CHAPTER IX.

LIFE IN GAOL.

In the Transvaal no distinction is made between ordinary criminals

and those who in other countries are recognized as first-class

misdemeanants. Consequently the Reformers, without regard to the

nature of their offence, their habits, health, age, or condition,

were handed over to the gaoler, Du Plessis, a relative of President

Kruger, to be dealt with at his kind discretion. For two days the

prisoners existed on the ordinary prison fare. The majority being men

in the early prime of life and in excellent health, suffered no ill

effects, preferring to do with little or no food rather than touch

that which was doled out to them; but to the others it was a rather

serious thing. There were several men between fifty and sixty years

of age whose lives had been spent under favourable conditions. There

were some suffering from consumption, one from diabetes, one from

fever, one from dysentery, and several others from less dangerous but

sufficiently serious complaints. All alike were compelled to sleep

upon the floor, with two thin blankets for protection. They were

locked in at 6 p.m., and allowed out at 6 a.m. Sanitary accommodation

was represented by the presence of a couple of buckets in the

sleeping room. The air-space per man worked out at 145 cubic feet as

against 900 feet prescribed by English prison regulations.

Ventilation was afforded on the one side by square holes cut in the

corrugated iron walls of the shed,{35} and on the other (the

buildings being lean-to's against the permanent prison buildings)

by grated windows opening into the native cells. Needless to say,

these grated windows were originally intended to afford ventilation

to the native cells, but the buildings to accommodate the Reformers

had been erected against the side-walls of the Kaffir quarters. The

stench was indescribable. At 6 a.m. the prisoners were allowed out

into the yard, where they had the option of exercising throughout the

day. The lavatories and bathing arrangements consisted of a tap in

the yard and an open furrow through which the town water ran, the

lower end of which was used as a wash-place by prisoners, white and

black alike. Within a foot or two of the furrow where alone washing

of the person or of clothing was allowed stood the gaol urinals.

There was neither adequate provision in this department nor any

attempt at proper supervision, the result being that through

irregularities, neglect, and defective arrangement the ground on both

sides of the water-furrow for six or eight yards was horribly stained

and saturated by leakage. Many of the prisoners could not approach

this quarter without being physically ill. Without further detail it

may be stated that there were at that time over 250 prisoners, about

100 of whom were white. There were three closets and six buckets for

the accommodation of all, and removals took place sometimes once a

day, sometimes once in every four days. Nothing but the horror of

such conditions, and the fact that they prevail still in Pretoria

Gaol, and presumably in other gaols more removed from critical

supervision, could warrant allusions to such a disgusting state of

affairs.

At 6.15 breakfast was served. A number of tin dishes, containing one

pound of mealie-meal porridge (ground maize) each were placed in a

row on the ground in the yard in the same manner as a dog's food

might be set out. A bucket near by contained some coarse salt in the

condition in which it was collected in the natural salt pans, the

cubes varying from the size of peas to the size of acorns. No sugar,

milk, tea, or coffee, was allowed. In order to utilize the salt the

prisoners were obliged to crush it with rough stones on the cement

steps. Needless to say, but few partook of this food. To those who

had not tasted it before in the course of prospecting or up-country

travelling where conditions are sometimes very hard, it was no

more possible to swallow it than to eat sawdust.

Dinner was at twelve o'clock, and it consisted of coarse meat boiled

to that degree which was calculated to qualify the water in which it

was boiled to be called soup, without depriving the meat of all title

to be considered a separate dish. With this meal was also served half

a pound of bread. Supper, which was provided at five o'clock, was

exactly the same as breakfast.

Two days of this fare told very severely upon those whose physical

condition was not of the best. By the third day several of the older

men and those in ill-health had broken down and were placed on

hospital fare. Matters were sufficiently serious to induce the

authorities to allow gradual amelioration of the conditions, and by

degrees food of a better class was introduced. Mattresses and other

articles of bedding were allowed, but stretchers although provided

for in the prison regulations were denied to the men until a few

hours before their release a month later, when the prisoners were

permitted by the gaoler to purchase them, no doubt with an eye to

reversion to him in the course of a few hours. From time to time the

regulations as to food were varied at the whim of the gaoler. On one

day only cooked food would be allowed in; on another only raw food;

on a third nothing but tinned stuff; on a fourth all was turned back

at the gates with the exception of that obtained by a few individuals

at a heavy premium.

A day or two after the passing of sentence representations were made

to the prisoners, excluding the four death-sentence men, that it

would be advisable to appeal to the clemency of the Government for

some mitigation. In that case, it was stated, there was every reason

to believe that the sentence of imprisonment would be entirely

remitted and that the sentence of banishment would also be commuted.

The individuals from whom this suggestion first came were of the

class which habitually trades between the Government and the

public--the gentlemen of the backstairs. For this reason some of the

prisoners gave considerable credence to the reports, whilst others

for the very same reason would have nothing whatever to do with them.

Hence arose a condition of things very like a deadlock among the

prisoners themselves. It was represented by these agents that it

would be worse than useless for some of the prisoners to petition if

many others refused to do so and stood out. Some of the prisoners did

actually petition--a course of action which was strongly condemned by

others; but it should be borne in mind that there were among the

prisoners many men who were in bad health and poor circumstances, who

had heavy responsibilities in private life, and who were not only

unable to pay their fines, but even unable to make any provision for

their families during incarceration. Such conditions would tend to

shake the nerve of most men.

With this nucleus to work upon the Government through their agents

began a system of terrorism by which they hoped to establish

conditions under which their 'magnanimity by inches' would appear in

the most favourable possible light. The first petition presented for

the signature of the prisoners was one in which they were asked to

admit the justice of their sentences, to express regret for what they

had done and to promise to behave themselves in the future. The

document closed with an obsequious and humiliating appeal to the

'proved magnanimity of the Government.' The reception accorded to

this was distinctly unfavourable, copies of the petitions being in

some instances torn up and flung in the faces of those who presented

them. The great majority of the prisoners refused to have anything to

do with them, and on representing the view that any appeal so couched

was not consistent with their self-respect, they were informed that

the petition had already been shown to the President and members of

the Executive Council and had been approved by them and that it would

not look well to alter it now.

Every effort was made for some days to induce the prisoners to sign

this document, but they refused. A certain number of the men were

opposed to signing anything whatever, even the most formal appeal to

the Executive Council for a revision of sentence. They based their

refusal upon two reasons: 1st, that they had been arrested by an act

of treachery and tried by a packed Court, and if the Executive

recognized the injustice of the sentence they might act

spontaneously without petition from the prisoners; 2nd, that they

believed that any document however moderate which they might sign

would only be the thin end of the wedge by which the Government hoped

to introduce the principle of individual statements and pleas--that

is to say each one to excuse himself at the expense of his neighbour,

and thus enable the authorities to establish by the prisoners' own

confessions the extent of the guilt and complicity which they had

been unable to prove.

Under such conditions an appeal was made to Messrs. Rose Innes, Q.C.,

and Solomon, Q.C. These gentlemen had remained in Pretoria and

devoted their time and energies to obtaining some amelioration of the

conditions of imprisonment and some mitigation of the sentences

imposed upon the Reformers. The petition as presented by the

Government was shown to Mr. Innes, who indignantly rejected the

suggestion of signing any such document. As the strongest reason

adduced in favour of signing petitions was the statement that

according to law and custom it was impossible for the Government to

take cognizance of the prisoners' case even with every desire to

mitigate the punishment unless it was brought before them by direct

appeal, Mr. Innes undertook to see the President and Chief-Justice

Kotzé on the subject. By this time further suggestions had been made

on the subject of petitions, and the prisoners were being urged among

other things to name in plain terms the extent and manner in which

they would like their sentences commuted. This proposal was regarded

as a preposterous and ridiculous one; but nothing is too ridiculous

for Pretoria and it was necessary to deal seriously with it.

In these circumstances, Mr. Rose Innes interviewed the Chief Justice,

in order to get the highest authority in the country as a guide. Mr.

Kotzé would not at first express an opinion as to whether petitions

should be sent in, but he was evidently inclined to recommend them as

politic, 'But,' said Mr. Innes, 'it is not a question of policy; it

is a matter of law. Is there anything in the law which renders it

necessary for a prisoner to petition before his sentence may be

revised by the Executive--anything which debars the Executive from

dealing with his case if he does not petition?' Mr. Kotzé's answer

was clear: 'No, certainly not--nothing whatever!'

In the interview with the President which took place immediately

after this Mr. Innes was brusquely informed that petitions from the

prisoners were of no value, and would receive no consideration; that

the President did not want any of their petitions; and that he was

guided solely by his burghers, who had already petitioned in the

matter. 'I would pay more heed,' said Mr. Kruger, 'to a petition from

fifty of my burghers than to one from the whole of Johannesburg.' At

the conclusion of an unpleasant interview, which called for all the

tact and good temper at the command of the gentleman who was

interesting himself on behalf of the prisoners, the President added

in an offhand manner, 'The petitions can do no harm and might

strengthen my hands in dealing with the rest of the Executive; so

they can send them in if they like.'

With this answer Messrs. Innes and Solomon returned to the gaol, and

after informing the prisoners of what had taken place advised them,

under the circumstances, to make a formal but respectful appeal for a

revision of the sentences. It was their opinion, based upon the

information which they had at great pains gathered, and it was also

the opinion of the Chief Justice, that no petition was necessary, and

that the sentences would be brought under the consideration of the

Executive by the memorials of the burghers; but they considered that

as interested persons or indiscreet friends had already suggested the

idea of petitions, and as a refusal now to sign anything might have a

very unfavourable effect upon persons with the disposition and

character of those with whom they had to deal, it would be advisable

to make an appeal so worded as to formally comply with the

requirements of the extreme party in the Executive; one which would

satisfy those of the prisoners who were in favour of appealing, and

would not be offensive to those who were against petitions at any

cost.

The strongest reason for urging this was to preserve unanimity of

action among the prisoners. The course was in fact a compromise

designed to satisfy those who considered a petition of some sort to

be necessary, and those who would not as they expressed it

'sacrifice their self-respect' by asking for anything from the

people who had treated them in what they deemed to be a dishonest

and treacherous manner.

All the prisoners except Messrs. A. Woolls-Sampson and W.D. (Karri)

Davies agreed to this: many did so much against their own wishes

because of the appeal to stand together, and because it was strongly

urged that their obstinacy would affect not only themselves but would

prevent the liberation of others whose circumstances were almost

desperate. They yielded--it is true--but remained unconvinced. To

Messrs. Sampson and Davies the answers of the Chief Justice and the

President are now of considerable importance, since the reason given

for their detention involves the repudiation of the assurances given

by the President and Chief Justice.

Those who had not signed any other form of appeal now made a formal

application to have their sentences brought into review by the

Executive Council. They stated then their belief that it was only the

beginning of the petition business that it would be wholly

ineffective and that it was to be understood that they would sign no

more under any circumstances. This application was deemed by the

emissaries of the Government to be sufficient to comply with the

requirements, and promises were conveyed to the prisoners that the

sentences would be at once taken into consideration and commutations

announced. In the course of a day or two however further demands were

made, and the prisoners were informed that they would be dressed in

prison garb under severer regulations specially passed for them

unless they at once petitioned against this course.

