YOGA
AS PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIONS
BY
SURENDRANATH DASGUPTA
M.A., PH.D.(CAL.), PH.D.(CANTAB.)
AUTHOR OF “A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY”, ETC.
_Professor of Philosophy, Presidency College, Calcutta_
_Late Professor of Sanskrit, Chittagong College_
_Late Lecturer in the University of Cambridge_
LONDON:
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO.
1924
YOGA AS PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION
Printed in Great Britain at
_The Mayflower Press, Plymouth_, William Brendon & Son, Ltd.
AS A HUMBLE TOKEN
OF DEEPEST REGARD AND GRATEFULNESS
TO THE
MAHARAJA SIR MANINDRACHANDRA NUNDY
K.C.I.E
WHOSE NOBLE CHARACTER AND SELF-DENYING CHARITIES
HAVE ENDEARED HIM TO THE PEOPLE OF BENGAL
AND
WHO SO KINDLY OFFERED ME HIS WHOLE-HEARTED
PATRONAGE IN
ENCOURAGING MY ZEAL FOR LEARNING AT A TIME
WHEN I WAS IN SO GREAT A NEED OF IT
PREFACE
This little volume is an attempt at a brief exposition of the
philosophical and religious doctrines found in Patañjali’s _Yoga-sūtra_
as explained by its successive commentaries of Vyāsa, Vācaspati, Vijñāna
Bhikshu, and others. The exact date of Patañjali cannot be definitely
ascertained, but if his identity with the other Patañjali, the author of
the Great Commentary (_Mahābhāshya_) on Pāṇini’s grammar, could be
conclusively established, there would be some evidence in our hands that
he lived in 150 B.C. I have already discussed this subject in the first
volume of my _A History of Indian Philosophy_, where the conclusion to
which I arrived was that, while there was some evidence in favour of
their identity, there was nothing which could be considered as being
conclusively against it. The term Yoga, according to Patañjali’s
definition, means the final annihilation (_nirodha_) of all the mental
states (_cittavṛtti_) involving the preparatory stages in which the mind
has to be habituated to being steadied into particular types of
graduated mental states. This was actually practised in India for a long
time before Patañjali lived; and it is very probable that certain
philosophical, psychological, and practical doctrines associated with it
were also current long before Patañjali. Patañjali’s work is, however,
the earliest systematic compilation on the subject that is known to us.
It is impossible, at this distance of time, to determine the extent to
which Patañjali may claim originality. Had it not been for the labours
of the later commentators, much of what is found in Patañjali’s
aphorisms would have remained extremely obscure and doubtful, at least
to all those who were not associated with such ascetics as practised
them, and who derived the theoretical and practical knowledge of the
subject from their preceptors in an upward succession of generations
leading up to the age of Patañjali, or even before him. It is well to
bear in mind that Yoga is even now practised in India, and the
continuity of traditional instruction handed down from teacher to pupil
is not yet completely broken.
If anyone wishes methodically to pursue a course which may lead him
ultimately to the goal aimed at by Yoga, he must devote his entire life
to it under the strict practical guidance of an advanced teacher. The
present work can in no sense be considered as a practical guide for such
purposes. But it is also erroneous to think—as many uninformed people
do—that the only interest of Yoga lies in its practical side. The
philosophical, psychological, cosmological, ethical, and religious
doctrines, as well as its doctrines regarding matter and change, are
extremely interesting in themselves, and have a definitely assured place
in the history of the progress of human thought; and, for a right
understanding of the essential features of the higher thoughts of India,
as well as of the practical side of Yoga, their knowledge is
indispensable.
The Yoga doctrines taught by Patañjali are regarded as the highest of
all Yogas (_Rājayoga_), as distinguished from other types of Yoga
practices, such as _Haṭhayoga_ or _Mantrayoga_. Of these _Haṭhayoga_
consists largely of a system of bodily exercises for warding off
diseases, and making the body fit for calmly bearing all sorts of
physical privations and physical strains. _Mantrayoga_ is a course of
meditation on certain mystical syllables which leads to the audition of
certain mystical sounds. This book does not deal with any of these
mystical practices nor does it lay any stress on the performance of any
of those miracles described by Patañjali. The scope of this work is
limited to a brief exposition of the intellectual foundation—or the
theoretical side—of the Yoga practices, consisting of the philosophical,
psychological, cosmological, ethical, religious, and other doctrines
which underlie these practices. The affinity of the system of Sāṃkhya
thought, generally ascribed to a mythical sage, Kapila, to that of Yoga
of Patañjali is so great on most important points of theoretical
interest that they may both be regarded as two different modifications
of one common system of ideas. I have, therefore, often taken the
liberty of explaining Yoga ideas by a reference to kindred ideas in
Sāṃkhya. But the doctrines of Yoga could very well have been compared or
contrasted with great profit with the doctrines of other systems of
Indian thought. This has purposely been omitted here as it has already
been done by me in my _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Systems of
Indian Thought_, the publication of which has for long been unavoidably
delayed. All that may be expected from the present volume is that it
will convey to the reader the essential features of the Yoga system of
thought. How far this expectation will be realized from this book it
will be for my readers to judge. It is hoped that the chapter on “Kapila
and Pātañjala School of Sāṃkhya” in my _A History of Indian Philosophy_
(Vol. I. Cambridge University Press, 1922) will also prove helpful for
the purpose.
I am deeply indebted to my friend Mr. Douglas Ainslie for the numerous
corrections and suggestions regarding the English style that he was
pleased to make throughout the body of the manuscript and the very warm
encouragement that he gave me for the publication of this work. In this
connection I also beg to offer my best thanks for the valuable
suggestions which I received from the reviser of the press. Had it not
been for these, the imperfections of the book would have been still
greater. The quaintness and inelegance of some of my expressions would,
however, be explained if it were borne in mind that here, as well as in
my _A History of Indian Philosophy_, I have tried to resist the
temptation of making the English happy at the risk of sacrificing the
approach to exactness of the philosophical sense; and many ideas of
Indian philosophy are such that an exact English rendering of them often
becomes hopelessly difficult.
I am grateful to my friend and colleague, Mr. D. K. Sen, M.A., for the
kind assistance that he rendered in helping me to prepare the index.
Last of all, I must express my deep sense of gratefulness to Sir
Ashutosh Mookerjee, Kt., C.S.I., etc. etc., and the University of
Calcutta, for kindly permitting me to utilize my _A Study of Patañjāli_,
which is a Calcutta University publication, for the present work.
S. N. DASGUPTA.
PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, CALCUTTA,
_April, 1924_.
CONTENTS
BOOK I. YOGA METAPHYSICS:
CHAPTER PAGE
I. PRAKṚTI 1
II. PURUSHA 13
III. THE REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 31
IV. THE PROCESS OF EVOLUTION 40
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CATEGORIES 48
VI. EVOLUTION AND CHANGE OF QUALITIES 64
VII. EVOLUTION AND GOD 84
BOOK II. YOGA ETHICS AND PRACTICE:
VIII. MIND AND MORAL STATES 92
IX. THE THEORY OF KARMA 102
X. THE ETHICAL PROBLEM 114
XI. YOGA PRACTICE 124
XII. THE YOGĀṄGAS 132
XIII. STAGES OF SAMADHI 150
XIV. GOD IN YOGA 159
XV. MATTER AND MIND 166
APPENDIX 179
INDEX 188
YOGA AS PHILOSOPHY
AND RELIGION
BOOK I. YOGA METAPHYSICS
CHAPTER I
PRAKRTI
However dogmatic a system of philosophical enquiry may appear to us, it
must have been preceded by a criticism of the observed facts of
experience. The details of the criticism and the processes of
self-argumentation by which the thinker arrived at his theory of the
Universe might indeed be suppressed, as being relatively unimportant,
but a thoughtful reader would detect them as lying in the background
behind the shadow of the general speculations, but at the same time
setting them off before our view. An Aristotle or a Patañjali may not
make any direct mention of the arguments which led him to a dogmatic
assertion of his theories, but for a reader who intends to understand
them thoroughly it is absolutely necessary that he should read them in
the light as far as possible of the inferred presuppositions and inner
arguments of their minds; it is in this way alone that he can put
himself in the same line of thinking with the thinker whom he is willing
to follow, and can grasp him to the fullest extent. In offering this
short study of the Pātañjala metaphysics, I shall therefore try to
supplement it with such of my inferences of the presuppositions of
Patañjali’s mind, which I think will add to the clearness of the
exposition of his views, though I am fully alive to the difficulties of
making such inferences about a philosopher whose psychological, social,
religious and moral environments differed so widely from ours.
An enquiry into the relations of the mental phenomena to the physical
has sometimes given the first start to philosophy. The relation of mind
to matter is such an important problem of philosophy that the existing
philosophical systems may roughly be classified according to the
relative importance that has been attached to mind or to matter. There
have been chemical, mechanical and biological conceptions which have
ignored mind as a separate entity and have dogmatically affirmed it to
be the product of matter only.[1] There have been theories of the other
extreme, which have dispensed with matter altogether and have boldly
affirmed that matter as such has no reality at all, and that thought is
the only thing which can be called Real in the highest sense. All matter
as such is non-Being or Māyā or Avidyā. There have been Nihilists like
the Śūnyavādi Buddhists who have gone so far as to assert that neither
matter nor mind exists. Some have asserted that matter is only thought
externalized, some have regarded the principle of matter as the
unknowable Thing-in-itself, some have regarded them as separate
independent entities held within a higher reality called God, or as two
of his attributes only, and some have regarded their difference as being
only one of grades of intelligence, one merging slowly and imperceptibly
into the other and held together in concord with each other by
pre-established harmony.
Underlying the metaphysics of the Yoga system of thought as taught by
Patañjali and as elaborated by his commentators we find an acute
analysis of matter and thought. Matter on the one hand, mind, the
senses, and the ego on the other are regarded as nothing more than two
different kinds of modifications of one primal cause, the Prakṛti. But
the self-intelligent principle called Purusha (spirit) is distinguished
from them. Matter consists only of three primal qualities or rather
substantive entities, which he calls the Sattva or intelligence-stuff,
Rajas or energy, and Tamas—the factor of obstruction or mass or inertia.
It is extremely difficult truly to conceive of the nature of these three
kinds of entities or Guṇas, as he calls them, when we consider that
these three elements alone are regarded as composing all phenomena,
mental and physical. In order to comprehend them rightly it will be
necessary to grasp thoroughly the exact relation between the mental and
the physical. What are the real points of agreement between the two? How
can the same elements be said to behave in one case as the conceiver and
in the other case as the conceived? Thus Vācaspati says:—
“The reals (guṇas) have two forms, viz. the determiner or the perceiver,
and the perceived or the determined. In the aspect of the determined or
the perceived, the guṇas evolve themselves as the five infra-atomic
potentials, the five gross elements and their compounds. In the aspect
of perceiver or determiner, they form the modifications of the ego
together with the senses.”[2]
It is interesting to notice here the two words used by Vācaspati in
characterising the twofold aspect of the guṇa viz. _vyavasāyātmakatva_,
their nature as the determiner or perceiver, and _vyavaseyātmakatva_,
their nature as determined or perceived. The elements which compose the
phenomena of the objects of perception are the same as those which form
the phenomena of the perceiving; their only distinction is that one is
the determined and the other is the determiner. What we call the
psychosis involving intellection, sensing and the ego, and what may be
called the infra-atoms, atoms and their combinations, are but two
different types of modifications of the same stuff of reals. There is no
intrinsic difference in nature between the mental and the physical.
The mode of causal transformation is explained by Vijñāna Bhikshu in his
commentary on the system of Sāṃkhya as if its functions consisted only
in making manifest what was already there in an unmanifested form. Thus
he says, “just as the image already existing in the stone is only
manifested by the activity of the statuary, so the causal activity also
generates only that activity by which an effect is manifested as if it
happened or came into being at the present moment.”[3] The effects are
all always existent, but some of them are sometimes in an unmanifested
state. What the causal operation, viz. the energy of the agent and the
suitable collocating instruments and conditions, does is to set up an
activity by which the effect may be manifested at the present moment.
With Sāṃkhya-Yoga, sattva, rajas and tamas are substantive entities
which compose the reality of the mental and the physical.[4] The mental
and the physical represent two different orders of modifications, and
one is not in any way superior to the other. As the guṇas conjointly
form the manifold without, by their varying combinations, as well as all
the diverse internal functions, faculties and phenomena, they are in
themselves the absolute potentiality of all things, mental and physical.
Thus Vyāsa in describing the nature of the knowable, writes: “The nature
of the knowable is now described:—The knowable, consisting of the
objects of enjoyment and liberation, as the gross elements and
the perceptive senses, is characterised by three essential
traits—illumination, energy and inertia. The sattva is of the nature of
illumination. Rajas is of the nature of energy. Inertia (tamas) is of
the nature of inactivity. The guṇa entities with the above
characteristics are capable of being modified by mutual influence on one
another, by their proximity. They are evolving. They have the
characteristics of conjunction and separation. They manifest forms by
one lending support to the others by proximity. None of these loses its
distinct power into those of the others, even though any one of them may
exist as the principal factor of a phenomenon with the others as
subsidiary thereto. The guṇas forming the three classes of substantive
entities manifest themselves as such by their similar kinds of power.
When any one of them plays the rôle of the principal factor of any
phenomenon, the others also show their presence in close contact. Their
existence as subsidiary energies of the principal factor is inferred by
their distinct and independent functioning, even though it be as
subsidiary qualities.”[5] The Yoga theory does not acknowledge qualities
as being different from substances. The ultimate substantive entities
are called guṇas, which as we have seen are of three kinds. The guṇa
entities are infinite in number; each has an individual existence, but
is always acting in co-operation with others. They may be divided into
three classes in accordance with their similarities of behaviour (śīla).
Those which behave in the way of intellection are called _sattva_, those
which behave in the way of producing effort of movement are called
_rajas_, and those which behave differently from these and obstruct
their process are called _tamas_. We have spoken above of a primal cause
_prakṛti_. But that is not a separate category independent of the guṇas.
Prakṛti is but a name for the guṇa entities when they exist in a state
of equilibrium. All that exists excepting the purushas are but the guṇa
entities in different kinds of combination amongst themselves. The
effects they produce are not different from them but it is they
themselves which are regarded as causes in one state and effects in
another. The difference of combination consists in this, that in some
combinations there are more of sattva entities than rajas or tamas, and
in others more of rajas or more of tamas. These entities are continually
uniting and separating. But though they are thus continually dividing
and uniting in new combinations the special behaviour or feature of each
class of entities remains ever the same. Whatever may be the nature of
any particular combination the sattva entities participating in it will
retain their intellective functions, rajas their energy
functions, and tamas the obstructing ones. But though they retain
their special features in spite of their mutual difference
they hold fast to one another in any particular combination
(_tulyajātīyātulyajātīyaśaktibhedānupātinaḥ_, which Bhikshu explains as
_aviśesheṇopashṭambhakasvabhāvāḥ_). In any particular combination it is
the special features of those entities which predominate that manifest
themselves, while the other two classes lend their force in drawing the
minds of perceivers to it as an object as a magnet draws a piece of
iron. Their functionings at this time are undoubtedly feeble
(_sūkshmavṛttimantaḥ_) but still they do exist.[6]
In the three guṇas, none of them can be held as the goal of the others.
All of them are equally important, and the very varied nature of the
manifold represents only the different combinations of these guṇas as
substantive entities. In any combination one of the guṇas may be more
predominant than the others, but the other guṇas are also present there
and perform their functions in their own way. No one of them is more
important than the other, but they serve conjointly one common purpose,
viz. the experiences and the liberation of the purusha, or spirit. They
are always uniting, separating and re-uniting again and there is neither
beginning nor end of this (_anyonyamithunāḥ sarvve naishāmādisamprayogo
viprayogo vā upalabhyate_).
They have no purpose of their own to serve, but they all are always
evolving, as Dr. Seal says, “ever from a relatively less differentiated,
less determinate, less coherent whole, to a relatively more
differentiated, more determinate, more coherent whole”[7] for the
experiences and liberation of purusha, or spirit. When in a state of
equilibrium they cannot serve the purpose of the purusha, so that state
of the guṇas is not for the sake of the purusha; it is its own
independent eternal state. All the other three stages of evolution, viz.
the liṅga (sign), aviśesha (unspecialised) and viśesha (specialised)
have been caused for the sake of the purusha.[8] Thus Vyāsa writes:—[9]
“The objects of the purusha are no cause of the original state
(_aliṅga_). That is to say, the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha
is not the cause which brings about the manifestation of the original
state of prakṛti in the beginning. The fulfilment of the objects of the
purusha is not therefore the reason of the existence of that ultimate
state. Since it is not brought into existence by the need of the
fulfilment of the purusha’s objects it is said to be eternal. As to the
three specialised states, the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha
becomes the cause of their manifestation in the beginning. The
fulfilment of the objects of the purusha is not therefore the reason for
the existence of the cause. Since it is not brought into existence by
the purusha’s objects it is said to be eternal. As to the three
specialised states, the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha being
the cause of their manifestation in the beginning, they are said to be
non-eternal.”
Vācaspati again says:—“The fulfilment of the objects of the purusha
could be said to be the cause of the original state, if that state could
bring about the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha, such as the
enjoyment of sound, etc., or manifest the discrimination of the
distinction between true self and other phenomena. If however it did
that, it could not be a state of equilibrium,” (_yadyaliṅgāvasthā
śabdādyupabhogam vā sattvapurushānyatākhyātim vā purushārtham
nirvarttayet tannrvarttane hi na sāmyavasthā syāt_). This state is
called the prakṛti. It is the beginning, indeterminate, unmediated and
undetermined. It neither exists nor does it not exist, but is the
principium of almost all existence. Thus Vyāsa describes it as “the
state which neither is nor is not; that which exists and yet does not;
that in which there is no non-existence; the unmanifested, the noumenon
(lit. without any manifested indication), the background of all”
(_niḥsattāsattam niḥsadasat nirasat avyaktam aliṅgam pradhānam_).[10]
Vācaspati explains it as follows:—“Existence consists in possessing the
capacity of effecting the fulfilment of the objects of the purusha.
