ENGLAND'S INTEREST IN ISLAM.
Nothing now remains for me but to point the moral which these essays
were designed to draw. It will have been observed that hitherto I have
avoided as much as possible all allusion to the direct political action
which Christendom is exercising, and must ever more and more exercise,
upon the fortunes of Islam; and in this I have been guided by two
motives. I have wished, first, to give prominence to the fact that in
all great movements of the human intellect the force of progression or
decay should be looked for mainly from within, not from without; and,
secondly, to simplify my subject so as to render it more easily
intelligible to the reading public. We have reached, however, the point
now when it will be necessary to take different ground, and look at
Islam no longer as regards her internal economy, but as she is being
affected by the world at large. We must inquire what influence the
material pressure of Europe is likely to have on her in the Levant, and
what in Africa and Central Asia; and, above all, we must examine closely
our own position towards her, and the course which duty and interest
require us to pursue in regard to the vast Mussulman population of our
Indian Empire.
I take it the sentiment generally of Continental Europe--I do not speak
of England--towards Mohammedanism is still much what it has always been,
namely, one of social hostility and political aggression. In spite of
all the changes which have affected religious thought in Catholic
Europe, and of the modern doctrine of tolerance in matters of opinion,
none of the nations by which Islam is immediately confronted to the
north and west have really changed anything of their policy towards her,
since the days when they first resolved on the recovery of "Christian
lands lost to the infidel." It is true that most of them no longer put
forward religious zeal as the motive of their action, or the possession
of the Holy Sepulchre as its immediate object; but under the name of
"civilization" their crusade is no less a continuous reality, and the
direction of their efforts has not ceased to be the resumption by Europe
of political control in the whole of the provinces once forming the
Roman Empire. The sentiment in its origin was a just one, and, though
now become for the most part selfish with the various Christian states,
who see in the advantage to Christendom only an advantage to themselves,
it appeals to an ancient and respectable moral sanction which is in
itself no inconsiderable power. It is certain that the national
conscience neither of France, nor Spain, nor Italy, nor Austria would
repudiate an aggression, however unprovoked, upon any of the still
independent Mussulman states of the Mediterranean, and that the only
judgment passed on such an act by public opinion would be one dependent
on its failure or success.
Thus in estimating the future of Islam as a political body, and in view
of the disparity proved to exist at all points between modern Europe and
its ancient rival in the matter of physical strength, we must be
prepared to see the latter submit at no distant date to great
territorial losses along the whole line of its European frontier. Few, I
think, to begin from the extreme west, will be inclined to doubt that,
should the French succeed in thoroughly crushing the Arab movement which
they have provoked in Tunis, and which will in all probability be
extended next summer to Morocco and Tripoli, the beginning of the next
century will see what is left of the Barbary Coast in their possession,
or in that of Spain or Italy; and the greater part of the cultivable
lands fronting the Mediterranean occupied by their immigrants. What
France has done or attempted to do in Algiers her two neighbours may
possibly achieve with even more success in Morocco and western Tripoli,
for the Spaniards and Italians are both eminently colonizing races, and
the hill country of Barbary is little different in climate from their
own. Tripoli, on the break up of the Ottoman Empire, will certainly
tempt Italian statesmen, and Spain has already a footing on the African
coast in Tetuan. It is therefore conceivable that the better lands on
the seaboard will receive a flood of such agriculturists from either
country as now seek their fortunes on the River Plate and elsewhere.
Should such be the case, the Mohammedan population may be ousted from
their possession of the soil, and driven southwards, at least for a
time, and a considerable decrease of the political strength of Islam be
witnessed in that quarter. I do not, however, conceive that Europe will
ever obtain a sure colonial footing south of the Atlas, or that the
Mussulmans of the Sahara will lose anything of their present religious
character. At worst, Southern Morocco and Fezzan will always remain
independent Mohammedan States, the nucleuses of religious life in
Barbary, and links between the Mussulmans of Northern and Central
Africa, while further east the growing influence of Egypt will make
itself felt intellectually to the advantage of believers. It is,
however, to Central Africa that Islam must in the future look for a
centre of religious gravity westwards. There, in the conversion of the
negro race of the Tropics, already so rapidly proceeding, she has good
prospect of compensation for all losses on the Mediterranean coast; and,
screened by the Sahara and by a climate unsuited to European life, she
may retain for centuries her political as well as her religious
independence. The negro races will not only be Mohammedanised; they will
also be Arabised; and a community of language and of custom will thus
preserve for Soudan its connection with Mecca, and so with the general
life of Islam. The losses, then, to Islam in Africa will be rather
apparent than real, and may even in the end prove a source of new
strength.
Nor must we lose sight of the possibility of a French defeat I believe
that at no time during the past forty years has the military position of
"our allies" been in a graver peril in their colony than now, or the
resources of their antagonists greater. It is a weakness of the French
system in Africa that it has made no attempt to assimilate the native
population; and it is the strength of that population, in as far as it
is Arab, that it does assimilate French thought to its own advantage. It
is far from certain whether the conquest of Algiers may not some day
have for its effect the renewal of Mohammedan political vitality in all
the Barbary Coast.
