The fourth claim is founded on the right of Congress to "pay the debts

and provide for the common defense and general welfare" of the United

States. This claim has less reason on its side than either of those

which we have already examined. The power of which this forms a part

is expressed in the following words: "Congress shall have power to lay

and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts and

provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States;

but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the

United States." That the second part of this grant gives a right to

appropriate the public money, and nothing more, is evident from the

following considerations: First. If the right of appropriation is not

given by this clause, it is not given at all, there being no other grant

in the Constitution which gives it directly or which has any bearing

on the subject, even by implication, except the two following: First,

the prohibition, which is contained in the eleventh of the enumerated

powers, not to appropriate money for the support of armies for a longer

term than two years; and, second, the declaration of the sixth member

or clause of the ninth section of the first article that no money shall

be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by

law. Second. This part of the grant has none of the characteristics of

a distinct and original power. It is manifestly incidental to the great

objects of the first part of the grant, which authorizes Congress to lay

and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, a power of vast extent,

not granted by the Confederation, the grant of which formed one of the

principal inducements to the adoption of this Constitution. If both

parts of the grant are taken together (as they must be, for the one

follows immediately after the other in the same sentence), it seems

to be impossible to give to the latter any other construction than

that contended for. Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes,

duties, imposts, and excises. For what purpose? To pay the debts and

provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,

an arrangement and phraseology which clearly show that the latter part

of the clause was intended to enumerate the purposes to which the money

thus raised might be appropriated. Third. If this is not the real object

and fair construction of the second part of this grant, it follows

either that it has no import or operation whatever or one of much

greater extent than the first part. This presumption is evidently

groundless in both instances. In the first because no part of the

Constitution can be considered useless; no sentence or clause in it

without a meaning. In the second because such a construction as made the

second part of the clause an original grant, embracing the same object

with the first, but with much greater power than it, would be in the

highest degree absurd. The order generally observed in grants, an order

founded in common sense, since it promotes a clear understanding of

their import, is to grant the power intended to be conveyed in the

most full and explicit manner, and then to explain or qualify it, if

explanation or qualification should be necessary. This order has, it

is believed, been invariably observed in all the grants contained in

the Constitution. In the second because if the clause in question is

not construed merely as an authority to appropriate the public money,

it must be obvious that it conveys a power of indefinite and unlimited

extent; that there would have been no use for the special powers to

raise and support armies and a navy, to regulate commerce, to call forth

the militia, or even to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and

excises. An unqualified power to pay the debts and provide for the

common defense and general welfare, as the second part of this clause

would be if considered as a distinct and separate grant, would extend to

every object in which the public could be interested. A power to provide

for the common defense would give to Congress the command of the whole

force and of all the resources of the Union; but a right to provide for

the general welfare would go much further. It would, in effect, break

down all the barriers between the States and the General Government and

consolidate the whole under the latter.

The powers specifically granted to Congress are what are called the

enumerated powers, and are numbered in the order in which they stand,

among which that contained in the first clause holds the first place

in point of importance. If the power created by the latter part of the

clause is considered an original grant, unconnected with and independent

of the first, as in that case it must be, then the first part is

entirely done away, as are all the other grants in the Constitution,

being completely absorbed in the transcendent power granted in the

latter part; but if the clause be construed in the sense contended for,

then every part has an important meaning and effect; not a line, a word,

in it is superfluous. A power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,

and excises subjects to the call of Congress every branch of the public

revenue, internal and external, and the addition to pay the debts and

provide for the common defense and general welfare gives the right of

applying the money raised--that is, of appropriating it to the purposes

specified according to a proper construction of the terms. Hence it

follows that it is the first part of the clause only which gives a power

which affects in any manner the power remaining to the States, as the

power to raise money from the people, whether it be by taxes, duties,

imposts, or excises, though concurrent in the States as to taxes and

excises must necessarily do. But the use or application of the money

after it is raised is a power altogether of a different character.

It imposes no burden on the people, nor can it act on them in a sense

to take power from the States or in any sense in which power can be

controverted, or become a question between the two Governments. The

application of money raised under a lawful power is a right or grant

which may be abused. It may be applied partially among the States, or

to improper purposes in our foreign and domestic concerns; but still

it is a power not felt in the sense of other power, since the only

complaint which any State can make of such partiality and abuse is

that some other State or States have obtained greater benefit from the

application than by a just rule of apportionment they were entitled to.

The right of appropriation is therefore from its nature secondary and

incidental to the right of raising money, and it was proper to place

it in the same grant and same clause with that right. By rinding them,

then, in that order we see a new proof of the sense in which the grant

was made, corresponding with the view herein taken of it.

The last part of this grant, which provides that all duties, imposts,

and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States, furnishes

another strong proof that it was not intended that the second part

should constitute a distinct grant in the sense above stated, or

convey any other right than that of appropriation. This provision

operates exclusively on the power granted in the first part of the

clause. It recites three branches of that power--duties, imposts, and

excises--those only on which it could operate, the rule by which the

fourth--that is, taxes--should be laid being already provided for in

another part of the Constitution. The object of this provision is to

secure a just equality among the States in the exercise of that power

by Congress. By placing it after both the grants--that is, after that

to raise and that to appropriate the public money--and making it apply

to the first only it shows that it was not intended that the power

granted in the second should be paramount to and destroy that granted in

the first. It shows also that no such formidable power as that suggested

had been granted in the second, or any power against the abuse of which

it was thought necessary specially to provide. Surely if it was deemed

proper to guard a specific power of limited extent and well-known

import against injustice and abuse, it would have been much more so

to have guarded against the abuse of a power of such vast extent and so

indefinite as would have been granted by the second part of the clause

if considered as a distinct and original grant.

With this construction all the other enumerated grants, and, indeed,

all the grants of power contained in the Constitution, have their full

operation and effect. They all stand well together, fulfilling the great

purposes intended by them. Under it we behold a great scheme, consistent

in all its parts, a Government instituted for national purposes, vested

with adequate powers for those purposes, commencing with the most

important of all, that of the revenue, and proceeding in regular order

to the others with which it was deemed proper to endow it, all, too,

drawn with the utmost circumspection and care. How much more consistent

is this construction with the great objects of the institution and with

the high character of the enlightened and patriotic citizens who framed

it, as well as of those who ratified it, than one which subverts every

sound principle and rule of construction and throws everything into

confusion.

I have dwelt thus long on this part of the subject from an earnest

desire to fix in a clear and satisfactory manner the import of the

second part of this grant, well knowing from the generality of the terms

used their tendency to lead into error. I indulge a strong hope that

the view herein presented will not be without effect, but will tend to

satisfy the unprejudiced and impartial that nothing more was granted by

that part than a power to _appropriate_ the public money raised under

the other part. To what extent that power may be carried will be the

next object of inquiry.

It is contended on the one side that as the National Government is

a government of limited powers it has no right to expend money except

in the performance of acts authorized by the other specific grants

according to a strict construction of their powers; that this grant

in neither of its branches gives to Congress discretionary power of

any kind, but is a mere instrument in its hands to carry into effect

the powers contained in the other grants. To this construction I was

inclined in the more early stage of our Government; but on further

reflection and observation my mind has undergone a change, for reasons

which I will frankly unfold.

The grant consists, as heretofore observed, of a twofold power--the

first to raise, the second to appropriate, the public money--and the

terms used in both instances are general and unqualified. Bach branch

was obviously drawn with a view to the other, and the import of each

tends to illustrate that of the other. The grant to raise money gives

a power over every subject from which revenue may be drawn, and is made

in the same manner with the grants to declare war, to raise and support

armies and a navy, to regulate commerce, to establish post-offices

and post-roads, and with all the other specific grants to the General

Government. In the discharge of the powers contained in any of these

grants there is no other check than that which is to be found in the

great principles of our system, the responsibility of the representative

to his constituents. If war, for example, is necessary, and Congress

declare it for good cause, their constituents will support them in it.

A like support will be given them for the faithful discharge of their

duties under any and every other power vested in the United States.

