STATEMENT OF THE RESOURCES FOR INVESTIGATING HISTORY, AND PROOFS OF THE
REGULARITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. THESE ACTIONS ARE GOVERNED BY MENTAL AND
PHYSICAL LAWS: THEREFORE BOTH SETS OF LAWS MUST BE STUDIED, AND THERE
CAN BE NO HISTORY WITHOUT THE NATURAL SCIENCES.
PAGE
Materials for writing history 1-3
Narrow range of knowledge possessed by historians 4-5
Object of the present work 6
Human actions, if not the result of fixed laws, must be due
to chance or to supernatural interference 8
Probable origin of free-will and predestination 9-12
Theological basis of predestination, and metaphysical basis
of free-will 12-16
The actions of men are caused by their antecedents, which
exist either in the human mind or in the external world 18-20
Therefore history is the modification of man by nature, and
of nature by man 20-21
Statistics prove the regularity of actions in regard to
murder and other crimes 22-26
Similar proof respecting suicides 27-29
Also respecting the number of marriages annually contracted 31-32
And respecting the number of letters sent undirected 32
The historian must ascertain whether mind or nature has most
influenced human actions; and therefore there can be no
history without physical science 33-35
NOTE A. Passages from Kant on free-will and necessity 35-38
CHAPTER II.
INFLUENCE EXERCISED BY PHYSICAL LAWS OVER THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY
AND OVER THE CHARACTER OF INDIVIDUALS.
Man is affected by four classes of physical agents; namely,
climate, food, soil, and the general aspect of nature 39-41
Operation of these agents on the accumulation of wealth 41-51
Their operation on the distribution of wealth 51-64
Illustrations of these principles from Ireland 65-67
From Hindustan 69-82
From Egypt 82-93
From Central America 93-94
And from Mexico and Peru 95
Operation of physical laws in Brazil 101-108
Influence of the general aspects of nature upon the imagination
and the understanding 118-119
Under some aspects, nature is more prominent than man;
under others, man more than nature 120
In the former case the imagination is more stimulated than
the understanding, and to this class all the earliest
civilizations belong 120-121
The imagination is excited by earthquakes and volcanoes 122-124
And by danger generally 125-126
Also by an unhealthy climate making life precarious 126-130
From these causes the civilizations exterior to Europe are
mainly influenced by the imagination, those in Europe by the
understanding 130-132
This proposition illustrated by a comparison between Hindustan
and Greece 132-147
Further illustration from Central America 147-148
Chemical and physiological note on the connection between food
and animal heat 148-151
CHAPTER III.
EXAMINATION OF THE METHOD EMPLOYED BY METAPHYSICIANS FOR DISCOVERING
MENTAL LAWS.
In the last chapter, two leading facts have been established,
which broadly separate Europe from other parts of the world 152-156
Hence it appears that of the two classes of mental and physical
laws the mental are the more important for the history of
Europe 156-157
Examination of the two metaphysical methods of generalizing
mental laws 158-165
Failure of these methods 165-167
CHAPTER IV.
MENTAL LAWS ARE EITHER MORAL OR INTELLECTUAL. COMPARISON OF MORAL AND
INTELLECTUAL LAWS, AND INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECT PRODUCED BY EACH ON THE
PROGRESS OF SOCIETY.
The historical method of studying mental laws is superior to
the metaphysical method 168-174
The progress of society is twofold, moral and intellectual 174-175
Comparison of the moral with the intellectual element 175
There is no evidence that the natural faculties of man improve 176-177
Progress, therefore, depends on an improvement in the
circumstances under which the faculties come into play 178
The standard of action having varied in every age, the causes
of action must be variable 179
But moral truths have not changed 179
And intellectual truths are constantly changing 181
Intellectual truths are the cause of progress 182
Ignorant men are mischievous in proportion to their sincerity 183-185
Illustrations of this from Rome and Spain 185-188
The diminution of religious persecution is owing to the
progress of knowledge 188-190
The diminution of the warlike spirit is owing to the same cause 190-192
Illustrations from Russia and Turkey 195-197
As civilization advances, men of intellect avoid becoming
soldiers 198
Illustrations of this from ancient Greece and modern Europe 198-202
The three principal ways in which the progress of knowledge
has lessened the warlike spirit are:
1. The invention of gunpowder 203-209
2. The discoveries made by political economists 210-211
3. The application of steam to purposes of travelling 219-223
Inference to be drawn as to the causes of social progress 224-226
CHAPTER V.
INQUIRY INTO THE INFLUENCE EXERCISED BY RELIGION, LITERATURE, AND
GOVERNMENT.
Recapitulation of preceding arguments 227
Moral feelings influence individuals, but do not affect society
in the aggregate 228-229
This being as yet little understood, historians have not
collected proper materials for writing history 230
Reasons why the present history is restricted to England 231-235
Comparison of the history of England with that of France 235-236
With that of Germany 237-240
With that of the United States of America 240-242
Necessity of ascertaining the fundamental laws of intellectual
progress 243
Much may be gained in that respect from studying the histories
of Germany, America, France, Spain, and Scotland 244-246
Deductive spirit in Scotland 246-252
Influence of religion on the progress of society 253-266
Illustration from the efforts of missionaries 254-256
Illustration from the Hebrews 257-258
Illustration from the early history of Christianity 259-262
And from Sweden and Scotland 263-266
Influence of literature on the progress of society 268-272
Influence of government on the progress of society 272-287
Illustrated by repeal of the corn-laws 273-274
The best legislation abrogates former legislation 275
The interference of politicians with trade has injured trade 276-278
Legislators have caused smuggling with all its attendant crimes 278-280
They have also increased hypocrisy and perjury 281-283
By their laws against usury they have increased usury 283-284
By other laws they have hindered the advance of knowledge 284-285
England has been less interfered with in these ways than
other nations, and is therefore more prosperous than they 286-287
CHAPTER VI.
ORIGIN OF HISTORY, AND STATE OF HISTORICAL LITERATURE DURING THE MIDDLE
AGES.
Conclusions arrived at by the preceding investigations 288
An inquiry into the changes in historical researches will throw
light on the changes in society 289-290
The earliest histories are ballads 291-295
One cause of error in history was the invention of writing 296-300
A change of religion in any country also tends to corrupt its
early history 300-307
But the most active cause of all was the influence of the
clergy 307-308
Absurdities which were consequently believed 309-317
Illustration of this from the history of Charlemagne by Turpin 318-321
And from the history of the Britons by Geoffrey 321-325
The first improvement in writing history began in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 325
But credulity was still prevalent, as is seen in Comines 327-328
And in the predictions of St[oe]ffler respecting the Deluge 330
Also in the work of Dr. Horst on the Golden Tooth 331-332
CHAPTER VII.
OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH INTELLECT FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE
SIXTEENTH TO THE END OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.
This absurd way of writing history was the natural result of the
state of the age 333
The spirit of doubt was a necessary precursor of improvement 334
Hence the supreme importance of scepticism 335-336
Origin of religious toleration in England 337
Hooker contrasted with Jewel 339-343
Scepticism and spirit of inquiry on other subjects 343-346
This tendency displayed in Chillingworth 347-350
Chillingworth compared with Hooker and Jewel 350
Subsequent movement in the same direction, and increasing
indifference to theological matters 352-355
Great advantage of this 356-358
Under James I. and Charles I. this opposition to authority
assumes a political character 359-361
Under Charles II. it takes a frivolous form at court 363
Influence of this spirit upon Sir Thomas Browne 365-367
Its influence upon Boyle 367-370
It causes the establishment of the Royal Society 371
Impetus now given to physical science, and attempts of the
clergy to oppose it 372
The clergy are naturally hostile to physical science, because
it lessens their own power 372-373
Illustration of this by the superstition of sailors and
agriculturists as compared with soldiers and mechanics 375-380
Legislative improvements in the reign of Charles II. in spite
of political degradation 380-386
These improvements were due to the sceptical and inquiring
spirit 387-388
Aided by the vices of the king 388
And by his dislike of the church 389
He encouraged Hobbes, and neglected the ablest of the clergy 390-393
The clergy, to recover their ground, allied themselves with
James II. 394-396
This alliance was dissolved by the Declaration of Indulgence 397-399
The clergy then united with the dissenters and brought about
the Revolution of 1688 399-400
Importance of the Revolution 401-403
But the clergy regretted it, and repented of their own act 403
Hostility between them and William III. 405-410
Hence a schism in the church 410-413
Fresh encouragement thus given to scepticism 413-414
Convocation first despised, and then abolished 414-415
After the Revolution the ablest men confine themselves to
secular professions, and avoided entering the church 415
The clergy lost all offices out of the church, and their
numbers diminished in both Houses of Parliament 416-418
The church rallied for a moment under Anne 418-420
But was weakened by the dissenters, headed by Wesley and
Whitefield 420-424
Theology separated from morals and from politics 424-426
Rapid succession of sceptical controversies 427-429
Knowledge begins to be diffused, and takes a popular form 430-433
Political meetings, and publication of parliamentary debates 433-434
Doctrine of personal representation, and idea of independence 436
Corresponding change in the style of authors 436-439
Hence great reforms became inevitable 439-440
This tendency was aided by George I. and George II. 441-443
But discouraged by George III., under whom began a dangerous
political reaction 444-446
Ignorance of George III. 446
Subserviency of Pitt 446-449
Incompetence of other statesmen, and the king's hatred of
great men 449-451
Deterioration of the House of Lords 451-455
Ability and accomplishments of Burke 458-461
He opposed the views of George III., and was neglected by him 462-467
Burke's subsequent hallucinations and violence 467-476
The king now favoured him 476-477
Policy of George III. respecting America 478-482
This policy reacted upon England 482-483
Policy in regard to France 483-486
This also reacted upon England 486
And produced arbitrary laws against the liberties of England 487-493
Which were zealously enforced by the executive 494-496
Gloomy political prospects of England late in the eighteenth
century 496-498
But, owing to the progress of knowledge, a counter reaction
was preparing 498-502
To which, and to the increasing power of public opinion,
England owes her great reforms of the nineteenth century 502-505
LIST OF AUTHORS QUOTED.
[In order to assist those who wish to verify my references, and also
with the view of indicating the nature and extent of the materials which
I have used, I have drawn up the following list of the principal works
quoted. When no edition is mentioned, the size is 8vo _et infra_. When
the name of the author is enclosed between brackets, the book is
anonymous; but in such cases I have usually subjoined some authority who
gives evidence of the authorship.]
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Abd-Allatif, Relation de l'Égypte, traduite par Silvestre de Sacy.
Paris, 1810. 4to.
Aberdeen: Extracts from the Council Register of the Burgh of Aberdeen,
from 1398 to 1570, printed for the Spalding Club. Aberdeen, 1844. 4to.
Ibid., from 1570 to 1625, printed for the Spalding Club. Aberdeen, 1848.
4to.
