EXAMINATION OF THE METHOD EMPLOYED BY METAPHYSICIANS FOR DISCOVERING
MENTAL LAWS.
The evidence that I have collected seems to establish two leading facts,
which, unless they can be impugned, are the necessary basis of universal
history. The first fact is, that in the civilizations out of Europe, the
powers of nature have been far greater than in those in Europe. The
second fact is, that those powers have worked immense mischief; and that
while one division of them has caused an unequal distribution of wealth,
another division of them has caused an unequal distribution of thought,
by concentrating attention upon subjects which inflame the imagination.
So far as the experience of the past can guide us, we may say, that in
all the extra European civilizations, these obstacles are insuperable:
certainly no nation has ever yet overcome them. But Europe, being
constructed upon a smaller plan than the other quarters of the
world--being also in a colder region, having a less exuberant soil, a
less imposing aspect, and displaying in all her physical phenomena much
greater feebleness--it was easier for Man to discard the superstitions
which Nature suggested to his imagination; and it was also easier for
him to effect, not, indeed, a just division of wealth, but something
nearer to it, than was practicable in the older countries.
Hence it is that, looking at the history of the world as a whole, the
tendency has been, in Europe, to subordinate nature to man; out of
Europe, to subordinate man to nature. To this there are, in barbarous
countries, several exceptions; but in civilized countries the rule has
been universal. The great division, therefore, between European
civilization and non-European civilization, is the basis of the
philosophy of history, since it suggests the important consideration,
that if we would understand, for instance, the history of India, we must
make the external world our first study, because it has influenced man
more than man has influenced it. If, on the other hand, we would
understand the history of a country like France or England, we must make
man our principal study, because nature being comparatively weak, every
step in the great progress has increased the dominion of the human mind
over the agencies of the external world. Even in those countries where
the power of man has reached the highest point, the pressure of nature
is still immense; but it diminishes in each succeeding generation,
because our increasing knowledge enables us not so much to control
nature as to foretell her movements, and thus obviate many of the evils
she would otherwise occasion. How successful our efforts have been, is
evident from the fact, that the average duration of life constantly
becomes longer, and the number of inevitable dangers fewer; and what
makes this the more remarkable is, that the curiosity of men is keener,
and their contact with each other closer, than in any former period; so
that while apparent hazards are multiplied, we find from experience that
real hazards are, on the whole, diminished.[280]
[280] This diminution of casualties is undoubtedly one cause, though a
slight one, of the increased duration of life; but the most
active cause is a general improvement in the physical condition
of man: see _Sir B. Brodie's Lectures on Pathology and Surgery_,
p. 212; and for proof that civilized men are stronger than
uncivilized ones, see _Quetelet_, _sur l'Homme_, vol. ii. pp. 67,
272; _Lawrence's Lectures on Man_, pp. 275, 276; _Ellis's
Polynesian Researches_, vol. i. p. 98; _Whately's Lectures on
Political Economy_, 8vo. 1831, p. 59; _Journal of the Statistical
Society_, vol. xvii. pp. 32, 33; _Dufau_, _Traité de
Statistique_, p. 107; _Hawkins's Medical Statistics_, p. 232.
If, therefore, we take the largest possible view of the history of
Europe, and confine ourselves entirely to the primary cause of its
superiority over other parts of the world, we must resolve it into the
encroachment of the mind of man upon the organic and inorganic forces
of nature. To this all other causes are subordinate.[281] For we have
seen that wherever the powers of nature reached a certain height, the
national civilization was irregularly developed, and the advance of the
civilization stopped. The first essential was, to limit the interference
of these physical phenomena; and that was most likely to be accomplished
where the phenomena were feeblest and least imposing. This was the case
with Europe; it is accordingly in Europe alone, that man has really
succeeded in taming the energies of nature, bending them to his own
will, turning them aside from their ordinary course, and compelling them
to minister to his happiness, and subserve the general purposes of human
life.
