THE MONARCHIST PLOT
THE PAMPHLET OF YANG TU
A shiver of impotent rage passed over the country when the nature
and acceptance of the Japanese Ultimatum became generally known.
The Chinese, always an emotional people responding with quasi-
feminine volubility to oppressive acts, cried aloud at the
ignominy of the diplomacy which had so cruelly crucified them. One
and all declared that the day of shame which had been so harshly
imposed upon them would never be forgotten and that Japan would
indeed pay bitterly for her policy of extortion.
Two movements were started at once: one to raise a National
Salvation Fund to be applied towards strengthening the nation in
any way the government might decide; the other, to boycott all
Japanese articles of commerce. Both soon attained formidable
proportions. The nation became deeply and fervently interested in
the double-idea; and had Yuan Shih-kai possessed true political
vision there is little doubt that by responding to this national
call he might have ultimately been borne to the highest pinnacles
of his ambitions without effort on his part. His oldest enemies
now openly declared that henceforth he had only to work honourably
and whole-heartedly in the nation's interest to find them
supporting him, and to have every black mark set against his name
wiped out.
In these circumstances what did he do? His actions form one of the
most incredible and, let it be said, contemptible chapters of
contemporary history.
In dealing with the origins of the Twenty-one Demands we have
already discussed the hints the Japan Representative had
officially made when presenting his now famous Memorandum. Briefly
Yuan Shih-kai had been told in so many words that since he was
already autocrat of all the Chinese, he had only to endorse the
principle of Japanese guidance in his administration to find that
his Throne would be as good as publicly and solidly established.
Being saturated with the doleful diplomacy of Korea, and seeing in
these proposals a mere trap, Yuan Shih-kai, as we have shown, had
drawn back in apparent alarm. Nevertheless the words spoken had
sunk in deep, for the simple and excellent reason that ever since
the coup d'etat of the 4th November, 1913, the necessity of
"consolidating" his position by something more permanent than a
display of armed force had been a daily subject of conversation in
the bosom of his family. The problem, as this misguided man saw
it, was simply by means of an unrivalled display of cunning to
profit by the Japanese suggestion, and at the same time to leave
the Japanese in the lurch.
His eldest son, an individual of whom it has been said that he had
absorbed every theory his foreign teachers had taught him without
being capable of applying a single one, was the leader in this
family intrigue. The unhappy victim of a brutal attempt to kill
him during the Revolution, this eldest son had been for years
semi-paralyzed: but brooding over his disaster had only fortified
in him the resolve to succeed his father as legitimate Heir.
Having saturated himself in Napoleonic literature, and being fully
aware of how far a bold leader can go in times of emergency, he
daily preached to his father the necessity of plucking the pear as
soon as it was ripe. The older man, being more skilled and more
cautious in statecraft than this youthful visionary, purposely
rejected the idea so long as its execution seemed to him
premature. But at last the point was reached when he was persuaded
to give the monarchy advocates the free hand they solicited, being
largely helped to this decision by the argument that almost
anything in China could be accomplished under cover of the war,--
SO LONG AS VESTED FOREIGN INTERESTS WERE NOT JEOPARDIZED.
In accordance with this decision, very shortly after the 18th
January, the dictator's lieutenants had begun to sound the leaders
of public opinion regarding the feasibility of substituting for
the nominal Republic a Constitutional Monarchy. Thus, in a highly
characteristic way, all through the tortuous course of the
Japanese negotiations, to which he was supposed to be devoting his
sole attention in order to save his menaced fatherland, Yuan Shih-
kai was assisting his henchmen to indoctrinate Peking officialdom
with the idea that the salvation of the State depended more on
restoring on a modified basis the old empire than in beating off
the Japanese assault. It was his belief that if some scholar of
national repute could be found, who would openly champion these
ideas and urge them with such persuasiveness and authority that
they became accepted as a Categorical Imperative, the game would
be as good as won, the Foreign Powers being too deeply committed
abroad to pay much attention to the Far East. The one man who
could have produced that result in the way Yuan Shih-kai desired
to see it, the brilliant reformer Liang Chi-chao, famous ever
since 1898, however, obstinately refused to lend himself to such
work; and, sooner than be involved in any way in the plot, threw
up his post of Minister of Justice and retired to the neighbouring
city of Tientsin from which centre he was destined to play a
notable part.
This hitch occasioned a delay in the public propaganda, though not
for long. Forced to turn to a man of secondary ability, Yuan Shih-
kai now invoked the services of a scholar who had been known to be
his secret agent in the Old Imperial Senate under the Manchus--a
certain Yang Tu--whose constant appeals in that chamber had indeed
been the means of forcing the Manchus to summon Yuan Shih-kai back
to office to their rescue on the outbreak of the Wuchang rebellion
in 1911. After very little discussion everything was arranged. In
the person of this ex-Senator, whose whole appearance was
curiously Machiavellian and decadent, the neo-imperialists at last
found their champion.