Again Mr. Innes represented their case to the Government at the

dictate of his own feelings of humanity, and not prompted thereto by

the prisoners themselves, most of whom would have been glad to see

the Government wreak their vengeance in petty and vindictive

provisions. The proposed alterations were however abandoned without

protest from the prisoners after the supply of convict garb had been

sent up to the gaol. So matters went on day by day, each day bringing

its fresh instalment of threats promises and cajoleries, each

morning its batch of disappointments. It was at first difficult to

say what object the Government had in view in endeavouring to compel

the Reformers to sign petitions, unless it were the unworthy one of

desiring to humiliate men who were already down, or the perhaps

more contemptible one of forcing them to turn informers by a process

of self-excusing and thus enable them to differentiate in the

commutations. The fact remained that repeated efforts were made and

pressure brought to bear upon the men to induce them to sign. One

pretext after another was used. Finally the naked truth came out: the

Government required each man to state in an individual declaration

the extent of his guilt the extenuating facts and the circumstances

under which he became associated with the Reform movement. This was

exactly what had been foretold by men who understood Boer methods.

The means resorted to by the gaol officials to enforce this

petition-signing were characteristic. The gaoler (Du Plessis) is one

of the most unfavourable specimens of his race. Unscrupulous and

brutal in his methods, untrustworthy as to his undertakings, and

violent and uncertain in his temper, he singled out those among the

prisoners whom he considered to be the leaders of the 'stiff-necked'

party as he termed it, and treated them with as much severity as he

could. These men found themselves unable to obtain those facilities

which were regarded as the right of all the prisoners. Upon occasion

their food was stopped at the gates, and visitors--their wives and

families--were refused admission, although provided with permits from

the proper authorities and complying with the gaol regulations; and

on more than one occasion he informed individual members of this

party that the 'petitions would have to be signed,' that they would

have to 'go down on their knees to the Government,' otherwise they

would 'rot in gaol.' All this undisguised eagerness to obtain the

signatures naturally only strengthened the resolution of the men who

stood out. They had already against their wishes and judgment signed

one application, and more than that they refused to do. When it was

found to be impossible to induce the men to inform against each

other, some modification was made in the demands of the

petition-hunters and some prisoners were asked and induced to make

statements concerning their own part in the late movement, making no

allusion to the part played by others, and, for reasons which it is

impossible to divine unless it was designed to lead to something

more, this was regarded by the Government as a desirable step.

The suspense and disappointment added to the original sentence upon a

man who was never even mentioned in evidence and who took no part in

the Reform movement, beyond associating himself with the

organizations for the protection of property in Johannesburg, told so

severely upon one of the prisoners that his mind became unhinged, and

in the course of the following period he developed marked signs of

homicidal and suicidal mania. His condition was so serious that

strong representations were made to all the officials connected with

the gaol--the gaoler himself, the district surgeon, the commissioner

of police, and the landdrost of Pretoria. The prisoners themselves

organized a system of guards or watches over their comrade, pending

the result of their representations to the officials. On the fourth

day however the unfortunate man, driven out of his mind by the

constant and cruel disappointment of purposely raised hopes, eluding

the watchfulness of his friends took his own life.

The news of this event was received with horror throughout South

Africa, the more so as for some days previously the newspapers had

hinted at some such impending catastrophe. In the course of the

inquiry which was held evidence was given showing that the gaol

surgeon had reported the state of affairs to the proper authorities

some days before, but in a formal and half-hearted way. Evidence

however was forthcoming that four of the prisoners (themselves

medical men) had forcibly represented the extreme seriousness of the

case to the gaoler, the gaol surgeon and the landdrost of Pretoria,

and had induced the assistant-gaoler and warders to support their

representations, but all without avail. The result of the inquiry was

to lay partial blame upon the doctor and to acquit everybody else--a

result which the public have been used to expect in the Transvaal. It

is somewhat difficult to see how the decision was arrived at, seeing

that in the offices there was the record of a special pass granted

to the unfortunate man's wife to visit him and remain with him for a

considerable period on the previous day in order to cheer him up

and avert serious consequences. The incident told severely upon the

nerves of those who were not themselves in the best of health, and

it was found necessary immediately to release or remove others among

the prisoners for fear of similar results.

The Government seemed to realize that it was incumbent upon them to

do something in order to allay the feeling of indignation which was

being roused throughout South Africa at their manner of treating the

prisoners, so a further instalment of magnanimity was decided upon.

On the day of the unfortunate affair the manager of the Government

newspaper, _The Press_, was authorized by President Kruger and other

members of the Executive to inform the prisoners that they would have

to make modified personal statements of the nature previously

indicated, and if these petitions were presented to the Executive

Council by 8 a.m. on the following Monday (the prisoners would then

have been three weeks in gaol) orders for their release would be

issued by Monday night. In order to secure a favourable reception of

this suggestion it was arranged that the clergyman who was to conduct

Divine service on Sunday in the gaol would deliver this message from

the President to the prisoners at the conclusion of the service, and

urge the men for their own sakes and for the sake of their families

and of their friends to abandon the position which they had taken up

and to sign declarations of the nature required, and so secure their

release. Nor was this all. Outside the gaol the wives of those men

who stood out against the petition movement were informed by

Government officials that unless the demands of the Government were

complied with by their husbands they would serve the full period of

their sentence. Pressure was brought to bear upon these ladies and

special facilities were given them to visit the gaol, avowedly in

order to bring about the desired end.

Eleven of the prisoners--apart from the four whose punishment in

substitution for death had not been decided upon, and who were

therefore not concerned in the petitions--declined to reconsider

their decision, and elected rather to serve their term of two years;

and they expressed the conviction at the same time that these

promises of the President would not be kept any more than others

had been. The result justified their judgment. After a postponement

of two days on some flimsy pretext the official intimation of the

commutations was given to the prisoners on Wednesday, May 20. Instead

of the release positively and definitely promised the term of

imprisonment was reduced in the following degree: Ten men were

released, twenty-four men were condemned to three months', eighteen

to five months', and four to one year's imprisonment; and the

clemency of the Government towards the four leaders was indicated by

a sentence of fifteen years each.

Even a short period of imprisonment under the existing conditions

meant certain death to a proportion of the men sentenced, and it is

not to be wondered at that the 'magnanimity' displayed by the

Government after the disappointments and delays seriously affected

the health of a number of the men, following as it did closely upon

the tragic affair already alluded to.

With regard to Messrs. Sampson and Davies no decision was announced,

it being intimated by Dr. Leyds that, as they had made no petition,

their case had not been brought before the Government, and the

Executive had therefore no official knowledge of their existence. But

the extent of the Government's magnanimity was even then not fully

known. On the following day it was announced to the prisoners that

they had been misinformed with regard to the five and twelve months'

commutations--that the intention and resolution of the Executive was

merely to grant these men permission to appeal at the end of the

periods named to the aforesaid magnanimity.

Some prominence has been given to the cases of those prisoners who

were unable for physical or other special reasons to withstand the

strain; and it should therefore be made equally clear that in many

cases the men regarded with contemptuous amusement the cat and mouse

policy and the stage-managed magnanimity displayed towards them. They

were perfectly well able and willing to endure the sentence passed

upon them, and they were not misled by Boer promises in which they

had never had any faith at all. There are good reasons to be assigned

for the willingness of many of the men to make appeals to the

Government: sheer hard necessity and the sufferings of those

dependent upon them were among these reasons; and it is unfair to

consider these appeals to have been due to loss of nerve.

There were among the prisoners twenty-three Englishmen, sixteen South

Africans, nine Scotchmen, six Americans, two Welshmen, one Irishman,

one Australian, one Hollander, one Bavarian, one German, one

Canadian, one Swiss, and one Turk. This variety of nationalities

should receive due consideration when questions such as for instance

that of the flag are considered. In this matter of petitions it was

not to be expected that men whose associations with the country had

been limited to a few years should experience the same depth of

feeling and bitterness of resentment as the South Africans born who

look upon the country as their native land and who view with keen

resentment the attitude of the Boers towards them in the Transvaal,

so much at variance with their attitude towards the Boers in the

neighbouring colonies. Nothing could illustrate this difference in

feeling better than the fact that of the eleven men who throughout

declined to sign petitions eight were South African born, one

Australian, one English, and one Scotch. There is nothing

discreditable to others in these figures; they simply indicate the

difference of feeling which did and indeed naturally must exist. The

South African born men consider themselves to have been robbed of a

portion of their birthright; the others have not the same reason for

thinking this.

With men of so many nationalities the position of the British

Resident would in any case have been one of difficulty, especially

after the part played by the High Commissioner. In the case of Sir

Jacobus de Wet very little satisfaction was given. What caused the

most comment and annoyance among the prisoners was that official

representatives of other countries appeared to have unusual

facilities offered them to visit the subjects of their Government--at

least, they could command the ordinary courtesies--whereas in the

case of the British Agent nothing of this sort existed. Frequently he

was observed standing outside the gaol in the worst of weather

without shelter, patiently waiting until the gaoler would deem fit to

see him. In the meantime that official would stroll through the yard,

making remarks to his subordinates indicative of the satisfaction he

experienced in keeping the representative of Her Majesty outside in

the rain and mud. Upon occasions when he was afforded admission he

was hustled through the yard by a warder and not allowed to hold

private conversation with any of the prisoners. On several occasions

he complained that he was refused admission by order of the gaoler,

and the spectacle of England's representative being turned away by an

ignorant and ill-conditioned official like Du Plessis was not an

edifying one. It is only necessary to say that upon an occasion when

Du Plessis adopted the same tactics towards the Portuguese Consul

that gentleman proceeded at once to the Presidency and demanded as

his right free admission to the gaol whenever he chose to go, and the

right was promptly recognized although there was no subject of his

Government at the time within the precincts. Indeed the Portuguese

Consul stated openly that he called for the purpose of visiting as a

friend one of the Reform prisoners, giving the name of one of the

recalcitrants most objectionable to the Government. The American

Consul too carried matters with a high hand on the occasion of his

visit to Pretoria, and it seemed as though the Paramount Power was

the only one which the Transvaal Government could afford or cared to

treat with contempt.

The period of gaol life afforded the Reformers some opportunity of

studying a department of the Transvaal Administration which they had

not before realized to be so badly in need of reform. The system--if

system it can be called--upon which the gaol was conducted may be

gathered from the gaoler's own words. When one of the prisoners had

inquired of him whether a certain treatment to which a white convict

had been subjected was in accordance with the rules of the gaol and

had received an answer in the affirmative, he remarked that he did

not think many of the Reformers could exist under such conditions. Du

Plessis replied: 'Oh no! Not one of you would be alive a month

if the rules were enforced. No white man could stand them. Indeed,'

he added, 'if the rules were _properly_ enforced, not even a nigger

could stand them!'