[281] The general social consequences of this I shall hereafter
consider; but the mere economical consequences are well expressed
by Mr. Mill: 'Of the features which characterize this progressive
economical movement of civilized nations, that which first
excites attention, through its intimate connexion with the
phenomena of Production, is the perpetual, and, so far as human
foresight can extend, the unlimited, growth of man's power over
nature. Our knowledge of the properties and laws of physical
objects shows no sign of approaching its ultimate boundaries; it
is advancing more rapidly, and in a greater number of directions
at once, than in any previous age or generation, and affording
such frequent glimpses of unexplored fields beyond, as to justify
the belief that our acquaintance with nature is still almost in
its infancy.' _Mill's Principles of Polit. Economy_, vol. ii. pp.
246-7.
All around us are the traces of this glorious and successful struggle.
Indeed, it seems as if in Europe there was nothing man feared to
attempt. The invasions of the sea repelled, and whole provinces, as in
the case of Holland, rescued from its grasp, mountains cut through and
turned into level roads; soils of the most obstinate sterility becoming
exuberant, from the mere advance of chemical knowledge; while, in regard
to electric phenomena, we see the subtlest, the most rapid, and the most
mysterious of all forces, made the medium of thought, and obeying even
the most capricious behests of the human mind.
In other instances, where the products of the external world have been
refractory, man has succeeded in destroying what he could hardly hope to
subjugate. The most cruel diseases, such as the plague, properly so
called, and the leprosy of the Middle Ages,[282] have entirely
disappeared from the civilized parts of Europe; and it is scarcely
possible that they should ever again be seen there. Wild beasts and
birds of prey have been extirpated, and are no longer allowed to infest
the haunts of civilised men. Those frightful famines, by which Europe
used to be ravaged several times in every century,[283] have ceased; and
so successfully have we grappled with them, that there is not the
slightest fear of their ever returning with any thing like their former
severity. Indeed, our resources are now so great, that we could at
worst, only suffer from a slight and temporary scarcity: since, in the
present state of knowledge, the evil would be met at the outset by
remedies which chemical science could easily suggest.[284]
[282] What this horrible disease once was, may be estimated from the
fact, 'qu'au treizième siècle on comptait en France seulement,
deux mille léproseries, et que l'Europe entière renfermait
environ dix-neuf mille établissemens semblables.' _Sprengel_,
_Histoire de la Médecine_, vol. ii. p. 374. As to the mortality
caused by the plague, see _Clot-Bey_, _de la Peste_, Paris, 1840,
pp. 62, 63, 185, 292.
[283] For a curious list of famines, see an essay by Mr. Farr, in
_Journal of the Statistical Society_, vol. ix. pp. 159-163. He
says, that in the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries,
the average was, in England, one famine every fourteen years.
[284] In the opinion of one of the highest living authorities, famine
is, even in the present state of chemistry, 'next to impossible.'
_Herschel's Discourse on Natural Philosophy_, p. 65. Cuvier
(_Recueil des Eloges_, vol. i. p. 10) says that we have succeeded
'a rendre toute famine impossible.' See also _Godwin on
Population_, p. 500; and for a purely economical argument to
prove the impossibility of famine, see _Mill's Principles of
Political Economy_, vol. ii. p. 258; and compare a note in
_Ricardo's Works_, p. 191. The Irish famine may seem an
exception: but it could have been easily baffled except for the
poverty of the people, which frustrated our efforts to reduce it
to a dearth.
It is hardly necessary to notice how, in numerous other instances, the
progress of European civilization has been marked by the diminished
influence of the external world: I mean, of course, those peculiarities
of the external world which have an existence independent of the wishes
of man, and were not created by him. The most advanced nations do, in
their present state, owe comparatively little to those original features
of nature which, in every civilization out of Europe, exercised
unlimited power. Thus, in Asia and elsewhere, the course of trade, the
extent of commerce, and many similar circumstances, were determined by
the existence of rivers, by the facility with which they could be
navigated, and by the number and goodness of the adjoining harbours.