Non-existence means a mere imaginary trifle (e.g. the horn of a hare).”
It is described as being beyond both these states of existence and
non-existence. The state of the equipoise of the three guṇas of
intelligence-stuff, inertia and energy, is nowhere of use in fulfilling
the objects of the purusha. It therefore does not exist as such. On the
other hand, it does not admit of being rejected as non-existent like an
imaginary lotus of the sky. It is therefore not non-existent. But even
allowing the force of the above arguments about the want of phenomenal
existence of prakṛti on the ground that it cannot serve the objects of
the purusha, the difficulty arises that the principles of Mahat, etc.,
exist in the state of the unmanifested also, because nothing that exists
can be destroyed; and if it is destroyed, it cannot be born again,
because nothing that does not exist can be born; it follows therefore
that since the principles of mahat, etc., exist in the state of the
unmanifested, that state can also affect the fulfilment of the objects
of the purusha. How then can it be said that the unmanifested is not
possessed of existence? For this reason, he describes it as that in
which it exists and does not exist. This means that the cause exists in
that state in a potential form but not in the form of the effect.
Although the effect exists in the cause as mere potential power, yet it
is incapable of performing the function of fulfilling the objects of the
purusha; it is therefore said to be non-existent as such. Further he
says that this cause is not such, that its effect is of the nature of
hare’s horn. It is beyond the state of non-existence, that is, of the
existence of the effect as mere nothing. If it were like that, then it
would be like the lotus of the sky and no effect would follow.[11]
But as Bhikshu points out (_Yoga-vārttika_, II. 18) this prakṛti is
not simple substance, for it is but the guṇa reals. It is simple only
in the sense that no complex qualities are manifested in it. It is the
name of the totality of the guṇa reals existing in a state of
equilibrium through their mutual counter opposition. It is a
hypothetical state of the guṇas preceding the states in which they
work in mutual co-operation for the creation of the cosmos for giving
the purushas a chance for ultimate release attained through a full
enjoyment of experiences. Some European scholars have often asked me
whether the prakṛti were real or whether the guṇas were real. This
question, in my opinion, can only arise as a result of confusion and
misapprehension, for it is the guṇas in a state of equilibrium that
are called prakṛti. Apart from guṇas there is no prakṛti (_guṇā eva
prakṛtiśabdavācyā na tu tadatiriktā prakṛtirasti. Yoga-vārttika_, II.
18). In this state, the different guṇas only annul themselves and no
change takes place, though it must be acknowledged that the state of
equipoise is also one of tension and action, which, however, being
perfectly balanced does not produce any change. This is what is meant
by evolution of similars (_adṛśapariṇāma_). Prakṛti as the equilibrium
of the three guṇas is the absolute ground of all the mental and
phenomenal modifications—pure potentiality.
Veṅkaṭa, a later Vaishṇava writer, describes prakṛti as one ubiquitous,
homogeneous matter which evolves itself into all material productions by
condensation and rarefaction. In this view the guṇas would have to be
translated as three different classes of qualities or characters, which
are found in the evolutionary products of the prakṛti. This will of
course be an altogether different view of the prakṛti from that which is
described in the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, and the guṇas could not be considered
as reals or as substantive entities in such an interpretation. A
question arises, then, as to which of these two prakṛtis is the earlier
conception. I confess that it is difficult to answer it. For though the
Vaishṇava view is elaborated in later times, it can by no means be
asserted that it had not quite as early a beginning as 2nd or 3rd
century B.C. If _Ahirbudhnyasamhitā_ is to be trusted then the
_Shashṭitantraśāstra_ which is regarded as an authoritative Sāṃkhya work
is really a Vaishṇava work. Nothing can be definitely stated about the
nature of prakṛti in Sāṃkhya from the meagre statement of the _Kārikā_.
The statement in the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ is, however, definitely in favour
of the interpretation that we have adopted, and so also the
_Sāṃkhya-sūtra_, which is most probably a later work. Caraka’s account
of prakṛti does not seem to be the prakṛti of _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ for here
the guṇas are not regarded as reals or substantive entities, but as
characters, and prakṛti is regarded as containing its evolutes, mahat,
etc., as its elements (_dhātu_). If Caraka’s treatment is the earliest
view of Sāṃkhya that is available to us, then it has to be admitted that
the earliest Sāṃkhya view did not accept prakṛti as a state of the
guṇas, or guṇas as substantive entities. But the _Yoga-sūtra_, II. 19,
and the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ support the interpretation that I have adopted
here, and it is very curious that if the Sāṃkhya view was known at the
time to be so different from it, no reference to it should have been
made. But whatever may be the original Sāṃkhya view, both the Yoga view
and the later Sāṃkhya view are quite in consonance with my
interpretation.
In later Indian thinkers there had been a tendency to make a compromise
between the Vedānta and Sāṃkhya doctrines and to identify prakṛti with
the avidyā of the Vedāntists. Thus Lokācāryya writes:—“It is called
prakṛti since it is the source of all change, it is called avidyā since
it is opposed to knowledge, it is called māyā since it is the cause of
diversion creation (_prakṛtirityucyate vikārotpādakatvāt avidyā
jñānavirodhitvāt māyā vicitrasṛshṭikaratvāt_).”[12] But this is
distinctly opposed to the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ which defines avidyā as
_vidyāviparītaṃ jñānāntaraṃ avidyā_, i.e. avidyā is that other knowledge
which is opposed to right knowledge. In some of the Upanishads,
_Svetāśvatara_ for example, we find that māyā and prakṛti are identified
and the great god is said to preside over them (_māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ
vidyāt māyinaṃ tumaheśvaraṃ_). There is a description also in the
Ṛgveda, X. 92, where it is said that (_nāsadāsīt na sadāsīt tadānīṃ_),
in the beginning there was neither the “Is” nor the “Is not,” which
reminds one of the description of prakṛti (_niḥsattāsattaṃ_ as that in
which there is no existence or non-existence). In this way it may be
shown from _Gītā_ and other Sanskrit texts that an undifferentiated,
unindividuated cosmic matter as the first principle, was often thought
of and discussed from the earliest times. Later on this idea was
utilised with modifications by the different schools of Vedāntists, the
Sāṃkhyists and those who sought to make a reconciliation between them
under the different names of prakṛti, avidyā and māyā. What avidyā
really means according to the Pātañjala system we shall see later on;
but here we see that whatever it might mean it does not mean prakṛti
according to the Pātañjala system. _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 13, makes
mention of māyā also in a couplet from _Shashṭitantraśāstra_;
_guṇānāṃ paramaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛshṭipathamṛcchati
yattu dṛshṭipathaṃ prāptaṃ tanmāyeva sutucch akaṃ._
The real appearance of the guṇas does not come within the line of our
vision. That, however, which comes within the line of vision is but
paltry delusion and Vācaspati Miśra explains it as follows:—Prakṛti is
like the māyā but it is not māyā. It is trifling (_sutucchaka_) in the
sense that it is changing. Just as māyā constantly changes, so the
transformations of prakṛti are every moment appearing and vanishing and
thus suffering momentary changes. Prakṛti being eternal is real and thus
different from māyā.
This explanation of Vācaspati’s makes it clear that the word māyā is
used here only in the sense of illusion, and without reference to the
celebrated māyā of the Vedāntists; and Vācaspati clearly says that
prakṛti can in no sense be called māyā, since it is real.[13]
CHAPTER II
PURUSHA
We shall get a more definite notion of prakṛti as we advance further
into the details of the later transformations of the prakṛti in
connection with the purushas. The most difficult point is to understand
the nature of its connection with the purushas. Prakṛti is a material,
non-intelligent, independent principle, and the souls or spirits are
isolated, neutral, intelligent and inactive. Then how can the one come
into connection with the other?
In most systems of philosophy the same trouble has arisen and has caused
the same difficulty in comprehending it rightly. Plato fights the
difficulty of solving the unification of the idea and the non-being and
offers his participation theory; even in Aristotle’s attempt to avoid
the difficulty by his theory of form and matter, we are not fully
satisfied, though he has shown much ingenuity and subtlety of thought in
devising the “expedient in the single conception of development.”
The universe is but a gradation between the two extremes of potentiality
and actuality, matter and form. But all students of Aristotle know that
it is very difficult to understand the true relation between form and
matter, and the particular nature of their interaction with each other,
and this has created a great divergence of opinion among his
commentators. It was probably to avoid this difficulty that the
dualistic appearance of the philosophy of Descartes had to be
reconstructed in the pantheism of Spinoza. Again we find also how Kant
failed to bring about the relation between noumenon and phenomenon, and
created two worlds absolutely unrelated to each other. He tried to
reconcile the schism that he effected in his _Critique of Pure Reason_
by his _Critique of Practical Reason_, and again supplemented it with
his _Critique of Judgment_, but met only with dubious success.
In India also this question has always been a little puzzling, and
before trying to explain the Yoga point of view, I shall first give some
of the other expedients devised for the purpose, by the different
schools of Advaita (monistic) Vedāntism.
I. The reflection theory of the Vedānta holds that the māyā is without
beginning, unspeakable, mother of gross matter, which comes in
connection with intelligence, so that by its reflection in the former we
have Īśvara. The illustrations that are given to explain it both in
_Siddhāntaleśa_[14] and in _Advaita-Brahmasiddhi_ are only cases of
physical reflection, viz. the reflection of the sun in water, or of the
sky in water.
II. The limitation theory of the Vedānta holds that the all-pervading
intelligence must necessarily be limited by mind, etc., so of necessity
it follows that “the soul” is its limitation. This theory is illustrated
by giving those common examples in which the Ākāśa (space) though
unbounded in itself is often spoken of as belonging to a jug or limited
by the jug and as such appears to fit itself to the shape and form of
the jug and is thus called _ghaṭāvacchinna ākāśa_, i.e. space as within
the jug.
Then we have a third school of Vedāntists, which seeks to explain it in
another way:—The soul is neither a reflection nor a limitation, but just
as the son of Kuntī was known as the son of Rādhā, so the pure Brahman
by his nescience is known as the jīva, and like the prince who was
brought up in the family of a low caste, it is the pure Brahman who by
his own nescience undergoes birth and death, and by his own nescience is
again released.[15]
The _Sāṃkhya-sūtra_ also avails itself of the same story in IV. 1,
“_rājaputtravattattvopadeśāt_,” which Vijñāna Bhikshu explains as
follows:—A certain king’s son in consequence of his being born under the
star Gaṇḍa having been expelled from his city and reared by a certain
forester remains under the idea: “I am a forester.” Having learnt that
he is alive, a certain minister informs him. “Thou art not a forester,
thou art a king’s son.” As he, immediately having abandoned the idea of
being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal state, saying, “I am
a king,” so too the soul realises its purity in consequence of
instruction by some good tutor, to the effect—“Thou, who didst originate
from the first soul, which manifests itself merely as pure thought, art
a portion thereof.”
In another place there are two sūtras:—(1) _niḥsaṅge’pi uparāgo
vivekāt_. (2) _japāsphaṭikayoriva noparāgaḥ kintvabhimānaḥ_. (1) Though
it be associated still there is a tingeing through non-discrimination.
(2) As in the case of the hibiscus and the crystal, there is not a
tinge, but a fancy. Now it will be seen that all these theories only
show that the transcendent nature of the union of the principle of pure
intelligence is very difficult to comprehend. Neither the reflection nor
the limitation theory can clear the situation from vagueness and
incomprehensibility, which is rather increased by their physical
illustrations, for the cit or pure intelligence cannot undergo
reflection like a physical thing, nor can it be obstructed or limited by
it. The reflection theory adduced by the _Sāṃkhya-sūtra_,
“_japāsphiṭikayoriva noparāgaḥ kintvabhimānaḥ_,” is not an adequate
explanation. For here the reflection produces only a seeming redness of
the colourless crystal, which was not what was meant by the Vedāntists
of the reflection school. But here, though the metaphor is more suitable
to express the relation of purusha with the prakṛti, the exact nature of
the relation is more lost sight of than comprehended. Let us now see how
Patañjali and Vyāsa seek to explain it.
Let me quote a few sūtras of Patañjali and some of the most important
extracts from the _Bhāshya_ and try, as far as possible, to get the
correct view:—
(1) _dṛgdarśanaśaktyorekātmateva asmitā_ II. 6.
(2) _drashṭā dṛśimātraḥ śuddho’pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ_ II. 20.
(3) _tadartha eva drśyasya ātmā_ II. 21.
(4) _kṛtārthaṃ prati nashṭamapyanashṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt_ II. 22.
(5) _Svasvāmiśaktyoḥ svarūpopalabdhihetuḥ saṃyogah_ II. 22.
(6) _tadabhāvāt saṃyogābhāvo hānaṃ taddṛśeḥ kaivalyaṃ_ II. 25.
(7) _sattvapurushayoḥ śuddhisāmye kaivalyaṃ_ III. 25.
(8) _citerapratisaṃkramāyāstadākārāpattau svabuddhisaṃvedanaṃ_ IV. 22.
(9) _sattvapurushayoratyantāsaṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāvśesho bhogaḥ
parārthatvāt svārthasaṃyamāt purushajñānam_ III. 35.
(1) The Ego-sense is the illusory appearance of the identity of the
power as perceiver and the power as perceived.
(2) The seer though pure as mere “seeing” yet perceives the forms
assumed by the psychosis (_buddhi_).
(3) It is for the sake of the purusha that the being of the knowable
exists.
(4) For the emancipated person the world-phenomena cease to exist, yet
they are not annihilated since they form a common field of experience
for other individuals.
(5) The cause of the realisation of the natures of the knowable and
purusha in consciousness is their mutual contact.
(6) Cessation is the want of mutual contact arising from the destruction
of ignorance and this is called the state of oneness.
(7) This state of oneness arises out of the equality in purity of the
purusha and buddhi or sattva.
(8) Personal consciousness arises when the purusha, though in its nature
unchangeable, is cast into the mould of the psychosis.
(9) Since the mind-objects exist only for the purusha, experience
consists in the non-differentiation of these two which in their natures
are absolutely distinct; the knowledge of self arises out of
concentration on its nature.
Thus in _Yoga-sūtra_, II. 6, dṛik or purusha the seer is spoken of as
śakti or power as much as the prakṛti itself, and we see that their
identity is only apparent. Vyāsa in his _Bhāshya_ explains _ekātmatā_
(unity of nature or identity) as _avibhāgaprāptāviva_, “as if there is
no difference.” And Pañcaśikha, as quoted in _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, writes:
“not knowing the purusha beyond the mind to be different therefrom, in
nature, character and knowledge, etc., a man has the notion of self, in
the mind through delusion.”
Thus we see that when the mind and purusha are known to be separated,
the real nature of purusha is realised. This seeming identity is again
described as that which perceives the particular form of the mind and
thereby appears, as identical with it though it is not so
(_pratyayānupaśya—pratyayāni bauddhamanupaśyati tamanupaśyannatadātmāpi
tadātmaka iva pratibhāti_, _Vāysa-bhāshya_, II. 20).
The purusha thus we see, cognises the phenomena of consciousness after
they have been formed, and though its nature is different from conscious
states yet it appears to be the same. Vyāsa in explaining this sūtra
says that purusha is neither quite similar to the mind nor altogether
different from it. For the mind (_buddhi_) is always changeful,
according to the change of the objects that are offered to it; so that
it may be said to be changeful according as it knows or does not know
objects; but the purusha is not such, for it always appears as the self,
being reflected through the mind by which it is thus connected with the
phenomenal form of knowledge. The notion of self that appears connected
with all our mental phenomena and which always illumines them is only
duo to this reflection of purusha in the mind. All phenomenal knowledge
which has the form of the object can only be transformed into conscious
knowledge as “I know this,” when it becomes connected with the self or
purusha. So the purusha may in a way be said to see again what was
perceived by the mind and thus to impart consciousness by transferring
its illumination into the mind. The mind suffers changes according to
the form of the object of cognition, and thus results a state of
conscious cognition in the shape of “I know it,” when the mind, having
assumed the shape of an object, becomes connected with the constant
factor purusha, through the transcendent reflection or identification of
purusha in the mind. This is what is meant by _pratyayānupaśya_
reperception of the mind-transformations by purusha, whereby the mind
which has assumed the shape of any object of consciousness becomes
intelligent. Even when the mind is without any objective form, it is
always being seen by purusha. The exact nature of this reflection is
indeed very hard to comprehend; no physical illustrations can really
serve to make it clear. And we see that neither the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ nor
the sūtras offer any such illustrations as Sāṃkhya did. But the
_Bhāshya_ proceeds to show the points in which the mind may be said to
differ from purusha, as well as those in which it agrees with it. So
that though we cannot express it anyhow, we may at least make some
advance towards conceiving the situation.