A more absolute and immediate loss must be anticipated in Europe and
Western Asia. There it is pretty certain that in a very few years
Ottoman rule will have ceased, and the Turkish-speaking lands composing
the Empire been absorbed by one or other of the powerful neighbours who
have so long coveted their possession. Austria, in person or by deputy,
may be expected by the end of the present century to have inherited the
European, and Russia the Asiatic, provinces of Turkey proper, while the
fate of Syria and Egypt will only have been averted, if averted it be,
by the intervention of England. That a dissolution of the Empire may
and will be easily accomplished I have myself little doubt. The military
power of Constantinople, though still considerable for the purposes of
internal control, will hardly again venture to cope single-handed with
any European State, nor is it in the least probable that the Sultan will
receive further Christian support from without. The fall of Kars has
laid Asia Minor open to the Russian arms, and the territorial cessions
of San Stefano and Berlin have laid Roumelia open to the Austrian. On
the first occasion of a quarrel with the Porte a simultaneous advance
from both quarters would preclude the chance of even a serious struggle,
and the subjugation of the Turkish-speaking races would be effected
without more difficulty.
The weakness of the Empire from a military point of view is, that it is
dependent wholly on its command of the sea, a position which enables it
to mass what troops it has rapidly on the points required, but which
even a second-rate Mediterranean power could wrest from it. Its
communication cut by a naval blockade, the Empire would almost without
further action be dissolved. Whatever loyalty the Sultan may have lately
achieved outside his dominions, there is not only no spirit of national
resistance in Asia Minor itself, but the provinces, even the most
Mussulman, would hail an invading army as a welcome deliverer from him.
Left to themselves they would abandon without compunction the Sultan's
cause, and the next war of an European state with Turkey will not only
be her last, but it will in all likelihood hardly be fought out by her.
Nor do I conceive that the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the annexation
of its Turkish provinces would be a mere political loss of so much
territory to Islam. It would involve moral consequences far greater than
this for the whole Mussulman world of North-Western Asia. I have the
authority of the most enlightened of modern Asiatic statesmen in support
of my opinion that it would be the certain deathblow of Mohammedanism as
a permanent religious faith in all the lands west of the Caspian, and
that even among the Tartar races of the far East, the Sunite Mussulmans
of Siberia and the Khanates, and as far as the Great Wall of China, it
would be a shock from which Sunism in its present shape would with
difficulty recover. What has hitherto supported the religious constancy
of orthodox believers in those lands, formerly Ottoman, which have
become subject to Russia, has been throughout the consciousness that
there was still upon the Russian border a great militant body of men of
their own faith, ruled by its acknowledged spiritual head.
The centre of their religious pride has been Constantinople, where the
Sultan and Caliph has sat enthroned upon the Bosphorus, commanding the
two worlds of Europe and Asia, and securing to them communication with
the holy places of their devotion and the living body of true believers.
Their self-respect has been maintained by this feeling, and with it
fidelity to their traditions. Moreover, the school of St. Sophia has
been a fountain-head of religious knowledge, the university at which the
Ulema of Kazan and Tiflis and Astrachan have received their spiritual
education; while at all times religious personages from Constantinople
have travelled among them, keeping alive the recollection of their lost
allegiance. On this basis their faith has retained what it has of
loyalty in spite of the political Russianising they have undergone; but
with their political centre destroyed, they would be as sheep without a
shepherd, scattered in little groups here and there among a growing
Christian population, and shut out from the fold of their belief.
Constantinople is the assembling place of pilgrimage for all
Mohammedans west of the Ural Mountains, who reach it by the Black Sea,
and could never be replaced to them by any new centre further south
among the Arab races, with whom they have little sympathy or direct
religious connection. A Caliph at Mecca or in Egypt could do little for
them, and the Turkish-speaking Sunites would have no university open to
them nearer than Bokhara. In this respect they would find themselves in
a far worse position than the Moors, however universally these may
become subject to Europe, and their religious disintegration would be a
mere question of time. I believe, therefore, that Islam must be prepared
for a loss, not only of political power in Europe and in Western Asia,
but also of the Mohammedan population in the Ottoman lands absorbed by
Russia. It will be a strange revenge of history if the Ottoman Turks,
whom Europe has for so many centuries held to be the symbolic figure of
Mohammedanism, shall one day cease to be Mohammedan. Yet it is a revenge
our children or our grandchildren may well live to see.
How far eastward the full results of this religious disintegration may
extend, it is perhaps fanciful to speculate. The north-western
provinces of Persia, which are inhabited by Mussulmans of mixed race
speaking the Turkish language and largely interfused with Christian
Armenians, would, I am inclined to think, follow the destiny of the
West, and ultimately accept Christianity as a dominant religion. But,
east of the Caspian, Sunite Islam, though severely shaken, may yet hope
to survive and hold its ground for centuries.
The present policy of Russia, whatever it may be in Europe, is far from
hostile to Mohammedanism in Central Asia. As a religion it is even
protected there, and it is encouraged by the Government in its
missionary labours among the idolatrous tribes of the Steppes, and among
the Buddhists, who are largely accepting its doctrines in the extreme
East. Hitherto there has been no Christian colonization in the direction
of the Khanates, nor is there any indigenous form of Christianity.