Abernethy (J.) The Hunterian Oration for the year 1819. London, 1819.
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Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland from 1124 to 1707. London,
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Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies of the Kirk of Scotland,
from 1560 to 1618. Edinburgh, 1839-1845. 3 vols. 4to.
Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, from 1638 to
1842. Edinburgh, 1843.
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Adolphus (J.) History of England from the accession of George III.
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Arnot (H.) The History of Edinburgh. Edinburgh, 1788. 4to.
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Aubrey (J.) Letters and Lives of Eminent Men. London, 1813. 2 vols.
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* * * * *
HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN ENGLAND.
_GENERAL INTRODUCTION._
CHAPTER I.
STATEMENT OF THE RESOURCES FOR INVESTIGATING HISTORY, AND PROOFS OF
THE REGULARITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS. THESE ACTIONS ARE GOVERNED BY
MENTAL AND PHYSICAL LAWS: THEREFORE BOTH SETS OF LAWS MUST BE
STUDIED, AND THERE CAN BE NO HISTORY WITHOUT THE NATURAL SCIENCES.
Of all the great branches of human knowledge, history is that upon which
most has been written, and which has always been most popular. And it
seems to be the general opinion that the success of historians has, on
the whole, been equal to their industry; and that if on this subject
much has been studied, much also is understood.
This confidence in the value of history is very widely diffused, as we
see in the extent to which it is read, and in the share it occupies in
all plans of education. Nor can it be denied that, in a certain point of
view, such confidence is perfectly justifiable. It cannot be denied that
materials have been collected which, when looked at in the aggregate,
have a rich and imposing appearance. The political and military annals
of all the great countries in Europe, and of most of those out of
Europe, have been carefully compiled, put together in a convenient form,
and the evidence on which they rest has been tolerably well sifted.
Great attention has been paid to the history of legislation, also to
that of religion: while considerable, though inferior, labour has been
employed in tracing the progress of science, of literature, of the fine
arts, of useful inventions, and, latterly, of the manners and comforts
of the people. In order to increase our knowledge of the past,
antiquities of every kind have been examined; the sites of ancient
cities have been laid bare, coins dug up and deciphered, inscriptions
copied, alphabets restored, hieroglyphics interpreted, and, in some
instances, long-forgotten languages reconstructed and re-arranged.
Several of the laws which regulate the changes of human speech have been
discovered, and, in the hands of philologists, have been made to
elucidate even the most obscure periods in the early migration of
nations. Political economy has been raised to a science, and by it much
light has been thrown on the causes of that unequal distribution of
wealth which is the most fertile source of social disturbance.
Statistics have been so sedulously cultivated, that we have the most
extensive information, not only respecting the material interests of
men, but also respecting their moral peculiarities; such as, the amount
of different crimes, the proportion they bear to each other, and the
influence exercised over them by age, sex, education, and the like. With
this great movement physical geography has kept pace: the phenomena of
climate have been registered, mountains measured, rivers surveyed and
tracked to their source, natural productions of all kinds carefully
studied, and their hidden properties unfolded: while every food which
sustains life has been chemically analysed, its constituents numbered
and weighed, and the nature of the connexion between them and the human
frame has, in many cases, been satisfactorily ascertained. At the same
time, and that nothing should be left undone which might enlarge our
knowledge of the events by which man is affected, there have been
instituted circumstantial researches in many other departments; so that
in regard to the most civilized people, we are now acquainted with the
rate of their mortality, of their marriages, the proportion of their
births, the character of their employments, and the fluctuations both
in their wages and in the prices of the commodities necessary to their
existence. These and similar facts have been collected, methodized, and
are ripe for use. Such results, which form, as it were, the anatomy of a
nation, are remarkable for their minuteness; and to them there have been
joined other results less minute, but more extensive. Not only have the
actions and characteristics of the great nations been recorded, but a
prodigious number of different tribes in all the parts of the known
world have been visited and described by travellers, thus enabling us to
compare the condition of mankind in every stage of civilization, and
under every variety of circumstance. When we moreover add, that this
curiosity respecting our fellow-creatures is apparently insatiable; that
it is constantly increasing; that the means of gratifying it are also
increasing, and that most of the observations which have been made are
still preserved;--when we put all these things together, we may form a
faint idea of the immense value of that vast body of facts which we now
possess, and by the aid of which the progress of mankind is to be
investigated.
But if, on the other hand, we are to describe the use that has been made
of these materials, we must draw a very different picture. The
unfortunate peculiarity of the history of man is, that although its
separate parts have been examined with considerable ability, hardly any
one has attempted to combine them into a whole, and ascertain the way in
which they are connected with each other. In all the other great fields
of inquiry, the necessity of generalization is universally admitted, and
noble efforts are being made to rise from particular facts in order to
discover the laws by which those facts are governed. So far, however, is
this from being the usual course of historians, that among them a
strange idea prevails, that their business is merely to relate events,
which they may occasionally enliven by such moral and political
reflections as seem likely to be useful. According to this scheme, any
author who from indolence of thought, or from natural incapacity, is
unfit to deal with the highest branches of knowledge, has only to pass
some years in reading a certain number of books, and then he is
qualified to be an historian; he is able to write the history of a great
people, and his work becomes an authority on the subject which it
professes to treat.
The establishment of this narrow standard has led to results very
prejudicial to the progress of our knowledge. Owing to it, historians,
taken as a body, have never recognized the necessity of such a wide and
preliminary study as would enable them to grasp their subject in the
whole of its natural relations. Hence the singular spectacle of one
historian being ignorant of political economy; another knowing nothing
of law; another nothing of ecclesiastical affairs and changes of
opinion; another neglecting the philosophy of statistics, and another
physical science: although these topics are the most essential of all,
inasmuch as they comprise the principal circumstances by which the
temper and character of mankind have been affected, and in which they
are displayed. These important pursuits being, however, cultivated, some
by one man, and some by another, have been isolated rather than united:
the aid which might be derived from analogy and from mutual illustration
has been lost; and no disposition has been shown to concentrate them
upon history, of which they are, properly speaking, the necessary
components.
Since the early part of the eighteenth century, a few great thinkers
have indeed arisen, who have deplored the backwardness of history, and
have done everything in their power to remedy it. But these instances
have been extremely rare: so rare, that in the whole literature of
Europe there are not more than three or four really original works which
contain a systematic attempt to investigate the history of man according
to those exhaustive methods which in other branches of knowledge have
proved successful, and by which alone empirical observations can be
raised to scientific truths.
Among historians in general, we find, after the sixteenth century, and
especially during the last hundred years, several indications of an
increasing comprehensiveness of view, and of a willingness to
incorporate into their works subjects which they would formerly have
excluded. By this means their assemblage of topics has become more
diversified, and the mere collection and relative position of parallel
facts has occasionally suggested generalizations no traces of which can
be found in the earlier literature of Europe. This has been a great
gain, in so far as it has familiarized historians with a wider range of
thought, and encouraged those habits of speculation, which, though
liable to abuse, are the essential condition of all real knowledge,
because without them no science can be constructed.
But, notwithstanding that the prospects of historical literature are
certainly more cheering now than in any former age, it must be allowed
that, with extremely few exceptions, they are only prospects, and that
as yet scarcely anything has been done towards discovering the
principles which govern the character and destiny of nations. What has
been actually effected I shall endeavour to estimate in another part of
this introduction: at present it is enough to say, that for all the
higher purposes of human thought history is still miserably deficient,
and presents that confused and anarchical appearance natural to a
subject of which the laws are unknown, and even the foundation
unsettled.[1]
[1] A living writer, who has done more than any other to raise the
standard of history, contemptuously notices 'l'incohérente
compilation de faits déjà improprement qualifiée _d'histoire_.'
_Comte_, _Philosophie Positive_, vol. v. p. 18. There is much in
the method and in the conclusions of this great work with which I
cannot agree; but it would be unjust to deny its extraordinary
merits.
Our acquaintance with history being so imperfect, while our materials
are so numerous, it seems desirable that something should be done on a
scale far larger than has hitherto been attempted, and that a strenuous
effort should be made to bring up this great department of inquiry to a
level with other departments, in order that we may maintain the balance
and harmony of our knowledge. It is in this spirit that the present
work has been conceived. To make the execution of it fully equal to the
conception is impossible: still I hope to accomplish for the history of
man something equivalent, or at all events analogous, to what has been
effected by other inquirers for the different branches of natural
science. In regard to nature, events apparently the most irregular and
capricious have been explained, and have been shown to be in accordance
with certain fixed and universal laws. This has been done because men of
ability, and, above all, men of patient, untiring thought, have studied
natural events with the view of discovering their regularity: and if
human events were subjected to a similar treatment, we have every right
to expect similar results. For it is clear that they who affirm that the
facts of history are incapable of being generalized, take for granted
the very question at issue. Indeed they do more than this. They not only
assume what they cannot prove, but they assume what in the present state
of knowledge is highly improbable. Whoever is at all acquainted with
what has been done during the last two centuries, must be aware that
every generation demonstrates some events to be regular and predictable,
which the preceding generation had declared to be irregular and
unpredictable: so that the marked tendency of advancing civilization is
to strengthen our belief in the universality of order, of method, and of
law. This being the case, it follows that if any facts, or class of
facts, have not yet been reduced to order, we, so far from pronouncing
them to be irreducible, should rather be guided by our experience of the
past, and should admit the probability that what we now call
inexplicable will at some future time be explained. This expectation of
discovering regularity in the midst of confusion is so familiar to
scientific men, that among the most eminent of them it becomes an
article of faith: and if the same expectation is not generally found
among historians, it must be ascribed partly to their being of inferior
ability to the investigators of nature, and partly to the greater
complexity of those social phenomena with which their studies are
concerned.
Both these causes have retarded the creation of the science of history.
The most celebrated historians are manifestly inferior to the most
successful cultivators of physical science: no one having devoted
himself to history who in point of intellect is at all to be compared
with Kepler, Newton, or many others that might be named.[2] And as to
the greater complexity of the phenomena, the philosophic historian is
opposed by difficulties far more formidable than is the student of
nature; since, while on the one hand, his observations are more liable
to those causes of error which arise from prejudice and passion, he, on
the other hand, is unable to employ the great physical resource of
experiment, by which we can often simplify even the most intricate
problems in the external world.
[2] I speak merely of those who have made history their main pursuit.
Bacon wrote on it, but only as a subordinate object; and it
evidently cost him nothing like the thought which he devoted to
other subjects.