But, in Europe, the determining cause is, not so much these physical
peculiarities, as the skill and energy of man. Formerly the richest
countries were those in which nature was most bountiful; now the richest
countries are those in which man is most active. For, in our age of the
world, if nature is parsimonious, we know how to compensate her
deficiencies. If a river is difficult to navigate, or a country
difficult to traverse, our engineers can correct the error, and remedy
the evil. If we have no rivers, we make canals; if we have no natural
harbours, we make artificial ones. And so marked is this tendency to
impair the authority of natural phenomena, that it is seen even in the
distribution of the people, since, in the most civilized parts of
Europe, the population of the towns is everywhere outstripping that of
the country; and it is evident that the more men congregate in great
cities, the more they will become accustomed to draw their materials of
thought from the business of human life, and the less attention they
will pay to those peculiarities of nature, which are the fertile source
of superstition, and by which, in every civilization out of Europe, the
progress of man was arrested.
From these facts it may be fairly inferred, that the advance of European
civilization is characterized by a diminishing influence of physical
laws, and an increasing influence of mental laws. The complete proof of
this generalization can be collected only from history; and therefore I
must reserve a large share of the evidence on which it is founded for
the future volumes of this work. But that the proposition is
fundamentally true must be admitted by whoever, in addition to the
arguments just adduced, will concede two premiss is, neither of which
seem susceptible of much dispute. The first premiss is, that we are in
possession of no evidence that the powers of nature have ever been
permanently increased; and that we have no reason to expect that any
such increase can take place. The other premiss is, that we have
abundant evidence that the resources of the human mind have become more
powerful, more numerous, and more able to grapple with the difficulties
of the external world; because every fresh accession to our knowledge
supplies fresh means with which we can either control the operations of
nature, or, failing in that, can foresee the consequences, and thus
avoid what it is impossible to prevent; in both instances, diminishing
the pressure exercised on us by external agents.
If these premisses are admitted, we are led to a conclusion which is of
great value for the purpose of this Introduction. For, if the measure of
civilization is the triumph of the mind over external agents, it becomes
clear, that of the two classes of laws which regulate the progress of
mankind, the mental class is more important than the physical. This,
indeed, is assumed by one school of thinkers as a matter of course,
though I am not aware that its demonstration has been hitherto attempted
by any thing even approaching an exhaustive analysis. The question,
however, as to the originality of my arguments, is one of very trifling
moment; but what we have to notice is, that in the present stage of our
inquiry, the problem with which we started has become simplified, and a
discovery of the laws of European history is resolved, in the first
instance, into a discovery of the laws of the human mind. These mental
laws, when ascertained, will be the ultimate basis of the history of
Europe; the physical laws will be treated as of minor importance, and as
merely giving rise to disturbances, the force and the frequency of which
have, during several centuries, perceptibly diminished.
If we now inquire into the means of discovering the laws of the human
mind, the metaphysicians are ready with an answer; and they refer us to
their own labours as supplying a satisfactory solution. It therefore
becomes necessary to ascertain the value of their researches, to measure
the extent of their resources, and, above all, to test the validity of
that method which they always follow, and by which alone, as they
assert, great truths can be elicited.
