CHAPTER I.

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THE TRANSVAAL FROM WITHIN

A Private Record of Public Affairs

BY

J.P. FITZPATRICK

AUTHOR OF 'THE OUTSPAN'

LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN

1899

_Written August, 1896.

Privately circulated June, 1899.

Supplemented and published September 1899._

PREFACE

It was originally designed to compile a statement of the

occurrences of 1895-6 in the Transvaal and of the conditions

which led up to them, in the hope of removing the very grave

misunderstandings which existed. Everybody else had been heard and

judged, the Uitlander had only been judged. It therefore seemed

proper that somebody should attempt to present the case for the

Uitlander. The writer, as a South African by birth, as a resident

in the Transvaal since 1884, and lastly as Secretary of the Reform

Committee, felt impelled to do this, but suffered under the

disability of President Kruger's three years' ban; and although it

might possibly have been urged that a plain statement of facts and

explanations of past actions could not be fairly regarded as a

deliberate interference in politics, the facts themselves when set

out appeared to constitute an indictment so strong as to make it

worth while considering whether the Government of the Transvaal would

not regard it as sufficient excuse to put in force the sentence of

banishment. The postponement of publication which was then decided

upon for a period of three years appeared to be tantamount to the

abandonment of the original purpose, and the work was continued with

the intention of making it a private record to be printed at the

expiry of the term of silence, and to be privately circulated among

those who were personally concerned or interested; a record which

might perhaps be of service some day in filling in a page of South

African history.

The private circulation of that work during June of the present

year led to suggestions from many quarters that it should be

supplemented by a chapter or two dealing with later events and

published; and the present volume is the outcome of these

suggestions.

It is realized that much of what might properly appear in a private

record will be considered rather superfluous in a book designed for

wider circulation. For instance, a good deal of space is given to

details of the trial and the prison life of the Reformers, which are

of no interest whatever to the public, although they form a record

which the men themselves may like to preserve. These might have been

omitted but that the writer desired to make no alterations in the

original text except in the nature of literary revision.

The writer may be charged by the "peace" party with deliberately

selecting a critical and anxious time as opportune to contribute a

new factor to those already militating against a peaceful settlement.

Two replies could be made to this: one an excuse and one an answer.

It would be an excuse that the writer did not deliberately select

the time of publication, but that the Transvaal Government in its

wisdom chose to impose silence for three years, and that the project

with which their action had interfered was resumed at the earliest

possible moment. The coincidence of another crisis with the date of

emancipation may be an unlucky coincidence, or it may be a result.

But there is neither necessity nor intention to offer excuses. The

responsibility is accepted and the answer is that a case so sound

needs only to be understood, that a recital of the facts must help

to dispel the mists of race prejudice and misunderstanding which are

obscuring the judgment of many; and that a firm but strictly just

and dignified handling of the question by the Imperial Government

is the only possible way to avert a catastrophe in South Africa. It

is essential therefore that first of all the conditions as they are

should be understood; and this record is offered as a contribution

to that end. Let the measure of its truth be the measure of its

usefulness!

The reader is not invited to believe that the case is presented in

such form as it might have been presented by an impartial historian.

It is the Transvaal _from within_, by one who feels all the

injustice and indignity of the position. With the knowledge, however,

that a good case is spoiled by overstatement and with the desire to

avoid injustice to others an earnest attempt has been made to state

the facts fairly. In how far that attempt has been successful the

reader must decide for himself.

J.P.F.

_July, 1899._

NOTE

It has been impossible to avoid in this volume more or less pointed

reference to certain nationalities in certain connections; for

instance such expressions as "the Boers," "the Cape Dutch," "the

Hollanders," "the Germans," are used. The writer desires to say once

and for all that unless the contrary is obviously and deliberately

indicated, the distinctions between nationalities are intended in the

political sense only and not in the racial sense, and if by mischance

there should be found something in these pages which seems offensive,

he begs the more indulgent interpretation on the ground of a very

earnest desire to remove and not to accentuate race distinctions.

General references are also made to classes--"the civil service,"

"the officials," &c. There are officials in the Transvaal service

who would earn the confidence and esteem of the public in any

administration in the world. It is hardly necessary to say that there

is no intention to disparage them.

CONTENTS

PART I.