Events now moved quickly enough. In the Eastern way, very few
weeks after the Japanese Ultimatum, a society was founded called
the Society for the Preservation of Peace (Chou An Hut) and
hundreds of affiliations opened in the provinces. Money was spent
like water to secure adherents, and when the time was deemed ripe
the now famous pamphlet of Yang Tu was published broadcast, being
in everybody's hands during the idle summer month of August. This
document is so remarkable as an illustration of the working of
that type of Chinese mind which has assimilated some portion of
the facts of the modern world and yet remains thoroughly
reactionary and illogical, that special attention must be directed
to it. Couched in the form of an argument between two individuals
--one the inquirer, the other the expounder--it has something of
the old Testament about it both in its blind faith and in its
insistence on a few simple essentials. It embodies everything
essential to an understanding of the old mentality of China which
has not yet been completely destroyed. From a literary standpoint
it has also much that is valuable because it is so naive; and
although it is concerned with such a distant region of the world
as China its treatment of modern political ideas is so bizarre and
yet so acute that it will repay study.
It was not, however, for some time, that the significance of this
pamphlet was generally understood. It was such an amazing
departure from old precedents for the Peking Government to lend
itself to public propaganda as a revolutionary weapon that the
mind of the people refused to credit the fatal turn things were
taking. But presently when it became known that the "Society for
the Preservation of Peace" was actually housed in the Imperial
City and in daily relations with the President's Palace; and that
furthermore the Procurator-General of Peking, in response to
innumerable memorials of denunciation, having attempted to proceed
against the author and publishers of the pamphlet, as well as
against the Society, had been forced to leave the capital under
threats against his life, the document was accepted at its face-
value. Almost with a gasp of incredulity China at last realized
that Yuan Shih-kai had been seduced to the point of openly
attempting to make himself Emperor. From those August days of 1915
until the 6th June of the succeeding year, when Fate had her own
grim revenge, Peking was given up to one of the most amazing
episodes that has ever been chronicled in the dramatic history of
the capital. It was as if the old city walls, which had looked
down on so much real drama, had determined to lend themselves to
the staging of an unreal comedy. For from first to last the
monarchy movement had something unreal about it, and might have
been the scenario of some vast picture-play. It was acting pure
and simple--acting done in the hope that the people might find it
so admirable that they would acclaim it as real, and call the
Dictator their King. But it is time to turn to the arguments of
Yang Tu and allow a Chinese to picture the state of his country:
A DEFENCE OF THE MONARCHICAL MOVEMENT PART I
Mr. Ko (or 'the stranger'): Since the establishment of the
Republic four years have passed, and upon the President depends
the preservation of order at home and the maintenance of prestige
abroad. I suppose that after improving her internal administration
for ten or twenty years, China will become a rich and prosperous
country, and will be able to stand in the front rank with western
nations.
Mr. Hu: No! No! If China does not make any change in the form of
government there is no hope for her becoming strong and rich;
there is even no hope for her having a constitutional government.
I say that China is doomed to perish.
Mr. Ko: Why so?
Mr. Hu: The republican form of government is responsible. The
Chinese people are fond of good names, but they do not care much
about the real welfare of the nation. No plan to save the country
is possible. The formation of the Republic as a result of the
first revolution has prevented that.
Mr. Ko: Why is it that there is no hope of China's becoming
strong?
Mr. Hu: The people of a republic are accustomed to listen to the
talk of equality and freedom which must affect the political and
more especially the military administration. In normal
circumstances both the military and student classes are required
to lay great emphasis upon unquestioned obedience and respect for
those who hold high titles. The German and Japanese troops observe
strict discipline and obey the orders of their chiefs. That is why
they are regarded as the best soldiers in the world. France and
America are in a different position. They are rich but not strong.
The sole difference is that Germany and Japan are ruled by
monarchs while France and America are republics. Our conclusion
therefore is that no republic can be strong.
But since the French and American peoples possess general
education, they are in a position to assume responsibility for the
good government of their nations which they keep in good order. On
that account, although these republics are not strong in dealing
with the Powers, they can maintain peace at home. China, however,
is unlike these countries, for her standard of popular education
is very low. Most of the Chinese soldiers declare as a
commonplace; "We eat the imperial food and we must therefore serve
the imperial master." But now the Imperial family is gone, and for
it has been substituted an impersonal republic, of which they know
nothing whatsoever. These soldiers are now law-abiding because
they have awe-inspiring and respectful feelings for the man at the
head of the state. But as the talk of equality and freedom has
gradually influenced them, it has become a more difficult task to
control them. As an example of this corrupt spirit, the commanders
of the Southern troops formerly had to obey their subordinate
officers and the subordinate officers had to obey their soldiers.
Whenever there was an important question to be discussed, the
soldiers demanded a voice and a share in the solution. These
soldiers were called the republican army. Although the Northern
troops have not yet become so degenerate, still they never
hesitate to disobey the order of their superiors whenever they are
ordered to proceed to distant localities. Now we have come to the
point when we are deeply satisfied if the army of the Republic
does not openly mutiny! We cannot expect any more from them save
to hope that they will not mutiny and that they will be able to
suppress internal disturbances. In the circumstances there is no
use talking about resistance of a foreign invasion by these
soldiers. As China, a republic, is situated between two countries,
Japan and Russia, both of which have monarchical governments, how
can we resist their aggression once diplomatic conversations
begin? From this it is quite evident that there is nothing which
can save China from destruction. Therefore I say there is no hope
of China becoming strong.
Mr. Ko: But why is it that there is no hope of China ever becoming
rich?
Mr. Hu: People may not believe that while France and America are
rich China must remain poor. Nevertheless, the reason why France
and America are rich is that they were allowed to work out their
own salvation without foreign intervention for many years, and
that at the same time they were free from internal disturbances.