Some subsequent experience of gaol-life induced the Reformers to

accept this view as tolerably correct. It is known for instance that

after the Malaboch war sixty-four of the tribe were incarcerated in

Pretoria Gaol. Some twenty were subsequently released, but of the

remainder twenty-six died within the year. Bad food vile sanitary

arrangements and want of clothing and shelter contributed to this

end. Malaboch was a petty chief against whom an expedition was

organized, ostensibly because he had refused to pay his taxes. The

expedition is chiefly notorious on account of the commandeering of

British subjects which led to the visit of Sir Henry Loch already

described. It resulted--as these expeditions inevitably do--in the

worsting of the natives, the capture of the chief and his headmen,

and the parcelling out of his tribe as indentured servants among the

Boers.

Considerable sympathy was felt with Malaboch among the Uitlanders,

not because of his refusal to pay taxes but because the opinion

prevailed that this refusal was due only to the tyrannical and

improper conduct of the Boer native commissioners; and a number of

Johannesburg men resolved in the interests of the native and also of

the native labour supply on the Rand to have the matter cleared up at

the forthcoming trial of the chief. Funds were provided and counsel

employed, nominally to defend Malaboch, but really to impeach the

native commissioners, who in many cases were and continue to be a

perfect curse to the country. No sooner had this intended course of

action become known than the Government decided to treat their

prisoners under the provisions of martial law--to treat them, in

fact, as prisoners of war, who were liable to be indefinitely

detained without further trial. Under these conditions they were

placed in the Pretoria Gaol, and with the exception of a few

subordinates there they have lived--or died--since. The offences of

these natives, for all anyone knows, may have been similar to those

of Langalibalele, Dinizulu, Secocoeni, Cetewayo, and other native

chiefs whom the British Government have also disposed of without

trial. But it is urged that these men are entitled to a trial,

because it is well known that the provocation under which they

committed their offences against the law--if indeed any were

committed--was such as, in the minds of most people, would justify

their action.{36}

The position of a native in the Pretoria Gaol is indeed an unhappy

one. Sleeping accommodation--that is to say, shed accommodation--is

provided for about one-quarter of the number confined there. During

fine weather it is no hardship upon the natives to sleep in the open

yard provided that they have some covering. The blankets doled out to

them are however in many cases such as one would not allow to remain

in one's kennels; and in wet or cold weather (and the fact is that

during at least one quarter of the year the nights are cold, whilst

during the five months' wet season rain may fall at any time) the

sufferings of these unfortunates many of whom have no blankets at all

are very severe. Of course the stronger fight their way into the

shed, and even fill the little covered passage-way; the others crouch

or lie about in the open yard like wild beasts without a vestige of

shelter.

On behalf of the native political prisoners representations were made

by the gaol doctor that they were dying in numbers from scurvy and

fever, for want of vegetable food. A special effort on his part

secured for a few days some allowance of this nature, but the matter

having been brought to the notice of General Joubert, the

Superintendent-General of natives, peremptory orders were issued to

discontinue this; and this although the wretched creatures might have

been sufficiently supplied from the gardens attached to the gaol

which are cultivated by the prisoners, and the product of which was

used by the gaoler to feed his pigs. For a little while longer the

doctor continued the vegetable diet at his own expense, but being

unable to afford this it was discontinued and the former death-rate

was resumed.

Floggings are quite common. In many instances white men have been

flogged there. It is not intended to suggest that this should not

have been done, but cases occurred in the Pretoria Gaol which are

surely difficult to justify. Du Plessis stated to the Reform

prisoners that he had with the sanction of the Landdrost inflicted

upon one prisoner named Thompson, who was undoubtedly refractory and

disobedient, _upwards of eighty lashes within three weeks._ He added

that this was as good as a death-sentence, because neither white nor

black could stand two inflictions of twenty-five lashes, as they were

given in Pretoria Gaol, without permanent injury to the constitution.

The effect, he observed, of this severe punishment upon the back was

to cause the blood to rush and settle on the lungs, and in every case

it resulted in fatal lung mischief.

During the period of imprisonment the Reformers witnessed a

considerable number of floggings. These when inflicted by the

assistant-gaoler or warders were usually marked by some kind of

moderation and consideration for the prisoner's physical condition,

and some regard for official decencies. The same cannot be said of

those in which Du Plessis himself took a prominent part. Upon one

occasion when a native had been released from the triangle, after

twenty strokes from the cat had been borne without a murmur, Du

Plessis suddenly became infuriated at the stoicism of his victim, and

stepping towards him knocked the released man down with his fist and

spurned him with his foot. Upon another occasion a boy of ten or

twelve years of age (under what circumstances is not known) was taken

by Du Plessis into the open yard, stretched in mid air by two warders

gripping his wrists and ankles, and flogged with a cane by Du Plessis

himself. The screams of the child were heart-rending and the sight

caused one lady who happened to be visiting in the gaol to faint.

When the wretched urchin was released by the two warders and stood

cowering before Du Plessis the latter repeated his former performance

of knocking his victim down with his closed fist.

Mr. Du Plessis it should be remembered is a sample of a certain class

only of the Boers--not by any means of all. He is a man with a

treacherous and vindictive temper, distinctly unpleasant in

appearance, being coarsely and powerfully built, and enjoying an

expression of countenance which varies between cunning and

insincerity on one hand and undisguised malevolence on the other.

Some idea of the general kindliness of his disposition may be

gathered from his actions. On one occasion, when special

relaxation of the rules was authorized by the Landdrost of Pretoria

in order to enable a number of the Johannesburg friends of the

prisoners to see them, and when about one hundred permits had been

issued by that official to men travelling over from Johannesburg

specially for the purpose, Du Plessis devised means to defeat this

act of consideration, and issued orders to his guards to admit only

three visitors at a time to the gaol. As a consequence, more than

half failed to gain admittance. Nor was he satisfied with this; he

informed the prisoners themselves that he wished the Landdrost had

issued two hundred passes instead of one hundred, so that he might

let those Johannesburg people know who was 'baas' there. Possibly the

fact that on the previous day he had been severely rebuffed in his

petition campaign may have provoked this act of retaliation.

Another instance of Mr. Du Plessis' system was afforded by the case

of an old schoolmaster, an Englishman named Grant. He had been a

teacher upon the farm of a Boer near Pretoria. Through some

difference with his employer he was dismissed; and his own version of

the affair indicates that he suffered considerable injustice. From

the evidence given in the case in which he subsequently figured it

appeared that in order to urge his grievance he returned to the

Boer's farm and even re-entered the house which he had formerly

occupied. He was arrested and charged with trespass, or threatening

to molest his late employer and members of his family, and was bound

over to keep the peace for six months and to find £50 surety for the

same, failing which he should go to gaol for that period. This seemed

to be rather a harsh sentence to pass upon a man who was over fifty

years of age, entirely destitute of means, of very inferior physique,

and who had been charged at the instance of an individual who could

certainly have protected himself against five such men as Grant. No

doubt the accused was an eccentric man, and probably a nuisance,

and it is even possible that his conduct left the magistrate no

alternative but to pass the sentence which he did: it is not intended

to question the justice of this part of the affair. Having been

sent to gaol, however, because he could not deposit £50, Grant was

treated as the commonest malefactor in all respects but one--he was

allowed to retain his own clothing. The unfortunate old man made a

pathetic picture with his seedy clothes, tail coat, tall white hat,

and worn gloves, which he punctiliously wore whenever called upon to

face the authorities--and it happened rather frequently. He objected

to being classed and herded with the thieves and murderers and others

whose crimes were even more repulsive. He protested against the class

of food that was served to him. For these remonstrances he at first

received solitary confinement and even poorer diet; and later with a

brutality which one can surely only find in a Du Plessis the

unfortunate old man was placed in the Kaffir stocks, thrown out in

the middle of the yard that he might be humiliated in the sight of

all, and kept there in the fierce heat of a tropical sun for half a

day. The sole excuse for this was that he had been unruly in

protesting against the treatment which he was receiving. The

spectacle excited the pity of the Reform prisoners to such an extent

that even with the certainty of an insulting rebuff from the gaoler

they endeavoured to represent the man's case so as to have him

released, but without success. It need only be added that the

unfortunate man did not serve his entire term, the first act of the

first released Reformers being to pay up the surety required and

provide him with funds to leave the country. Grant may have been as

guilty and offensive as eccentricity can make a man, but nothing can

justify the manner in which he was treated.

The stocks in the hands of Du Plessis were not the mild corrective

instrument which they are sometimes considered to be. According to

this authority the stocks can be made to inflict various degrees of

punishment. Du Plessis states that when he took over the gaol he

found that the custom was to place men in the stocks within a cell

and to trust to the irksomeness of the position and the solitary

confinement to bring about a better frame of mind; but he soon found

that this system was capable of improvement. His first act was to

place the prisoners white or black in the stocks in the middle of the

yard, so that they should be exposed to the observation and remarks

of all the officials and visitors and their fellow-prisoners. In

explaining the reasons for this change, he said that he found that

in a cool cell a man could be tolerably comfortable and that even the

most hardened of them preferred not to be seen in the stocks by

others; whereas in the yard they were obliged to sit on the uneven

gravel and to endure the heat of the sun as well as being 'the

cynosure of every eye.' But this did not satisfy the ingenious Du

Plessis. The yard of the Pretoria gaol inclines from south to north

about one foot in four, and Du Plessis' observant eye detected that

the prisoners invariably sat facing down the slope--for of course

they were not allowed to lie down while in the stocks, this being too

comfortable a position. Upon studying the question he found that in

this way much more ease was experienced owing to the more obtuse

angle thus formed by the body and the legs. This did not suit him and

he issued further orders that in future all prisoners in the stocks

should be obliged to sit facing uphill, and that they should not be

allowed to hold on to the stocks in order to maintain themselves in

this position but should have to preserve the upright posture of the

body by means of the exertion of the muscles of the back alone.

Needless to say the maintenance of such a position for hours at a

time caused an agony of aches which many prisoners were quite unable

to endure, and frequently the men were seen to throw themselves back

and lie down at the risk of being kicked up by the vigilant Du

Plessis and confined in the stocks for a longer period than was

originally intended. Nor did this complete the list of Mr. Du

Plessis' ingenuities. The stocks had been built to accommodate

several persons at the same time, and he found that by inserting the

legs in the alternate holes, instead of in the pair as designed by

the architect of the stocks, the increased spread of the legs caused

still greater strain upon his victim. This was reserved for special

cases--say one in every four or five.

The incidents here given illustrating the methods of this delectable

individual were all witnessed by the Reformers. The account of Du

Plessis may serve the purpose of showing the methods practised under

a Government whose officials are appointed whenever possible from the

family circle and not because of fitness. It is more especially

designed to show the character of the man in whose hands the

prisoners were placed with almost absolute discretion; the man who

enjoys the privilege of discussing with his relative President

Kruger, at any hour at which he may choose to visit the Presidency,

the treatment to be accorded to his victims; the man who is retained

in his position in spite of repeated exposures by his superiors, and

who is credited with exercising very considerable influence with Mr.

