MATTER AND MIND
In conclusion it may be worth while saying a few words as to theories of
the physical world supplementary to the views that have already been
stated above.
Gross matter, as the possibility of sensation, has been divided into
five classes, according to their relative grossness, corresponding to
the relative grossness of the senses. Some modern investigators have
tried to understand the five bhūtas, viz. ākāśa, marut, tejas, ap and
kshiti as ether, gaseous heat and light, liquids and solids. But I
cannot venture to agree when I reflect that solidity, liquidity and
gaseousness represent only an impermanent aspect of matter. The division
of matter from the standpoint of the possibility of our sensations, has
a firm root in our nature as cognising beings and has therefore a better
rational footing than the modern chemical division into elements and
compounds, which are being daily threatened by the gradual advance of
scientific culture. This carries with it no fixed and consistent
rational conception as do the definitions of the ancients, but is a mere
makeshift for understanding or representing certain chemical changes of
matter and has therefore a merely relative value.
There are five aspects from which gross matter can be viewed. These are
(1) sthūla (gross), (2) svarūpa (substantive), (3) sūkshma (subtle), (4)
anvaya (conjunction), (5) arthavattva (purpose for use). The sthūla or
gross physical characteristics of the bhūtas are described as follows:—
Qualities of Earth—Form, heaviness, roughness, obstruction, stability,
manifestation (vṛtti), difference, support, turbidity, hardness and
enjoyability.
Ap—Smoothness, subtlety, clearness, whiteness, softness, heaviness,
coolness, conservation, purity, cementation.
Tejas—Going upwards, cooking, burning, light, shining, dissipating,
energising.
Vāyu—Transverse motion, purity, throwing, pushing, strength, movability,
want of shadow.
Ākāśa—Motion in all directions, non-agglomeration, non-obstruction.
These physical characteristics are distinguished from the aspects by
which they appeal to the senses, which are called their svarūpas. Earth
is characterised by gandha or smell, ap by rasa or taste, tejas by rūpa,
etc. Looked at from this point of view, we see that smell arises by the
contact of the nasal organ with the hard particles of matter; so this
hardness or solidity which can so generate the sensibility of gandha, is
said to be the svarūpa of kshiti. Taste can originate only in connection
with liquidity, so this liquidity or sneha is the svarūpa or nature of
ap. Light—the quality of visibility—manifests itself in connection with
heat, so heat is the svarūpa of fire. The sensibility of touch is
generated in connection with the vibration of air on the epidermal
surface; so this vibratory nature is the svarūpa of air.
The sensibility to sound proceeds from the nature of
obstructionlessness, which belongs to ākāśa, so this obstructionlessness
is the svarūpa of ākāśa.
The third aspect is the aspect of tanmātras, which are the causes of the
atoms or paramāṇus. Their fourth aspect is their aspect of guṇas or
qualities of illumination, action, inertia. Their fifth aspect is that
by which they are serviceable to purusha, by causing his pleasurable or
painful experiences and finally his liberation.
Speaking of aggregation with regard to the structure of matter, we see
that this is of two kinds (1) when the parts are in intimate union and
fusion, e.g. any vegetable or animal body, the parts of which can never
be considered separately. (2) When there are such mechanical aggregates
or collocations of distinct and independent parts _yutasiddhāvayava_ as
the trees in a forest.
A dravya or substance is an aggregate of the former type, and is the
grouping of generic or specific qualities and is not a separate
entity—the abode of generic and specific qualities like the dravya of
the Vaiśeshika conception. The aspect of an unification of generic and
specific qualities seen in parts united in intimate union and fusion is
called the dravya aspect. The aggregation of parts is the structural
aspect of which the side of appearance is the unification of generic and
specific qualities called the dravya.
The other aggregation of yutasiddhāvayava, i.e. the collocation of the
distinct and independent parts, is again of two kinds, (1) in which
stress may be laid on the distinction of parts, and (2) that in which
stress is laid on their unity rather than on their distinctness. Thus in
the expression mango-grove, we see that many mangoes make a grove, but
the mangoes are not different from the grove. Here stress is laid on the
aspect that mangoes are the same as the grove, which, however, is not
the case when we say that here is a grove of mangoes, for the expression
“grove of mangoes” clearly brings home to our minds the side of the
distinct mango-trees which form a grove.
Of the gross elements, ākāśa seems especially to require a word of
explanation. There are according to Vijñāna Bhikshu and Nāgeśa two kinds
of ākāśa—kāraṇa (or primal) and kārya (atomic). The first or original is
the undifferentiated formless tamas, for in that stage it has not the
quality of manifesting itself in sounds. This kāraṇa later on develops
into the atomic ākāśa, which has the property of sound. According to the
conception of the purāṇas, this karyākāśa evolves from the ego as the
first envelope of vāyu or air. The kāraṇakāśa or non-atomic ākāśa should
not be considered as a mere vacuum, but must be conceived as a positive,
all-pervasive entity, something like the ether of modern physicists.
From this ākāśa springs the atomic ākāśa or kāryākāśa, which is the
cause of the manifestation of sound. All powers of hearing, even though
they have their origin in the principle of egoism, reside in the ākāśa
placed in the hollow of the ear. When soundness or defect is noticed
therein, soundness or defect is also noticed in the power of hearing.
Further, when of the sounds working in unison with the power of hearing,
the sounds of solids, etc., are to be apprehended, then the power of
hearing located in the hollow of the ear requires the capacity of
resonance residing in the substratum of the ākāśa of the ear. This sense
of hearing, then, operates when it is attracted by the sound originated
and located in the mouth of the speaker, which acts as a loadstone. It
is this ākāśa which gives penetrability to all bodies; in the absence of
this, all bodies would be so compact that it would be difficult to
pierce them even with a needle. In the _Sāṃkhya-sūtra_ II. 12, it is
said that eternal time and space are of the nature of ākāśa. So this
so-called eternal time and space do not differ from the one
undifferentiated formless tamas of which we have just spoken. Relative
and infinite time arise from the motion of atoms in space—the cause of
all change and transformation; and space as relative position cannot be
better expressed than in the words of Dr. B. N. Seal, as “totality of
positions as an order of co-existent points, and as such it is wholly
relative to the understanding like order in time, being constructed on
the basis of relations of position intuited by our empirical or relative
consciousness. But there is this difference between space order and time
order:—there is no unit of space as position (_dik_) though we may
conceive time, as the moment (_kshaṇa_) regarded as the unit of change
in the causal series. Spatial position (_dik_) results only from the
different relations in which the all-pervasive ākāśa stands to the
various finite objects. On the other hand, space as extension or locus
of a finite body, or deśa, has an ultimate unit, being analysable into
the infinitesimal extension quality inherent in the guṇas of
prakṛti.”[44]
Citta or mind has two degrees: (1) the form of states such as real
cognition, including perception, inference, competent evidence, unreal
cognition, imagination, sleep and memory. (2) In the form in which all
those states are suppressed. Between the stage of complete outgoing
activity of ordinary experience (_vyutthāna_) and complete suppression
of all states, there are thousands of states of infinite variety,
through which a man’s experiences have to pass, from the vyutthāna state
to the nirodha. In addition to the five states spoken of above, there is
another kind of real knowledge and intuition, called prajñā, which dawns
when by concentration the citta is fixed upon any one state and that
alone. This prajñā is superior to all other means of knowledge, whether
perception, inference or competent evidence of the Vedas, in this, that
it is altogether unerring, unrestricted and unlimited in its scope.
Pramāṇa, we have seen, includes perception, inference and competent
evidence. Perception originates when the mind or citta, through the
senses (ear, skin, eye, taste and nose) is modified by external objects
and passes to them, generating a kind of knowledge about them in which
their specific characters become more predominant.
Mind is all-pervasive and can come in touch with the external world, by
which we have the perception of the thing. Like light, which emits rays
and pervades all, though it remains in one place, the citta by its
vṛttis comes in contact with the external world, is changed into the
form of the object of perception and thus becomes the cause of
perception; as the citta has to pass through the senses, it becomes
coloured by them, which explains the fact that perception is impossible
without the help of the senses. As it has to pass through the senses, it
undergoes the limitations of the senses, which it can avoid, if it can
directly concentrate itself upon any object without the help of the
senses; from this originates the prajñā, through which dawns absolute
real knowledge of the thing; unhampered by the limitations of the senses
which can act only within a certain area or distance and cannot cognize
subtler objects.
We see that in ordinary perception our minds are drawn towards the
object, as iron is attracted by magnets. Thus Bhikshu says in explaining
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_ IV. 17:—
“The objects of knowledge, though inactive in themselves, may yet draw
the everchanging cittas towards them like a magnet and change them in
accordance with their own forms, just as a piece of cloth is turned red
by coming into contact with red lac.” So it is that the cittas attain
the form of anything with which they come in touch and there is then the
perception that that thing is known. Perception (_pratyaksha_) is
distinguished from inference, etc., in this, that here the knowledge
arrived at is predominantly of the specific and special characters
(_viśesha_) of the thing and not of its generic qualities us in
inference, etc.
Inference proceeds from inference, and depends upon the fact that
certain common qualities are found in all the members of a class, as
distinguished from the members of a different class. Thus the qualities
affirmed of a class will be found to exist in all the individual members
of that class; this attribution of the generic characters of a class to
the individual members that come under it is the essence of inference.
An object perceived or inferred by a competent man is described by him
in words with the intention of transferring his knowledge to another;
and the mental modification, which has for its sphere the meaning of
such words, is the verbal cognition of the hearer. When the speaker has
neither perceived nor inferred the object, and speaks of things which
cannot be believed, the authority of verbal cognition fails. But it does
not fail in the original speaker, God or Īśvara, and his dictates the
Śāstras with reference either to the object of perception or of
inference.
Viparyyaya or unreal cognition is the knowledge of the unreal as in
doubt—a knowledge which possesses a form that does not tally with the
real nature of the thing either as doubt or as false knowledge. Doubt
may be illustrated by taking the case of a man who sees something in dim
light and doubts its nature. “Is it a wooden post or a man?” In nature
there is either the wooden post or the man, but there is no such fact or
entity which corresponds with doubt: “Is it a wooden post or a man?”
Knowledge as doubt is not cognition of a fact or entity. The illusion of
seeing all things yellow through a defect of the eye (as in jaundice)
can only be corrected when the objects are seen in their true colours.
In doubt, however, their defective nature is at once manifest. Thus when
we cannot be sure whether a certain thing is a post or a man, we know
that our knowledge is not definite. So we have not to wait till the
illusoriness of the previous knowledge is demonstrated by the advent of
right knowledge. The evil nature of viparyyaya is exemplified in avidyā
nescience, asmitā, rāga, etc.[45]
Viparyyaya is distinguished from vikalpa—imagination—in this, that
though the latter is also unreal knowledge its nature as such is not
demonstrated by any knowledge that follows, but is on the contrary
admitted on all sides by the common consent of mankind. But it is only
the learned who can demonstrate by arguments the illusoriness of vikalpa
or imagination.