If any nation wishes to become rich, it must depend upon
industries for its wealth. Now, what industries most fear is
disorder and civil war. During the last two years order has been
restored and many things have returned their former State, but our
industrial condition is the same as under the Manchu Dynasty.
Merchants who lost their capital during the troublous times and
who are now poor have no way of retrieving their losses, while
those who are rich are unwilling to invest their money in
industrial undertakings, fearing that another civil war may break
out at any moment, since they take the recent abortive second
revolution as their warning. In future, we shall have disquietude
every few years; that is whenever the president is changed. Then
our industrial and commercial condition will be in a still worse
condition. If our industries are not developed, how can we expect
to be strong? Take Mexico as a warning. There is very little
difference between that country and China, which certainly cannot
be compared with France and America. Therefore I say there is no
hope for China ever becoming rich.
Mr. Ko: Why is it that you say there is no hope for China having a
Constitutional Government?
Mr. Hu: A true republic must be conducted by many people
possessing general education, political experience and a certain
political morality. Its president is invested with power by the
people to manage the general affairs of the state. Should the
people desire to elect Mr. A their president today and Mr. B
tomorrow, it does not make much difference; for the policy of the
country may be changed together with the change of the president
without there being any danger of disorder of chaos following such
change. We have a very different problem to solve in China. The
majority of our people do not know what the republic is, nor do
they know anything about a Constitution nor have they any true
sense of equality and freedom. Having overthrown the Empire and
established in its place a republic they believe that from now on
they are subservient to no one, and they think they can do as they
please. Ambitious men hold that any person may be president and if
they cannot get the presidency by fair means of election they are
prepared to fight for it with the assistance of troops and
robbers. The second revolution is an illustration of this point.
From the moment that the Emperor was deposed, the centralization
of power in the government was destroyed; and no matter who may be
at the head of the country, he cannot restore peace except by the
re-establishment of the monarchy. So at the time when the republic
was formed, those who had previously advocated Constitutional
Government turned into monarchists. Although we have a Provisional
Constitution now and we have all kinds of legislative organs,
which give to the country an appearance of a constitutional
government, China has a constitutional government in name only and
is a monarchy in spirit. Had the government refrained from
exercising monarchical power during the last four years, the
people could not have enjoyed one day of peace. In short, China's
republic must be governed by a monarchy through a constitutional
government. If the constitutional government cannot govern the
republic, the latter cannot remain. The question of constitutional
government is therefore very important, but it will take ten or
twenty years before it can be solved.
Look at the people of China today! They know that something
terrible is going to come sooner or later. They dare not think of
the future. The corrupt official lines his pocket with unrighteous
money, preparing to flee to foreign countries or at least to the
Foreign Settlements for safety. The cautious work quietly and do
not desire to earn merit but merely try to avoid giving offence.
The scholars and politicians are grandiloquent and discourse upon
their subjects in a sublime vein, but they are no better than the
corrupt officials. As for our President, he can remain at the head
of the State for a few years. At most he may hold office for
several terms,--or perhaps for his whole life. Then questions must
arise as to who shall succeed him; how to elect his successor; how
many rivals will there be; whether their policies will be
different from his, etc., etc. He personally has no idea regarding
the solution of these questions. Even if the president is a
sagacious and capable man, he will not be able to make a policy
for the country or fix a Constitution which will last for a
hundred years. Because of this he is driven merely to adopt a
policy so as to maintain peace in his own country and to keep the
nation intact so long as he may live. In the circumstances such a
president can be considered the best executive head we can have.
Those who are worshippers of the constitutional government cannot
do more than he does. Here we find the reason for the silence of
the former advocates of a constitutional administration. They have
realized that by the formation of the republic the fundamental
problem of the country has been left unsolved. In this wise it
happens that the situation is something like this. Whilst the
country is governed by an able president, the people enjoy peace
and prosperity. But once an incapable man assumes the presidency,
chaos will become the order of the day, a state of affairs which
will finally lead to the overthrow of the president himself and
the destruction of the country. In such circumstances, how can you
devise a general policy for the country which will last for a
hundred years? I say that there is no hope for China establishing
a truly constitutional government.
Mr. Ko: In your opinion there is no hope for China becoming strong
and rich or for her acquiring a constitutional government. She has
no choice save ultimately to disappear. And yet is there no plan
possible whereby she may be saved?
Mr. Hu: If China wishes to save herself from ultimate
disappearance from the face of the earth, first of all she must
get rid of the republic. Should she desire wealth and strength,
she must adopt a constitutional government. Should she want
constitutional government she must first establish a monarchy.
Mr. Ko: How is it that should China desire wealth and strength she
must first adopt the constitutional form of government?
Mr. Hu: Wealth and strength is the object of the country, and a
constitutional government is the means to realizing this object.
In the past able rulers could accomplish their purpose without a
constitutional government. We refer to Emperor Wu of the Han
Dynasty and Emperor Tai Chung of the Tang Dynasty. However, when
these able rulers died their system of administration died with
them. This contention can be supported by numerous historical
instances; but suffice to say that in China as well as in Europe,
the lack of a constitutional government has been the cause of the
weakness of most of the nations in ancient times. Japan was never
known as a strong nation until she adopted a constitutional
government. The reason is this: when there is no constitutional
government, the country cannot continue to carry out a definite
policy.
