of princes; has restrained the

arrogance of the nobles; and has even diminished the prejudices of the

clergy. In a word, it is this which has remedied the three fundamental

errors of the olden time: errors which made the people, in politics too

confiding; in science too credulous; in religion too intolerant.

This rapid summary of what has actually been effected, may perhaps

startle those readers to whom such large investigations are not

familiar. The importance, however, of the principle at issue is so

great, that I purpose in this Introduction to verify it by an

examination of all the prominent forms of European civilization. Such an

inquiry will lead to the remarkable conclusion, that no single fact has

so extensively affected the different nations as the duration, the

amount, and above all the diffusion, of their scepticism. In Spain, the

church, aided by the Inquisition, has always been strong enough to

punish sceptical writers, and prevent, not indeed the existence, but the

promulgation of sceptical opinions.[544] By this means the spirit of

doubt being quenched, knowledge has for several centuries remained

almost stationary; and civilization, which is the fruit of knowledge,

has also been stationary. But in England and France, which, as we shall

presently see, are the countries where scepticism first openly appeared,

and where it has been most diffused, the results are altogether

different; and the love of inquiry being encouraged, there has arisen

that constantly-progressive knowledge to which these two great nations

owe their prosperity. In the remaining part of this volume, I shall

trace the history of this principle in France and England, and examine

the different forms under which it has appeared, and the way in which

those forms have affected the national interests. In the order of the

investigation, I shall give the precedence to England; because, for the

reasons already stated, its civilization must be deemed more normal than

that of France; and therefore, notwithstanding its numerous

deficiencies, it approaches the natural type more closely than its

great neighbour has been able to do. But as the fullest details

respecting English civilization will be found in the body of the present

work, I intend in the Introduction to devote merely a single chapter to

it, and to consider our national history simply in reference to the

immediate consequences of the sceptical movement; reserving for a future

occasion those subsidiary matters which, though less comprehensive, are

still of great value. And as the growth of religious toleration is

undoubtedly the most important of all, I will, in the first place, state

the circumstances under which it appeared in England in the sixteenth

century; and I will then point out how other events, which immediately

followed, were part of the same progress, and were indeed merely the

same principles acting in different directions.

[544] On the influence of the French literature, which, late in the

eighteenth century, crept into Spain in spite of the church, and

diffused a considerable amount of scepticism among the most

educated classes, compare _Llorente_, _Hist. de l'Inquisition_,

vol. i. p. 322, vol. ii. p. 543, vol. iv. pp. 98, 99, 102, 148;

_Doblado's Letters from Spain_, pp. 115, 119, 120, 133, 231, 232;

_Lord Holland's Foreign Reminiscences_, edit. 1850, p. 76;

_Southey's Hist. of Brazil_, vol. iii. p. 607; and an imperfect

statement of the same fact in _Alison's Hist. of Europe_, vol. x.

p. 8. In regard to the Spanish colonies, compare _Humboldt_,

_Nouv. Espagne_, vol. ii. p. 818, with _Ward's Mexico_, vol. i.

p. 83.

A careful study of the history of religious toleration will prove, that

in every Christian country where it has been adopted, it has been forced

upon the clergy by the authority of the secular classes.[545] At the

present day, it is still unknown to those nations among whom the

ecclesiastical power is stronger than the temporal power; and as this,

during many centuries, was the general condition, it is not wonderful

that, in the early history of Europe, we should find scarcely a trace of

so wise and benevolent an opinion. But at the moment when Elizabeth

mounted the throne of England, our country was about equally divided

between two hostile creeds; and the queen, with remarkable ability,

contrived during some time so to balance the rival powers, as to allow

to neither a decisive preponderance. This was the first instance which

had been seen in Europe of a government successfully carried on without

the active participation of the spiritual authority; and the consequence

was, that for several years the principle of toleration, though still

most imperfectly understood, was pushed to an extent which is truly

surprising for so barbarous an age.[546] Unhappily, after a time,

various circumstances, which I shall relate in their proper place,

induced Elizabeth to change a policy which she, even with all her

wisdom, perhaps considered to be a dangerous experiment, and for which

the knowledge of the country was as yet hardly ripe. But although she

now allowed the Protestants to gratify their hatred against the

Catholics, there was, in the midst of the sanguinary scenes which

followed, one circumstance very worthy of remark. Although many persons

were most unquestionably executed merely for their religion, no one

ventured to state their religion as the cause of their execution.[547]

The most barbarous punishments were inflicted upon them; but they were

told that they might escape the punishment by renouncing certain

principles which were said to be injurious to the safety of the

state.[548] It is true, that many of these principles were such as no

Catholic could abandon without at the same time abandoning his religion,

of which they formed an essential part. But the mere fact that the

spirit of persecution was driven to such a subterfuge, showed that a

great progress had been made by the age. A most important point, indeed,

was gained when the bigot became a hypocrite; and when the clergy,

though willing to burn men for the good of their souls, were obliged to

justify their cruelty by alleging considerations of a more temporal,

and, as they considered, a less important character.[549]

[545] Nearly two hundred years ago, Sir William Temple observed that in

Holland the clergy possessed less power than in other countries;

and that, therefore, there existed an unusual amount of

toleration. _Observations upon the United Provinces_, in

_Temple's Works_, vol. i. pp. 157-162. About seventy years later,

the same inference was drawn by another acute observer, Le Blanc,

who, after mentioning the liberality which the different sects

displayed towards each other in Holland, adds, 'La grande raison

d'une harmonie si parfaite est que tout s'y régle par les

séculiers de chacune de ces religions, et qu'on n'y souffriroit

pas des ministres, dont le zèle imprudent pourroit détruire cette

heureuse correspondance.' _Le Blanc_, _Lettres d'un Français_,

vol. i. p. 73. I merely give these as illustrations of an

important principle, which I shall hereafter prove.

[546] 'In the first eleven years of her reign, not one Roman Catholic

was prosecuted capitally for religion.' _Neal's Hist. of the

Puritans_, vol. i. p. 444; and the same remark in _Collier's

Eccles. Hist._ vol. vii. p. 252, edit. 1840.

[547] Without quoting the impudent defence which Chief-Justice Popham

made, in 1606, for the barbarous treatment of the Catholics

(_Campbell's Chief Justices_, vol. i. p. 225), I will give the

words of the two immediate successors of Elizabeth. James I.

says: 'The trewth is, according to my owne knowledge, the late

queene of famous memory never punished any Papist for religion.'

_Works of King James_, London, 1616, folio, p. 252. And Charles

I. says: 'I am informed, neither Queen Elizabeth nor my father

did ever avow that any priest in their times was executed merely

for religion.' _Parl. Hist._ vol. ii. p. 713.

[548] This was the defence set up in 1583, in a work called _The

Execution of Justice in England_, and ascribed to Burleigh. See

_Hallam's Const. Hist._ vol. i. pp. 146, 147; and _Somers

Tracts_, vol. i. pp. 189-208: 'a number of persons whom they term

as martyrs,' p. 195; and at p. 202, the writer attacks those who

have 'entitled certain that have suffered for treason to be

martyrs for religion.' In the same way, the opponents of Catholic

Emancipation in our time, found themselves compelled to abandon

the old theological ground, and to defend the persecution of the

Catholics rather by political arguments than by religious ones.

Lord Eldon, who was by far the most influential leader of the

intolerant party, said, in a speech in the House of Lords, in

1810, that 'the enactments against the Catholics were meant to

guard, not against the abstract opinions of their religion, but

against the political dangers of a faith which acknowledged a

foreign supremacy.' _Twiss's Life of Eldon_, vol. i. p. 435; see

also pp. 483, 501, 577-580. Compare _Alison's Hist._ vol. vi. pp.

379 seq., a summary of the debate in 1805.

[549] Mr. Sewell seems to have this change in view in his _Christian

Politics_, 8vo, 1844, p. 277. Compare _Coleridge's note_ in

_Southey's Life of Wesley_, vol. i. p. 270. An able writer says

of the persecutions which, in the seventeenth century, the Church

of England directed against her opponents: 'This is the stale

pretence of the clergy in all countries, after they have

solicited the government to make penal laws against those they

call heretics or schismaticks, and prompted the magistrates to a

vigorous execution, then they lay all the odium on the civil

power for whom they have no excuse to allege, but that such men

suffered, not for religion, but for disobedience to the laws.'

_Somers Tracts_, vol. xii. p. 534. See also _Butler's Mem. of the

Catholics_, vol. i. p. 389, and vol. ii. pp. 44-46.

A remarkable evidence of the change that was then taking place, is found

in the two most important theological works which appeared in England

during the reign of Elizabeth. _Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity_ was

published at the end of the sixteenth century,[550] and is still

considered one of the greatest bulwarks of our national church. If we

compare this work with _Jewel's Apology for the Church of England_,

which was written thirty years before it,[551] we shall at once be

struck by the different methods these eminent writers employed. Both

Hooker and Jewel were men of learning and genius. Both of them were

familiar with the Bible, the Fathers, and the Councils. Both of them

wrote with the avowed object of defending the Church of England; and

both of them were well acquainted with the ordinary weapons of

theological controversy. But here the resemblance stops. The men were

very similar; their works are entirely different. During the thirty

years which had elapsed, the English intellect had made immense

progress; and the arguments which in the time of Jewel were found

perfectly satisfactory, would not have been listened to in the time of

Hooker. The work of Jewel is full of quotations from the Fathers and the

Councils, whose mere assertions, when they are uncontradicted by

Scripture, he seems to regard as positive proofs. Hooker, though he

shows much respect to the Councils, lays little stress upon the Fathers,

and evidently considered that his readers would not pay much attention

to their unsupported opinions. Jewel inculcates the importance of faith;

Hooker insists upon the exercise of reason.[552] The first employs all

his talents in collecting the decisions of antiquity, and in deciding

upon the meaning which they may be supposed to bear. The other quotes

the ancients, not so much from respect for their authority, as with the

view of illustrating his own arguments. Thus, for instance, both Hooker

and Jewel assert the undoubted right of the sovereign to interfere in

ecclesiastical affairs. Jewel, however, fancied that he had proved the

right, when he had pointed out that it was exercised by Moses, by

Joshua, by David, and by Solomon.[553] On the other hand, Hooker lays

down that this right exists, not because it is ancient, but because it

is advisable; and because it is unjust to suppose that men who are not

ecclesiastics will consent to be bound by laws which ecclesiastics alone

have framed.[554] In the same opposite spirit do these great writers

conduct their defence of their own church. Jewel, like all the authors

of his time, had exercised his memory more than his reason; and he

thinks to settle the whole dispute by crowding together texts from the

Bible, with the opinions of the commentators upon them.[555] But Hooker,

who lived in the age of Shakespeare and Bacon, found himself

constrained to take views of a far more comprehensive character. His

defence rests neither upon tradition nor upon commentators, nor ever

upon revelation; but he is content that the pretensions of the hostile

parties shall be decided by their applicability to the great exigencies

of society, and by the ease with which they adapt themselves to the

general purposes of ordinary life.[556]

[550] The first four books, which are in every point of view the most

important, were published in 1594. _Walton's Life of Hooker_, in

_Wordsworth's Ecclesiast. Biog._ vol. iii. p. 509. The sixth book

is said not to be authentic; and doubts have been thrown upon the

seventh and eighth books; but Mr. Hallam thinks that they are

certainly genuine. _Literature of Europe_, vol. ii. pp. 24, 25.

[551] _Jewel's Apology_ was written in 1561 or 1562. See _Wordsworth's

Eccles. Biog._ vol. iii. p. 313. This work, the Bible, and _Fox's

Martyrs_, were ordered, in the reign of Elizabeth, 'to be fixed

in all parish churches, to be read by the people.' _Aubrey's

Letters_, vol. ii. p. 42. The order, in regard to Jewel's

_Defence_, was repeated by James I. and Charles I. _Butler's Mem.

of the Catholics_, vol. iv. p. 413.