The metaphysical method, though necessarily branching into two
divisions, is, in its origin, always the same, and consists in each
observer studying the operations of his own mind.[285] This is the
direct opposite of the historical method; the metaphysician studying one
mind, the historian studying many minds. Now, the first remark to make
on this is, that the metaphysical method is one by which no discovery
has ever yet been made in any branch of knowledge. Every thing we at
present know has been ascertained by studying phenomena, from which all
casual disturbances having been removed, the law remains as a
conspicuous residue.[286] And this can only be done by observations so
numerous as to eliminate the disturbances, or else by experiments so
delicate as to isolate the phenomena. One of these conditions is
essential to all inductive science; but neither of them does the
metaphysician obey. To isolate the phenomenon is for him an
impossibility; since no man, into whatever state of reverie he may be
thrown, can entirely cut himself off from the influence of external
events, which must produce an effect on his mind, even when he is
unconscious of their presence. As to the other condition, it is by the
metaphysician set at open defiance; for his whole system is based on the
supposition that, by studying a single mind, he can get the laws of all
minds; so that while he, on the one hand, is unable to isolate his
observations from disturbances, he, on the other hand, refuses to adopt
the only remaining precaution--he refuses so to enlarge his survey as to
eliminate the disturbances by which his observations are troubled.[287]
[285] 'As the metaphysician carries within himself the materials of his
reasoning, he is not under a necessity of looking abroad for
subjects of speculation or amusement.' _Stewart's Philosophy of
the Mind_, vol. i. p. 462; and the same remark, almost literally
repeated, at vol. iii. p. 260. Locke makes what passes in each
man's mind the sole source of metaphysics, and the sole test of
their truth. _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, in _Locke's
Works_, vol. i. pp. 18, 76, 79, 121, 146, 152, 287, vol. ii. pp.
141, 243.
[286] The deductive sciences form, of course, an exception to this; but
the whole theory of metaphysics is founded on its inductive
character, and on the supposition that it consists of generalized
observations, and that from them alone the science of mind can be
raised.
[287] These remarks are only applicable to those who follow the purely
metaphysical method of investigation. There is, however, a very
small number of metaphysicians, among whom M. Cousin is the most
eminent in France, in whose works we find larger views, and an
attempt to connect historical inquiries with metaphysical ones;
thus recognizing the necessity of verifying their original
speculations. To this method there can be no objection, provided
the metaphysical conclusions are merely regarded as hypothesis,
which require verification to raise them to theories. But,
instead of this cautious proceeding, the almost invariable plan
is, to treat the hypothesis as if it were a theory already
proved, and as if there remained nothing to do but to give
historical illustrations of truths established by the
psychologist. This confusion between illustration and
verification appears to be the universal failing of those who,
like Vico and Fichte, speculate upon historical phenomena _à
priori_.
This is the first and fundamental objection to which metaphysicians are
exposed, even on the threshold of their science. But if we penetrate a
little deeper, we shall meet with another circumstance, which, though
less obvious, is equally decisive. After the metaphysician has taken for
granted that, by studying one mind, he can discover the laws of all
minds, he finds himself involved in a singular difficulty as soon as he
begins to apply even this imperfect method. The difficulty to which I
allude is one which, not being met with in any other pursuit, seems to
have escaped the attention of those who are unacquainted with
metaphysical controversies. To understand, therefore, its nature, it is
requisite to give a short account of those two great schools, to one of
which all metaphysicians must necessarily belong.
In investigating the nature of the human mind, according to the
metaphysical scheme, there are two methods of proceeding, both of which
are equally obvious, and yet both of which lead to entirely different
results. According to the first method, the inquirer begins by examining
his sensations. According to the other method, he begins by examining
his ideas. These two methods always have led, and always must lead, to
conclusions diametrically opposed to each other. Nor are the reasons of
this difficult to understand. In metaphysics, the mind is the instrument
as well as the material on which the instrument is employed. The means
by which the science must be worked out, being thus the same as the
object upon which it works, there arises a difficulty of a very peculiar
kind. This difficulty is, the impossibility of taking a comprehensive
view of the whole of the mental phenomena; because, however extensive
such a view may be, it must exclude the state of the mind by which, or
in which, the view itself is taken. Hence we may perceive what, I think,
is a fundamental difference between physical and metaphysical inquiries.
In physics, there are several methods of proceeding, all of which lead
to the same results. But in metaphysics, it will invariably be found,
that if two men of equal ability, and equal honesty, employ different
methods in the study of the mind, the conclusions which they obtain will
also be different. To those who are unversed in these matters, a few
illustrations will set this in a clearer light. Metaphysicians who begin
by the study of ideas observe in their own minds an idea of space.