Within comparatively recent times there was born in Europe the
constitutional form of government. European nations adopted it,
and they became strong. The most dangerous fate that can confront
a nation is that after the death of an able ruler the system of
administration he has established disappears with him; but this
the constitutional form of government is able to avert. Take for
instance William I of Germany who is dead but whose country
continues to this day strong and prosperous. It is because of
constitutional government. The same is true of Japan, which has
adopted constitutional government and which is becoming stronger
and stronger every day. The change of her executive cannot affect
her progress in respect of her strength. From this it is quite
clear that constitutional government is a useful instrument for
building up a country. It is a government with a set of fixed laws
which guard the actions of both the people and the president none
of whom can overstep the boundary as specified in the laws. No
ruler, whether be he a good man or a bad man, can change one iota
of the laws. The people reap the benefit of this in consequence.
It is easy to make a country strong and rich but it is difficult
to establish a constitutional government. When a constitutional
government has been established, everything will take care of
itself, prosperity following naturally enough. The adoption of a
constitutional government at the present moment can be compared to
the problem of a derailed train. It is hard to put the train back
on the track, but once on the track it is very easy to move the
train. What we should worry about is not how to make the country
rich and prosperous, but how to form a genuine constitutional
government. Therefore I say that if China desires to be strong and
prosperous, she should first of all adopt the constitutional form
of government.
Mr. Ko: I do not understand why it is that a monarchy should be
established before the constitutional form of government can be
formed?
Mr. Hu: Because if the present system continues there will be
intermittent trouble. At every change of the president there will
be riot and civil war. In order to avert the possibility of such
aweful times place the president in a position which is permanent.
It follows that the best thing is to make him Emperor. When that
bone of contention is removed, the people will settle down to
business and feel peace in their hearts, and devote their whole
energy and time to the pursuit of their vocations. It is logical
to assume that after the adoption of the monarchy they will
concentrate their attention on securing a constitutional
government which they know is the only salvation for their
country. As for the Emperor, knowing that he derives his position
from the change from a republic, and filled with the desire of
pacifying the people, he cannot help sanctioning the formation of
the constitutional form of government, which in addition, will
insure to his offspring the continuation of the Throne. Should he
adopt any other course, he will be exposed to great personal
danger. If he is broadminded, he will further recognize the fact
that if no constitutional form of government is introduced, his
policy will perish after his death. Therefore I say that before
the adoption of the constitutional form of government, a monarchy
should be established. William I of Germany and the Emperor Meiji
of Japan both tried the constitutional form of government and
found it a success.
Mr. Ko: Please summarize your discussion.
Mr. Hu: In short, the country cannot be saved except through the
establishment of a constitutional form of government. No
constitutional government can be formed except through the
establishment of a monarchy. The constitutional form of government
has a set of fixed laws, and the monarchy has a definite head who
cannot be changed, in which matters lies the source of national
strength and wealth.
Mr. Ko: What you have said in regard to the adoption of the
constitutional monarchy as a means of saving the country from
dismemberment is quite true, but I would like to have your opinion
on the relative advantages and disadvantages of a republic and a
monarchy, assuming that China adopts the scheme of a monarchy.
Mr. Hu: I am only too glad to give you my humble opinion on this
momentous question.
Mr. Ko: You have said that China would be devastated by contending
armies of rival leaders trying to capture the presidency. At what
precise moment will that occur?
Mr. Hu: The four hundred million people of China now rely upon the
President alone for the protection of their lives and property.
Upon him likewise falls the burden of preserving both peace and
the balance of power in the Far East. There is no time in the
history of China that the Head of the State has had to assume such
a heavy responsibility for the protection of life and property and
for the preservation of peace in Asia; and at no time in our
history has the country been in greater danger than at the present
moment. China can enjoy peace so long as His Excellency Yuan Shih-
kai remains the President, and no longer. Should anything befall
the President, every business activity will at once be suspended,
shops will be closed, disquietude will prevail, people will become
panic-stricken, the troops uncontrollable, and foreign warship
will enter our harbours. European and American newspapers will be
full of special dispatches about the complicated events in China,
and martial law will be declared in every part of the country. All
this will be due to the uncertainty regarding the succession to
the presidency.
It will be seen from the first section of this long and
extraordinary pamphlet how the author develops his argument. One
of his major premises is the inherent unruliness of Republican
soldiery,--the armies of republics not to be compared with the
armed forces of monarchies,--and consequently constituting a
perpetual menace to good government. Passing on from this, he lays
down the proposition that China cannot hope to become rich so long
as the fear of civil war is ever-present; and that without a
proper universal education a republic is an impossibility. The
exercise of monarchical power in such circumstances can only be
called an inevitable development,--the one goal to be aimed at
being the substitution of Constitutional Government for the
dictatorial rule. The author deals at great length with the
background to this idea, playing on popular fears to reinforce his
casuistry. For although constitutional government is insisted upon
as the sole solution, he speedily shows that this
constitutionalism will depend more on the benevolence of the
dictator than on the action of the people. And should his advice
be not heeded, when Fortune wills that Yuan Shih-kai's rule shall
end, chaos will ensue owing to the "uncertainty" regarding the
succession.
Here the discussion reaches its climax--for the demand that
salvation be sought by enthroning Yuan Shih-kai now becomes clear
and unmistakable. Let the author speak for himself.
Mr. Ko: But it is provided in the Constitutional Compact that a
president must be selected from among the three candidates whose
names are now kept in a golden box locked in a stone room. Do you
think this provision is not sufficient to avert the terrible times
which you have just described?