It affords to the friends of our free governments the most heartfelt

consolation to know--and from the best evidence, our own experience--that

in great emergencies the boldest measures, such as form the strongest

appeals to the virtue and patriotism of the people, are sure to obtain

the most decided approbation. But should the representative act

corruptly and betray his trust, or otherwise prove that he was unworthy

of the confidence of his constituents, he would be equally sure to lose

it and to be removed and otherwise censured, according to his deserts.

The power to raise money by taxes, duties, imposts, and excises is alike

unqualified, nor do I see any check on the exercise of it other than

that which applies to the other powers above recited, the responsibility

of the representative to his constituents. Congress know the extent of

the public engagements and the sums necessary to meet them; they know

how much may be derived from each branch of revenue without pressing

it too far; and, paying due regard to the interests of the people,

they likewise know which branch ought to be resorted to in the first

instance. From the commencement of the Government two branches of this

power, duties and imposts, have been in constant operation, the revenue

from which has supported the Government in its various branches and met

its other ordinary engagements. In great emergencies the other two,

taxes and excises, have likewise been resorted to, and neither was the

right or the policy ever called in question.

If we look to the second branch of this power, that which authorizes the

appropriation of the money thus raised, we find that it is not less

general and unqualified than the power to raise it. More comprehensive

terms than to "pay the debts and provide for the common defense and

general welfare" could not have been used. So intimately connected with

and dependent on each other are these two branches of power that had

either been limited the limitation would have had the like effect on

the other. Had the power to raise money been conditional or restricted

to special purposes, the appropriation must have corresponded with it,

for none but the money raised could be appropriated, nor could it be

appropriated to other purposes than those which were permitted. On the

other hand, if the right of appropriation had been restricted to certain

purposes, it would be useless and improper to raise more than would be

adequate to those purposes. It may fairly be inferred these restraints

or checks have been carefully and intentionally avoided. The power in

each branch is alike broad and unqualified, and each is drawn with

peculiar fitness to the other, the latter requiring terms of great

extent and force to accommodate the former, which have been adopted,

and both placed in the same clause and sentence.

Can it be presumed that all these circumstances were so nicely adjusted

by mere accident? Is it not more just to conclude that they were the

result of due deliberation and design? Had it been intended that

Congress should be restricted in the appropriation of the public money

to such expenditures as were authorized by a rigid construction of the

other specific grants, how easy would it have been to have provided for

it by a declaration to that effect. The omission of such declaration is

therefore an additional proof that it was not intended that the grant

should be so construed.

It was evidently impossible to have subjected this grant in either

branch to such restriction without exposing the Government to very

serious embarrassment. How carry it into effect? If the grant had been

made in any degree dependent upon the States, the Government would have

experienced the fate of the Confederation. Like it, it would have

withered and soon perished. Had the Supreme Court been authorized, or

should any other tribunal distinct from the Government be authorized,

to impose its veto, and to say that more money had been raised under

either branch of this power--that is, by taxes, duties, imposts, or

excises--than was necessary, that such a tax or duty was useless, that

the appropriation to this or that purpose was unconstitutional, the

movement might have been suspended and the whole system disorganized.

It was impossible to have created a power within the Government or

any other power distinct from Congress and the Executive which should

control the movement of the Government in this respect and not destroy

it. Had it been declared by a clause in the Constitution that the

expenditures under this grant should be restricted to the construction

which might be given of the other grants, such restraint, though the

most innocent, could not have failed to have had an injurious effect on

the vital principles of the Government and often on its most important

measures. Those who might wish to defeat a measure proposed might

construe the power relied on in support of it in a narrow and contracted

manner, and in that way fix a precedent inconsistent with the true

import of the grant. At other times those who favored a measure might

give to the power relied on a forced or strained construction, and,

succeeding in the object, fix a precedent in the opposite extreme.

Thus it is manifest that if the right of appropriation be confined

to that limit, measures may oftentimes be carried or defeated by

considerations and motives altogether independent of and unconnected

with their merits, and the several powers of Congress receive

constructions equally inconsistent with their true import. No such

declaration, however, has been made, and from the fair import of the

grant, and, indeed, its positive terms, the inference that such was

intended seems to be precluded.

Many considerations of great weight operate in favor of this

construction, while I do not perceive any serious objections to it.

If it be established, it follows that the words "to provide for the

common defense and general welfare" have a definite, safe, and useful

meaning. The idea of their forming an original grant, with unlimited

power, superseding every other grant, is abandoned. They will be

considered simply as conveying a right of appropriation, a right

indispensable to that of raising a revenue and necessary to expenditures

under every grant. By it, as already observed, no new power will be

taken from the States, the money to be appropriated being raised under

a power already granted to Congress. By it, too, the motive for giving

a forced or strained construction to any of the other specific grants

will in most instances be diminished and in many utterly destroyed.

The importance of this consideration can not be too highly estimated,

since, in addition to the examples already given, it ought particularly

to be recollected that to whatever extent any specified power may be

carried the right of jurisdiction goes with it, pursuing it through

all its incidents. The very important agency which this grant has in

carrying into effect every other grant is a wrong argument in favor of

the construction contended for. All the other grants are limited by

the nature of the offices which they have severally to perform, each

conveying a power to do a certain thing, and that only, whereas this is

coextensive with the great scheme of the Government itself. It is the

lever which raises and puts the whole machinery in motion and continues

the movement. Should either of the other grants fail in consequence of

any condition or limitation attached to it or misconstruction of its

powers, much injury might follow, but still it would be the failure of

one branch of power, of one item in the system only. All the others

might move on. But should the right to raise and appropriate the public

money be improperly restricted, the whole system might be sensibly

affected, if not disorganized. Each of the other grants is limited by

the nature of the grant itself; this, by the nature of the Government

only. Hence it became necessary that, like the power to declare war,

this power should be commensurate with the great scheme of the

Government and with all its purposes.

If, then, the right to raise and appropriate the public money is not

restricted to the expenditures under the other specific grants according

to a strict construction of their powers, respectively, is there no

limitation to it? Have Congress a right to raise and appropriate the

money to any and to every purpose according to their will and pleasure?

They certainly have not. The Government of the United States is a

limited Government, instituted for great national purposes, and for

those only. Other interests are committed to the States, whose duty

it is to provide for them. Each government should look to the great

and essential purposes for which it was instituted and confine itself

to those purposes. A State government will rarely if ever apply money to

national purposes without making it a charge to the nation. The people

of the State would not permit it. Nor will Congress be apt to apply

money in aid of the State administrations for purposes strictly local

in which the nation at large has no interest, although the State should

desire it. The people of the other States would condemn it. They would

declare that Congress had no right to tax them for such a purpose, and

dismiss at the next election such of their representatives as had voted

for the measure, especially if it should be severely felt. I do not

think that in offices of this kind there is much danger of the two

Governments mistaking their interests or their duties. I rather expect

that they would soon have a clear and distinct understanding of them

and move on in great harmony.

Good roads and canals will promote many very important national

purposes. They will facilitate the operations of war, the movements of

troops, the transportation of cannon, of provisions, and every warlike

store, much to our advantage and to the disadvantage of the enemy in

time of war. Good roads will facilitate the transportation of the mail,

and thereby promote the purposes of commerce and political intelligence

among the people. They will by being properly directed to these objects

enhance the value of our vacant lands, a treasure of vast resource to

the nation. To the appropriation of the public money to improvements

having these objects in view and carried to a certain extent I do not

see any well-founded constitutional objection.

In regard to our foreign concerns, provided they are managed with

integrity and ability, great liberality is allowable in the application

of the public money. In the management of these concerns no State

interests can be affected, no State rights violated. The complete and

exclusive control over them is vested in Congress. The power to form

treaties of alliance and commerce with foreign powers, to regulate by

law our commerce with them, to determine on peace or war, to raise

armies and a navy, to call forth the militia and direct their operations

belongs to the General Government. These great powers, embracing the

whole scope of our foreign relations, being granted, on what principle

can it be said that the minor are withheld? Are not the latter clearly

and evidently comprised in the former? Nations are sometimes called upon

to perform to each other acts of humanity and kindness, of which we see

so many illustrious examples between individuals in private life. Great

calamities make appeals to the benevolence of mankind which ought not

to be resisted. Good offices in such emergencies exalt the character

of the party rendering them. By exciting grateful feelings they soften

the intercourse between nations and tend to prevent war. Surely if the

United States have a right to make war they have a right to prevent it.