All class notions and concepts are formed by taking note only of the
general characters of things and associating them with a symbol called
“name.” Things themselves, however, do not exist in the nature of these
symbols or names or concepts; it is only an aspect of them that is
diagrammatically represented by the intellect in the form of concepts.
When concepts are united or separated in our thought and language, they
consequently represent only an imaginary plane of knowledge, for the
things are not as the concepts represent them. Thus when we say
“Caitra’s cow,” it is only an imaginary relation for, strictly speaking,
no such thing exists as the cow of Caitra. Caitra has no connection in
reality with the cow. When we say purusha is of the nature of
consciousness, there is the same illusory relation. Now what is here
predicated of what? Purusha is consciousness itself, but in predication
there must always be a statement of the relation of one to another. Thus
it sometimes breaks a concept into two parts and predicates the one of
the other, and sometimes predicates the unity of two concepts which are
different. Thus its sphere has a wide latitude in all thought-process
conducted through language and involves an element of abstraction and
construction which is called vikalpa. This represents the faculty by
which our concepts are arranged in an analytical or synthetical
proposition. It is said to be _śabdajñānānupāti vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ_,
i.e. the knowledge that springs from relating concepts or names, which
relating does not actually exist in the objective world as it is
represented in propositional forms.
Sleep is that mental state which has for its objective substratum the
feeling of emptiness. It is called a state or notion of mind, for it is
called back on awakening; when we feel that we have slept well our minds
are clear, when we have slept badly our minds are listless, wandering
and unsteady. For a person who seeks to attain communion or samādhi,
these desires of sleep are to be suppressed, like all other desires.
Memory is the retaining in the mind of objects perceived when perception
occurs by the union of the cittas with external objects, according to
the forms of which the cittas are transformed; it retains these
perceptions, as impressions or saṃskāras by means of its inherent tamas.
These saṃskāras generate memory, when such events occur as can manifest
them by virtue of associations.
Thus memory comes when the percepts already known and acquired are kept
in the mind in the form of impressions and are manifested by the
udbodhakas or associative manifestors. It differs from perceptions in
this that the latter are of the nature of perceiving the unknown and
unperceived, whereas the former serves to bring before the mind percepts
that have already been acquired. Memory is therefore of percepts already
acquired by real cognition, unreal cognition, imagination, sleep and
memory. It manifests itself in dreams as well as in waking states.
The relation between these states of mind and the saṃskāras is this that
their frequency and repetition strengthens the saṃskāras and thus
ensures the revival of these states.
They are all endowed with sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (pain) and moha
(ignorance). These feelings cannot be treated separately from the states
themselves, for their manifestations are not different from the
manifestation of the states themselves. Knowledge and feeling are but
two different aspects of the modifications of cittas derived from
prakṛti; hence neither can be thought separately from the other. The
fusion of feeling with knowledge is therefore here more fundamental than
in the modern tripartite division of mind.
In connection with this we are to consider the senses whose action on
the external world is known as “perceiving,” “grahaṇa,” which is
distinguished from “pratyaksha,” which means the effect of “perceiving,”
viz. perception. Each sense has got its special sphere of work, e.g.
sight is of the eye, and this is called their second aspect, viz.
svarūpa. Their third aspect is of “asmitā” or ego, which manifests
itself through the senses. Their fourth aspect is their characteristic
of guṇas, viz. that of manifestation (_prakāśa_), action (_kriyā_) and
retention (_sthiti_). Their fifth aspect is that they are set in motion
for purusha, his experiences and liberation.
It is indeed difficult to find the relation of manas with the senses and
the cittas. In more than one place manas is identified with cittas, and,
on the other hand, it is described as a sense organ. There is another
aspect in which manas is said to be the king of the cognitive and motor
senses. Looked at in this aspect, manas is possibly the directive side
of the ego by which it guides the cognitive and conative senses in the
external world and is the cause of their harmonious activity for the
experience of purusha. As a necessary attribute of this directive
character of manas, the power of concentration, which is developed by
prāṇāyāma, is said to belong to manas. This is the rajas side of manas.
There is another aspect of manas which is called the anuvyavasāya or
reflection, by which the sensations (ālocana) are associated,
differentiated, integrated, assimilated into percepts and concepts. This
is possibly the sāttvika side of manas.
There is another aspect by which the percepts and concepts are retained
(_dhāraṇa_) in the mind as saṃskāras, to be repeated or revealed again
in the mind as actual states. This is the tamas side of manas.
In connection with this we may mention ūha (positive argumentation),
apoha (negative argumentation) and tattvajñāna (logical conclusion)
which are the modes of different anuvyavasāyas of the manas. Will, etc.,
are to be included with these (_Yoga-varttikā_, II. 18). Looked at from
the point of view of cittas, these may equally be regarded as the
modifications of cittas.
The motives which sustain this process of outgoing activity are false
knowledge, and such other emotional elements as egoism, attachment,
aversion, and love of life. These emotional elements remain in the mind
in the germinal state as power alone; or they exist in a fully operative
state when a man is under the influence of any one of them; or they
alternate with others, such as attachment or aversion; or they may
become attenuated by meditation upon opposites. Accordingly they are
called respectively prasupta, udāra, vicchinna or tanu. Man’s minds or
cittas may follow these outgoing states or experiences, or gradually
remove those emotions which are commonly called afflictions, thus
narrowing their sphere and proceeding towards final release.
All the psychic states described above, viz. pramāṇa, viparyyaya, etc.,
are called either afflicted or unafflicted according as they are moved
towards outgoing activity or are actuated by the higher motive of
emancipation by narrowing the field of experiences gradually to a
smaller and smaller sphere and afterwards to suppress them altogether.
These two kinds of motives, one of afflictions that lead towards
external objects of attachment and aversion or love of life, and the
other which leads to striving for kaivalya, are the sole motives which
guide all human actions and psychic states.
They influence us whenever suitable opportunities occur, so that by the
study of the Vedas, self-criticism or right argumentation, or from the
instruction of good men, abhyāsa and vairāgya may be roused by vidyā.
Right knowledge and a tendency towards kaivalya may appear in the mind
even when a man is immersed in the afflicted states of outgoing
activity. So also afflicted states may appear when a man is bent upon or
far advanced in those actions which are roused by vidyā or the tendency
towards kaivalya.
It seems that the Yoga view of actions, or karma, does not deprive man
of his freedom of will. The habit of performing particular types of
action only strengthens the corresponding subconscious impressions or
saṃskāras of those actual states, and thus makes it more and more
difficult to overcome their propensity to generate their corresponding
actual states, and thus obstructs the adoption of an unhampered and free
course of action. The other limitation to the scope of the activity of
his free will is the vāsanā aspect of the saṃskāras by which he
naturally feels himself attached by pleasurable ties to certain
experiences and by painful ones to others. But these only represent the
difficulties and impediments which come to a man, when he has to adopt
the Yoga course of life, the contrary of which he might have been
practising for a very long period, extending over many life-states.
The free will is not curbed in any way, for it follows directly from the
teleological purpose of prakṛti, which moves for the experience and
liberation of purusha. So this motive of liberation, which is the basis
of all good conduct, can never be subordinated to the other impulse,
which goads man towards outgoing experiences. But, on the other hand,
this original impulse which attracts man towards these ordinary
experiences, as it is due to the false knowledge which identifies
prakṛti with purusha, becomes itself subordinate and loses its influence
and power, when such events occur, which nullify false knowledge by
tending to produce a vision of the true knowledge of the relation of
prakṛti with purusha. Thus, for example, if by the grace of God false
knowledge (avidyā) is removed, true knowledge at once dawns upon the
mind and all the afflictions lose their power.
Free will and responsibility for action cease in those life-states which
are intended for suffering from actions only, e.g. life-states of
insects, etc.
APPENDIX
SPHOṬAVĀDA
Another point to be noted in connection with the main metaphysical
theories of Patañjali is the Sphoṭa theory which considers the relation
of words with their ideas and the things which they signify. Generally
these three are not differentiated one from the other, and we are not
accustomed to distinguish them from one another. Though distinct yet
they are often identified or taken in one act of thought, by a sort of
illusion. The nature of this illusory process comes to our view when we
consider the process of auditory perception of words. Thus if we follow
the _Bhāshya_ as explained by Vijñāna Bhikshu we find that by an effect
of our organs of speech, the letters are pronounced. This vocal sound is
produced in the mouth of the speaker from which place the sound moves in
aerial waves until it reaches the ear drum of the hearer, by coming in
contact with which it produces the audible sound called dhvani
(_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 17). The special modifications of this dhvani are
seen to be generated in the form of letters (_varṇa_) and the general
name for these modifications is nāda. This sound as it exists in the
stage of varṇas or letters is also called varṇa. If we apply the word
śabda or sound in the most general sense, then we can say that this is
the second stage of sound moving towards word-cognition, the first stage
being that of its utterance in the mouth of the speaker. The third stage
of śabda is that in which the letters, for example, g, au, and ḥ, of the
word “gauḥ” are taken together and the complete word-form “gauḥ” comes
before our view. The comprehension of this complete word-form is an
attribute of the mind and not of the sense of hearing. For the sense of
hearing senses the letter-forms of the sound one by one as the
particular letters are pronounced by the speaker and as they approach
the ear one by one in air-waves. But each letter-form sound vanishes as
it is generated, for the sense of hearing has no power to hold them
together and comprehend the letter-forms as forming a complete
word-form. The ideation of this complete word-form in the mind is called
sphoṭa. It differs from the letter-form in this that it is a complete,
inseparable, and unified whole, devoid of any past, and thus is quite
unlike the letter-forms which die the next moment after they originate.
According to the system of Patañjali as explained by the commentators,
all significance belongs to this sphoṭa-form and never to the letters
pronounced or heard. Letters when they are pronounced and heard in a
particular order serve to give rise to such complete ideational
word-images which possess some denotation and connotation of meaning and
are thus called “sphoṭas,” or that which illuminates. These are
essentially different in nature from the sounds in letter-forms
generated in the senses of hearing which are momentary and evanescent
and can never be brought together to form one whole, have no meaning,
and have the sense of hearing as their seat.