[552] 'Wherefore the natural measure whereby to judge our doings is, the

sentence of Reason determining and setting down what is good to

be done.' _Eccl. Polity_, book i. sec. viii. in _Hooker's Works_,

vol. i. p. 99. He requires of his opponents, 'not to exact at our

hands for every action the knowledge of some place of Scripture

out of which we stand bound to deduce it, as by divers

testimonies they seek to enforce; but rather, as the truth is, so

to acknowledge, that _it sufficeth if such actions be framed

according to the law of reason_.' Book ii. sec. i. _Works_, vol.

i. p. 151. 'For men to be tied and led by authority, as it were

with a kind of captivity of judgment, and, though there be reason

to the contrary, not to listen unto it, but to follow, like

beasts, the first in the herd, they know not nor care not

whither: this were brutish. Again, that authority of men should

prevail with men, either against or above Reason, is no part of

our belief. Companies of learned men, be they never so great and

reverend, are to yield unto Reason.' Book ii. sec. vii. vol. i.

pp. 182, 183. In book v. sec. viii. vol. ii. p. 23, he says, that

even 'the voice of the church' is to be held inferior to reason.

See also a long passage in book vii. sec. xi. vol. iii. p. 152;

and on the application of reason to the general theory of

religion, see vol. i. pp. 220-223, book iii. sec. viii. Again, at

p. 226: 'Theology, what is it, but the science of things divine?

What science can be attained unto, without the help of natural

discourse and Reason?' And he indignantly asks those who insist

on the supremacy of faith, 'May we cause our faith without Reason

to appear reasonable in the eyes of men?' vol. i. p. 230.

[553] After referring to Isaiah, he adds: 'Præter, inquam, hæc omnia, ex

historiis et optimorum temporum exemplis videmus pios principes

procurationem ecclesiarum ab officio suo nunquam putasse alienam.

'Moses civilis magistratus, ac ductor populi, omnem religionis,

et sacrorum rationem, et accepit a Deo, et populo tradidit, et

Aaronem episcopum de aureo vitulo, et de violata religione,

vehementer et graviter castigavit. Josue, etsi non aliud erat,

quàm magistratus civilis, tamen cùm primùm inauguraretur et

præficeretur populo, accepit mandata nominatim de religione,

deque colendo Deo.

'David rex, cùm omnis jam religio, ab impio rege Saule prorsus

esset dissipata, reduxit arcam Dei, hoc est, religionem

restituit: nec tantùm adfuit ut admonitor aut hortator operis,

sed etiam psalmos et hymnos dedit, et classes disposuit, et

pompam instituit, et quodammodo præfuit sacerdotibus.

'Salomon rex ædificavit templum Domino, quod ejus pater David

animo tantùm destinaverat: et postremò orationem egregiam habuit

ad populum de religione, et cultu Dei; et Abiatharum episcopum

postea summovit, et in ejus locum Sadocum surrogavit.' _Apolog.

Eccles. Anglic._ pp. 161, 162.

[554] He says that, although the clergy may be supposed more competent

than laymen to regulate ecclesiastical matters, this will

practically avail them nothing: 'It were unnatural not to think

the pastors and bishops of our souls a great deal more fit than

men of secular trades and callings; howbeit, when all which the

wisdom of all sorts can do is done, for the devising of laws in

the church, it is the general consent of all that giveth them the

form and vigour of laws; without which they could be no more unto

us than the counsels of physicians to the sick.' _Ecclesiastical

Polity_, book viii. sec. vi. vol. iii. p. 303. He adds, p. 326:

'Till it be proved that some special law of Christ hath for ever

annexed unto the clergy alone the power to make ecclesiastical

laws, we are to hold it a thing most _consonant with equity and

reason_, that no ecclesiastical laws be made in a Christian

commonwealth, without consent as well of the laity as of the

clergy, but least of all without consent of the highest power.'

[555] 'Quòd si docemus sacrosanctum Dei evangelium, et veteres

episcopos, atque ecclesiam primitivam nobiscum facere.' If this

be so, then, indeed, 'speramus, neminem illorum' (his opponents)

'ita negligentem fore salutis suæ, quin ut velit aliquando

cogitationem suscipere, ad utros potiùs se adjungat.' _Apolog.

Eccles. Anglic._ p. 17. At p. 53, he indignantly asks if any one

will dare to impeach the Fathers: 'Ergo Origenes, Ambrosius,

Augustinus, Chrysostomus, Gelasius, Theodoretus erant desertores

fidei catholicæ? Ergo tot veterum episcoporum et doctorum virorum

tanta consensio nihil aliud erat quàm conspiratio hæreticorum?

Aut quod tum laudabatur in illis, id nunc damnatur in nobis?

Quodque in illis erat catholicum, id nunc mutatis tantùm hominum

voluntatibus, repentè factum est schismaticum? Aut quod olim erat

verum, nunc statim, quia istis non placet, erit falsum?' His work

is full of this sort of eloquent, but, as it appears to our age,

pointless declamation.

[556] This large view underlies the whole of the _Ecclesiastical

Polity_. I can only afford room for a few extracts, which will be

illustrations rather than proofs: the proof will be obvious to

every competent reader of the work itself. 'True it is, the

ancienter the better ceremonies of religion are; howbeit not

absolutely true and without exception; _but true only so far

forth as those different ages do agree_ in the state of those

things for which, at the first, those rites, orders, and

ceremonies were instituted.' vol. i. p. 36. 'We count those

things perfect which want nothing requisite for the end whereto

they were instituted.' vol. i. p. 191. 'Because when a thing doth

cease to be available unto the end which gave it being, the

continuance of it must then of necessity appear superfluous.' And

even of the laws of God, he boldly adds: 'Notwithstanding the

authority of their Maker, the mutability of that end for which

they are made doth also make them changeable.' vol. i. p. 236.

'And therefore laws, though both ordained of God himself, and the

end for which they were ordained continuing, may notwithstanding

cease, if by alteration of persons or times they be found

unsufficient to attain unto that end.' vol. i. p. 238. At p. 240:

'I therefore conclude, that neither God's being Author of laws

for government of his church, nor his committing them unto

Scripture, is any reason sufficient wherefore all churches should

for ever be bound to keep them without change.' See, too, vol.

iii. p. 169, on 'the exigence of necessity.' Compare pp. 182,

183, and vol. i. p. 323, vol. ii. pp. 273, 424. Not a vestige of

such arguments can be found in Jewel; who, on the contrary, says

(_Apologia_, p. 114), 'Certè in religionem Dei nihil gravius dici

potest, quàm si ea accusetur novitatis. Ut enim in Deo ipso, ita

in ejus cultu nihil oportet esse novum.'

It requires but little penetration to see the immense importance of the

change which these two great works represent. As long as an opinion in

theology was defended by the old dogmatic method, it was impossible to

assail it without incurring the imputation of heresy. But when it was

chiefly defended by human reasoning, its support was seriously weakened.

For by this means the element of uncertainty was let in. It might be

alleged, that the arguments of one sect are as good as those of another;

and that we cannot be sure of the truth of our principles, until we have

heard what is to be said on the opposite side. According to the old

theological theory, it was easy to justify the most barbarous

persecution. If a man knew that the only true religion was the one which

he professed, and if he also knew that those who died in a contrary

opinion were doomed to everlasting perdition--if he knew these things

beyond the remotest possibility of a doubt, he might fairly argue, that

it is merciful to punish the body in order to save the soul, and secure

to immortal beings their future salvation, even though he employed so

sharp a remedy as the halter or the stake.[557] But if this same man is

taught to think that questions of religion are to be settled by reason

as well as by faith, he can scarcely avoid the reflection, that the

reason even of the strongest minds is not infallible, since it has led

the ablest men to the most opposite conclusions. When this idea is once

diffused among a people, it cannot fail to influence their conduct. No

one of common sense and common honesty will dare to levy upon another,

on account of his religion, the extreme penalty of the law, when he

knows it possible that his own opinions may be wrong, and that those of

the man he has punished may be right. From the moment when questions of

religion begin to evade the jurisdiction of faith, and submit to the

jurisdiction of reason, persecution becomes a crime of the deepest dye.

Thus it was in England in the seventeenth century. As theology became

more reasonable, it became less confident, and therefore more merciful.

Seventeen years after the publication of the great work of Hooker, two

men were publicly burned by the English bishops, for holding heretical

opinions.[558] But this was the last gasp of expiring bigotry; and since

that memorable day, the soil of England has never been stained by the

blood of a man who has suffered for his religious creed.[559]

[557] Archbishop Whately has made some very good remarks on this. See

his _Errors of Romanism traced to their Origin in Human Nature_,

pp. 237, 238.

[558] Their names were Legat and Wightman, and they suffered in 1611:

see the contemporary account in _Somers Tracts_, vol. ii. pp.

400-408. Compare _Blackstone's Comment._ vol. iv. p. 49;

_Harris's Lives of the Stuarts_, vol. i. pp. 143, 144; and note

in _Burton's Diary_, vol. i. p. 118. Of these martyrs to their

opinions, Mr. Hallam says: 'The first was burned by King, bishop

of London; the second by Neyle, of Litchfield.' _Const. Hist._

vol. i. pp. 611, 612.

[559] It should be mentioned, to the honour of the Court of Chancery,

that late in the sixteenth, and early in the seventeenth century,

its powers were exerted against the execution of those cruel

laws, by which the Church of England was allowed to persecute men

who differed from its own views. See _Campbell's Chancellors_,

vol. ii. pp. 135, 176, 231.

We have thus seen the rise of that scepticism which in physics must

always be the beginning of science, and in religion must always be the

beginning of toleration. There is, indeed, no doubt that in both cases

individual thinkers may, by a great effort of original genius,

emancipate themselves from the operation of this law. But in the

progress of nations no such emancipation is possible. As long as men

refer the movements of the comets to the immediate finger of God, and as

long as they believe that an eclipse is one of the modes by which the

Deity expresses his anger, they will never be guilty of the blasphemous

presumption of attempting to predict such supernatural appearances.

Before they could dare to investigate the causes of these mysterious

phenomena, it is necessary that they should believe, or at all events

that they should suspect, that the phenomena themselves were capable of

being explained by the human mind. In the same way, until men are

content in some degree to bring their religion before the bar of their

own reason, they never can understand how it is that there should be a

diversity of creeds, or how any one can differ from themselves without

being guilty of the most enormous and unpardonable crime.[560]

[560] 'To tax any one, therefore, with want of reverence, because he

pays no respect to what we venerate, is either irrelevant, or is

a mere confusion. The fact, so far as it is true, is no reproach,

but an honour; because to reverence all persons and all things is

absolutely wrong: reverence shown to that which does not deserve

it, is no virtue; no, nor even an amiable weakness, but a plain

folly and sin. But if it be meant that he is wanting in proper

reverence, not respecting what is really to be respected, that is

assuming the whole question at issue, because what we call

divine, he calls an idol; and as, supposing that we are in the

right, we are bound to fall down and worship, so, supposing him

to be in the right, he is no less bound to pull it to the ground

and destroy it.' _Arnold's Lectures on Modern History_, pp. 210,

211. Considering the ability of Dr. Arnold, considering his great

influence, and considering his profession, his antecedents, and

the character of the university in which he was speaking, it must

be allowed that this is a remarkable passage, and one well worthy

the notice of those who wish to study the tendencies of the

English mind during the present generation.

If we now continue to trace the progress of opinions in England, we

shall see the full force of these remarks. A general spirit of inquiry,

of doubt, and even of insubordination, began to occupy the minds of men.