Thus the _Bhāshya_ says that the main difference between the mind and
purusha is that the mind is constantly undergoing modifications, as it
grasps its objects one by one; for the grasping of an object, the act of
having a percept is nothing but its own undergoing of different
modifications, and thus, since an object sometimes comes within the
grasp of the mind and again disappears in the subconscious as a saṃskāra
(potency) and again comes into the field of the understanding as smṛti
(memory), we see that it is pariṇāmi or changing. But purusha is the
constant seer of the mind when it has an object, as in ordinary forms of
phenomenal knowledge, or when it has no object as in the state of
nirodha or cessation. Purusha is unchanging. It is the light which
remains unchanged amidst all the changing modifications of the mind, so
that we cannot distinguish purusha separately from the mind. This is
what is meant by saying _buddheḥ pratisaṃvedī purushaḥ_, i.e. purusha
reflects or turns into its own light the concepts of mind and thus is
said to know it. Its knowing is manifested in our consciousness as the
ever-persistent notion of the self, which is always a constant factor in
all the phenomena of consciousness. Thus purusha always appears in our
consciousness as the knowing agent. Truly speaking, however, purusha
only sees himself; he is not in any way in touch with the mind. He is
absolutely free from all bondage, absolutely unconnected with prakṛti.
From the side of appearance he seems only to be the intelligent seer
imparting consciousness to our conscious-like conception, though in
reality he remains the seer of himself all the while. The difference
between purusha and prakṛti will be clear when we see that purusha is
altogether independent, existing in and for himself, free from any
bondage whatsoever; but buddhi exists on the other hand for the
enjoyment and release of purusha. That which exists in and for itself,
must ever be the selfsame, unchangeable entity, suffering no
transformations or modifications, for it has no other end owing to which
it will be liable to change. It is the self-centred, self-satisfied
light, which never seeks any other end and never leaves itself. But
prakṛti is not such; it is always undergoing endless, complex
modifications and as such does not exist for itself but for purusha, and
is dependent upon him. The mind is unconscious, while purusha is the
pure light of intelligence, for the three guṇas are all non-intelligent,
and the mind is nothing but a modification of these three guṇas which
are all non-intelligent.
But looked at from another point of view, prakṛti is not altogether
different from purusha; for had it been so how could purusha, which is
absolutely pure, reperceive the mind-modifications? Thus the _Bhāshya_
(II. 20) writes:—
“Well then let him be dissimilar. To meet this he says: He is not quite
dissimilar. Why? Although pure, he sees the ideas after they have come
into the mind. Inasmuch as purusha cognises the ideas in the form of
mind-modification, he appears to be, by the act of cognition, the very
self of the mind although in reality he is not.” As has been said, the
power of the enjoyer, purusha (_dṛkśakti_), is certainly unchangeable
and it does not run after every object. In connection with a changeful
object it appears forever as if it were being transferred to every
object and as if it were assimilating its modifications. And when the
modifications of the mind assume the form of the consciousness by which
it is coloured, they imitate it and look as if they were manifestations
of purusha’s consciousness unqualified by the modifications of the
non-intelligent mind.
All our states of consciousness are analysed into two parts—a permanent
and a changing part. The changing part is the form of our consciousness,
which is constantly varying according to the constant change of its
contents. The permanent part is that pure light of intelligence, by
virtue of which we have the notion of self reflected in our
consciousness. Now, as this self persists through all the varying
changes of the objects of consciousness, it is inferred that the light
which thus shines in our consciousness is unchangeable. Our mind is
constantly suffering a thousand modifications, but the notion of self is
the only thing permanent amidst all this change. It is this self that
imports consciousness to the material parts of our knowledge. All our
concepts originated from our perception of external material objects.
Therefore the forms of our concepts which could exactly and clearly
represent these material objects in their own terms, must be made of a
stuff which in essence is not different from them. But with the
reflection of purusha, the soul, the notion of self comes within the
content of our consciousness, spiritualising, as it were, all our
concepts and making them conscious and intelligent. Thus this seeming
identity of purusha and the mind, by which purusha may be spoken of as
the seer of the concept, appears to the self, which is manifested in
consciousness by virtue of the seeming reflection. For this is that
self, or personality, which remains unchanged all through our
consciousness. Thus our phenomenal intelligent self is partially a
material reality arising out of the seeming interaction of the spirit
and the mind. This interaction is the only way by which matter releases
spirit from its seeming bondage.
But the question arises, how is it that there can even be a seeming
reflection of purusha in the mind which is altogether non-intelligent?
How is it possible for the mind to catch a glimpse of purusha, which
illuminates all the concepts of consciousness, the expression
“_anupaśya_” meaning that he perceives by imitation (_anukāreṇa
paśyati_)? How can purusha, which is altogether formless, allow any
reflection of itself to imitate the form of buddhi, by virtue of which
it appears as the self—the supreme possessor and knower of all our
mental conceptions? There must be at least some resemblance between the
mind and the purusha, to justify in some sense this seeming reflection.
And we find that the last sūtra of the Vibhūtipāda says:
_sattvapurushayoḥ śuddhisāmye kaivalyaṃ_—which means that when the
sattva or the preponderating mind-stuff becomes as pure as purusha,
kaivalya or oneness is attained. This shows that the pure nature of
sattva has a great resemblance to the pure nature of purusha. So much
so, that the last stage preceding the state of kaivalya, is almost the
same as kaivalya itself, when purusha is in himself and there are no
thoughts to reflect. In this state, we see that the mind can be so pure
as to reflect exactly the nature of purusha, as he is in himself. This
state in which the mind becomes as pure as purusha and reflects him in
his purity, does not materially differ from the state of kaivalya, in
which purusha is in himself—the only difference being that the mind,
when it becomes so pure as this, becomes gradually lost in prakṛti and
cannot again serve to bind purusha.
I cannot refrain here from the temptation of referring to a beautiful
illustration from Vyāsa, to explain the way in which the mind serves the
purposes of purusha. _Cittamayaskāntamaṇikalpaṃ sannidhimātropakāri
dṛśyatvena svaṃ bhavati purushasya svāminaḥ_ (I. 4), which is explained
in _Yoga-vārttika_ as follows: _Tathāyaskāntamaṇiḥ svasminneva
ayaḥsannidhīkaraṇamātrāt śalyarishkarshaṇākhyam upakāram kurvat
purushasya svāminaḥ svam bhvati bhogasādhanatvāt_, i.e. just as a magnet
draws iron towards it, though it remains unmoved itself, so the
mind-modifications become drawn towards purusha, and thereby become
visible to purusha and serve his purpose.
To summarise: We have seen that something like a union takes place
between the mind and purusha, i.e. there is a seeming reflection of
purusha in the mind, simultaneously with its being determined
conceptually, as a result whereof this reflection of purusha in the
mind, which is known as the self, becomes united with these conceptual
determinations of the mind and the former is said to be the perceiver of
all these determinations. Our conscious personality or self is thus the
seeming unity of the knowable as the mind in the shape of conceptual or
judgmental representations with the reflections of purusha in the mind.
Thus, in the single act of cognition, we have the notion of our own
personality and the particular conceptual or perceptual representation
with which this ego identifies itself. The true seer, the pure
intelligence, the free, the eternal, remains all the while beyond any
touch of impurity from the mind, though it must be remembered that it is
its own seeming reflection in the mind that appears as the ego, the
cogniser of all our states, pleasures and sorrows of the mind and one
who is the apperceiver of this unity of the seeming reflection—of
purusha and the determinations of the mind. In all our conscious states,
there is such a synthetic unity between the determinations of our mind
and the self, that they cannot be distinguished one from the other—a
fact which is exemplified in all our cognitions, which are the union of
the knower and the known. The nature of this reflection is a
transcendent one and can never be explained by any physical
illustration. Purusha is altogether different from the mind, inasmuch as
he is the pure intelligence and is absolutely free, while the latter is
non-intelligent and dependent on purusha’s enjoyment and release, which
are the sole causes of its movement. But there is some similarity
between the two, for how could the mind otherwise catch a seeming
glimpse of him? It is also said that the pure mind can adapt itself to
the pure form of purusha; this is followed by the state of kaivalya.
We have discussed the nature of purusha and its general relations with
the mind. We must now give a few more illustrations. The chief point in
which purusha of the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala differs from the similar
spiritual principle of Vedānta is, that it regards its soul, not as one,
but as many. Let us try to discuss this point, in connection with the
arguments of the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine in favour of a separate
principle of purusha. Thus the _Kārikā_ says: _saṃghātaparārthatvāt
triguṇādiviparyyayādadhishthānāt purusho’sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṃ
pravṛtteśca_,[16] “Because an assemblage of things is for the sake of
another; because there must be an entity different from the three guṇas
and the rest (their modifications); because there must be a
superintending power; because there must be someone who enjoys; and
because of (the existence of) active exertion for the sake of
abstraction or isolation (from the contact with prakṛti) therefore the
soul exists.” The first argument is from design or teleology by which it
is inferred that there must be some other simple entity for which these
complex collocations of things are intended. Thus Gauḍapāda says: “In
such manner as a bed, which is an assemblage of bedding, props, cotton,
coverlet and pillows, is for another’s use, not for its own, and its
several component parts render no mutual service, and it is concluded
that there is a man who sleeps upon the bed and for whose sake it was
made; so this world, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for
use and there is a soul, for whose enjoyment this body, another’s
consisting of intellect and the rest, has been produced.”[17]
The _second argument_ is that all the knowable is composed of just three
elements: first, the element of sattva, or intelligence-stuff, causing
all manifestations; second, the element of rajas or energy, which is
ever causing transformations; and third, tamas, or the mass, which
enables rajas to actualise. Now such a prakṛti, composed of these three
elements, cannot itself be a seer. For the seer must be always the same
unchangeable, actionless entity, the ever present, ever constant factor
in all stages of our consciousness.
_Third argument_: There must be a supreme background of pure
consciousness, all our co-ordinated basis of experience. This background
is the pure actionless purusha, reflected in which all our mental states
become conscious. Davies explains this a little differently, in
accordance with a simile in the _Tattva-Kaumudī_, _yathā rathādi
yantrādibhiḥ_, thus: “This idea of Kapila seems to be that the power of
self-control cannot be predicted of matter, which must be directed or
controlled for the accomplishment of any purpose, and this controlling
power must be something external to matter and diverse from it. The
soul, however, never acts. It only seems to act; and it is difficult to
reconcile this part of the system with that which gives to the soul a
controlling force. If the soul is a charioteer, it must be an active
force.” But Davies here commits the mistake of carrying the simile too
far. The comparison of the charioteer and the chariot holds good, to the
extent that the chariot can take a particular course only when there is
a particular purpose for the charioteer to perform. The motion of the
chariot is fulfilled only when it is connected with the living person of
the charioteer, whose purpose it must fulfil.
_Fourth argument_: Since prakṛti is non-intelligent, there must be one
who enjoys its pains and pleasures. The emotional and conceptual
determinations of such feelings are aroused in consciousness by the
seeming reflection of the light of purusha.
_Fifth argument_: There is a tendency in all persons to move towards the
oneness of purusha, to be achieved by liberation; there must be one for
whose sake the modifications of buddhi are gradually withheld, and a
reverse process set up, by which they return to their original cause
prakṛti and thus liberate purusha. It is on account of this reverse
tendency of prakṛti to release purusha that a man feels prompted to
achieve his liberation as the highest consummation of his moral ideal.
Thus having proved the existence of purusha, the _Kārikā_ proceeds to
prove his plurality: “_janmamaraṇakaraṇānāṃ pratiniyamādayugapat
pravṛtteśca purushabahutvaṃ siddhaṃ traiguṇyaviparyyayācca_.” “From
the individual allotment of birth, death and the organs; from
diversity of occupations and from the different conditions of the
three guṇas, it is proved that there is a plurality of souls.” In
other words, since with the birth of one individual, all are not born;
since with the death of one, all do not die; and since each individual
has separate sense organs for himself; and since all beings do not
work at the same time in the same manner; and since the qualities of
the different guṇas are possessed differently by different
individuals, purushas are many. Patañjali, though he does not infer
the plurality of purushas in this way, yet holds the view of the
sūtra, _kṛtārthaṃ prati nashṭamapyanashṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt_.
“Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been
achieved, it is not destroyed, being common to others.”
Davies, in explaining the former _Kārikā_, says: “There is, however, the
difficulty that the soul is not affected by the three guṇas. How can
their various modifications prove the individuality of souls in
opposition to the Vedāntist doctrine, that all souls are only portions
of the one, an infinitely extended monad?”
This question is the most puzzling in the Sāṃkhya doctrine. But careful
penetration of the principles of Sāṃkhya-Yoga would make clear to us
that this is a necessary and consistent outcome of the Sāṃkhya view of a
dualistic universe.
For if it is said that purusha is one and we have the notion of
different selves by his reflection into different minds, it follows that
such notions as self, or personality, are false. For the only true being
is the one, purusha. So the knower being false, the known also becomes
false; the knower and the known having vanished, everything is reduced
to that which we can in no way conceive. It may be argued that according
to the Sāṃkhya philosophy also, the knower is false, for the pure
purusha as such is not in any way connected with prakṛti. But even then
it must be observed that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view does not hold that the
knower is false but analyses the nature of the ego and says that it is
due to the seeming unity of the mind and purusha, both of which are
reals in the strictest sense of the term. Purusha is there justly called
the knower. He sees and simultaneously with this, there is a
modification of buddhi (mind); this seeing becomes joined with this
modification of buddhi and thus arises the ego, who perceives that
particular form of the modification of buddhi. Purusha always remains
the knower. Buddhi suffers modifications and at the same time catches a
glimpse of the light of purusha, so that contact (_saṃyoga_) of purusha
and prakṛti occurs at one and the same point of time, in which there is
unity of the reflection of purusha and the particular transformation of
buddhi.
The knower, the ego and the knowable, are none of them false in the
Sāṃkhya-Yoga system at the stage preceding kaivalya, when buddhi becomes
as pure as purusha; its modification resembles the exact form of purusha
and then purusha knows himself in his true nature in buddhi; after which
buddhi vanishes. The Vedānta has to admit the modifications of māyā, but
must at the same time hold it to be unreal. The Vedānta says that māyā
is as beginningless as prakṛti yet has an ending with reference to the
released person as the buddhi of the Sāṃkhyists.
But according to the Vedānta philosophy, knowledge of ego is only false
knowledge—an illusion as many imposed upon the formless Brahman. Māyā,
according to the Vedāntist, can neither be said to exist nor to
non-exist. It is _anirvācyā_, i.e. can never be described or defined.
Such an unknown and unknowable māyā causes the Many of the world by
reflection upon the Brahman. But according to the Sāṃkhya doctrine,
prakṛti is as real as purusha himself. Prakṛti and purusha are two
irreducible metaphysical remainders whose connection is beginningless
(_anādisaṃyoga_). But this connection is not unreal in the Vedānta sense
of the term. We see that according to the Vedānta system, all notions of
ego or personality are false and are originated by the illusive action
of the māyā, so that when they ultimately vanish there are no other
remainders. But this is not the case with Sāṃkhya, for as purusha is the
real seer, his cognitions cannot be dismissed as unreal, and so purushas
or knowers as they appear to us to be, must be held real. As prakṛti is
not the māyā of the Vedāntist (the nature of whose influence over the
spiritual principle cannot be determined) we cannot account for the
plurality of purushas by supposing that one purusha is being reflected
into many minds and generating the many egos. For in that case it will
be difficult to explain the plurality of their appearances in the minds
(buddhis). For if there be one spiritual principle, how should we
account for the supposed plurality of the buddhis? For we should rather
expect to find one buddhi and not many to serve the supposed one
purusha, and this will only mean that there can be only one ego, his
enjoyment and release. Supposing for argument’s sake that there are many
buddhis and one purusha, which reflected in them, is the cause of the
plurality of selves, then we cannot see how prakṛti is moving for the
enjoyment and release of one purusha; it would rather appear to be moved
for the sake of the enjoyment and release of the reflected or unreal
self. For purusha is not finally released with the release of any number
of particular individual selves. For it may be released with reference
to one individual but remain bound to others. So prakṛti would not
really be moved in this hypothetical case for the sake of purusha, but
for the sake of the reflected selves only. If we wish to avoid the said
difficulties, then with the release of one purusha, all purushas will
have to be released. For in the supposed theory there would not really
be many different purushas, but the one purusha appearing as many, so
that with his release all the other so-called purushas must be released.
We see that if it is the enjoyment (_bhoga_) and salvation (_apavarga_)
of one purusha which appear as so many different series of enjoyments
and emancipations, then with his experiences all should have the same
experiences. With his birth and death, all should be born or all should
die at once. For, indeed, it is the experiences of one purusha which
appear in all the seeming different purushas. And in the other
suppositions there is neither emancipation nor enjoyment by purusha at
all. For there, it is only the illusory self that enjoys or releases
himself. By his release no purusha is really released at all. So the
fundamental conception of prakṛti as moving for the sake of the
enjoyment and release of purusha has to be abandoned.
So we see that from the position in which Sāṃkhya and Yoga stood, this
plurality of the purushas was the most consistent thing that they could
think of. Any compromise with the Vedānta doctrine here would have
greatly changed the philosophical aspect and value of the Sāṃkhya
philosophy. As the purushas are nothing but pure intelligences they can
as well be all-pervading though many. But there is another objection
that, since number is a conception of the phenomenal mind, how then can
it be applied to the purushas which are said to be many?[18] But that
difficulty remains unaltered even if we regard the purusha as one. When
we go into the domain of metaphysics and try to represent Reality with
the symbols of our phenomenal conceptions we have really to commit
almost a violence towards it. But we must perforce do this in all our
attempts to express in our own terms that pure, inexpressible, free
illumination which exists in and for itself beyond the range of any
mediation by the concepts or images of our mind. So we see that Sāṃkhya
was not inconsistent in holding the doctrine of the plurality of the
purushas. Patañjali does not say anything about it, since he is more
anxious to discuss other things connected with the presupposition of the
plurality of purusha. Thus he speaks of it only in one place as quoted
above and says that though for a released person this world disappears
altogether, still it remains unchanged in respect to all the other
purushas.