It is not, therefore, surprising that the study of the movements of Man
should be still in its infancy, as compared with the advanced state of
the study of the movements of Nature. Indeed the difference between the
progress of the two pursuits is so great, that while in physics the
regularity of events, and the power of predicting them, are often taken
for granted even in cases still unproved, a similar regularity is in
history not only not taken for granted, but is actually denied. Hence it
is that whoever wishes to raise history to a level with other branches
of knowledge, is met by a preliminary obstacle; since he is told that in
the affairs of men there is something mysterious and providential, which
makes them impervious to our investigations, and which will always hide
from us their future course. To this it might be sufficient to reply,
that such an assertion is gratuitous; that it is by its nature incapable
of proof; and that it is moreover opposed by the notorious fact that
everywhere else increasing knowledge is accompanied by an increasing
confidence in the uniformity with which, under the same circumstances,
the same events must succeed each other. It will, however, be more
satisfactory to probe the difficulty deeper, and inquire at once into
the foundation of the common opinion that history must always remain in
its present empirical state, and can never be raised to the rank of a
science. We shall thus be led to one vast question, which indeed lies at
the root of the whole subject, and is simply this: Are the actions of
men, and therefore of societies, governed by fixed laws, or are they the
result either of chance or of supernatural interference? The discussion
of these alternatives will suggest some speculations of considerable
interest.
For, in reference to this matter, there are two doctrines, which appear
to represent different stages of civilization. According to the first
doctrine, every event is single and isolated, and is merely considered
as the result of a blind chance. This opinion, which is most natural to
a perfectly ignorant people, would soon be weakened by that extension of
experience which supplies a knowledge of those uniformities of
succession and of co-existence that nature constantly presents. If, for
example, wandering tribes, without the least tincture of civilization,
lived entirely by hunting and fishing, they might well suppose that the
appearance of their necessary food was the result of some accident which
admitted of no explanation. The irregularity of the supply, and the
apparent caprice with which it was sometimes abundant and sometimes
scanty, would prevent them from suspecting anything like method in the
arrangements of nature; nor could their minds even conceive the
existence of those general principles which govern the order of events,
and by a knowledge of which we are often able to predict their future
course. But when such tribes advance into the agricultural state, they,
for the first time, use a food of which not only the appearance, but the
very existence, seems to be the result of their own act. What they sow,
that likewise do they reap. The provision necessary for their wants is
brought more immediately under their own control, and is more palpably
the consequence of their own labour. They perceive a distinct plan, and
a regular uniformity of sequence, in the relation which the seed they
put into the ground bears to the corn when arrived at maturity. They are
now able to look to the future, not indeed with certainty, but with a
confidence infinitely greater than they could have felt in their former
and more precarious pursuits.[3] Hence there arises a dim idea of the
stability of events; and for the first time there begins to dawn upon
the mind a faint conception of what at a later period are called the
Laws of Nature. Every step in the great progress will make their view of
this more clear. As their observations accumulate, and as their
experience extends over a wider surface, they meet with uniformities
that they had never suspected to exist, and the discovery of which
weakens that doctrine of chance with which they had originally set out.
Yet a little further, and a taste for abstract reasoning springs up; and
then some among them generalize the observations that have been made,
and despising the old popular opinion, believe that every event is
linked to its antecedent by an inevitable connexion, that such
antecedent is connected with a preceding fact; and that thus the whole
world forms a necessary chain, in which indeed each man may play his
part, but can by no means determine what that part shall be.
[3] Some of the moral consequences of thus diminishing the
precariousness of food are noticed by M. Charles Comte in his
_Traité de Législation_, vol. ii. pp. 273-275. Compare _Mill's
History of India_, vol. i. pp. 180-181. But both these able writers
have omitted to observe that the change facilitates a perception of
the regularity of phenomena.
Thus it is that, in the ordinary march of society, an increasing
perception of the regularity of nature destroys the doctrine of Chance,
and replaces it by that of Necessary Connexion. And it is, I think,
highly probable that out of these two doctrines of Chance and Necessity
there have respectively arisen the subsequent dogmas of Free Will and
Predestination. Nor is it difficult to understand the manner in which,
in a more advanced state of society, this metamorphosis would occur. In
every country, as soon as the accumulation of wealth has reached a
certain point, the produce of each man's labour becomes more than
sufficient for his own support: it is therefore no longer necessary that
all should work; and there is formed a separate class, the members of
which pass their lives for the most part in the pursuit of pleasure; a
very few, however, in the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge. Among
these last there are always found some who, neglecting external events,
turn their attention to the study of their own minds;[4] and such men,
when possessed of great abilities, become the founders of new
philosophies and new religions, which often exercise immense influence
over the people who receive them. But the authors of these systems are
themselves affected by the character of the age in which they live. It
is impossible for any man to escape the pressure of surrounding
opinions; and what is called a new philosophy or a new religion is
generally not so much a creation of fresh ideas, but rather a new
direction given to ideas already current among contemporary thinkers.[5]
Thus, in the case now before us, the doctrine of Chance in the external
world corresponds to that of Free Will in the internal: while the other
doctrine of Necessary Connexion is equally analogous to that of
Predestination; the only difference being that the first is a
development by the metaphysician, the second by the theologian. In the
first instance, the metaphysician setting out with the doctrine of
Chance, carries into the study of the mind this arbitrary and
irresponsible principle, which in its new field becomes Free Will; an
expression by which all difficulties seem to be removed, since perfect
freedom, itself the cause of all actions, is caused by none, but, like
the doctrine of Chance, is an ultimate fact admitting of no further
explanation.[6] In the second instance, the theologian taking up the
doctrine of Necessary Connexion recasts it into a religious shape; and
his mind being already full of conceptions of order and of uniformity,
he naturally ascribes such undeviating regularity to the prescience of
Supreme Power; and thus to the magnificent notion of One God there is
added the dogma that by Him all things have from the beginning been
absolutely pre-determined and preordained.
[4] On the relation between this and the previous creation of wealth,
see _Tennemann_, _Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. i. p. 30; 'Ein
gewisser Grad von Cultur und Wohlstand ist eine nothwendige äussere
Bedingung der Entwickelung des philosophischen Geistes. So lange
der Mensch noch mit den Mitteln seiner Existenz und der Befriedigung
seiner thierischen Bedürfnisse beschäftiget ist, so lange gehet die
Entwickelung und Bildung seiner Geisteskräfte nur langsam von
statten, und er nähert sich nur Schritt vor Schritt einer freiern
Vernunftthätigkeit.' ... 'Daher finden wir, dass man nur in denen
Nationen anfing zu philosophiren, welche sich zu einer
beträchtlichen Stufe des Wohlstandes und der Cultur emporgehoben
hatten.' Hence, as I shall endeavour to prove in the next chapter,
the immense importance of the physical phenomena which precede and
often control the metaphysical. In the history of the Greek mind we
can distinctly trace the passage from physical to metaphysical
inquiries. See _Grote's History of Greece_, vol. iv. p. 519, edit.
1847. That the atomic doctrine, in its relation to chance, was a
natural precursor of Platonism, is remarked in _Broussais_, _Examen
des Doctrines Médicales_, vol. i. pp. 53, 54, an able though
one-sided work. Compare, respecting the Chance of the atomists,
_Ritter's History of Ancient Philosophy_, vol. i. p. 553; an
hypothesis, as Ritter says, 'destructive of all inner energy;'
consequently antagonistic to the psychological hypothesis which
subsequently sprang up and conquered it. That physical researches
came first, is moreover attested by Diogenes Laertius: [Greek: Merê
de philosophias tria, physikon, êthikon, dialektikon; physikon men,
to peri kosmou, kai tôn en autô; êthikon de, to peri biou kai tôn
pros hêmas; dialektikon de, to amphoterôn tous logous presbeuon;
kai mechri men' Archelaou to physikon eidos ên apo de Sôkratous,
hôs proeirêtai, to êthikon; apo de Zênônos tou 'Eleatou, to
dialektikon.] _De Vitis Philosophorum Pro[oe]m._ segm. 18, vol. i.
p. 12: compare lib. ii. segm. 16, vol. i. p. 89.
[5] Beausobre has some good remarks on this in his learned work
_Histoire Critique de Manichée_, vol. i. p. 179, where he says that
the great religious heresies have been founded on previous
philosophies. Certainly no one acquainted with the history of
opinions will admit the sweeping assertion of M. Stahl that 'la
philosophie d'un peuple a sa racine dans sa théologie.' _Klimrath_,
_Travaux_, vol. ii. p. 454, Paris, 1843.
[6] 'Also ist ein Wille, dem die blose gesetzgebende Form der Maxime
allein zum Gesetze dienen kann, ein freier Wille.' _Kritik der
praktischen Vernunft_ in _Kant's Werke_, vol. iv. p. 128. 'Hat
selber für sich eigentlich keinen Bestimmungsgrund.' _Metaphysik
der Sitten_ in _Werke_, vol. v. p. 12. 'Die unbedingte Causalität
der Ursache.' _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_ in _Werke_, vol. ii.
p. 339. See also _Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Metaphysik_ in
vol. iii. p. 268.
These opposite doctrines of free will and predestination[7] do, no
doubt, supply a safe and simple solution of the obscurities of our
being; and as they are easily understood, they are so suited to the
average capacity of the human mind, that even at the present day an
immense majority of men are divided between them; and they have not only
corrupted the sources of our knowledge, but have given rise to religious
sects, whose mutual animosities have disturbed society, and too often
embittered the relations of private life. Among the more advanced
European thinkers there is, however, a growing opinion that both
doctrines are wrong or, at all events, that we have no sufficient
evidence of their truth. And as this is a matter of great moment, it is
important, before we proceed further, to clear up as much of it as the
difficulties inherent in these subjects will enable us to do.
[7] That these doctrines, when treated according to the ordinary
methods of reasoning, not only oppose but exclude each other, would
be universally admitted if it were not for a desire generally felt
to save certain parts of each: it being thought dangerous to give
up free will on account of weakening moral responsibility, and
equally dangerous to give up predestination on account of impugning
the power of God. Various attempts have therefore been made to
reconcile liberty with necessity, and make the freedom of man
harmonize with the foreknowledge of the Deity. Compare on this
point a remarkable letter from Locke to Molyneux (_Locke's Works_,
vol. viii. p. 305), with the argument in one of Bentley's Sermons
(_Monk's Life of Bentley_, vol. ii. pp. 7, 8); also _Ritter's Hist.
of Ancient Philosophy_, vol. iv. pp. 143, 144; _Tennemann_, _Gesch.
der Philosophie_, vol. iv. pp. 301-304; _Copleston's Inquiry into
the Doctrines of Necessity and Predestination_, pp. 6, 7, 46, 69,
70, 85, 92, 108, 136; _Mosheim's Ecclesiastical Hist._, vol. i.
p. 207, vol. ii. p. 96; _Neander's Hist. of the Church_, vol. iv.
pp. 294, 389-391; _Bishop of Lincoln on Tertullian_, 1845, p. 323;
_Hodgson on Buddhism_, in _Transac. of Asiatic Society_, vol. ii.
p. 232.