_The Vaiśeshika view._—Saṅkara Miśra, however, holds that this “sphoṭa”
theory is absolutely unnecessary, for even the supporters of sphoṭa
agree that the sphoṭa stands conventionally for the thing that it
signifies; now if that be the case what is the good of admitting sphoṭa
at all? It is better to say that the conventionality of names belongs to
the letters themselves, which by virtue of that can conjointly signify a
thing; and it is when you look at the letters from this aspect—their
unity with reference to their denotation of one thing—that you call them
a pada or name (_Upaskāra_, II. 2, 21). So according to this view we
find that there is no existence of a different entity called “name” or
“sphoṭa” which can be distinguished from the letters coming in a
definite order within the range of the sense of hearing. The letters
pronounced and heard in a definite order are jointly called a name when
they denote a particular meaning or object.
_Kumārila’s view_:—Kumārila, the celebrated scholar of the Mīmāṃsa
school, also denies the sphoṭa theory and asserts like the Vaiśeshika
that the significance belongs to the letters themselves and not to any
special sphoṭa or name. To prove this he first proves that the
letter-forms are stable and eternal and suffer no change on account of
the differences in their modes of accent and pronunciation. He then goes
on to show that the sphoṭa view only serves to increase the complexity
without any attendant advantage. Thus the objection that applies to the
so-called defect of the letter-denotation theory that the letters cannot
together denote a thing since they do not do it individually, applies to
the name-denotation of the sphoṭa theory, since there also it is said
that though there is no sphoṭa or name corresponding to each letter yet
the letters conjointly give rise to a sphoṭa or complete name
(_Ślokavārttika_, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 91–93).
The letters, however, are helped by their potencies (saṃskāras) in
denoting the object, or the meaning. The sphoṭa theory has, according to
Kumārila and Pārthasārathi, also to admit this saṃskāra of the letters
in the manifestation of the name or the śabda-sphoṭa, whereas they only
admit it as the operating power of the letters in denoting the object or
the thing signified. Saṃskāras according to Kumārila are thus admitted
both by the sphoṭa theorists and the Kumārila school of Mīmāṃsa, only
with this difference that the latter with its help can directly denote
the object of the signified, whereas the former have only to go a step
backwards in thinking their saṃskāra to give rise to the name or the
śabda-sphoṭa alone (_Nyāyaratnākara_, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 104).
Kumārila says that he takes great pains to prove the nullity of the
sphoṭa theory only because if the sphoṭa view be accepted then it comes
to the same thing as saying that words and letters have no validity, so
that all actions depending on them also come to lose their validity
(_Ślokavārttika_, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 137).
_Prabhākara._—Prabhākara also holds the same view; for according to him
also the letters are pronounced in a definite order; though when
individually considered they are momentary and evanescent, yet they
maintain themselves by their potency in the form of a pāda or name, and
thus signify an object. Thus Śāliknātha Miśra says in his _Prakaraṇa
Pañcikā_, p. 89: “It is reasonable to suppose that since the later
letters in a word are dependent upon the perception of a preceding one
some special change is wrought in the letters themselves which leads to
the comprehension of the meaning of a word.... It cannot be proved
either by perception or by inference that there is any word apart from
the letters; the word has thus for its constituents the letters.”
_Śabara._—The views of Kamārila and Prahhākara thus explicated are but
elaborate explanations of the view of Śabara who states the whole theory
in a single line—_pūrvavarṇajanitasaṃskārasahito’ntyo varṇaḥ
pratyāyakaḥ_.
“The last letter together with the potency generated by the preceding
letters is the cause of significance.”
_Mahābhāshya and Kaiyaṭa._—After describing the view of those who are
antagonistic to the sphoṭa theory it is necessary to mention the
Vaiākaraṇa school which is in favour of it; thus we find that in
explaining the following passage of Mahābhāshya,
“What is then a word? It is that which being pronounced one can
understand specific objects such as those (cows) which have tail, hoofs,
horns, etc.”
Kaiyata says: “The grammarians think that denotation belongs to words,
as distinct from letters which are pronounced, for if each of the
letters should denote the object, there would be no need of pronouncing
the succeeding letters....”
The vaiyakaraṇas admit the significant force of names as distinguished
from letters. For if the significant force be attributed to letters
individually, then the first letter being quite sufficient to signify
the object, the utterance of other letters becomes unnecessary; and
according to this view if it is held that each letter has the generating
power, then also they cannot do it simultaneously, since they are
uttered one after another. On the view of manifestation, also, since the
letters are manifested one after another, they cannot be collected
together in due order; if their existence in memory is sufficient, then
we should expect no difference of signification or meaning by the change
of order in the utterance of the letters; that is “_sara_” ought to have
the same meaning as “_rasa_.” So it must be admitted that the power of
signification belongs to the sphoṭa as manifested by the nādas as has
been described in detail in _Vākyapadīya_.
As the relation between the perceiving capacity and the object of
perception is a constant one so also is the relation between the sphoṭa
and the nāda as the manifested and the manifestor (_Vākyapadīya_ 98).
Just as the image varies corresponding to the variation of the
reflector, as oil, water, etc., so also the reflected or manifested
image differs according to the difference of the manifestor (_Vāk._
100). Though the manifestation of letters, propositions and names occurs
at one and the same time yet there seems to be a “before and after”
according to the “before and after” of the nāda utterances (_Vāk._ 102).
That which is produced through the union and disunion (of nādas or
dhvanis) is called sphoṭa, whereas other sound-perceptions arising from
sounds are called dhvanis (_Vāk._ 103). As by the movement of water the
image of a thing situated elsewhere also appears to adopt the movement
of the water and thus seems to move, so also the sphoṭa, though
unchanging in itself, yet appears to suffer change in accordance with
the change of nāda which manifests it (_Vāk._ 49). As there are no parts
of the letters themselves so the letters also do not exist as parts of
the name. There is again no ultimate or real difference between names
and propositions (_Vāk._ 73). It is only in popular usage that they are
regarded as different. That which others regard as the most important
thing is regarded as false here, for propositions only are here regarded
as valid (_Vāk._ 74). Though the letters which manifest names and
propositions are altogether different from them, yet their powers often
appear as quite undifferentiated from them (_Vāk._ 89). Thus when
propositions are manifested by the cause of the manifestation of
propositions they appear to consist of parts when they first appear
before the mind. Thus, though the pada-sphoṭa or the vākya-sphoṭa does
not really consist of parts, yet, as the powers of letters cannot often
be differentiated from them, they also appear frequently to be made up
of parts (_Vāk._ 91).
_The Yoga View._—As to the relation of the letters to the sphoṭa,
Vācaspati says, in explaining the _Bhāshya_, that each of the letters
has the potentiality of manifesting endless meanings, but none of them
can do so individually; it is only when the letter-form sounds are
pronounced in succession by one effort of speech that the individual
letters by their own particular contiguity or distance from one another
can manifest a complete word called the sphoṭa. Thus owing to the
variation of contiguity of distance by intervention from other
letter-form sounds any letter-form sound may manifest any meaning or
word; for the particular order and the association of letter-form sounds
depend upon the particular output of energy required in uttering them.
The sphoṭa is thus a particular modification of buddhi, whereas the
letter-form sounds have their origin in the organ of speech when they
are uttered, and the sense of hearing when they are heard. It is well to
note here that the theory that the letters themselves have endless
potentiality and can manifest any word-sphoṭas, according to their
particular combinations and recombinations, is quite in keeping with the
main metaphysical doctrine of the Pātañjala theory.
_Vākya-sphoṭa._—What is said here of the letter-form sounds and the
śabda-sphoṭas also applies to the relation that the śabda-sphoṭas bear
to propositions or sentences. A word or name does not stand alone; it
always exists as combined with other words in the form of a proposition.
Thus the word “tree” whenever it is pronounced carries with it the
notion of a verb “asti” or “exists,” and thereby demonstrates its
meaning. The single word “tree” without any reference to any other word
which can give it a propositional form has no meaning. Knowledge of
words always comes in propositional forms; just as different letter-form
sounds demonstrate by their mutual collocation a single word or
śabda-sphoṭa, so the words also by their mutual combination or
collocation demonstrate judgmental or propositional significance or
meaning. As the letters themselves have no meaning so the words
themselves have also no meaning; it is only by placing them side by side
in a particular order that a meaning dawns in the mind. When single
words are pronounced they associate other words with themselves and thus
appear to signify a meaning. But though a single word is sufficient by
association with other words to carry a meaning, yet sentences or
propositions should not be deemed unnecessary for they serve to
specialise that meaning (_niyamārthe anuvādaḥ_). Thus “cooks” means that
any subject makes something the object of his cooking. The mention of
the subject “Devadatta” and the object “rice” only specialises the
subject and the object. Though the analysis of a sentence into the words
of which it is constituted is as imaginary as the analysis of a word
into the letter-form sounds, it is generally done in order to get an
analytical view of the meaning of a sentence—an imaginary division of it
as into cases, verbs, etc.
_Abhihitānvayavada and Anvitābhidhānavāda._—This reminds us of the two
very famous theories about the relation of sentences to words, viz. the
“Abhihitānvayavāda” and the “Anvitābhidhānavāda.” The former means that
words themselves can express their separate meanings by the function
abhidhā or denotation; these are subsequently combined into a sentence
expressing one connected idea. The latter means that words only express
a meaning as parts of a sentence, and as grammatically connected with
each other; they only express an action or something connected with
action; in “sāmānaya”, “bring the cow”—“gām” does not properly mean
“gotva” but “ānayanānvitagotva,” that is, the bovine genus as connected
with bringing. We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing
verb and vice versa—(Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, Cowell).
_The Yoga point of view._—It will be seen that strictly speaking the
Yoga view does not agree with any one of these views though it
approaches nearer to the Anvitābhidhāna view than to the Abhihitānvaya
view. For according to the Yoga view the idea of the sentence is the
only true thing; words only serve to manifest this idea but have
themselves no meaning. The division of a sentence into the component
word-conceptions is only an imaginary analysis—an afterthought.
_Confusion the cause of verbal cognition._—According to Patañjali’s view
verbal cognition proceeds only from a confusion of the letter-form
sounds (which are perceived in the sense of hearing), the śabda-sphoṭa
which is manifested in the buddhi, and the object which exists in the
external world. These three though altogether distinct from one another
yet appear to be unified on account of the saṅketa or sign, so that the
letter-form sounds, the śabda-sphoṭa, and the thing, can never be
distinguished from one another. Of course knowledge can arise even in
those cases where there is no actual external object, simply by virtue
of the manifesting power of the letter-form sounds. This saṅketa is
again defined as the confusion of words and their meanings through
memory, so that it appears that what a word is, so is its denoted
object, and what a denoted word is, so is its object. Convention is a
manifestation of memory of the nature of mutual confusion of words and
their meanings. This object is the same as this word, and this word is
the same as this object. Thus there is no actual unity of words and
their objects: such unity is imaginary and due to beginningless
tradition. This view may well be contrasted with Nyāya, according to
which the convention of works as signifying objects is due to the will
of God.