How was it possible to grant to Congress a power for such minor purposes

other than in general terms, comprising it within the scope and policy

of that which conveyed it for the greater?

The right of appropriation is nothing more than a right to apply the

public money to this or that purpose. It has no incidental power, nor

does it draw after it any consequences of that kind. All that Congress

could do under it in the case of internal improvements would be to

appropriate the money necessary to make them. For every act requiring

legislative sanction or support the State authority must be relied on.

The condemnation of the land, if the proprietors should refuse to sell

it, the establishment of turnpikes and tolls, and the protection of the

work when finished must be done by the State. To these purposes the

powers of the General Government are believed to be utterly incompetent.

To the objection that the United States have no power in any instance

which is not complete to all the purposes to which it may be made

instrumental, and in consequence that they have no right to appropriate

any portion of the public money to internal improvements because they

have not the right of sovereignty and jurisdiction over them when made,

a full answer has, it is presumed, been already given. It may, however,

be proper to add that if this objection was well founded it would not

be confined to the simple case of internal improvements, but would

apply to others of high importance. Congress have a right to regulate

commerce. To give effect to this power it becomes necessary to establish

custom-houses in every State along the coast and in many parts of

the interior. The vast amount of goods imported and the duties to be

performed to accommodate the merchants and secure the revenue make it

necessary that spacious buildings should be erected, especially in the

great towns, for their reception. This, it is manifest, could best be

performed under the direction of the General Government. Have Congress

the right to seize the property of individuals if they should refuse

to sell it, in quarters best adapted to the purpose, to have it valued,

and to take it at the valuation? Have they a right to exercise

jurisdiction within those buildings? Neither of these claims has ever

been set up, nor could it, as is presumed, be sustained. They have

invariably either rented houses where such as were suitable could be

obtained, or, where they could not, purchased the ground of individuals,

erected the buildings, and held them under the laws of the State. Under

the power to establish post-offices and post-roads houses are also

requisite for the reception of the mails and the transaction of the

business of the several offices. These have always been rented or

purchased and held under the laws of the State in the same manner as

if they had been taken by a citizen. The United States have a right to

establish tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, and such have been

established in every State of the Union. It is believed that the houses

for these inferior courts have invariably been rented. No right of

jurisdiction in them has ever been claimed, nor other right than that of

privilege, and that only while the court is in session. A still stronger

case may be urged. Should Congress be compelled by invasion or other

cause to remove the Government to some town within one of the States,

would they have a right of jurisdiction over such town, or hold even the

house in which they held their session under other authority than the

laws of such State? It is believed that they would not. If they have

a right to appropriate money for any of these purposes, to be laid out

under the protection of the laws of the State, surely they have an equal

right to do it for the purposes of internal improvements.

It is believed that there is not a corporation in the Union which does

not exercise great discretion in the application of the money raised

by it to the purposes of its institution. It would be strange if the

Government of the United States, which was instituted for such important

purposes and endowed with such extensive powers, should not be allowed

at least equal discretion and authority. The evil to be particularly

avoided is the violation of State rights. Shunning that, it seems to be

reasonable and proper that the powers of Congress should be so construed

as that the General Government in its intercourse with other nations and

in our internal concerns should be able to adopt all such measures lying

within the fair scope and intended to facilitate the direct objects of

its powers as the public welfare may require and a sound and provident

policy dictate.

The measures of Congress have been in strict accord with the view taken

of the right of appropriation both as to its extent and limitation, as

will be shown by a reference to the laws, commencing at a very early

period. Many roads have been opened, of which the following are the

principal: The first from Cumberland, at the head waters of the Potomac,

in the State of Maryland, through Pennsylvania and Virginia, to the

State of Ohio (March 29, 1806; see vol. 4, p. 13, of the late edition

of the laws). The second from the frontiers of Georgia, on the route

from Athens to New Orleans, to its intersection with the thirty-first

degree of north latitude (April 31, 1806, p. 58). The third from the

Mississippi at a point and by a route described to the Ohio (same act).

The fourth from Nashville, in Tennessee, to Natchez (same act). The

fifth from the thirty-first degree of north latitude, on the route

from Athens to New Orleans, under such regulations as might be agreed

on between the Executive and the Spanish Government (March 3, 1807,

p. 117). The sixth from the foot of the rapids of the river Miami,

of Lake Erie, to the western line of the Connecticut Reserve (December

12, 1811, p. 364). The seventh from the Lower Sandusky to the boundary

line established by the treaty of Greenville (same act). The eighth from

a point where the United States road leading from Vincennes to the

Indian boundary line, established by the treaty of Greenville, strikes

the said line, to the North Bend, in the State of Ohio (January 8, 1812,

p. 367). The ninth for repairing and keeping in repair the road between

Columbia, on Duck River, in Tennessee, and Madisonville, in Louisiana,

and also the road between Fort Hawkins, in Georgia, and Fort Stoddard

(April 27, 1816, p. 104 of the acts of that year). The tenth from the

Shawneetown, on the Ohio River, to the Sabine, and to Kaskaskias,

in Illinois (April 27, 1816, p. 112). The eleventh from Reynoldsburg,

on Tennessee River, in the State of Tennessee, through the Chickasaw

Nation, to intersect the Natchez road near the Chickasaw old town (March

3, 1817, p. 252). The twelfth: By this act authority was given to the

President to appoint three commissioners for the purpose of examining

the country and laying out a road from the termination of the Cumberland

road, at Wheeling, on the Ohio, through the States of Ohio, Indiana,

and Illinois, to a point to be chosen by them, on the left bank of the

Mississippi, between St. Louis and the mouth of the Illinois River, and

to report an accurate plan of the said road, with an estimate of the

expense of making it. It is, however, declared by the act that nothing

was thereby intended to imply an obligation on the part of the United

States to make or defray the expense of making the said road or any part

thereof.

In the late war two other roads were made by the troops for military

purposes--one from the Upper Sandusky, in the State of Ohio, through

the Black Swamp, toward Detroit, and another from Plattsburg, on Lake

Champlain, through the Chatauga woods toward Sacketts Harbor, which have

since been repaired and improved by the troops. Of these latter there

is no notice in the laws. The extra pay to the soldiers for repairing

and improving those roads was advanced in the first instance from the

appropriation to the Quartermaster's Department and afterwards provided

for by a specific appropriation by Congress. The necessity of keeping

those roads open and in good repair, being on the frontier, to

facilitate a communication between our posts, is apparent.

All of these roads except the first were formed merely by cutting down

the trees and throwing logs across, so as to make causeways over such

parts as were otherwise impassable. The execution was of the coarsest

kind. The Cumberland road is the only regular work which has been

undertaken by the General Government or which could give rise to any

question between the two Governments respecting its powers. It is a

great work, over the highest mountains in our Union, connecting from

the seat of the General Government the Eastern with the Western waters,

and more intimately the Atlantic with the Western States, in the

formation of which $1,800,000 have been expended. The measures pursued

in this case require to be particularly noticed as fixing the opinion

of the parties, and particularly of Congress, on the important question

of the right. Passing through Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia,

it was thought necessary and proper to bring the subject before their

respective legislatures to obtain their sanction, which was granted by

each State by a legislative act, approving the route and providing for

the purchase and condemnation of the land. This road was founded on an

article of compact between the United States and the State of Ohio,

under which that State came into the Union, and by which the expense

attending it was to be defrayed by the application of a certain portion

of the money arising from the sale of the public lands within that

State. In this instance, which is by far the strongest in respect to

the expense, extent, and nature of the work done, the United States have

exercised no act of jurisdiction or sovereignty within either of the

States by taking the land from the proprietors by force, by passing acts

for the protection of the road, or to raise a revenue from it by the

establishment of turnpikes and tolls, or any other act founded on the

principle of jurisdiction or right. Whatever they have done has, on the

contrary, been founded on the opposite principle, on the voluntary and

unqualified admission that the sovereignty belonged to the State and not

to the United States, and that they could perform no act which should

tend to weaken the power of the State or to assume any to themselves.