CHAPTER I. EARLIER DAYS 1

CHAPTER II. AFTER THE WAR 44

CHAPTER III. THE ORIGIN OF THE MOVEMENT 117

CHAPTER IV. THE REFORM COMMITTEE 137

CHAPTER V. THE COMMITTEE'S DILEMMA 151

CHAPTER VI. THE INVASION 173

CHAPTER VII. AFTER DOORNKOP 200

CHAPTER VIII. ARREST AND TRIAL OF THE REFORMERS 222

CHAPTER IX. LIFE IN GAOL 251

PART II.

CHAPTER X. THREE YEARS' GRACE 285

CHAPTER XI. THE BEGINNING OF THE END 333

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX A. Pretoria Convention. 369

APPENDIX B. London Convention. 377

APPENDIX C. President Kruger's Affairs in the Raads. 385

APPENDIX D. Volksraad Debates. 387

APPENDIX E. Malaboch. 395

APPENDIX F. The Great Franchise Debate. 396

APPENDIX G. Terms of Dr. Jameson's Surrender. 404

APPENDIX H. Sir John Willoughby's Report to the War Office. 411

APPENDIX I. Manifesto. 422

APPENDIX K. The Case of the Chieftainess Toeremetsjani. 432

APPENDIX L. Report on the Letter written on a Torn Telegram Form

signed "F.R.," by Mr. T.H. Gurrin, Expert in Handwriting. 438

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

IN EARLIER DAYS.

When, before resorting to extreme measures to obtain what the

Uitlanders deemed to be their bare rights, the final appeal or

declaration was made on Boxing Day, 1895, in the form of the

manifesto published by the Chairman of the National Union, President

Kruger, after an attentive consideration of the document as

translated to him, remarked grimly: 'Their rights. Yes, they'll get

them--over my dead body!' And volumes of explanation could not better

illustrate the Boer attitude and policy towards the English-speaking

immigrants.

'L'État c'est moi' is almost as true of the old Dopper President as

it was of its originator; for in matters of external policy and in

matters which concern the Boer as a party the President has his way

as surely and as completely as any anointed autocrat. To anyone who

has studied the Boers and their ways and policy--who has given more

than passing consideration to the incidents and negotiations of the

present year{01}--it must be clear that President Kruger does

something more than represent the opinion of the people and execute

their policy: he moulds them in the form he wills. By the force of

his own strong convictions and prejudices, and of his indomitable

will, he has made the Boers a people whom he regards as the germ of

the Africander nation; a people chastened, selected, welded, and

strong enough to attract and assimilate all their kindred in South

Africa, and then to realize the dream of a Dutch Republic from the

Zambesi to Capetown.

In the history of South Africa the figure of the grim old President

will loom large and striking--picturesque, as the figure of one who

by his character and will made and held his people; magnificent, as

one who in the face of the blackest fortune never wavered from his

aim or faltered in his effort; who, with a courage that seemed, and

still seems, fatuous, but which may well be called heroic, stood up

against the might of the greatest empire in the world. And, it may

be, pathetic, too, as one whose limitations were great, one whose

training and associations--whose very successes--had narrowed, and

embittered and hardened him; as one who, when the greatness of

success was his to take and to hold, turned his back on the supreme

opportunity, and used his strength and qualities to fight against the

spirit of progress, and all that the enlightenment of the age

pronounces to be fitting and necessary to good government and a

healthy State.

To an English nobleman, who, in the course of an interview, remarked,

'My father was a Minister of England, and twice Viceroy of Ireland,'

the old Dutchman answered, 'And my father was a shepherd!' It was not

pride rebuking pride; it was the ever-present fact which would not

have been worth mentioning but for the suggestion of the antithesis.

He too was a shepherd, and is--a peasant. It may be that he knows

what would be right and good for his people, and it may be not; but

it is sure that he realizes that to educate would be to emancipate,

to broaden their views would be to break down the defences of their

prejudices, to let in the new leaven would be to spoil the old bread,

to give unto all men the rights of men would be to swamp for ever the

party which is to him greater than the State. When one thinks on the

one-century history of the people, much is seen that accounts for

their extraordinary love of isolation, and their ingrained and

passionate aversion to control; much too that draws to them a world

of sympathy. And when one realizes the old Dopper President hemmed in

once more by the hurrying tide of civilization, from which his people

have fled for generations--trying to fight both fate and

Nature--standing up to stem a tide as resistless as the eternal

sea--one sees the pathos of the picture. But this is as another

generation may see it.