INDEX
_abhihitānvayavāda_, 186
abhiniveśa, 101, 104
_abhivyaktikāraṇa_, 133
abhyāsa, 100, 101, 126, 128, 129, 130, 138, 143, 149, 162, 177
Absorption, 102
Abstraction, 135, 136, 148, 154, 174
Accessories, 135, 137, 145
Accidental variation, 77
_acit_, 162
Actual, 73
Actuality, 83
adharma, 85, 86, 88, 102, 106, 162
adhikārin, 123
adṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 112
_adṛshṭa-janmavedanīya karma_, 105, 110, 111
advaita, 14
_Advaita-Brahmasiddhi_, 14
Afflictions, 100, 103, 104, 105, 123, 124, 128, 143, 173 n., 176, 177,
178
Agent, 4
Aggregation, 168
Agreement, 33
ahaṃkāra, 38, 40, 41, 53, 56, 58, 61, 82, 86, 87, 93
ahaṃkāra-sāttvika, rājasa, tāmasa, 55
ahiṃsā, 136, 138, 139, 144
_Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā_, 10
akhyāti, 164
aklishṭa, 101
aklishṭavṛtti, 128
_aliṇga_, 7, 41, 42, 62, 118
_anādisaṃyoga_, 28
_anāśrita_, 29 n.
anekabhavika, 107, 112, 113
Anger, 141
_anirvācyā_, 28
aniyatavipāka, 112
aniyatavipāka-adṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 113
antaḥkaraṇa, 43 n.
_anukāreṇa paśyati_, 21
anupaśya, 21
anuvrata, 139
anuvyavasāya, 176
anvaya, 166, 167
anvayikāraṇa, 61
_anvitābhidhānavāda_, 186
anvitābhidhānavāda, Yoga view, near to, 186
_anyābhyāṃ ahaṃkārābhyām svakāryyopajanane rājasāhaṃkāraḥ
sahakārībhavati_, 55
anyathākhyāti, 164, 173 n.
_anyatvakāraṇa_, 134
_anyonyamithunāḥ sarvve naishāmādisamprayogo viprayogo vā úpalabhyate_,
7
aṅga, 145
aṇu, 43 n., 65
ap, 74, 75, 166, 167
ap atom, 65, 66
apara vairāgya, 127, 128
aparigraha, 141
_apavarga_, 29
apoha, 101, 176
Appearance, 36
apuṇya karma, 88
Aristotle, 1, 13
_artha_, 150
arthavattva, 166, 167
_arthena svakīyayā grāhyaśaktyā vijñānamajani_, 33
asamprajñāta, 124, 149
asamprajñāta samādhi, 125
Asceticism, 136, 139, 142, 144
asmitā, 51, 59, 100, 104, 118, 153, 154, 172, 175
asmitā-ego, 51
_asmitāmātra_, 50, 51, 59, 160
_asmitānugata_, 125, 153, 154
_asmītyetāvanmātrākāratvādasmitā_, 153
Assimilation, 101
Association of ideas, 37
asteya, 141, 144
Astral body, 93
aśukla, 140
aśuklākṛshṇa, 102, 103, 111
Atheistic, 90
Atomic change as unit of time, 43
Atoms, 4, 38, 39, 43, 65, 72, 74, 77, 81, 152, 167;
continual change, 71
Attachment, 99, 100, 176, 177
Avariciousness, 136, 141
avasthā, 76
avasthāpariṇāma, 71, 73, 82, 156, 165
Aversion, 98, 176, 177
_avibhāgaprāptāviva_, 17
avidyā, 2, 11, 12, 97, 99, 100, 101, 104, 114, 115, 116, 120, 123, 128,
131, 159, 172, 173 n., 178;
its definition, 11;
uprooting of, 115, 116
avidyā of yoga and Sāṃkhya, 164
aviśesha, 7, 7 n., 40, 41, 60, 61, 62, 81, 82, 84, 165
_aviśesheṇopashṭambhakasvabhāvāḥ_, 6
aviveka, 173 n.
_avyapadeśyatva_, 77
_avyavasthitākhilapariṇamo bhavatyeva_, 85
_ayutasiddhāvayava_, 69
_ādisamprayoga_, 7
ākāra, 85
ākāśa, 14, 43 n., 56, 57, 58, 68, 80, 93, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170
ākāśa, two kinds of, 168
ākāśa atom, 65, 66;
Bhikshu and Vācaspati on, 65
ākāśa tanmātra, 66
ālocana, 176
āmalaka, 77, 78, 79
ānanda, 153,154
ānandānugata, 125, 153, 154
_āptikāraṇa_, 133, 135
āpūra, 93
_āpyakāraṇa_, 135
āsana, 136, 145
āśaya, 103
_āśerate sāṃsārikā purushā asminniti āśayaḥ_, 103
āvaraṇa śakti, 84
āyush, 105, 106, 115
Barabara muni, 64
bāhya karma, 102
Beginningless, 28
Behaviour, 6
Bel, 77
Benares, 11 n.
bhakti, 161
bhaktiyoga, 159, 161
bhava, 110
_bhavishyadvyaktikamanāgataṃanudbhūtavyaktikamatītam svavyāpāropārūḍhaṃ
varttamānaṃ trayaṃ caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyam yadi caitat svarūpato
nābhavishyannedaṃ nirvishayaṃ jñānamudapatsyata tasmādatītamanāgataṃ
svarūpato’stīti_, 31 n.
_Bhāshya_, 16, 17, 18, 19, 33, 61, 62, 67, 71, 76, 78, 80, 91, 95, 99,
109, 110, 131
bhāvanā, 161
Bhikshu, 6, 9, 12 n., 43 n., 45 n., 46 n., 50, 65, 67, 85, 86, 88, 90,
94, 109, 110, 112, 126, 129, 145, 153, 168
_bhoga_, 29, 105, 106, 115
bhoga-śarīra, 105
Bhoja, 126
Bhojavṛtti, 95
bhrama, 173 n.
bhūta, 60, 69, 166
bhūtādi, 54, 56, 58, 63, 64;
accretion from, 65, 66
Biological, 2
Birth, 133, 161
Body, sattvamaya, 160
Bondage, 19
Brahmacaryya, 141
Brahman, 27, 28, 139
Breath, 146, 147
Breath regulation, 135, 136
_buddheḥ pratisaṃvedi purushaḥ_, 19
_buddhi_, 16, 18, 21, 27, 28, 40, 51, 52, 61, 115, 116, 118, 152, 173
n.
Buddhist, 33, 45 n.
Buddhists, their theory of _sahopalambhaniyama_ refuted, 33
Caitra, 173
Caraka, 11
Caste, 139
Categories of existence, 41
Category, 6, 117
Caturdaśī, 139
Causal activity, 4
Causal operation, 4
Causal transformation, 4
Causality, 152
Causation, 132, 133;
Sāṃkhya view of, 81
Cause, 79, 81, 85, 133, 134;
nine kinds of, 133
Cessation, 19
Change, 43, 44;
Buddhist and Yoga idea contrasted, 45 n.;
units of, 45, 46
Changeful, 18
Characterised, 37
Characteristic, 37
_Chāyā-vyākhyā_, 63, 93
Chemical, 2
Chowkhamba, 11 n.
Circumstance, 139
cit, 15, 162
citta, 36, 81, 92, 93, 94, 96, 101, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 125, 132,
147, 154, 161, 175;
different forms of, 92, 93;
different states of, 170;
its nature, 94
_cittamayaskāntamaṇikalpaṃ sannidhimātropakāri dṛśyatvena svaṃ bhavati
purushasya svāminaḥ_, 22
_cittaprasāda_, 127
Clairaudience, 144
Class-characteristics, 4 n.
Cleanliness, 136, 143, 144
Coco-nut, 77
Co-existence, 34
Cognitive states, 48
Coherent, 7, 37
Collocation, 37
Commentary, 4
Compassion, 137
Complacency, 137
Compounds, 3, 166
Conceived, 3
Conceiver, 3
Concentration, 17, 94, 95, 96, 123, 126, 128, 135, 136, 147, 148, 150,
152, 153, 155, 163, 170
Concept, 150, 162, 173
Conceptual, 23, 25
Concomitant causes, 85
Condensation, 10
Conscious-like, 19
Consciousness, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 45, 92, 93, 122, 149, 151, 154, 173
Consciousness contentless, 50
Conscious states, 17
Conservation, 132, 133
Contact, 27, 29 n.
Contemplation, 97
Contentment, 136, 139, 144
Continence, 136, 139, 141, 144
Contrary, 141
Co-operation, 5
Cosmic evolution, 47
Cosmic matter, 74
Country, 139
Creation, 114, 115, 160, 161
_Critique of Judgment_, 14
_Critique of Practical Reason_, 14
_Critique of Pure Reason_, 14
Davies, 25
Decision, 53
Demerit, 86, 87, 88, 93, 102, 103
Denotation, 7 n.
deśa, 85, 170
Descartes, 13
Desire, 141
Determinate, 7
Determined, 3, 37
Determiner, 3
Devotion, 139, 142, 145, 161
dhāraṇā, 101, 128, 130, 135, 136, 137, 138, 145, 147, 148, 176
dharma, 42, 71, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 101, 103, 106, 162
dharmamegha-samādhi, 117
_dharmapariṇāma_, 69, 71, 74, 80, 81, 156, 165
dharmin, 71, 73, 74, 76
_dharmisvarūpamātro hi dharmaḥ, dharmivikriyā eva eshā dharmadvārā
propañcyate_, 37, 71
dharmī, 42
_dhātu_, 11
_dhṛtikāraṇa_, 135
dhyāna, 117, 130, 135, 136, 138, 139, 145, 147, 148
Difference, 33
Differentiated, 7, 37, 62
Differentiation, 53, 66, 101
dik, 170
Discrimination, 8, 116, 120, 164
Distractions, 126, 148
Doubt, 172
_drashṭā dṛśiṃātraḥ śuddho’pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ_, 16
dravya, 4 n., 29 n., 168
Droṇa, 140 n.
_dṛgdarśanaśaktyorekātmateva asmitā_, 16, 51
dṛk, 17
_dṛkśakti_, 20
dṛshṭajanma karmāśaya, 105
_dṛshṭajanmavedanīya_, 105, 110, 112
duḥkha, 175
dvesha, 104
Earth, 167
Effect, 81, 82, 85, 132
Efficient cause, 82
Ego, 3, 4, 27, 28, 38, 42, 51, 52, 53, 60, 61, 99, 152, 153, 175;
a modification of buddhi, 53;
evolution in three lines from, 54;
three kinds of, 55
Egohood, 50, 124
Ego-universal, 50
ekabhavika, 105, 110, 111, 112
ekabhavikatva, 109
_ekāgra_, 95, 96, 123, 126
ekātmatā, 17
_ekātmikā saṃvidasmitā_, 51
ekendriya, 128
Elements, 3, 166
Emancipation, 164
Energy, 3, 5, 8, 132
Enjoyment, 28, 29
Equilibrium, 6, 7, 8, 9, 42, 43, 87
Error, 173 n.