CHAPTER III
THE REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD
We may now come to the attempt of Yoga to prove the reality of an
external world as against the idealistic Buddhists. In sūtra 12 of the
chapter on kaivalya we find: “The past and the future exist in reality,
since all qualities of things manifest themselves in these three
different ways. The future is the manifestation which is to be. The past
is the appearance which has been experienced. The present is that which
is in active operation. It is this threefold substance which is the
object of knowledge. If it did not exist in reality, there would not
exist a knowledge thereof. How could there be knowledge in the absence
of anything knowable? For this reason the past and present in reality
exist.”[19]
So we see that the present holding within itself the past and the future
exists in reality. For the past though it has been negated has really
been preserved and kept in the present, and the future also though it
has not made its appearance yet exists potentially in the present. So,
as we know the past and the future worlds in the present, they both
exist and subsist in the present. That which once existed cannot die,
and that which never existed cannot come to be (_nāstyasataḥ saṃbhavaḥ
na cāsti sato vināsāḥ_, _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, V. 12). So the past has not
been destroyed but has rather shifted its position and hidden itself in
the body of the present, and the future that has not made its appearance
exists in the present only in a potential form. It cannot be argued, as
Vācaspati says, that because the past and the future are not present
therefore they do not exist, for if the past and future do not exist how
can there be a present also, since its existence also is only relative?
So all the three exist as truly as any one of them, and the only
difference among them is the different way or mode of their existence.
He next proceeds to refute the arguments of those idealists who hold
that since the external knowables never exist independently of our
knowledge of them, their separate external existence as such may be
denied. Since it is by knowledge alone that the external knowables can
present themselves to us we may infer that there is really no knowable
external reality apart from knowledge of it, just as we see that in
dream-states knowledge can exist apart from the reality of any external
world.
So it may be argued that there is, indeed, no external reality as
it appears to us. The Buddhists, for example, hold that a blue
thing and knowledge of it as blue are identical owing to the maxim
that things which are invariably perceived together are one
(_sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ_). So they say that
external reality is not different from our idea of it. To this it
may be replied that if, as you say, external reality is identical
with my ideas and there is no other external reality existing as
such outside my ideas, why then does it appear as existing apart,
outside and independent of my ideas? The idealists have no basis
for the denial of external reality, and for their assertion that
it is only the creation of our imagination like experiences in
dreams. Even our ideas carry with them the notion that reality
exists outside our mental experiences. If all our percepts and
notions as this and that arise only by virtue of the influence of
the external world, how can they deny the existence of the
external world as such? The objective world is present by its own
power. How then can this objective world be given up on the
strength of mere logical or speculative abstraction?
Thus the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 14, says: “There is no object without the
knowledge of it, but there is knowledge as imagined in dreams without
any corresponding object; thus the reality of external things is like
that of dream-objects, mere imagination of the subject and unreal. How
can they who say so be believed? Since they first suppose that the
things which present themselves to us by their own force do so only on
account of the invalid and delusive imagination of the intellect, and
then deny the reality of the external world on the strength of such an
imaginary supposition of their own.”
The external world has generated knowledge of itself by its own
presentative power (_arthena svakīyayāgrāhyaśaktyā vijñānamajani_), and
has thus caused itself to be represented in our ideas, and we have no
right to deny it.[20] Commenting on the _Bhāshya_ IV. 14, Vācaspati says
that the method of agreement applied by the Buddhists by their
_sahopalambhaniyama_ (maxim of simultaneous revelation) may possibly be
confuted by an application of the method of difference. The method of
agreement applied by the idealists when put in proper form reads thus:
“Wherever there is knowledge there is external reality, or rather every
case of knowledge agrees with or is the same as every case of the
presence of external reality, so knowledge is the cause of the presence
of the external reality, i.e. the external world depends for its reality
on our knowledge or ideas and owes its origin or appearance as such to
them.” But Vācaspati says that this application of the method of
agreement is not certain, for it cannot be corroborated by the method of
difference. For the statement that every case of absence of knowledge is
also a case of absence of external reality cannot be proved, i.e. we
cannot prove that the external reality does not exist when we have no
knowledge of it (_sahopalambhaniyamaśca vedyatvañca hetū
sandigdhavyatirekatayānaikāntikau_) IV. 14.
Describing the nature of grossness and externality, the attributes of
the external world, he says that grossness means the pervading of more
portions of space than one, i.e. grossness means extension, and
externality means being related to separate space, i.e. co-existence in
space. Thus we see that extension and co-existence in space are the two
fundamental qualities of the gross external world. Now an idea can never
be said to possess them, for it cannot be said that an idea has extended
into more spaces than one and yet co-existed separately in separate
places. An idea cannot be said to exist with other ideas in space and to
extend in many points of space at one and the same time. To avoid this
it cannot be said that there may be plurality of ideas so that some may
co-exist and others may extend in space. For co-existence and extension
can never be asserted of our ideas, since +hey are very fine and subtle,
and can be known only at the time of their individual operation, at
which time, however, other ideas may be quite latent and unknown.
Imagination has no power to negate their reality, for the sphere of
imagination is quite distinct from the sphere of external reality, and
it can never be applied to an external reality to negate it. Imagination
is a mental function, and as such has no touch with the reality outside,
which it can by no means negate.
Further it cannot be said that, because grossness and externality can
abide neither in the external world nor in our ideas, they are therefore
false. For this falsity cannot be thought as separable from our ideas,
for in that case our ideas would be as false as the false itself. The
notion of externality and grossness pervades all our ideas, and if they
are held to be false, no true thing can be known by our ideas and they
therefore become equally false.
Again, knowledge and the external world can never be said to be
identical because they happen to be presented together. For the method
of agreement cannot by itself prove identity. Knowledge and the knowable
external world may be independently co-existing things like the notions
of existence and non-existence. Both co-exist independently of one
another. It is therefore clear enough, says Vācaspati, that the
certainty arrived at by perception, which gives us a direct knowledge of
things, can never be rejected on the strength of mere logical
abstraction or hair-splitting discussion.
We further see, says Patañjali, that the thing remains the same though
the ideas and feelings of different men may change differently about
it.[21] Thus A, B, C may perceive the same identical woman and may feel
pleasure, pain or hatred. We see that the same common thing generates
different feelings and ideas in different persons; external reality
cannot be said to owe its origin to the idea or imagination of any one
man, but exists independently of any person’s imagination in and for
itself. For if it be due to the imagination of any particular man, it is
his own idea which as such cannot generate the same ideas in another
man. So it must be said that the external reality is what we perceive it
outside.
There are, again, others who say that just as pleasure and pain
arise along with our ideas and must be said to be due to them so the
objective world also must be said to have come into existence along
with our ideas. The objective world therefore according to these
philosophers has no external existence either in the past or in the
future, but has only a momentary existence in the present due to our
ideas about it. That much existence only are they ready to attribute
to external objects which can be measured by the idea of the moment.
The moment I have an idea of a thing, the thing rises into existence
and may be said to exist only for that moment and as soon as the
idea disappears the object also vanishes, for when it cannot be
presented to me in the form of ideas it can be said to exist in no
sense. But this argument cannot hold good, for if the objective
reality should really depend upon the idea of any individual man,
then the objective reality corresponding to an idea of his ought to
cease to exist either with the change of his idea, or when he
directs attention to some other thing, or when he restrains his mind
from all objects of thought. Now, then, if it thus ceases to exist,
how can it again spring into existence when the attention of the
individual is again directed towards it? Again, all parts of an
object can never be seen all at once. Thus supposing that the front
side of a thing is visible, then the back side which cannot be seen
at the time must not be said to exist at all. So if the back side
does not exist, the front side also can as well be said not to exist
(_ye cāsyānupasthitā bhāgaste cāsya na syurevaṃ nāsti pṛshṭhamiti
udaramapi na gṛhyeta._ _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 16). Therefore it must
be said that there is an independent external reality which is the
common field of observation for all souls in general; and there are
also separate “Cittas” for separate individual souls (_tasmāt
svatantro’rthaḥ sarvapurusasādhdāraṇaḥ svatantrāṇi ca cittāni
pratipurushaṃ, pravarttante_, _ibid._). And all the experiences of
the purusha result from the connection of this “Citta” (mind) with
the external world.
Now from this view of the reality of the external world we are
confronted with another question—what is the ground which underlies the
manifold appearance of this external world which has been proved to be
real? What is that something which is thought as the vehicle of such
qualities as produce in us the ideas? What is that self-subsistent
substratum which is the basis of so many changes, actions and reactions
that we always meet in the external world? Locke called this substratum
substance and regarded it as unknown, but said that though it did not
follow that it was a product of our own subjective thought yet it did
not at the same time exist without us. Hume, however, tried to explain
everything from the standpoint of association of ideas and denied all
notions of substantiality. We know that Kant, who was much influenced by
Hume, agreed to the existence of some such unknown reality which he
called the Thing-in-itself, the nature of which, however, was absolutely
unknowable, but whose influence was a great factor in all our
experiences.
But the _Bhāshya_ tries to penetrate deeper into the nature of this
substratum or substance and says: _dharmisvarūpamātro hi dharmaḥ,
dharmivikriyā eva eshā dharmadvārā prapañcyate_, _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III.
13. The characteristic qualities form the very being itself of the
characterised, and it is the change of the characterised alone that is
detailed by means of the characteristic. To understand thoroughly the
exact significance of this statement it will be necessary to take a more
detailed review of what has already been said about the guṇas. We know
that all things mental or physical are formed by the different
collocations of sattva of the nature of illumination (_prakāśa_),
rajas—the energy or mutative principle of the nature of action
(_kriyā_)—and tamas—the obstructive principle of the nature of inertia
(_sthiti_) which in their original and primordial state are too fine to
be apprehended (_gunānāṃparamaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛshṭipathamṛcchati_,
_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 13). These different guṇas combine in various
proportions to form the manifold universe of the knowable, and thus are
made the objects of our cognition. Through combining in different
proportions they become, in the words of Dr. B. N. Seal, “more and more
differentiated, determinate and coherent,” and thus make themselves
cognisable, yet they never forsake their own true nature as the guṇas.
So we see that they have thus got two natures, one in which they remain
quite unchanged as guṇas, and another in which they collocate and
combine themselves in various ways and thus appear under the veil of a
multitude of qualities and states of the manifold knowable (_te
vyaktasūkshmā guṇātmānaḥ_ [IV. 13] ... _sarvamidaṃ guṇānāṃ
sanniveśaviśeshamātramiti paramārthato guṇātmānaḥ_, _Bhāshya_, _ibid._).
Now these guṇas take three different courses of development from the ego
or ahaṃkāra according to which the ego or ahaṃkāra may be said to be
sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa. Thus from the sāttvika side of the ego by a
preponderance of sattva the five knowledge-giving senses, e.g. hearing,
sight, touch, taste and smell are derived. From the rajas side of ego by
a preponderance of rajas the five active senses of speech, etc., are
derived. From the tamas side of ego or ahaṃkāra by a preponderance of
tamas are derived the five tanmātras. From which again by a
preponderance of tamas the atoms of the five gross elements—earth,
water, fire, air and ether are derived.
In the derivation of these it must be remembered that all the three
guṇas are conjointly responsible. In the derivation of a particular
product one of the guṇas may indeed be predominant, and thus may bestow
the prominent characteristic of that product, but the other two guṇas
are also present there and perform their functions equally well. Their
opposition does not withhold the progress of evolution but rather helps
it. All the three combine together in varying degrees of mutual
preponderance and thus together help the process of evolution to produce
a single product. Thus we see that though the guṇas are three, they
combine to produce on the side of perception, the senses, such as those
of hearing, sight, etc.; and on the side of the knowable, the individual
tanmātras of gandha, rasa, rūpa, sparśa and śabda. The guṇas composing
each tanmātra again harmoniously combine with each other with a
preponderance of tamas to produce the atoms of each gross element. Thus
in each combination one class of guṇas remains prominent, while the
others remain dependent upon it but help it indirectly in the evolution
of that particular product.
CHAPTER IV
THE PROCESS OF EVOLUTION
The evolution which we have spoken of above may be characterised in two
ways: (1) That arising from modifications or products of some other
cause which are themselves capable of originating other products like
themselves; (2) That arising from causes which, though themselves
derived, yet cannot themselves be the cause of the origination of other
existences like themselves. The former may be said to be slightly
specialised (_aviśesha_) and the latter thoroughly specialised
(_viśesha_).
Thus we see that from prakṛti comes mahat, from mahat comes ahaṃkāra,
and from ahaṃkāra, as we have seen above, the evolution takes three
different courses according to the preponderance of sattva, rajas and
tamas originating the cognitive and conative senses and manas, the
superintendent of them both on one side and the tanmātras on the other.
These tanmātras again produce the five gross elements. Now when ahaṃkāra
produces the tanmātras or the senses, or when the tanmātras produce the
five gross elements, or when ahaṃkāra itself is produced from buddhi or
mahat, it is called _tattvāntara-pariṇāma_, i.e. the production of a
different tattva or substance.
Thus in the case of _tattvāntara-pariṇāma_ (as for example when the
tanmātras are produced from ahaṃkāra), it must be carefully noticed
that the state of being involved in the tanmātras is altogether
different from the state of being of ahaṃkāra; it is not a mere change
of quality but a change of existence or state of being.[22] Thus
though the tanmātras are derived from ahaṃkāra the traces of ahaṃkāra
cannot be easily followed in them. This derivation is not such that
the ahaṃkāra remains principally unchanged and there is only a change
of quality in it, but it is a different existence altogether, having
properties which differ widely from those of ahaṃkāra. So it is called
tattvāntara-pariṇāma, i.e. evolution of different categories of
existence.
Now the evolution that the senses and the five gross elements can
undergo can never be of this nature, for they are viśeshas, or
substances which have been too much specialised to allow the evolution
of any other substance of a different grade of existence from
themselves. With them there is an end of all emanation. So we see that
the aviśeshas or slightly specialised emanations are those which being
themselves but emanations can yet yield other emanations from
themselves. Thus we see that mahat, ahaṃkāra and the five tanmātras are
themselves emanations, as well as the source of other emanations. Mahat,
however, though it is undoubtedly an aviśesha or slightly specialised
emanation, is called by another technical name liṅga or sign, for from
the state of mahat, the prakṛti from which it must have emanated may be
inferred. Prakṛti, however, from which no other primal state is
inferable, is called the aliṅga or that which is not a sign for the
existence of any other primal and more unspecialised state. In one sense
all the emanations can be with justice called the liṅgas or states of
existence standing as the sign by which the causes from which they have
emanated can be directly inferred. Thus in this sense the five gross
elements maybe called the liṅga of the tanmātras, and they again of the
ego, and that again of the mahat, for the unspecialised ones are
inferred from their specialised modifications or emanations. But this
technical name liṅga is reserved for the mahat from which the aliṅga or
prakṛti can be inferred. This prakṛti, however, is the eternal state
which is not an emanation itself but the basis and source of all other
emanations.
The liṅga and the aliṅga have thus been compared in the _Kārikā_:
“_hetumadanityamavyāpi sakriyamanekāśritaṃ liṅgaṃ
sāvayavam paratantraṃ vyaktaṃ viparītamavyaktaṃ_.”
The liṅga has a cause, it is neither eternal nor universal, but mobile,
multiform, dependent, determinate, and possesses parts, whereas the
aliṅga is the reverse. The aliṅga or prakṛti, however, being the cause
has some characteristics in common with its liṅgas as distinguished from
the purushas, which are altogether different from it.
Thus the _Kārikā_ says:
“_triguṇamaviveki vishayaḥ sāmānyamacetanaṃ prasavadharmi
vyaktaṃ tathā pradhānaṃ tadviparītastathā pumān_.”
The manifested and the unmanifested _pradhāna_ or _prakṛti_ are both
composed of the three guṇas, non-intelligent, objective, universal,
unconscious and productive. Soul in these respects is the reverse. We
have seen above that prakṛti is the state of equilibrium of the guṇas,
which can in no way be of any use to the purushas, and is thus held to
be eternal, though all other states are held to be non-eternal as they
are produced for the sake of the purushas.
The state of prakṛti is that in which the guṇas completely overpower
each other and the characteristics (_dharma_) and the characterised
(_dharmī_) are one and the same.
Evolution is thus nothing but the manifestation of change, mutation, by
the energy of rajas. The rajas is the one mediating activity that breaks
up all compounds, builds up new ones and initiates original
modifications. Whenever in any particular combination the proportion of
sattva, rajas or tamas alters, as a condition of this alteration, there
is the dominating activity of rajas by which the old equilibrium is
destroyed and another equilibrium established; this in its turn is again
disturbed and again another equilibrium is restored. Now the
manifestation of this latent activity of rajas is what is called change
or evolution. In the external world the time that is taken by a paramāṇu
or atom to move from its place is identical with a unit of change.[23]
Now an atom will be that quantum which is smaller or finer than that
point or limit at which it can in any way be perceived by the senses.
Atoms are therefore mere points without magnitude or dimension, and the
unit of time or moment (_kshaṇa_) that is taken up in changing the
position of these atoms is identical with one unit of change or
evolution. The change or evolution in the external world must therefore
be measured by these units of spatial motion of the atoms; i.e. an atom
changing its own unit of space is the measure of all physical change or
evolution.
Each unit of time (_kshaṇa_) corresponding to this change of an atom of
its own unit of space is the unit-measure of change. This instantaneous
succession of time as discrete moments one following the other is the
notion of the series of moments or pure and simple succession. Now the
notion of these discrete moments is the notion of time. Even the notion
of succession is one that does not really exist but is imagined, for a
moment comes into being just when the moment just before had passed so
that they have never taken place together. Thus Vyāsa in III. 52, says:
“_kshaṇatatkramayornāsti vastusamāhāraḥ iti buddhisamāhāraḥ
muhūrttāhorātrātrādayaḥ_.” _Sa tvayaṃ kālaḥ vastuśūnyo’pi
buddhinirmāṇaḥ._ The moments and their succession do not belong to the
category of actual things; the hour, the day and night, are all
aggregates of mental conceptions. This time which is not a substantive
reality in itself, but is only a mental concept, represented to us
through linguistic usage, appears to ordinary minds as if it were an
objective reality.