To-day we are too close--so close that the meaner details, the

insincerity, the injustice, the barbarity--all the unlovely touches

that will by-and-by be forgotten--sponged away by the gentle hand of

time, when only the picturesque will remain.

In order to understand the deep, ineradicable aversion to English

rule which is in the heart and the blood and the bones of every Boer,

and of a great many of their kindred who are themselves British

subjects, one must recall the conditions under which the Dutch came

under British rule. When, in 1814, the Cape was finally ceded to

England, it had been twice acquired and held by conquest. The

colonists were practically all Dutch, or Huguenots who had adopted

Dutch as their language, and South Africa as their home. In any case

they were people who, by tradition, teaching and experience, must

have regarded the English as their enemies; people in whom there must

have been roused bitter resentment against being handed over with the

land to their traditional enemies. Were they serfs or subjects? has

been asked on their behalf. Had Holland the right, the power, over

freemen born, to say to them, 'You are our subjects, on our soil, and

we have transferred the soil and with it your allegiance to England,

whose sovereignty you will not be free to repudiate.' The Dutch

colonist said 'No.' The English Government and the laws of the day

said 'Yes.'

Early in the century the Boers began to trek away from the sphere of

British rule. They were trekkers before that, indeed. Even in the

days of Van Riebeck (1650) they had trekked away from the crowded

parts, and opened up with the rifle and the plough new reaches of

country; pioneering in a rough but most effective way, driving back

the savage races, and clearing the way for civilization. There is,

however, a great difference to be noted between the early treks of

the emigrants and the treks 'from British rule.' In the former (with

few exceptions) they went, knowing that their Government would follow

them, and even anxious to have its support and its representatives;

and the people who formed their migrating parties were those who had

no or insufficient land in the settled parts, those who were starting

life on their own account, or those whose families could not be

located and provided for in the cramped circumstances of the more

occupied parts. In the other case, rich and poor, old and young,

went off as in the days and in the fashion of Moses or Abraham. They

went without leave or help of the Government; secretly or openly

they went, and they asked nothing but to be left alone. They left

their homes, their people, the protection of an established

Government and a rough civilization, and went out into the unknown.

And they had, as it appeared to them, and as it will appear to many

others, good reasons for taking so grave a step. For, although the

colonists of South Africa enjoyed better government, and infinitely

more liberty, under British rule, than they had under the tyrannical

_régime_ of the Dutch East India Company twenty years before

(against which the Boers had twice risen in rebellion) there were

many things which were not as they should have been. A generation

had grown up which knew nothing of the arbitrary and oppressive rule

of the old Dutch Company. Simple folks have long memories, and all

the world over injuries make a deeper and more lasting impression

than benefits; and the older generation of Boers, which could recall

a condition of things contrasting unpleasantly with British rule,

also remembered the executions of Slagters Nek--a vindication of the

law which, when all allowance has been made for disturbed times, and

the need of strong measures to stop rebellion in a newly-acquired

country, seems to us to-day to have been harsh, unnecessary, and

unwise in policy, and truly terrible in the manner of fulfilment.

The Boers have produced from their own ranks no literary champion to

plead or defend their cause, and their earlier history is therefore

little known, and often misunderstood; but to their aid has come Mr.

George McCall Theal, the South African historian, whose years of

laborious research have rescued for South Africa much that would

otherwise have been lost. In his 'History of the Boers' Mr. Theal

records the causes of the great emigration, and shows how the Boers

stood up for fair treatment, and fought the cause, not of Boers

alone, but of all colonists. Boers and British were alike harshly and

ignorantly treated by high-handed Governors, and an ill-informed and

prejudiced Colonial Office, who made no distinction on the grounds

of nationality between the two; for we read that Englishmen had been

expelled the country, thrown in gaol, had their property

confiscated, and their newspapers suppressed for asserting their

independence, and for trifling breaches of harsh laws. The following

extract gives the best possible synopsis of the causes, and should

whet an appetite which can be gratified by the purchase of Mr.

Theal's book:

Why, then, did these men abandon their homes, sacrifice whatever

property could not be carried away, and flee from English rule as

from the most hateful tyranny? The causes are stated in a great mass

of correspondence addressed by them to the Colonial Government, and

now preserved, with other colonial records, in declarations published

by some of them before leaving, in letters to their relatives and to

newspapers, and in hundreds of pages of printed matter, prepared by

friendly and hostile hands. The declaration of one of the ablest men

among them assigns the following as the motives of himself and the

party that went with him:

'GRAHAM'S TOWN,

'_January 22, 1837_

'1. We despair of saving the colony from those evils which threaten

it by the turbulent and dishonest conduct of vagrants who are allowed

to infest the country in every part; nor do we see any prospect of

peace or happiness for our children in a country thus distracted by

internal commotions.