Eternal, 8, 91
Eternity, two kinds of, 118
Ethics, 92
European, 10
Evolutes, 11
Evolution, 7, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 47, 62, 65, 69, 72, 76, 81, 84,
87, 89, 114;
as change, 43;
as change of qualities and as derivation of categories, 69;
definite law of, 82;
its limitations by time and space, 79;
measured by units of spatial motion, 44;
of manas, 55;
of the senses, 54;
of categories, difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga view, 58–62;
of similars, 10
Evolutionary process, 77, 85, 91
Exhalation, 146
Existence as capacity of effecting, 8
Expiratory, 136
Extension, 34
Externality, 34
External reality, 34;
Buddhist objection to, 32;
has more than a momentary existence, 36;
its ground, 36;
not due to imagination, 35;
not identical with our ideas, 35
External world, 31;
refutation of Buddhist objections, 33
Faith, 102
Fichte, 50
Fisherman, 139
Force, 82
Freedom, 123, 125, 127;
of will, 177
Friendliness, 137
Future, 31, 32, 46, 72
Gaṇḍa, 15
gandha, 38, 152, 167
gandha-tanmātra, 58, 64
Gauḍapāda, 24
Generalisation, 154
Generic, 168
_ghaṭāvacchinna ākāśa_, 14
_Gītā_, 12
_Gītābhāshya_, 4 n.
Goal, 115, 121, 124, 127, 129
God, 2, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 115, 136, 139, 142, 143, 145, 148, 149,
161, 163, 164, 172, 178, 187
Gold, 134
grahaṇa, 101, 153, 175
_grahaṇadhāraṇohāpohatattvajñānābhiniveśā buddhau varttamānā purushe
adhyāropitasadbhāvāḥ_, 53
grahītṛ, 153
grāhya, 54, 153
Gross elements, derivation of, 65 _et seq._
Grossness, 34
_guṇā eva prakṛtiśabdavācyā na tu tadatiriktā prakṛtirasti_, 10
_guṇānāṃ hi dvairūpyaṃ vyavasāyātmkatvam vyavaseyātmakatvaṃca_, 53
_guṇānāṃ paramaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛshṭipathamṛcchati, yattu drshṭipathaṃ
prāptam tanmāyeva sutucchakaṃ_, 12, 37
guṇas, 3, 4 n., 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 24, 26, 37, 38, 39, 42, 53, 76, 78,
81, 82, 98, 101, 118, 120, 121, 131, 155, 167, 170
guṇas, three classes, 5;
as causal effect, 6;
evolution of the cognitive and conative senses and tanmātras, 38;
identity of qualities and substances, 5;
relative preponderance of, 7;
special affinity of each class, 6;
special behaviour of each class of, 6;
their atomic qualities consistent with their all-pervasiveness, 43
n.;
their common purpose, 7;
their co-operation, 38;
their mode of combination, 6;
their mode of mutual operation, 5;
their mode of evolution, 7;
their nature as feelings, 68;
their twofold nature, 53;
their threefold course of development, 38;
their want of purpose in the state of equilibrium, 7;
two classes of their evolution, _aviśesha_ and _viśesha_, 40
Hariharāraṇya, 96
Heaven, 86 n.
_hetumadanityamavyāpi sakriyamanekāśritaṃ liṅgaṃ sāvayavamparatantraṃ
vyaktaṃ viparītamavyaktaṃ_, 42
Hibiscus, 15 n.
hiṃsā, 140, 141
_History of Hindu Chemistry_, 7 n., 63 n., 170 n.
Horn of a hare, 8
Hume, 37
Idealistic Buddhists, 31
Ignorance, 141, 145
Illumination, 5
Illusion, 173 n.;
of Yoga and Sāṃkhya, 164
Illusive, 28
Imagination, 34
Immanent purpose, 90
Independence, 95, 128, 134
Indeterminate, 8
India, 14
Indra, 86 n.
Inertia, 3, 5, 8, 37, 167
Inference, 1, 2, 81, 96, 154, 156, 162, 163, 170, 171
Infra-atomic, 3
Infra-atoms, 4
Inhalation, 146
Injury, 139
Inorganic, 74
Inspiratory, 136
Intellection, 6
Intelligence, 2, 48
Intelligence-stuff, 3, 8, 49
Iron, 6
Īśvara, 14, 79, 87, 88, 90, 103, 126, 144, 145, 159, 160, 161, 162,
164, 172;
removal of barriers, 87
Īśvarakṛshṇa, 7 n.
Īśvarapraṇidhāna, 142, 145, 161
_Īśvarasyāpi dharmādhisṭhānārthaṃ pratibandhāpanaya eva vyāpāro_, 87
_janmamaraṇakaraṇānāṃ pratiniyamādayugapat pravṛtteśca purushabahutvam
siddhaṃ traiguṇyaviparyyayācca_, 26
_japāsphaṭikayoriva noparāgaḥ kintvabhimānaḥ_, 15
_jāti_, 105, 106, 115
Jealousy, 143
jīva, 14
jīvanmukta, 117
jīvanmukti, 120
jñāna, 150
jñānayoga, 130, 142, 143, 159
Judgmental, 23
kaivalya, 22, 23, 27, 31, 95, 96, 116, 118, 121, 122, 139, 140, 142,
143, 177
kalpa, 160
Kant, 14, 37
Kapila, 25
karma, 86, 98, 117, 159, 160, 177;
its classification and divergence of views, 109–113
karma-sannyāsin, 103
karmāśaya, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 160
karmayoga, 159
karuṇā, 137, 138, 139
Kaumudī, 64
kāla, 85
kāma, 104
kāraṇa, 168
kāraṇacitta, 93
_kārikā_, 7 n., 11, 24, 26, 42, 64, 165
Kārya, 168
kārya vimukti, 120
kāryya citta, 92
kāryyakarī śakti, 84
Kāśmīra, 79
_kevalapurushākārā saṃvit_, 153
kevalī, 117, 118
kirātā, 101
kleśa, 99, 100, 104, 114
klishṭa, 128
klishṭavṛtti, 100
Knowable, 5, 27, 32, 38
Knower, 27, 50
Knowledge, different kinds of, differentiated, 163
Known, 27
_kriyā_, 37, 175
kriyāyoga, 129, 130, 142, 143, 161
krodha, 104
kṛshṇa, 102, 103, 111
kṛshṇa karma, 103, 111
_kṛtārthaṃ prati nashṭamapyanashṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt_, 26
_kshaṇa_, 43, 44, 45, 46 n., 146, 170
_kshaṇabhaṅguram_, 12 n.
_kshaṇapracayāśraya_, 46 n.
_kshaṇapratiyogi_, 46 n.
_kshaṇatatkramayornāsti vastusamāhāraḥ iti buddhisamāhāraḥ
muhūrttāhorātrātrādayaḥ. sa tvayaṃ kālaḥ vastuśūnyo’pi
buddhinirmāṇah_, 44
_kshipta_, 95, 122
kshiti, 74, 75, 166
kshiti atom, 66
kuntī, 14, 15 n.
kuśala, 121
kuśalī, 121
kūṭastha nitya, 118
lakshaṇa, 76, 82
lakshaṇa-pariṇāma, 71, 72, 73, 74, 156, 165
Latent, 46, 73, 81, 96, 108
_laukikamāyeva_, 12 n.
liberation, 7, 25, 167, 175, 177
Light, 167
Limitation theory, 14, 15
liṅga, 7, 41, 42, 51, 62, 118
_liṅgamātram mahattatvaṃ sattāmātre mahati ātmani_, 50
_lobha_, 104
Locke, 37
Lokācāryya, 11, 55, 58
Lotus, 9
_madhumatī_, 125
_madhupratīka_, 125
Magnet, 6, 89, 171
mahat, 9, 11, 40, 41, 42, 51, 56, 58, 59, 61, 82;
its potential existence in prakṛti, 9
_Mahābhārata_, 15 n., 80, 140
mahāpralaya, 118
mahāvrata, 139
maitrī, 137, 138, 139
manas, 40, 51, 55, 60, 81, 100, 118, 133, 175, 176
Manifested, 72
mantra, 161
Many, 27, 28
_Maṇiprabhā_, 65
marut, 75, 166
Mass, 3
Material cause, 61, 81
Matter, 2, 3, 166
mānasa karma, 102
mātrā, 146
māyā, 2, 11, 12, 14, 27, 28
_māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt māyinaṃ tu maheśvaraṃ_, 11
_māyeva_, 12 n.
Mechanical, 2
Meditation, 102, 135, 136, 145, 148, 149, 161, 176
Memory, 53, 98
Mental, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 37, 48
Mental states, analysis of, 48
Merit, 85, 86, 87, 88, 93, 103
Metaphysics, 30
Method of agreement, 33, 35;
of difference, 33
Mind, 2, 3, 18, 19, 81;
its seven qualities, 156
Mind-modification, 20, 22;
-transformations, 18
_moha_, 104, 175
_Mokshadharmādhyāya_, 140
Moment, 44, 45
Momentary, 12, 35
Moral, 2
Moral ideal, 26
Movement, 48
muditā, 137, 139
_mūḍha_, 95, 122
Nahusha, 86
Naiyāyika, 58
Name, 150, 173;
and thing, 173
Nandī, 85
_na tu kshaṇātiriktaḥ kshaṇikaḥ padārthaḥ kaścidishyate taistu
kshaṇamātrasthāyyeva padārthaḥ ishyate_, 45 n.
_Naturalism and agnosticism_, 2 n.
Natural selection, 76
Nāgeśa, 61, 63, 66, 86, 87, 94, 107, 109, 117, 168
Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, 90, 126
_nāsadāsīt na sadāsīt tadānīm_, 12
_nāstyasataḥ saṃbhavaḥ na cāsti sato vināśāḥ_, 31
Nectar, 85
Nescience, 14, 15, 97, 99;
its different forms, 172 n.
nidrā, 101
Nihilists, 2
_niḥsaṅge’pi uparāgo vivekāt_, 15
_niḥsattāsattam niḥsadasat nirasat avyaktam aliṅgam pradhānam_, 8
niḥsattāsattaṃ, 12
nirasmitā, 153
nirmāṇa citta, 160, 161
nirānanda, 153
nirodha, 19, 96, 118, 149, 155, 156, 170
_nirodhaja saṃskāra_, 97
nirodha samādhi, 139
_niruddha_, 95, 123
nirvicāra, 149, 153, 154
nirvīja, 122, 125
nirvīja samādhi, 154
nirvitarka, 150, 151, 153, 154
niścaya, 50
niyama, 136, 139, 142, 143, 148
niyata vipāka, 112
niyatavipākadṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 113
Nīlakaṇṭha, 80, 88, 89
Non-being, 2
Non-covetousness, 139, 144
Non-discrimination, 15
Non-distinction, 173 n.
