WASHINGTON, _January 30, 1824_.
_To the House of Representatives of the United States_:
In compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of the
15th of December last, requesting the President of the United States "to
communicate a plan for a peace establishment of the Navy of the United
States," I herewith transmit a report from the Secretary of the Navy,
which contains the plan required.
In presenting this plan to the consideration of Congress, I avail myself
of the occasion to make some remarks on it which the importance of the
subject requires and experience justifies.
If a system of universal and permanent peace could be established, or
if in war the belligerent parties would respect the rights of neutral
powers, we should have no occasion for a navy or an army. The expense
and dangers of such establishments might be avoided. The history of all
ages proves that this can not be presumed; on the contrary, that at
least one-half of every century, in ancient as well as modern times,
has been consumed in wars, and often of the most general and desolating
character. Nor is there any cause to infer, if we examine the condition
of the nations with which we have the most intercourse and strongest
political relations, that we shall in future be exempt from that
calamity within any period to which a rational calculation may be
extended. And as to the rights of neutral powers, it is sufficient to
appeal to our own experience to demonstrate how little regard will be
paid to them whenever they come in conflict with the interests of the
powers at war while we rely on the justice of our cause and on argument
alone. The amount of the property of our fellow-citizens which was
seized and confiscated or destroyed by the belligerent parties in the
wars of the French Revolution, and of those which followed before we
became a party to the war, is almost incalculable.
The whole movement of our Government from the establishment of our
independence has been guided by a sacred regard for peace. Situated as
we are in the new hemisphere, distant from Europe and unconnected with
its affairs, blessed with the happiest Government on earth, and having
no objects of ambition to gratify, the United States have steadily
cultivated the relations of amity with every power; and if in any
European wars a respect for our rights might be relied on, it was
undoubtedly in those to which I have adverted. The conflict being vital,
the force being nearly equally balanced, and the result uncertain, each
party had the strongest motives of interest to cultivate our good will,
lest we might be thrown into the opposite scale. Powerful as this
consideration usually is, it was nevertheless utterly disregarded
in almost every stage of and by every party to those wars. To these
encroachments and injuries our regard for peace was finally forced
to yield.
In the war to which at length we became a party our whole coast from St.
Croix to the Mississippi was either invaded or menaced with invasion,
and in many parts with a strong imposing force both land and naval.
In those parts where the population was most dense the pressure was
comparatively light, but there was scarcely an harbor or city on any
of our great inlets which could be considered secure. New York and
Philadelphia were eminently exposed, the then existing works not being
sufficient for their protection. The same remark is applicable in a
certain extent to the cities eastward of the former, and as to the
condition of the whole country southward of the latter the events which
mark the war are too recent to require detail. Our armies and Navy
signalized themselves in every quarter where they had occasion to meet
their gallant foe, and the militia voluntarily flew to their aid with
a patriotism and fought with a bravery which exalted the reputation of
their Government and country and which did them the highest honor. In
whatever direction the enemy chose to move with their squadrons and to
land their troops our fortifications, where any existed, presented but
little obstacle to them. They passed those works without difficulty.
Their squadrons, in fact, annoyed our whole coast, not of the sea only,
but every bay and great river throughout its whole extent. In entering
those inlets and sailing up them with a small force the effect was
disastrous, since it never failed to draw out the whole population on
each side and to keep it in the field while the squadron remained there.
The expense attending this species of defense, with the exposure of
the inhabitants and the waste of property, may readily be conceived.
The occurrences which preceded the war and those which attended it were
alike replete with useful instruction as to our future policy. Those
which marked the first epoch demonstrate clearly that in the wars of
other powers we can rely only on force for the protection of our neutral
rights. Those of the second demonstrate with equal certainty that in any
war in which we may be engaged hereafter with a strong naval power the
expense, waste, and other calamities attending it, considering the vast
extent of our maritime frontier, can not fail, unless it be defended
by adequate fortifications and a suitable naval force, to correspond
with those which were experienced in the late war. Two great objects
are therefore to be regarded in the establishment of an adequate naval
force: The first, to prevent war so far as it may be practicable; the
second, to diminish its calamities when it may be inevitable. Hence the
subject of defense becomes intimately connected in all its parts in war
and in peace, for the land and at sea. No government will be disposed in
its wars with other powers to violate our rights if it knows we have the
means, are prepared and resolved to defend them. The motive will also be
diminished if it knows that our defenses by land are so well planned and
executed that an invasion of our coast can not be productive of the
evils to which we have heretofore been exposed.