Moreover, Central Asia, though connected by ties of sympathy with
Constantinople, has never been politically or even religiously dependent
on it. It has a university of its own in Bokhara, a seat of learning
still renowned throughout Asia, and it is thither and not to St. Sophia
that the Sunite Mussulmans east of the Caspian proceed for their
degrees.
Mohammedanism, therefore, in Eastern Asia is not exposed to such
immediate danger as in the West. Bokhara may lose its political
independence, but there is no probability for many generations to come
of its being Christianized as Constantinople certainly must be, and it
may even on the fall of the latter become the chief centre of Sunite
orthodoxy of the existing Hanefite type, remaining so perhaps long after
the rest of Islam shall have abandoned Hanefism. It is obvious, however,
that cut off geographically as the Khanates are from the general life of
Islam, Bokhara can but vaguely represent the present religious power of
Constantinople, and will be powerless to influence the general flow of
Mohammedan thought. Its influence could be exerted only through India,
and would be supported by no political prestige. So that it is far more
likely in the future to follow than to lead opinion. Otherwise isolation
is its only fate.
The future of Shiite Mohammedanism in Persia proper is a still more
doubtful problem. Exposed like the rest of Central Asia to Russian
conquest, the Persian monarchy cannot without a speedy and complete
revolution of its internal condition fail to succumb politically. The
true Irâni, however, have an unique position in Mohammedan Asia which
may save them from complete absorption. Unlike any Mohammedan race
except the Arabian, they are distinctly national. The Turk, conqueror
though he has always been, repudiates still the name of Turk, calling
himself simply a Moslem, and so likewise do the less distinguished races
he has subjected. But the Persian does not do this. He is before all
things Irâni, and to the extent that he has made for himself a
Mohammedanism of his own. He boasts of a history and a literature older
far than Islam, and has not consented to forget it as a thing belonging
only to "the Age of Ignorance." He runs, therefore, little risk of being
either Russianised or Christianised by conquest; and being of an
intellectual fibre superior to that of the Russians, and, as far as the
mass of the population is concerned, being physically as well gifted, it
may be supposed that he will survive, if he cannot avert, his political
subjugation.
There is at the present moment, I am informed, a last desperate effort
making at Teheran for the re-organization of the Empire on a liberal
basis of government, and though it would be folly to count much on its
success, it may conceivably succeed. Mohammedanism would not there, as
at Constantinople, be found a barrier to reform, for Persian Shiism is
an eminently elastic creed, and on the contrary may, it is thought, be
made the instrument of a social reformation; only, as I have said it
would be folly to count on its success; and there are certain moral
defects in Persian character which do not encourage lookers-on. Shiite
Mohammedanism, however, whether Persia be absorbed or not by Russia, is
of little importance in a general review of Islam's future, and may
safely be dismissed as not directly relevant to the main question before
us.
Admitting, then, the probability, nay, the certainty, of considerable
political and territorial losses northwards, caused by the violent
pressure of a hostile Europe, let us see what yet remains to Islam as
her certain heritage, and how the changes foreshadowed may affect her
general life. I cannot myself find any cause of despair for Mussulmans
in the prospect of a curtailment of their religious area in the
directions indicated, or any certain reason of exultation for their
enemies in the thought that with the fall of Constantinople Islam, too,
will have fallen. On the contrary, I see in the coming destruction of
the Ottoman supremacy, and in the exclusion of the northern races, even
at the cost of their religious support, from the counsels of the
faithful, an element of hope in the future far outweighing the immediate
chagrin which may be caused by loss of sovereignty or loss of
population.
The Mohammedan population which the fall of Constantinople would
conceivably cut off from the main body could not at most number more
than some twenty millions, and when we remember that this is no more
than a tithe of the whole Mussulman census, and that the proportion is a
constantly decreasing one, it will be evident that there is little
ground for looking at the loss as one necessarily fatal to religion. The
northern races still give to Mohammedanism an appearance of physical
strength; but it is an appearance only, and it is given at the cost of
its intellectual vigour. The political success of the Turks has for
centuries thrown Islam off its moral equilibrium, and their
disappearance from its supreme counsels will give weight to races more
worthy of representing religious interests. Constantinople will be
replaced by Cairo or Mecca, and the Tartar by the Arab--an exchange
which, intellectually considered, no lover of Islam need deplore.
One great result the fall of Constantinople certainly will have, which I
believe will be a beneficial one. It will give to Mohammedanism a more
distinctly religious character than it has for many centuries possessed,
and by forcing believers to depend upon spiritual instead of temporal
arms will restore to them, more than any political victories could do,
their lost moral life. Even independently of considerations of race as
between Turk and Arab, I believe that the fall of the Mussulman Empire,
as a great temporal dominion, would relieve Islam of a burden of
sovereignty which she is no longer able in the face of the modern world
to support. She would escape the stigma of political depravity now
clinging to her, and her aims would be simplified and intensified. I
have already stated my opinion that it is to Arabia that Mussulmans must
in the future look for a centre of their religious system, and a return
of their Caliphate to Mecca will signify more than a mere political
change. It is obvious that empire will be there impossible in the sense
given to it at Constantinople, and that the display of armies and the
mundane glory of vast palaces and crowds of slaves will be altogether
out of place.