Non-existence, 8, 12
Non-injury, 139, 140, 144;
its classification, 141
Non-stealing, 139
Noumenon, 8, 14
Observance, 135, 136
oṃkāra, 161
Omniscience, 95
oshadhi, 161
Pain, 98, 121, 122, 126, 137, 142
Palm, 77
Pantheism, 13
Pañcaśikha, 17, 52, 103 n.
parama mahat, 68
paramāṇu in Sāṃkhya and Yoga, 43 n., 66, 67, 165, 167
para vairāgya, 120, 127, 128
parikarma, 129, 130, 135, 137
pariṇāma, 98
_pariṇāmaduḥkhatā_, 98
_pariṇāmakramaniyama_, 62, 82
pariṇāmi, 19
pariṇāminityatā, 119
Past, 31, 32, 46, 72
Patañjali, 1, 2, 5 n., 16, 26, 30, 35, 51, 119
Patent, 81
pāda, 54
Pāñcāla, 79
pāṇi, 54
pāpa karma, 100
pāpakarmāśaya, 105
Pātañjala, 1, 12, 90, 115
pāyu, 54, 58
Perceived, 3
Perceiver, 3
Percept, 19
Perception, 3, 53, 96, 154, 162, 170, 171, 175
Permanent, 21
Phenomena, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 95
Phenomenal, 29, 84, 125, 155
Philosopher, 2
Philosophical, 2
Physical, 2, 3, 4, 5, 37, 166
_Physical, Chemical and Mechanical Theories of the Ancient Hindus_, 63
n.
Plant: its possession of life and senses, 80
Plato, 13
Pleasure, 98
Plurality, 26–29, 30
Poison, 85
Posture, 135, 136, 145
Potency, 19, 82, 96, 98, 101, 106, 116, 124, 125, 154, 155;
destroying other potencies, 117
Potential, 9, 32, 73, 77, 83, 84, 85
Potentiality, 5, 83, 84
Potentials, 3
Power, 82
pradhāna, 118
prajñā, 102, 116, 117, 120, 122, 125, 126, 128, 136, 151, 154, 170,
171;
its seven stages, 119–120
prajñāsaṃskāra, 101
prajñāloka, 149
prakāśa, 37, 175
prakṛti, 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 17, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 40, 41,
42, 54, 59, 62, 77, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 114,
115, 117, 118, 120, 122, 125, 143, 152, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165,
170, 173 n., 175, 177, 178;
as undifferentiated cosmic matter, 12;
as equilibrium of dharma and dharmī, 42;
avidyā and vāsanā lie merged in it, 114;
different views of, 10, 11;
different from avidyā, 12;
evolution of the second category of asmitā, 51;
its difference from māyā, 12;
its difference from purusha, 20;
its first evolutionary product, mahat, 50, 51;
its goal, 116;
its identity with guṇa reals, 9;
its relation with guṇas, 6;
its similarity with purusha, 20;
Lokācāryya’s view of, 11;
nature in the state of equilibrium, 8;
refilling from, 86;
roused by God, 87;
Venkaṭa’s view of, 10
prakṛtilīna, 127
_prakṛtivikṛti_, 7 n.
_prakṛtiṛityucyate vikārotpādakatvāt avidyā jñānavirodhitvāt māyā
vicitrasṛshṭikaratvāt_, 11
prakṛtyāpūra, 106
pralaya, 114
pramāṇa, 101, 170, 176
praṇava, 161
prāṇāyāma, 136, 137, 145, 146, 147, 148, 175
prasupta, 176
_pratipaksha bhāvanā_, 141
_pratisambandhī_, 46 n.
pratiyogī, 46 n.
pratyāhāra, 136, 137, 147, 148
pratyaksha, 171, 175
pratyaya, 119, 134
_pratyayakāraṇa_, 133
_pratyayaṃ bauddhamanupaśyati tamanupaśyannatadātmāpi tadātmaka iva
pratibhāti_, 17
_pratyayānupaśya_, 17, 18
_Pravacana-bhāshya_, 64
_prāmāṇyaniścaya_, 134 n.
Pre-established harmony, 2
Present, 31, 32, 46, 72
Presentative ideation, 101
Presentative power, 33
Pride, 143
Primal, 3
Primal cause, 3, 6
pṛthivī, 57
Psychological, 2
Psychology, 81
Psychosis, 3, 16
puṇya, 100
puṇya karma, 88, 100
puṇya karmāśaya, 105
Purāṇa, 64
Purification, 138
Purificatory, 129, 130, 136
Purity, 139
purusha, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 19, 23, 28, 29, 42, 48, 53, 61, 76,
89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 100, 104, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 125,
131, 133, 143, 154, 159, 162, 164, 173, 173 n., 175, 177, 178;
arguments in favour of its separate existence, 24;
contrast with vedantic Brahman, 26;
different from the mental states, 17;
fulfilment of its objects, 7, 8;
its connection with prakṛti real, 28;
its final separation from prakṛti, 118;
its permanence, 21;
its plurality, 26–30;
its reflection in the mind, 18;
its relation with concepts and ideas, 49;
its similarity with sattva, 49;
meaning determined from the sūtras, 16, 17;
nature of its reflection in buddhi, 21, 22
purushārtha, 89
purushārthatā, 120, 164;
its relation with avidyā, 115
pūrvadeśa, 43 n.
rajas, 3, 4, 5, 6, 24, 37, 40, 43, 47, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 62, 95, 96,
116, 175
Rarefaction, 10
rasa, 38, 152
rasa-tanmātra, 58, 64
Ray, P. C., 7 n., 63 n., 170 n.
Rādhā, 14, 15 n.
rāga, 97, 99, 104, 172
_Rājamārtaṇda_, 65
_rājaputtravattattvopadeśāt_, 15
rājasa, 38
Rāmānuja, 64, 162
Realisation, 137
Reality, 2, 4, 30, 118, 154
Reals, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 28
Reason, 50
Reasoning, 53
Rebirth, 93, 107
Reflection, 18, 28
Reflection theory, 14, 15
Release, 28, 29, 123, 128
Religious, 2
Reperception, 18
Restraint, 135, 136
Retention, 101
Right knowledge, 53
rūpa, 38, 65, 152, 167
rūpa tanmātra, 57, 64
Ṛgveda, 11
ṛshi, 144
ṛtambharā, 154
_sadṛśapariṇāmā_, 10
sahakāri, 55
_sahopalambhaniyama_, 33
_sahopalambhaniyamaś ca vedyatvañca hetū
sandigdhavyatirekatayānaikāntikau_, 34
_sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nilataddhiyoḥ_, 32
Salvation, 145, 159, 162
samādhi, 81, 96, 102, 118, 122, 124, 126, 128, 130, 135, 136, 137, 140,
142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 155, 161, 162;
classification of, 153, 154
samādhipariṇāma, 155
samāna tantra, 67
samprajñāta, 96, 124, 125, 126, 137, 144, 149, 153, 155, 156
samprajñāta samādhi, 138, 145, 150, 154
_sampratyaya_, 134 n.
_saṃghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyyayādadhishṭhānāt purusho’sti
bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṃ pravṛtteśca_, 24
saṃsāra, 115, 121
saṃskāra, 19, 81, 96, 98, 101, 108, 109, 125, 174, 176, 177
_saṃskārāḥ vṛttibhiḥ kriyante saṃskāraiśca vṛttayaḥ evaṃ
vṛttisaṃskāracakram aniśamāvarttate_, 97
saṃskāraśesha, 125
_saṃskāryyakāraṇa_, 135
_saṃsṛshṭā vivicyante_, 62
_saṃvega_, 129
saṃyama, 149, 157
_saṃyoga_, 27, 29 n.
sannyāsāśrama, 103
santosha, 143
saṅketa, 187
Sarasvatī Rāmānanda, 126
_sarvaṃ sarvātmakaṃ_, 77
satkāraṇavāda, 81
satkāryyavāda, 81
sattva, 3, 4, 5, 6, 22, 24, 37, 38, 40, 43, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55,
56, 96, 116, 143, 144, 153, 160, 161
_sattvapurushayoḥ śuddhisāmye kaivalyaṃ_, 16, 22
_sattvapurushayoratyantāsaṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśesho bhogaḥ parārthatvāt
svārthasamyamāt purushajñā, nam_, 16
savicāra, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154;
prajñā, 151
savitarka, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154
_sā ca ātmanā grahītrā saha buddhirekātmikā saṃvid_, 51
_sāmānya guṇa_, 29 n.
Sāṃkhya, 4, 7 n., 10, 11, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 29 n., 30, 58, 62, 67,
89, 90, 94, 140, 164, 165;
Jaina influence on, 94 n.
_Sāṃkhya-kārikā_, 55, 56 n., 67
Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala, 24, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 85
Sāṃkhya philosophy, 4 n.
_Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāshya_, 4 n.
_Sāṃkhya-sūtra_, 11, 15, 169
_Sāṃkhya-Yoga_, 4, 26, 27, 50 n., 57
Sāṃkhyists, 12
sānanda, 153
sāttvika, 38, 56
sāttvikaahaṃkāra, 63
_Science of Ethics_, 50
Seal, Dr. B. N., 7, 37, 63 n., 66–169
Seeming reflection, 22, 23
Seer, 17, 19, 23, 24, 28, 47, 51
Self, 8, 18, 21, 26, 49, 51, 54
Self-consciousness, 52, 54
Self-control, 24
Self-intelligent, 3
Self-subsistent, 36
Sensation, 166
Sense, 141
Sense faculties, 56
Sense organs, 56
Senses, 3, 40, 41, 47, 54, 60, 86, 87, 100, 102, 135, 147, 167, 171;
divergent views about their evolution, 57
Separation, 29 n.