'2. We complain of the severe losses which we have been forced to

sustain by the emancipation of our slaves, and the vexatious laws

which have been enacted respecting them.

'3. We complain of the continual system of plunder which we have for

years endured from the Kaffirs and other coloured classes, and

particularly by the last invasion of the colony, which has desolated

the frontier districts, and ruined most of the inhabitants.

'4. We complain of the unjustifiable odium which has been cast upon

us by interested and dishonest persons, under the name of religion,

whose testimony is believed in England, to the exclusion of all

evidence in our favour; and we can foresee, as the result of this

prejudice, nothing but the total ruin of the country.

'5. We are resolved, wherever we go, that we will uphold the just

principles of liberty; but, whilst we will take care that no one is

brought by us into a condition of slavery, we will establish such

regulations as may suppress crime, and preserve proper relations

between master and servant.

'6. We solemnly declare that we leave this colony with a desire to

enjoy a quieter life than we have hitherto had. We will not molest

any people, nor deprive them of the smallest property; but, if

attacked, we shall consider ourselves fully justified in defending

our persons and effects, to the utmost of our ability, against every

enemy.

'7. We make known that when we shall have framed a code of laws for

our guidance, copies shall be forwarded to this colony for general

information; but we take the opportunity of stating that it is our

firm resolve to make provision for the summary punishment, even with

death, of all traitors, without exception, who may be found amongst

us.

'8. We purpose, in the course of our journey, and on arrival at the

country in which we shall permanently reside, to make known to the

native tribes our intentions, and our desire to live in peace and

friendly intercourse with them.

'9. We quit this colony under the full assurance that the English

Government has nothing more to require of us, and will allow us to

govern ourselves without its interference in future.

'10. We are now leaving the fruitful land of our birth, in which we

have suffered enormous losses and continual vexation, and are about

to enter a strange and dangerous territory; but we go with a firm

reliance on an all-seeing, just, and merciful God, whom we shall

always fear, and humbly endeavour to obey.

'In the name of all who leave the colony with me,

'P. RETIEF.'

But formal declarations such as the above are not in all instances to

be trusted. It is much safer to compare numerous documents written at

different times, by different persons, and under different

circumstances. For our subject this means of information is as

complete as can be desired. The correspondence of the emigrants with

the Cape Government was the work of many individuals, and extended

over many years. The letters are usually of great length, badly

constructed, and badly spelt--the productions, in short, of

uneducated men; but so uniform is the vein of thought running through

them all, that there is not the slightest difficulty in condensing

them into a dozen pages. When analyzed, the statements contained in

them are found to consist of two charges, one against the Imperial

Government, the other against the agents in South Africa of the

London Missionary Society.

The Imperial Government was charged with exposing the white

inhabitants of the colony, without protection, to robbery and murder

by the blacks; with giving credence in every dispute to statements

made by interested persons in favour of savages, while refusing to

credit the testimony, no matter how reliable, of colonists of

European extraction; with liberating the slaves in an unjust manner;

and generally with such undue partiality for persons with black skins

and savage habits, as to make it preferable to seek a new home in the

wilderness than remain under the English flag.

The missionaries of the London Society were charged with usurping

authority that should properly belong to the civil magistrate; with

misrepresenting facts; and with advocating schemes directly hostile

to the progress of civilization, and to the observance of order. And

it was asserted that the influence of these missionaries was all

powerful at the Colonial Office in London, by which the colony,

without a voice in the management of its affairs, was then ruled

absolutely.

In support of the charges against the Imperial Government, the

emigrants dwelt largely upon the devastation of the eastern districts

by the Kaffirs' inroad of December, 1834, which was certainly

unprovoked by the colonists. Yet Lord Glenelg, who was then Secretary

of State for the Colonies, justified the Kaffirs, and not only

refused to punish them, but actually gave them a large slip of land,

including the dense jungles along the Fish River, that had long

been part of the colony; and made no other provision against the

recurrence of a destructive invasion than a series of treaties with a

number of barbarous chiefs, who had no regard for their engagements.