The Caliph of the future, in whatever city he may fix his abode, will be
chiefly a spiritual and not a temporal king, and will be limited in the
exercise of his authority by few conditions of the existing material
kind. He will be spared the burden of despotic government, the odium of
tax-gathering and conscription over unwilling populations, the constant
struggle to maintain his authority in arms, and the as constant intrigue
against rival Mohammedan princes. It is probable that all these would
readily acknowledge the nominal sovereignty of a Caliph who could not
pretend to coerce them physically, and that the spiritual allegiance of
orthodox believers everywhere would accrue to him as other Mohammedan
sovereignty relaxed its hold. Thus the dream of what is called
Pan-islamism may yet be fulfilled, though in another form from that in
which it is now presented to the faithful by Abd el Hamid and the Ulema
of Constantinople.
That Islam in this spiritual form may achieve more notable triumphs than
by arms in Eastern and Southern Asia we may well believe, and even that
it may establish itself one day as the prevailing religion of the
Continent. Its moral advance within recent times in the Malay
Archipelago, in China, in Tartary, and in India, encourages the
supposition that under alien rule Mohammedanism will be able to hold its
own, and more than own, against all rivals, and that in the decay of
Buddhism it, and not Christianity, will be the form under which God will
eventually be worshipped in the Tropics. Its progress among the Malays
under Dutch rule is certainly an astonishing phenomenon, and, taken in
connection with a hardly less remarkable progress in Equatorial Africa,
may well console those Mussulmans who see in the loss of their temporal
dominions northwards signs of the decay of Islam. Could such a
reformation as was suggested in my last chapter be indeed effected, the
vigour of conversion would doubtless be redoubled, independently of any
condition of political prosperity in the ancient seats of Mohammedan
dominion. I do not, therefore, see in territorial losses a sign of
Islam's ruin as a moral and intellectual force in the world.
It is time, however, to consider the special part destined to be played
by England in the drama of the Mussulman future. England, if I
understand her history rightly, stands towards Islam in a position quite
apart from that of the rest of the European States. These I have
described as continuing a tradition of aggression inherited from the
Crusades, and from the bitter wars waged by the Latin and Greek Empires
against the growing power of the Ottoman Turks. In the latter England
took no part, her religious schism having already separated her from the
general interests of Catholic Europe, while she had withdrawn from the
former in the still honourable stage of the adventure, and consequently
remained with no humiliating memories to avenge. She came, therefore,
into her modern relations with Mohammedans unprejudiced against them,
and able to treat their religious and political opinions in a humane and
liberal spirit, seeking of them practical advantages of trade rather
than conquest. Nor has the special nature of her position towards them
been unappreciated by Mohammedans.
In spite of the deceptions on some points of late years, and recent
vacillations of policy towards them, the still independent nations of
Islam see in England something different from the rest of Christendom,
something not in its nature hostile to them, or regardless of their
rights and interests. They know at least that they have nothing to dread
from Englishmen on the score of religious intolerance, and there is even
a tendency with some of them to exaggerate the sympathy displayed
towards them by supposing a community of beliefs on certain points
considered by them essential. Thus the idea is common among the
ignorant in many Mussulman countries that the English are _Muwahedden_,
or Unitarians, in contradistinction to the rest of Christians, who are
condemned as _Musherrakin_, or Polytheists; and the Turkish alliance is
explained by them on this supposition, supplemented in the case of the
Turks themselves with the idea that England is itself a part of Islam,
and so its natural ally.[18] These are of course but ideas of the
vulgar. Yet they represent a fact which is not without importance,
namely, that England's is accepted by Mussulmans as a friendly not a
hostile influence, and that her protection is sought without that
suspicion which is attached to the friendly offices of other powers.
Even in India, where Englishmen have supplanted the Mussulmans as a
ruling race, the sentiment towards British rule is not, as far as I can
learn, and compared with that of other sections of the Indian community,
a hostile one.
The Mussulmans of Delhi and the Punjab would no doubt desire a
resumption by themselves of practical authority in the country where
they were till lately masters; but they are conscious that they are not
strong enough now to effect this, and their feeling towards English rule
is certainly less bitter than towards the Hindoos, their former
subjects, now their rivals. Were they in any way specially protected in
their religious interests by the Indian Government, they would, I am
confident, make not only contented but actively loyal subjects.
As things stand, therefore, it would seem natural that, in the general
disruption which will follow the fall of Constantinople, it is to
England the various nations of Islam should look mainly for direction in
their political difficulties. The place of adviser and protector,
indeed, seems pointed out for her. With the disappearance of the Ottoman
Sultan there will be no longer any great Mussulman sovereignty in the
world, and the Mohammedan population of India, already the wealthiest
and most numerous, will then assume its full importance in the counsels
of believers. It will also assuredly be expected of the English Crown
that it should then justify its assumption of the old Mohammedan title
of the Moguls, by making itself in some sort the political head of
Islam. Her Majesty will be left its most powerful sovereign, and it
will be open to her advisers, if they be so minded, to exercise
paramount influence on all its affairs. I do not say that they will be
so minded, but they will have the power and the opportunity to a degree
never yet presented to any Christian Government of directing the tone of
thought of Mussulmans throughout the world, and of utilizing the
greatest religious force in Asia for the purposes of humanity and
progress. I am myself profoundly convinced that on England's acceptance
or refusal of this mission the future of her dominion in India will
mainly depend, and with it the whole solution of the problem she has set
to herself of civilizing Southern Asia.