Whatever doubts may be thrown on the account which I have given of the
probable origin of the ideas of free will and predestination, there
can, at all events, be no dispute as to the foundation on which those
ideas are now actually based. The theory of predestination is founded on
a theological hypothesis; that of free will on a metaphysical
hypothesis. The advocates of the first proceed on a supposition for
which, to say the least of it, they have as yet brought forward no good
evidence. They require us to believe that the Author of Creation, whose
beneficence they at the same time willingly allow, has, notwithstanding
His supreme goodness, made an arbitrary distinction between the elect
and the non-elect; that He has from all eternity doomed to perdition
millions of creatures yet unborn, and whom His act alone can call into
existence: and that He has done this, not in virtue of any principle of
justice, but by a mere stretch of despotic power.[8] This doctrine owes
its authority among Protestants to the dark though powerful mind of
Calvin; but in the early Church it was first systematically methodized
by Augustin, who appears to have borrowed it from the Manicheans.[9] At
all events, and putting aside its incompatibility with other notions
which are supposed to be fundamental,[10] it must, in a scientific
investigation, be regarded as a barren hypothesis, because, being beyond
the province of our knowledge, we have no means of ascertaining either
its truth or its falsehood.
[8] Even Ambrose, who never went so far as Augustin, states this
principle in its repulsive nakedness: 'Deus quos dignat vocat, quos
vult religiosos facit.' _Neander_, vol. iv. p. 287. Calvin declares
'that God, in predestinating from all eternity one part of mankind
to everlasting happiness, and another to endless misery, was led to
make this distinction by no other motive than His own good pleasure
and free will.' _Mosheim's Eccles. Hist._, vol. ii. p. 103, see also
p. 100; and _Carwithen's Hist. of the Church of England_, vol. i.
p. 552.
[9] On the Manichæan origin of Augustin's opinions, compare _Potter_,
_Esprit de l'Eglise_, vol. ii. p. 171, Paris, 1821; _Tomline's
Refutation of Calvinism_, 1817, pp. 571-576; _Southey's Book of the
Church_, 1824, vol. i. pp. 301, 302; _Matter_, _Hist. du
Gnosticisme_, 1828, vol. i. p. 325. However, Beausobre (_Histoire
de Manichée_, vol. ii. pp. 33-40) seems to have proved a difference
between the election of Augustin and that of Basilides.
[10] On the absurdity of 'an omnipotent arbitrary Deity,' and on the
incongruity of such a combination with [Greek: physei kalon kai
dikaion], see _Cudworth's Intellect. Syst._, vol. i. pp. 45, 419,
vol. iii. p. 241, vol. iv. p. 160. See also _Theodicee_ in _Kant's
Werke_, vol. vi. pp. 141, 142, and _Metaphysik der Sitten_ in vol.
v. p. 332, upon 'den göttlichen Zweck in Ansehung des menschlichen
Geschlechts.'
The other doctrine, which has long been celebrated under the name of
Free Will, is connected with Arminianism; but it in reality rests on the
metaphysical dogma of the supremacy of human consciousness. Every man,
it is alleged, feels and knows that he is a free agent: nor can any
subtleties of argument do away with our consciousness of possessing a
free will.[11] Now the existence of this supreme jurisdiction, which is
thus to set at defiance all the ordinary methods of reasoning, involves
two assumptions: of which the first, though possibly true, has never
been proved; and the other is unquestionably false. These assumptions
are, that there is an independent faculty called consciousness, and that
the dictates of that faculty are infallible. But, in the first place, it
is by no means certain that consciousness is a faculty; and some of the
ablest thinkers have been of opinion that it is merely a state or
condition of the mind.[12] Should this turn out to be the case, the
argument falls to the ground; since, even if we admit that all the
faculties of the mind, when completely exercised, are equally accurate,
no one will make the same claim for every condition into which the mind
itself may be casually thrown. However, waiving this objection, we may,
in the second place, reply, that even if consciousness is a faculty, we
have the testimony of all history to prove its extreme fallibility.[13]
All the great stages through which, in the progress of civilization,
the human race has successively passed, have been characterized by
certain mental peculiarities or convictions, which have left their
impress upon the religion, the philosophy, and the morals of the age.
Each of these convictions has been to one period a matter of faith, to
another a matter for derision;[14] and each of them has, in its own
epoch, been as intimately bound up with the minds of men, and become as
much a part of their consciousness, as is that opinion which we now term
freedom of the will. Yet it is impossible that all these products of
consciousness can be true, because many of them contradict each other.
Unless, therefore, in different ages there are different standards of
truth, it is clear that the testimony of a man's consciousness is no
proof of an opinion being true; for if it were so, then two propositions
diametrically opposed to each other might both be equally accurate.
Besides this, another view may be drawn from the common operations of
ordinary life. Are we not in certain circumstances conscious of the
existence of spectres and phantoms; and yet is it not generally admitted
that such beings have no existence at all? Should it be attempted to
refute this argument by saying that such consciousness is apparent and
not real, then I ask, What is it that judges between the consciousness
which is genuine and that which is spurious?[15] If this boasted
faculty deceives us in some things, what security have we that it will
not deceive us in others? If there is no security, the faculty is not
trustworthy. If there is a security, then, whatever it may be, its
existence shows the necessity for some authority to which consciousness
is subordinate, and thus does away with that doctrine of the supremacy
of consciousness, on which the advocates of free will are compelled to
construct the whole of their theory. Indeed, the uncertainty as to the
existence of consciousness as an independent faculty, and the manner in
which that faculty, if it exists, has contradicted its own suggestions,
are two of the many reasons which have long since convinced me that
metaphysics will never be raised to a science by the ordinary method of
observing individual minds; but that its study can only be successfully
prosecuted by the deductive application of laws which must be
discovered historically, that is to say, which must be evolved by an
examination of the whole of those vast phenomena which the long course
of human affairs presents to our view.
[11] Johnson said to Boswell, 'Sir, we _know_ our will is free, and
there's an end on't.' _Boswell's Life of Johnson_, edit. Croker,
1848, p. 203. 'La question: Sommes-nous libres? me paraît
au-dessous de la discussion. Elle est résolue par le témoignage de
la conscience attestant que dans certains cas nous pourrions faire
le contraire de ce que nous faisons.' _Cousin_, _Hist. de la
Philosophie_, I. Série, vol. i. pp. 190, 191. 'Die Freiheit des
Menschen, als moralischen Wesens, gründet sich auf das sittliche
Bewusstseyn.' _Tennemann_, _Gesch. der Philosophie_, vol. v.
p. 161. That this is the only ground for believing in the freedom
of the will is so evident, that we need not notice the mystical
proof of Philo (_Ritter's Ancient Philosophy_, vol. iv. p. 447);
nor the physical one of the Basilidian monads (_Beausobre_, _Hist.
de Manichée_, vol. ii. p. 23); still less the argument of
Bardesanes, who thought to demonstrate freedom by the variety of
human customs! _Matter_, _Hist. du Gnosticisme_, vol. i. p. 323,
which should be compared with _Burdach's Physiologie comme Science
d'Observation_, vol. v. p. 50, Paris, 1839.
[12] Mr. James Mill (_Analysis of the Mind_, vol. i. pp. 171, 172) says
that consciousness and belief are the same, and that great error
has arisen from calling 'consciousness a feeling distinct from all
other feelings.' According to Locke (_Essay concerning Human
Understanding_, book ii. chap. i., Works, vol. i. p. 89),
'consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own
mind.' Brown (_Philosophy of the Mind_, pp. 67, 68) denies that
consciousness is a faculty: and Sir W. Hamilton complains of
'Reid's degradation of consciousness into a special faculty.'
_Notes to Reid's Works_, pp. 223, 297, 373. M. Cousin (_Hist. de
la Philosophie_, II. Série, vol. i. p. 131) pronounces
consciousness to be 'phénomène complexe;' and at p. 94, 'la
_condition_ nécessaire de l'intelligence c'est la conscience:'
while a still later writer (_Jobert's New System of Philosophy_,
vol. i. p. 25) declares that 'we have the consciousness of our
consciousness--this is certain.' The statement in Alciphron,
Dialogue vii. (_Berkeley's Works_, vol. i. pp. 505, 506) is equally
unsatisfactory: and what still further perplexes the question is
the existence of what is now recognised as 'double consciousness.'
See on this extraordinary phenomenon _Elliotson's Physiology_,
pp. 367-369, 1165; _Mayo's Physiology_, pp. 195, 196; _Prichard's
Treatise on Insanity_, pp. 450, 451; _Carpenter's Human
Physiology_, p. 379.
[13] This requires explanation. Consciousness is infallible as to the
_fact_ of its testimony; but fallible as to the _truth_. That we
are conscious of certain phenomena, is a proof that those phenomena
exist in the mind, or are presented to it; but to say that this
demonstrates the truth of the phenomena is to go a step further,
and not only offer a testimony, but also pass a judgment. The
moment we do this, we introduce the element of fallibility; because
consciousness and judgment put together cannot be always right,
inasmuch as judgment is often wrong.
The late Blanco White, a thinker of considerable subtlety, says: 'The
important distinction between _libertas a necessitate_ and _libertas a
coactione_, is seldom attended to. Nothing whatever can _force_ my will:
every man is more or less conscious of that fact: but at the same time
we are, or may be, equally conscious that we are never decided without a
motive.' _Life of B. White_, by Himself, 1845, vol. iii. p. 90. But how
can a man be conscious 'that nothing whatever _can_ force his will'?
This is not consciousness, but judgment: it is a judgment of what may
be, not a consciousness of what is. If there is any meaning in the word
'consciousness,' it must refer solely to the present, and can never
include future contingencies as to what _may_ be or _can_ be.
[14] As Herder says, 'Was diese Nation ihrem Gedankenkreise
unentbehrlich hält, daran hat jene nie gedacht oder hält es gar
für schädlich.' _Ideen zur Gesch. der Menschheit_, vol. ii. p. 130.