Mr. Hu: The provision you have mentioned is useless. Can you find
any person who is able to be at the head of the state besides His
Excellency Yuan Shih-kai? The man who can succeed President Yuan
must enjoy the implicit confidence of the people and must have
extended his influence all over the country and be known both at
home and abroad. He must be able to maintain order, and then no
matter what the constitution provides, he will be unanimously
elected President. He must also be able to assure himself that the
two other candidates for the presidency have no hope for success
in the presidential campaign. The provision in the constitution,
as well as the golden casket in which the names of the three
candidates are kept which you have mentioned, are nothing but
nominal measures. Moreover there is no man in China who answers
the description of a suitable successor which I have just given.
Here arises a difficult problem; and what has been specified in
the Constitutional Compact is a vain attempt to solve it. It is
pertinent to ask why the law-makers should not have made the law
in such a way that the people could exercise their free choice in
the matter of the presidential successor? The answer is that there
is reason to fear that a bad man may be elected president by
manipulations carried out with a masterly hand, thereby
jeopardizing the national welfare. This fear has influenced the
constitution-makers to settle upon three candidates from among
whom the president must be elected. Then it may be asked why not
fix upon one man instead of upon three since you have already
deprived the people of part of their freedom? The answer is that:
there is not a single man whose qualifications are high enough to
be the successor. As it is, three candidates of equal
qualifications are put forward for the people to their selection.
No matter how one may argue this important question from the legal
point of view, there is the fact that the law makers fixed upon
three candidates for the presidency, believing that we do not
possess a suitable presidential successor. The vital question of
the day setting aside all paper talk, is whether or not China has
a suitable man to succeed President Yuan Shih-kai. Whether or not
the constitutional compact can be actually carried out in future I
do not know; but I do know that that instrument will eventually
become ineffective.
Mr. Ko: I desire a true picture of the chaos which you have hinted
will ensue in this country. Can you tell me anything along that
line?
Mr. Hu: In a time of confusion, the soldiers play the most
important part, virtuous and experienced and learned statesmen
being unable to cope with the situation. The only qualification
which a leader at such a time needs to possess is the control of
the military, and the ability to suppress Parliament. Should such
a person be made the president, he cannot long hold his enviable
post in view of the fact that he cannot possess sufficient
influence to control the troops of the whole country. The generals
of equal rank and standing will not obey each other, while the
soldiers and politicians, seeing a chance in these differences for
their advancement, will stir up their feelings and incite one
another to fight. They will fight hard among themselves. The
rebels, who are now exiles in foreign lands, taking advantage of
the chaos in China, will return in very little time to perpetrate
the worst crimes known in human history. The royalists who are in
retirement will likewise come out to fish in muddy waters. Persons
who have the qualifications of leaders will be used as tools to
fight for the self-aggrandizement of those who use them. I do not
wish to mention names, but I can safely predict that more than ten
different parties will arise at the psychological moment. Men who
will never be satisfied until they become president, and those who
know they cannot get the presidency but who are unwilling to serve
others, will come out one after another. Confusion and disturbance
will follow with great rapidity. Then foreign countries which have
entertained wild ambitions, availing themselves of the distressful
situation in China, will stir up ill-feelings among these parties
and so increase the disturbances. When the proper time comes,
various countries, unwilling to let a single country enjoy the
privilege of controlling China, will resort to armed intervention.
In consequence the eastern problem will end in a rupture of the
international peace. Whether China will be turned at that time
into a battleground for the Chinese people or for the foreign
Powers I cannot tell you. It is too dreadful to think of the
future which is enshrouded in a veil of mystery. However, I can
tell you that the result of this awful turmoil will be either the
slicing of China like a melon or the suppression of internal
trouble with foreign assistance which will lead to dismemberment.
As to the second result some explanation is necessary. After
foreign countries have helped us to suppress internal
disturbances, they will select a man of the type of Li Wang of
Korea, who betrayed his country to Japan, and make him Emperor of
China. Whether this man will be the deposed emperor or a member of
the Imperial family or the leader of the rebel party, remains to
be seen. In any event he will be a figurehead in whose hand will
not be vested political, financial and military power, which will
be controlled by foreigners. All the valuable mines, various kinds
of industries and our abundant natural resources will likewise be
developed by others. China will thus disappear as a nation.
In selecting a man of the Li Wang type, the aforesaid foreign
countries will desire merely to facilitate the acquisition of
China's territory. But there can be easily found such a man who
bears remarkable resemblance to Li Wang, and who will be willing
to make a treaty with the foreigners whereby he unpatriotically
sells his country in exchange for a throne which he can never
obtain or keep without outside assistance. His procedure will be
something like this: He will make an alliance with a foreign
nation by which the latter will be given the power to carry on
foreign relations on behalf of his country. In the eyes of
foreigners, China will have been destroyed, but the people will
continue deceived and made to believe that their country is still
in existence. This is the first step. The second step will be to
imitate the example of Korea and make a treaty with a certain
power, whereby China is annexed and the throne abolished. The
imperial figure-head then flees to the foreign country where he
enjoys an empty title. Should you then try to make him devise
means for regaining the lost territory it will be too late. For
China will have been entirely destroyed by that time. This is the
second procedure in the annexation of Chinese territory. The
reason why that foreign country desires to change the republic
into the monarchy is to set one man on the throne and make him
witness the whole process of annexation of his country, thereby
simplifying the matter. When that time has come, the people will
not be permitted to make any comment upon the form of government
suitable for China, or upon the destruction of their country. The
rebels who raised the standard of the republic have no principles
and if they now find that some other tactics will help to increase
their power they will adopt these tactics. China's republic is
doomed, no matter what happens. If we do not change it ourselves,
others will do it for us. Should we undertake the change ourselves
we can save the nation: otherwise there is no hope for China to
remain a nation. It is to be regretted that our people now assume
an attitude of indifference, being reluctant to look forward to
the future, and caring not what may happen to them and their
country. They are doomed to become slaves after the loss of their
national independence.