Kruger; but, above all, the man in whose charge remain up to the

present time{37} the two Reformers, Messrs. Sampson and Davies, who

declined to sign any petition, and concerning whom Du Plessis stated

openly: 'Wait until the others have gone, and if the Government leave

them in my hands, I'll make them ready to sign anything.' Sufficient

has been said concerning this individual to warrant the description

publicly given of him by Colonel Rhodes{38}--'A brutal and inhuman

wretch!' Like most bullies the man is also a coward. When he

witnessed the outburst of feeling among the prisoners in consequence

of the death of their comrade, he would not venture into the

precincts of the gaol for two days, until assured that the men had

again become capable of self-control.

So much for the details of gaol life.

In the meantime sympathy with the prisoners began to take practical

form, and the unanimity of feeling on their behalf throughout South

Africa, which was quite unexpected and which greatly embarrassed

the Boer Government, tended to bring matters to a head. Mr. Rose

Innes, who had so generously and constantly exerted himself in

Pretoria in order to obtain some amelioration of the condition of the

prisoners, and who had in his official capacity as watching the case

for the Imperial Government made a very strong report to the Colonial

Office, did not content himself with these exertions. Upon his return

to Capetown he suggested and organized the getting up of a monster

petition to the President and Executive, urging upon them in the

interests of the peace of South Africa to release the imprisoned men.

The petitions were to represent the views of every town and village

in South Africa, and were to be presented by the mayors or municipal

heads of the communities. In this movement Mr. Rose Innes was most

ably seconded by Mr. Edmund Garrett, the editor of the _Cape Times,_

and other prominent men. A movement of this nature naturally excited

considerable attention in Pretoria; but the success of it was wholly

unexpected. The President and his party had played to the South

African gallery, and they had not yet realized that they had in any

way overdone the theatrical part. They had no suspicion of the real

feeling with which the sentences were regarded, nor of the extent to

which they had alienated sympathy by that and the subsequent

'magnanimous' action. 'Magnanimity by inches' had been placarded

throughout South Africa, and the whole game was characterized as one

of cat and mouse, in which the President was playing with his victims

with indifference to the demands of justice and humanity, partly with

a view to wringing concessions from the British Government, and

partly from a mistaken idea that by such a course he would obtain

credit at each step afresh for dealing generously with those who were

at his mercy.

The movement had been well organized. The resolution had been passed

in every town in South Africa, even including the towns of the Free

State. The mayors (over 200 in number) were on their way to Pretoria,

when the President, with his back against the wall, realized for the

first time that he had overshot the mark and that unless he released

the men before the arrival of the deputies he would either have to

do so apparently at their instance, or refuse to do so and risk

rousing a dangerous feeling. He chose the former course; he released

all the imprisoned men with the exception of the four who had been

sentenced to death and the two who had refused to appeal. Pretoria

and Johannesburg were already full of deputies and visitors from Cape

Colony, Natal, and the Free State, all bound on the same errand of

mercy. The feelings of these men, brought many hundreds of miles from

their homes, sacrificing their own business and personal convenience

in order to approach the President and to support a measure which

they felt to be imperatively necessary to the allaying of feeling in

South Africa may be imagined, but were not expressed, when they heard

that they had been allowed to undertake this journey as part of the

President's game, only to receive a slap in the face from His Honour

by the carrying out of the measure before they were permitted to

interview him. This at least was what was felt to be the case upon

the release of the majority. Absolute proof of it was forthcoming

within the week, when the President refused to receive the

deputations and kept them waiting in Pretoria until he had released

the four leaders as well, without allowing the delegates the

satisfaction of a courteous recognition of their mission. He admitted

them it is true to an informal interview, in the course of which he

managed to insult and outrage the feelings of a good many by

lecturing them and giving vent to very candid opinions as to their

personal action and duties; but he would not receive their

representatives officially.

On May 30 the prisoners with the exception of the six already

referred to were released, the terms being that their fines should be

paid at once, and the unexpired term of imprisonment remitted. Each

one as released was required to bind himself for the term of three

years, reckoned from the 30th day of May, 1896, neither directly nor

indirectly to meddle in the internal or external politics of the

South African Republic, and to conduct himself as a law-abiding

citizen of the State.

In some cases the provision was added that if in the opinion of the

Executive Council the terms of this undertaking should be broken,

the sentence of banishment which was held in suspense would come into

force, and the men were required to sign this addendum to the above

undertaking. The resolution of the Executive Council, which deals

with the mitigation of the sentences, states that the imprisonment

portions of the sentences are remitted; that the fines (£2,000 in all

cases) must be paid at once; and that the banishment shall remain in

abeyance subject to the faithful observance of the above undertaking;

but that should any action be taken by any of the prisoners

constituting in the opinion of the Executive Council a breach of the

above undertaking, the sentence of banishment shall come into force.

There is no definition of the phrase 'meddle in politics,' nor is

there any indication of what in the opinion of the Executive Council

constitutes politics. There is of course on record the President's

own statement in public that he would not permit any discussion on

the dynamite and railway questions because they are matters of 'high

politics'; and if haply the Executive should also hold this view, it

is difficult to see how any of the prisoners will be able to follow

their ordinary business and attend to those commercial affairs in

which they are concerned without committing some breach of this

ridiculous provision.

No answer was received to the many representations made on behalf of

the four leaders, except that the Government were busy with the

matter. Upon the release of the other prisoners it was suggested to

them by friends outside that it would be a proper and politic course

to proceed in a body to the Presidency and thank the President for

the action he had taken in their respect, and at the same time to beg

of him to extend a similar clemency to the four leaders who were

still left in gaol. Most of the men were dead against taking any such

action. They held very strongly to the opinion that they had been

arrested by treachery, condemned by arrangement, and played with as

counters in an unscrupulous manner. They recognized no obligation

towards the President. They could see no magnanimity in a policy

which had secured their arrest under the circumstances described

which inveigled them into pleading guilty to a nominal offence,

and which imposed upon them a sentence such as that passed. They

considered the enormous fine which they were then called upon to

pay to say nothing of the imprisonment which they had already

suffered wholly disproportionate to the offence, and their natural

impulse was to avoid the man who was directly responsible for it all,

or at least not to meet him under circumstances so unequal, when they

would be sure to be insulted, and would be obliged to suffer the

insult in silence.

Some of them however yielded to the representations of their friends,

who considered that it should be done for the sake of the men who

were not yet released; whilst there were others who expressed the

view that they would rather go back and do their imprisonment than

suffer the humiliation which it was proposed to inflict; that they

would not do it for themselves, and they could not bring themselves

to do it for anybody else. A considerable number of the prisoners

called upon His Honour; and this was the 'dog' interview. After

hearing the address of the men the President proceeded to pat himself

and his people on the back, saying that he knew he had behaved with

great magnanimity and moderation, and that he hoped that such

generosity would not be entirely thrown away.

'You must know,' he said, 'that I sometimes have to punish my dogs;

and I find that there are dogs of two kinds. Some of them who are

good come back and lick my boots. Others get away at a distance and

snarl at me. I see that some are still snarling. I am glad that you

are not like them.'

Those among his hearers who could understand His Honour's remarks,

although they had been prepared for much, were certainly not prepared

for this. The interpreter stood for a moment without rendering into

English the metaphor chosen by the worthy President, and even His

Honour--slow to perceive where he has transgressed the limits of

etiquette and good breeding--gathered from the expressions upon the

faces that something was wrong, and turning to the interpreter, said:

'Oh, that's only my joke! Don't interpret that to them.'

But those who witnessed it say that there was no joke in his voice or

his eye as he said it. Proceeding then with more circumspection he

walked out his dog in another form, and said that it was very well to

punish the little dogs as he had punished them, but somebody should

also punish the big dog--evidently referring to Mr. Rhodes--and in

the course of a homily he again mixed his parable, sticking all the

time to his dog however, remarking in conclusion that it was very

well to punish the dogs, but what was to happen to the owner of the

dogs, who stood by urging them on and crying 'Tsaa!'?

Throughout the week His Honour continued to make the homely dog work

to good purpose, but the interview with the released Reformers was,

it is believed, the first occasion upon which he made use of it.

Certainly on no other occasion did the President do such ample

justice to his reputation as a finished diplomat.

In the mean time negotiations had been proceeding for obtaining the

release of the leaders. The friends and representatives of the four

prisoners had become subject to all manner of attentions from numbers

of people in Pretoria; near relations of the President himself,

high-placed Government officials, their relatives, hangers-on,

prominent Boers, and persons of all sorts and descriptions, all

offered their services and indicated means by which the thing could

be arranged. All wanted money--personal bribes. The prisoners

themselves were similarly approached, and they who a month previously

had been condemned to death witnessed with disgust a keen competition

among their enemies for the privilege of effecting--at a price--their

release. Day after day they were subjected to the disgusting

importunities of these men--men who a little while before had been

vaunting their patriotism and loudly expressing a desire to prove it

by hanging these same Reformers.

The gaoler Du Plessis, representing himself as having been sent by

the President, suggested to the four men that they should 'make a

petition.' They declined to do so. Du Plessis was then reinforced by

the Chief Commissioner of Police, and the two officials again urged

this course but stated that they did not wish it to be known that

they had been sent by the Executive and therefore could not

consent to their names being used. Upon these terms the prisoners

again declined. They said that if they were to hold any communication

with the Government they required to have it on record that they did

so at the suggestion of the two responsible gaol officials who

represented themselves as expressing the wish of the Executive

Council. After further delay and consultations with the President and

others the two officials above named consented to allow their names

to be used in the manner indicated. Not content with this the

prisoners demanded that they should be allowed to send an independent

messenger to the President to ascertain whether he really required a

written appeal for revision of sentence. Having received confirmation

in this manner the four men addressed a letter to the Executive

Council. In this letter they stated that they had been sentenced to

death; that the death-sentence had been commuted; and that they

understood--but had received no authoritative information on the

subject--that they were to suffer instead a term of fifteen years'

imprisonment. They suggested the imposition of a monetary penalty in

place of the imprisonment; they stated that they held and represented

important interests in the State and that they believed their release

would tend to the restoration of confidence and favourable conditions

in the business community of the Rand; and they concluded by saying

that, if the Executive saw fit to adopt this suggestion, they the

prisoners would return to their business in good faith.

It had frequently been intimated to these men that it would be

impossible for the Government to impose a fine in place of the

death-sentence because money so obtained would be blood-money.

Reference had been made in the Executive Council to Biblical

precedents, notably the case of Judas, and the opinion was held that

if blood-money were taken the Lord would visit His wrath upon the

people.

The Boers are in their way a very religious people. But they are also

essentially practical; and it is difficult to find an instance in

which the religious principle has operated to their commercial

disadvantage. This at any rate was not one. The train of reasoning

which led them to justify the imposition of a fine was somewhat in

this wise: To _impose a fine_ would be to take blood-money, and

would be immoral and iniquitous: to _accept the offer of a present_

on condition that the sentence should be entirely remitted however

would be quite another thing.