Whence, they ask, can this arise? It cannot, they say, owe its origin to
the senses, because the senses only supply what is finite and
contingent; whereas the idea of space is infinite and necessary.[288] It
is infinite, since we cannot conceive that space has an end; and it is
necessary, since we cannot conceive the possibility of its
non-existence. Thus far the idealist. But the sensualist, as he is
called,[289]--he who begins, not with ideas, but with sensations,
arrives at a very different conclusion. He remarks that we can have no
idea of space until we have first had an idea of objects; and that the
ideas of objects can only be the results of the sensations which those
objects excite. As to the idea of space being necessary, this, he says,
only results from the circumstance that we never can perceive an object
which does not bear a certain position to some other object. This forms
an indissoluble association between the idea of position and the idea of
an object; and as this association is constantly repeated before us, we
at length find ourselves unable to conceive an object without position,
or, in other words, without space.[290] As to space being infinite,
this, he says, is a notion we get by conceiving a continual addition to
lines, or to surfaces, or to bulk, which are the three modifications of
extension.[291] On innumerable other points we find the same discrepancy
between the two schools. The idealist,[292] for example, asserts that
our notions of cause, of time, of personal identity, and of substance,
are universal and necessary; that they are simple; and that not being
susceptible of analysis, they must be referred to the original
constitution of the mind.[293] On the other hand, the sensationalist, so
far from recognizing the simplicity of these ideas, considers them to be
extremely complex, and looks upon their universality and necessity as
merely the result of a frequent and intimate association.[294]
[288] Compare _Stewart's Philosophy of the Mind_, vol. ii. p. 194, with
_Cousin_, _Hist. de la Philosophie_, II. série, vol. ii. p. 92.
Among the Indian metaphysicians, there was a sect which declared
space to be the cause of all things. _Journal of Asiatic Soc._
vol. vi. pp. 268, 290. See also the _Dabistan_, vol. ii. p. 40,
which, however, was contrary to the Vedas. _Rammohun Roy on the
Veds_, 1832, pp. 8, 111. In Spain, the doctrine of the infinity
of space is heretical. _Doblado's Letters_, p. 96; which should
be compared with the objection of Irenæus against the
Valentinians, in _Beausobre_, _Histoire de Manichée_, vol. ii. p.
275. For the different theories of space, I may, moreover, refer
to _Ritter's Hist. of Ancient Philosophy_, vol. i. pp. 451, 473,
477, vol. ii. p. 314, vol. iii. pp. 195-204; _Cudworth's
Intellectual System_, vol. i. p. 191, vol. iii. pp. 230, 472;
_Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol. ii. pp. 23,
62, 81, 120, 139, 147, 256, 334, 347; _Tennemann_, _Geschichte
der Philosophie_, vol. i. p. 109, vol. ii. p. 303, vol. iii. pp.
130-137, vol. iv. p. 284, vol. v. pp. 384-387, vol. vi. p. 99,
vol. viii. pp. 87, 88, 683, vol. ix. pp. 257, 355, 410, vol. x.
p. 79, vol. xi. pp. 195, 385-389.
[289] This is the title conferred by M. Cousin upon nearly all the
greatest English metaphysicians, and upon Condillac and all his
disciples in France, their system having 'le nom mérité de
sensualisme.' _Cousin_, _Histoire de la Philosophie_, II. série,
vol. ii. p. 88. The same name is given to the same school, in
_Feuchtersleben's Medical Psychology_, p. 52, and in _Renouard's
Histoire de la Médecine_, vol. i. p. 346, vol. ii. p. 368. In
_Jobert's New System of Philosophy_, vol. ii. p. 334, 8vo. 1849,
it is called 'sensationalism,' which seems a preferable
expression.
[290] This is very ably argued by Mr. James Mill in his _Analysis of the
Phenomena of the Human Mind_, vol. ii. pp. 32, 93-95, and
elsewhere. Compare _Essay concerning Human Understanding_, in
_Locke's Works_, vol. i. pp. 147, 148, 154, 157, and the
ingenious distinction, p. 198, 'between the idea of the infinity
of space, and the idea of a space infinite.' At p. 208, Locke
sarcastically says, 'But yet, after all this, there being men who
persuade themselves that they have clear, positive, comprehensive
ideas of infinity, it is fit they enjoy their privilege; and I
should be very glad (with some others that I know, who
acknowledge they have none such) to be better informed by their
communication.'