Let us see what our actual relations with Mohammedanism are, and what is
the value of its goodwill to us in Asia. And first as to India. I find
in _Hunter's Gazetteer_, our latest authority, the following figures:--
MUSSULMAN CENSUS OF INDIA.
Bengal 19,553,831
Assam 1,104,601
North-West Provinces 4,189,348
Ajmere 47,310
Oudh 1,197,724
Punjab 9,337,685
Central Provinces 233,247
Berar 154,951
Mysore 208,991
Coorg 11,304
British Burmah 99,846
Madras 1,857,857
Bombay 2,870,450
-----------
Total 40,867,145
These are large figures taken merely as they stand, but in point of fact
they represent far more than is apparent. To understand them at their
full value it must be remembered--First, that the Mussulman population
is a largely increasing one, not only in actual numbers, but in its
proportion to the other races and sects of the Peninsula, a fact which I
believe the census returns of 1881, when published, will amply prove.
Secondly, that its geographical distribution coincides pretty closely
with that of the political life and energy of the country. The Punjab
and the North-West Provinces alone contain an aggregate of thirteen
million Mussulmans. Thirdly, that it is homogeneous to a degree shown by
no other Indian community. Though less numerous by two-thirds than the
whole Hindoo population, it is far more so than any coherent section of
that population, and is thus the largest body of opinion in the Empire.
Fourthly, it is also the most generally enlightened. It is the only
section of the community which knows its own history and preserves the
tradition of its lost political importance; and if it has held itself
aloof hitherto from competition with other races for the public service,
it has been through pride rather than inability. What Mussulmans there
are who have entered the service of Government have been men of
distinguished capacity. And lastly, it is no isolated body, but remains
in close communication with the mass of its fellow-believers throughout
the world. The Mohammedan population of India is, therefore, an
exceptional as well as a large one.
Our second interest in Mohammedanism lies in Egypt. Here, standing at
the threshold of our commerce with the East, we find another large
community almost wholly Mussulman, for whose well-being we are already
to a certain extent pledged, and in whose political future we perceive
our own to be involved. A hostile Egypt we rightly hold to be an
impossibility for our position; and religious antagonism at Cairo, even
if controlled by military occupation, would be to us a constant menace.
Nor must it be supposed that Egypt, like the Barbary coast, will, into
whose hands soever it falls, change its religious aspect. The population
of the Delta is too industrious, too sober, and content with too little,
to fear competition as agriculturists with either Italians, Greeks, or
Maltese; and the conditions of life under a torrid sun will always
protect Egypt from becoming an European colony. The towns may, indeed,
be overrun by foreigners, but the heart of the country will remain
unchanged, and, like India, will refuse to remodel itself on any foreign
system of civilization. Mohammedanism, therefore, will maintain itself
in Egypt intact, and its good-will will remain our necessity.[19]
A third interest lies in Asiatic Turkey. This we have guaranteed by
treaty against foreign invasion; and though our pledge is nominally to
the Sultan, not to the people of the Empire, and though that pledge is
contingent upon an impossibility, administrative reform, and is
therefore not strictly binding, it is impossible to escape the
admission that we have a moral obligation towards the Mussulmans of
Asia Minor and Syria. How far we may be disposed or able to fulfil it
remains to be seen. I do not myself anticipate any further intervention
on the part of England in defence of the Turkish-speaking lands. These,
from their geographical position, lie outside our effective military
control, and, dishonourable as a retreat from our engagements will be to
us, it may be a necessity.
It is difficult to understand how an English army could effectively
protect either Asia Minor or Mesopotamia from Russian invasion. The
occupation of Kars has given Russia the command of the Tigris and
Euphrates, and with them of Armenia, Kurdistan and Irak, so that our
protection could hardly be extended beyond the sea-coast of Asia Minor
and the Persian Gulf. No such inability, however, applies to Syria.
There, if we _will_, we certainly _can_ carry out our engagements. A
mere strip of seaboard, backed by the desert, and attackable only from
the north on a narrow frontier of some hundred miles, Syria is easily
defensible by a nation holding the sea. It is probable that a railway
run from the Gulf of Scanderun to the Euphrates, and supported by a
single important fortress, would be sufficient to effect its military
security at least for many years; and Syria might thus have given to it
a chance of self-government, and some compensation for misfortunes in
which we have had no inconsiderable share. But this is an interest of
honour rather than of political necessity to England; and he must
possess a sanguine mind who, in the present temper of Englishmen, would
count greatly on such motives as likely to determine the action of their
Government. If, however, it should be otherwise, it is evident that the
success of such a protectorate would depend principally upon the
Mohammedan element in Syria, which so greatly preponderates over any
other.