[15] Plato was struck by the extreme difficulty of finding a standard
in the human mind whereby we may test the truth or falsehood of
spectral phenomena and dreams. And the only conclusion to which
this consummate thinker could arrive, was that whatever appears
true to the individual mind is true for him: which, however, is an
evasion of the problem, not a solution of it. See the Theætetus,
where Plato, as usual, puts his own speculations into the mouth of
Socrates. He opens the question at the beginning of sec. 39
(_Platonis Opera_, vol. iii. p. 426, edit. Bekker, Lond. 1826),
[Greek: Mê toinun apolipômen rhson elleipon autou. lepetai de
enupniôn te peri kai nosôn, tôn te allôn kai manias], &c. These are
the supposed sources of error; but Socrates, after discussing them,
and entangling Theætetus in a maze, sums up at the end of sec. 45,
p. 434, [Greek: alêthês ara emoi êh emê aisthêsis.] See further,
p. 515, on the formation of erroneous judgments; and respecting the
assertions made by many of the Greeks that [Greek: pasa phantsia
alêthês] and [Greek: pasa duxa alêthês], compare _Cudworth_,
vol. iii. p. 379, vol. iv. p. 118. For physiological considerations
concerning the preservation of consciousness in dreams and in
insanity, see _Broussais_, _Examen des Doctrines Médicales_,
vol. i. p. 406; his _Cours de Phrénologie_, p. 49; _Esquirol_,
_Maladies Mentales_, vol. i. p. 97, vol. ii. p. 790; _Simon's
Pathology_, p. 204; _Holland's Medical Notes_, p. 434; _Henle_,
_Anatomie Générale_, vol. ii. p. 287; _Burdach_, _Traité de
Physiologie_, vol. v. p. 223. See, too, the passages in Tennemann
which connect this difficulty with the theory of representation
(_Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. i. p. 357, vol. ii. pp. 119,
159, vol. iii. p. 406, vol. iv. p. 418); and the attempt of
Berkeley (_Works_, vol. i. pp. 93, 101, 176) to turn it into a
defence of his own system, on the ground that our belief respecting
the external world may be as false when we are awake as when we
dream. The solution offered by the Stoics is merely a verbal and
unproved distinction: [Greek: diapherei de phantasia kai phantasma.
phantasma men gar esti dokêsis dianoias oia ginetai kata tous
upnous; phantasia de esti tupôsis en psuchê toutestin alloiôsis,
hôs ho Chrusippos en tê duôdekatê peri psuchês uphistatai.] _Diog.
Laert. de Vitis Philos._ lib. vii. segm. 50, vol. i. p. 395.
Fortunately, however, for the object of this work, the believer in the
possibility of a science of history is not called upon to hold either
the doctrine of predestined events, or that of freedom of the will;[16]
and the only positions which, in this stage of the inquiry, I shall
expect him to concede are the following: That when we perform an action,
we perform it in consequence of some motive or motives; that those
motives are the results of some antecedents; and that, therefore, if we
were acquainted with the whole of the antecedents, and with all the laws
of their movements, we could with unerring certainty predict the whole
of their immediate results. This, unless I am greatly mistaken, is the
view which must be held by every man whose mind is unbiased by system,
and who forms his opinions according to the evidence actually before
him.[17] If, for example, I am intimately acquainted with the character
of any person, I can frequently tell how he will act under some given
circumstances. Should I fail in this prediction, I must ascribe my error
not to the arbitrary and capricious freedom of his will, nor to any
supernatural pre-arrangement, for of neither of these things have we the
slightest proof; but I must be content to suppose either that I had been
misinformed as to some of the circumstances in which he was placed, or
else that I had not sufficiently studied the ordinary operations of his
mind. If, however, I were capable of correct reasoning, and if, at the
same time, I had a complete knowledge both of his disposition and of all
the events by which he was surrounded, I should be able to foresee the
line of conduct which, in consequence of those events, he would
adopt.[18]
[16] Meaning by free will, a cause of action residing in the mind, and
exerting itself independently of motives. If any one says that we
have this power of acting without motives, but that in the
practical exercise of the power we are always guided by motives
either conscious or unconscious--if any one says this, he asserts
a barren proposition, which does not interfere with my views, and
which may or may not be true, but which most assuredly no one has
ever yet succeeded in proving.
[17] That is, according to the phenomenal evidence presented to the
understanding, and estimated by the ordinary logic with which the
understanding is conversant. But Kant has made a most remarkable
attempt to avoid the practical consequences of this, by asserting
that freedom, being an idea produced by the reason, must be
referred to transcendental laws of the reason; that is, to laws
which are removed from the domain of experience, and cannot be
verified by observation. In regard, however, to the scientific
conceptions of the understanding (as distinguished from the Reason)
he fully admits the existence of a Necessity destructive of
Liberty. In Note A, at the end of this chapter, I shall put
together the most important passages in which Kant unfolds this
view.
[18] This is, of course, an hypothetical case, merely given as an
illustration. We never can know the whole of any man's antecedents,
or even the whole of our own; but it is certain that the nearer we
approach to a complete knowledge of the antecedent, the more
likely we shall be to predict the consequent.
Rejecting, then, the metaphysical dogma of free will, and the
theological dogma of predestined events,[19] we are driven to the
conclusion that the actions of men, being determined solely by their
antecedents, must have a character of uniformity, that is to say, must,
under precisely the same circumstances, always issue in precisely the
same results. And as all antecedents are either in the mind or out of
it, we clearly see that all the variations in the results, in other
words, all the changes of which history is full, all the vicissitudes of
the human race, their progress or their decay, their happiness or their
misery, must be the fruit of a double action; an action of external
phenomena upon the mind, and another action of the mind upon the
phenomena.
[19] The doctrine of providential interference is bound up with that of
predestination, because the Deity, foreseeing all things, must have
foreseen His own intention to interfere. To deny this foresight, is
to limit the omniscience of God. Those, therefore, who hold that,
in particular cases, a special providence interrupts the ordinary
course of events, must also hold that in each case the interruption
had been predestined; otherwise they impeach one of the Divine
attributes. For, as Thomas Aquinas puts it (_Neander's History of
the Church_, vol. viii. p. 176), 'knowledge, as knowledge, does not
imply, indeed, causality; but in so far as it is a knowledge
belonging to the artist who forms, it stands in the relation of
causality to that which is produced by his art.'
The same argument is stated by Alciphron, though not quite so
conclusively; _Dialogue_ vii. sec. 20 in _Berkeley's Works_,
vol. i. p. 515: and as to the impossibility of Omniscience having
new knowledge or an afterthought, see _Hitchcock's Religion of
Geology_, 1851, pp. 267, 328; an ingenious work, but one which
leaves all the real difficulties untouched. Compare _Ritter's Hist.
of Ancient Philos._ vol. iv. pp. 326, 327, with _Tennemann_,
_Gesch. der Philos._ vol. vi. pp. 151, 342-345, vol. ix. pp. 81-94,
vol. xi. p. 178; and in particular, the question raised (vol. viii.
p. 242), 'Ob das Vorherwissen Gottes die Ursache der künftigen
Dinge sey, oder nicht.' It was to meet all this, that some asserted
the eternity of matter, and others the existence of two original
principles, one good and one evil. _Beausobre_, _Histoire de
Manichée_, vol. ii. pp. 145, 146, 252, 336.
These are the materials out of which a philosophic history can alone be
constructed. On the one hand, we have the human mind obeying the laws of
its own existence, and, when uncontrolled by external agents, developing
itself according to the conditions of its organization. On the other
hand, we have what is called Nature, obeying likewise its laws; but
incessantly coming into contact with the minds of men, exciting their
passions, stimulating their intellect, and therefore giving to their
actions a direction which they would not have taken without such
disturbance. Thus we have man modifying nature, and nature modifying
man; while out of this reciprocal modification all events must
necessarily spring.
The problem immediately before us, is to ascertain the method of
discovering the laws of this double modification: and this, as we shall
presently see, leads us into a preliminary inquiry as to which of the
two modifications is the more important; that is to say, whether the
thoughts and desires of men are more influenced by physical phenomena,
or whether the physical phenomena are more influenced by them. For it is
evident that whichever class is the more active, should if possible be
studied before the other; and this, partly because its results will be
more prominent, and therefore more easy to observe; and partly because
by first generalizing the laws of the greater power we shall leave a
smaller residue of unexplained facts than if we had begun by
generalizing the laws of the lesser power. But, before entering into
this examination, it will be convenient to state some of the most
decisive proofs we now possess of the regularity with which mental
phenomena succeed each other. By this means the preceding views will be
considerably strengthened; and we shall, at the same time, be able to
see what those resources are which have been already employed in
elucidating this great subject.
That the results actually effected are extremely valuable is evident,
not only from the wide surface which the generalizations cover, but also
from the extraordinary precautions with which they have been made. For
while most moral inquiries have depended on some theological or
metaphysical hypothesis, the investigations to which I allude are
exclusively inductive; they are based on collections of almost
innumerable facts, extending over many countries, thrown into the
clearest of all forms, the form of arithmetical tables; and finally,
they have been put together by men who, being for the most part mere
government officials,[20] had no particular theory to maintain, and no
interest in distorting the truth of the reports they were directed to
make.
[20] _Dufau_, _Traité de Statistique_, pp. 75, 148.
The most comprehensive inferences respecting the actions of men, which
are admitted by all parties as incontestable truths, are derived from
this or from analogous sources; they rest on statistical evidence, and
are expressed in mathematical language. And whoever is aware of how much
has been discovered by this single method, must not only recognize the
uniformity with which mental phenomena succeed each other, but must, I
think, feel sanguine that still more important discoveries will be made,
so soon as there are brought into play those other powerful resources
which even the present state of knowledge will abundantly supply.
Without, however, anticipating future inquiries, we are, for the moment,
only concerned with those proofs of the existence of a uniformity in
human affairs which statisticians have been the first to bring forward.
The actions of men are by an easy and obvious division separated into
two classes, the virtuous and the vicious; and as these classes are
correlative, and when put together compose the total of our moral
conduct, it follows that whatever increases the one, will in a relative
point of view diminish the other; so that if we can in any period detect
a uniformity and a method in the vices of a people, there must be a
corresponding regularity in their virtues; or if we could prove a
regularity in their virtues, we should necessarily infer an equal
regularity in their vices; the two sets of actions being, according to
the terms of the division, merely supplementary to each other.[21] Or,
to express this proposition in another way, it is evident that if it can
be demonstrated that the bad actions of men vary in obedience to the
changes in the surrounding society, we shall be obliged to infer that
their good actions, which are, as it were, the residue of their bad
ones, vary in the same manner; and we shall be forced to the further
conclusion, that such variations are the result of large and general
causes, which, working upon the aggregate of society, must produce
certain consequences, without regard to the volition of those
particular men of whom the society is composed.
[21] Some moralists have also established a third class of actions,
which they call indifferent, as belonging neither to virtue nor to
vice; and hence there arose the famous doctrine of probability,
set up by several eminent Romish casuists, and hotly attacked by
Pascal. But this, if we put aside its worst feature, namely its
practical bearings, is merely a question of definition; inasmuch
as every indifferent act must lean on the side either of evil or
of good, and may therefore be referred to the category to which it
inclines; and certainly every increase of vice diminishes virtue
relatively, though not always absolutely. Among the Greek
philosophers there was a schism on this point: [Greek: Areskei de
autois] (i.e. the Stoics) [Greek: mêden meson einai aretês kai
kakias; tôn peripatêtikôn metaxu aretês kai kakias einai legontôn
tên prokopên]. _Diog. Laert. de Vitis Philosophorum_, lib. vii.
segm. 127, vol. i. p. 445.
Such is the regularity we expect to find, if the actions of men are
governed by the state of the society in which they occur; while, on the
other hand, if we can find no such regularity, we may believe that their
actions depend on some capricious and personal principle peculiar to
each man, as free will or the like. It becomes, therefore, in the
highest degree important to ascertain whether or not there exists a
regularity in the entire moral conduct of a given society; and this is
precisely one of those questions for the decision of which statistics
supply us with materials of immense value.