All that they have done has been to appropriate the public money to

the construction of this road and to cause it to be constructed, for

I presume that no distinction can be taken between the appropriation

of money raised by the sale of the public lands and of that which

arises from taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; nor can I believe that

the power to appropriate derives any sanction from a provision to that

effect having been made by an article of compact between the United

States and the people of the then Territory of Ohio. This point may,

however, be placed in a clearer light by a more particular notice of

the article itself.

By an act of April 30, 1802, entitled "An act to enable the people of

the eastern division of the territory northwest of the river Ohio to

form a constitution and State government, and for the admission of such

State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, and

for other purposes," after describing the limits of the proposed new

State and authorizing the people thereof to elect a convention to

form a constitution, the three following propositions were made to the

convention, to be obligatory on the United States if accepted by it:

First, that section No. 16 of every township, or, where such section

had been sold, other lands equivalent thereto, should be granted to the

inhabitants of such township for the use of free schools. Second, that

the 6 miles' reservation, including the salt springs commonly called

the Sciota Salt Springs, the salt springs near the Muskingum River and

in the military tract, with the sections which include the same, should

be granted to the said State for the use of the people thereof, under

such regulations as the legislature of the State should prescribe:

_Provided_, That it should never sell or lease the same for more than

ten years. Third, that one twentieth part of the proceeds of the public

lands lying within the said State which might be sold by Congress from

and after the 30th June ensuing should be applied to the laying out and

making public roads from the navigable waters emptying into the

Atlantic, to the Ohio, and through the State of Ohio, such roads to be

laid out under the authority of Congress, with the consent of the

several States through which they should pass.

These three propositions were made on the condition that the convention

of the State should provide by an ordinance, irrevocable without the

consent of the United States, that every tract of land sold by Congress

after the 30th of June ensuing should remain for the term of five years

after sale exempt from every species of tax whatsoever.

It is impossible to read the ordinance of the 23d of April, 1784, or

the provisions of the act of April 30, 1802, which are founded on it,

without being profoundly impressed with the enlightened and magnanimous

policy which dictated them. Anticipating that the new States would be

settled by the inhabitants of the original States and their offspring,

no narrow or contracted jealousy was entertained of their admission

into the Union in equal participation in the national sovereignty with

the original States. It was foreseen at the early period at which that

ordinance passed that the expansion of our Union to the Lakes and to

the Mississippi and all its waters would not only make us a greater

power, but cement the Union itself. These three propositions were well

calculated to promote these great results. A grant of land to each

township for free schools, and of the salt springs to the State, which

were within its limits, for the use of its citizens, with 5 per cent of

the money to be raised from the sale of lands within the State for the

construction of roads between the original States and the new State, and

of other roads within the State, indicated a spirit not to be mistaken,

nor could it fail to produce a corresponding effect in the bosoms of

those to whom it was addressed. For these considerations the sole return

required of the convention was that the new State should not tax the

public lands which might be sold by the United States within it for the

term of five years after they should be sold. As the value of these

lands would be enhanced by this exemption from taxes for that term, and

from which the new State would derive its proportionable benefit, and

as it would also promote the rapid sale of those lands, and with it

the augmentation of its own population, it can not be doubted, had this

exemption been suggested unaccompanied by any propositions of particular

advantage, that the convention would, in consideration of the relation

which had before existed between the parties, and was about to be so

much improved, most willingly have acceded to it and without regarding

it as an onerous condition.

Since, then, it appears that the whole of the money to be employed in

making this road was to be raised from the sale of the public lands, and

which would still belong to the United States, although no mention had

been made of them in the compact, it follows that the application of the

money to that purpose stands upon the same ground as if such compact had

not been made, and in consequence that the example in favor of the right

of appropriation is in no manner affected by it.

The same rule of construction of the right of appropriation has been

observed and the same liberal policy pursued toward the other new

States, with certain modifications adapted to the situation of each,

which were adopted with the State of Ohio. As, however, the reasoning

which is applicable to the compact with Ohio in relation to the right

of appropriation, in which light only I have adverted to it, is equally

applicable to the several compacts with the other new States, I deem it

unnecessary to take a particular notice of them.

It is proper to observe that the money which was employed in the

construction of all the other roads was taken directly from the

Treasury. This fact affords an additional proof that in the

contemplation of Congress no difference existed in the application of

money to those roads between that which was raised by the sale of lands

and that which was derived from taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.

So far I have confined my remarks to the acts of Congress respecting the

right of appropriation to such measures only as operate internally and

affect the territory of the individual States. In adverting to those

which operate externally and relate to foreign powers I find only two

which appear to merit particular attention. These were gratuitous grants

of money for the relief of foreigners in distress--the first in 1794

to the inhabitants of St. Domingo, who sought an asylum on our coast

from the convulsions and calamities of the island; the second in 1812

to the people of Caracas, reduced to misery by an earthquake. The

considerations which were applicable to these grants have already

been noticed and need not be repeated.

In this examination of the right of appropriation I thought it proper

to present to view also the practice of the Government under it, and to

explore the ground on which each example rested, that the precise nature

and extent of the construction thereby given of the right might be

clearly understood. The right to raise money would have given, as is

presumed, the right to use it, although nothing had been said to that

effect in the Constitution; and where the right to raise it is granted

without special limitation, we must look for such limitation to other

causes. Our attention is first drawn to the right to appropriate, and

not finding it there we must then look to the general powers of the

Government as designated by the specific grants and to the purposes

contemplated by them, allowing to this (the right to raise money), the

first and most important of the enumerated powers, a scope which will

be competent to those purposes. The practice of the Government, as

illustrated by numerous and strong examples directly applicable, ought

surely to have great weight in fixing the construction of each grant.

It ought, I presume, to settle it, especially where it is acquiesced

in by the nation and produces a manifest and positive good. A practical

construction, thus supported, shows that it has reason on its side and

is called for by the interests of the Union. Hence, too, the presumption

that it will be persevered in. It will surely be better to admit that

the construction given by these examples has been just arid proper than

to deny that construction and still to practice on it--to say one thing

and to do another.

Wherein consists the danger of giving a liberal construction to the

right of Congress to raise and appropriate the public money? It has

been shown that its obvious effect is to secure the rights of the

States from encroachment and greater harmony in the political movement

between the two governments, while it enlarges to a certain extent

in the most harmless way the useful agency of the General Government

for all the purposes of its institution. Is not the responsibility of

the representative to his constituent in every branch of the General

Government equally strong and as sensibly felt as in the State

governments, and is not the security against abuse as effectual in the

one as in the other government? The history of the General Government

in all its measures fully demonstrates that Congress will never venture

to impose unnecessary burdens on the people or any that can be avoided.

Duties and imposts have always been light, not greater, perhaps, than

would have been imposed for the encouragement of our manufactures had

there been no occasion for the revenue arising from them; and taxes and

excises have never been laid except in cases of necessity, and repealed

as soon as the necessity ceased. Under this mild process and the sale

of some hundreds of millions of acres of good land the Government will

be possessed of money, which may be applied with great advantage to

national purposes. Within the States only will it be applied, and,

of course, for their benefit, it not being presumable that such appeals

as were made to the benevolence of the country in the instances of

the inhabitants of St. Domingo and Caracas will often occur. How,

then, shall this revenue be applied? Should it be idle in the Treasury?

That our resources will be equal to such useful purposes I have no

doubt, especially if by completing our fortifications and raising and

maintaining our Navy at the point provided for immediately after the

war we sustain our present altitude and preserve by means thereof for

any length of time the peace of the Union.