In physics, it enabled them, almost at a blow, to throw off the shackles

of antiquity, and give birth to sciences founded not on notions of old,

but on individual observations and individual experiments.[561] In

politics, it stimulated them to rise against the government, and

eventually bring their king to the scaffold. In religion, it vented

itself in a thousand sects, each of which proclaimed, and often

exaggerated, the efficiency of private judgment.[562] The details of

this vast movement form one of the most interesting parts of the

history of England: but without anticipating what I must hereafter

relate, I will at present mention only one instance, which, from the

circumstances attending it, is very characteristic of the age. The

celebrated work by Chillingworth on the _Religion of Protestants_, is

generally admitted to be the best defence which the Reformers have been

able to make against the Church of Rome.[563] It was published in

1637,[564] and the position of the author would induce us to look for

the fullest display of bigotry that was consistent with the spirit of

his time. Chillingworth had recently abandoned the creed which he now

came forward to attack; and he, therefore, might be expected to have

that natural inclination to dogmatize with which apostasy is usually

accompanied. Besides this, he was the godson and the intimate friend of

Laud,[565] whose memory is still loathed, as the meanest, the most

cruel, and the most narrowminded man who ever sat on the episcopal

bench.[566] He was, moreover, a fellow of Oxford, and was a constant

resident at that ancient university, which has always been esteemed as

the refuge of superstition, and which has preserved to our own day its

unenviable fame.[567] If now we turn to the work that was written under

these auspices, we can scarcely believe that it was produced in the same

generation, and in the same country, where, only twenty-six years

before, two men had been publicly burned because they advocated opinions

different to those of the established church. It is, indeed, a most

remarkable proof of the prodigious energy of that great movement which

was now going on, that its pressure should be felt under circumstances

the most hostile to it which can possibly be conceived; and that a

friend of Laud, and a fellow of Oxford, should, in a grave theological

treatise, lay down principles utterly subversive of that theological

spirit which for many centuries had enslaved the whole of Europe.

[561] On the connexion between the rise of the Baconian philosophy and

the change in the spirit of theologians, compare _Comte_,

_Philosophie Positive_, vol. v. p. 701, with _Whately on Dangers

to Christian Faith_, pp. 148, 149. It favoured, as Tennemann

(_Gesch. der Philos._ vol. x. p. 14) says, the 'Belebung der

selbstthätigen Kraft des menschlichen Geistes;' and hence the

attack on the inductive philosophy in _Newman's Development of

Christian Doctrine_, pp. 179-183. But Mr. Newman does not seem to

be aware how irrevocably we are now pledged to the movement which

he seeks to reverse.

[562] The rapid increase of heresy in the middle of the seventeenth

century is very remarkable, and it greatly aided civilization in

England by encouraging habits of independent thought. In Feb.

1646-7, Boyle writes from London, 'There are few days pass here,

that may not justly be accused of the brewing or broaching of

some new opinion. Nay, some are so studiously changling in that

particular, they esteem an opinion as a diurnal, after a day or

two scarce worth the keeping. If any man have lost his religion,

let him repair to London, and I'll warrant him he shall find it:

I had almost said too, and if any man has a religion, let him but

come hither now, and he shall go near to lose it.' _Birch's Life

of Boyle_, in _Boyle's Works_, vol. i. pp. 20, 21. See also

_Bates's Account of the late Troubles_, edit. 1685, part ii. p.

219, on 'that unbridled licentiousness of hereticks which grew

greater and greater daily.' Compare to the same effect _Carlyle's

Cromwell_, vol. i. p. 289; _Hallam's Const. Hist._ vol. i. p.

608; and _Carwithen's Hist. of the Church of England_, vol. ii.

p. 203: 'sectaries began to swarm.'

[563] Not to quote the opinions of inferior men respecting

Chillingworth, it is enough to mention, that Lord Mansfield said

he was 'a perfect model of argumentation.' _Butler's

Reminiscences_, vol. i. p. 126. Compare a letter from Warburton,

in _Nichols's Illustrations of the Eighteenth Century_, vol. iv.

p. 849.

[564] _Des Maizeaux_, _Life of Chillingworth_, p. 141.

[565] _Aubrey's Letters and Lives_, vol. ii. p. 285; _Des Maizeaux_,

_Life of Chillingworth_, pp. 2, 9. The correspondence between

Laud and Chillingworth is supposed to be lost. _Des Maizeaux_, p.

12. Carwithen (_Hist. of the Church of England_, vol. ii. p. 214)

says, 'Laud was the godfather of Chillingworth.'

[566] The character of Laud is now well understood and generally known.

His odious cruelties made him so hated by his contemporaries,

that after his condemnation, many persons shut up their shops,

and refused to open them till he was executed. This is mentioned

by Walton, an eye-witness. See _Walton's Life of Sanderson_, in

_Wordsworth's Eccles. Biog._ vol. iv. p. 429.

[567] A modern writer suggests, with exquisite simplicity, that

Chillingworth derived his liberal principles _from_ Oxford: 'the

very same college which nursed the high intellect and tolerant

principles of Chillingworth.' _Bowles's Life of Bishop Ken_, vol.

i. p. xxi.

In this great work, all authority in matters of religion is openly set

at defiance. Hooker, indeed, had appealed from the jurisdiction of the

Fathers to the jurisdiction of reason; he had, however, been careful to

add, that the reason of individuals ought to bow before that of the

church, as we find it expressed in great Councils, and in the general

voice of ecclesiastical tradition.[568] But Chillingworth would hear of

none of these things. He would admit of no reservations which tended to

limit the sacred right of private judgment. He not only went far beyond

Hooker in neglecting the Fathers,[569] but he even ventured to despise

the Councils. Although the sole object of his work was to decide on the

conflicting claims of the two greatest sects into which the Christian

Church has broken, he never quotes as authorities the Councils of that

very church respecting which the disputes were agitated.[570] His strong

and subtle intellect, penetrating the depths of the subject, despised

that sort of controversy which had long busied the minds of men. In

discussing the points upon which the Catholics and Protestants were at

issue, he does not inquire whether the doctrines in question met the

approval of the early church, but he asks if they are in accordance with

human reason; and he does not hesitate to say that, however true they

may be, no man is bound to believe them if he finds that they are

repugnant to the dictates of his own understanding. Nor will he consent

that faith should supply the absence of authority. Even this favourite

principle of theologians is by Chillingworth made to yield to the

supremacy of the human reason.[571] Reason, he says, gives us

knowledge; while faith only gives us belief, which is a part of

knowledge, and is, therefore, inferior to it. It is by reason, and not

by faith, that we must discriminate in religious matters; and it is by

reason alone that we can distinguish truth from falsehood. Finally, he

solemnly reminds his readers, that in religious matters no one ought to

be expected to draw strong conclusions from imperfect premises, or to

credit improbable statements upon scanty evidence; still less, he says,

was it ever intended that men should so prostitute their reason, as to

believe with infallible faith that which they are unable to prove with

infallible arguments.[572]

[568] Hooker's undue respect for the Councils of the Church is noticed

by Mr. Hallam, _Const. Hist._ vol. i. p. 213. Compare the

hesitating remarks in _Coleridge's Literary Remains_, vol. iii.

pp. 35, 36.

[569] Reading the Fathers he contemptuously calls travelling on a

'north-west discovery.' _Chillingworth's Religion of

Protestants_, p. 366. Even to Augustine, who was probably the

ablest of them, Chillingworth pays no deference. See what he says

at pp. 196, 333, 376; and as to the authority of the Fathers in

general, see pp. 252, 346. Chillingworth observed, happily

enough, that churchmen 'account them fathers when they are for

them, and children when they are against them.' _Calamy's Life_,

vol. i. p. 253.

[570] As to the supposed authority of Councils, see _Religion of

Protestants_, pp. 132, 463. It affords curious evidence of the

slow progress of theologians to observe the different spirit in

which some of our clergy consider these matters. See, for

instance, _Palmer on the Church_, 1839, vol. ii. pp. 150-171. In

no other branch of inquiry do we find this obstinate

determination to adhere to theories which all thinking men have

rejected for the last two centuries.

[571] Indeed, he attempts to fasten the same doctrine upon the

Catholics; which, if he could have done, would of course have

ended the controversy. He says, rather unfairly, 'Your church you

admit, because you think you have reason to do so; so that by

you, as well as Protestants, all is finally resolved into your

own reason.' _Relig. of Protest._ p. 134.

[572] 'God desires only that we believe the conclusion, as much as the

premises deserve; that the strength of our faith be equal or

proportionable to the credibility of the motives to it.' _Relig.

of Protest._ p. 66. 'For my part, I am certain that God hath

given us our reason to discern between truth and falsehood; and

he that makes not this use of it, but believes things he knows

not why, I say it is by chance that he believes the truth, and

not by choice; and I cannot but fear that God will not accept of

this sacrifice of fools.' p. 133. 'God's spirit, if he please,

may work more,--a certainty of adherence beyond a certainty of

evidence; but neither God doth, nor man may, require of us, as

our duty, to give a greater assent to the conclusion than the

premises deserve; to build an infallible faith upon motives that

are only highly credible and not infallible; as it were a great

and heavy building upon a foundation that hath not strength

proportionate.' p. 149. 'For faith is not knowledge, no more than

three is four, but eminently contained in it; so that he that

knows, believes, and something more; but he that believes many

times does not know--nay, if he doth barely and merely believe,

he doth never know.' p. 412. See also p. 417.

No one of ordinary reflection can fail to perceive the manifest tendency

of these opinions. But what is more important to observe is, the process

through which, in the march of civilization, the human mind had been

obliged to pass before it could reach such elevated views. The

Reformation, by destroying the dogma of an infallible church, had of

course weakened the reverence which was paid to ecclesiastical

antiquity. Still, such was the force of old associations, that our

countrymen long continued to respect what they had ceased to venerate.

Thus it was, that Jewel, though recognizing the supreme authority of the

Bible, had, in cases where it was silent or ambiguous, anxiously

appealed to the early church, by whose decision he supposed all

difficulties could be easily cleared. He, therefore, only used his

reason to ascertain the discrepancies which existed between Scripture

and tradition; but when they did not clash, he paid what is now

considered a superstitious deference to antiquity. Thirty years after

him came Hooker;[573] who made a step in advance, and laying down

principles from which Jewel would have shrunk with fear, did much to

weaken that which it was reserved for Chillingworth utterly to destroy.

Thus it is, that these three great men represent the three distinct

epochs of the three successive generations in which they respectively

lived. In Jewel, reason is, if I may so say, the superstructure of the

system; but authority is the basis upon which the superstructure is

built. In Hooker, authority is only the superstructure, and reason is

the basis.[574] But in Chillingworth, whose writings were harbingers of

the coming storm, authority entirely disappears, and the whole fabric of

religion is made to rest upon the way in which the unaided reason of man

shall interpret the decrees of an omnipotent God.

[573] On the connexion between the Reformation and the views advocated

in the _Ecclesiastical Polity_, compare _Newman's Development of

Christian Doctrine_, p. 47, with some able remarks by Locke, in

_King's Life of Locke_, vol. ii. pp. 99-101. Locke, who was

anything but a friend to the church, was a great admirer of

Hooker, and in one place calls him 'the arch-philosopher.' _Essay

on Government_, in _Locke's Works_, vol. iv. p. 380.

[574] The opposition between Jewel and Hooker was so marked, that some

of the opponents of Hooker quoted against him Jewel's Apology.

See _Wordsworth's Eccl. Biog._ vol. iii. p. 513. Dr. Wordsworth

calls this 'curious;' but it would be much more curious if it had

not happened. Compare the remarks made by the Bishop of Limerick

(_Parr's Works_, vol. ii. p. 470, _Notes on the Spital Sermon_),

who says, that Hooker 'opened that fountain of reason,' &c.;

language which will hardly be considered too strong by those who

have compared the _Ecclesiastical Polity_ with the theological

works previously produced by the English church.