So negotiations were set on foot to induce the prisoners to make the

necessary offer; and the prisoners, as has been shown, did so. This

satisfied the religious scruple of the Boer, but the terms of the

offer were not satisfactory to his commercial requirements. It became

necessary to make a definite offer. Further negotiations followed,

and the prisoners gathered that an offer of £10,000 apiece would be

viewed with favour by the President and his advisers; and it was

stated by members of the Volksraad and prominent officials who were

in the confidence of and in communication with the Government that,

in the event of such a contingency arising as the prisoners making an

offer of cash, the Executive would not take the money for the benefit

of the State but would accept it for charitable purposes--an

educational institute or a hospital or some such object.

This was communicated to the prisoners by the personages referred to,

and an offer was accordingly made of £10,000 apiece. The matter was

discussed in the Executive Council, and the Boer, true to his

instinct and record, perceived an opportunity to improve his

position. The religious gentlemen who would not take blood-money now

objected that the amount proposed was altogether too small, and the

President with that readiness so characteristic of him observed that

he thought the prisoners must have made a mistake, and meant £40,000

apiece instead of £40,000 for the lot.

Another delay ensued, and in the meanwhile more and more deputies

flocked to Pretoria, and stronger grew the feeling, and more angry,

disappointed, and disgusted grew the communities of Johannesburg and

Pretoria. The President, however, played his game unmoved by any such

considerations.

The next announcement from the Executive was a wholly unexpected one.

It was that they felt it necessary to consult Judge Gregorowski as to

the amount of money which ought to be taken as a donation to

charities. The matter of assessing the value of a death-sentence in

cash might perhaps be deemed a perplexing and a difficult one from

lack of precedent, yet nobody supposed the Executive Council to be

unequal to the task. It might also seem unfair to impose this further

burden of responsibility upon a judge; but Mr. Gregorowski had proved

himself superior to precedent and untrammelled by custom; and there

was much to be said in favour of continuing an association which had

worked very satisfactorily so far.

When however the President, with that resolute determination to be

generous which was so well advertised, at last overcame all obstacles

and succeeded in holding a meeting of his advisers to receive Mr.

Gregorowski's report, and when it was found that that gentleman

assessed capital punishment at £25,000 per head, the Executive

Council with one accord avowed themselves to be so utterly taken by

surprise by the announcement that they required time to think the

matter over and decide upon a course of action.

No doubt this opinion of Mr. Gregorowski's took them quite as much by

surprise as did his original sentences. However in the course of a

day or two they had recovered sufficiently to intimate to the

prisoners that, if they would amend their first offer of £40,000 for

the four and make it one of £40,000 apiece, the Executive would

decline to accept so large a sum, as being greater than they

considered equitable and would reply that in the opinion of the

Government £25,000 apiece would be sufficient. It was quite plainly

intimated that this procedure presented certain attractions to the

President, who desired for political purposes to exhibit further

magnanimity. The prisoners who by this time had gained some insight

into Mr. Kruger's methods, who knew from past experience the value of

his promises, and who could find no record in history to encourage

them in participating to this extent in the confidence trick,

point-blank refused to have anything to do with it.

They agreed to make a formal offer of a 'reasonable' fine, leaving

the interpretation of this to the Government, but only on the

distinct understanding that the amount should not exceed £25,000

each. They had learned that Mr. Gregorowski had fixed this amount and

that the Executive had agreed to accept it, and they would not offer

a penny more for magnanimity or anything else. They stated in

plain terms that they looked upon this matter simply as a bargain;

that if they should get out they were paying their way out, and that

in so far as their release from the position was concerned the

transaction was closed upon business terms and there should be no

question afterwards as to gratitude or magnanimity. The fines were

paid,{39} and on July 11 the leaders were released.

Messrs. Phillips, Farrar, and Hammond, who were compelled through

their business ties to continue their association with the Transvaal,

signed the same undertaking concerning politics as that given by the

rest of the prisoners--with the difference that in their case it

operates for a period of fifteen years. Colonel Rhodes however

declined to give the required undertaking and elected to take his

sentence of fifteen years' banishment. On the night of June 11

therefore he was sent across the border under escort, and passing

through the Free State proceeded at once to Matabeleland to render

what assistance he could to his brother in the suppression of the

rebellion. As though the excitement of the past few months had not

been sufficient, it may be added that in the first engagement in

which he took part on his arrival at Buluwayo his horse was shot, and

he narrowly escaped the same fate himself.

From time to time adverse comment has been made on the subject of

this undertaking of the Reformers to abstain from further

participation in politics. The position of the Reformers was this:

They had entered upon the movement to obtain the redress of certain

matters closely affecting their feelings as men and their interests

and business as settlers in the country. They were disarmed and

placed at the mercy of the Boer Government by the action of England's

Representative. To decline to give the pledge required would entail

banishment, which would in many cases mean ruin to them and in all

cases would remove them from the sphere in which they might yet

contribute to the attainment of the ends they had in view. The only

compensating consideration possible in such a course would be that

the redress desired would be effected through the influence of the

Imperial Government; but since the Imperial Government had shown

that under the circumstances they were neither willing nor able to

maintain to a logical conclusion the position which they took up when

they secured disarmament, the Reformers concluded that their obvious

course was to give the required undertaking. It is true that several

among them did decline to give this undertaking, saying that they

would prefer to serve their terms of imprisonment; but they received

the answer that after the term of two years' imprisonment the

Government would still require the undertaking or enforce the

banishment clause, so that it appeared to them there was no way out

of it but to sign what was required and wait patiently.

It is perfectly obvious that one of two alternatives will present

itself. Either the Government will come to regard this provision as a

dead letter, and wholly ignore it; or some of the men, in the course

of their business and in dealing with economic questions such as they

are morally entitled to discuss will fall foul of the 'opinion of the

Executive.' The issue will then be a very clear one, and many of

those who were strongly opposed to the Reformers on the premisses on

which they started will find themselves in cordial agreement with

them in later developments.{40}

The Reform movement closed for the time being with the release of the

leaders. Sixty-four men had been committed for trial. From four of

them the Government had received £100,000, and from fifty-six others

£112,000. One was dead; one had fallen so seriously ill before the

trial that he was unable to present himself with the rest, but on

recovering and announcing his intention to plead 'Not guilty' and

fight it out, the case against him was withdrawn.

There remained two men, Messrs. Sampson and Davies, whose case the

Government had refused to consider because they declined to appeal.

They had been sentenced on April 28 to two years' imprisonment and

£2,000 fine, or failing payment to another year's imprisonment, and

to three years' banishment; and under that sentence do they lie at

the present moment in the Pretoria gaol, at the mercy of the Boer

Government and its very competent representative Mr. Du Plessis.{41}

Much _kudos_ has accrued to Mr. Kruger for his magnanimity and much

profit for his astuteness! Great credit is also given to Mr.

Chamberlain for his prompt impartiality. And surely some day a

tribute of sympathy and admiration will go out from a people who like

pluck and who love fair play to two Englishmen who hold that a solemn

pledge is something which even a Boer should hold to, whilst

self-respect is more than liberty and beyond all price.

Footnotes for Chapter IX

{35} This was done on the second day--after a night without any

ventilation at all.

{36} See Appendix E.

{37} (July, 1899.) They were released in June, 1897.

{38} Du Plessis' threats regarding Messrs. Sampson and Davies were

made so openly and vengefully that Colonel F.W. Rhodes deemed it to

be his duty as soon as he was released to report the matter to the

High Commissioner, with a view to ensuring some measure of protection

for the two gentlemen above referred to. After the release of

the other prisoners, Du Plessis was for a time suspended, owing

to charges laid against him by the Inspector of Prisons. No

investigation appears however to have been made, and the man was

reinstated. During the month of September, after Messrs. Sampson and

Davies had already done five months of their sentence in Pretoria

Gaol, this man, finding himself unable to break their spirit by other

means, made a proposal to the Government to separate the two and to

place them in two small country gaols at wide distances apart and far

removed from the friendly offices and watchful eyes of their friends,

and thus deprive them of such benefit as they may be able _in the

future_ to get from proximity to the official representative of

England. In the past they have certainly derived none.

{39} It seems like reflecting on the reader's intelligence to add

that nothing more has been heard of the 'charities.'

{40} (July, 1899.) A clear indication of the Government's disposition

towards the Reformers was given by the treatment accorded to Mr.

Lionel Phillips. In consequence of a publication by Sir John

Willoughby of an article on the subject of the Raid, which failed to

accurately represent the facts as they were present to the minds of

the Reformers, Mr. Phillips wrote an article in the _Nineteenth

Century_ magazine, which was purely historical, moderate in tone, and

obviously designed only as an answer to the allegations which had

been made. The Executive Council arrived at the conclusion that it

was a breach of his undertaking to abstain from interference in

politics, and they issued a decree of banishment against him. As Mr.

Phillips had taken up his residence permanently in Europe, and as it

was well known that it would be extremely inconvenient for him to

return to South Africa in order to dispute this action it was

generally considered that the object of the move was to establish

a precedent, so to say, on the cheap, and in the same spirit to

intimidate others among the Reformers who were believed not to have

lost their interest in the cause of reform nor to have abandoned

their intention to begin again as soon as they were free to do so. It

is no exaggeration to say that scarcely a week could have passed

during the last two and a half years in which some or all of the half

dozen Uitlanders most prominent in the cause of reform have not been

in receipt of a warning of one kind or another, ranging from

apparently friendly advice not to take too keen an interest in

certain matters, up to the giddy eminence of being black listed in

the Dutch papers as one of those to be dragged out and shot without

trial as a traitor and a rebel. Such are the conditions under which

the unarmed Uitlanders labour for reform.

{41} (July, 1899.) Du Plessis was promoted to be Chief Inspector of

Prisons shortly after the release of Messrs. Sampson and Davies,

and still holds that post!

PART II.

A POSTSCRIPT.

CHAPTER X.

THREE YEARS' GRACE.

Very seldom has any community been in a position so unsatisfactory as

that in which the people of Johannesburg found themselves in the year

1896. Judgments passed in the heat of the moment upon matters which

had not been properly explained, and which in many cases were

completely obscured by deliberate misrepresentation, had incurred for

the community dislike contempt and mistrust which were wholly

undeserved. Those who knew the facts and who were able and willing to

speak, the Reformers themselves, were bonded to abstain from politics

for three years under penalty of banishment. Betrayed, deserted,

muzzled, helpless, hopeless, and divided, no community could have

been in a more unsatisfactory condition. It was abundantly clear that

the time had been allowed to pass when the Imperial Government might

have insisted upon reforms and the fulfilment of the President's

promises--not in the spirit in which they had been made, but in the

spirit in which the President himself had intended the world to

construe them. The impact of the revelations was too great to permit

of public judgment quickly recovering its balance. It was realized

that Mr. Kruger's effects had been admirably stage-managed and that

for the time being, and possibly for a very considerable time, the

Uitlanders were completely out of court. There were a few--but how

few!--whose faith was great and whose conviction that the truth must

prevail was abiding, who realized that there was nothing for it but

to begin all over again--to begin and to persevere upon sound lines;

and they took heart of such signs as there were and started afresh.