When we hear charges raised against other governments of breaches

of their constitutions, or, rather, of their charters, we always

anticipate the most serious consequences--communities deprived of

privileges which they have long enjoyed, or individuals oppressed and

punished in violation of the ordinary forms and guards of trial to

which they were accustomed and entitled. How different is the situation

of the United States! Nor can anything mark more strongly the great

characteristics of that difference than the grounds on which like

charges are raised against this Government. It is not alleged that any

portion of the community or any individual has been oppressed or that

money has been raised under a doubtful title. The principal charges are

that a work of great utility to the Union and affecting immediately

and with like advantage many of the States has been constructed; that

pensions to the surviving patriots of our Revolution, to patriots who

fought the battles and promoted the independence of their country, have

been granted, by money, too, raised not only without oppression, but

almost without being felt, and under an acknowledged constitutional

power.

From this view of the right to appropriate and of the practice under

it I think that I am authorized to conclude that the right to make

internal improvements has not been granted by the power "to pay the

debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare," included

in the first of the enumerated powers; that that grant conveys nothing

more than a right to appropriate the public money, and stands on the

same ground with the right to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,

and excises, conveyed by the first branch of that power; that the

Government itself being limited, both branches of the power to raise

and appropriate the public money are also limited, the extent of the

Government as designated by the specific grants marking the extent

of the power in both branches, extending, however, to every object

embraced by the fair scope of those grants and not confined to a strict

construction of their respective powers, it being safer to aid the

purposes of those grants by the appropriation of money than to extend

by a forced construction the grant itself; that although the right to

appropriate the public money to such improvements affords a resource

indispensably necessary to such a scheme, it is nevertheless deficient

as a power in the great characteristics on which its execution depends.

The substance of what has been urged on this subject may be expressed in

a few words. My idea is that Congress have an unlimited power to raise

money, and that in its appropriation they have a discretionary power,

restricted only by the duty to appropriate it to purposes of common

defense and of general, not local, national, not State, benefit.

I will now proceed to the fifth source from which the power is said to

be derived, viz, the power to make all laws which shall be necessary

and proper for carrying into execution all the powers vested by the

Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any department

or officer thereof. This is the seventeenth and last of the enumerated

powers granted to Congress.

I have always considered this power as having been granted on a

principle of greater caution to secure the complete execution of all

the powers which had been vested in the General Government. It contains

no distinct and specific power, as every other grant does, such as to

lay and collect taxes, to declare war, to regulate commerce, and the

like. Looking to the whole scheme of the General Government, it gives

to Congress authority to make all laws which should be deemed necessary

and proper for carrying all its powers into effect. My impression has

been invariably that this power would have existed substantially if this

grant had not been made; for why is any power granted unless it be to be

executed when required, and how can it be executed under our Government

unless it be by laws necessary and proper for the purpose--that is, well

adapted to the end? It is a principle universally admitted that a grant

of a power conveys as a necessary consequence or incident to it the

means of carrying it into effect by a fair construction of its import.

In the formation, however, of the Constitution, which was to act

directly upon the people and be paramount to the extent of its powers

to the constitutions of the States, it was wise in its framers to leave

nothing to implication which might be reduced to certainty. It is known

that all power which rests solely on that ground has been systematically

and zealously opposed under all governments with which we have any

acquaintance; and it was reasonable to presume that under our system,

where there was a division of the sovereignty between the two

independent governments, the measures of the General Government would

excite equal jealousy and produce an opposition not less systematic,

though, perhaps, less violent. Hence the policy by the framers of our

Government of securing by a fundamental declaration in the Constitution

a principle which in all other governments had been left to implication

only. The terms "necessary" and "proper" secure to the powers of all

the grants to which the authority given in this is applicable a fair

and sound construction, which is equally binding as a rule on both

Governments and on all their departments.

In examining the right of the General Government to adopt and execute

under this grant a system of internal improvement the sole question

to be decided is whether the power has been granted under any of the

other grants. If it has, this power is applicable to it to the extent

stated. If it has not, it does not exist at all, for it has not been

hereby granted. I have already examined all the other grants (one only

excepted, which will next claim attention) and shown, as I presume, on

the most liberal construction of their powers that the right has not

been granted by any of them; hence it follows that in regard to them

it has not been granted by this.

I come now to the last source from which this power is said to be

derived, viz, the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and

regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United

States, which is contained in the second clause of the third section

of the fourth article of the Constitution.

To form a just opinion of the nature and extent of this power it will

be necessary to bring into view the provisions contained in the first

clause of the section of the article referred to, which makes an

essential part of the policy in question. By this it is declared that

new States shall be admitted into the Union, but that no new States

shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State,

nor any States be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts

of States, without the consent of the legislatures of the States

concerned as well as of the United States.

If we recur to the condition of our country at the commencement of

the Revolution, we shall see the origin and cause of these provisions.

By the charters of the several colonies limits by latitude and other

descriptions were assigned to each. In commencing the Revolution the

colonies, as has already been observed, claimed by those limits,

although their population extended in many instances to a small portion

of the territory lying within them. It was contended by some of the

States after the declaration of independence that the vacant lands lying

within any of the States should become the property of the Union, as by

a common exertion they would be acquired. This claim was resisted by the

others on the principle that all the States entered into the contest in

the full extent of their chartered rights, and that they ought to have

the full benefit of those rights in the event of success. Happily this

controversy was settled, as all interfering claims and pretensions

between the members of our Union and between the General Government and

any of these members have been, in the most amicable manner and to the

satisfaction of all parties. On the recommendation of Congress the

individual States having such territory within their chartered limits

ceded large portions thereof to the United States on condition that it

should be laid off into districts of proper dimensions, the lands to

be sold for the benefit of the United States, and that the districts

be admitted into the Union when they should obtain such a population

as it might be thought proper and reasonable to prescribe. This is the

territory and this the property referred to in the second clause of the

fourth article of the Constitution.

All the States which had made cessions of vacant territory except

Georgia had made them before the adoption of the Constitution, and

that State had made a proposition to Congress to that effect which

was under consideration at the time the Constitution was adopted. The

cession was completed after the adoption of the Constitution. It was

made on the same principle and on similar conditions with those which

had been already made by the other States. As differences might arise

respecting the right or the policy in Congress to admit new States

into the Union under the new Government, or to make regulations for the

government of the territory ceded in the intermediate state, or for the

improvement and sale of the public lands, or to accept other cessions,

it was thought proper to make special provisions for these objects,

which was accordingly done by the above-recited clause in the

Constitution.

Thus the power of Congress over the ceded territory was not only

limited to these special objects, but was also temporary. As soon as

the territory became a State the jurisdiction over it as it had before

existed ceased. It extended afterwards only to the unsold lands, and

as soon as the whole were sold it ceased in that sense also altogether.

From that moment the United States have no jurisdiction or power in the

new States other than in the old, nor can it be obtained except by an

amendment of the Constitution.

Since, then, it is manifest that the power granted to Congress to

dispose of and make all needful regulations respecting the territory

and other property of the United States relates solely to the territory

and property which had been ceded by individual States, and which after

such cession lay without their respective limits, and for which special

provision was deemed necessary, the main power of the Constitution

operating internally, not being applicable or adequate thereto, it

follows that this power gives no authority, and has even no bearing on

the question of internal improvement. The authority to admit new States

and to dispose of the property and regulate the territory is not among

the enumerated powers granted to Congress, because the duties to be

performed under it are not among the ordinary duties of that body, like

the imposition of taxes, the regulation of commerce, and the like. They

are objects in their nature special, and for which special provision was

more suitable and proper.