So the conception of time as discrete moments is the real one, whereas
the conception of time as successive or as continuous is unreal, being
only due to the imagination of our empirical and relative consciousness.
Thus Vācaspati further explains it. A moment is real (_vastupatitaḥ_)
and is the essential element of the notion of succession. Succession
involves the notion of change of moments, and the moment is called time
by those sages who know what time is. Two moments cannot happen
together. There cannot be any succession of two simultaneous things.
Succession means the notion of change involving a preceding and a
succeeding moment. Thus there is only the present moment and there are
no preceding and later moments. Therefore there cannot be any union of
these moments. The past and the future moments may be said to exist only
if we speak of past and future as identical with the changes that have
become latent and others that exist potentially but are not manifested.
Thus in one moment, the whole world suffers changes. All these
characteristics are associated with the thing as connected with one
particular moment.[24]
So we find here that time is essentially discrete, being only the
moments of our cognitive life. As two moments never co-exist, there is
no succession or continuous time. They exist therefore only in our
empirical consciousness which cannot take the real moments in their
discrete nature but connects the one with the other and thereby imagines
either succession or continuous time.
Now we have said before, that each unit of change or evolution is
measured by this unit of time _kshaṇa_ or moment; or rather the units of
change are expressed in terms of these moments or _kshaṇas_. Of course
in our ordinary consciousness these moments of change cannot be grasped,
but they can be reasonably inferred. For at the end of a certain period
we observe a change in a thing; now this change, though it becomes
appreciable to us after a long while, was still going on every moment,
so, in this way, the succession of evolution or change cannot be
distinguished from the moments coming one after another. Thus the
_Yoga-sūtra_ says in IV. 33: “Succession involving a course of changes
is associated with the moments.” Succession as change of moments is
grasped only by a course of changes. A cloth which has not passed
through a course of changes through a series of moments cannot be found
old all at once at any time. Even a new cloth kept with good care
becomes old after a time. This is what is called the termination of a
course of changes and by it the succession of a course of changes can be
grasped. Even before a thing is old there can be inferred a sequence of
the subtlest, subtler, subtle, grossest, grosser and gross changes
(_Tattvavaiśāradī_, IV. 33).[25]
Now as we have seen that the unit of time is indistinguishable from the
unit of change or evolution, and as these moments are not co-existing
but one follows the other, we see that there is no past or future
existing as a continuous before or past, and after or future. It is the
present that really exists as the manifested moment; the past has been
conserved as sublatent and the future as the latent. So the past and
future exist in the present, the former as one which has already had its
manifestation and is thus conserved in the fact of the manifestation of
the present. For the manifestation of the present as such could not have
taken place until the past had already been manifested; so the
manifestation of the present is a concrete product involving within
itself the manifestation of the past; in a similar way it may be said
that the manifestation of the present contains within itself the seed or
the unmanifested state of the future, for if this had not been the case,
the future never could have happened. So we see that the whole world
undergoes a change at one unit point of time, and not only that but it
conserves within itself all the past and future history of cosmic
evolution.
We have pointed out before that the manifestation of the rajas or energy
as action is what is called change. Now this manifestation of action can
only take place when equilibrium of a particular collocation of guṇas is
disturbed and the rajas arranges or collocates with itself the sattva
and tamas, the whole group being made intelligible by the inherent
sattva. So the cosmic history is only the history of the different
collocations of the guṇas. Now, therefore, if it is possible for a seer
to see in one vision the possible number of combinations that the rajas
will have with sattva and tamas, he can in one moment perceive the past,
present or future of this cosmic evolutionary process; for with such
minds all past and future are concentrated at one point of vision which
to a person of ordinary empirical consciousness appears only in the
series. For the empirical consciousness, impure as it is, it is
impossible that all the powers and potencies of sattva and rajas should
become manifested at one point of time; it has to take things only
through its senses and can thus take the changes only as the senses are
affected by them; whereas, on the other hand, if its power of knowing
was not restricted to the limited scope of the senses, it could have
grasped all the possible collocations or changes all at once. Such a
perceiving mind whose power of knowing is not narrowed by the senses can
perceive all the finest modifications or changes that are going on in
the body of a substance (see _Yoga-sūtra_, III. 53).
CHAPTER V
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CATEGORIES
The Yoga analysis points to the fact that all our cognitive states are
distinguished from their objects by the fact of their being intelligent.
This intelligence is the constant factor which persists amidst all
changes of our cognitive states. We are passing continually from one
state to another without any rest, but in this varying change of these
states we are never divested of intelligence. This fact of intelligence
is therefore neither the particular possession of any one of these
states nor that of the sum of these states; for if it is not the
possession of any one of these states it cannot be the possession of the
sum of these states. In the case of the released person again there is
no mental state, but the self-shining intelligence. So Yoga regarded
this intelligence as quite distinct from the so-called mental states
which became intelligent by coming in connection with this intelligence.
The actionless, absolutely pure and simple intelligence it called the
purusha.
Yoga tacitly assumed a certain kind of analysis of the nature of these
mental states which sought to find out, if possible, the nature of their
constituent elements or moments of existence. Now in analysing the
different states of our mind we find that a particular content of
thought is illuminated and then passed over. The ideas rise, are
illuminated and pass away. Thus they found that “movement” was one of
the principal elements that constituted the substance of our thoughts.
Thought as such is always moving. This principle of movement, mutation
or change, this energy, they called rajas.
Now apart from this rajas, thought when seen as divested of its sensuous
contents seems to exhibit one universal mould or form of knowledge which
assumes the form of all the sensuous contents that are presented to it.
It is the one universal of all our particular concepts or ideas—the
basis or substratum of all the different shapes imposed upon itself, the
pure and simple. Sattva in which there is no particularity is that
element of our thought which, resembling purusha most, can attain its
reflection within itself and thus makes the unconscious mental states
intelligible. All the contents of our thought are but modes and
limitations of this universal form and are thus made intelligible. It is
the one principle of intelligibility of all our conscious states.
Now our intellectual life consists in a series of shining ideas or
concepts; concepts after concepts shine forth in the light of the pure
intelligence and pass away. But each concept is but a limitation of the
pure shining universal of our knowledge which underlies all its changing
modes or modifications of concepts or judgments. This is what is called
pure knowledge in which there is neither the knower nor the known. This
pure object—subjectless knowledge differs from the pure intelligence or
purusha only in this that later on it is liable to suffer various
modifications, as the ego, the senses, and the infinite percepts and
concepts, etc., connected therewith, whereas the pure intelligence
remains ever pure and changeless and is never the substratum of any
change. At this stage sattva, the intelligence-stuff, is prominent and
rajas and tamas are altogether suppressed. It is for this reason that
the buddhi or mind is often spoken of as the sattva. Being an absolute
preponderance of sattva it has nothing else to manifest, but it is its
pure-shining self. Both tamas and rajas being mostly suppressed they
cannot in any way affect the effulgent nature of this pure shining of
contentless knowledge in which there is neither the knower nor the
known.
But it must be remembered that it is holding suspended as it were within
itself the elements of rajas and tamas which cannot manifest themselves
owing to the preponderance of the sattva.
This notion of pure contentless consciousness is immediate and abstract
and as such is at once mediated by other necessary phases. Thus we see
that this pure contentless universal consciousness is the same as the
ego-universal (_asmitāmātra_). For this contentless universal
consciousness is only another name for the contentless unlimited,
infinite of the ego-universal. A quotation from Fichte may here be
useful as a comparison. Thus he says in the introduction to his _Science
of Ethics_: “How an object can ever become a subject, or how a being can
ever become an object of representation: this curious change will never
be explained by anyone who does not find a point where the objective and
subjective are not distinguished at all, but are altogether one. Now
such a point is established by, and made the starting point of our
system. This point is the Egohood, the Intelligence, Reason, or whatever
it may be named.”[26] The _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 19, describes it as
_liṅgamātram mahattatvaṃ sattāmātre mahati ātmani_, and again in I. 36
we find it described as the waveless ocean, peaceful infinite pure
egohood. This obscure egohood is known merely as being. This mahat has
also been spoken of by Vijñāna Bhikshu as the manas, or mind, as it has
the function of assimilation (_niścaya_). Now what we have already said
about mahat will, we hope, make it clear that this mahat is the last
limit at which the subject and the object can be considered as one
indistinguishable point which is neither the one nor the other, but the
source of both.
This buddhi is thus variously called _mahat_, _asmitāmātra_, _manas_,
_sattva_, _buddhi_ and _liṅga_, according to the aspects from which this
state is observed.
This state is called mahat as it is the most universal thing conceivable
and the one common source from which all other things originate.
Now this phase of sattva or pure shining naturally passes into the other
phase, that of the Ego as knower or Ego as subject. The first phase as
mahat or asmitāmātra was the state in which the sattva was predominant
and the rajas and tamas were in a suppressed condition. The next moment
is that in which the rajas comes uppermost, and thus the ego as the
subject of all cognition—the subject I—the knower of all the mental
states—is derived. The contentless subject-objectless “I” is the passive
sattva aspect of the buddhi catching the reflection of the spirit of
purusha.
In its active aspect, however, it feels itself one with the spirit and
appears as the ego or subject which knows, feels and wills. Thus
Patañjali says, in II. 6: _dṛgdarśanaśaktyorekātmateva asmitā_, i.e. the
seeming identity of the seer and the perceiving capacity is called
asmitā-ego. Again in _Bhāshya_, I. 17, we have _ekātmikā saṃvidasmitā_
(knowledge as one identical is asmitā) which Vācaspati explains as _sā
ca ātmanā grahītrā saha buddhirekātmikā saṃvid_, i.e. it is the feeling
of identity of the buddhi (mind) with the self, the perceiver. Thus we
find that the mind is affected by its own rajas or activity and posits
itself as the ego or subject as activity. By reason of this position of
the “I” as active it perceives itself in the objective, in all its
conative and cognitive senses in its thoughts and feelings and also in
the external world of extension and co-existence; in the words of
Pañcaśikha (II. 5) thinking the animate and inanimate beings to be the
self, man regards their prosperity as his own and becomes glad, and
regards their adversity as his own and is sorry. Here the “I” is posited
as the active entity which becomes conscious of itself, or in other
words the “I” becomes self-conscious. In analysing this notion of
self-consciousness we find that here the rajas or element of activity or
mobility has become predominant and this predominance of rajas has been
manifested by the inherent sattva. Thus we find that the rajas side or
“I as active” has become manifested or known as such, i.e. “I” becomes
conscious of itself as active. And this is just what is meant by
self-consciousness.
This ego or self-consciousness then appears as the modification of the
contentless pure consciousness of the mind (_buddhi_); it is for this
reason that we see that this self-consciousness is but a modification of
the universal mind. The absolute identity of subject and object as the
egohood is not A part of our natural consciousness, for in all stages of
our actual consciousness, even in that of self-consciousness, there is
an element of the preponderance of rajas or activity which directs this
unity as the knower and the known and then unites them as it were. Only
so far as I distinguish myself as the conscious, from myself as the
object of consciousness, am I at all conscious of myself.
When we see that the buddhi transforms itself into the ego, the subject,
or the knower, at this its first phase there is no other content which
it can know, it therefore knows itself in a very abstract way as the
“I,” or in other words, the ego becomes self-conscious; but at this
moment the ego has no content; the tamas being quite under suppression,
it is evolved by a preponderance of the rajas; and thus its nature as
rajas is manifested by the sattva and thus the ego now essentially knows
itself to be active, and holds itself as the permanent energising
activity which connects with itself all the phenomena of our life.
But now when the ego first directs itself towards itself and becomes
conscious of itself, one question which naturally comes to our mind is,
“Can the ego direct itself towards itself and thus divide itself into a
part that sees and one that is seen?” To meet this question it is
assumed that the guṇas contain within themselves the germs of both
subjectivity and objectivity (_guṇānāṃ hi dvairūpyaṃ vyavasāyātmkatvam
vyavaseyātmakatvaṃ ca. Tattvavaiśāradī_, III. 47); the guṇas have two
forms, the perceiver and the perceived. Thus we find that in the ego the
quality of the guṇas as the perceiver comes to be first manifested and
the ego turns back upon itself and makes itself its own object. It is at
this stage that we are reminded of the twofold nature of the guṇas.
It is by virtue of this twofold nature that the subject can make itself
its own object; but as these two sides have not yet developed they are
still only abstract and exist but in an implicit way in this state of
the ego (_ahaṃkāra_).
Enquiring further into the nature of the relation of this ego and the
buddhi, we find that the ego is only another phase or modification of
the buddhi; however different it might appear from buddhi it is only
an appearance or phase of it; its reality is the reality of the
buddhi. Thus we see that when the knower is affected in his different
modes of concepts and judgments, this too is to be ascribed to the
buddhi. Thus Vyāsa writes (II. 18) that perception, memory,
differentiation, reasoning, right knowledge, decision belong properly
to mind (buddhi) and are only illusorily imposed on the purusha
(_grahaṇadhāraṇohāpohatattvajñānābhiniveśā buddhau varttamānā purushe
adhyāropitasadbhāvāḥ_).
Now from this ego we find that three developments take place in three
distinct directions according to the preponderance of sattva, rajas or
tamas.
By the preponderance of rajas, the ego develops itself into the five
conative senses, vāk (speech), pāṇi (hands), pāda (feet), pāyu (organ of
passing the excreta) and upastha (generative organ). By the
preponderance of sattva, the ego develops itself into the five cognitive
senses—hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell; and by a preponderance of
tamas it stands as the bhūtādi and produces the five tanmātras, and
these again by further preponderance of tamas develops into the
particles of the five gross elements of earth, water, light, heat, air
and ether.
Now it is clear that when the self becomes conscious of itself as object
we see that there are three phases in it: (i) that in which the self
becomes an object to itself; (ii) when it directs itself or turns as the
subject upon itself as the object, this moment of activity which can
effect an aspect of change in itself; (iii) the aspect of the
consciousness of the self, the moment in which it perceives itself in
its object, the moment of the union of itself as the subject and itself
as the object in one luminosity of self-consciousness. Now that phase of
self in which it is merely an object to itself is the phase of its union
with prakṛti which further develops the prakṛti in moments of
materiality by a preponderance of the inert tamas of the bhūtādi into
tanmātras and these again into the five grosser elements which are then
called the _grāhya_ or perceptible.
The sattva side of this ego or self-consciousness which was hitherto
undifferentiated becomes further differentiated, specialised and
modified into the five cognitive senses with their respective functions
of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell, synchronising with the
evolution of the prakṛti on the tanmātric side of evolution. These again
individually suffer infinite modifications themselves and thus cause an
infinite variety of sensations in their respective spheres in our
conscious life. The rajas side of the ego becomes specialised as the
active faculties of the five different conative organs.
There is another specialisation of the ego as the manas which is its
direct instrument for connecting itself with the five cognitive and
conative senses. What is perceived as mere sensations by the senses is
connected and generalised and formed into concepts by the manas; it is
therefore spoken of as partaking of both the conative and the cognitive
aspects in the _Sāṃkhya-kārikā_, 27.
Now though the modifications of the ego are formed successively by the
preponderance of sattva, rajas and tamas, yet the rajas is always the
accessory cause (_sahakāri_) of all these varied collocations of the
guṇas; it is the supreme principle of energy and supplies even
intelligence with the energy which it requires for its own conscious
activity. Thus Lokācāryya says in his _Tattvatraya_: “the tāmasa ego
developing into the material world and the sāttvika ego developing into
the eleven senses, both require the help of the rājasa ego for the
production of this development” (_anyābhyāṃ ahaṃkārābhyām
svakāryyopajanane rājasāhaṃkūraḥ sahakārī bhavati_); and Barabara in his
_Bhāshya_ writes: “just as a seed-sprout requires for its growth the
help of water as instrumental cause, so the rājasa ahaṃkāra (ego) works
as the accessory cause (_sahakāri_) for the transformations of sāttvika
and tāmasa ahaṃkāra into their evolutionary products.” The mode of
working of this instrumental cause is described as “rajas is the mover.”
The rājasa ego thus moves the sattva part to generate the senses; the
tamas part generating the gross and subtle matter is also moved by the
rajas, agent of movement. The rājasa ego is thus called the common cause
of the movement of the sāttvika and the tāmasa ego. Vācaspati also says:
“though rajas has no separate work by itself yet since sattva and tamas
(which though capable of undergoing modification, do not do their work)
are actionless in themselves, the agency of rajas lies in this that it
moves them both for the production of the effect.”[27] And according as
the modifications are sāttvika, tāmasa or rājasika, the ego which is the
cause of these different modifications is also called vaikārika, bhūtādi
and taijasa. The mahat also as the source of the vaikārika, taijasa and
bhūtādi ego may be said to have three aspects.
Now speaking of the relation of the sense faculties with the sense
organs, we see that the latter, which are made up of the grosser
elements are the vehicle of the former, for if the latter are injured in
any way, the former are also necessarily affected.[28]
To take for example the specific case of the faculty of hearing and its
organ, we see that the faculty of hearing is seated in the ether
(_ākāśa_) within our ear-hole. It is here that the power of hearing is
located. When soundness or defect is noticed therein, soundness or
defect is noticed in the power of hearing also. When the sounds of
solids, etc., are heard, then the power of hearing located in the hollow
of the ear stands in need of the resonance produced in the ākāśa of the
ear.