Sex restraint, 144
_Shashṭitantraśāstra_, 10, 12
siddha, 144
_Siddhānta-candrikā_, 65, 95
_Siddhāntaleśa_, 14
Sign, 7, 41
Simultaneous revelation, 33
Sins, 103
Sleep, 174
smṛti, 19, 64, 101, 102, 108, 126, 128, 136
Social, 2
Soul, 13, 14, 24, 25
Sound, 169
Space, 79, 146, 152;
as relative position, 169
Space order, 170
sparśa, 38, 65
sparśâtanmātra, 57, 64
Specialised, 7, 8
Specific, 168
sphoṭavāda, 178–187;
_Kumāril’s view_, 181;
Mahābhāshya and Kaiyaṭa, 182;
Prabhākara, 182;
Śabara’s view, 182;
_Vaiśeshika view_, 180;
Vākya-sphoṭa, 185;
_Yoga view_, 184
Spinoza, 13
Spirits, 7, 13
Spiritual principle, 24, 28
_sthiti_, 37, 175
_sthitikāraṇa_, 133
sthūla, 166
sthūlavishayaka, 154
Strength, 102
Studies, 136, 139
Subconscious, 81
Sub-latent, 46, 73
Substance, 4 n., 29 n., 40, 47, 73, 74, 76, 81, 168;
its nature, 37
Substantive entities, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 82, 84
Substratum, 36, 37, 49
Succession, 44, 45
_summum bonum_, 121
Susheṇa, 135
_sutucchaka_, 12
_sūkshma_, 61, 67, 166, 167
sūkshmavishayaka, 154
_sūkshmavṛttimantaḥ_, 6
Sūtra, 15, 17, 22, 26, 31, 62, 64, 108, 137, 147
_Sūtrārthabodhinī_, 65, 90
svarūpa, 166, 167, 175
svādhyāya, 136, 142, 161
_Svetāśvatara_, 11
Sympathy, 137, 138
śabda, 38, 65, 150
_śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ_, 174
śabda-tanmātra, 57, 64
_śabdādīnām mūrttisamānajātīyānām_, 66 n.
śakti, 17, 82, 83
śaktimān, 82, 83
Śaṅkara, 4 n., 135, 162
śānta, 73
_Sānti-parva_, 80, 88, 89
śāstra, 172
śauca, 143, 144
śīla, 6
śraddhā, 102, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 135, 138, 158
śruti, 57
śukla, 102, 111, 140, 175
śukla karma, 103, 140
śukla karmāśaya, 111
śuklakṛshṇa, 102, 111
Śūnyavādi Buddhists, 2
_svalpasaṅkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamarshaḥ_, 103 n.
_svasvāmiśaktyoḥ svarūpopalabdhihetuḥ saṃyogaḥ_, 16
_tadartha eva drśyasya ātmā_, 16
_tadabhāvāt saṃyogābhāvo hānaṃ taddṛśeḥ kaivalyaṃ_, 16
taijasa, 56
tamas, 3, 4, 5, 6, 37, 39, 40, 43, 47, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 94, 95,
117, 169, 176
tanmātra, 38, 40, 42, 54, 59, 61, 65, 66, 67, 70, 82, 83, 124, 151, 167
tanmātras, evolution of grosser elements from, 65;
their difference from paramānus, 68;
their evolution, _et seq._, 64;
their relation to ahaṃkāra, 40, 41
tanmātrāvayava, 66
_tanmātrāṇāmapi parasparavyārvṛttasvabhāvatvamastyeva tacca
yogimātragamyam_, 68
tanu, 176
_tapaḥ_, 136
tapas, 161
_tasmāt svatantro’rthaḥ sarvapurushasādhāraṇaḥ svatantrāṇi ca cittāni
pratipurushaṃ, pravarttante_, 36
Taste, 167
_tatradṛshṭajanmavedanīyasya niyatavipākasya_, 109
tattva, 40, 94
tattvajñāna, 101, 176
_Tattva-kaumudī_, 25, 56 n., 103 n.
_Tattva-nirūpaṇa_, 66
_Tattvatraya_, 11 n., 55, 58, 64, 66
_Tattvavaiśāradī_, 3 n., 5 n., 9 n., 33 n., 46, 53, 56 n., 64, 75, 78,
79, 93, 135, 154
tattvāntara, 68
_tattvāntara-pariṇāma_, 40, 41, 69
tāmasa, 38, 56
tāmasa ahaṃkāra, 60, 62
_te vyaktasūkshmā guṇātmānaḥ ... sarvamidaṃ guṇānāṃ
Sanniveśaviśeshamātramiti paramārthato guṇātmānaḥ_, 38
tejas, 65, 75, 166, 167
tejas atom, 66
Teleological, 86, 121
Teleology, 24, 76, 77, 89
Temptation, 141
Theft, 136, 141
Theists, 90
Theories, 2
Thing, 150
Thing-in-itself, 2, 37
Thought, 2
Time, 79, 139, 152, 169;
as discrete moments, 44;
as unit of change, 43;
element of imagination in, 44;
unit of, 46;
order, 170
Tinduka, 77
Trance, 135, 136, 143;
Trance-cognition, 95
Transcendent, 18
Transformations, 20, 24
trasareṇu, 66
_triguṇamaviveki vishayaḥ sāmānyamacetanaṃ prasavadharmi vyaktaṃ tathā
pradhānaṃ, tadviparītastathā pumān_, 42
Truth, 141
Truthfulness, 139, 140, 144
_Tulyajātīyātulyajātīyaśaktibhedānupātinaḥ_, 6
udāra, 176
udbodhaka, 174
udghāta, 146, 147
udita, 73
Ultimate state, 7
Unafflicted, 176
Understanding, 19
Undetermined, 8
Undifferentiated, 12, 162
Unindividuated, 12
Universe, 1, 13;
a product of guṇa combinations, 37
Unknowable, 2, 37
Unmanifested, 4, 8, 72
Unmediated, 8
Unpredicable, 73
Unreal, 28
Unspecialised, 7
Unwisdom, 142
Upanishads, 11
upastha, 54, 58
upādāna, 61
upādāna kāraṇa, 61, 133
upekshā, 137, 139
_utpādyakāraṇa_, 135
uttaradeśa, 43 n.
ūha, 101, 176
vaikārika, 56
vairāgya, 100, 101, 127, 129, 130, 135, 136, 143, 149, 162, 177
Vaiśeshika, 43 n., 71, 168
Vaiśeshika atoms, 70
vaishṇava, 10
Vanity, 143
vaśīkāra, 128
_vastupatitaḥ_, 44
_vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ_, 35 n.
Vācaspati, 3, 5 n., 8, 12, 32, 33, 35, 44, 46 n., 51, 55, 62, 65, 66,
67, 75, 78, 87, 89, 93, 109, 110, 112, 118, 126, 129, 144, 153, 154
vāk, 54
_Vākyapadīya_, 183
vāsanā, 99, 106, 108, 114, 116, 177;
contrasted with karmāśaya, 107
Vāyu, 167
Vāyu atom, 65
Vedas, 154, 160, 162, 170, 177
Vedānta, 11, 14, 24, 27, 28, 29, 162
Vedāntism, 14
Vedāntists, 12, 26, 66, 81
Vedic, 103
Vehicles of actions, 103
Venkaṭa, 10
Veracity, 136, 140
Verbal cognition, cause of, 186;
view of Nyāya, 187
vibhu, 43 n.
_vibhu parimāṇa_, 29 n.
vibhūti, 158
Vibhūtipāda, 22
vicāra, 153
vicārānugata, 125, 153
vicchinna, 176
Vice, 86, 87
_videha_, 127
vidyā, 177
_vidyāviparītam jñānāntaraṃ avidyā_, 11, 97
_Vijñanāmṛta-bhāshya_, 88, 90
Vijñāna Bhikshu, 4, 15
vikalpa, 101, 150, 173, 174
_vikārakāraṇa_, 133
_vikāryyakāraṇa_, 135
_vikṛti_, 7 n., 165
_vikshipta_, 95, 123
vikshiptacitta, 96, 130
vipāka, 105, 107
viparyyaya, 101, 172, 173, 176
_viprayoga_, 7
Virtue, 86
_Vishṇu Purāṇa_, 66
viśesha, 7, 7 n., 40, 59, 81, 84, 165, 171
_viśeshapariṇāma_, 60
_viśeshāviśeshaliṅgamātrāliṅgāniguṇaparvāṇi_, 59
visokā, 125
vitarka, 153
vitarkānugata, 125, 154
_viyoga_, 29 n.
_viyogakāraṇa_, 134, 135
vīryya, 102, 126, 128, 135, 136
Vomit, 141
_Vṛtti_, 56, 92, 96, 97, 101, 102, 122, 171
vyaṇgya, 57
vyaṅjaka, 57
vyatireka, 128
_vyavasāyātmakatva_, 3
_vyavaseyātmakatva_, 3
Vyāsa, 5, 7, 8, 8 n., 22, 53, 121, 133, 135
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, 3 n., 5 n., 7 n., 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 33, 36, 37,
43 n., 50, 56, 58, 59, 60, 66 n., 68 n., 70, 71 n., 79, 84, 85, 94,
99, 101, 117, 119, 121, 133, 171
vyoman, 75
vyutthāna, 155, 156, 170
_vyutthāna citta_, 95
Ward, 2 n.
Wicked, 102
World-phenomena, 16
World-process, 91
_yadyaliṅgāvasthā śabdādyupabhogaṃ vā sattvapurushānyatākhyātim vā
purushārtham nirvarttayet tannrvarttane hi na sāmyāvasthā syāt_, 8
Yama, 136, 138, 139, 142, 143, 148
Yatamāna, 127
_yathā rathādi yantradibhiḥ_, 25
_yathāyaskāntamaṇiḥ svasminneva ayaḥsannidhīkaraṇamātrāt
śalyanishkarshaṇākhyam upakāram kurvat purushasya svāminaḥ svam
bhavati bhogasādhanatvāt_, 22
_ye cāsyānupasthitā bhāgaste cāsya na syurevaṃ nāsti pṛshṭhamiti
udaramapi na gṛhyeta_, 36
Yoga, 14, 29, 48, 62, 89, 96, 122, 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 140, 144,
147, 155, 162, 177;
its points of difference with Sāṃkhya, 163–165
Yoga metaphysics, 1
_Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of thought_, 165
Yoga system, 2
Yoga theory, 5
yogāṅga, 122, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 144, 145, 149
_Yoga-sūtra_, 5 n., 11, 17, 35 n., 43 n., 45, 47, 108, 117, 142, 153
_Yoga-vārttika_, 4 n., 6 n., 9, 10, 12 n., 22, 29 n., 43 n., 45 n., 60,
61, 65, 66, 67, 87, 110, 126, 127, 129, 134 n., 143, 154, 176
Yogins, 79, 87, 95, 97, 98, 121, 125, 127, 128, 129, 136, 139, 143,
147, 153, 155, 156, 158, 160;
nine kinds of, 129
_yogyatāvacchinnā dharmiṇaḥ śaktireva dharmaḥ_, 82
Yudhishṭhira, 140
_yutasiddhāvayaba_, 168
-----
Footnote 1:
See Ward’s _Naturalism and Agnosticism_.