It has been an article of faith with them that Mr. Kruger missed

his supreme chance at the time of the trial of the Reformers, and

that from the date of the death-sentence his judgment and his luck

have failed him. He abused his good fortune and the luck turned, so

they say; and the events of the last three years go to support that

impression. To his most faithful ally amongst the Uitlanders the

President, in the latter days of 1896, commented adversely upon the

ingratitude of those Reformers who had not called to thank him for

his magnanimity; and this man replied: 'You must stop talking about

that, President, because people are laughing at you. You made a

bargain with them and they paid the price you asked, so now they owe

you nothing.' But his Honour angrily repudiated that construction:

nothing will convert him to that view.

It has been said that Dr. Jameson is the best friend Paul Kruger ever

had, and with equal truth it may be said that, in 1896, President

Kruger proved himself to be the best friend of the Reformers. Not

even the most sanguine of his enemies could have expected to witness

the impolitic and unjust acts by which the President revealed

himself, vindicated the Reformers, and undermined a position of

unparalleled strength in an incredibly short time. The bargaining and

the bad grace which marked the release of the Reformers had prepared

the world to view Mr. Kruger's action and attitude a little more

critically than it had hitherto been disposed to do. The real

conditions of Dr. Jameson's surrender had also become known, and

although the action of the Boer leaders was regarded as far too

trifling a matter to be seriously considered as against the Raid

itself, nevertheless a residuum of impression was left which helped

to form opinion at a later stage. There followed, too, an irritating

correspondence between the Transvaal and Imperial Governments, in the

course of which Dr. Leyds successfully established his skill as a

smart letter writer and his limitations as a statesman. The

Municipal Law, the first product of the 'forget and forgive'

proclamation--which proclamation, by-the-bye, had already begun to

prove itself an awkward weapon placed in the hands of his enemies by

President Kruger himself--had been exposed and denounced as farcical,

and it now required but little to convince the once admiring world of

the President's real character and intentions. That little was

forthcoming in a touch of ridicule more potent than all arguments.

The Transvaal Government formulated their demand for damages for the

Raid in a form which made everyone smile--£677,938 3s. 3d. for actual

outlay, and £1,000,000 for 'Moral and Intellectual Damages.' What

with the fines of the Reformers, and the seizure of the provisions of

all sorts acquired by them for the purposes of the Reform movement,

which latter must have exceeded £50,000 in value, the Boer Government

had already received upwards of a quarter of a million, and had, in

fact, made a profit on the Raid; so that this demand came as a

surprise even to the Uitlanders, as much perhaps due to the

extraordinary phrasing of the demand as to the amount claimed.

It may be wondered why, under provocation so great as that of

complete abandonment by the country whose representative had placed

them in their then hopeless position, no distinct movement took

place--no tendency even developed itself--among the Uitlanders

generally to unite with the Boers in favour of a Republican movement

throughout South Africa, to the exclusion of the Imperial power. In

answer to this it must be said that such an idea undoubtedly did take

strong hold of the non-British portion of the Uitlander population,

as witness the manner in which the Cape Colony Dutchmen, Hollanders,

Germans, and individuals of other European nationalities associated

themselves with the Boer party, almost invariably by open

declaration, and in many cases even by naturalization, thus

forfeiting their own national rights and obtaining nothing but vague

promises and the liability to military service in return. But the

Republican movement made no further headway than this because British

subjects formed the large majority of the Uitlanders. They had, it is

true, a great grievance against the Imperial Government; but against

the Transvaal Government they had one greater still; and it would

take a great deal to kill the passionate loyalty of the British South

African. It would be idle to discuss what might have happened had Mr.

Kruger seized his opportunity and let in a considerable section of

the then unenfranchised to strengthen the ranks of the Republican

party; that can only be a matter of individual conjecture. What is

certain, however, is that he did not do so and never intended to do

so; wherein his lack of statesmanship is again made manifest.

Mr. Kruger has carried out in its fullest (its best or its worst) the

characteristic principle of his people already referred to, that of

giving too little and asking too much. It is doing only bare justice

to the determination with which he adheres to the policy of his life

to say that he gives nothing to anybody. From the most distant to the

nearest he deals alike with all. With the people of Europe, he has

taxed their investments, disregarded their interests, and flouted

their advice; but nevertheless he has for years commanded their moral

support. In his dealings with the British Government, pushed as they

have been some half a dozen times to the very verge of war, he has

invariably come off with something for nothing. In his dealings with

the Uitlanders he has bartered promises and in return--_circumspice_!

In the matter of the events of 1895-6 he came out with a quarter of a

million in cash, a claim for £1,677,938 3s. 3d. odd (including Moral

and Intellectual Damages), and a balance of injured innocence which

may not be expressed in figures. In his dealings with Cape Colony he

has taxed the products of their land and industry, he went to the

verge of war to destroy their trade in the case of the closing of the

Vaal River drifts, he has permitted the Netherlands Railway to so

arrange its tariffs as to divert traffic from them to other parts, he

has refused to their people (his own flesh and blood, among whom he

was born) the most elementary rights when they settle in his country!

And yet in his need he calls upon them, and they come! His treatment

of the Orange Free State has been exactly the same. Their grievance

against him is incomparably worse, because of their liability to

become involved in the consequences of a policy which they are not

allowed to influence. But President Kruger is, above all things,

practical. Everything is gauged by the measure of the advantage which

it can bring to him; and his treatment of the Free State is

determined by their utility to him and his power over them, and is

not influenced by their moral claims upon his good will. Natal and

Portugal have their experience of broken agreements and strained

interpretations, of intrigues with native subjects and neighbours

for the extension of rights or boundaries, all designed to benefit

the Transvaal and to undermine them. All, all with the same result!

Something for nothing! Within the borders of the Transvaal the policy

is the same. Moral rights and the claims of justice are unrecognized.

For services rendered there may be some return; a privilege, a

contract, an appointment. But this cannot be properly regarded as a

neglect of principle upon Mr. Kruger's part, for after all the reward

is at the expense of the Uitlanders. It is usually the least price at

which the service could be secured; and it is generally in such

form as to give the recipient a profit in which the members of the

Government party largely share, but it never confers a power to

which the President himself is not superior; indeed, it is almost

invariably hedged about by such conditions as to make its continuance

dependent upon the President's good will. If any one should

think this description of conditions in the Transvaal and of the

President's policy to be unduly harsh, let him satisfy himself by an

investigation of those matters which appear on merely superficial

examination to support opinions contrary to those expressed by the

writer. Let him examine the terms of the closer union with the Free

State, the circumstances leading to the closing of the Vaal River

drifts, the condition of the Dutch subjects of Cape Colony and of the

Orange Free State in the Transvaal, the Netherlands Railway tariffs

as they operate against Cape Colony and the Free State, the Railway

Agreement with Natal, the disputes with Portugal, the attempts to

acquire native territory on the East Coast, the terms of the

Netherlands Railway Concession, Selati Railway Concession, Dynamite

Concession--in fact, all other concessions, monopolies, contracts,

privileges, appointments, and rights, made, granted, or entered

into by President Kruger to or with his friends. Let him recall the

treatment and the fate of some of those to whom ampler reference

will be made later on; for instance, Chief Justice Kotzé and

Judge Ameshof, who in the dealings with the Reformers rendered

valuable--but perhaps injudicious and unjudicial--service, as already

sufficiently described; the treatment of Dr. Coster, the State

Attorney, who also deserved better of the President; the public

repudiation of Mr. J.B. Robinson, whose friendship for President

Kruger had been frequently and amply evidenced to the grave

dissatisfaction of the Uitlander population; the public and insulting

repudiation of Sir Henry de Villiers, the Chief Justice of Cape

Colony, after he had served his purpose! The result of any such

inquiry must confirm the conclusion that 'something for nothing' is

the President's policy and achievement.

A policy or a movement which is to involve the cooperation of

thousands of intelligent men cannot be carried out upon such terms,

and this may be regarded as the main reason why the spirit of

Republicanism did not generally itself develop under circumstances

apparently so favourable to it. The President's policy may be

considered astute or unwise according to the point of view from which

it is regarded. Viewed from the standpoint of the State itself,

undoubtedly it fails lamentably in statesmanship. In the interests of

the Boer party, however, or of the man Paul Kruger, it may well be

doubted whether the policy may not be a token of remarkable sagacity.

He knows his own limitations and the limitations of his people. He

knows that to freely admit to a share in the Government a number of

intelligent people, would make a continuance of himself or his party

in absolute power for any length of time a matter of utter

impossibility. In these circumstances the problem which President

Kruger had set himself was a remarkably difficult one. To

republicanize South Africa, to secure the support of the majority of

the white inhabitants, and yet to yield no whit of power to those by

whose aid he would achieve his object, would indeed be carrying to

sublime heights the policy of 'something for nothing.'

Many years before the Raid Mr. Kruger had a well-defined policy to

republicanize South Africa, and the Uitlanders of the Transvaal were

quite alive to it, as may be gathered by reference to their

newspapers. But the voice was as a voice crying in the wilderness in

those days, and, as has been said, it required the Jameson Raid to

advertize the conditions in the Transvaal and to direct attention to

what had been proclaimed unheeded for many years. Immediately prior

to the Raid Mr. Kruger was floundering in a morass of difficulties.

The policy of 'something for nothing' had been exposed, and it was

seen through by all the Dutchmen in South Africa and was resented by

all save his own little party in the Transvaal; but the Jameson Raid

gave the President a jumping-off place on solid ground, and he was

not slow to take advantage of it.

It is not too much to say that the vast majority of people in Europe

and America are indebted to Dr. Jameson for any knowledge which they

may have acquired of the Transvaal and its Uitlander problem. Theirs

is a disordered knowledge, and perhaps it is not unnatural that they

should in a manner share the illusion of the worthy sailor who, after

attending divine service, assaulted the first Israelite he met

because he had only just heard of the Crucifixion. A number of worthy

people are still disposed to excuse many things in the Transvaal

because of the extreme provocation given by the Jameson Raid. The

restrictions upon English education are considered to be 'not

unnatural when one remembers the violent attempt to swamp the Dutch.'

The excessive armaments are held to be 'entirely justifiable

considering what has happened.' The building of forts is 'an ordinary

precaution.' The prohibiting of public meetings is 'quite wrong, of

course, but can you wonder at it?' Many of these worthy people will,

no doubt, learn with pained surprise that all these things were among

the causes which led to the Reform movement of 1895-6, and are not

the consequences of that movement as they erroneously suppose. The

Press Law and Public Meetings Act had been passed; arms had been

imported and ordered in tens of thousands; machine guns and

quantities of ammunition also; forts were being built;{42} the

suppression of all private schools had been advocated by Dr.