This sense of hearing, then, having its origin in the principle of
ahaṃkāra, behaves like iron, and is drawn by the sounds originated and
located in the mouth of the speaker acting as loadstone, and transforms
them into its own successive modifications (_vṛtti_) and thus senses the
sounds of the speaker. And it is for this reason that for every living
creature, the perception of sound in external space in the absence of
defects is never void of authority. Thus Pancasikha also says, as quoted
in _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 41:
“To all those whose organs of hearing are situated in the same place (at
different times) the ākāśa sustaining the sense of hearing is the same.”
The ākāśa, again, in which the power of hearing is seated, is born out
of the soniferous tanmātra, and has therefore the quality of sound
inherent in itself. It is by this sound acting in unison that it takes
the sounds of external solids, etc. This then proves that the ākāśa is
the substratum of the power of hearing, and also possesses the quality
of sound. And this sameness of the situation of sound is an indication
of the existence of ākāśa as that which is the substratum of the
auditory power (_śruti_) which manifests the sounds of the same class in
ākāśa. Such a manifestation of sound cannot be without such an auditory
sense-power. Nor is such an auditory power a quality of pṛthivī (earth),
etc., because it cannot be in its own self both the manifestor and the
manifested (_vyahṅgya_ and _vyañjaka_), _Tattvavaiśāradī_, III. 41. It
is the auditory power which manifests all sounds with the help of the
ākāśa of the sense organ.
The theory of the guṇas was accepted by many others outside the
Sāṃkhya-Yoga circle and they also offered their opinions on the nature
of the categories.
There are thus other views prevalent about the genesis of the senses, to
which it may be worth our while to pay some attention as we pass by.
The sāttvika ego in generating the cognitive senses with limited powers
for certain specified objects of sense only accounted for their
developments from itself in accompaniment with the specific tanmātras.
Thus
sāttvika ego + sound potential (śabda-tanmātra) = sense of hearing.
sāttvika ego + touch potential (śparś-tanmātra) = sense of touch.
sāttvika ego + sight potential (śrūpa-tanmātra) = sense of vision.
sāttvika ego + taste potential (vasa-tanmātra) = sense of taste.
sāttvika ego + smell potential (gandha-tanmātra) = sense of smell.
The conative sense of speech is developed in association with the sense
of hearing; that of hand in association with the sense of touch; that of
feet in association with the sense of vision; that of upastha in
association with the sense of taste; that of pāyu in association with
the sense of smell.
Last of all, the manas is developed from the ego without any
co-operating or accompanying cause.
The Naiyāyikas, however, think that the senses are generated by the
gross elements, the ear for example by ākāśa, the touch by air and so
forth. But Lokācāryya in his _Tattvatraya_ holds that the senses are not
generated by gross matter but are rather sustained and strengthened by
it.
There are others who think that the ego is the instrumental and that the
gross elements are the material causes in the production of the senses.
The view of the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ is, I believe, now quite clear since we
see that the mahat through the asmitā generates from the latter (as
differentiations from it, though it itself exists as integrated in the
mahat), the senses, and their corresponding gross elements.
Before proceeding further to trace the development of the bhūtādi on the
tanmātric side, I think it is best to refer to the views about the
supposed difference between the Yoga and the views of the Sāṃkhya works
about the evolution of the categories. Now according to the Yoga view
two parallel lines of evolution start from mahat, one of which develops
into the ego, manas, the five cognitive and the five conative senses,
while on the other side it develops into the five grosser elements
through the five tanmātras which are directly produced from mahat
through the medium ahaṃkāra.
Thus the view as found in the Yoga works may be tabulated thus:—
Prakṛti
|
Mahat or Asmitāmātra
|
+----------+---------+
| |
Asmitā Tanmātras--5
| |
---+--- ---------+--------
11 senses 5 gross elements
The view of the Śaṃkhya works may be tabulated thus:--
Prakṛti
|
Mahat
|
Ego
|
+-----------+--------+
| |
11 senses 5 Tanmātras
|
5 gross elements
The place in the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ which refers to this genesis is that
under _viśeshāviśeshaliṅgamātrāliṅgāni guṇaparvāṇi_, II. 19. There it
says that the four bhūtas are ether, air, fire, water and earth. These
are the viśeshas (specialised modifications) of the unspecialised
modifications the tanmātras of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. So
also are the cognitive senses of hearing, touch, eye, tongue, and nose
and the conative senses of speech, hand, feet, anus and the generative
organ. The eleventh one manas (the co-ordinating organ) has for its
object the objects of all the above ten senses. So these are the
specialised modifications (_viśeshas_) of the unspecialised (aviśesha)
asmitā. The guṇas have these sixteen kinds of specialised modifications
(_viśeshapariṇāma_). The six unspecialised modifications are the sound
tanmātra, touch tanmātra, colour tanmātra, taste tanmātra and smell
tanmātra. These tanmātras respectively contain one, two, three, four,
and five special characteristics. The sixth unspecialised modification
is asmitāmātra. These are the six aviśesha evolutions of the pure being,
the mahat. The category of mahat is merely a sign beyond the aviśeshas
and it is there that these exist and develop.
In this _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ the fully specialised ones, viśeshas, the
grosser elements are said to have been derived from the tanmātras and
the senses and manas, the faculty of reflection are said to have been
specialised from the ego or asmitā. The tanmātras, however, have not
been derived from the ego or asmitā here. But they together with asmitā
are spoken of as the six slightly specialised ones, the five being the
five tanmātras and the sixth one being the ego. These six aviśeshas are
the specialisations of the mahat, the great egohood of pure Be-ness. It
therefore appears that the six aviśeshas are directly derived from the
mahat, after which the ego develops into the eleven senses and the
tanmātras into the five gross elements in three different lines.
But let us see how _Yoga-vārttika_ explains the point here:—
“But like the senses the tanmātras are also special modifications of the
ahaṃkāra having specially modified characteristics such as sound, touch,
etc., why, therefore, are they not mentioned as special modifications
(_viśeshas_)? The answer is that those only are mentioned as special
modification which are ultimate special modifications. The tanmātras are
indeed the special modifications of the ego, but they themselves produce
further special modifications, the bhūtas. The aviśeshas are explained
as the six aviśeshas. The tanmātras are generated from the tāmasa
ahaṃkāra gradually through sound, etc. The category of mahat which is
the ground of all modifications, called also the buddhi, has six
evolutionary products called the aviśeshas. Though the mahat and the
prakṛti may also be regarded as the root-causes out of which the
tanmātras have evolved, yet the word aviśesha is used as a technical
term having a special application to the six aviśeshas only.” The
modifications of these are from the buddhi through the intermediate
stage of the ahaṃkāra, as has been explained in the _Bhāshya_, I. 45.
Thus we see that the _Yoga-vārttika_ says that the _Bhāshya_ is here
describing the modifications of buddhi in two distinct classes, the
aviśeshas and the viśeshas; and that the mahat has been spoken of as the
source of all the aviśeshas, the five tanmātras and the ego; strictly
speaking, however, the genesis of the tanmātras from mahat takes place
through the ego and in association with the ego, for it has been so
described in the _Bhāshya_, I. 45.
Nāgeśa in explaining this _Bhāshya_ only repeats the view of
_Yoga-vārttika_.
Now let us refer to the _Bhāshya_ of I. 45, alluded to by the
_Yoga-vārttika_: “The gradual series of subtler causes proceeds up to
the aliṅga or the prakṛti. The earth atom has the smell tanmātra as its
subtle cause; the water atom has the taste tanmātra; the air atom the
touch tanmātra; the ākāśa atom the sound tanmātra; and of these ahaṃkāra
is the subtle cause; and of this the mahat is the subtle cause.” Here by
subtle cause (_sūkshma_) it is upādānakāraṇa or material cause which is
meant; so the _Bhāshya_ further says: “It is true that purusha is the
subtlest of all. But yet as prakṛti is subtler than the mahat, it is not
in that sense that purusha is subtler than prakṛti for purusha is only
an instrumental cause of the evolution of mahat, but not its material
cause.” I believe it is quite clear that ahaṃkāra is spoken of here as
the _sūkshma anvayikārana_ of the tanmātras. This anvayikāraṇa is the
same as upādāna (material cause) as Vācaspati calls it. Now again in the
_Bhāshya_ of the same _sūtra_ II. 19 later on we see the liṅga or the
mahat is the stage next to prakṛti, it is differentiated from it though
still remaining integrated in the regular order of evolution. The six
aviśeshas are again differentiated while still remaining integrated in
the mahat in the order of evolution (_pariṇāmakramaniyama_).
The mahat tattva (liṅga) is associated with the prakṛti (aliṅga). Its
development is thus to be considered as the production of a
differentiation as integrated within the prakṛti. The six aviśeshas are
also to be considered as the production of successive differentiations
as integrated within the mahat.
The words _saṃsṛshṭa vivicyante_ are the most important here for they
show us the real nature of the transformations. “_Saṃsṛshtā_” means
integrated and “_vivicyante_” means differentiated. This shows that the
order of evolution as found in the Sāṃkhya works (viz. mahat from
prakṛti, ahaṃkāra from mahat and the eleven senses and the tanmātras
from ahaṃkāra) is true only in this sense that these modifications of
ahaṃkāra take place directly as differentiations of characters in the
body of mahat. As these differentiations take place through ahaṃkāra as
the first moment in the series of transformations it is said that the
transformations take place directly from ahaṃkāra; whereas when stress
is laid on the other aspect it appears that the transformations are but
differentiations as integrated in the body of the mahat, and thus it is
also said that from mahat the six aviśeshas—namely, ahaṃkāra and the
five tanmātras—come out. This conception of evolution as differentiation
within integration bridges the gulf between the views of Yoga and the
Saṃkhya works. We know that the tanmātras are produced from the tāmasa
ahaṃkāra. This ahaṃkāra is nothing but the tāmasa side of mahat roused
into creative activity by rajas. The sāttvika ahaṃkāra is given as a
separate category producing the senses, whereas the tamas as bhūtādi
produces the tanmātras from its disturbance while held up within the
mahat.[29]
Nāgeśa in the _Chāyā-vyākhyā_ of II. 19, however, follows the Sāṃkhya
explanation. He says: “The five tanmātras having in order one, two,
three, four and five characteristics are such that the preceding ones
are the causes of the succeeding ones. The śabdatanmātra has only the
characteristic of sound, the sparśatanmātra of sound and touch and so
on.... All these tanmātras are produced from the tāmasa ahaṃkāra in the
order of śabda, sparśa, etc.” This ignores the interpretation of the
_Vyāsā-bhāshya_ that the tanmātras are differentiations within the
integrated whole of mahat through the intermediary stage of the tāmasa
ahaṃkāra.
CHAPTER VI
EVOLUTION AND CHANGE OF QUALITIES
The order of the evolution of the tanmātras as here referred to is as
follows:—
Bhūtādi (tāmasa ahaṃkāra)
|
Śabdatanmātra
|
Sparśatanmātra
|
Rūpatanmātra
|
Rasatanmātra
|
Gandhatanmātra
The evolution of the tanmātras has been variously described in the
Purāṇas and the Smṛti literature. These divergent views can briefly be
brought under two headings: those which derive the tanmātras from the
bhûtas and those which derive them from the ahaṃkāra and the bhûtas from
them. Some of these schools have been spoken of in the Barabara Muni’s
commentary on the _Tattvatraya_—a treatise on the Rāmānuja
Philosophy—and have been already explained in a systematic way by Dr. B.
N. Seal. I therefore refrain from repeating them needlessly. About the
derivation of the tanmātras all the other Sāṃkhya treatises, the
_Kārikā_, the _Kaumudī_, the _Tattvavaiśāradī_, the _Sūtra_ and
_Pravacana-bhāshya_, the _Siddhāntacandrikā_, _Sūtrārthabodhinī_, the
_Rajamārtaṇḍa_ and the _Maṇiprabhā_ seem to be silent. Further speaking
of the tanmātras, Vijñāna Bhikshu says that the tanmātras exist only in
unspecialised forms; they therefore can be neither felt nor perceived in
any way by the senses of ordinary men. This is that indeterminate state
of matter in which they can never be distinguished one from the other,
and they cannot be perceived to be possessed of different qualities or
specialised in any way. It is for this that they are called tanmātras,
i.e. their only specialization is a mere thatness. The Yogins alone
perceive them.
Now turning towards the further evolution of the grosser elements from
the tanmātras, we see that there are great divergences of view here
also, some of which are shown below. Thus Vācaspati says: “The earth
atom is produced from the five tanmātras with a predominance of the
smell tanmātra, the water atom from the four tanmātras excepting the
smell tanmātra with a preponderance of the taste tanmātra, and so on”
(I. 44).
Thus here we find that the ākāśa atom (aṇu) has been generated simply by
the ākāśa tanmātra; the vāyu atom has been generated by two tanmātras,
śabda and sparśa, of which the sparśa appears there as the chief. The
tejas atom has been developed from the śabda, sparśa and rûpa tanmātras,
though the rûpa is predominant in the group. The ap atom has been
developed from the four tanmātras, śabda, sparśa, rûpa and rasa, though
rasa is predominant in the group, and the earth or kshiti atom has been
developed from the five tanmātras, though the gandha tanmātra is
predominant in the group.
Now the _Yoga-vārttika_ agrees with Vācaspati in all these details, but
differs from him only in maintaining that the ākāśa atom has been
generated from the śabda tanmātra with an accretion from bhūtādi,
whereas Vācaspati says that the ākāśa atom is generated simply by the
ākāśa tanmātra.[30]
Nāgeśa, however, takes a slightly different view and says that to
produce the gross atoms from the tanmātras, an accretion of bhūtādi as
an accompanying agent is necessary at every step; so that we see that
the vāyu atom is produced from these three: śabda + sparśa + accretion
from bhūtādi. Tejas atom = śabda + śparśa + rūpa + accretion from
bhūtādi. Ap atom = śabda + śparśa + rūpa + rasa + accretion from
bhūtādi. Kshiti atom = śabda + śparśa + rūpa + rasa + gandha + accretion
from bhūtādi.
I refrain from giving the _Vishṇu Purāṇa_ view which has also been
quoted in the _Yoga-vārttika_, and the view of a certain school of
Vedāntists mentioned in the _Tattva-nirūpaṇa_ and referred to and
described in the _Tattvatraya_, as Dr. B. N. Seal has already described
them in his article.
We see thus that from bhūtādi come the five tanmātras which can be
compared to the Vaiśeshika atoms as they have no parts and neither
grossness nor visible differentiation.[31] Some differentiation has of
course already begun in the tanmātras, as they are called śabda, śparśa,
rūpa, rasa and gandha, which therefore may be said to belong to a class
akin to the grosser elements of ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, ap and kshiti.[32]
The next one, the paramāṇu (atom), which is gross in its nature and is
generated from the tanmātras which exist in it as parts
(_tanmātrāvayava_) may be compared with the trasareṇu of the
Vaiśeshikas. Thus the _Yoga-vārttika_ says: “this is called paramāṇu by
the Vaiśeshikas. We however call the subtlest part of the visible earth,
earth atoms” (IV. 14). The doctrine of atoms is recognised both in the
_Yoga-sūtrās_ (I. 46) and the _Bhāshya_ (III. 52, IV. 14, etc.).
Whether Sāṃkhya admitted the paramāṇus (atoms) or not cannot be
definitely settled. The _Sāṃkhya-kārikā_ does not mention the paramāṇus,
but Vijñāna Bhikshu thinks that the word “_sūkshma_” in _Kārikā_, 39,
means paramāṇus (_Yoga-vārttika_, IV. 14). Though the word paramāṇu is
not mentioned in the _Kārikā_, I can hardly suppose that Sāṃkhya did not
admit it in the sense in which Yoga did. For it does not seem probable
that Sāṃkhya should think that by the combination of the subtle
tanmātras we could all at once have the bigger lumps of bhūta without
there being any particles. Moreover, since the Yoga paramāṇus are the
finest visible particles of matter it could not have been denied by
Sāṃkhya. The supposition of some German scholars that Sāṃkhya did not
admit the paramāṇus does not seem very plausible. Bhikshu in
_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 52, says that the guṇas are in reality Vaiśeshika
atoms.
The third form is gross air, fire, water, etc., which is said to belong
to the mahat (gross) class. I cannot express it better than by quoting a
passage from _Yoga-vārttika_, IV. 4: “The _Bhāshya_ holds that in the
tanmātras there exists the specific differentiation that constitutes the
five tanmātras, the kshiti atom is generated and by the conglomeration
of these gross atoms gross earth is formed. So again by the combination
of the four tanmātras the water atom is formed and the conglomeration of
these water atoms makes gross water.”
“It should be noted here: since the _Bhāshya_ holds that the tanmātras
of sound, etc., are of the same class as the corresponding gross
elements it may be assumed that the combining tanmātras possess the
class characteristics which are made manifest in gross elements by
hardness, smoothness, etc.” Bhikshu holds that since Sāṃkhya and Yoga
are similar (_samānatantra_) this is to be regarded as being also the
Sāṃkhya view.
There is, however, another measure which is called the measure of parama
mahat, which belongs to ākāśa for example.
Now these paramāṇus or atoms are not merely atoms of matter but they
contain within themselves those particular qualities by virtue of which
they appear, as pleasant, unpleasant or passive to us. If we have
expressed ourselves clearly, I believe it has been shown that when the
inner and the outer proceed from one source, the ego and the external
world do not altogether differ in nature from the inner; both have been
formed by the collocation of the guṇas (_sarvamidaṃ guṇānāṃ
sanniveśaviseshamātram_). The same book which in the inner microcosm is
written in the language of ideas has been in the external world written
in the language of matter. So in the external world we have all the
grounds of our inner experience, cognitive as well as emotional,
pleasurable as well as painful. The modifications of the external world
are only translated into ideas and feelings; therefore these paramāṇus
are spoken of as endowed with feelings.