Having now examined all the powers of Congress under which the right

to adopt and execute a system of internal improvement is claimed and

the reasons in support of it in each instance, I think that it may

fairly be concluded that such a right has not been granted. It appears

and is admitted that much may be done in aid of such a system by the

right which is derived from several of the existing grants, and more

especially from that to appropriate the public money. But still it is

manifest that as a system for the United States it can never be carried

into effect under that grant nor under all of them united, the great

and essential power being deficient, consisting of a right to take up

the subject on principle; to cause our Union to be examined by men of

science, with a view to such improvements; to authorize commissioners to

lay off the roads and canals in all proper directions; to take the land

at a valuation if necessary, and to construct the works; to pass laws

with suitable penalties for their protection; and to raise a revenue

from them, to keep them in repair, and make further improvement by the

establishment of turnpikes and tolls, with gates to be placed at the

proper distances.

It need scarcely be remarked that this power will operate, like many

others now existing, without affecting the sovereignty of the States

except in the particular offices to be performed. The jurisdiction of

the several States may still exist over the roads and canals within

their respective limits, extending alike to persons and property, as if

the right to make and protect such improvements had not been vested in

Congress. The right, being made commensurate simply with the purposes

indispensable to the system, may be strictly confined to them. The

right of Congress to protect the works by laws imposing penalties would

operate on the same principles as the right to protect the mail. The act

being punishable only, a jurisdiction over the place would be altogether

unnecessary and even absurd.

In the preceding inquiry little has been said of the advantages which

would attend the exercise of such a power by the General Government.

I have made the inquiry under a deep conviction that they are almost

incalculable, and that there was a general concurrence of opinion among

our fellow-citizens to that effect. Still, it may not be improper for

me to state the grounds upon which my own impression is founded. If it

sheds no additional light on this interesting part of the subject, it

will at least show that I have had more than one powerful motive for

making the inquiry. A general idea is all that I shall attempt.

The advantages of such a system must depend upon the interests to be

affected by it and the extent to which they may be affected, and those

must depend on the capacity of our country for improvement and the means

at its command applicable to that object.

I think that I may venture to affirm that there is no part of our globe

comprehending so many degrees of latitude on the main ocean and so

many degrees of longitude into the interior that admits of such great

improvement and at so little expense. The Atlantic on the one side, and

the Lakes, forming almost inland seas, on the other, separated by high

mountains, which rise in the valley of the St. Lawrence and determine

in that of the Mississippi, traversing from north to south almost the

whole interior, with innumerable rivers on every side of those mountains,

some of vast extent, many of which take their sources near to each other,

give the great outline. The details are to be seen on the valuable maps

of our country.

It appears by the light already before the public that it is practicable

and easy to connect by canals the whole coast from its southern to its

northern extremity in one continued inland navigation, and to connect in

like manner in many parts the Western lakes and rivers with each other.

It is equally practicable and easy to facilitate the intercourse between

the Atlantic and the Western country by improving the navigation of

many of the rivers which have their sources near to each other in the

mountains on each side, and by good roads across the mountains between

the highest navigable points of those rivers. In addition to the example

of the Cumberland road, already noticed, another of this kind is now in

train from the head waters of the river James to those of the Kanawha;

and in like manner may the Savannah be connected with the Tennessee. In

some instances it is understood that the Eastern and Western waters may

be connected together directly by canals. One great work of this kind is

now in its progress and far advanced in the State of New York, and there

is good reason to believe that two others may be formed, one at each

extremity of the high mountains above mentioned, connecting in the one

instance the waters of the St. Lawrence with Lake Champlain, and in

the other some of the most important of the Western rivers with those

emptying into the Gulf of Mexico, the advantage of which will be seen

at the first glance by an enlightened observer.

Great improvements may also be made by good roads in proper directions

through the interior of the country. As these roads would be laid out

on principle on a full view of the country, its mountains, rivers, etc.,

it would be useless, if I had the knowledge, to go into detail respecting

them. Much has been done by some of the States, but yet much remains to

be done with a view to the Union.

Under the colonial governments improvements of this kind were not

thought of. There was, it is believed, not one canal and little

communication from colony to colony. It was their policy to encourage

the intercourse between each colony and the parent country only. The

roads which were attended to were those which led from the interior of

each colony to its principal towns on the navigable waters. By those

routes the produce of the country was carried to the coast, and shipped

thence to the mercantile houses in London, Liverpool, Glasgow, or other

towns to which the trade was carried on. It is believed that there was

but one connected route from North to South at the commencement of the

Revolution, and that a very imperfect one. The existence and principle

of our Union point out the necessity of a very different policy.

The advantages which would be derived from such improvements are

incalculable. The facility which would thereby be afforded to the

transportation of the whole of the rich productions of our country

to market would alone more than amply compensate for all the labor

and expense attending them. Great, however, as is that advantage, it

is one only of many and by no means the most important, Every power of

the General Government and of the State governments connected with the

strength and resources of the country would be made more efficient

for the purposes intended by them. In war they would facilitate the

transportation of men, ordnance, and provisions, and munitions of war of

every kind to every part of our extensive coast and interior on which an

attack might be made or threatened. Those who have any knowledge of the

occurrences of the late war must know the good effect which would result

in the event of another war from the command of an interior navigation

alone along the coast for all the purposes of war as well as of commerce

between the different parts of our Union. The impediments to all

military operations which proceeded from the want of such a navigation

and the reliance which was placed, notwithstanding those impediments,

on such a commerce can not be forgotten. In every other line their

good effect would be most sensibly felt. Intelligence by means of the

Post-Office Department would be more easily, extensively, and rapidly

diffused. Parts the most remote from each other would be brought more

closely together. Distant lands would be made more valuable, and the

industry of our fellow-citizens on every portion of our soil be better

rewarded.

It is natural in so great a variety of climate that there should be

a corresponding difference in the produce of the soil; that one part

should raise what the other might want. It is equally natural that the

pursuits of industry should vary in like manner; that labor should be

cheaper and manufactures succeed better in one part than in another;

that were the climate the most severe and the soil less productive,

navigation, the fisheries, and commerce should be most relied on.

Hence the motive for an exchange for mutual accommodation and active

intercourse between them. Each part would thus find for the surplus

of its labor, in whatever article it consisted, an extensive market

at home, which would be the most profitable because free from duty.

There is another view in which these improvements are of still more

vital importance. The effect which they would have on the bond of union

itself affords an inducement for them more powerful than any which have

been urged or than all of them united. The only danger to which our

system is exposed arises from its expansion over a vast territory.

Our union is not held together by standing armies or by any ties other

than the positive interests and powerful attractions of its parts toward

each other. Ambitious men may hereafter grow up among us who may promise

to themselves advancement from a change, and by practicing upon the

sectional interests, feelings, and prejudices endeavor under various

pretexts to promote it. The history of the world is replete with

examples of this kind--of military commanders and demagogues becoming

usurpers and tyrants, and of their fellow-citizens becoming their

instruments and slaves. I have little fear of this danger, knowing well

how strong the bond which holds us together is and who the people are

who are thus held together; but still, it is proper to look at and to

provide against it, and it is not within the compass of human wisdom

to make a more effectual provision than would be made by the proposed

improvements. With their aid and the intercourse which would grow out

of them the parts would soon become so compacted and bound together

that nothing could break it.

The expansion of our Union over a vast territory can not operate

unfavorably to the States individually. On the contrary, it is believed

that the greater the expansion within practicable limits--and it is not

easy to say what are not so--the greater the advantage which the States

individually will derive from it. With governments separate, vigorous,

and efficient for all local purposes, their distance from each other can

have no injurious effect upon their respective interests. It has already

been shown that in some important circumstances, especially with the aid

of these improvements, they must derive great advantage from that cause

alone--that is, from their distance from each other. In every other way

the expansion of our system must operate favorably for every State in

proportion as it operates favorably for the Union. It is in that sense

only that it can become a question with the States, or, rather, with

the people who compose them. As States they can be affected by it only

by their relation to each other through the General Government and by

its effect on the operations of that Government. Manifest it is that to

any extent to which the General Government can sustain and execute its

functions with complete effect will the States--that is, the people who

compose them--be benefited. It is only when the expansion shall be

carried beyond the faculties of the General Government so as to enfeeble

its operations to the injury of the whole that any of the parts can be

injured. The tendency in that stage will be to dismemberment and not to

consolidation. This danger should, therefore, be looked at with profound

attention as one of a very serious character. I will remark here that

as the operations of the National Government are of a general nature,

the States having complete power for internal and local purposes, the

expansion may be carried to very great extent and with perfect safety.