Mr. Ko: I am very much frightened by what you have said. You have
stated that the adoption of a constitutional monarchy can avert
such terrible consequences; but is there not likely to be
disturbance during the change of the republic to monarchy, since
such disturbance must always accompany the presidential election?
Mr. Hu: No comparison can be formed between these two things.
There may be tumult during the change of the form of government,
but it will be better in comparison with the chaos that will some
day ensue in the republic. There is no executive head in the
country when a republic endeavours to select a presidential
successor. At such a time, the ambitious try to improve their
future, while the patriotic are at a loss now to do anything which
will assist in the maintenance of order. Those who are rebellious
rise in revolt while those who are peace-loving are compelled by
circumstances to join their rank and file. Should the form of
government be transformed into a monarchical one, and should the
time for change of the head of the state come, the successor
having already been provided for, that will be well-known to the
people. Those who are patriotic will exert their utmost to
preserve peace, and as result the heir-apparent can peacefully
step on the throne. There are persons who will contend for the
office of the President, but not for the throne. Those who contend
for the office of President do not commit any crime, but those who
try to seize the throne are rebels. Who dares to contend for the
Throne?
At the time of the change of the president in a republic,
ambitious persons arise with the intention of capturing this most
honourable office, but not so when the emperor is changed. Should
there be a body of persons hostile to the heir-apparent, that body
must be very small. Therefore I say that the enemies of a
succeeding Emperor are a few, whilst there are many in the case of
a presidential successor. This is the first difference.
Those who oppose the monarchy are republican enthusiasts or
persons who desire to make use of the name of the republic for
their own benefit. These persons will raise trouble even without
the change of the government. They do not mind disturbing the
peace of the country at the present time when the republic exists.
It is almost certain that at the first unfurling of the imperial
flags they will at once grasp such an opportune moment and try to
satisfy their ambition. Should they rise in revolt at the time
when the Emperor is changed the Government, supported by the loyal
statesmen and officials, whose interests are bound up with the
welfare of the imperial family and whose influence has spread far
and wide, will be able to deal easily with any situation which may
develop. Therefore I declare that the successor to the throne has
more supporters while the presidential successor has few. This is
the second difference between the republic and the constitutional
monarchy.
Why certain persons will contend for the office of the President
can be explained by the fact that there is not a single man in the
country whose qualifications are above all the others. Succession
to the throne is a question of blood-relation with the reigning
Emperor, and not a question of qualifications. The high officials
whose qualifications are unusually good are not subservient to
others but they are obedient to the succeeding Emperor, because of
their gratitude for what the imperial family has done for them,
and because their well-being is closely associated with that of
the imperial household. I can cite an historical incident to
support my contention. Under the Manchu Dynasty, at one time
General Chu Chung-tang was entrusted with the task of suppressing
the Mohammedan rebellion. He appointed General Liu Sung San
generalissimo. Upon the death of General Liu, Chu Chung-tang
appointed his subordinate officers to lead the army, but the
subordinate officers competed for power. Chu Chung-tang finally
made the step-son of General Liu the Commander-in-Chief and the
officers and soldiers all obeyed his order as they did his
father's. But it may be mentioned that this young man was not more
able than any of his father's subordinate commanders. Nevertheless
prestige counted. He owed his success to his natural
qualification, being a step-son to General Liu. So is the case
with the emperor whose successor nobody dares openly to defy--to
say nothing of actually disputing his right to the throne. This is
the third difference between the republic and the monarchy.
I will not discuss the question: as to whether there being no
righteous and able heir-apparent to succeed his Emperor-father,
great danger may not confront the nation. However, in order to
provide against any such case, I advocate that the formation of a
constitutional government should go hand in hand with the
establishment of the monarchy. At first it is difficult to
establish and carry out a constitutional government, but once it
is formed it will be comparatively easy. When the constitutional
government has been established, the Emperor will have to seek his
fame in such useful things as the defence of his country and the
conquest of his enemy. Everything has to progress, and men
possessing European education will be made use of by the reigning
family. The first Emperor will certainly do all he can to capture
the hearts of the people by means of adopting and carrying out in
letter as well as in spirit constitutional government. The heir-
apparent will pay attention to all new reforms and new things.
Should he do so, the people will be able to console themselves by
saying that they will always be the people of a constitutional
monarchy even after the succession to the throne of the heir-
apparent. When the time comes for the heir-apparent to mount the
throne the people will extend to him their cordial welcome, and
there will be no need to worry about internal disturbances.
Therefore, I conclude that the successor to the presidential chair
has to prevent chaos by wielding the monarchical power, while the
new emperor can avert internal disquietude forever by means of his
constitutional government. This is the fourth difference between
the republic and the monarchy. These four differences are
accountable for the fact that there will not be as much
disturbance at the time of the change of emperors as at the time
when the president is changed.