Mansvelt--all long, long before the Jameson Raid. So also had the

republican propaganda been at work, but it had not caught on outside

the two Republics.

Difficult as his task might appear, Mr. Kruger had now command of the

two great persuasive forces--money and sentiment. With the money he

pushed on the forts, and imported immense quantities of big guns,

small arms, and ammunition--far in excess of what could possibly be

used by the whole of the Boer population of the Transvaal after

making every allowance for spare arms in reserve; and such an

extraordinary supply was not unnaturally believed to be designed for

the use of others outside the Transvaal. More than this, an army of

emissaries, agents, and spies in the pay of the Transvaal Government

were spread about the Free State, Cape Colony, and Natal. Newspapers

were supported in different parts of South Africa and a considerable

amount of money was spent upon the Press in France and Germany.

It would be absurd to suggest and it would be unjust to let it be

inferred that all those who were drawn into sympathy with the Boers

supported or were even cognizant of President Kruger's ultimate aim.

It is an everyday experience that the scope of work and ambition

expands as one progresses. Whether the strong man really sees his

ultimate goal and tackles with magnificent courage the innumerable

and seemingly insurmountable obstacles which lie between him and it,

or whether in the wisdom and mercy of Providence there is such an

adjustment of courage and foresight as prevents him from seeing more

than he is able to face, who can say? But what is beyond all doubt is

that, given the one strong man who does know his mind, he will lead

as the Pied Piper led, and there is no thought in his following to

ask the whither and the why.

Given the sympathy and the means, the difficulty of President

Kruger's self-imposed task was not so great as at first appeared. To

some it was advisable to do no more than point to the Jameson Raid

and say: 'We only wish to live in peace and to be left alone.' To

some again that act is construed as a sign that the British people

wish to upset the two Republics, therefore they must strengthen and

be prepared. To others the appeal is made: 'We Dutch are the settlers

and owners of the country, we wish for peace, of course, but we must

dominate--you under your form of government, we under ours.'

To others again it is further advanced: 'Let us negotiate the

elimination of the Imperial power; we do not suggest fight, but if we

present a united front they must retire peacefully and concede our

demands.' And lastly comes the appeal to those who are in sympathy

with the advanced republicans: 'Arm and prepare. Some day we shall

find England in a difficulty, divided by party or hampered by

external complications; it has often happened before and we have

always profited. That will be our time to drive them out.'

It would be very unjust to some of the most prominent men on the

Dutch side in Cape Colony to leave the slenderest grounds for the

inference that they are to be associated with the extreme and

actively disloyal aim. All that it is intended to do is to indicate

the fine gradations in arguments by which a number are drawn

together--under a leadership which they do not realize, and going

they know not where! The strongest of these arguments and appeals are

particularly popular with the younger generation of Dutch South

Africans who entertain a visionary scheme of independence suggested

by the history of the United States. But there is something more

serious in it than this, as may be deduced from the fact that in

December, 1896, the writer was approached by Mr. D.P. Graaff,

formerly a prominent member of the Cape Legislative Council and now

as always a prominent Afrikander Bondsman, with the suggestion that

all the South African born should combine in the effort to create the

United States of South Africa, 'upon friendly terms with England, but

confining the direct Imperial right in South Africa to a naval

base at Simonstown and possibly a position in Natal.' This

concession--from South Africa to England--would not, it was argued,

involve disadvantage to the former, because for a considerable time

it would be necessary to preserve friendly relations with England and

to have the protection of her fleet for the coast.

It is of course quite easy to attach too much importance to the

opinions of individual politicians of this class, who are as a rule

merely shouters with the biggest crowd; but the prominent association

of such an apostle of republicanism with the Bond, and the fact that

he should have gone so far with a Reformer of known strong British

sympathies seem to warrant the attaching of some importance to the

suggestion.{43} A similar suggestion was made to several of the

Reformers at the time of the judicial crisis by one of the judges of

the Transvaal High Court, when it was hoped to enlist the sympathies

of the Uitlanders with a movement to curtail President Kruger's power

and to establish republicanism on a firmer basis in South Africa. In

order to forestall an obvious comment, it may be said that discussion

was in both cases declined on the ground that it would be

participating in politics in the sense forbidden by President

Kruger's three years' ban.

The year 1896 was a very bad one for the whole of South Africa.

Besides the Raid and the suspense and disorganization entailed by the

prolonged trial, the terrible dynamite explosion in Johannesburg,{44}

the still more terrible rebellion and massacre in Rhodesia, and the

crushing visitation of the great cattle scourge, the Rinderpest,

helped to produce a deplorable state of affairs in the Transvaal.

Then there was another thing which rankled badly: Messrs. Sampson and

Davies were still in gaol.{45} The feeling throughout South Africa

was reflected in the monotonous announcement which appeared in the

_Cape Times_ week by week for thirteen months:--'To-day Messrs.

Sampson and Davies complete the--week of their imprisonment in

Pretoria gaol for the crime of not signing a petition.' It seemed

scarcely credible that the President should still harbour any

illusions about his magnanimity; nevertheless, for some weeks before

the celebration of the Queen's Record reign it was rumoured that the

two prisoners were to be released upon that occasion as a mark of his

Honour's sympathy. Opinion had not been unanimous upon the attitude

of either the President or the prisoners; but an ugly incident

silenced most of the President's apologists. Gold stealing and the

purchase of stolen gold were being carried on such a scale and with

such impunity that at last, in desperation, the directors and

officials of one of the big mining companies (the City and Suburban

G.M. Co.), at the risk of being shot by desperadoes, took upon

themselves the functions of the detectives and police. They caught

'red-handed' two notorious characters and delivered them over, with

the gold in their possession, to the authorities. The thieves

actually boasted then that nothing would happen to them as they had

'made it all right;' and a few days later one of them was allowed to

escape out of the Court-house buildings which stand in the middle of

a large square. The other was convicted and sentenced to six months'

imprisonment. He was a criminal of a bad and dangerous type, the head

of a gang known to be concerned in gold stealing and burglary as a

profession. The penalty was regarded by all parties as most

inadequate and the judge himself commented adversely upon the

drafting of the law which tended to screen the prisoner. Not one

mitigating circumstance was forthcoming! And yet, whilst ignoring a

fresh outburst of protest against the detention of Messrs. Sampson

and Davies, and whilst the Industrial Commission was exposing the

gold thefts and denouncing the complicity of the police, Mr. Kruger

decided to remit three-fourths of the sentence and to discharge

the thief unconditionally. Is it to be wondered that such ill-advised

action called to mind the prisoners' boast, and that it was

contrasted prominently with the treatment of the two Reformers?

Three events of importance marked the year 1897 in the history of the

Transvaal. The first was the High Court crisis in February; the

second, the appointment of the Industrial Commission of Inquiry; the

third, the Queen's Record Reign celebration.

The High Court crisis arose out of the case of Brown _v._ The State,

already referred to.{46} Brown had acted within his legal rights

according to the terms of a proclamation. That proclamation had been

illegally withdrawn, and the Government realizing that they would

have to stand the consequences of their action in the courts of the

country, introduced a law which was immediately passed by the

Volksraad, absolving them from all liability, and practically

non-suiting all claimants. Mr. Kotzé in his judgment declared this

law to be improper and in conflict with the Constitution, and gave

judgment in favour of Brown, but left the amount of damages to be

determined later after hearing further evidence.{47}

The first Volksraad was then in special session, and the President

promptly introduced a law known as Law 1 of 1897, which empowered him

to exact assurances from the judges that they would respect all

resolutions of the Volksraad as having the force of law and declare

themselves not entitled to test the validity of a law by its

agreement or conflict with the Constitution; and it further empowered

the President in the event of his not being satisfied with the

character of the replies to summarily dismiss the judges. The judges

protested in a body that they would not submit to such treatment. The

High Court was adjourned and all legal business was stopped.

Particularly emphatic was Mr. Justice Gregorowski. He stated that

no honourable man could possibly sit upon the Transvaal Bench as long

as Law 1 of 1897 remained upon the Statute Book. At this juncture Sir

Henry de Villiers, Chief Justice of Cape Colony, came to Pretoria for

the purpose of effecting a compromise and averting a crisis. The

compromise was practically an armistice. The judges promised not to

exercise the testing right pending the speedy introduction of a

measure safeguarding the independence of the courts. Mr. Kruger on

his side promised to refrain from enforcing the provisions of Law 1

of 1897, and undertook to introduce as speedily as possible the

required new law.

The position in which the President found himself was undoubtedly one

of some difficulty, but he chose a very bad way out of it.

High-handed arbitrary methods cannot effect a permanent and

satisfactory solution of a question of that character, but Mr. Kruger

was unwilling to go to the root of the evil and to admit what Mr.

Kotzé's judgment had brought home with perhaps too sudden force,

namely, that the laws and system of Government were in a condition of

complete chaos. The sequel can be told in a few words. In February,

1898, Mr. Kotzé considered that ample time had been allowed by him

for the fulfilment of President Kruger's promise. Sir Henry de

Villiers thought it proper to allow more time. The point of

difference between Mr. Kotzé and Sir Henry de Villiers was the

interpretation to be placed upon the expression 'this session,' which

had been used in the previous February when the President had said

that if he did not introduce the proposed measures this session, the

judges might consider that he had failed to keep his promise. Mr.

Kotzé contended that as the Raad was then in session it meant _that

Session_, and that in any case that session and another had passed,

and a third was in progress and there was still no sign of the

promised measures. Sir Henry de Villiers stated that in his opinion

the reasonable construction would be that Mr. Kruger meant the

following _ordinary_ session, and that only ordinary sessions could

be considered (for in each year there are one special and one

ordinary session), so that the President might be entitled to claim

the whole of the year 1898 within which to fulfil his promise, but

that this would be the extreme limit of forbearance, after which

failure could only be regarded as a breach of faith. Sir Henry de

Villiers in fact defended Mr. Kruger. Mr. Kotzé, however, held to his

opinion; he wrote to the President reminding him of the undertaking,

charged him with failure to keep his promise and withdrew the pledge

which he had given. The President promptly exercised his right under

Law 1 of 1897, and dismissed Mr. Kotzé, who had served the country as

judge and chief justice for over twenty years. Whatever the merits of

the particular case may be it appeared to be a shocking exhibition

of arbitrary power to dismiss without compensation, pension, or

provision of any sort, a man no longer young, whose services had been

given for nearly a quarter of a century, who in the extreme dilemma

of the Raid had stood by the President, and who, from some points of

view, must be admitted to have served him 'not wisely but too well.'