The immense success of this great work of Chillingworth, must have aided

that movement of which it is itself an evidence.[575] It formed a

decisive vindication of religious dissent;[576] and thus justified the

breaking up of the Anglican church, which the same generation lived to

witness. Its fundamental principle was adopted by the most influential

writers of the seventeenth century,--such as Hales, Owen, Taylor,

Burnet, Tillotson, Locke, and even the cautious and time-serving Temple;

all of whom insisted upon the authority of private judgment, as forming

a tribunal from which no one had the power of appeal. The inference to

be drawn from this seems obvious.[577] If the ultimate test of truth is

individual judgment, and if no one can affirm that the judgments of men,

which are often contradictory, can ever be infallible, it follows of

necessity that there is no decisive criterion of religious truth. This

is a melancholy, and, as I firmly believe, a most inaccurate conclusion;

but it is one which every nation must entertain, before it can achieve

that great work of toleration, which, even in our own country, and in

our own time, is not yet consummated. It is necessary that men should

learn to doubt, before they begin to tolerate; and that they should

recognize the fallibility of their own opinions, before they respect the

opinions of their opponents.[578] This great process is far from being

yet completed in any country; and the European mind, barely emerged from

its early credulity, and from an overweening confidence in its own

belief, is still in a middle, and, so to say, a probationary stage. When

that stage shall be finally passed, when we shall have learned to

estimate men solely by their character and their acts, and not at all by

their theological dogmas, we shall then be able to form our religious

opinions by that purely transcendental process, of which in every age

glimpses have been granted to a few gifted minds. That this is the

direction in which things are now hastening, must be clear to every one

who has studied the progress of modern civilization. Within the short

space of three centuries, the old theological spirit has been compelled,

not only to descend from its long-established supremacy, but to abandon

those strongholds to which, in the face of advancing knowledge, it has

vainly attempted to secure a retreat. All its most cherished pretensions

it has been forced gradually to relinquish.[579] And although in England

a temporary prominence has recently been given to certain religious

controversies, still the circumstances attending them show the

alteration in the character of the age. Disputes which, a century ago,

would have set the whole kingdom in a flame, are now regarded with

indifference by the vast majority of educated men. The complications of

modern society, and the immense variety of interests into which it is

divided, have done much to distract the intellect, and to prevent it

from dwelling upon subjects which a less-occupied people would deem of

paramount importance. Besides this, the accumulations of science are far

superior to those of any former age, and offer suggestions of such

surpassing interest, that nearly all our greatest thinkers devote to

them the whole of their time, and refuse to busy themselves with matters

of mere speculative belief. The consequence is, that what used to be

considered the most important of all questions, is now abandoned to

inferior men, who mimic the zeal, without possessing the influence of

those really great divines whose works are among the glories of our

early literature. These turbulent polemics have, indeed, distracted the

church by their clamour, but they have not made the slightest impression

upon the great body of English intellect; and an overwhelming majority

of the nation is notoriously opposed to that monastic and ascetic

religion which it is now vainly attempted to reconstruct. The truth is,

that the time for these things has gone by. Theological interests have

long ceased to be supreme; and the affairs of nations are no longer

regulated according to ecclesiastical views.[580] In England, where the

march has been more rapid than elsewhere, this change is very

observable. In every other department we have had a series of great and

powerful thinkers, who have done honour to their country, and have won

the admiration of mankind. But for more than a century, we have not

produced a single original work in the whole field of controversial

theology. For more than a century, the apathy on this subject has been

so marked, that there has been made no addition of value to that immense

mass of divinity which, among thinking men, is in every successive

generation losing something of its former interest.[581]

[575] Des Maizeaux (_Life of Chillingworth_, pp. 220, 221) says: 'His

book was received with a general applause; and, what perhaps

never happened to any other controversial work of that bulk, two

editions of it were published within less than five months....

The quick sale of a book, and especially of a book of

controversy, in folio, is a good proof that the author hit the

taste of his time.' See also _Biographia Britannica_, edit.

Kippis, vol. iii. pp. 511, 512.

[576] Or, as Calamy cautiously puts it, Chillingworth's work 'appeared

to me to go a great way towards the justifying of moderate

conformity.' _Calamy's Life_, vol. i. p. 234. Compare _Palmer on

the Church_, vol. i. pp. 267, 268; and what is probably an

allusion to Chillingworth in _Doddridge's Correspond. and Diary_,

vol. ii. p. 81. See also the opinion of Hobbes, in _Aubrey's

Letters and Lives_, vol. ii. pp. 288, 629.

[577] A short but able view of the aspect which the English mind now

began to assume, will be found in _Stäudlin_, _Geschichte der

theologischen Wissenschaften_, vol. ii. pp. 95 seq.

[578] In _Whately's Dangers to Christian Faith_, pp. 188-198, there is a

perspicuous statement of the arguments now commonly received

against coercing men for their religious opinions. But the most

powerful of these arguments are based entirely upon expediency,

which would have insured their rejection in an age of strong

religious convictions. Some, and only some, of the theological

difficulties respecting toleration, are noticed in _Coleridge's

Lit. Remains_, vol. i. pp. 312-315; and in another work (_The

Friend_, vol. i. p. 73), he mentions, what is the real fact 'that

same indifference which makes toleration so easy a virtue with

us.' See also _Archdeacon Hare's Guesses at Truth_, 2nd series,

1848, p. 278; and _Nichols's Illustrations of Lit. Hist._ vol. v.

p. 817: 'a spirit of mutual toleration and forbearance has

appeared (at least one good consequence of religious

indifference).'

[579] It would be idle to offer proofs of so notorious a fact; but the

reader will be interested by some striking remarks in

_Capefigue_, _Hist. de la Réforme_, vol. i. pp. 228, 229.

[580] A writer intimately acquainted with the social condition of the

great European countries, says: 'Ecclesiastical power is almost

extinct as an active element in the political or social affairs

of nations or of individuals, in the cabinet or in the family

circle; and a new element, literary power, is taking its place in

the government of the world.' _Laing's Denmark_, 1852, p. 82. On

this natural tendency in regard to legislation, see _Meyer_,

_Esprit des Institut. Judiciaires_, vol. i. p. 267 note; and a

good summary in _Stäudlin_, _Gesch. der theolog. Wissenschaften_,

vol. ii. pp. 304, 305. It is not surprising to find that many of

the clergy complain of a movement so subversive of their own

power. Compare _Ward's Ideal of a Christian Church_, pp. 40,

108-111, 388; _Sewell's Christian Politics_, pp. 276, 277, 279;

_Palmer's Treatise on the Church_, vol. ii. p. 361. It is thus

that everything is tending to confirm the remarkable prediction

of Sir James Mackintosh, that 'church-power (unless some

revolution, auspicious to priestcraft, should replunge Europe in

ignorance) will certainly not survive the nineteenth century.'

_Mem. of Mackintosh_, vol. i. p. 67.

[581] 'The "divines" in England at the present day, her bishops,

professors, and prebendaries, are not theologians. They are

logicians, chemists, skilled in the mathematics, historians, poor

commentators upon Greek poets.' _Theodore Parker's Critical and

Miscellaneous Writings_, 1848, p. 302. At p. 33, the same high

authority says: 'But, within the present century, what has been

written in the English tongue, in any department of theological

scholarship, which is of value and makes a mark on the age? The

_Bridgewater Treatises_, and the new edition of _Paley_,--we

blush to confess it,--are the best things.' Sir William Hamilton

(_Discussions on Philosophy_, 1852, p. 699) notices the decline

of 'British theology,' though he appears ignorant of the cause of

it. The Rev. Mr. Ward (_Ideal of a Christian Church_, p. 405)

remarks, that 'we cannot wonder, however keenly we may mourn, at

the decline and fall of dogmatic theology.' See also _Lord

Jeffrey's Essays_, vol. iv. p. 337: 'Warburton, we think, was the

last of our great divines.... The days of the Cudworths and

Barrows, the Hookers and Taylors, are long gone by.' Dr. Parr was

the only English theologian since Warburton who possessed

sufficient learning to retrieve this position; but he always

refused to do so, being, unconsciously to himself, held back by

the spirit of his age. Thus, we find him writing to Archbishop

Magee, in 1823: 'As to myself, I long ago determined not to take

any active part in polemical theology.' _Parr's Works_, vol. vii.

p. 11.

In the same way, since the early part of the eighteenth century,

hardly any one has carefully read the Fathers, except for mere

historical and secular purposes. The first step was taken about

the middle of the seventeenth century, when the custom of quoting

them in sermons began to be abandoned. _Burnet's Own Time_, vol.

i. pp. 329, 330; _Orme's Life of Owen_, p. 184. After this they

rapidly fell into contempt; and the Rev. Mr. Dowling (_Study of

Ecclesiast. History_, p. 195) asserts, that 'Waterland, who died

in 1740, was the last of our great patristical scholars.' To this

I may add, that nine years subsequent to the death of Waterland,

the obvious decay of professional learning struck Warburton,

afterwards Bishop of Gloucester, so much, that he wrote to

Jortin, somewhat roughly, 'anything makes a divine among our

parsons.' See his _Letter_, written in 1749, in _Nichols's

Illustrations of Lit. Hist._ vol. ii. p. 173; and for other

evidence of the neglect by the clergy of their ancient studies,

see _Jones's Memoirs of Horne, Bishop of Norwich_, pp. 68, 184;

and the complaint of Dr. Knowler, in 1766, in _Nichols's Lit.

Anec._ vol. ii. p. 130. Since then, attempts have been made at

Oxford to remedy this tendency; but such attempts, being opposed

by the general march of affairs, have been, and must be, futile.

Indeed, so manifest is the inferiority of these recent efforts,

that one of the most active cultivators in that field frankly

admits, that, in point of knowledge, his own party has effected

nothing; and he even asserts, with great bitterness, that 'it is

melancholy to say it, but the chief, perhaps the only, English

writer who has any claim to be considered an ecclesiastical

historian, is the infidel Gibbon.' _Newman on the Develop. of

Christ. Doct._ p. 5.

These are only some of the innumerable signs, which must be discerned by

every man who is not blinded by the prejudices of an imperfect

education. An immense majority of the clergy,--some from ambitious

feelings, but the greater part, I believe, from conscientious

motives,--are striving to check the progress of that scepticism which is

now gathering in upon us from every quarter.[582] It is time that these

well-intentioned, though mistaken, men should see the delusion under

which they labour. That by which they are so much alarmed, is the

intermediate step which leads from superstition to toleration. The

higher order of minds have passed through this stage, and are

approaching what is probably the ultimate form of the religious history

of the human race. But the people at large, and even some of those who

are commonly called educated men, are only now entering that earlier

epoch in which scepticism[583] is the leading feature of the mind. So

far, therefore, from our apprehensions being excited by this

rapidly-increasing spirit, we ought rather to do everything in our power

to encourage that which, though painful to some, is salutary to all;

because by it alone can religious bigotry be effectually destroyed. Nor

ought we to be surprised that, before this can be done, a certain degree

of suffering must first intervene.[584] If one age believes too much, it

is but a natural reaction that another age should believe too little.

Such are the imperfections of our nature, that we are compelled, by the

very laws of its progress, to pass through those crises of scepticism

and of mental distress, which to a vulgar eye are states of national

decline and national shame; but which are only as the fire by which the

gold must be purged before it can leave its dross in the pot of the

refiner. To apply the imagery of the great allegorist, it is necessary

that the poor pilgrim, laden with the weight of accumulated

superstitions, should struggle through the Slough of Despond and the

Valley of Death, before he can reach that glorious city, glittering with

gold and with jewels, of which the first sight is sufficient recompense

for his toils and his fears.

[582] As some writers, moved by their wishes rather than by their

knowledge, seek to deny this, it may be well to observe, that the

increase of scepticism since the latter part of the eighteenth

century is attested by an immense mass of evidence, as will

appear to whoever will compare the following authorities:

_Whately's Dangers to Christian Faith_, p. 87; _Kay's Social

Condition of the People_, vol. ii. p. 506; _Tocqueville_, _de la

Démocratie_, vol. iii. p. 72; _J. H. Newman on Development_, pp.

28, 29; _F. W. Newman's Natural History of the Soul_, p. 197;

_Parr's Works_, vol. ii. p. 5, vol. iii. pp. 688, 689; _Felkin's

Moral Statistics_, in _Journal of Statist. Soc._ vol. i. p. 541;

_Watson's Observations on the Life of Wesley_, pp. 155, 194;

_Matter_, _Hist. du Gnosticisme_, vol. ii. p. 485; _Ward's Ideal

of a Christian Church_, pp. 266, 267, 404; _Turner's Hist. of

England_, vol. ii. pp. 129, 142, vol. iii. p. 509; _Priestley's

Memoirs_, vol. i. pp. 127, 128, 446, vol. ii. p. 751; _Cappe's

Memoirs_, p. 367; _Nichols's Lit. Anec. of Eighteenth Century_,

vol. iv. p. 671, vol. viii. p. 473; _Nichols's Illust. of Lit.