It must be obvious to all that the further the expansion is carried,

provided it be not beyond the just limit, the greater will be the

freedom of action to both Governments and the more perfect their

security, and in all other respects the better the effect will be to

the whole American people. Extent of territory, whether it be great

or small, gives to a nation many of its characteristics. It marks the

extent of its resources, of its population, of its physical force.

It marks, in short, the difference between a great and a small power.

To what extent it may be proper to expand our system of government is a

question which does not press for a decision at this time. At the end of

the Revolutionary war, in 1783, we had, as we contended and believed,

a right to the free navigation of the Mississippi, but it was not until

after the expiration of twelve years, in 1795, that that right was

acknowledged and enjoyed. Further difficulties occurred in the bustling

of a contentious world when, at the expiration of eight years more, the

United States, sustaining the strength and energy of their character,

acquired the Province of Louisiana, with the free navigation of the

river from its source to the ocean and a liberal boundary on the western

side. To this Florida has since been added, so that we now possess all

the territory in which the original States had any interest, or in which

the existing States can be said, either in a national or local point

of view, to be in any way interested. A range of States on the western

side of the Mississippi, which already is provided for, puts us

essentially at ease. Whether it will be wise to go further will turn

on other considerations than those which have dictated the course

heretofore pursued. At whatever point we may stop, whether it be at

a single range of States beyond the Mississippi or by taking a greater

scope, the advantage of such improvements is deemed of the highest

importance. It is so on the present scale. The further we go the greater

will be the necessity for them.

It can not be doubted that improvements for great national purposes

would be better made by the National Government than by the governments

of the several States. Our experience prior to the adoption of the

Constitution demonstrated that in the exercise by the individual States

of most of the powers granted to the United States a contracted rivalry

of interest and misapplied jealousy of each other had an important

influence on all their measures to the great injury of the whole. This

was particularly exemplified by the regulations which they severally

made of their commerce with foreign nations and with each other. It

was this utter incapacity in the State governments, proceeding from

these and other causes, to act as a nation and to perform all the duties

which the nation owed to itself under any system which left the General

Government dependent on the States, which produced the transfer of

these powers to the United States by the establishment of the present

Constitution. The reasoning which was applicable to the grant of any of

the powers now vested in Congress is likewise so, at least to a certain

extent, to that in question. It is natural that the States individually

in making improvements should look to their particular and local

interests, The members composing their respective legislatures represent

the people of each State only, and might not feel themselves at liberty

to look to objects in these respects beyond that limit. If the resources

of the Union were to be brought into operation under the direction of

the State assemblies, or in concert with them, it may be apprehended

that every measure would become the object of negotiation, of bargain

and barter, much to the disadvantage of the system, as well as discredit

to both governments. But Congress would look to the whole and make

improvements to promote the welfare of the whole. It is the peculiar

felicity of the proposed amendment that while it will enable the United

States to accomplish every national object, the improvements made with

that view will eminently promote the welfare of the individual States,

who may also add such others as their own particular interests may

require.

The situation of the Cumberland road requires the particular and early

attention of Congress. Being formed over very lofty mountains and in

many instances over deep and wide streams, across which valuable bridges

have been erected, which are sustained by stone walls, as are many other

parts of the road, all these works are subject to decay, have decayed,

and will decay rapidly unless timely and effectual measures are adopted

to prevent it.

The declivities from the mountains and all the heights must suffer from

the frequent and heavy falls of water and its descent to the valleys,

as also from the deep congelations during our severe winters. Other

injuries have also been experienced on this road, such as the displacing

the capping of the walls and other works, committed by worthless people

either from a desire to render the road impassable or to have the

transportation in another direction, or from a spirit of wantonness to

create employment for idlers. These considerations show that an active

and strict police ought to be established over the whole road, with

power to make repairs when necessary, to establish turnpikes and tolls

as the means of raising money to make them, and to prosecute and punish

those who commit waste and other injuries.

Should the United States be willing to abandon this road to the States

through which it passes, would they take charge of it, each of that

portion within its limits, and keep it in repair? It is not to be

presumed that they would, since the advantages attending it are

exclusively national, by connecting, as it does, the Atlantic with the

Western States, and in a line with the seat of the National Government.

The most expensive parts of this road lie within Pennsylvania and

Virginia, very near the confines of each State and in a route not

essentially connected with the commerce of either.

If it is thought proper to vest this power in the United States,

the only mode in which it can be done is by an amendment of the

Constitution. The States individually can not transfer the power

to the United States, nor can the United States receive it. The

Constitution forms an equal and the sole relation between the General

Government and the several States, and it recognizes no change in it

which shall not in like manner apply to all. If it is once admitted

that the General Government may form compacts with individual States

not common to the others, and which the others might even disapprove,

into what pernicious consequences might it not lead? Such compacts are

utterly repugnant to the principles of the Constitution and of the most

dangerous tendency. The States through which this road passes have given

their sanction only to the route and to the acquisition of the soil

by the United States, a right very different from that of jurisdiction,

which can not be granted without an amendment to the Constitution, and

which need not be granted for the purposes of this system except in the

limited manner heretofore stated. On full consideration, therefore, of

the whole subject I am of opinion that such an amendment ought to be

recommended to the several States for their adoption.

I have now essentially executed that part of the task which I imposed

on myself of examining the right of Congress to adopt and execute a

system of internal improvement, and, I presume, have shown that it does

not exist. It is, I think, equally manifest that such a power vested in

Congress and wisely executed would have the happiest effect on all the

great interests of our Union. It is, however, my opinion that the power

should be confined to great national works only, since if it were

unlimited it would be liable to abuse and might be productive of evil.

For all minor improvements the resources of the States individually

would be fully adequate, and by the States such improvements might be

made with greater advantage than by the Union, as they would understand

better such as their more immediate and local interests required.

In the view above presented I have thought it proper to trace the

origin of our institutions, and particularly of the State and National

Governments, for although they have a common origin in the people, yet,

as the point at issue turned on what were the powers granted to the

one government and what were those which remained to the other, I was

persuaded that an analysis which should mark distinctly the source of

power in both governments, with its progress in each, would afford the

best means for obtaining a sound result. In our political career there

are, obviously, three great epochs. The colonial state forms the first;

the Revolutionary movement from its commencement to the adoption of the

Articles of Confederation the second, and the intervening space from

that event to the present day the third. The first may be considered

the infant state. It was the school of morality, of political science

and just principles. The equality of rights enjoyed by the people of

every colony under their original charters forms the basis of every

existing institution, and it was owing to the creation by those

charters of distinct communities that the power, when wrested from the

Crown, passed directly and exclusively to the people of each colony.

The Revolutionary struggle gave activity to those principles, and its

success secured to them a permanent existence in the governments

of our Union, State and National. The third epoch comprises the

administration under the Articles of Confederation, with the adoption

of the Constitution and administration under it. On the first and

last of these epochs it is not necessary to enlarge for any purpose

connected with the object of this inquiry. To the second, in which we

were transferred by a heroic exertion from the first to the third stage,

and whose events give the true character to every institution, some

further attention is due. In tracing in greater detail the prominent

acts of a movement to which we owe so much I shall perform an office

which, if not useful, will be gratifying to my own feelings, and I hope

not unacceptable to my readers.

Of the Revolutionary movement itself sentiments too respectful, too

exalted, can not be entertained. It is impossible for any citizen having

a just idea of the dangers which we had to encounter to read the record

of our early proceedings and to see the firmness with which they were

met and the wisdom and patriotism which were displayed in every stage

without being deeply affected by it. An attack on Massachusetts was

considered an attack on every colony, and the people of each moved in

her defense as in their own cause. The meeting of the General Congress

in Philadelphia on the 6th of September, 1774, appears to have been

the result of a spontaneous impulse in every quarter at the same time.