Mr. Kotzé was not at that time popular among the Uitlanders on

account of his action in the matter of the Reformers, and especially

because he had acted on behalf of the Government in securing the

services of Mr. Gregorowski for the Reform trial; but the

circumstances of his dismissal and the fact that he was known to be

dependent upon his salary as judge, taken in conjunction with the

courageous stand which he had made against the President's arbitrary

will, enlisted public sympathy on his behalf, and a purse amounting

in all to about £6,000 was presented to him as a mark of appreciation

for his past services. But then followed the 'most unkindest cut of

all.' Mr. Gregorowski, who had resigned a judgeship in order to fill

the post of State Attorney when Dr. Coster, in consequence of an

insulting reference of the President's to his countrymen,

relinquished it,--Mr. Gregorowski, who had been foremost to declare

that no honourable man could possibly accept the position of judge

while Law 1 of 1897 stood on the Statute Book, became Chief Justice

_vice_ Mr. Kotzé dismissed. And by way of finally disposing of the

subject, the President when questioned in the Raad as to the

explanation of his apologist, denied that he had ever made any

promise of any sort or description to Sir Henry de Villiers or

anybody else!

Mr. Justice Ameshof, who with Mr. Kotzé had made a stand against the

President in this matter, was also obliged to relinquish his

judgeship. Thus it will be seen that at one swoop Mr. Kruger disposed

of three reputable intermediaries whom he had used to great advantage

at one time or another. 'Something for nothing,' for Mr. Kruger!

Whether Mr. Kotzé acted in haste or whether Sir Henry de Villiers'

plea for more time was justified are questions which it is no longer

necessary to discuss, not alone because Mr. Kruger denied ever having

made the promise out of which the disagreement arose, but because

even up to the present time no measure safeguarding the High Court

has been introduced or foreshadowed in the legislature. And Law 1 of

1897, which according to Mr. Gregorowski made it impossible for any

honourable man to sit upon the Bench, is still upon the Statute Book

and Mr. Gregorowski sits as Chief Justice subject to its provisions.

No one disputes that the position of the High Court as determined by

Law 1 of 1897 is a very unsatisfactory one, but the apologists for

President Kruger frequently say that there has been no actual case of

hardship, and that the Uitlanders are crying out before they are

hurt. They maintain that it was a measure passed under great

provocation for a particular purpose, and that the power granted

under it, although very undesirable in principle, has never been

used. This is incorrect; the power has been used, and injustice has

been suffered. Two cases of actual hardship are those of Brown _v._

Government, the case out of which the whole matter arose, and the

case of the Pretoria Waterworks Company. But there are other cases

too which have never been brought into court having been either

compromised or abandoned because of the hopelessness of the position,

for it is obvious that there would be great reluctance on the part of

business men to make a fight merely for the purpose of showing that

they suffered under a disability when the result of such a fight

would inevitably be to antagonize the only tribunal to which they

could appeal.

The case of the Pretoria Waterworks Company is rather a bad one. The

Government in 1889 gave a contract for the water supply of Pretoria.

It was a permission, but not an exclusive right, to supply the

town from springs on Government ground. The President, finding that

the contractor was not in a position to undertake the work, requested

certain business houses to form a company to acquire this right and

to supply the town with water. After inquiry into the local

conditions and the probable costs, these people represented that

unless they received the exclusive right they would be unable to

undertake the work, as the cost of importing pipes and machinery

transported from Natal by bullock waggon and the then expensive

conditions of working would make the work so costly that at a later

period, after the introduction of railways, it would be possible for

competitors, such for instance as the projected Municipality of

Pretoria, to establish a system of water supply at probably half the

cost of the first one and thus compete to their disadvantage. For

these reasons the contractor and his friends declined to proceed with

the formation of the company. The President, however, was very

desirous of having a good water supply, and after some months of

negotiations the original contract was supplemented by a grant from

the Executive Council, who then held plenary powers from the

Volksraad, giving the proposed company the exclusive right.

Immediately after the receipt of this grant the company was formed,

the capital subscribed and the machinery and other material

purchased. In 1898, after nine years of work, during which

shareholders had received dividends averaging 2-2/3 per cent. per

annum, some differences occurred between the Company and the

consumers, and the latter combined and subscribed the necessary funds

to take action in the High Court, the object being to challenge the

exclusive right and to enable the town through its Municipality to

provide its own supply. At the same time the Government at the

instance of the townspeople opened negotiations with the Company with

a view to expropriation in accordance with the terms stipulated in

the original contract. While matters were in this position, however,

certain members of the Volksraad prominently concerned in the action

against the Company, introduced a measure in the Volksraad cancelling

the second or exclusive grant made by the Government nine years

before and recommending that the Government should either buy out

the Waterworks Company upon suitable terms or should give the

necessary facilities to the Town Council to introduce another system

of supply. The application of the Company to be allowed to state its

case was ignored, and after a short discussion the resolution was

passed and the measure became law. By the action of the Volksraad the

Company was deprived of that principal asset upon the security of

which the capital had been subscribed, and the Government were

rescued from an awkward position. The Government took no steps to

defend their action in granting the right or to protest against the

action of the Volksraad, and became, therefore, parties to an act of

piracy. The Company were thus placed entirely at the mercy of the

Government, for under the provisions of Law 1 of 1897, the Volksraad

resolution put them out of court both as to upholding their title and

claiming damages. All doubts as to the Government's complicity in

this action were removed when upon negotiations being opened for the

expropriation of the Company the Government refused to follow the

procedure prescribed in the contract on the ground that as the

Company had now lost the exclusive right they must accept a less sum

in compensation, otherwise the Government would authorise the rival

Municipal scheme. Under these circumstances the shareholders having

no other power to appeal to adopted the common-sense course of taking

what they could get. The result can only be expressed in figures. The

shares, which had been purchased at over 40s. at the time of the

Volksraad's action were worth less than 28s. in liquidation. The

inquiry into the Raid by the Select Committee of the House of

Commons, early in 1897, was productive of a result which is not

always traced to its real cause. The greatest dissatisfaction was

expressed in the Transvaal and among all the Boers in South Africa

with one feature of the Westminster inquiry, viz., the investigation

of the causes which made the Raid possible. Mr. Kruger and his

friends had enjoyed such a run of luck and so much indulgence, and

had been so successful in presenting their side of the case only,

that it seemed to them improper that anyone should wish to inquire

into all the circumstances. It would even appear from what

followed that the President had convinced himself that there were no

grievances, that he was an entirely innocent party deeply injured by

the Reformers and the British Government, and that the Westminster

inquiry had been authorized and conducted for the sole purpose of

exposing him and justifying the Reform movement.

As the months dragged on and no improvement in the conditions of the

Uitlanders took place, as indeed the complaints grew louder and the

state of affairs grew worse, the President again began to hear the

voices calling for reform. Timid whispers they were, perhaps, and far

between, for the great bulk of the Uitlanders were in a morose and

sullen mood. Having tried and failed on stronger lines they were

incapable as yet of returning with any heart to the old fruitless and

already rejected constitutional methods. The suggestions for reform,

consequently, came principally from those who were on friendly terms

with the Boer party and believed themselves to carry some weight.

They have by this time learned that nobody carries weight with

President Kruger unless he has power to back his suggestions. Many

years before, the late Mr. W.Y. Campbell as spokesman of a deputation

from Johannesburg, addressing President Kruger, stated in the course

of his remarks that the people of Johannesburg 'protested' against a

certain measure. The President jumped up in one of his characteristic

moods and said: 'Protest! Protest!! what is the good of protesting?

You have not got the guns! I have.' And Mr. Campbell, in reporting

this in Johannesburg, remarked: 'That man is sensible; he knows the

position. I claim to be sensible also, and I know he is right: you

can take my name off any other deputations, for we'll get nothing by

asking.'

It is stated, and the statement comes from one who claims to have

been the father of the suggestion, that the President was induced to

appoint a commission of inquiry by the argument that if, as he

believed, the wretched state of affairs in Johannesburg was due not

to the action of the Government but to the greed, machinations, and

mismanagement of the capitalists, nothing could suit the latter worse

than to be taken at their word and to have a commission appointed to

take evidence on oath and to publicly inquire into the state of

affairs; in fact to copy the Westminster inquiry. It is

conceivable that the resolute refusal to investigate matters or to

listen to complaints or explanations which the President had

throughout maintained may have been the means of preserving a

blissful faith in the strength of his own case and the rottenness of

the Uitlanders'; at any rate, it seems to be an undoubted fact that

the Industrial Commission of Inquiry, which was appointed by the

Executive at the request of the President, was appointed in the

confident belief that it would shift the burden of responsibility

from his shoulders to those of the capitalists. This construction of

his motives may appear to be severe and perhaps even unfair, but it

is entirely borne out by the manner in which he dealt with the report

of the Industrial Commission, fighting against its acceptance,

ignoring the recommendations of relief, and even imposing fresh

burdens. There is, nevertheless, one thing to be deduced which is in

a manner to Mr. Kruger's credit, and that is that he really must have

believed that the case would--from his point of view--bear inquiring

into.

The members of the Commission with power to vote were Messrs. Schalk

W. Burger, Member of the Executive Council (Chairman); J.S. Smit,

Government Railway Commissioner; Christiaan Joubert, Minister of

Mines; Schmitz-Dumont, Acting State Mining Engineer; and J.F. de

Beer, first special Judicial Commissioner, Johannesburg. Mr. Thos.

Hugo, the General Manager of the National Bank, was appointed

financial adviser, and certain advisory members were arbitrarily

selected by the Government. The complete exclusion of all those who

had had any direct or indirect association with the late Reform

movement or with those in any way connected with it strengthened the

conviction that the Government designed the Commission to be a

whitewashing one; but whatever the design may have been it would be

doing an injustice both to the Government officials and to the

advisory members to have it supposed that they were parties to such

an idea. They were not; they did their work admirably, and no inquiry

could have been conducted in a better spirit. This, however, was not

foreseen, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the Uitlanders

were induced to view the thing seriously and to realize that, no

matter how it had occurred, this was a supreme opportunity for

proving to the world the soundness of their case. The report and

proceedings are published by the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines in a

volume containing over 700 pages of printed matter and a number of

diagrams. The whole constitutes a damning indictment of the

Government, as the following extracts from the report of the

Commission testify:--

Your Commission are pleased to state that at present there exist all

the indications of an honest administration, and the State, as well

as the Mining Industry, must be congratulated upon the fact that most

of the mines are controlled and directed by financial and practical

men who devote their time, energy, and knowledge to the mining

industry, and who have not only introduced the most up-to-date

machinery and mining appliances, but also the greatest perfection of

method and process known to science. But for these a good many of the

mines now producing gold would not have reached that stage....

To avoid such a calamity (viz., the closing down of the mines) your

Commission are of opinion that it is the duty of the Government to

co-operate with the mining industry, and to devise means in order to

make it possible for lower-grade mines to work at a profit, and

generally to lighten the burdens of the mining industry. This and the

development and equipment of the new mines are a few examples among

others where it is desirable that the Government shall take an active

part, especially when the fact is taken into consideration that up

till now the mining industry must be held as the financial basis,

support, and mainstay of the State.

The question, therefore, becomes one of national economy, and it is

incumbent upon the Government, considering the rapid growth and

progress of the country, to so alter its fiscal laws and systems of

administration as to meet the requirements of its principal

industry....

The Transvaal from Within: A Private Record of Public Affairs · 第 10 / 14 章