[291] _Mill's Analysis of the Mind_, vol. ii. pp. 96, 97. See also the
_Examination of Malebranche_, in _Locke's Works_, vol. viii. pp.
248, 249; and _Müller's Elements of Physiology_, vol. ii. p.
1081, which should be compared with _Comte_, _Philosophie
Positive_, vol. i. p. 354.
[292] I speak of idealists in opposition to sensationalists; though the
word idealist is often used by metaphysicians in a very different
sense. On the different kinds of idealism, see _Kritik der reinen
Vernunft_, and _Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik_, in
_Kant's Werke_, vol. ii. pp. 223, 389, vol. iii. pp. 204, 210,
306, 307. According to him, the Cartesian idealism is empirical.
[293] Thus, Dugald Stewart (_Philosophical Essays_, Edin. 1810, p. 33)
tells us of 'the simple idea of personal identity.' And Reid
(_Essays on the Powers of the Mind_, vol. i. p. 354) says, 'I
know of no ideas or notions that have a better claim to be
accounted simple and original than those of space and time.' In
the Sanscrit metaphysics, time is 'an independent cause.' See the
_Vishnu Purana_, pp. 10, 216.
[294] 'As Space is a comprehensive word, including all positions, or the
whole of synchronous order, so Time is a comprehensive word,
including all successions, or the whole of successive order.'
_Mill's Analysis of the Mind_, vol. ii. p. 100; and on the
relation of time to memory, vol. i. p. 252. In _Jobert's New
System of Philosophy_, vol. i. p. 33, it is said that 'time is
nothing but the succession of events, and we know events by
experience only.' See also p. 133, and compare respecting time
_Condillac_, _Traité des Sensations_, pp. 104-114, 222, 223,
331-333. To the same effect is _Essay concerning Human
Understanding_, book ii. chap. xiv., in _Locke's Works_, vol. i.
p. 163; and see his second reply to the Bishop of Worcester, in
_Works_, vol. iii. pp. 414-416; and as to the idea of substance,
see vol. i. pp. 285-290, 292, 308, vol. iii. pp. 5, 10, 17.
This is the first important difference which is inevitably consequent on
the adoption of different methods. The idealist is compelled to assert,
that necessary truths and contingent truths have a different
origin.[295] The sensationalist is bound to affirm that they have the
same origin.[296] The further these two great schools advance, the more
marked does their divergence become. They are at open war in every
department of morals, of philosophy, and of art. The idealists say that
all men have essentially the same notion of the good, the true, and the
beautiful. The sensationalists affirm that there is no such standard,
because ideas depend upon sensations, and because the sensations of men
depend upon the changes in their bodies, and upon the external events by
which their bodies are affected.
[295] Reid (_Essays on the Powers of the Mind_, vol. i. p. 281) says,
that necessary truths 'cannot be the conclusions of the senses;
for our senses testify only what is, and not what must
necessarily be.' See also vol. ii. pp. 53, 204, 239, 240, 281.
The same distinction is peremptorily asserted in _Whewell's
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences_, 8vo, 1847, vol. i. pp.
60-73, 140; and see _Dugald Stewart's Philosophical Essays_, pp.
123, 124. Sir W. Hamilton (_Additions to Reid's Works_, p. 754)
says, that non-contingent truths 'have their converse absolutely
incogitable.' But this learned writer does not mention how we are
to know when anything is 'absolutely incogitable.' That we cannot
cogitate an idea, is certainly no proof of its being incogitable;
for it may be cogitated at some later period, when knowledge is
more advanced.