This event is the most prominent feature in the correspondence of

the emigrants; it is fairly recorded, and the language used is in

general much more moderate than that employed by the English

frontier colonists when relating the same circumstance.

Next stands the removal of all restraint from the coloured population

of the colony, without the protection to the whites of even a Vagrant

Act. Several of the colonial divisions had been for ten or twelve

years overrun by fugitives from the Basuto and Betshuana countries,

who had been driven from their own homes by the troubles already

recorded. These people were usually termed Mantatees or Makatees,

from the supposition that they were all subjects of Ma Ntatisi.

Towards the eastern frontiers Kaffirs, and after the war Fingos,

wandered about practically wherever they chose. In the remainder of

the colony Hottentots, free blacks, and mixed breeds came and went as

they pleased. How is it possible, said the farmers, for us to

cultivate the ground, or breed cattle, with all these savages and

semi-savages constantly watching for opportunities to plunder

us--with no police, and no law under which suspicious characters can

be arrested and made to account for their manner of living?

Much is said of the reproofs of Sir Benjamin D'Urban by the Secretary

of State, and, after 1838, of the dismissal of that Governor, (1) The

emigrants asserted that he was the best Governor the colony had had

since it became subject to England; they dwelt upon his benevolence,

his ability, his strict justice, his impartiality to white and black,

his efforts to promote civilization; and then they complained, in

words more bitter than are to be found when they referred to any

other subject, that the good Governor had been reproved, and finally

deprived of his office, because he had told the plain truth,

regardless of the London Missionary Society; and had endeavoured to

mete out to black criminals the same justice that he would have meted

out had they been white. There is now no one in South Africa who does

not agree with the emigrants in this matter. Nearly half a century

has passed away since Sir Benjamin D'Urban was forced into retirement

by Lord Glenelg; and during that period the principal measures which

he proposed have been approved of and adopted, while the successors

of those missionaries who were his bitter opponents are at present

among the strongest advocates of his system of dealing with the

natives.

Sir Benjamin D'Urban remained in South Africa, after being deprived

of office, until the reversal of his policy towards the natives was

admitted by most people even in England to have been a mistake. He

did not leave the Cape until April, 1846, just after the commencement

of the War of the Axe.

Concerning the liberation of the slaves, there is less in this

correspondence than one might reasonably expect to find. Many scores

of pages can be examined without any allusion whatever to it. Nowhere

is there a single word to be found in favour of slavery as an

institution; the view of the emigrants, with hardly an exception,

being fairly represented in the following sentence, taken from a

letter of the Volksraad at Natal to Sir George Napier: 'A long and

sad experience has sufficiently convinced us of the injury, loss, and

dearness of slave labour, so that neither slavery nor the slave trade

will ever be permitted among us.'

[The allusions to the emancipation of slaves, and to slavery as an

institution, will be considered by many to need some modification or

explanation. The Dutch even to-day speak of the emancipation as the

real cause of the great exodus; and the system of indenture, and

the treatment of natives generally by the Boers, cannot fairly be

regarded as warranting the view expressed by Mr. Theal in connection

with this letter to Sir George Napier.]

It is alleged, however, that the emancipation, as it was carried out,

was an act of confiscation. It is stated that most of the slaves were

brought to the colony in English ships, and sold by English subjects;

that when, in 1795, the colony was invited by English officers of

high rank to place itself under the protection of England, one of the

inducements held out was security in slave property; at the same time

those officers warning the colonists that if France obtained

possession she would liberate the slaves, as she had done in

Martinique, thereby ruining this colony as she had ruined that

island; that the English Government had recently and suddenly changed

its policy, and required them to conform to the change with equal

alacrity, whereas they were convinced that gradual emancipation, with

securities against vagrancy, was the only safe course. The

emancipation had been sudden, and the slaves had been placed upon a

perfect political equality with their former proprietors. The

missionaries applauded this as a noble and generous act of the

Imperial Government, and they were told that by everyone in England

it was so regarded. But at whose expense was this noble and generous

act carried out? Agents of the Imperial Government had appraised the

slaves, generally at less than their market value. Two-fifths of this

appraisement, being the share apportioned to the Cape out of the

twenty million pounds sterling voted by the Imperial Parliament, had

then been offered to the proprietors as compensation, if they chose

to go to London for it, otherwise they could only dispose of their

claims at a heavy discount. Thus, in point of fact, only about

one-third of the appraised amount had been received. To all

slave-holders this had meant a great reduction of wealth, while to

many of those who were in debt it was equivalent to the utter

deprivation of all property.