Hist._ vol. v. p. 640; _Combe's Notes on the United States_, vol.

ii. pp. 171, 172, 183.

[583] It has been suggested to me by an able friend, that there is a

class of persons who will misunderstand this expression; and that

there is another class who, without misunderstanding it, will

intentionally misrepresent its meaning. Hence, it may be well to

state distinctly what I wish to convey by the word 'scepticism.'

By scepticism I merely mean hardness of belief; so that an

increased scepticism is an increased perception of the difficulty

of proving assertions; or, in other words, it is an increased

application, and an increased diffusion, of the rules of

reasoning, and of the laws of evidence. This feeling of

hesitation and of suspended judgment has, in every department of

thought, been the invariable preliminary to all the intellectual

revolutions through which the human mind has passed; and without

it, there could be no progress, no change, no civilization. In

physics, it is the necessary precursor of science; in politics,

of liberty; in theology, of toleration. These are the three

leading forms of scepticism; it is, therefore, clear, that in

religion the sceptic steers a middle course between atheism and

orthodoxy, rejecting both extremes, because he sees that both are

incapable of proof.

[584] What a learned historian has said of the effect which the method

of Socrates produced on a very few Greek minds, is applicable to

that state through which a great part of Europe is now passing:

'The Socratic dialectics, clearing away from the mind its mist of

fancied knowledge, and laying bare the real ignorance, produced

an immediate effect, like the touch of the torpedo. The

newly-created consciousness of ignorance was alike unexpected,

painful, and humiliating,--a season of doubt and discomfort, yet

combined with an internal working and yearning after truth, never

before experienced. Such intellectual quickening, which could

never commence until the mind had been disabused of its original

illusion of false knowledge, was considered by Socrates not

merely as the index and precursor, but as the indispensable

condition of future progress.' _Grote's Hist. of Greece_, vol.

viii. pp. 614, 615, 8vo, 1851. Compare _Kritik der reinen

Vernunft_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol. ii. pp. 572, 577. 'So ist der

Skeptizismus ein Ruheplatz für die menschliche Vernunft, da sie

sich über ihre dogmatische Wanderung besinnen und den Entwurf von

der Gegend machen kann, wo sie sich befindet, um ihren Weg

fernerhin mit mehrerer Sicherheit wählen zu können, aber nicht

ein Wohnplatz zum beständigen Aufenthalte.... So ist das

skeptische Verfahren zwar an sich selbst für die Vernunftfragen

nicht befriedigend, aber doch vorübend, um ihre Vorsichtigkeit zu

erwecken und auf gründliche Mittel zu weisen, die sie in ihren

rechtmässigen Besitzen sichern können.'

During the whole of the seventeenth century, this double movement of

scepticism and of toleration continued to advance; though its progress

was constantly checked by the two successors of Elizabeth, who in every

thing reversed the enlightened policy of the great queen. These princes

exhausted their strength in struggling against the tendencies of an age

they were unable to understand; but, happily, the spirit which they

wished to quench had reached a height that mocked their control. At the

same time, the march of the English mind was still farther aided by the

nature of those disputes which, during half a century, divided the

country. In the reign of Elizabeth, the great contest had been between

the church and its opponents; between those who were orthodox, and those

who were heretical. But in the reigns of James and Charles, theology was

for the first time merged in politics. It was no longer a struggle of

creeds and dogmas; but it was a struggle between those who favoured the

crown, and those who supported the parliament. The minds of men, thus

fixed upon matters of real importance, neglected those inferior pursuits

that had engrossed the attention of their fathers.[585] When, at length,

public affairs had reached their crisis, the hard fate of the king,

which eventually advanced the interests of the throne, was most

injurious to those of the church. There can, indeed, be no doubt that

the circumstances connected with the execution of Charles, inflicted a

blow upon the whole system of ecclesiastical authority, from which, in

this country, it has never been able to recover. The violent death of

the king excited the sympathies of the people; and by thus strengthening

the hands of the royalists, hastened the restoration of the

monarchy.[586] But the mere name of that great party which had risen to

power, was suggestive of the change that, in a religious point of view,

was taking place in the national mind. It was, indeed, no light thing,

that England should be ruled by men who called themselves Independents;

and who, under that title, not only beat back the pretensions of the

clergy, but professed an unbounded contempt for all those rites and

dogmas which the clergy had, during many centuries, continued to

amass.[587] True it is, that the Independents did not always push to

their full extent the consequences of their own doctrines.[588] Still,

it was a great matter to have those doctrines recognized by the

constituted authorities of the state. Besides this, it is important to

remark, that the Puritans were more fanatical than superstitious.[589]

They were so ignorant of the real principles of government, as to direct

penal laws against private vices; and to suppose that immorality could

be stemmed by legislation.[590] But, notwithstanding this serious

error, they always resisted the aggressions even of their own clergy;

and the destruction of the old episcopal hierarchy, though perhaps too

hastily effected, must have produced many beneficial results. When the

great party by whom these things were accomplished, was at length

overthrown, the progress of events still continued to tend in the same

direction. After the Restoration, the church, though reinstated in her

ancient pomp, had evidently lost her ancient power.[591] At the same

time, the new king, from levity, rather than from reason, despised the

disputes of theologians, and treated questions of religion with what he

considered a philosophic indifference.[592] The courtiers followed his

example, and thought they could not err in imitating him, whom they

regarded as the Lord's anointed. The results were such as must be

familiar even to the most superficial readers of English literature.

That grave and measured scepticism, by which the Independents had been

characterized, lost all its decorum when it was transplanted into the

ungenial atmosphere of a court. The men by whom the king was surrounded,

were unequal to the difficulties of suspense; and they attempted to

fortify their doubts by the blasphemous expression of a wild and

desperate infidelity. With scarcely an exception, all those writers who

were most favoured by Charles, exhausted the devices of their ribald

spirit, in mocking a religion, of the nature of which they were

profoundly ignorant. These impious buffooneries would, by themselves,

have left no permanent impression on the age; but they deserve

attention, because they were the corrupt and exaggerated representatives

of a more general tendency. They were the unwholesome offspring of that

spirit of disbelief, and of that daring revolt against authority, which

characterized the most eminent Englishmen during the seventeenth

century. It was this which caused Locke to be an innovator in his

philosophy, and an Unitarian in his creed. It was this which made Newton

a Socinian; which forced Milton to be the great enemy of the church, and

which not only turned the poet into a rebel, but tainted with Arianism

the _Paradise Lost_. In a word, it was the same contempt for tradition,

and the same resolution to spurn the yoke, which, being first carried

into philosophy by Bacon, was afterwards carried into politics by

Cromwell; and which, during that very generation, was enforced in

theology by Chillingworth, Owen, and Hales; in metaphysics by Hobbes and

Glanvil; and in the theory of government by Harrington, Sydney, and

Locke.

[585] Dr. Arnold, whose keen eye noted this change, says (_Lectures on

Modern History_, p. 232), 'What strikes us predominantly, is,

that what, in Elizabeth's time, was a controversy between

divines, was now a great political contest between the crown and

the parliament.' The ordinary compilers, such as Sir A. Alison

(_Hist. of Europe_, vol. i. p. 51), and others, have entirely

misrepresented this movement; an error the more singular, because

the eminently political character of the struggle was recognized

by several contemporaries. Even Cromwell, notwithstanding the

difficult game he had to play, distinctly stated, in 1655, that

the origin of the war was not religious. See _Carlyle's

Cromwell_, vol. iii. p. 103; and corroborative evidence in

_Walker's History of Independency_, part i. p. 132. James I. also

saw that the Puritans were more dangerous to the state than to

the church: 'do not so far differ from us in points of religion,

as in their confused form of policy and parity; being ever

discontented with the present government, and impatient to suffer

any superiority; which maketh their sects insufferable in any

well-governed commonwealth.' _Speech of James I._, in _Parl.

Hist._ vol. i. p. 982. See also the observations ascribed to De

Foe, in _Somers Tracts_, vol. ix. p. 572: 'The king and

parliament fell out about matters of civil right; ... the first

difference between the king and the English parliament did not

respect religion, but civil property.'

[586] See _Clarendon's Hist. of the Rebellion_, p. 716. Sir W. Temple,

in his _Memoirs_, observes, that the throne of Charles II. was

strengthened by 'what had passed in the last reign.' _Temple's

Works_, vol. ii. p. 344. This may be illustrated by the remarks

of M. Lamartine on the execution of Louis XVI. _Hist. des

Girondins_, vol. v. pp. 86-7: 'Sa mort, au contraire, aliénait de

la cause française cette partie immense des populations qui ne

juge les événements humains que par le c[oe]ur. La nature humaine

est pathétique; la république l'oublia, elle donna à la royauté

quelque chose du martyre, à la liberté quelque chose de la

vengeance. Elle prépara ainsi une réaction contre la cause

républicaine, et mit du côté de la royauté la sensibilité,

l'intérêt, les larmes d'une partie des peuples.'

[587] The energy with which the House of Commons, in 1646, repelled the

pretensions of 'the Assembly of Divines,' is one of many proofs

of the determination of the predominant party not to allow

ecclesiastical encroachments. See the remarkable details in

_Parl. Hist._ vol. iii. pp. 459-463; see also p. 1305. As a

natural consequence, the Independents were the first sect which,

when possessed of power, advocated toleration. Compare _Orme's

Life of Owen_, pp. 63-75, 102-111; _Somers Tracts_, vol. xii. p.

542; _Walker's Hist. of Independency_, part ii. pp. 50, 157, part

iii. p. 22; _Clarendon's Hist. of the Rebellion_, pp. 610, 640.

Some writers ascribe great merit to Jeremy Taylor for his

advocacy of toleration (_Heber's Life of Taylor_, p. xxvii.; and

_Parr's Works_, vol. iv. p. 417); but the truth is that when he

wrote the famous _Liberty of Prophesying_, his enemies were in

power; so that he was pleading for his own interests. When,

however, the Church of England again obtained the upper hand,

Taylor withdrew the concessions which he had made in the season

of adversity. See the indignant remarks of Coleridge (_Lit.

Remains_, vol. iii. p. 250), who, though a great admirer of

Taylor, expresses himself strongly on this dereliction: see also

a recently published _Letter to Percy, Bishop of Dromore_, in

_Nichols's Illustrations of Lit. History_, vol. vii. p. 464.

[588] However, Bishop Short (_History of the Church of England_, 8vo,

1847, pp. 452, 458) says, what is undoubtedly true, that the

hostility of Cromwell to the church was not theological, but

political. The same remark is made by Bishop Kennet. _Note_ in

_Burton's Diary_, vol. ii. p. 479. See also _Vaughan's Cromwell_,

vol. i. p. xcvii.; and on the generally tolerant spirit of this

great man, see _Hallam's Const. Hist._ vol. ii. p. 14; and the

evidence in _Harris's Lives of the Stuarts_, vol. iii. pp. 37-47.

But the most distinct recognition of the principle, is in a

_Letter from Cromwell to Major-General Crawford_, recently

printed in _Carlyle's Cromwell_, vol. i. pp. 201, 202, 8vo, 1846.

In it Cromwell writes, 'Sir, the state, in choosing men to serve

it, takes no notice of their opinions; if they be willing

faithfully to serve it--that satisfies.' See additional proof in

_Carwithen's Hist. of the Church of Engl._ vol. ii. pp. 245, 249.

[589] No one can understand the real history of the Puritans, who does

not take this into consideration. In the present Introduction, it

is impossible to discuss so large a subject; and I must reserve

it for the future part of this work, in which the history of

England will be specially treated. In the mean time, I may

mention, that the distinction between fanaticism and superstition

is clearly indicated, but not analyzed, by Archbishop Whately, in

his _Errors of Romanism traced to their Origin in Human Nature_,

p. 49. This should be compared with _Hume's Philosophical Works_,

vol. iii. pp. 81-89, Edinb. 1826, on the difference between

enthusiasm and superstition; a difference which is noticed, but,

as it appears to me, misunderstood, by Maclaine, in his

_Additions to Mosheim's Ecclesiast. Hist._ vol. ii. p. 38.