[296] This is asserted by all the followers of Locke; and one of the
latest productions of that school declares, that 'to say that
necessary truths cannot be acquired by experience, is to deny the
most clear evidence of our senses and reason.' _Jobert's New
System of Philosophy_, vol. i. p. 58.
Such is a short specimen of the opposite conclusions to which the ablest
metaphysicians have been driven, by the simple circumstance that they
have pursued opposite methods of investigation. And this is the more
important to observe, because, after these two methods have been
employed, the resources of metaphysics are evidently exhausted.[297]
Both parties agree that mental laws can only be discovered by studying
individual minds, and that there is nothing in the mind which is not the
result either of reflection or of sensation. The only choice, therefore,
they have to make, is between subordinating the results of sensation to
the laws of reflection, or else subordinating the results of reflection
to the laws of sensation. Every system of metaphysics has been
constructed according to one of these schemes; and this must always
continue to be the case, because, when the two schemes are added
together, they include the totality of metaphysical phenomena. Each
process is equally plausible;[298] the supporters of each are equally
confident; and, by the very nature of the dispute, it is impossible that
any middle term should be found; nor can there ever be an umpire,
because no one can mediate between metaphysical controversies without
being a metaphysician, and no one can be a metaphysician without being
either a sensationalist or an idealist; in other words, without
belonging to one of those very parties whose claims he professes to
judge.[299]
[297] To avoid misapprehension, I may repeat, that, here and elsewhere,
I mean by metaphysics, that vast body of literature which is
constructed on the supposition that the laws of the human mind
can be generalized _solely_ from the facts of individual
consciousness. For this scheme, the word 'metaphysics' is rather
inconvenient, but it will cause no confusion if this definition
of it is kept in view by the reader.
[298] What a celebrated historian of philosophy says of Platonism, is
equally true of all the great metaphysical systems: 'Dass sie ein
zusammenhängendes harmonisches Ganzes ausmachen (_i.e._ the
leading propositions of it) fällt in die Augen.' _Tennemann_,
_Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. ii. p. 527. And yet he
confesses (vol. iii. p. 52) of it and the opposite system: 'und
wenn man auf die Beweise siehet, so ist der Empirismus des
Aristoteles nicht besser begründet als der Rationalismus des
Plato.' Kant admits that there can be only one true system, but
is confident that he has discovered what all his predecessors
have missed. _Die Metaphysik der Sitten_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol.
v. p. 5, where he raises the question, 'ob es wohl mehr, als eine
Philosophie geben könne.' In the _Kritik_, and in the
_Prolegomena zujeder künftigen Metaphysik_, he says that
metaphysics have made no progress, and that the study can hardly
be said to exist. _Werke_, vol. ii. pp. 49, 50, vol. iii. pp.
166, 246.
[299] We find a curious instance of this, in the attempt made by M.
Cousin to found an eclectic school; for this very able and
learned man has been quite unable to avoid the one-sided view
which is to every metaphysician an essential preliminary; and he
adopts that fundamental distinction between necessary ideas and
contingent ideas, by which the idealist is separated from the
sensationalist: 'la grande division des idées aujourd'hui établie
est la division des idées contingentes et des idées nécessaires.'
_Cousin_, _Hist. de la Philosophie_, II. série, vol. i. p. 82:
see also vol. ii. p. 92, and the same work, I. série, vol. i. pp.
249, 267, 268, 311, vol. iii. pp. 51-54. M. Cousin constantly
contradicts Locke, and then says he has refuted that profound and
vigorous thinker; while he does not even state the arguments of
James Mill, who, as a metaphysician, is the greatest of our
modern sensationalists, and whose views, whether right or wrong,
certainly deserve notice from an eclectic historian of
philosophy.
Another eclectic, Sir W. Hamilton, announces (_Discussions on
Philosophy_, p. 597) 'an undeveloped philosophy, which, I am
confident, is founded upon truth. To this confidence I have come,
not merely through the convictions of my own consciousness, but
by finding in this system a centre and conciliation for the most
opposite of philosophical opinions.' But, at p. 589, he summarily
disposes of one of the most important of these philosophical
opinions as 'the superficial edifice of Locke.'