A fourth interest, also a moral one, but connected with an accepted fact
of English policy, is the attempted abolition of the African slave
trade. Now, though it is unquestionable that Mohammedanism permits, and
has hitherto encouraged, slavery as a natural condition of human
society, it is no less true that without the co-operation of the various
Mussulman princes of the African and Arabian coasts its abolition cannot
be effected. Short of the occupation by European garrisons of all the
villages of the Red Sea, and from Gardafui southwards to Mozambique, or,
on the other hand, of the subjection of all independent Moslem
communities in Arabia and elsewhere, a real end, or even a real check,
cannot be put on the traffic except through the co-operation of
Mussulmans themselves. The necessity has, indeed, been completely
recognized in the numerous treaties and arrangements made with the
Sultans of Turkey, Zanzibar, and Oman, and with the Viceroy of Egypt;
and, though I am far from stating that these arrangements are wholly
voluntary on the part of any of the princes, yet their good-will alone
can make the prevention efficient. An excellent proof of this is to be
found in the case of the Turkish Government, which, since its quarrel
with the English, has given full license to the traffic in the Red Sea,
which no means at the disposal of the latter can in any measure check.
At no modern period has a larger number of slaves been imported into
Hejaz and Yemen than during the last eighteen months, and until friendly
relations with the Porte, or whatever Mussulman authority succeeds the
Porte in those provinces, are restored, slave-trading will continue. I
do not myself entirely sympathize with anti-slave-trade ideas as applied
to Mohammedan lands, knowing as I do how tolerable and even advantageous
the social condition of the negroes is in them. But still I wish to see
slavery discontinued, and I believe that a firm but friendly attitude
towards Mussulmans will have completely extinguished it in another two
generations. A rupture with them can only prolong and aggravate its
existence.
Lastly, we may perhaps find a prospective interest for England in the
probability of a Caffre conversion to Mohammedanism at no very remote
period, and the extension of Islam to her borders in South Africa. It is
of course premature to be alarmed at this, as it is a contingency which
can hardly happen in the lifetime of any now living; but Mohammedanism
is not a creed which a hundred or two hundred years will see
extinguished in Africa or Asia, and already it has passed considerably
south of the Equator. Cape Colony at this day numbers some fifteen
thousand Mussulmans.
It would seem, then, on all these grounds difficult for England to ally
herself, in dealing with Islam, with what may be called the Crusading
States of Europe. Her position is absolutely distinct from that of any
of them, and her interests find no parallel among Christian nations,
except perhaps the Dutch. For good as for evil, she has admitted a vast
body of Mohammedans into her social community, and contracted
engagements from which she can hardly recede towards others among them,
so that it is impossible she should really work in active antagonism to
them. As Christians, Englishmen may regret this; but as practical men,
they would surely be wise to recognize the fact, and to accept the
duties it entails. Nor can these be discharged by a mere policy of
inaction. England should be prepared to do more than assert a general
doctrine of tolerance and equality for all religions in respect of this
one. Mohammedanism is not merely an opinion; a certain political
organization is a condition of its existence, and a certain geographical
latitude; and, moreover, it is a force which cannot remain
neutral--which will be either a friend or a foe. To do nothing for
Mussulmans in the next ten years will be to take cause against them. The
circumstances of their case do not admit of indifference, and they are
approaching a crisis in which they will, on two points at least, require
vigorous political protection. Their Caliphate in some form of temporal
sovereignty, though perhaps not of empire, will have to be maintained;
and short of securing this to them, and their free access as pilgrims to
Mecca, it will be idle to pretend to Mussulmans that we are protecting
their interests, or doing any part of our sovereign duty towards them.
It can hardly be argued that the Indian doctrine of religious equality
will suffer from doing political justice to Mohammedans.
On the downfall, therefore, of the Ottoman Empire, whenever that event
shall occur, the _rôle_ of England in regard to Islam seems plainly
marked out. The Caliphate--no longer an empire, but still an independent
sovereignty--must be taken under British protection, and publicly
guaranteed its political existence, undisturbed by further aggression
from Europe. On the Bosphorus no such guarantee can now be reasonably
given, because there it lies in a position militarily indefensible.
England is a naval power, and the seat of the Caliphate must be one
secured from all attack by land. It will then be for Mohammedans, and
especially for the Mohammedans of India, to decide upon the new
metropolis of their faith, the conditions of their choice lying within
the narrow limits of their still independent lands. If Syria be still
free, that metropolis may be Damascus; if Irak, Bagdad; or it may be in
Egypt, or Arabia, or Central Asia.
It is manifest, however, that as far as British protection against
Europe is concerned, the further it is removed from Christendom the
better, and the more easily accessible by sea. I have already given it
as my opinion that the move, when made will be one southwards, and
ultimately to Arabia. But it may well happen that its first stage will
be no further than Cairo. The Caliphate reached Constantinople through
Egypt, and may return by the same road, and there are certain quite
recent symptoms which seem to point in the direction of such a course
being the one taken. The events of the last year in Egypt are
significant. For the first time in its modern history a strong national
party has arisen on the Nile, and has found full support from the Azhar
Ulema, who are now the most powerful body of religious opinion in Islam.