For the main object of legislation being to protect the innocent against
the guilty, it naturally followed that European governments, so soon as
they became aware of the importance of statistics, should begin to
collect evidence respecting the crimes they were expected to punish.
This evidence has gone on accumulating, until it now forms of itself a
large body of literature, containing, with the commentaries connected
with it, an immense array of facts, so carefully compiled, and so well
and clearly digested, that more may be learned from it respecting the
moral nature of Man than can be gathered from all the accumulated
experience of preceding ages.[22] But as it will be impossible in this
Introduction to give anything like a complete statement of those
inferences which, in the actual state of statistics, we are authorized
to draw, I shall content myself with examining two or three of the most
important, and pointing out the connexion between them.
[22] I say this advisedly: and whoever has examined these subjects must
be aware of the way in which writers on morals repeat the
commonplace and hackneyed notions of their predecessors; so that a
man, after reading everything that has been written on moral
conduct and moral philosophy, will find himself nearly as much in
the dark as when his studies first began. The most accurate
investigators of the human mind have hitherto been the poets,
particularly Homer and Shakespeare; but these extraordinary
observers mainly occupied themselves with the concrete phenomena
of life; and if they analyzed, as they probably did, they have
concealed the steps of the process, so that now we can only verify
their conclusions empirically. The great advance made by the
statisticians consists in applying to these inquiries the doctrine
of averages, which no one thought of doing before the eighteenth
century.
Of all offences, it might well be supposed that the crime of murder is
one of the most arbitrary and irregular. For when we consider that this,
though generally the crowning act of a long career of vice, is often the
immediate result of what seems a sudden impulse; that when premeditated,
its committal, even with the least chance of impunity, requires a rare
combination of favourable circumstances for which the criminal will
frequently wait; that he has thus to bide his time, and look for
opportunities he cannot control; that when the time has come his heart
may fail him; that the question whether or not he shall commit the crime
may depend on a balance of conflicting motives, such as fear of the law,
a dread of the penalties held out by religion, the prickings of his own
conscience, the apprehension of future remorse, the love of gain,
jealousy, revenge, desperation;--when we put all these things together,
there arises such a complication of causes, that we might reasonably
despair of detecting any order or method in the result of those subtle
and shifting agencies by which murder is either caused or prevented. But
now, how stands the fact? The fact is, that murder is committed with as
much regularity, and bears as uniform a relation to certain known
circumstances, as do the movements of the tides, and the rotations of
the seasons. M. Quetelet, who has spent his life in collecting and
methodizing the statistics of different countries, states, as the result
of his laborious researches, that 'in everything which concerns crime,
the same numbers re-occur with a constancy which cannot be mistaken; and
that this is the case even with those crimes which seem quite
independent of human foresight, such, for instance, as murders, which
are generally committed after quarrels arising from circumstances
apparently casual. Nevertheless, we know from experience that every
year there not only take place nearly the same number of murders, but
that even the instruments by which they are committed are employed in
the same proportion.'[23] This was the language used in 1835 by
confessedly the first statistician in Europe, and every subsequent
investigation has confirmed its accuracy. For later inquiries have
ascertained the extraordinary fact that the uniform reproduction of
crime is more clearly marked, and more capable of being predicted, than
are the physical laws connected with the disease and destruction of our
bodies. Thus, for instance, the number of persons accused of crime in
France between 1826 and 1844 was, by a singular coincidence, about equal
to the male deaths which took place in Paris during the same period, the
difference being that the fluctuations in the amount of crime were
actually smaller than the fluctuations in the mortality; while a similar
regularity was observed in each separate offence, all of which obeyed
the same law of uniform and periodical repetition.[24]
[23] 'Dans tout ce qui se rapporte aux crimes, les mêmes nombres se
reproduisent avec une constance telle, qu'il serait impossible de
la méconnaître, même pour ceux des crimes qui sembleraient devoir
échapper le plus à toute prévision humaine, tels que les meurtres,
puisqu'ils se commettent, en général, à la suite de rixes qui
naissent sans motifs, et dans les circonstances, en apparence,
les plus fortuites. Cependant l'expérience prouve que non-seulement
les meurtres sont annuellement à peu près en même nombre, mais
encore que les instrumens qui servent à les commettre sont employés
dans les mêmes proportions.' _Quetelet sur l'Homme_, Paris, 1835,
vol. i. p. 7; see also vol. ii. pp. 164, 247.
[24] 'Thus in twenty years' observations, the number of persons accused
of various crimes in France, and registered under their respective
ages, scarcely varies at any age from year to year, comparing the
proportion per cent. under each age with the totals. The number of
persons accused in all France, in the years 1826 to 1844, was about
equal to the deaths of males registered in Paris; but singularly
enough, the former results are more regular than the latter,
notwithstanding the accidental causes which might affect
them;--notwithstanding even a revolution in Paris, which convulsed
society and brought in a new dynasty.' _Brown on the Uniform Action
of the Human Will_, in _The Assurance Magazine_, no. viii., July
1852, pp. 349, 350. That the variations in crime are less than
those of mortality, is also noticed in _Statistique Morale_,
pp. 18, 34, in _Mémoires de l'Académie de Belgique_, vol. xxi.,
Bruxelles, 1848, 4to.
This, indeed, will appear strange to those who believe that human
actions depend more upon the peculiarities of each individual than on
the general state of society. But another circumstance remains behind
still more striking. Among public and registered crimes there is none
which seems so completely dependent on the individual as suicide.
Attempts to murder or to rob may be, and constantly are, successfully
resisted; baffled sometimes by the party attacked, sometimes by the
officers of justice. But an attempt to commit suicide is much less
liable to interruption. The man who is determined to kill himself is not
prevented at the last moment by the struggles of an enemy; and, as he
can easily guard against the interference of the civil power,[25] his
act becomes as it were isolated; it is cut off from foreign
disturbances, and seems more clearly the product of his own volition
than any other offence could possibly be. We may also add that, unlike
crimes in general, it is rarely caused by the instigation of
confederates; so that men, not being goaded into it by their companions,
are uninfluenced by one great class of external associations which
might hamper what is termed the freedom of their will. It may,
therefore, very naturally be thought impracticable to refer suicide to
general principles, or to detect anything like regularity in an offence
which is so eccentric, so solitary, so impossible to control by
legislation, and which the most vigilant police can do nothing to
diminish. There is also another obstacle that impedes our view: this is,
that even the best evidence respecting suicide must always be very
imperfect. In cases of drowning, for example, deaths are liable to be
returned as suicides which are accidental; while, on the other hand,
some are called accidental which are voluntary.[26] Thus it is, that
self-murder seems to be not only capricious and uncontrollable, but also
very obscure in regard to proof; so that on all these grounds it might
be reasonable to despair of ever tracing it to those general causes by
which it is produced.
[25] The folly of lawgivers thinking that by their enactments they can
diminish suicide, is exposed by M. C. Comte in his _Traité de
Législation_, vol. i. p. 486. See also some good remarks by
Jefferson, in his observations on criminal law in _Appendix to
Jefferson's Memoirs, by Randolph_, vol. i. pp. 126, 127. Heber
(_Journey through India_, vol. i. pp. 389, 390) found that the
English Government had vainly attempted to check the suicides
frequently committed at Benares by drowning: and in our country
the interference of legislators is met by the perjury of jurors,
since, as Bentham says, English juries do not hesitate to violate
their oaths by declaring the suicide to be _non compos_.
_Principles of Penal Law_, in _Bentham's Works_, edit. Bowring,
1843, vol. i. pp. 479, 480. In regard to the determination of the
individual, and the impossibility of baffling his intention, there
are cases recorded of persons who, being deprived of the ordinary
means of destruction, put an end to life by holding their breath;
while others effected their purpose by turning back the tongue so
as to exclude air from the larynx. _Elliotson's Human Physiology_,
pp. 491, 492.
[26] This also applies to other cases besides those of drowning. See
_Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence_, 1846, pp. 587, 597; and on the
difficulty of always distinguishing a real suicide from an apparent
one, see _Esquirol_, _Maladies Mentales_, vol. i. p. 575. From a
third to a half of all suicides are by drowning. Compare _Dufau_,
_Traité de Statistique_, p. 304; _Winslow's Anatomy of Suicide_,
1840, p. 277; _Quetelet_, _Statistique Morale_, p. 66. But among
these, many are no doubt involuntary; and it is certain that
popular opinion grossly exaggerates the length of time during which
it is possible to remain under water. _Brodie's Surgery_, 1846,
pp. 89-92.
These being the peculiarities of this singular crime, it is surely an
astonishing fact, that all the evidence we possess respecting it points
to one great conclusion, and can leave no doubt on our minds that
suicide is merely the product of the general condition of society, and
that the individual felon only carries into effect what is a necessary
consequence of preceding circumstances.[27] In a given state of
society, a certain number of persons must put an end to their own life.
This is the general law; and the special question as to who shall commit
the crime depends, of course, upon special laws; which, however, in
their total action, must obey the large social law to which they are all
subordinate. And the power of the larger law is so irresistible, that
neither the love of life nor the fear of another world can avail
anything towards even checking its operation. The causes of this
remarkable regularity I shall hereafter examine; but the existence of
the regularity is familiar to whoever is conversant with moral
statistics. In the different countries for which we have returns, we
find year by year the same proportion of persons putting an end to their
own existence; so that, after making allowance for the impossibility of
collecting complete evidence, we are able to predict, within a very
small limit of error, the number of voluntary deaths for each ensuing
period; supposing, of course, that the social circumstances do not
undergo any marked change. Even in London, notwithstanding the
vicissitudes incidental to the largest and most luxurious capital in the
world, we find a regularity greater than could be expected by the most
sanguine believer in social laws; since political excitement, mercantile
excitement, and the misery produced by the dearness of food, are all
causes of suicide, and are all constantly varying.[28] Nevertheless, in
this vast metropolis, about 240 persons every year make away with
themselves; the annual suicides oscillating, from the pressure of
temporary causes, between 266, the highest, and 213, the lowest. In
1846, which was the great year of excitement caused by the railway
panic, the suicides in London were 266; in 1847 began a slight
improvement, and they fell to 256; in 1848 they were 247; in 1849 they
were 213; and in 1850 they were 229.[29]
[27] 'Tout semble dépendre de causes déterminées. Ainsi, nous trouvons
annuellement à peu près le même nombre de suicides, non-seulement
en général, mais encore en faisant la distinction des sexes, celle
des âges, ou même celle des instruments employés pour se détruire.
Une année reproduit si fidèlement les chiffres de l'année qui a
précédé, qu'on peut prévoir ce qui doit arriver dans l'année qui
va suivre.' _Quetelet_, _Statistique Morale_, 1848, p. 35; see
also p. 40.