[590] Compare _Barrington's Observations on the Statutes_, p. 143, with

_Burton's Diary of the Parliaments of Cromwell_, vol. i. pp.

xcviii. 145, 392, vol. ii. pp. 35, 229. In 1650, a second

conviction of fornication was made felony, without benefit of

clergy; but, after the Restoration, Charles II. and his friends

found this law rather inconvenient; so it was repealed. See

_Blackstone's Commentaries_, vol. iv. p. 65.

[591] See _Life of Ken, by a Layman_, edit. 1854, vol. i. p. 51. At

p. 129, the same writer says, with sorrow, 'The church recovered

much of her temporal possessions, but not her spiritual rule.'

The power of the bishops was abridged 'by the destruction of the

court of high-commission.' _Short's Hist. of the Church of

England_, p. 595. See also, on the diminished influence of the

Church-of-England clergy after the Restoration, _Southey's Life

of Wesley_, vol. i. pp. 278, 279; and _Watson's Observations on

the Life of Wesley_, pp. 129-131.

[592] Buckingham and Halifax, the two men who were perhaps best

acquainted with Charles II., both declared that he was a deist.

Compare _Lingard's Hist. of Engl._ vol. viii. p. 127, with

_Harris's Lives of the Stuarts_, vol. v. p. 55. His subsequent

conversion to Catholicism is exactly analogous to the increased

devotion of Louis XIV. during the later years of his life. In

both cases, superstition was the natural refuge of a worn-out and

discontented libertine, who had exhausted all the resources of

the lowest and most grovelling pleasures.

The progress which the English intellect was now making towards shaking

off ancient superstitions,[593] was still further aided by the

extraordinary zeal displayed in the cultivation of the physical

sciences. This, like all great social movements, is clearly traceable to

the events by which it was preceded. It was partly cause, and partly

effect, of the increasing incredulity of the age. The scepticism of the

educated classes made them dissatisfied with those long-established

opinions, which only rested on unsupported authority; and this gave rise

to a desire to ascertain how far such notions might be verified or

refuted by the real condition of things. A curious instance of the

rapid progress of this spirit may be found in the works of an author who

was one of the most eminent among the mere literary men of his time.

While the Civil War was barely decided, and three years before the

execution of the king, Sir Thomas Browne published his celebrated work,

called _Inquiries into Vulgar and Common Errors_.[594] This able and

learned production has the merit of anticipating some of those results

which more modern inquirers have obtained;[595] but it is chiefly

remarkable, as being the first systematic and deliberate onslaught ever

made in England upon those superstitious fancies which were then

prevalent respecting the external world. And what is still more

interesting is, that the circumstances under which it appeared make it

evident, that while the learning and genius of the author belonged to

himself, the scepticism which he displayed respecting popular belief was

forced on him by the pressure of the age.

[593] One of the most curious instances of this may be seen in the

destruction of the old notions respecting witchcraft. This

important revolution in our opinions was effected, so far as the

educated classes are concerned, between the Restoration and the

Revolution; that is to say, in 1660, the majority of educated men

still believed in witchcraft; while in 1688, the majority

disbelieved it. In 1665, the old orthodox view was stated by

Chief-Baron Hale, who, on a trial of two women for witchcraft,

said to the jury: 'That there are such creatures as witches, I

make no doubt at all; for, first, the Scriptures have affirmed so

much; secondly, the wisdom of all nations hath provided laws

against such persons, which is an argument of their confidence of

such a crime.' _Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices_, vol. i.

pp. 565, 566. This reasoning was irresistible, and the witches

were hung; but the change in public opinion began to affect even

the judges, and after this melancholy exhibition of the

Chief-Baron, such scenes became gradually rarer; though Lord

Campbell is mistaken in supposing (p. 563) that this was 'the

last capital conviction in England for the crime of bewitching.'

So far from this, three persons were executed at Exeter for

witchcraft in 1682. See _Hutchinson's Historical Essay concerning

Witchcraft_, 1720, pp. 56, 57. Hutchinson says: 'I suppose these

are the last three that have been hanged in England.' If,

however, one may rely upon a statement made by Dr. Parr, two

witches were hung at Northampton in 1705; and in '1712, five

other witches suffered the same fate at the same place.' _Parr's

Works_, vol. iv. p. 182, 8vo, 1828. This is the more shameful,

because, as I shall hereafter prove, from the literature of that

time, a disbelief in the existence of witches had become almost

universal among educated men; though the old superstition was

still defended on the judgment-seat and in the pulpit. As to the

opinions of the clergy, compare _Cudworth's Intellect. Syst._

vol. iii. pp. 345, 348; _Vernon Correspond._ vol. ii. pp. 302,

303; _Burt's Letters from the North of Scotland_, vol. i. pp.

220, 221; _Wesley's Journals_, pp. 602, 713. Wesley, who had more

influence than all the bishops put together, says: 'It is true,

likewise, that the English in general, and, indeed, most of the

men of learning in Europe, have given up all accounts of witches

and apparitions as mere old wives' fables. I am sorry for

it.... The giving up witchcraft is, in effect, giving up the

Bible.... But I cannot give up, to all the Deists in Great

Britain, the existence of witchcraft, till I give up the credit

of all history, sacred and profane.'

However, all was in vain. Every year diminished the old belief;

and in 1736, a generation before Wesley had recorded these

opinions, the laws against witchcraft were repealed, and another

vestige of superstition effaced from the English statute-book.

See _Barrington on the Statutes_, p. 407; _Note_ in _Burton's

Diary_, vol. i. p. 26; _Harris's Life of Hardwicke_, vol. i. p.

307.

To this it may be interesting to add, that in Spain a witch was

burned so late as 1781. _Ticknor's Hist. of Spanish Literature_,

vol. iii. p. 238.

[594] The first edition was published in 1646. _Works of Sir Thomas

Browne_, vol. ii. p. 163.

[595] See the notes in Mr. Wilkin's edition of _Browne's Works_, Lond.

1836, vol. ii. pp. 284, 360, 361.

In or about 1633, when the throne was still occupied by a superstitious

prince; when the Church of England was at the height of her apparent

power; and when men were incessantly persecuted for their religious

opinions--this same Sir Thomas Browne wrote his _Religio Medici_,[596]

in which we find all the qualities of his later work, except the

scepticism. Indeed, in the _Religio Medici_, there is shown a credulity

that must have secured the sympathy of those classes which were then

dominant. Of all the prejudices which at that time were deemed an

essential part of the popular creed, there was not one which Browne

ventured to deny. He announces his belief in the philosopher's

stone;[597] in spirits, and tutelary angels;[598] and in

palmistry.[599] He not only peremptorily affirms the reality of witches,

but he says that those who deny their existence are not merely infidels,

but atheists.[600] He carefully tells us that he reckons his nativity,

not from his birth, but from his baptism; for before he was baptized, he

could not be said to exist.[601] To these touches of wisdom, he moreover

adds, that the more improbable any proposition is, the greater his

willingness to assent to it; but that when a thing is actually

impossible, he is on that very account prepared to believe it.[602]

[596] The precise date is unknown; but Mr. Wilkin supposes that it was

written 'between the years 1633 and 1635.' Preface to _Religio

Medici_, in _Browne's Works_, vol. ii. p. 4.

[597] Ibid. vol. ii. p. 58.

[598] Ibid. vol. ii. p. 47.

[599] Or, as he calls it, 'chiromancy.' _Religio Medici_, in _Browne's

Works_, vol. ii. p. 89.

[600] 'For my part, I have ever believed, and do now know, that there

are witches. They that doubt of these, do not only deny them, but

spirits; and are obliquely, and upon consequence, a sort, not of

infidels, but atheists.' Ibid. vol. ii. pp. 43, 44.

[601] 'From this I do compute or calculate my nativity.' Ibid. vol. ii.

p. 64.

[602] _Religio Medici_, sec. ix. in _Browne's Works_, vol. ii. pp. 13,

14: unfortunately too long to extract. This is the 'credo quia

impossibile est,' originally one of Tertullian's absurdities, and

once quoted in the House of Lords by the Duke of Argyle, as 'the

ancient religious maxim.' _Parl. Hist._ vol. xi. p. 802. Compare

the sarcastic remark on this maxim in the _Essay concerning Human

Understanding_, book iv. chap. xviii. _Locke's Works_, vol. ii.

p. 271. It was the spirit embodied in this sentence which

supplied Celsus with some formidable arguments against the

Fathers. _Neander's Hist. of the Church_, vol. i. pp. 227, 228.

Such were the opinions put forth by Sir Thomas Browne in the first of

the two great works he presented to the world. But in his _Inquiries

into Vulgar Errors_, there is displayed a spirit so entirely different,

that if it were not for the most decisive evidence, we could hardly

believe it to be written by the same man. The truth, however, is, that

during the twelve years which elapsed between the two works, there was

completed that vast social and intellectual revolution, of which the

overthrow of the church and the execution of the king were but minor

incidents. We know from the literature, from the private correspondence,

and from the public acts of that time, how impossible it was, even for

the strongest minds, to escape the effects of the general intoxication.

No wonder, then, that Browne, who certainly was inferior to several of

his contemporaries, should have been affected by a movement which they

were unable to resist. It would have been strange, indeed, if he alone

had remained uninfluenced by that sceptical spirit, which, because it

had been arbitrarily repressed, had now broken all bounds, and in the

reaction soon swept away those institutions which vainly attempted to

stop its course.

It is in this point of view that a comparison of the two works becomes

highly interesting, and, indeed, very important. In this, his later

production, we hear no more about believing things because they are

impossible; but we are told of 'the two great pillars of truth,

experience and solid reason.'[603] We are also reminded that one main

cause of error is 'adherence unto authority;'[604] that another is,

'neglect of inquiry;'[605] and, strange to say, that a third is

'credulity.'[606] All this was not very consistent with the old

theological spirit; and we need not, therefore, be surprised that Browne

not only exposes some of the innumerable blunders of the Fathers,[607]

but, after speaking of errors in general, curtly adds: 'Many others

there are, which we resign unto divinity, and perhaps deserve not

controversy.'[608]

[603] _Inquiries into Vulgar and Common Errors_, book iii. chap. xxviii.

in _Browne's Works_, vol. ii. p. 534.

[604] Ibid. book i. chap. vii. vol. ii. p. 225.

[605] 'A supinity, or neglect of inquiry.' Ibid. book i. chap. v.

vol. ii. p. 211.

[606] 'A third cause of common errors is the credulity of men.' Book i.

chap. v. vol. ii. p. 208.

[607] See two amusing instances in vol. ii. pp. 267, 438.

[608] _Vulgar and Common Errors_, book vii. chap. xi., in _Browne's

Works_, vol. iii. p. 326.

The difference between these two works is no bad measure of the rapidity

of that vast movement which, in the middle of the seventeenth century,

was seen in every branch of practical and speculative life. After the

death of Bacon, one of the most distinguished Englishmen was certainly

Boyle, who, if compared with his contemporaries, may be said to rank

immediately below Newton, though, of course, very inferior to him as an

original thinker.[609] With the additions he made to our knowledge we

are not immediately concerned; but it may be mentioned, that he was the

first who instituted exact experiments into the relation between colour

and heat;[610] and by this means, not only ascertained some very

important facts, but laid a foundation for that union between optics and

thermotics, which, though not yet completed, now merely waits for some

great philosopher to strike out a generalization large enough to cover

both, and thus fuse the two sciences into a single study. It is also to

Boyle, more than to any other Englishman, that we owe the science of

hydrostatics, in the state in which we now possess it.[611] He is the

original discoverer of that beautiful law, so fertile in valuable

results, according to which the elasticity of air varies as its

density.[612] And, in the opinion of one of the most eminent modern

naturalists, it was Boyle who opened up those chemical inquiries, which

went on accumulating until, a century later, they supplied the means by

which Lavoisier and his contemporaries fixed the real basis of

chemistry, and enabled it for the first time to take its proper stand

among those sciences that deal with the external world.[613]

[609] Monk (_Life of Bentley_, vol. i. p. 37) says, that Boyle's

discoveries 'have placed his name in a rank second only to that

of Newton;' and this, I believe, is true, notwithstanding the

immense superiority of Newton.