They are politically hostile to the Sultan, and though they have no
design as yet of repudiating his Caliphal title, they are unlikely to be
faithful to his broken fortunes, and on the downfall of Constantinople
will doubtless proclaim a Caliph of their own. The family of Mohammed
Ali, if popular, may then hope for their suffrages, or it may be some
seyyid, or sherif, of the legitimate house of Koreysh. In any case, a
Caliphate at Cairo is a possibility which we must contemplate; and one
which, under the political direction and sole guarantee of England, but
enjoying full sovereignty there, might be a solution of the difficulty
acceptable to Mohammedans, and not unfavourable to English interests. It
seems to me, however, that it would be but a make-shift arrangement, not
a permanent settlement, and this from the complexity of foreign
interests in Egypt, which would keep the Mohammedan pontiff there under
restraints irksome to the religious sense of Mussulmans. It would be in
fact but the prelude to that final return to Arabia which Arabian
thought, if no other, destines for the Caliphate. The Sherif of Mecca
would hardly tolerate any further subjection to an Emir el Mumenin shorn
of his chief attributes of power, and unable, it might be, any longer to
enforce his authority. Sooner or later the Caliphate, in some form or
another, would return to its original seat, and find there its final
resting-place.
Established at Mecca, our duty of protecting the head of the Mussulman
religion would be comparatively a simple one. Hejaz for all military
purposes is inaccessible by land for Europeans; and Mecca, were it
necessary at any time to give the Caliph a garrison of Mussulman
troops, is within a night's march of the coast. In Arabia no Christian
rights need vindication, nor could any European power put in a claim of
interference. Yemen, the only province capable of attracting European
speculation, would, I know, gladly accept an English protectorate, such
as has been already given with such good results to Oman; and other
points of the Arabian shore might equally be declared inviolable.
Arabia, in fact, might be declared the natural appanage of the
Caliphate, the Stati Pontificali of the supreme head of the Mussulman
religion. In its internal organization we should have no cause to
interfere; nor would its protection from without involve us in any
outlay.
It has already been shown how favourable an action an Arabian Caliphate
may be expected to exercise on the progressive thought of Islam. That it
could not be a hostile power to England is equally certain. Whether or
not the Caliph reside at Mecca, the Grand Sherifate must always there
exist and the pilgrimage be continued; and we may hope the latter may
then be principally under English auspices. The regulation of the Haj
is, indeed, an immediate necessary part of our duty and condition of
our influence in the Mussulman world; and it is one we should be grossly
in error to neglect. It will have been seen by the table given in the
first chapter that nearly the whole pilgrimage to Arabia is now made by
sea, and that the largest number of pilgrims sent there by any nation
comes from British territory. With the protectorate, therefore, in the
future of Egypt, and, let us hope, of Syria, England would be in the
position of exercising a paramount influence on the commercial fortune
of the Holy Cities.
The revenue of Hejaz derived from the Haj is computed at three millions
sterling, a figure proved by the yearly excess of imports over exports
in her seaports, for she produces nothing, and the patronage of half, or
perhaps two-thirds, of this great revenue would make England's a
position there quite unassailable. An interdiction of the Haj, or the
threat of such for a single year, would act upon every purse among the
Hejazi and neutralize the hostility of the most recalcitrant of resident
caliphs or sherifs; while a systematic development of the pilgrimage as
a Government undertaking, with the construction of a railway from Jeddah
to Mecca, and the establishment of thoroughly well-ordered lines of
steamers from the principal Mohammedan ports, all matters which would
amply repay their cost, would every year add a new prestige to English
influence. This might be still further enhanced by the very simple
measure of collecting and transmitting officially the revenue of the
Wakaf property, entailed on the sherifs, in India. This is said to
amount to half a million sterling, and might, as in Turkey, take the
form of a government subsidy. At present it is collected privately, and
reaches the sherifs reduced, as I have been told, by two-thirds in the
process of collection, so that the mere assumption of this perfectly
legitimate duty by the Indian authorities would put a large sum into the
hands of those in office at Mecca, and a proportionate degree of power
into the hands of its collectors. This, indeed, would be no more than is
being already done by our Government for the Shia Shrines of Kerbela and
Meshed Ali, with results entirely beneficial to English popularity and
influence.
With regard to the pilgrimage, I will venture to quote the opinion of
one of the most distinguished and loyal Mohammedans in India, who has
lately been advocating the claims of his co-religionists on the Indian
Government for protection in this and other matters. Speaking of Sultan
Abd el Hamid's Pan-islamic schemes, which he asserts have not as yet
found much favour in India, he continues, "I may, however, add that by
far the most formidable means which can be adopted for propagating such
ideas, or for rousing a desire for Islamic union, would be the
distribution of pamphlets to the pilgrims at Mecca. The annual Haj at
Mecca draws the more religious from all parts of India, and the Hajjis
on their return are treated with exceptional respect and visited by
their friends and neighbours, who naturally inquire about the latest
news and doctrines propounded in the Holy Cities; so that for the
dissemination of their views the most effective way would be for the
propagandists to bring the Hajjis under their influence. I call it
_effective_, because the influence of what the Hajjis say goes to the
remotest villages of the Mofussil." He then advocates as a
counter-acting influence the undertaking by Government of the transport
of the Haj to Jeddah, and the appointment of an agent, a native of
India, to look after their interests while in the Holy Land. "By
making," he concludes, "the arrangements I have suggested, the English
Government will gain, not only the good-will of the whole Mohammedan
population of India, but they will also inspire the Hajjis with the
wholesome feeling that they owe allegiance to, and can claim protection
from, an empire other than that to which the people of Arabia are
subject (the Turkish).