[28] On the causes of suicides, see _Burdach's Traité de Physiologie_,
vol. v. pp. 476-478; and _Forry's Climate and its Endemic
Influences_, p. 329. The latest researches of M. Casper confirm
the statement of earlier statisticians, that suicide is more
frequent among Protestants than among Catholics. _Casper_,
_Denkwürdigkeiten zur medicinischen Statistik_, Berlin, 1846,
p. 139.
[29] See the tables in the _Assurance Magazine_, no. iv. p. 309, no.
v. p. 34, no. viii. p. 350. These are the only complete
consecutive returns of London suicides yet published; those issued
by the police being imperfect. _Assurance Magazine_, no. v. p. 53.
From inquiries made for me at the General Register Office, in
January 1856, I learnt that there was an intention of completing
the yearly returns, but I do not know if this has since been done.
Such is some, and only some, of the evidence we now possess respecting
the regularity with which, in the same state of society, the same crimes
are necessarily reproduced. To appreciate the full force of this
evidence, we must remember that it is not an arbitrary selection of
particular facts, but that it is generalized from an exhaustive
statement of criminal statistics, consisting of many millions of
observations, extending over countries in different grades of
civilization, with different laws, different opinions, different morals,
different habits. If we add to this, that these statistics have been
collected by persons specially employed for that purpose, with every
means of arriving at the truth, and with no interest to deceive, it
surely must be admitted that the existence of crime according to a fixed
and uniform scheme, is a fact more clearly attested than any other in
the moral history of man. We have here parallel chains of evidence
formed with extreme care, under the most different circumstances, and
all pointing in the same direction; all of them forcing us to the
conclusion, that the offences of men are the result not so much of the
vices of the individual offender as of the state of society into which
that individual is thrown.[30] This is an inference resting on broad and
tangible proofs accessible to all the world; and as such cannot be
overturned, or even impeached, by any of those hypotheses with which
metaphysicians and theologians have hitherto perplexed the study of
past events.
[30] 'L'expérience démontre en effet, avec toute l'évidence possible,
cette opinion, qui pourra sembler paradoxale au premier abord, que
_c'est la société qui prépare le crime, et que le coupable n'est
que l'instrument qui l'exécute_.' _Quetelet sur l'Homme_, vol. ii.
p. 325.
Those readers who are acquainted with the manner in which in the
physical world the operations of the laws of nature are constantly
disturbed, will expect to find in the moral world disturbances equally
active. Such aberrations proceed, in both instances, from minor laws,
which at particular points meet the larger laws, and thus alter their
normal action. Of this, the science of mechanics affords a good example
in the instance of that beautiful theory called the parallelogram of
forces; according to which the forces are to each other in the same
proportion as is the diagonal of their respective parallelograms.[31]
This is a law pregnant with great results; it is connected with those
important mechanical resources, the composition and resolution of
forces; and no one acquainted with the evidence on which it stands, ever
thought of questioning its truth. But the moment we avail ourselves of
it for practical purposes, we find that in its action it is warped by
other laws, such as those concerning the friction of air, and the
different density of the bodies on which we operate, arising from their
chemical composition, or, as some suppose, from their atomic
arrangement. Perturbations being thus let in, the pure and simple action
of the mechanical law disappears. Still, and although the results of the
law are incessantly disturbed, the law itself remains intact.[32] Just
in the same way, the great social law, that the moral actions of men
are the product not of their volition, but of their antecedents, is
itself liable to disturbances which trouble its operation without
affecting its truth. And this is quite sufficient to explain those
slight variations which we find from year to year in the total amount of
crime produced by the same country. Indeed, looking at the fact that the
moral world is far more abundant in materials than the physical world,
the only ground for astonishment is that these variations should not be
greater; and from the circumstance that the discrepancies are so
trifling, we may form some idea of the prodigious energy of those vast
social laws, which, though constantly interrupted, seem to triumph over
every obstacle, and which, when examined by the aid of large numbers,
scarcely undergo any sensible perturbation.[33]
[31] The diagonal always giving the resultant when each side represents
a force; and if we look on the resultant as a compound force, a
comparison of diagonals becomes a comparison of compounds.
[32] A law of nature being merely a generalization of relations, and
having no existence except in the mind, is essentially intangible;
and therefore, however small the law may be, it can never admit of
exceptions, though its operation may admit of innumerable
exceptions. Hence, as Dugald Stewart (_Philosophy of the Mind_,
vol. ii. p. 211) rightly says, we can only refer to the laws of
nature 'by a sort of figure or metaphor.' This is constantly lost
sight of even by authors of repute; some of whom speak of laws as
if they were causes, and therefore liable to interruption by larger
causes; while other writers pronounce them to be 'delegated
agencies' from the Deity. Compare _Prout's Bridgewater Treatise_,
pp. 318, 435, 495; _Sadler's Law of Population_, vol. ii. p. 67;
_Burdach's Physiologie_, vol. i. p. 160. Mr. Paget, in his able
work, _Lectures on Pathology_, vol. i. p. 481, vol. ii. p. 542,
with much greater accuracy calls such cases 'apparent exceptions'
to laws; but it would be better to say, 'exceptions to the
operations of laws.' The context clearly proves that Mr. Paget
distinctly apprehends the difference; but a slight alteration of
this kind would prevent confusion in the minds of ordinary readers.
[33] Mr. Rawson, in his _Inquiry into the Statistics of Crime in England
and Wales_ (published in the _Journal of the Statistical Society_,
vol. ii. pp. 316-344), says, p. 327, 'No greater proof can be given
of the possibility of arriving at certain constants with regard to
crime, than the fact which appears in the following table, that the
greatest variation which has taken place during the last three
years, in the proportion of any class of criminals at the same
period of life, has not exceeded a half per cent.' See also _Report
of British Association for 1839, Transac. of Sec._, p. 118. Indeed,
all writers who have examined the evidence are forced to admit this
regularity, however they may wish to explain it. M. Dufau (_Traité
de Statistique_, p. 144) says, 'Les faits de l'ordre moral sont,
aussi bien que ceux de l'ordre naturel, le produit de causes
constantes et régulières,' &c.; and at p. 367, 'C'est ainsi que le
monde moral se présente à nous, de ce point de vue, comme offrant,
de même que le monde physique, un ensemble continu d'effets dus à
des causes constantes et régulières, dont il appartient surtout à
la statistique de constater l'action.' See to the same effect
_Moreau-Christophe des Prisons en France_, Paris, 1838, pp. 53,
189.
Nor is it merely the crimes of men which are marked by this uniformity
of sequence. Even the number of marriages annually contracted, is
determined, not by the temper and wishes of individuals, but by large
general facts, over which individuals can exercise no authority. It is
now known that marriages bear a fixed and definite relation to the price
of corn;[34] and in England the experience of a century has proved that,
instead of having any connexion with personal feelings, they are simply
regulated by the average earnings of the great mass of the people:[35]
so that this immense social and religious institution is not only
swayed, but is completely controlled, by the price of food and by the
rate of wages. In other cases, uniformity has been detected, though the
causes of the uniformity are still unknown. Thus, to give a curious
instance, we are now able to prove that even the aberrations of memory
are marked by this general character of necessary and invariable order.
The post-offices of London and of Paris have latterly published returns
of the number of letters which the writers, through forgetfulness,
omitted to direct; and, making allowance for the difference of
circumstances, the returns are year after year copies of each other.
Year after year the same proportion of letter-writers forget this simple
act; so that for each successive period we can actually foretell the
number of persons whose memory will fail them in regard to this
trifling and, as it might appear, accidental occurrence.[36]
[34] 'It is curious to observe how intimate a relation exists between
the price of food and the number of marriages.' ... 'The relation
that subsists between the price of food and the number of marriages
is not confined to our own country; and it is not improbable that,
had we the means of ascertaining the facts, we should see the like
result in every civilized community. We possess the necessary
returns from France; and these fully bear out the view that has
been given.' _Porter's Progress of the Nation_, vol. ii. pp. 244,
245, London, 1838.
[35] 'The marriage returns of 1850 and 1851 exhibit the excess which
since 1750 has been invariably observed when the substantial
earnings of the people are above the average.' _Journal of
Statistical Society_, vol. xv. p. 185.
[36] See _Somerville's Physical Geography_, vol. ii. pp. 409-411, which,
says this able writer, proves that 'forgetfulness as well as free
will is under constant laws.' But this is using the word 'free
will' in a sense different from that commonly employed.
To those who have a steady conception of the regularity of events, and
have firmly seized the great truth that the actions of men, being guided
by their antecedents, are in reality never inconsistent, but, however
capricious they may appear, only form part of one vast scheme of
universal order, of which we in the present state of knowledge can
barely see the outline--to those who understand this, which is at once
the key and the basis of history, the facts just adduced, so far from
being strange, will be precisely what would have been expected and ought
long since to have been known. Indeed, the progress of inquiry is
becoming so rapid and so earnest, that I entertain little doubt that
before another century has elapsed, the chain of evidence will be
complete, and it will be as rare to find an historian who denies the
undeviating regularity of the moral world, as it now is to find a
philosopher who denies the regularity of the material world.
It will be observed, that the preceding proofs of our actions being
regulated by law, have been derived from statistics; a branch of
knowledge which, though still in its infancy,[37] has already thrown
more light on the study of human nature than all the sciences put
together. But although the statisticians have been the first to
investigate this great subject by treating it according to those methods
of reasoning which in other fields have been found successful; and
although they have, by the application of numbers, brought to bear upon
it a very powerful engine for eliciting truth--we must not, on that
account, suppose that there are no other resources remaining by which it
may likewise be cultivated: nor should we infer that because the
physical sciences have not yet been applied to history, they are
therefore inapplicable to it. Indeed, when we consider the incessant
contact between man and the external world, it is certain that there
must be an intimate connexion between human actions and physical laws;
so that if physical science had not hitherto been brought to bear upon
history, the reason is, either that historians have not perceived the
connexion, or else that, having perceived it, they have been destitute
of the knowledge by which its workings can be traced. Hence there has
arisen an unnatural separation of the two great departments of inquiry,
the study of the internal and that of the external: and although, in the
present state of European literature, there are some unmistakable
symptoms of a desire to break down this artificial barrier, still it
must be admitted that as yet nothing has been actually accomplished
towards effecting so great an end. The moralists, the theologians, and
the metaphysicians, continue to prosecute their studies without much
respect for what they deem the inferior labours of scientific men; whose
inquiries, indeed, they frequently attack, as dangerous to the interests
of religion, and as inspiring us with an undue confidence in the
resources of the human understanding. On the other hand, the cultivators
of physical science, conscious that they are an advancing body, are
naturally proud of their own success; and, contrasting their discoveries
with the more stationary position of their opponents, are led to despise
pursuits the barrenness of which has now become notorious.