[610] Compare _Powell on Radiant Heat_ (_Brit. Assoc._ vol. i. p. 287),

with _Lloyd's Report on Physical Optics_, 1834, p. 338. For the

remarks on colours, see _Boyle's Works_, vol. ii. pp. 1-40; and

for the account of his experiments, pp. 41-80; and a slight

notice in _Brewster's Life of Newton_, vol. i. pp. 155, 156, 236.

It is, I think, not generally known, that Power is said to be

indebted to Boyle for originating some of his experiments on

colours. See a letter from Hooke, in _Boyle's Works_, vol. v. p.

533.

[611] Dr. Whewell (_Bridgewater Treatise_, p. 266) well observes, that

Boyle and Pascal are to hydrostatics what Galileo is to

mechanics, and Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton to astronomy. See

also on Boyle, as the founder of hydrostatics, _Thomson's Hist.

of the Royal Society_, pp. 397, 398; and his _Hist. of

Chemistry_, vol. i. p. 204.

[612] This was discovered by Boyle about 1650, and confirmed by Mariotte

in 1676. See _Whewell's Hist. of the Inductive Sciences_, vol.

ii. pp. 557, 588; _Thomson's Hist. of Chemistry_, vol. i. p. 215;

_Turner's Chemistry_, vol. i. pp. 41, 200; _Brande's Chemistry_,

vol. i. p. 363. This law has been empirically verified by the

French Institute, and found to hold good for a pressure even of

twenty-seven atmospheres. See _Challis on the Mathematical Theory

of Fluids_, in _Sixth Report of Brit. Assoc._ p. 226; and

_Herschel's Nat. Philos._ p. 231. Although Boyle preceded

Mariotte by a quarter of a century, the discovery is rather

unfairly called the law of Boyle and Mariotte; while foreign

writers, refining on this, frequently omit the name of Boyle

altogether, and term it the law of Mariotte! See, for instance,

_Liebig's Letters on Chemistry_, p. 126; _Monteil Divers Etats_,

vol. viii. p. 122; _Kaemtz's Meteorology_, p. 236; _Comte_,

_Philos. Pos._ vol. i. pp. 583, 645, vol. ii. pp. 484, 615;

_Pouillet_, _Elémens de Physique_, vol. i. p. 339, vol. ii. pp.

58, 183.

[613] 'L'un des créateurs de la physique expérimentale, l'illustre

Robert Boyle, avait aussi reconnu, dès le milieu du dix-septième

siècle, une grande partie des faits qui servent aujourd'hui de

base à cette chimie nouvelle.' _Cuvier_, _Progrès des Sciences_,

vol. i. p. 30. The 'aussi' refers to Rey. See also _Cuvier_,

_Hist. des Sciences Naturelles_, part ii. pp. 322, 346-349. A

still more recent writer says, that Boyle 'stood, in fact, on the

very brink of the pneumatic chemistry of Priestley; he had in his

hand the key to the great discovery of Lavoisier.' _Johnston on

Dimorphous Bodies_, in _Reports of Brit. Assoc._ vol. vi. p. 163.

See further respecting Boyle, _Robin et Verdeil_, _Chimie

Anatomique_, Paris, 1853, vol. i. pp. 576, 577, 579, vol. ii. p.

24; and _Sprengel_, _Hist. de la Médecine_, vol. iv. p. 177.

The application of these discoveries to the happiness of Man, and

particularly to what may be called the material interests of

civilization, will be traced in another part of this work; but what I

now wish to observe, is the way in which such investigations harmonized

with the movement I am attempting to describe. In the whole of his

physical inquiries, Boyle constantly insists upon two fundamental

principles: namely, the importance of individual experiments, and the

comparative unimportance of the facts which, on these subjects,

antiquity has handed down.[614] These are the two great keys to his

method: they are the views which he inherited from Bacon, and they are

also the views which have been held by every man who, during the last

two centuries, has added anything of moment to the stock of human

knowledge. First to doubt,[615] then to inquire, and then to discover,

has been the process universally followed by our great teachers. So

strongly did Boyle feel this, that though he was an eminently religious

man,[616] he gave to the most popular of his scientific works the title

of _The Sceptical Chemist_; meaning to intimate, that until men were

sceptical concerning the chemistry of their own time, it would be

impossible that they should advance far in the career which lay before

them. Nor can we fail to observe that this remarkable work, in which

such havoc was made with old notions, was published in 1661,[617] the

year after the accession of Charles II., in whose reign the spread of

incredulity was indeed rapid, since it was seen not only among the

intellectual classes, but even among the nobles and personal friends of

the king. It is true, that in that rank of society, it assumed an

offensive and degenerate form. But the movement must have been one of no

common energy which, in so early a stage, could thus penetrate the

recesses of the palace, and excite the minds of the courtiers; a lazy

and feeble race, who from the frivolity of their habits are, under

ordinary circumstances, predisposed to superstition, and prepared to

believe whatever the wisdom of their fathers has bequeathed to them.

[614] This disregard of ancient authority appears so constantly in his

works, that it is difficult to choose among innumerable passages

which might be quoted. I will select one which strikes me as well

expressed, and is certainly very characteristic. In his _Free

Inquiry into the vulgarly received Notion of Nature_, he says

(_Boyle's Works_, vol. iv. p. 359), 'For I am wont to judge of

opinions as of coins: I consider much less, in any one that I am

to receive, whose inscription it bears, than what metal it is

made of. It is indifferent enough to me whether it was stamped

many years or ages since, or came but yesterday from the mint.'

In other places he speaks of the 'schoolmen' and 'gownmen' with a

contempt not much inferior to that expressed by Locke himself.

[615] In his _Considerations touching Experimental Essays_, he says

(_Boyle's Works_, vol. i. p. 197), 'Perhaps you will wonder,

Pyrophilus, that in almost every one of the following essays I

should speak so doubtingly, and use so often _perhaps_, _it

seems_, _it is not improbable_, and such other expressions as

argue a diffidence of the truth of the opinions I incline to,'

&c. Indeed, this spirit is seen at every turn. Thus his _Essay on

Crystals_, which, considering the then state of knowledge, is a

remarkable production, is entitled 'Doubts and Experiments

touching the curious Figures of Salts.' _Works_, vol. ii. p. 488.

It is, therefore, with good reason that M. Humboldt terms him

'the cautious and doubting Robert Boyle.' _Humboldt's Cosmos_,

vol. ii. p. 730.

[616] On the sincere Christianity of Boyle, compare _Burnet's Lives and

Characters_, edit. Jebb, 1833, pp. 351-360; _Life of Ken, by a

Layman_, vol. i. pp. 32, 33; _Whewell's Bridgewater Treatise_, p.

273. He made several attempts to reconcile the scientific method

with the defence of established religious opinions. See one of

the best instances of this, in _Boyle's Works_, vol. v. pp. 38,

39.

[617] _The Sceptical Chemist_ is in _Boyle's Works_, vol. i.

pp. 290-371. It went through two editions in the author's

lifetime, an unusual success for a book of that kind. _Boyle's

Works_, vol. i. p. 375, vol. iv. p. 89, vol. v. p. 345. I find

from a letter written in 1696 (_Fairfax Correspondence_, vol. iv.

p. 344), that Boyle's works were then becoming scarce, and that

there was an intention of reprinting the whole of them. In regard

to the _Sceptical Chemist_, it was so popular, that it attracted

the attention of Monconys, a French traveller, who visited London

in 1663, and from whom we learn that it was to be bought for four

shillings, 'pour quatre chelins.' _Voyages de Monconys_, vol.

iii. p. 67, edit. 1695; a book containing some very curious facts

respecting London in the reign of Charles II.; but, so far as I

am aware, not quoted by any English historian. In _Sprengel's

Hist. de la Médecine_, vol. v. pp. 78-9, there is a summary of

the views advocated in the _Sceptical Chemist_, respecting which

Sprengel says, 'Ce fut cependant aussi en Angleterre que

s'élevèrent les premiers doutes sur l'exactitude des explications

chimiques.'

In everything this tendency was now seen. Everything marked a growing

determination to subordinate old notions to new inquiries. At the very

moment when Boyle was prosecuting his labours, Charles II. incorporated

the Royal Society, which was formed with the avowed object of increasing

knowledge by direct experiment.[618] And it is well worthy of remark,

that the charter now first granted to this celebrated institution

declares that its object is the extension of natural knowledge, as

opposed to that which is supernatural.[619]

[618] 'From the nature and constitution of the Royal Society, the

objects of their attention were necessarily unlimited. The

physical sciences, however, or those which are promoted by

experiment, were their declared objects; and experiment was the

method which they professed to follow in accomplishing their

purpose.' _Thomson's Hist. of the Royal Society_, p. 6. When the

society was first instituted, experiments were so unusual, that

there was a difficulty of finding the necessary workmen in

London. See a curious passage in _Weld's Hist. of the Royal

Society_, 1848, vol. ii. p. 88.

[619] Dr. Paris (_Life of Sir H. Davy_, 1831, vol. ii. p. 178) says,

'The charter of the Royal Society states, that it was established

for the improvement of _natural_ science. This epithet _natural_

was originally intended to imply a meaning, of which very few

persons, I believe, are aware. At the period of the establishment

of the society, the arts of witchcraft and divination were very

extensively encouraged; and the word _natural_ was therefore

introduced in contradistinction to _supernatural_.' The charters

granted by Charles II. are printed in _Weld's History of the

Royal Society_, vol. ii. pp. 481-521. Evelyn (_Diary,_ 13 _Aug._

1662, vol. ii. p. 195) mentions, that the object of the Royal

Society was 'natural knowledge.' See also _Aubrey's Letters and

Lives_, vol. ii. p. 358; _Pulteney's Hist. of Botany_, vol. ii.

pp. 97, 98; and on the distinction thus established in the

popular mind between natural and supernatural, compare _Boyle's

Works_, vol. ii. p. 455, vol. iv. pp. 288, 359.

It is easy to imagine with what terror and disgust these things were

viewed by those inordinate admirers of antiquity who, solely occupied in

venerating past ages, are unable either to respect the present or hope

for the future. These great obstructors of mankind played, in the

seventeenth century, the same part as they play in our own day,

rejecting every novelty, and therefore opposing every improvement. The

angry contest which arose between the two parties, and the hostility

directed against the Royal Society, as the first institution in which

the idea of progress was distinctly embodied, are among the most

instructive parts of our history, and on another occasion I shall relate

them at considerable length. At present it is enough to say, that the

reactionary party, though led by an overwhelming majority of the clergy,

was entirely defeated; as, indeed, was to be expected, seeing that their

opponents had on their side nearly all the intellect of the country, and

were moreover reinforced by such aid as the court could bestow. The

progress was, in truth, so rapid as to carry away with it some of the

ablest members even of the ecclesiastical profession; their love of

knowledge proving too strong for the old traditions in which they had

been bred. But these were exceptional cases, and, speaking generally,

there is no doubt that in the reign of Charles II. the antagonism

between physical science and the theological spirit was such as to

induce nearly the whole of the clergy to array themselves against the

science, and seek to bring it into discredit. Nor ought we to be

surprised that they should have adopted this course. That inquisitive

and experimental spirit which they wished to check was not only

offensive to their prejudices, but it was also detrimental to their

power. For, in the first place, the mere habit of cultivating physical

science taught men to require a severity of proof which it was soon

found that the clergy were, in their own department, unable to supply.

And, in the second place, the additions made to physical knowledge

opened new fields of thought, and thus tended still further to divert

attention from ecclesiastical topics. Both these effects would of course

be limited to the comparatively few persons who were interested in

scientific inquiries: it is, however, to be observed, that the ultimate

results of such inquiries must have been extended over a far wider

surface. This may be called their secondary influence; and the way in

which it operated is well worth our attention, because an acquaintance

with it will go far to explain the reason of that marked opposition

which has always existed between superstition and knowledge.