"The proposed help would stand in very favourable contrast to the
sufferings which the pilgrims undergo from maladministration at Mecca
and in their journey to Medina. Moreover, practically the assistance
rendered by the Government would be the most effective way of resisting
such influences as the propagandists might bring to bear upon the Hajjis
with a view to animate them with hostility to the British supremacy in
India.... I believe if the Indian Government only wished to make some
such arrangement it would pay its own way. I am absolutely certain that
it would have a disproportionately beneficial effect on the political
feelings of the Mohammedans towards British rule."
Such, or some such, is the line of action which England, looking merely
to her own interests, may, it is hoped, pursue in the next century, and
begin in this. Her Asiatic interests she must recognize to be peace and
security in Mussulman India, good-will in Egypt, and the healthy growth
of the humaner thought of Islam everywhere; and these she can only
secure by occupying the position marked out for her by Providence of
leading the Mohammedan world in its advance towards better things. The
mission is a high one, and well worthy of her acceptance, and the means
at her disposal are fully sufficient for its discharge. Nor will her
refusal, if she refuse, be without grave and immediate danger. The
Mohammedan world is roused as it has never been in its history to a
sense of its political and moral dangers, and is looking round on all
sides for a leader of whatsoever name or nation to espouse its cause. We
can hardly doubt that the position of directing so vast a force, if
abandoned by England, will be claimed by some more resolute neighbour.
The British Empire in Asia is cause of envy to the world at large, and
its prosperity has many enemies, who will certainly make the distress of
Islam an engine in their hands against it. Neglected by the power which
they hold bound to protect their interest, the Mussulmans of India will
certainly become its bitterest enemies, and though they may not
immediately be able to give effect to their hostility, the day of
embarrassment for us can hardly fail to come, and with it their
opportunity. At best the enmity of Islam will make the dream of
reconciling the Indian populations to our rule for ever an
impossibility. Leaders they will look for elsewhere--in Russia, maybe,
in Germany, or even France, jealous of our interests in Egypt--not
leaders such as we might have been for their good, but for our evil, and
in pursuance of their own designs. The Caliphate is a weapon forged for
any hand--for Russia's at Bagdad, for France's at Damascus, or for
Holland's (call it one day Germany's) in our stead at Mecca. Protected
by any of these nations the Caliphate might make our position
intolerable in India, filling up for us the measure of Mussulman
bitterness, of which we already are having a foretaste in the
Pan-islamic intrigues at Constantinople.
But enough of this line of reasoning, which after all is selfish and
unworthy. The main point is, that England should fulfil the trust she
has accepted of developing, not destroying, the existing elements of
good in Asia. She cannot destroy Islam, nor dissolve her own connection
with her. Therefore, in God's name, let her take Islam by the hand and
encourage her boldly in the path of virtue. This is the only worthy
course, and the only wise one, wiser and worthier, I venture to assert,
than a whole century of crusade.
In conclusion, I would say to Mohammedans that if I have drawn a gloomy
picture of their immediate political fortunes, it is not that I despair
even of these. Their day of empire in the world seems over, but their
day of self-rule may well dawn again, though under changed conditions
from any we now witness. I foresee for them the spiritual inheritance of
Africa and Southern Asia, and as the intelligence of the races they
convert shall have risen to the level of their present rulers, and
Europe, weary of her work, shall have abandoned the task of Asiatic and
African government, the temporal inheritance too. How long this shall be
delayed we know not. Their prophet has foretold that Islam shall not
outlive two thousand years before the Móhdy shall come, and the thirteen
hundredth is just commencing; nor do I believe their deliverance will be
so very long delayed. A "man of justice" may yet restore their fortunes;
but it will hardly be by present violence or by wading to Mecca through
seas of blood; and when the end of their humiliation shall have come,
it may be found that his true mission has commenced already, and that
the battle he was to fight has been long waging in the hearts of those
who have striven to reform their ways and purify their law, rather than
lament their broken power and the corrupt vanities of their temporal
empire.
THE END.
FOOTNOTES:
[18] The Arabs believe that the Beni Ghassan, the Christian Bedouin
tribe which opposed the Caliph Omar, migrated to Great Britain on the
Mohammedan conquest of Syria.
[19] Since this was written astonishing evidence of political vitality
has been given to Europe by Egypt, and there is now, I trust, little
doubt that she will be left to work out her salvation in her own way.
The phenomenon opens too large a vista to the imagination to be treated
of in a note, but the Author would invite attention to it as a fact
worthy of more consideration than all his arguments.
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES.
End of Project Gutenberg's The Future of Islam, by Wilfred Scawen Blunt