There is another difference between the tanmātras and the paramāṇus. The
former cannot be perceived to be endowed with the feeling elements as
the latter. Some say, however, that it is not true that the tanmātras
are not endowed with the feeling elements, but they cannot be perceived
by any save the Yogins; thus it is said: _tanmātrāṇāmapi
parasparavyāvṛttasvabhāvatvamastyeva tacca yogimātragamyam_. The
tanmātras also possess differentiated characters, but they can be
perceived only by the Yogins; but this is not universally admitted.
Now these paramāṇus cannot further be evolved into any other different
kind of existence or tattvāntara.[33] We see that the paramāṇus though
they have been formed from the tanmātras resemble them only in a very
remote way and are therefore placed in a separate stage of evolution.
With the bhūtas we have the last stage of evolution of the guṇas. The
course of evolution, however, does not cease here, but continues
ceaselessly, though by its process no new stage of existence is
generated, but the product of the evolution is such that in it the
properties of the gross elements which compose its constitution can be
found directly. This is what is called _dharmapariṇāma_, as
distinguished from the _tattvāntara-pariṇāma_ spoken above. The
evolution of the viśeshas from the aviśeshas is always styled
tattvāntara-pariṇāma, as opposed to the evolution that takes place among
the viśeshas themselves, which is called _dharmapariṇāma_ or evolution
by change of qualities. Now these atoms or paramāṇus of kshiti, ap,
tejas, marut or ākāśa conglomerate together and form all sentient or
non-sentient bodies in the world. The different atoms of earth, air,
fire, water, etc., conglomerate together and form the different animate
bodies such as cow, etc., or inanimate bodies such as jug, etc., and
vegetables like the tree, etc. These bodies are built up by the
conglomerated units of the atoms in such a way that they are almost in a
state of combination which has been styled _ayutasiddhāvayava_. In such
a combination the parts do not stand independently, but only hide
themselves as it were in order to manifest the whole body, so that by
the conglomeration of the particles we have what may be called a body,
which is regarded as quite a different thing from the atoms of which it
is composed. These bodies change with the different sorts of change or
arrangement of the particles, according to which the body may be spoken
of as “one,” “large,” “small,” “tangible” or “possessing” the quality of
action. Some philosophers hold the view that a body is really nothing
but the conglomeration of the atoms; but they must be altogether wrong
here since they have no right to ignore the “body,” which appears before
them with all its specific qualities and attributes; moreover, if they
ignore the body they have to ignore almost everything, for the atoms
themselves are not visible.
Again, these atoms, though so much unlike the Vaiśeshika atoms since
they contain tanmātras of a different nature as their constituents and
thus differ from the simpler atoms of the Vaiśeshikas, compose the
constituents of all inorganic, organic or animal bodies in such a way
that there is no break of harmony—no opposition between them;—but, on
the contrary, when any one of the guṇas existing in the atoms and their
conglomerations becomes prominent, the other guṇas though their
functions are different from it, yet do not run counter to the prominent
guṇas, but conjointly with them, help to form the specific modification
for the experiences of the purusha. In the production of a thing, the
different guṇas do not choose different independent courses for their
evolution, but join together and effectuate themselves in the evolution
of a single product. Thus we see also that when the atoms of different
gross elements possessing different properties and attributes coalesce,
their difference of attributes does not produce confusion, but they
unite in the production of the particular substances by a common
teleological purpose (see _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, IV. 14).
We thus see that the bodies or things composed by the collocation of the
atoms in one sense differ from the atoms themselves and in another are
identical with the atoms themselves. We see therefore that the
appearance of the atoms as bodies or things differs with the change of
position of the atoms amongst themselves. So we can say that the change
of the appearance of things and bodies only shows the change of the
collocation of the atoms, there being always a change of appearance in
the bodies consequent on every change in the position of the atoms. The
former therefore is only an explicit appearance of the change that takes
place in the substance itself; for the appearance of a thing is only an
explicit aspect of the very selfsame thing—the atoms; thus the _Bhāshya_
says: _dharmisvarūpamātro hi dharmaḥ, dharmivrikriyā eva eshā
dharmadvārā prapañcyate_, i.e. a dharma (quality) is merely the nature
of the dharmin (substance), and it is the changes of the dharmin that
are made explicit by the dharmas.[34] Often it happens that the change
of appearance of a thing or a body, a tree or a piece of cloth, for
example, can be marked only after a long interval. This, however, only
shows that the atoms of the body had been continually changing and
consequently the appearance of the body or the thing also had been
continually changing; for otherwise we can in no way account for the
sudden change of appearance. All bodies are continually changing the
constituent collocation of atoms and their appearances. In the smallest
particle of time or kshaṇa the whole universe undergoes a change. Each
moment or the smallest particle of time is only the manifestation of
that particular change. Time therefore has not a separate existence in
this philosophy as in the Vaiśeshika, but it is only identical with the
smallest amount of change—viz. that of an atom of its own amount of
space. Now here the appearance is called the dharma, and that particular
arrangement of atoms or guṇas which is the basis of the particular
appearance is called the dharmin. The change of appearance is therefore
called the dharma-pariṇāma.[35]
Again this change of appearance can be looked at from two other aspects
which though not intrinsically different from the change of appearance
have their own special points of view which make them remarkable. These
are _lakshaṇa-pariṇāma_ and _avasthā-pariṇāma_. Taking the particular
collocation of atoms in a body for review, we see that all the
subsequent changes that take place in it exist in it only in a latent
way in it which will be manifested in future. All the previous changes
of the collocating atoms are not also lost but exist only in a sublatent
way in the particular collocation of atoms present before us. For the
past changes are by no means destroyed but are preserved in the peculiar
and particular collocation of atoms of the present moment. For had not
the past changes taken place, the present could not appear. The present
had held itself hidden in the past just as the future is hidden within
the present. It therefore only comes into being with the unfolding of
the past, which therefore exists only in a sublatent form in it.
It is on account of this that we see that a body comes into being and
dies away. Though this birth or death is really subsumed the change of
appearance yet it has its own special aspect, on account of which it has
been given a separate name as lakshaṇa-pariṇāma. It considers the three
stages of an appearance—the unmanifested when it exists in the future,
the manifested moment of the present, and the past when it has been
manifested—lost to view but preserved and retained in all the onward
stages of the evolution. Thus when we say that a thing has not yet come
into being, that it has just come into being, and that it is no longer,
we refer to this lakshaṇa-pariṇāma which records the history of the
thing in future, present and past, which are only the three different
moments of the same thing according to its different characters, as
unmanifested, manifested and manifested in the past but conserved.
Now it often happens that though the appearance of a thing is constantly
changing owing to the continual change of the atoms that compose it, yet
the changes are so fine and infinitesimal that they cannot be marked by
anyone except the Yogins; for though structural changes may be going on
tending towards the final passing away of that structure and body into
another structure and body, which greatly differs from it, yet they may
not be noticed by us, who can take note of the bigger changes alone.
Taking therefore two remarkable stages of things, the difference between
which may be so notable as to justify us in calling the later the
dissolution or destruction of the former, we assert that the thing has
suffered growth and decay in the interval, during which the actual was
passing into the sublatent and the potential was tending towards
actualization. This is what is called the avasthā-pariṇāma, or change of
condition, which, however, does not materially differ from the
lakshaṇa-pariṇāma and can thus be held to be a mode of it. It is on
account of this that a substance is called new or old, grown or decayed.
Thus in explaining the illustration given in the _Bhāshya_, III. 13:
“there is avasthā-pariṇāma. At the moments of cessation the potencies of
cessation become stronger and those of ordinary experience weaker.” The
_Yoga-vārttika_ says: “The strength and weakness of the two potencies is
like the newness or oldness of a jug; growth and decay being the same as
origination and decease, there is no difference here from
_lakshaṇa-pariṇāma_.”
It is now time for us to examine once more the relation of dharmin,
substance, and dharma, its quality or appearance.
Dharmin, or substance, is that which remains common to the latent (as
having passed over or _śānta_), the rising (the present or _udita_) and
the unpredicable (future or _avyapadeśya_) characteristic qualities of
the substance.
Substance (take for example, earth) has the power of existing in the
form of particles of dust, a lump or a jug by which water may be
carried. Now taking the stage of lump for examination we may think of
its previous stage, that of particles of dust, as being latent, and its
future stage as jug as the unpredicable. The earth we see here to be
common to all these three stages which have come into being by its own
activity and consequent changes. Earth here is the common quality which
remains unchanged in all these stages, and so relatively constant among
its changes as particles, lump and jug. This earth therefore is regarded
as the dharmin, characterised one, the substance; and its stages as its
dharma or qualities. When this dharmin, or substance, undergoes a change
from a stage of lump to a stage of jug, it undergoes what is called
_dharma-pariṇāma_ or change of quality.
But its dharma, as the shape of the jug may be thought to have itself
undergone a change—inasmuch as it has now come into being, from a state
of relative non-being, latency or unpredicability. This is called the
lakshaṇa-pariṇāma of the dharma or qualities as constituting a jug. This
jug is again suffering another change as new or old according as it is
just produced or is gradually running towards its dissolution, and this
is called the avasthā-pariṇāma or change of condition. These three,
however, are not separate from the dharma-pariṇāma, but are only aspects
of it; so it may be said that the dharmin or substance directly suffers
the dharma-pariṇāma and indirectly the lakshaṇa and the
avasthā-pariṇāma. The dharma, however, changes and the lakshaṇa-pariṇāma
can be looked at from another point of view, that of change of state,
viz. growth and decay. Thus we see that though the atoms of kshiti, ap,
etc., remain unchanged, they are constantly suffering changes from the
inorganic to plants and animals, and from thence again back to the
inorganic. There is thus a constant circulation of changes in which the
different atoms of kshiti, ap, tejas, vāyu and ākāśa remaining
themselves unchanged are suffering dharma-pariṇāma as they are changed
from the inorganic to plants and animals and back again to the
inorganic. These different states or dharmas (as inorganic, etc.),
again, according as they are not yet, now, or no longer or passed over,
are suffering the lakshaṇa-pariṇāma. There is also the avasthā-pariṇāma
of these states according as any one of them (the plant state for
example) is growing or suffering decay towards its dissolution.
This circulation of cosmic matter in general applies also to all
particular things, such as the jug, the cloth, etc.; the order of
evolution here will be that of powdered particles of earth, lump of
earth, the earthen jug, the broken halves of the jug, and again the
powdered earth. As the whole substance has only one identical evolution,
these different states only happen in order of succession, the
occurrence of one characteristic being displaced by another
characteristic which comes after it immediately. We thus see that one
substance may undergo endless changes of characteristic in order of
succession; and along with the change of characteristic or dharma we
have the lakshaṇa-pariṇāma and the avasthā-pariṇāma as old or new, which
is evidently one of infinitesimal changes of growth and decay. Thus
Vācaspati gives the following beautiful example: “Even the most
carefully preserved rice in the granary becomes after long years so
brittle that it crumbles into atoms. This change cannot happen to new
rice all on a sudden. Therefore we have to admit an order of successive
changes” (_Tattvavaivśāradī_, III. 15).
We now see that substance has neither past nor future; appearances or
qualities only are manifested in time, by virtue of which substance is
also spoken of as varying and changing temporally, just as a line
remains unchanged in itself but acquires different significances
according as one or two zeros are placed on its right side.
Substance—the atoms of kshiti, ap, tejas, marut, vyoman, etc., by
various changes of quality appear as the manifold varieties of cosmical
existence. There is no intrinsic difference between one thing and
another, but only changes of character of one and the same thing; thus
the gross elemental atoms like water and earth particles acquire various
qualities and appear as the various juices of all fruits and herbs. Now
in analogy with the arguments stated above, it will seem that even a
qualified thing or appearance may be relatively regarded as substance,
when it is seen to remain common to various other modifications of that
appearance itself. Thus a jug, which may remain common in all its
modifications of colour, may be regarded relatively as the dharmin or
substance of all these special appearances or modifications of the same
appearance.
We remember that the guṇas, which are the final substratum of all the
grosser particles, are always in a state of commotion and always
evolving in the manner previously stated, for the sake of the experience
and final realisation of the parusha, the only object or end of the
prakṛti. Thus the _Bhāshya_, III. 13, says: “So it is the nature of the
guṇas that there cannot remain even a moment without the evolutionary
changes of dharma, lakshaṇa and avasthā; movement is the characteristic
of the guṇas. The nature of the guṇas is the cause of their constant
movement.”
Although the pioneers of modern scientific evolution have tried to
observe scientifically some of the stages of the growth of the inorganic
and of the animal worlds into the man, yet they do not give any reason
for it. Theirs is more an experimental assertion of facts than a
metaphysical account of evolution. According to Darwin the general form
of the evolutionary process is that which is accomplished by “very
slight variations which are accumulated by the effect of natural
selection.” And according to a later theory, we see that a new species
is constituted all at once by the simultaneous appearance of several new
characteristics very different from the old. But why this accidental
variation, this seeming departure from the causal chain, comes into
being, the evolutionists cannot explain. But the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala
doctrine explains it from the standpoint of teleology or the final goal
inherent in all matter, so that it may be serviceable to the purusha. To
be serviceable to the purusha is the one moral purpose in all prakṛti
and its manifestations in the whole material world, which guide the
course and direction of the smallest particle of matter. From the
scientific point of view, the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine is very much in
the same position as modern science, for it does not explain the cause
of the accidental variation noticed in all the stages of evolutionary
process from any physical point of view based on the observation of
facts.
But it does much credit to the Pātañjala doctrines that they explain
this accidental variation, this _avyapadeśyatva_ or unpredicability of
the onward course of evolution from a moral point of view, that of
teleology, the serviceability of the purusha. They found, however, that
this teleology should not be used to usurp the whole nature and function
of matter. We find that the atoms are always moving by virtue of the
rajas or energy, and it is to this movement of the atoms in space that
all the products of evolution are due. We have found that the difference
between the juices of Coco-nut, Palm, Bel, Tinduka (Diospyros
Embryopteries), Āmalaka (Emblic Myrobalan) can be accounted for by the
particular and peculiar arrangement of the atoms of earth and water
alone, by their stress and strain; and we see also that the evolution of
the organic from the inorganic is due to this change of position of the
atoms themselves; for the unit of change is the change in an atom of its
own dimension of spatial position. There is always the transformation of
energy from the inorganic to the organic and back again from the
organic. Thus the differences among things are solely due to the
different stages which they occupy in the scale of evolution, as
different expressions of the transformation of energy; but virtually
there is no intrinsic difference among things _sarvaṃ sarvātmakaṃ_; the
change of the collocation of atoms only changes potentiality into
actuality, for there is potentiality of everything for every thing
everywhere throughout this changing world. Thus Vācaspati writes: “The
water possessing taste, colour, touch and sound and the earth possessing
smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound suffer an infinite variety of
changes as roots, flowers, fruits, leaves and their specific tastes and
other qualities. The water and the earth which do not possess these
qualities cannot have them, for we have proved that what is non-existent
cannot come into being. The trees and plants produce the varied tastes
and colours in animals, for it is by eating these that they acquire such
richness of colour, etc. Animal products can again produce changes in
plant bodies. By sprinkling blood on it a pomegranate may be made as big
as a palm” (_Tattvavaiśaradī_, III. 14).
Looked at from the point of view of the guṇas, there is no intrinsic
difference between things, though there are a thousand manifestations of
differences, according to time, place, form and causality. The
expressions of the guṇas, and the manifestations of the transformations
of energy differ according to time, place, shape, or causality—these are
the determining circumstances and environments which determine the modes
of the evolutionary process; surrounding environments are also involved
in determining this change, and it is said that two Āmalaka fruits
placed in two different places undergo two different sorts of changes in
connection with the particular spots in which they are placed, and that
if anybody interchanges them a Yogin can recognise and distinguish the
one from the other by seeing the changes that the fruits have undergone
in connection with their particular points of space. Thus the _Bhāshya_
says: “Two Āmalaka fruits having the same characteristic genus and
species, their situation in two different points of space contributes to
their specific distinction of development, so that they may be
identified as this and that. When an Āmalaka is brought from a distance
to a man previously inattentive to it, he naturally cannot distinguish
this Āmalaka as being the distant one which has been brought before him
without his knowledge. But right knowledge should be competent to
discern the distinction; and the sūtra says that the place associated
with one Āmalaka fruit is different from the place associated with
another Āmalaka at another point of space; and the Yogin can perceive
the difference of their specific evolution in association with their
points of space; similarly the atoms also suffer different modifications
at different points of space which can be perceived by Īśvara and the
Yogins” (_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 53).
Vācaspati again says: “Though all cause is essentially all effects yet a
particular cause takes effect in a particular place, thus though the
cause is the same, yet saffron grows in Kāśmīra and not in Pāñcāla. So,
the rains do not come in summer, the vicious do not enjoy happiness.
Thus in accordance with the obstructions of place, time, animal form,
and instrumental accessories, the same cause does not produce the same
effect. Though as cause everything is essentially everything else, yet
there is a particular country for a particular effect, such as Kāśmīra
is for saffron. Even though the causes may be in other countries such as
Pāñcāla, yet the effect will not happen there, and for this reason
saffron does not manifest itself in Pāñcāla. So in summer there are no
rains and so no paddy grows then” (_Tattvavaiśāradī_, III. 14).
We see therefore that time, space, etc., are the limitations which
regulate, modify and determine to a certain extent the varying
transformations and changes and the seeming differences of things,
though in reality they are all ultimately reducible to the three guṇas;
thus Kāśmīra being the country of saffron, it will not grow in the
Pāñcāla country, even though the other causes of its growth should all
be present there;—here the operation of cause is limited by space.