Footnote 2:
Vācaspati’s _Tattvavaiśāradī_ on the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 47.
Footnote 3:
_Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāshya_, I. 120.
Footnote 4:
It is indeed difficult to say what was the earliest conception of the
guṇas. But there is reason to believe, as I have said elsewhere, that
guṇa in its earliest acceptance meant qualities. It is very probable
that as the Sāṃkhya philosophy became more and more systematised it
was realised that there was no ultimate distinction between substance
and qualities. In consequence of such a view the guṇas which were
originally regarded as qualities began to be regarded as substantive
entities and no contradiction was felt. Bhikshu in many places
describes the guṇas as substantive entities (_dravya_) and their
division into three classes as being due to the presence of three
kinds of class-characteristics. This would naturally mean that within
the same class there were many other differences which have not been
taken into account (_Yoga-vārttika_, II. 18). But it cannot be said
that the view that the guṇas are substantive entities and that there
is no difference between qualities and substances is regarded as a
genuine Sāṃkhya view even as early as Śaṅkara. See _Ghābhāshya_, XIV.
5.
Footnote 5:
See _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ on Patañjali’s _Yoga-sūtras_, II. 18, and
Vācaspati’s _Tattvavaiśāradī_ on it.
Footnote 6:
See Bhikshu’s _Yoga-vārttika_, II. 18.
Footnote 7:
_History of Hindu Chemistry_, Vol. II, by P. C. Ray, p. 66.
Footnote 8:
The usual Sāṃkhya terms as found in Iśvarakṛshṇa’s _Kārikā_, having
the same denotation as aviśesha and viśesha, are _prakṛtivikṛti_ and
_vikṛti_.
Footnote 9:
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 19.
Footnote 10:
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 19.
Footnote 11:
_Tattvavaiśāradī_, II. 19.
Footnote 12:
_Tattvatraya_, p. 48 (Chowkhamba edition), Benares.
Footnote 13:
Bhikshu in his _Yoga-vārttika_ explains “_māyeva_” as “_laukikamāyeva
kshaṇabhaṇguram_” evanescent like the illusions of worldly experience.
Footnote 14:
_Siddhāntalleśa_ (Jīveśvara nirūpaiṇa).
Footnote 15:
Princess Kuntī of the Mahābhārata had a son born to her by means of a
charm when she was still a virgin. Being afraid of a public scandal
she floated the child in a stream; the child was picked up by the wife
of a carpenter (Rādhā). The boy grew up to be the great hero Karṇa and
he thought that he was the son of a carpenter until the fact of his
royal lineage was disclosed to him later in life.
Footnote 16:
_Kārikā_ 17.
Footnote 17:
Gauḍapāda’s commentary on _Kārikā_ 17.
Footnote 18:
Purusha is a substance (_dravya_) because it has independent existence
(_anāśrita_) and has a measure (_vibhu parimāṇa_) of its own. So it
always possesses the common characteristics (_sāmānya guṇa_) of
substances, contact (_saṃyoga_), separation (_viyoga_) and number
(_saṃkhyā_). Purusha cannot be considered to be suffering change or
impure on account of the possession of the above common
characteristics of all substances. _Yoga-vārttika_, II. 17.
Footnote 19:
Thus the _Bhāshya_ says:
_bhavishyadvyaktikamanāgataṃanudbhūtavyaktikamatītaṃ
svavyāpāropārūḍhaṃ varttamānaṃ trayaṃ, caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyaṃ
yadi caitat svarūpato nābhavishyannedaṃ nirvishayaṃ jñānamudapatsyata
tasmādatītamanāgataṃ svarūpato’ stīti_.
Footnote 20:
_Tattvavaiśāradī_, IV. 14.
Footnote 21:
_Vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ._ _Yoga-sūtra_, IV.
15.
Footnote 22:
“_Tattvāntara-pariṇāma_” means the evolution of a wholly new category
of existence. Thus the tanmātras are wholly different from the ego
from which they are produced. So the atoms are wholly different from
the tanmātras from which they are produced, for the latter, unlike the
former, have no sense-properties. In all combinations of atoms, there
would arise thousands of new qualities, but none of the products of
the combination of atoms can be called a tattvāntara, or a new
category of existence since all these qualities are the direct
manifestations of the specific properties of the atoms.
Footnote 23:
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 52, says that the smallest indivisible part of a
thing is called a paramāṇu. Vijñāna Bhikshu in explaining it says that
paramāṇu here means guṇa, for if a thing say a stone is divided, then
the furthest limit of division is reached when we come to the
indivisible guṇas. But if the prakṛti is all-pervading (_vibhu_) how
can the guṇas be atomic? Bhikshu says (_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 52) in
reply that there are some classes of guṇas (e.g. those which produce
mind _antaḥkaraṇa_ and _ākāśa_) which are all-pervading, while the
others are all atomic. In Bhikshu’s interpretation a moment is to be
defined as the time which a guṇa entity takes to change its own unit
of space. Guṇas are thus equivalent to the Vaiśeshika paramāṇus.
Bhikshu, however, does not deny that there are no atoms of earth,
water, etc., but he says that where reference is not made to these
atoms but to guṇa atoms for the partless units of time can only be
compared with the partless guṇas. But Vācaspati does not make any
comment here to indicate that the smallest indivisible unit of matter
should mean guṇas. Moreover, _Yoga-sūtra_, I. 40, and _Vyāsa-bhāshya_,
I. 45, speak of _paramāṇu_ and _aṇu_ in the sense of earth-atoms, etc.
Even Bhikshu does not maintain that paramāṇu is used there in the
sense of atomic guṇa entities. I could not therefore accept Bhikshu’s
interpretation that paramāṇu here refers to guṇa. Paramāṇu may here be
taken in the sense of material atoms of earth, water, etc. The atoms
(paramāṇu) here cannot be absolutely partless, for it has two sides,
prior (_pūrvadeśa_) and posterior (_uttaradeśa_).
Footnote 24:
Bhikshu regards the movement of a guṇa of its own unit of space as the
ultimate unit of time (_kshaṇa_). The whole world is nothing else but
a series of _kshaṇas_. This view differs from the Buddhist view that
everything is momentary in this that it does not admit of any other
thing but the _kshaṇas_ (_na tu kskaṇātiriktaḥ kshaṇikaḥ padārthaḥ
kaścidishyate taistu kskaṇamātrasthāyyeva padārthaḥ ishyate_.
_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 52).
Footnote 25:
There is a difference of opinion as regards the meaning of the word
“_kshaṇapratiyogi_” in IV. 33. Vācaspati says that it means the
growth associated with a particular _kshaṇa_ or moment
(_kshaṇapracayāśraya_). The word _pratiyogī_ is interpreted by
Vācaspati as related (_pratisambandhī_). Bhikshu, however, gives a
quite different meaning. He interprets _kshaṇa_ as “interval” and
pratiyogī as “opposite of” (_virodhī_). So “_kshaṇapratiyogī_” means
with him “without any interval” or “continuous.” He holds that the
sūtra means that all change is continuous and not in succession.
There is according to his interpretation no interval between the
cessation of a previous character and the rise of a new one.
Footnote 26:
Nothing more than a superficial comparison with Fichte is here
intended. A large majority of the texts and the commentary literature
would oppose the attempts of all those who would like to interpret
Sāṃkhya-yoga on Fichtean lines.
Footnote 27:
_Tattvakaumudī_ on _Sāṃkhya-kārikā_, 25.
Footnote 28:
_Tattvavaiśāradī_, III. 41.
Footnote 29:
This was first pointed out by Dr. B. N. Seal in his _Physical,
Chemical and Mechanical Theories of the Ancient Hindus_ in Dr. P. C.
Ray’s _Hindu Chemistry_, Vol. II.
Footnote 30:
_Yoga-vārttika_, I. 45.
Footnote 31:
I have already said before that Bhikshu thinks that the guṇas (except
the all-pervading ones) may be compared to the Vaiśeshika atoms. See
_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 52.
Footnote 32:
Cf. _Vyāsa-bhāshya_—“_sabdādīnāṃ mūrttisamānajátīyānāṃ_,” IV. 14.
Footnote 33:
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 19.
Footnote 34:
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 13.
Footnote 35:
_Ibid._
Footnote 36:
Nahusha an earthly king became Indra the king of the gods by the
fruition of his virtues, but on account of gross misdeeds fell from
Heaven and was turned into a snake.
Footnote 37:
_Tattravaiśāradī_, IV, 3.
Footnote 38:
I have translated both citta and buddhi as mind. The word buddhi is
used when emphasis is laid on the intellective and cosmical functions
of the mind. The word citta is used when emphasis is laid on the
conservative side of mind as the repository of all experiences,
memory, etc.
Footnote 39:
If this is a Sāṃkhya doctrine, it seems clearly to be a case of Jaina
influence.
Footnote 40:
Compare Pañcaśikha, _svalpasaṇkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamarshaḥ_,
_Tattvakaumudī_, 2.
Footnote 41:
Pratyaya is explained in _Yoga-vārttika_, II. 28, as _sampratyaya_ or
_prāmāṇyaniścaya_.
Footnote 42:
Yudhishṭhira led falsely Droṇa to believe that the latter’s son was
dead by inaudibly muttering that it was only an elephant having the
same name as that of his son that had died.
Footnote 43:
This book has, however, not yet been published.
Footnote 44:
Dr. Ray’s _Hindu Chemistry_, Vol. II, p. 81.
Footnote 45:
Avidyā manifests itself in different forms: (1) as the afflictions
(_kleśa_) of asmitā (egoism), rāga (attachment), dvesha (antipathy)
and abhiniveśa (self-love); (2) as doubt and intellectual error; (3)
as error of sense. All these manifestations of avidyā are also the
different forms of viparyyaya or bhrama (error, illusion, mistake).
This bhrama in Yoga is the thinking of something as that which it is
not (_anyathākhyāti_). Thus we think the miserable worldly existence
as pleasurable and attribute the characteristics of prakṛti to purusha
and vice versa. All afflictions are due to this confusion and
misjudgment, the roots of which stay in the buddhis in all their
transmigrations from one life to another. Sāṃkhya, however, differs
from Yoga and thinks that all error (_avidyā_ or _bhrama_) is due only
to non-distinction between the true and the untrue. Thus
non-distinction (_aviveka_) between prakṛti and purusha is the cause
of all our miserable mundane existence. Avidyā and aviveka are thus
synonymous with Sāṃkhya.
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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained.
● Used numbers for footnotes, placing them all at the end of the last
chapter.
● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.