On these grounds, we must, I think, arrive at the conclusion, that as
metaphysicians are unavoidably, and by the very nature of their inquiry,
broken up into two completely antagonistic schools, the relative truth
of which there are no means of ascertaining; as they, moreover, have but
few resources, and as they use those resources according to a method by
which no other science has ever been developed,--we, looking at these
things, ought not to expect that they can supply us with sufficient data
for solving those great problems which the history of the human mind
presents to our view. And whoever will take the pains fairly to estimate
the present condition of mental philosophy, must admit that,
notwithstanding the influence it has always exercised over some of the
most powerful minds, and through them over society at large, there is,
nevertheless, no other study which has been so zealously prosecuted, so
long continued, and yet remains so barren of results. In no other
department has there been so much movement, and so little progress. Men
of eminent abilities, and of the greatest integrity of purpose, have in
every civilized country, for many centuries, been engaged in
metaphysical inquiries; and yet at the present moment their systems, so
far from approximating towards truth, are diverging from each other with
a velocity which seems to be accelerated by the progress of knowledge.
The incessant rivalry of the hostile schools, the violence with which
they have been supported, and the exclusive and unphilosophic confidence
with which each has advocated its own method,--all these things have
thrown the study of the mind into a confusion only to be compared to
that in which the study of religion has been thrown by the controversies
of the theologians.[300] The consequence is, that if we except a very
few of the laws of association, and perhaps I may add the modern
theories of vision and of touch,[301] there is not to be found in the
whole compass of metaphysics a single principle of importance, and at
the same time of incontestable truth. Under these circumstances, it is
impossible to avoid a suspicion that there is some fundamental error in
the manner in which these inquiries have been prosecuted. For my own
part, I believe that, by mere observation of our own minds, and even by
such rude experiments as we are able to make upon them, it will be
impossible to raise psychology to a science; and I entertain very little
doubt that metaphysics can only be successfully studied by an
investigation of history so comprehensive as to enable us to understand
the conditions which govern the movements of the human race.[302]
[300] Berkeley, in a moment of candour, inadvertently confesses what is
very damaging to the reputation of his own pursuits: 'Upon the
whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not
all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused
philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely
owing to ourselves. That we have first raised a dust, and then
complain we cannot see.' _Principles of Human Knowledge_, in
_Berkeley's Works_, vol. i. p. 74. Every metaphysician and
theologian should get this sentence by heart: 'That we have first
raised a dust, and then complain we cannot see.'
[301] Some of the laws of association, as stated by Hume and Hartley,
are capable of historical verification, which would change the
metaphysical hypothesis into a scientific theory. Berkeley's
theory of vision, and Brown's theory of touch, have, in the same
way, been verified physiologically; so that we now know what
otherwise we could only have suspected.
[302] In regard to one of the difficulties stated in this chapter as
impeding metaphysicians, it is only just to quote the remarks of
Kant: 'Wie aber das Ich, der ich denke, von dem Ich, das sich
selbst anschaut, unterschieden (indem ich mir noch andere
Anschauungsart wenigstens als möglich vorstellen kann), und doch
mit diesem letzteren als dasselbe Subject einerlei sei, wie ich
also sagen könne: Ich als Intelligenz und denkend Subject,
erkenne mich selbst als gedachtes Object, so fern ich mir noch
über das in der Anschauung gegeben bin, nur, gleich anderen
Phänomenen, nicht wie ich vor dem Verstande bin, sondern wie ich
mir erscheine, hat nicht mehr auch nicht weniger Schwierigkeit
bei sich, als wie ich mir selbst überhaupt ein Object und zwar
der Anschauung und innerer Wahrnehmungen sein könne.' _Kritik der
reinen Vernunft_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol. ii. p. 144. I am very
willing to let the question rest on this: for to me it appears
that both cases are not only equally difficult, but, in the
present state of our knowledge, are equally impossible.