The first public act proposing it, according to the Journals of

the First Congress, was passed by the house of representatives of

Connecticut on the 3d of June of that year; but it is presumed that the

first suggestion came from Massachusetts, the colony most oppressed,

and in whose favor the general sympathy was much excited. The exposition

which that Congress made of grievances, in the petition to the King, in

the address to the people of Great Britain, and in that to the people

of the several colonies, evinced a knowledge so profound of the English

constitution and of the general principles of free government and of

liberty, of our rights founded on that constitution and on the charters

of the several colonies, and of the numerous and egregious violations

which had been committed of them, as must have convinced all impartial

minds that the talent on this side of the Atlantic was at least equal

to that on the other. The spirit in which those papers were drawn, which

was known to be in strict accord with the public sentiment, proved that,

although the whole people cherished a connection with the parent country

and were desirous of preserving it on just principles, they nevertheless

stood embodied at the parting line, ready to separate forever if

a redress of grievances, the alternative offered, was not promptly

rendered. That alternative was rejected, and in consequence war and

dismemberment followed.

The powers granted to the delegates of each colony who composed the

First Congress looked primarily to the support of rights and to a

redress of grievances, and, in consequence, to the restoration of

harmony, which was ardently desired. They justified, however, any

extremity in case of necessity. They were ample for such purposes,

and were executed in every circumstance with the utmost fidelity.

It was not until after the meeting of the Second Congress, which took

place on the 10th May, 1775, when full proof was laid before it of the

commencement of hostilities in the preceding month by a deliberate

attack of the British troops on the militia and inhabitants of Lexington

and Concord, in Massachusetts, that war might be said to be decided on,

and measures were taken to support it. The progress even then was slow

and reluctant, as will be seen by their second petition to the King and

their second address to the people of Great Britain, which were prepared

and forwarded after that event. The arrival, however, of large bodies of

troops and the pressure of war in every direction soon dispelled all

hope of accommodation.

On the 15th of June, 1775, a commander in chief of the forces raised and

to be raised for the defense of American liberty was appointed by the

unanimous vote of Congress, and his conduct in the discharge of the

duties of that high trust, which he held through the whole of the war,

has given an example to the world for talents as a military commander;

for integrity, fortitude, and firmness under the severest trials; for

respect to the civil authority and devotion to the rights and liberties

of his country, of which neither Rome nor Greece have exhibited the

equal. I saw him in my earliest youth, in the retreat through Jersey,

at the head of a small band, or rather in its rear, for he was always

next the enemy, and his countenance and manner made an impression on me

which time can never efface. A lieutenant then in the Third Virginia

Regiment, I happened to be on the rear guard at Newark, and I counted

the force under his immediate command by platoons as it passed me, which

amounted to less than 3,000 men. A deportment so firm, so dignified,

so exalted, but yet so modest and composed, I have never seen in any

other person.

On the 6th July, 1775, Congress published a declaration of the causes

which compelled them to take up arms, and immediately afterwards took

measures for augmenting the Army and raising a navy; for organizing the

militia and providing cannon and small arms and military stores of every

kind; for raising a revenue and pushing the war offensively with all the

means in their power. Nothing escaped the attention of that enlightened

body. The people of Canada were invited to join the Union, and a force

sent into the province to favor the Revolutionary party, which, however,

was not capable of affording any essential aid. The people of Ireland

were addressed in terms manifesting due respect for the sufferings, the

talents, and patriotism of that portion of the British Empire, and a

suitable acknowledgment was made to the assembly of Jamaica for the

approbation it had expressed of our cause and the part it had taken

in support of it with the British Government.

On the 2d of June, 1775, the convention of Massachusetts, by a letter

signed by their president, of May the 10th, stated to Congress that they

labored under difficulties for the want of a regular form of government,

and requested to be favored with explicit advice respecting the taking

up and exercising the powers of civil government, and declaring their

readiness to submit to such a general plan as the Congress might direct

for the colonies, or that they would make it their great study to

establish such a form of government there as should not only promote

their own advantage, but the union and interest of all America. To this

application an answer was given on the 9th, by which it was recommended

to the convention "to write letters to the inhabitants of the several

places entitled to representation in assembly, requesting them to choose

such representatives, and that the assembly, when chosen, should elect

councilors, and that said assembly or council should exercise the powers

of government until a governor of His Majesty's appointment will consent

to govern the colony according to its charter."

On the 18th October of the same year the delegates from New Hampshire

laid before Congress an instruction from their convention "to use their

utmost endeavors to obtain the advice and direction of Congress with

respect to a method for administering justice and regulating their civil

police." To this a reply was given on the 3d November, by which it was

recommended to the convention "to call a full and free representation of

the people, and that the representatives, if they thought it necessary,

should establish such a form of government as in their judgment would

best promote the happiness of the people and most effectually secure

peace and good order in the Province during the continuance of the

present dispute between Great Britain and the colonies."

On the 4th November it was resolved by Congress "that if the convention

of South Carolina shall find it necessary to establish a form of

government in that colony it be recommended to that convention to

call a full and free representation of the people; and the said

representatives, if they think it necessary, shall establish such a

form of government as in their judgment will best promote the happiness

of the people and most effectually secure peace and good order in the

colony during the continuance of the present dispute between Great

Britain and the colonies."

On the 4th December following a resolution passed recommending the same

measure, and precisely in the same words, to the convention of Virginia.

On the 10th May, 1776, it was recommended to the respective assemblies

and conventions of the united colonies, where no government sufficient

to the exigencies of their affairs had been established, "to adopt such

government as should, in the opinion of the representatives of the

people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents

in particular and America in general."

On the 7th June resolutions respecting independence were moved and

seconded, which were referred to a committee of the whole on the 8th

and 10th, on which latter day it was resolved to postpone a decision on

the first resolution or main question until the 1st July, but that no

time might be lost in case the Congress agree thereto that a committee

be appointed to prepare a declaration to the effect of that resolution.

On the 11th June, 1776, Congress appointed a committee to prepare and

digest a plan of confederation for the colonies. On the 12th July the

committee reported a draft of articles, which were severally afterwards

debated and amended until the 15th November, 1777, when they were

adopted. These articles were then proposed to the legislatures of the

several States, with a request that if approved by them they would

authorize their delegates to ratify the same in Congress, and, which

being done, to become conclusive. It was not until the 21st of March,

1781, as already observed, that they were ratified by the last State

and carried into effect.

On the 4th July, 1776, independence was declared by an act which

arrested the attention of the civilized world and will bear the test

of time. For force and condensation of matter, strength of reason,

sublimity of sentiment and expression, it is believed that no document

of equal merit exists. It looked to everything, and with a reach,

perspicuity, and energy of mind which seemed to be master of everything.

Thus it appears, in addition to the very important charge of managing

the war, that Congress had under consideration at the same time the

Declaration of Independence, the adoption of a confederation for the

States, and the propriety of instituting State governments, with the

nature of those governments, respecting which it had been consulted by

the conventions of several of the colonies. So great a trust was never

reposed before in a body thus constituted, and I am authorized to add,

looking to the great result, that never were duties more ably or

faithfully performed.

The distinguishing characteristic of this movement is that although the

connection which had existed between the people of the several colonies

before their dismemberment from the parent country was not only not

dissolved but increased by that event, even before the adoption of the

Articles of Confederation, yet the preservation and augmentation of that

tie were the result of a new creation, and proceeded altogether from

the people of each colony, into whose hands the whole power passed

exclusively when wrested from the Crown. To the same cause the greater

change which has since occurred by the adoption of the Constitution is

to be traced.

The establishment of our institutions forms the most important epoch

that history hath recorded. They extend unexampled felicity to the whole

body of our fellow-citizens, and are the admiration of other nations.

To preserve and hand them down in their utmost purity to the remotest

ages will require the existence and practice of virtues and talents

equal to those which were displayed in acquiring them. It is ardently

hoped and confidently believed that these will not be wanting.