It is evident, that a nation perfectly ignorant of physical laws will

refer to supernatural causes all the phenomena by which it is

surrounded.[620] But so soon as natural science begins to do its work,

there are introduced the elements of a great change. Each successive

discovery, by ascertaining the law that governs certain events, deprives

them of that apparent mystery in which they were formerly involved.[621]

The love of the marvellous becomes proportionably diminished; and when

any science has made such progress as to enable those who are acquainted

with it to foretell the events with which it deals, it is clear that the

whole of those events are at once withdrawn from the jurisdiction of

supernatural, and brought under the authority of natural powers.[622]

The business of physical philosophy is, to explain external phenomena

with a view to their prediction; and every successful prediction which

is recognised by the people causes a disruption of one of those links

which, as it were, bind the imagination to the occult and invisible

world. Hence it is that, supposing other things equal, the superstition

of a nation must always bear an exact proportion to the extent of its

physical knowledge. This may be in some degree verified by the ordinary

experience of mankind. For if we compare the different classes of

society, we shall find that they are superstitious in proportion as the

phenomena with which they are brought in contact have or have not been

explained by natural laws. The credulity of sailors is notorious, and

every literature contains evidence of the multiplicity of their

superstitions, and of the tenacity with which they cling to them.[623]

This is perfectly explicable by the principle I have laid down.

Meteorology has not yet been raised to a science; and the laws which

regulate winds and storms being in consequence still unknown, it

naturally follows, that the class of men most exposed to their dangers

should be precisely the class which is most superstitious.[624] On the

other hand, soldiers live upon an element much more obedient to man, and

they are less liable than sailors to those risks which defy the

calculations of science. Soldiers, therefore, have fewer inducements to

appeal to supernatural interference; and it is universally observed,

that as a body they are less superstitious than sailors. If, again, we

compare agriculturists with manufacturers, we shall see the operation of

the same principle. To the cultivators of land, one of the most

important circumstances is the weather, which, if it turn out

unfavourable, may at once defeat all their calculations. But science not

having yet succeeded in discovering the laws of rain, men are at present

unable to foretell it for any considerable period; the inhabitant of the

country is, therefore, driven to believe that it is the result of

supernatural agency, and we still see the extraordinary spectacle of

prayers offered up in our churches for dry weather or for wet weather; a

superstition which to future ages will appear as childish as the

feelings of pious awe with which our fathers regarded the presence of a

comet, or the approach of an eclipse. We are now acquainted with the

laws which determine the movements of comets and eclipses; and as we are

able to predict their appearance, we have ceased to pray that we may be

preserved from them.[625] But because our researches into the phenomena

of rain happen to have been less successful,[626] we resort to the

impious contrivance of calling in the aid of the Deity to supply those

deficiencies in science which are the result of our own sloth; and we

are not ashamed, in our public churches, to prostitute the rites of

religion by using them as a cloak to conceal an ignorance we ought

frankly to confess.[627] The agriculturist is thus taught to ascribe to

supernatural agency the most important phenomena with which he is

concerned;[628] and there can be no doubt that this is one of the causes

of those superstitious feelings by which the inhabitants of the country

are unfavourably contrasted with those of the town.[629] But the

manufacturer, and, indeed, nearly every one engaged in the business of

cities, has employments, the success of which being regulated by his own

abilities, has no connexion with those unexplained events that perplex

the imagination of the cultivators of the earth. He who, by his

ingenuity, works up the raw material, is evidently less affected by

uncontrollable occurrences, than he by whom the raw material is

originally grown. Whether it is fair, or whether it is wet, he pursues

his labours with equal success, and learns to rely solely upon his own

energy, and the cunning of his own arm. As the sailor is naturally more

superstitious than the soldier, because he has to deal with a more

unstable element; just in the same way is the agriculturist more

superstitious than the mechanic, because he is more frequently and more

seriously affected by events which the ignorance of some men makes them

call capricious, and the ignorance of other men makes them call

supernatural.

[620] The speculative view of this tendency has been recently

illustrated in the most comprehensive manner by M. Auguste Comte,

in his _Philosophie Positive_; and his conclusions in regard to

the earliest stage of the human mind are confirmed by everything

we know of barbarous nations; and they are also confirmed, as he

has decisively proved, by the history of physical science. In

addition to the facts he has adduced, I may mention, that the

history of geology supplies evidence analogous to that which he

has collected from other departments.

A popular notion of the working of this belief in supernatural

causation may be seen in a circumstance related by Combe. He

says, that in the middle of the eighteenth century the country

west of Edinburgh was so unhealthy, 'that every spring the

farmers and their servants were seized with fever and ague.' As

long as the cause of this was unknown, 'these visitations were

believed to be sent by Providence;' but after a time the land was

drained, the ague disappeared, and the inhabitants perceived that

what they had believed to be supernatural was perfectly natural,

and that the cause was the state of the land, not the

intervention of the Deity. _Combe's Constitution of Man_, Edinb.

1847, p. 156.

[621] I say apparent mystery, because it does not at all lessen the real

mystery. But this does not affect the accuracy of my remark,

inasmuch as the people at large never enter into such subtleties

as the difference between Law and Cause; a difference, indeed,

which is so neglected, that it is often lost sight of even in

scientific books. All that the people know is, that events which

they once believed to be directly controlled by the Deity, and

modified by Him, are not only foretold by the human mind, but are

altered by human interference. The attempts which Paley and

others have made to solve this mystery by rising from the laws to

the cause, are evidently futile, because to the eye of reason the

solution is as incomprehensible as the problem; and the arguments

of the natural theologians, in so far as they are arguments, must

depend on reason. As Mr. Newman truly says, 'A God uncaused and

existing from eternity, is to the full as incomprehensible as a

world uncaused and existing from eternity. We must not reject the

latter theory as incomprehensible; for so is every other possible

theory.' _Newman's Natural History of the Soul_, 1849, p. 36. The

truth of this conclusion is unintentionally confirmed by the

defence of the old method, which is set up by Dr. Whewell in his

_Bridgewater Treatise_, pp. 262-5; because the remarks made by

that able writer refer to men who, from their vast powers, were

most likely to rise to that transcendental view of religion which

is slowly but steadily gaining ground among us. Kant, probably

the deepest thinker of the eighteenth century, clearly saw that

no arguments drawn from the external world could prove the

existence of a First Cause. See, among other passages, two

particularly remarkable in _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, _Kant's

Werke_, vol. ii. pp. 478, 481, on 'der physikotheologische

Beweis.'

[622] This is tersely expressed by M. Lamennais: 'Pourquoi les corps

gravitent-ils les uns vers les autres? Parceque Dieu l'a voulu,

disaient les anciens. Parceque les corps s'attirent, dit la

science.' _Maury_, _Légendes du Moyen Age_, p. 33. See to the

same effect _Mackay's Religious Development_, 1850, vol. i. pp.

5, 30, 31, and elsewhere. See also a partial statement of the

antithesis in _Copleston's Inquiry into Necessity and

Predestination_, p. 49; an ingenious but overrated book.

[623] I much regret that I did not collect proof of this at an earlier

period of my reading. But having omitted taking the requisite

notes, I can only refer, on the superstition of sailors to

_Heber's Journey through India_, vol. i. p. 423; _Richardson's

Travels in the Sahara_, vol. i. p. 11; _Burckhardt's Travels in

Arabia_, vol. ii. p. 347; _Davis's Chinese_, vol. iii. pp. 16,

17; _Travels of Ibn Batuta in the Fourteenth Century_, p. 43;

_Journal of Asiat. Soc._ vol. i. p. 9; _Works of Sir Thomas

Browne_, vol. i. p. 130; _Alison's Hist. of Europe_, vol. iv. p.

566; _Burnes's Travels into Bokhara_, vol. iii. p. 53; _Leigh

Hunt's Autobiography_, 1850, vol. ii. p. 255; _Cumberland's

Memoirs_, 1807, vol. i. pp. 422-425; _Walsh's Brazil_, vol. i.

pp. 96, 97; _Richardson's Arctic Expedition_, vol. i. p. 93;

_Holcroft's Memoirs_, vol. i. p. 207, vol. iii. p. 197.

[624] Andokides, when accused before the dikastery at Athens, said, 'No,

dikasts; the dangers of accusation and trial are human, but the

dangers encountered at sea are divine.' _Grote's Hist. of

Greece_, vol. xi. p. 252. Thus, too, it has been observed, that

the dangers of the whale-fishery stimulated the superstition of

the Anglo-Saxons. See _Kemble's Saxons in England_, vol. i. pp.

390, 391. Erman, who mentions the dangerous navigation of the

Lake of Baikal, says, 'There is a saying at Irkutsk, that it is

only upon the Baikal, in the autumn, that a man learns to pray

from his heart.' _Erman's Travels in Siberia_, vol. ii. p. 186.

[625] In Europe, in the tenth century, an entire army fled before one of

those appearances, which would now scarcely terrify a child:

'Toute l'armée d'Othon se dispersa subitement à l'apparition

d'une éclipse de soleil, qui la remplit de terreur, et qui fut

regardée comme l'annonce du malheur qu'on attendait depuis

longtemps.' _Sprengel_, _Hist. de la Médecine_, vol. ii. p. 368.

The terror inspired by eclipses was not finally destroyed before

the eighteenth century; and in the latter half of the seventeenth

century they still caused great fear both in France and in

England. See _Evelyn's Diary_, vol. ii. p. 52, vol. iii. p. 372;

_Carlyle's Cromwell_, vol. ii. p. 366; _Lettres de Patin_, vol.

iii. p. 36. Compare _Voyages de Monconys_, vol. v. p. 104, with

_Hare's Guesses at Truth_, 2nd series, pp. 194, 195. There

probably never has been an ignorant nation whose superstition has

not been excited by eclipses. For evidence of the universality of

this feeling, see _Symes's Embassy to Ava_, vol. ii. p. 296;

_Raffles' Hist. of Java_, vol. i. p. 530; _Southey's Hist. of

Brazil_, vol. i. p. 354, vol. ii. p. 371; _Marsden's Hist. of

Sumatra_, p. 159; _Niebuhr_, _Description de l'Arabie_, p. 105;

_Moffat's Southern Africa_, p. 337; _Mungo Park's Travels_, vol.

i. p. 414; _Moorcroft's Travels in the Himalayan Provinces_, vol.

ii. p. 4; _Crawfurd's Hist. of the Indian Archipelago_, vol. i.

p. 305; _Ellis's Polynesian Researches_, vol. i. p. 331;

_Mackay's Religious Development_, vol. i. p. 425; _Works of Sir

W. Jones_, vol. iii. p. 176, vol. vi. p. 16; _Wilson's Note_ in

the _Vishnu Purana_, p. 140; _Wilson's Theatre of the Hindus_,

vol. i. part ii. p. 90; _Montucla_, _Hist. des Mathématiques_,

vol. i. p. 444; _Asiatic Researches_, vol. xii. p. 484; _Ward's

View of the Hindoos_, vol. i. p. 101; _Prescott's Hist. of Peru_,

vol. i. p. 123; _Kohl's Russia_, p. 374; _Thirlwall's Hist. of

Greece_, vol. iii. p. 440, vol. vi. p. 216; _Murray's Life of

Bruce_, p. 103; _Turner's Embassy to Tibet_, p. 289; _Grote's

Hist. of Greece_, vol. vii. p. 432, vol. xii. pp. 205, 557;

_Journal Asiatique_, I^e série, vol. iii. p. 202, Paris, 1823;

_Clot-Bey_, _de la Peste_, Paris, 1840, p. 224.

In regard to the feelings inspired by comets, and the influence

of Bayle in removing those superstitions late in the seventeenth

century, compare _Tennemann_, _Gesch. der Philosoph._, vol. xi.

p. 252; _Le Vassor_, _Hist. de Louis XIII_, vol. iii. p. 415;

_Lettres de Sevigné_, vol. iv. p. 336; _Autobiography of Sir S.

D'Ewes_, edit. Halliwell, vol. i. pp. 122, 123, 136.