It was under a thorough conviction of these truths, derived from the
admonitions of the late war, that Congress, as early as the year 1816,
during the term of my enlightened and virtuous predecessor, under whom
the war had been declared, prosecuted, and terminated, digested and made
provision for the defense of our country and support of its rights,
in peace as well as in war, by acts which authorized and enjoined the
augmentation of our Navy to a prescribed limit, and the construction
of suitable fortifications throughout the whole extent of our maritime
frontier and wherever else they might be deemed necessary. It is to the
execution of these works, both land and naval, and under a thorough
conviction that by hastening their completion I should render the best
service to my country and give the most effectual support to our free
republican system of government that my humble faculties would admit of,
that I have devoted so much of my time and labor to this great system of
national policy since I came into this office, and shall continue to do
it until my retirement from it at the end of your next session.
The Navy is the arm from which our Government will always derive most
aid in support of our neutral rights. Every power engaged in war will
know the strength of our naval force, the number of our ships of each
class, their condition, and the promptitude with which we may bring them
into service, and will pay due consideration to that argument. Justice
will always have great weight in the cabinets of Europe; but in long and
destructive wars exigencies often occur which press so vitally on them
that unless the argument of force is brought to its aid it will be
disregarded. Our land forces will always perform their duty in the event
of war, but they must perform it on the land. Our Navy is the arm which
must be principally relied on for the annoyance of the commerce of the
enemy and for the protection of our own, and also, by cooperation with
the land forces, for the defense of the country. Capable of moving in
any and every direction, it possesses the faculty, even when remote from
our coast, of extending its aid to every interest on which the security
and welfare of our Union depend. Annoying the commerce of the enemy and
menacing in turn its coast, provided the force on each side is nearly
equally balanced, it will draw its squadrons from our own; and in case
of invasion by a powerful adversary by a land and naval force, which is
always to be anticipated and ought to be provided against, our Navy may,
by like cooperation with our land forces, render essential aid in
protecting our interior from incursion and depredation.
The great object in the event of war is to stop the enemy at the coast.
If this is done our cities and whole interior will be secure. For the
accomplishment of this object our fortifications must be principally
relied on. By placing strong works near the mouths of our great inlets
in such positions as to command the entrances into them, as may be done
in many instances, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for ships
to pass them, especially if other precautions, and particularly that of
steam batteries, are resorted to in their aid. In the wars between other
powers into which we may be drawn in support of our neutral rights it
can not be doubted that this defense would be adequate to the purpose
intended by it, nor can it be doubted that the knowledge that such works
existed would form a strong motive with any power not to invade our
rights, and thereby contribute essentially to prevent war. There are,
it is admitted, some entrances into our interior which are of such
vast extent that it would be utterly impossible for any works, however
extensive or well posted, to command them. Of this class the Chesapeake
Bay, which is an arm of the sea, may be given as an example. But, in my
judgment, even this bay may be defended against any power with whom we
may be involved in war as a third party in the defense of our neutral
rights. By erecting strong works at the mouth of James River, on both
sides, near the capes, as we are now doing, and at Old Point Comfort and
the Rip Raps, and connecting those works together by chains whenever the
enemy's force appeared, placing in the rear some large ships and steam
batteries, the passage up the river would be rendered impracticable.
This guard would also tend to protect the whole country bordering on the
bay and rivers emptying into it, as the hazard would be too great for
the enemy, however strong his naval force, to ascend the bay and leave
such a naval force behind; since, in the event of a storm, whereby his
vessels might be separated, or of a calm, the ships and steam batteries
behind the works might rush forth and destroy them. It could only be in
the event of an invasion by a great power or a combination of several
powers, and by land as well as by naval forces, that those works could
be carried; and even then they could not fail to retard the movement of
the enemy into the country and to give time for the collection of our
regular troops, militia, and volunteers to that point, and thereby
contribute essentially to his ultimate defeat and expulsion from our
territory.
Under a strong impression that a peace establishment of our Navy is
connected with the possible event of war, and that the naval force
intended for either state, however small it may be, is connected with
the general system of public defense, I have thought it proper in
communicating this report to submit these remarks on the whole subject.