After considering the inorganic, vegetable and animal kingdoms as three
stages in the evolutionary process, our attention is at once drawn to
their conception of the nature of relation of plant life to animal life.
Though I do not find any special reference in the _Bhāshya_ to this
point, yet I am reminded of a few passages in the _Mahābhārata_, which I
think may be added as a supplement to the general doctrine of evolution
according to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala philosophy as stated here. Thus the
_Mahābhārata_ says: “Even the solid trees have ether (ākāśa) in them
which justifies the regular appearance of flowers and fruits. By heat
the leaves, the bark, flowers and fruits become withered, and since
there is withering and decay in them, there is in them the sensation of
touch. Since by the sound of air, fire and thunder the fruits and
flowers fall away, there must be the sense of hearing in them. The
creepers encircle the trees and they go in all directions, and since
without sight there could not be any choice of direction, the trees have
the power of vision. By various holy and unholy smells and incenses of
various kinds the trees are cured of their diseases and blossom forth,
therefore the trees can smell. Since they drink by their roots, and
since they get diseases, and since their diseases can be cured, there is
the sense of taste in the trees. Since they enjoy pleasure and suffer
pain, and since their parts which are cut grow, I see life everywhere in
trees and not want of life” (_Sāntiparva_, 184).
Nīlakaṇṭha in his commentary goes still further and says that a hard
substance called vajramaṇi also may be called living. Here we see that
the ancients had to a certain extent forestalled the discovery of Sir J.
C. Bose that the life functions differed only in degree between the
three classes, the inorganic, plants and animals.
These are all, however, only illustrations of dharma-pariṇāma, for here
there is no radical change in the elements themselves, the appearance of
qualities being due only to the different arrangement of the atoms of
the five gross elements. This change applies to the viśeshas only—the
five gross elements externally and the eleven senses internally. How the
inner microcosm, the manas and the senses are affected by
dharma-pariṇāma we shall see hereafter, when we deal with the psychology
of the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine. For the present it will suffice to
say that the citta or mind also suffers this change and is modified in a
twofold mode; the patent in the form of the ideas and the latent, as the
substance itself, in the form of saṃskāras of subconscious impressions.
Thus the _Bhāshya_ says: “The mind has two kinds of characteristics,
perceived and unperceived. Those of the nature of ideas are perceived
and those inherent in the integral nature of it are unperceived. The
latter are of seven kinds and may be ascertained by inference. These are
cessation of mental states by samādhi, virtue and vice, subconscious
impressions, change, life-functioning, power of movement, and energy”
(III. 15).
This dharma-pariṇāma as we have shown it, is essentially different from
the satkāraṇavāda of the aviśeshas described above. We cannot close this
discussion about evolution without noticing the Sāṃkhya view of
causation.
We have seen that the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala view holds that the effect is
already existent in the cause, but only in a potential form. “The
grouping or collocation alone changes, and this brings out the
manifestation of the latent powers of the guṇas, but without creation of
anything absolutely new or non-existent.” This is the true satkāryyavāda
theory as distinguished from the so-called satkāryyavāda theory of the
Vedāntists, which ought more properly to be called the satkāraṇavāda
theory, for with them the cause alone is true, and all effects are
illusory, being only impositions on the cause. For with them the
material cause alone is true, whilst all its forms and shapes are merely
illusory, whereas according to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine all the
appearances or effects are true and are due to the power which the
substance has of transforming itself into those various appearances and
effects _yogyatāvacchinnā dharmiṇaḥ śaktireva dharmaḥ_ (III. 14). The
operation of the concomitant condition or efficient cause serves only to
effect the passage of a thing from potency to actualisation.
Everything in the phenomenal world is but a special collocation of the
guṇas; so that the change of collocation explains the diversity of
things. Considered from the point of view of the guṇas, things are all
the same, so excluding that, the cause of the diversity in things is the
power which the guṇas have of changing their particular collocations and
thus assuming various shapes. We have seen that the prakṛti unfolds
itself through various stages—the mahat called the great being—the
ahaṃkāra, the tanmātras called the aviśeshas. Now the liṅga at once
resolves itself into the ahaṃkāra and through it again into the
tanmātras. The ahaṃkāra and the tanmātras again resolve themselves into
the senses and the gross elements, and these again are constantly
suffering thousands of modifications called the dharma, lakshaṇa, and
avasthā-pariṇāma according to the definite law of evolution
(_pariṇāmakramaniyama_).
Now according to the Saṃkhya-Pātañjala doctrine, the śakti—power,
force—and the śaktimān—the possessor of power or force—are not different
but identical. So the prakṛti and all its emanations and modifications
are of the nature of substantive entities as well as power or force.
Their appearances as substantive entities and as power or force are but
two aspects, and so it will be erroneous to make any such distinction as
the substantive entity and its power or force. That which is the
substantive entity is the force, and that which is the force is the
substantive entity. Of course for all practical purposes we can indeed
make some distinction, but that distinction is only relatively true.
Thus when we say that earth is the substantive entity and the power
which it has of transforming itself into the produced form, lump, or jug
as its attribute, we see on the one hand that no distinction is really
made between the appearance of the earth as jug and its power of
transforming itself into the jug. As this power of transforming itself
into lump or jug, etc., always abides in the earth we say that the jug,
etc., are also abiding in the earth; when the power is in the potential
state, we say that the jug is in the potential state, and when it is
actualised, we say that the jug has been actualised. Looked at from the
tanmātric side, the earth and all the other gross elements must be said
to be mere modifications, and as such identical with the power which the
tanmātras have of changing themselves into them. The potentiality or
actuality of any state is the mere potentiality or actuality of the
power which its antecedent cause has of transforming itself into it.
CHAPTER VII
EVOLUTION AND CHANGE OF QUALITIES
Prakṛti, though a substantive entity is yet a potential power, being
actualised as its various modifications, the aviśeshas and the viśeshas.
Being of the nature of power, the movement by which it actualises itself
is immanent within itself and not caused from without. The operation of
the concomitant conditions is only manifested in the removal of the
negative barriers by which the power was stopped or prevented from
actualising itself. Being of the nature of power, its potentiality means
that it is kept in equilibrium by virtue of the opposing tendencies
inherent within it, which serve to obstruct one another and are
therefore called the āvaraṇa śakti. Of course it is evident that there
is no real or absolute distinction between the opposing force (_āvaraṇa
śakti_) and the energising force (_kāryyakarī śakti_); they may be
called so only relatively, for the same tendency which may appear as the
_āvaraṇa śakti_ of some tendencies may appear as the _kāryyakarī śakti_
elsewhere. The example chosen to explain the nature of prakṛti and its
modifications conceived as power tending towards actuality from
potentiality in the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ is that of a sheet of water enclosed
by temporary walls within a field, but always tending to run out of it.
As soon as the temporary wall is broken in some direction, the water
rushes out of itself, and what one has to do is to break the wall at a
particular place. Prakṛti is also the potential for all the infinite
diversity of things in the phenomenal world, but the potential tendency
of all these mutually opposed and diverse things cannot be actualised
together. Owing to the concomitant conditions when the barrier of a
certain tendency is removed, it at once actualises itself in its effect
and so on.
We can only expect to get any effect from any cause if the necessary
barriers can be removed, for everything is everything potentially and it
is only necessary to remove the particular barrier which is obstructing
the power from actualising itself in that particular effect towards
which it is always potentially tending. Thus Nandī who was a man is at
once turned into a god for his particular merit, which served to break
all the barriers of the potential tendency of his body towards becoming
divine, so that the barriers being removed the potential power of the
prakṛti of his body at once actualises itself in the divine body.
The _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ (III. 14) mentions four sorts of concomitant
conditions which can serve to break the barrier in a particular way and
thus determine the mode or form of the actualisations of the potential.
These are (1) ākāra, form and constitution of a thing; deśa, place, (3)
kāla, time; thus from a piece of stone, the shoot of a plant cannot
proceed, for the arrangement of the particles in stone is such that it
will oppose and stand as a bar to its potential tendencies to develop
into the shoot of a plant; of course if these barriers could be removed,
say by the will of God, as Vijñāna Bhikshu says, then it is not
impossible that the shoot of a plant might grow from a stone. By the
will of God poison may be turned into nectar and nectar into poison, and
there is no absolute certainty of the course of the evolutionary
process, for God’s will can make any change in the direction of its
process (_avyavasthitākhilapariṇāmo bhavatyeva_, III. 14).
According to the Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala theory dharma, merit, can only be
said to accrue from those actions which lead to a man’s salvation, and
adharma from just the opposite course of conduct. When it is said that
these can remove the barriers of the prakṛti and thus determine its
modifications, it amounts almost to saying that the modifications of the
prakṛti are being regulated by the moral conditions of man. According to
the different stages of man’s moral evolution, different kinds of merit,
dharma or adharma, accrue, and these again regulate the various physical
and mental phenomena according to which a man may be affected either
pleasurably or painfully. It must, however, be always remembered that
the dharma and adharma are also the productions of prakṛti, and as such
cannot affect it except by behaving as the cause for the removal of the
opposite obstructions—the dharma for removing the obstructions of
adharma and adharma for those of dharma. Vijñāna Bhikshu and Nāgeśa
agree here in saying that the modifications due to dharma and adharma
are those which affect the bodies and senses. What they mean is possibly
this, that it is dharma or adharma alone which guides the
transformations of the bodies and senses of all living beings in general
and the Yogins.
The body of a person and his senses are continually decaying and being
reconstructed by refilling from the gross elements and from ahaṃkāra
respectively. These refillings proceed automatically and naturally; but
they follow the teleological purpose as chalked out by the law of karma
in accordance with the virtues or vices of a man. Thus the gross insult
to which the sages were subjected by Nahusha[36] was so effective a sin
that by its influence the refilling of Nahusha’s body and the senses was
stopped and the body and senses of a snake were directly produced by a
process of refilling from the gross elements and ahaṃkāra, for providing
him with a body in which he could undergo the sufferings which were his
due owing to the enormity of his vice. Thus by his vicious action the
whole machinery of prakṛti was set in operation so that he at once died
and was immediately reborn as a snake. In another place Vācaspati “the
virtuous enjoys happiness” as an illustration of the cause of dharma and
adharma as controlling the course of the development of prakṛti. We
therefore see that the sphere of merit and demerit lies in the helping
of the formation of the particular bodies and senses (from the gross
elements and ahaṃkāra respectively) suited to all living beings
according to their stages of evolution and their growth, decay, or other
sorts of their modifications as pleasure, pain, and also as illness or
health. Thus it is by his particular merit that the Yogin can get his
special body or men or animals can get their new bodies after leaving
the old ones at death. Thus _Yoga-vārttika_ says: “Merit by removing the
obstructions of demerit causes the development of the body and the
senses.”
As for Īśvara I do not remember that the _Bhāshya_ or the sūtras ever
mention Him as having anything to do with the controlling of the
modifications of the prakṛti by removing the barriers, but all the later
commentators agree in holding him responsible for the removal of all
barriers in the way of prakṛtis development. So that Īśvara is the root
cause of all the removal of barriers, including those that are affected
by merit and demerit. Thus Vācaspati says (IV. 3): _Īśvarasyāpi
dharmādhishṭhānārthaṃ pratibandhāpanaya eva vyāpāro_, i.e. God stands as
the cause of the removal of such obstacles in the prakṛti as may lead to
the fruition of merit or demerit.
_Yoga-vārttika_ and Nāgeśa agree in holding Īśvara responsible for the
removal of all obstacles in the way of the evolution of prakṛti. Thus
Bhikshu says that God rouses prakṛti by breaking the opposing forces of
the state of equilibrium and also of the course of evolution (IV. 3).
It is on account of God that we can do good or bad actions and thus
acquire merit or demerit. Of course God is not active and cannot cause
any motion in prakṛti. But He by His very presence causes the obstacles,
as the barriers in the way of prakṛti’s development, to be removed, in
such a way that He stands ultimately responsible for the removal of all
obstacles in the way of prakṛti’s development and thus also of all
obstacles in the way of men’s performance of good or bad deeds. Man’s
good or bad deeds “puṇyakarma,” apuṇyakarma, dharma or adharma serve to
remove the obstacles of prakṛti in such a way as to result in
pleasurable or painful effects; but it is by God’s help that the
barriers of prakṛti are removed and it yields itself in such a way that
a man may perform good or bad deeds according to his desire. Nīlakaṇṭha,
however, by his quotations in explanation of 300/2, _Śāntiparva_, leads
us to suppose that he regards God’s will as wholly responsible for the
performance of our good or bad actions. For if we lay stress on his
quotation “He makes him do good deeds whom He wants to raise, and He
makes him commit bad deeds whom He wants to throw down,” it appears that
he whom God wants to raise is made to perform good actions and he whom
God wants to throw downwards is made to commit bad actions. But this
seems to be a very bold idea, as it will altogether nullify the least
vestige of freedom in and responsibility for our actions and is
unsupported by the evidence of other commentators. Vijñāna Bhikshu also
says with reference to this śruti in his _Vijñānamṛta-bhāshya_, III. 33:
“As there is an infinite _regressus_ between the causal connection of
seed and shoot, so one karma is being determined by the previous karma
and so on; there is no beginning to this chain.” So we take the
superintendence of merits and demerits (_dharmādhispṭhānatā_) by Īśvara
to mean only in a general way the help that is offered by Him in
removing the obstructions of the external world in such a manner that it
may be possible for a man to perform practically meritorious acts in the
external world.
Nīlakaṇṭha commenting on the Yoga view says that “like a piece of
magnet, God though inactive, may by His very presence stir up prakṛti
and help His devotees. So the Yoga holds that for the granting of
emancipation God has to be admitted” (_Śāntiparva_, 300/2).
In support of our view we also find that it is by God’s influence that
the unalterable nature of the external world is held fast and a limit
imposed on the powers of man in producing changes in the external world.
Thus Vācaspati in explaining the Bhāshya (III. 45) says: “Though capable
of doing it, yet he does not change the order of things, because another
earlier omnipotent being had wished the things to be such as they were.
They would not disobey the orders of the omnipotent God.”
Men may indeed acquire unlimited powers of producing any changes they
like, for the powers of objects as they change according to the
difference of class, space, time and condition, are not permanent, and
so it is proper that they should act in accordance with the desire of
the Yogin; but there is a limit to men’s will by the command of God—thus
far and no further.
Another point in our favour is that the Yoga philosophy differs from the
Sāṃkhya mainly in this that the purushārtha or serviceability to the
purusha is only the aim or end of the evolution of prakṛti and not
actually the agent which removes the obstacles of the prakṛti in such a
way as to determine its course as this cosmical process of evolution.
Purushārtha is indeed the aim for which the process of evolution exists;
for this manifold evolution in its entirety affects the interests of the
purusha alone; but that does not prove that its teleology can really
guide the evolution on its particular lines so as to ensure the best
possible mode of serving all the interests of the purusha, for this
teleology being immanent in the prakṛti is essentially non-intelligent.
Thus Vācaspati says: “The fulfilment of the purpose of the purusha is
not also the prime mover. God has the fulfilment of the purpose of the
purusha as His own purpose, for which He behaves as the prime mover. The
fulfilment of the purpose of the purusha may be regarded as cause only
in the sense that it is the object in view of God, the prime mover.”[37]
The Sāṃkhya, however, hopes that this immanent purpose in prakṛti acts
like a blind instinct and is able to guide the course of its evolution
in all its manifold lines in accordance with the best possible service
of the purusha.
The Pātañjala view, as we have seen, maintains that Īśvara removes all
obstacles of prakṛti in such a way that this purpose may find scope for
its realisation. Thus _Sūtrārthabodhinī_, IV. 3, of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha
says: “According to atheistic Sāṃkhya the future serviceability of
purusha alone is the mover of prakṛti. But with us theists the
serviceability of purusha is the object for which prakṛti moves. It is
merely as an object that the serviceability of the purusha may be said
to be the mover of the prakṛti.”
As regards the connection of prakṛti and purusha, however, both Sāṃkhya
and Pātañjala agree according to Vijñāna Bhikshu in denying the
interference of Īśvara; it is the movement of prakṛti by virtue of
immanent purpose that connects itself naturally with the purusha.
Vijñāna Bhikshu’s own view, however, is that this union is brought about
by God (_Vijñānāmṛta-bhāshya_, p. 34).
To recapitulate, we see that there is an immanent purpose in prakṛti
which connects it with the purushas. This purpose is, however, blind and
cannot choose the suitable lines of development and cause the movement
of Prakṛti along them for its fullest realisation. Prakṛti itself,
though a substantial entity, is also essentially of the nature of
conserved energy existing in the potential form but always ready to flow
out and actualise itself, if only its own immanent obstructions are
removed. Its teleological purpose is powerless to remove its own
obstruction. God by His very presence removes the obstacles, by which,
prakṛti of itself moves in the evolutionary process, and thus the
purpose is realised; for the removal of obstacles by the influence of
God takes place in such a way that the purpose may realise its fullest
scope. Realisation of the teleology means that the interests of purusha
are seemingly affected and purusha appears to see and feel in a manifold
way, and after a long series of such experiences it comes to understand
itself in its own nature, and this being the last and final realisation
of the purpose of prakṛti with reference to that purusha all connections
of prakṛti with such a purusha at once cease; the purusha is then said
to be liberated and the world ceases for him to exist, though it exists
for the other unliberated purushas, the purpose of the prakṛti with
reference to whom has not been realised. So the world is both eternal
and non-eternal, i.e. its eternality is only relative and not absolute.
Thus the _Bhāshya_ says the question “whether the world will have an end
or not cannot be directly answered. The world-process gradually ceases
for the wise and not for others, so no one-sided decision can be true”
(IV. 33).
BOOK II. ETHICS AND PRACTICE