Mr. Ko: I can understand what you have said with regard to the
advantages and disadvantages of the republic and the monarchy, but
there are many problems connected with the formation of a
constitutional monarchy which we have to solve. Why is it that the
attempt to introduce constitutional government during the last
years of the Manchu Dynasty proved a failure?
Mr. Hu: The constitutional government of the Manchu Dynasty was
one in name only, and as such the forerunner of the revolution of
1911. Towards the end of the Manchu Dynasty, the talk of starting
a revolution to overthrow the imperial regime was in everybody's
mouth, although the constitutional party endeavoured to accomplish
something really useful. At that time His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai
was the grand chancellor, and realizing the fact that nothing
except the adoption of a constitutional government could save the
throne of the Manchus, he assumed the leadership of the
constitutional party, which surpassed in strength the
revolutionary party as a result of his active support. The
people's hearts completely turned to the constitutional party for
salvation, while the revolutionary party lost that popular support
which it had formerly enjoyed. Then it seemed that the imperial
household would soon adopt the constitutional monarchy and the
threatening revolution could be averted. Unfortunately, the
elaborate plans of His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai regarding the
adoption of the constitutional government were not carried out by
the imperial household. A great change took place: His Excellency
retired to his native province; and after losing this powerful
leader the constitutional party was pitilessly shattered. A
monarchist party suddenly made its appearance on the political
arena to assist the imperial family, which pretended to do its
very best for the development of a constitutional government, but
secretly exerted itself to the utmost for the possession and
retention of the real power. This double-dealing resulted in
bringing about the revolution of 1911. For instance, when the
people cried for the convening of a parliament, the imperial
family said "No." The people also failed to secure the abolition
of certain official organs for the imperialists. They lost
confidence in the Reigning House, and simultaneously the
revolutionary party raised its banner and gathered its supporters
from every part of the country. As soon as the revolt started at
Wuchang the troops all over the country joined in the movement to
overthrow the Manchu Dynasty. The members of the Imperial Senate,
most of whom were members of the constitutional party, could not
help showing their sympathy with the revolutionists. At last the
imperial household issued a proclamation containing Nineteen
Articles--a veritable magna carta--but it was too late. The
constitutional government which was about to be formed was thus
laid aside. What the imperial family did was the mere organization
of an advisory council. A famous foreign scholar aptly remarked:
"A false constitutional government will eventually result in a
true revolution." In trying to deceive the people by means of a
false constitutional government the imperial house encompassed its
own destruction. Once His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai stated in a
memorial to the throne that there were only two alternatives: to
give the people a constitutional government or to have them
revolt. What happened afterwards is a matter of common knowledge.
Therefore I say that the government which the imperial family
attempted to form was not a constitutional government.
Mr. Ko: Thank you for your discussion of the attempt of the
imperial household to establish a constitutional government; but
how about the Provisional Constitution, the parliament and the
cabinet in the first and second years of the Republic? The
parliament was then so powerful that the government was absolutely
at its mercy, thereby disturbing the peaceful condition of the
country. The people have tasted much of the bitterness of
constitutional government. Should you mention the name of
constitutional government again they would be thoroughly
frightened. Is that true?
Mr. Hu: During the first and second years of the Republic, in my
many conversations with the members of the Kuo Ming Tang, I said
that the republic could not form an efficient method of control,
and that there would be an over centration of power through the
adoption of monarchical methods of ruling, knowing as well as I
did the standards of our people. When the members of the Kuo Ming
Tang came to draw up the Provisional Constitution they purposely
took precisely the opposite course of action and ignored my
suggestion. It may, however, be mentioned that the Provisional
Constitution made in Nanking was not so bad, but after the
government was removed to Peking, the Kuo Ming Tang people tied
the hand and foot of the government by means of the Cabinet System
and other restrictions with the intention of weakening the power
of the central administration in order that they might be able to
start another revolution. From the dissolution of the Nanking
government to the time of the second revolution they had this one
object in view, namely to weaken the power of the central
administration so that they could contend for the office of the
president by raising further internal troubles in China. Those
members of the Kuo Ming Tang who made the constitution know as
well as I that China's republic must be governed through a
monarchical administration; and therefore the unreasonable
restrictions in the Provisional Constitution were purposely
inserted.
Mr. Ko: What is the difference between the constitutional
government which you have proposed and the constitutional
government which the Manchu Dynasty intended to adopt?
Mr. Hu: The difference lies in the proper method of procedure and
in honesty of purpose, which are imperative if constitutional
government expects to be successful.
Mr. Ko: What do you mean by the proper method of procedure?
Mr. Hu: The Provisional Constitution made in Nanking, which was
considered good, is not suitable for insertion in the future
constitution, should a constitutional monarchy be established. In
making a constitution for the future constitutional monarchy we
have to consult the constitutions of the monarchies of the world.