[37] Achenwall, in the middle of the eighteenth century, is usually
considered to be the first systematic writer on statistics, and is
said to have given them their present name. See _Lewis_, _Methods
of Observation and Reasoning in Politics_, 1852, vol. i. p. 72;
_Biographie Universelle_, vol. i. p. 140; _Dufau_, _Traité de
Statistique_, pp. 9, 10. Even so late as 1800, the Bishop of
Llandaff wrote to Sir John Sinclair, 'I must think the kingdom is
highly indebted to you for bringing forward a species of knowledge
(statistics) wholly new in this country, though not new in other
parts of Europe.' _Sinclair's Correspondence_, vol. i. p. 230.
Sinclair, notwithstanding his industry, was a man of slender
powers, and did not at all understand the real importance of
statistics, of which, indeed, he took a mere practical view.
Since then statistics have been applied extensively to medicine;
and still more recently, and on a smaller scale, to philology and
to jurisprudence. Compare _Bouillaud_, _Philosophie Médicale_,
pp. 96, 186; _Renouard_, _Hist. de la Médecine_, vol. ii. pp. 474,
475; _Esquirol_, _Maladies Mentales_, vol. ii. pp. 665-667;
_Holland's Medical Notes_, pp. 5, 472; _Vogel's Pathological
Anatomy_, pp. 15-17; _Simon's Pathology_, p. 180; _Phillips on
Scrofula_, pp. 70, 118, &c.; _Prichard's Physical Hist. of
Mankind_, vol. iv. p. 414; _Eschbach_, _Etude du Droit_,
pp. 392-394.
It is the business of the historian to mediate between these two
parties, and reconcile their hostile pretensions by showing the point at
which their respective studies ought to coalesce. To settle the terms of
this coalition, will be to fix the basis of all history. For since
history deals with the actions of men, and since their actions are
merely the product of a collision between internal and external
phenomena, it becomes necessary to examine the relative importance of
those phenomena; to inquire into the extent to which their laws are
known; and to ascertain the resources for future discovery possessed by
these two great classes, the students of the mind and the students of
nature. This task I shall endeavour to accomplish in the next two
chapters: and if I do so with anything approaching to success, the
present work will at least have the merit of contributing something
towards filling up that wide and dreary chasm, which, to the hindrance
of our knowledge, separates subjects that are intimately related, and
should never be disunited.
* * * * *
NOTE A.
'Der Begriff der Freiheit ist ein reiner Vernunftbegriff, der eben darum
für die theoretische Philosophie transcendent, d. i. ein solcher ist,
dem kein angemessenes Beispiel in irgend einer möglichen Erfahrung
gegeben werden kann, welcher also keinen Gegenstand einer uns möglichen
theoretischen Erkenntniss ausmacht, und schlechterdings nicht für ein
constitutives, sondern lediglich als regulatives, und zwar nur bloss
negatives Princip der speculativen Vernunft gelten kann, im praktischen
Gebrauche der selben aber seine Realität durch praktische Grundsätze
beweist, die, als Gesetze, eine Causalität der reinen Vernunft,
unabhängig von allen empirischen Bedingungen (dem Sinnlichen überhaupt),
die Willkühr zu bestimmen, und einen reinen Willen in uns beweisen, in
welchem die sittlichen Begriffe und Gesetze ihren Ursprung haben.'
_Metaphysik der Sitten_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol. v. pp. 20, 21. 'Würden
die Gegenstände der Sinnenwelt für Dinge an sich selbst genommen, und
die oben angeführten Naturgesetze für Gesetze der Dinge an sich selbst,
so wäre der Widerspruch' (_i.e._ between Liberty and Necessity)
'unvermeidlich. Ebenso, wenn das Subject der Freiheit gleich den übrigen
Gegenständen als blose Erscheinung vorgestellt würde, so könnte
ebensowohl der Widerspruch nicht vermieden werden; denn es würde
ebendasselbe von einerlei Gegenständen in derselben Bedeutung zugleich
bejaht und verneint werden. Ist aber Naturnothwendigkeit bloss auf
Erscheinungen bezogen, und Freiheit bloss auf Dinge an sich selbst, so
entspringt kein Widerspruch, wenn man gleich beide Arten von Causalität
annimmt oder zugibt, so schwer oder unmöglich es auch sein möchte, die
von der letzteren Art begreiflich zu machen.' ... 'Natur also und
Freiheit eben demselben Dinge, aber in verschiedener Beziehung, einmal
als Erscheinung, das andre Mal als einem Dinge an sich selbst ohne
Widerspruch beigelegt werden können.' ... 'Nun kann ich ohne
Widerspruch sagen: alle Handlungen vernünftiger Wesen, sofern sie
Erscheinungen sind (in irgend einer Erfahrung angetroffen werden),
stehen unter der Naturnothwendigkeit; eben dieselben Handlungen aber,
bloss respective auf das vernünftige Subject und dessen Vermögen, nach
blosser Vernunft zu handeln, sind frei.' _Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen
Metaphysik_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol. iii. pp. 268-270. 'Denn ein
Geschöpf zu sein und als Naturwesen bloss dem Willen seines Urhebers zu
folgen; dennoch aber als freihandelndes Wesen (welches seinen vom
äusseren Einfluss unabhängigen Willen hat, der dem ersteren vielfältig
zuwider sein kann), der Zurechnung fähig zu sein, und seine eigene That
doch auch zugleich als die Wirkung eines höheren Wesens anzusehen: ist
eine Vereinbarung von Begriffen, die wir zwar in der Idee einer Welt,
als des höchsten Gutes, zusammen denken müssen; die aber nur der
einsehen kann, welcher bis zur Kenntniss der übersinnlichen
(intelligiblen) Welt durchdringt und die Art einsieht, wie sie der
Sinnenwelt zum Grunde liegt.' _Theodicee_, in _Kant's Werke_, vol. vi.
p. 149. 'Nun wollen wir annehmen, die durch unsere Kritik nothwendig
gemachte Unterscheidung der Dinge, als Gegenstände der Erfahrung, von
eben denselben, als Dingen an sich selbst, wäre gar nicht gemacht, so
müsste der Grundsatz der Causalität und mithin der Naturmechanismus in
Bestimmung derselben durchaus von allen Dingen überhaupt als wirkenden
Ursachen gelten. Von eben demselben Wesen also, z. B. der menschlichen
Seele, würde ich nicht sagen können, ihr Wille sei frei, und er sei doch
zugleich der Naturnothwendigkeit unterworfen, d. i. nicht frei, ohne in
einen offenbaren Widerspruch zu gerathen; weil ich die Seele in beiden
Sätzen in eben derselben Bedeutung, nämlich als Ding überhaupt (als
Sache an sich selbst), genommen habe und, ohne vorhergehende Kritik,
auch nicht anders nehmen konnte. Wenn aber die Kritik nicht geirrt hat,
da sie das Object in zweierlei Bedeutung nehmen lehrt, nämlich als
Erscheinung, oder als Ding an sich selbst; wenn die Deduction ihrer
Verstandesbegriffe richtig ist, mithin auch der Grundsatz der Causalität
nur auf Dinge im ersten Sinne genommen, nämlich so fern sie Gegenstände
der Erfahrung sind, geht, eben dieselben aber nach der zweiten Bedeutung
ihm nicht unterworfen sind, so wird eben derselbe Wille in der
Erscheinung (den sichtbaren Handlungen) als dem Naturgesetze nothwendig
gemäss und so fern nicht frei, und doch andererseits, als einem Dinge an
sich selbst angehörig, jenem nicht unterworfen, mithin als frei gedacht,
ohne dass hiebei ein Widerspruch vorgeht.' _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_,
in _Kant's Werke_, vol. ii. p. 24. 'Und hier zeigt die zwar gemeine,
aber betrügliche Voraussetzung der absoluten Realität der Erscheinungen
sogleich ihren nachtheiligen Einfluss, die Vernunft zu verwirren. Denn
sind Erscheinungen Dinge an sich selbst, so ist Freiheit nicht zu
retten. Alsdann ist Natur die vollständige und an sich hinreichend
bestimmende Ursache jeder Begebenheit, und die Bedingung derselben ist
jederzeit nur in der Reihe der Erscheinungen enthalten, die sammt ihrer
Wirkung unter dem Naturgesetze nothwendig sind. Wenn dagegen
Erscheinungen für Nichts mehr gelten, als sie in der That sind, nämlich
nicht für Dinge an sich, sondern blosse Vorstellungen, die nach
empirischen Gesetzen zusammenhängen, so müssen sie selbst noch Gründe
haben, die nicht Erscheinungen sind.' ... 'Hier habe ich nur die
Anmerkung machen wollen, dass, da der durchgängige Zusammenhang aller
Erscheinungen in einem Context der Natur ein unnachlässliches Gesetz
ist, dieses alle Freiheit nothwendig umstürzen müsste, wenn man der
Realität der Erscheinungen hartnäckig anhängen wollte. Daher auch
diejenigen, welche hierin der gemeinen Meinung folgen, niemals dahin
haben gelangen können, Natur und Freiheit mit einander zu vereinigen.'
_Kritik_, in _Werke_, vol. ii. pp. 419, 420. Finally, at p. 433, 'Man
muss wohl bemerken, dass wir hiedurch nicht die Wirklichkeit der
Freiheit, als eines der Vermögen, welche die Ursache von den
Erscheinungen unserer Sinnenwelt enthalten, haben darthun wollen. Denn
ausser dass dieses gar keine transcendentale Betrachtung, die bloss mit
Begriffen zu thun hat, gewesen sein würde, so könnte es auch nicht
gelingen, indem wir aus der Erfahrung niemals auf Etwas, was gar nicht
nach Erfahrungsgesetzen gedacht werden muss, schliessen können. Ferner
haben wir auch gar nicht einmal die Möglichkeit der Freiheit beweisen
wollen; denn dieses wäre auch nicht gelungen, weil wir überhaupt von
keinem Realgrunde und keiner Causalität aus blossen Begriffen _a priori_
die Möglichkeit erkennen können. Die Freiheit wird hier nur als
transcendentale Idee behandelt, wodurch die Vernunft die Reihe der
Bedingungen in der Erscheinung durch das sinnlich Unbedingte schlechthin
aufzuheben denkt, dabei sich in eine Antinomie mit ihren eigenen
Gesetzen, welche sie dem empirischen Gebrauche des Verstandes
vorschreibt, verwickelt. Dass nun diese Antinomie auf einem blossen
Scheine beruhe, und dass Natur der Causalität aus Freiheit wenigstens
nicht widerstreite, das war das Einzige, was wir leisten konnten, und
woran es uns auch einzig und allein gelegen war.'
These passages prove that Kant saw that the phenomenal reality of Free
Will is an indefensible doctrine: and as the present work is an
investigation of the laws of phenomena, his transcendental philosophy
does not affect my conclusions. According to Kant's view (and with which
I am inclined to agree) the ordinary metaphysical and theological
treatment of this dark problem is purely empirical, and therefore has no
value. The denial of the supremacy of consciousness follows as a natural
consequence, and is the result of the Kantian philosophy, and not, as is
often said, the base of it.