They can be divided into three classes which are represented by
England, Prussia and Japan. England is advanced in its
constitutional government, which has been in existence for
thousands of years, (sic) and is the best of all in the world. The
English king enjoys his empty title and the real power of the
country is exercised by the parliament, which makes all the laws
for the nation. As to Prussia, the constitutional monarchy was
established when the people started a revolution. The ruler of
Prussia was compelled to convene a parliament and submitted to
that legal body a constitution. Prussia's constitution was made by
its ruler together with the parliament. Its constitutional
government is not so good as the English. As to the Japanese
constitutional monarchy, the Emperor made a constitution and then
convened a parliament. The constitutional power of the Japanese
people is still less than that of the Prussian people. According
to the standard of our people we cannot adopt the English
constitution as our model, for it is too advanced. The best thing
for us to do is to adopt part of the Prussian and part of the
Japanese in our constitution-making. As our people are better
educated now than ever before, it is decidedly unwise entirely to
adopt the Japanese method, that is, for the Emperor to make a
constitution without the approval of the parliament and then to
convoke a legislative body. In the circumstances China should
adopt the Prussian method as described above with some
modifications, which will be very suitable to our conditions. As
to the contents of the constitution we can copy such articles as
those providing the right for the issue of urgent orders and
appropriation of special funds, etc. from the Japanese
Constitution, so that the power of the ruler can be increased
without showing the slightest contempt for the legislative organ.
I consider that this is the proper method of procedure for the
formation of a constitutional monarchy for China.
Mr. Ko: Can I know something about the contents of our future
constitution in advance?
Mr. Hu: If you want to know them in detail I recommend you to read
the Constitutions of Prussia and Japan. But I can tell you this
much. Needless to say that such stipulations as articles
guaranteeing the rights of the people and the power of the
parliament will surely be worked into the future constitution.
These are found in almost every constitution in the world. But as
the former Provisional Constitution has so provided that the power
of the parliament is unlimited, while that of the president is
very small the Chief Executive, besides conferring decorations and
giving Orders of Merit, having almost nothing to do without the
approval of the Senate, it is certain that nothing will be taken
from that instrument for the future constitution. Nor will the
makers of the future constitution take anything from the nineteen
capitulations offered by the Manchu Government, which gave too
much power to the legislative organ. According to the Nineteen
Articles the Advisory Council was to draw up the constitution,
which was to be ratified by the parliament; the Premier being
elected by the parliament; whilst the use of the army and navy
required the parliament's sanction; the making of treaties with
foreign countries have likewise to be approved by the parliament,
etc., etc. Such strict stipulations which are not even known in
such an advanced country in matters constitutional as England were
extorted from the imperial family by the advisory council.
Therefore it is most unlikely that the makers of the future
constitution will take any article from the nineteen capitulations
of "confidence." They will use the Constitutions of Japan and
Prussia as joint model and will always have in their mind the
actual conditions of this country and the standard of the people.
In short, they will copy some of the articles in the Japanese
constitution, and adopt the Prussian method of procedure for the
making of the constitution.
Mr. Ko: What do you mean by honesty?
Mr. Hu: It is a bad policy to deceive the people. Individually the
people are simple, but they cannot be deceived collectively. The
Manchu Government committed an irretrievable mistake by promising
the people a constitutional government but never carrying out
their promise. This attitude on the part of the then reigning
house brought about the first revolution. As the standard of our
people at the present time is not very high, they will be
satisfied with less power if it is properly given to them. Should
any one attempt to deceive them his cause will finally be lost. I
do not know how much power the people and the parliament will get
in the constitutional monarchy, but I would like to point out here
that it is better to give them less power than to deceive them. If
they are given less power, and if they want more, they will
contend for it. Should the government deem it advisable to give
them a little more, well and good. Should they be unfit for the
possession of greater power, the government can issue a
proclamation giving the reasons for not complying with their
request, and they will not raise trouble knowing the true
intention of the government. However, honesty is the most
important element in the creation of a constitutional monarchy. It
is easy and simple to practise it. The parliament must have the
power to decide the laws and fix the budgets. Should its decision
be too idealistic or contrary to the real welfare of the country,
the Government can explain its faults and request it to reconsider
its decision. Should the parliament return the same decision, the
Government can dissolve it and convoke another parliament. In so
doing the Government respects the parliament instead of despising
it. But what the parliament has decided should be carried out
strictly by the Government, and thus we will have a real
constitutional Government. It is easy to talk but difficult to
act, but China like all other countries has to go through the
experimental stage and face all kinds of difficulties before a
genuine constitutional government can be evolved. The beginning is
difficult but once the difficulty is over everything will go on
smoothly. I emphasize that it is better to give the people less
power at the beginning than to deceive them. Be honest with them
is my policy.
Mr. Ko: I thank you very much for what you have said. Your
discussion is interesting and I can understand it well. The proper
method of procedure and honesty of purpose which you have
mentioned will tend to wipe out all former corruption.
Mr. Ko, or the stranger, then departed.
On this note the pamphleteer abruptly ends. Having discussed ad
nauseam the inadequacy of all existing arrangements, even those
made by Yuan Shih-kai himself, to secure a peaceful succession to
the presidency; and having again insisted upon the evil part
soldiery cannot fail to play, he introduces a new peril, the
certainty that the foreign Powers will set up a puppet Emperor
unless China solves this problem herself, the case of Korea being
invoked as an example of the fate of divided nations. Fear of
Japan and the precedent of Korea, being familiar phenomena, are
given a capital in all this debate, being secondary only to the
crucial business of ensuring the peaceful succession to the
supreme office. The transparent manner in which the history of the
first three years of the Republic is handled in order to drive
home these arguments will be very apparent. A fit crown is put on
the whole business by the final suggestion that the Constitutional
Government of China under the new empire must be a mixture of the
Prussian and Japanese systems, Yang Tu's last words being that it
is best to be honest with the people! No more damning indictment
of Yuan Shih-kai's regime could possibly have been penned.