As regards the missionaries, a crusade was organized by some of these

worthies, who had themselves married Kaffir women, and who spared no

effort and showed no scruple in blackening the name of colonist.

The views and interests of the colonists and of these men were so

different that concord was hardly possible. The missionaries desired

that the blacks should be collected together in villages: the

colonists were unwilling that they should be thus withdrawn from

service. 'Teach them the first step in civilization, to labour

honestly for their maintenance, and add to that oral instruction in

the doctrines of Christianity,' said the colonists. 'Why should they

be debarred from learning to read and write? And as there can only be

schools if they are brought together in villages, why should they not

be collected together?' replied the missionaries.

Then came another and a larger question. By whom should the waste

places of the land, the vast areas which were without other occupants

than a few roving Bushmen, be peopled? 'By the white man,' said the

colonists; 'it is to the advantage of the world in all time to come

that the higher race should expand and be dominant here; it would be

treason to humanity to prevent its growth where it can grow without

wrong to others, or to plant an inferior stock where the superior can

take root and flourish.' 'By Africans,' said the missionaries; 'this

is African soil; and if mission stations are established on its

desolate tracts, people will be drawn to them from the far interior,

the community will grow rapidly, those enlightened by Christianity

here will desire in their turn to enlighten their friends beyond, and

thus the Gospel teaching will spread until all Africa stretches out

its hands to God.' Coupled with such arguments, which were constantly

used by missionaries in the early part of this century, before their

enthusiasm was cooled by experience, were calculations that appealed

strongly to the commercial instincts of people in England. A dozen

colonial farmers required something like a hundred square miles of

land for their cattle runs; on this same ground, under missionary

supervision, three or four hundred families of blacks could exist;

these blacks would shortly need large quantities of manufactured

goods; and thus it would be to the interest of trade to encourage

them rather than the colonists. 'Already,' said they, 'after only a

few years' training, many blacks can read as well or better than the

ordinary colonists, and are exhibiting a decided taste for

civilization.'

There was thus a broad line of demarcation between the colonists and

such of the missionaries as held these views, and the tendency on

each side was to make it still broader. It was deepened into positive

antipathy towards those missionaries who, following Dr. Vanderkemp's

example, united themselves in marriage with black women, and

proclaimed themselves the champions of the black population against

the white. Everyone acquainted with South African natives knows how

ready they are to please their friends by bringing forward charges

against anyone whom those friends dislike. Unfortunately the

missionaries Vanderkemp and Read were deceived into believing a great

number of charges of cruelty made against various colonists, which a

little observation would have shown in most instances to be

groundless; and thereupon they lodged accusations before the High

Court of Justice. In 1811 between seventy and eighty such cases came

before the Circuit Court for trial. There was hardly a family on the

frontier of which some relative was not brought as a criminal before

the judges to answer to a charge of murder or violent assault.

Several months were occupied in the trials, and more than a thousand

witnesses were examined, but in every instance the most serious

charges were proved to be without foundation. Only a few convictions,

and those of no very outrageous crimes, resulted from these

prosecutions, which kept the entire colony in a ferment until long

after the circuit was closed.

Thus far everyone will approve of the sentiments of one party or the

other according to his sympathy, but in what follows no unprejudiced

person who will take the trouble to study the matter thoroughly can

acquit the anti-colonial missionaries of something more faulty than

mere error of judgment. For years their writings teemed with charges

against the colonists similar to those they had brought before the

High Court of Justice. These writings were circulated widely in

Europe, where the voice of the colonists was never heard, and they

created impressions there which no refutation made in South Africa

could ever counteract. The acts, the language, even the written

petitions of the colonists, were so distorted in accounts sent home,

that these accounts cannot now be read by those who have made

themselves acquainted with the truth, without the liveliest feelings

of indignation being excited.

The colonists learned that in England they were regarded as cruel

barbarians because they refused to permit Hottentot herds, swarming

with vermin, to be seated in their front rooms at the time of family

prayer. They found themselves pictured as the harshest of

taskmasters, as unfeeling violators of native rights. And of late

years it had become plain to them that the views of their opponents

were being acted upon at the Colonial Office, while their complaints

were wholly disregarded.

Several causes of dissatisfaction, besides those above mentioned,

contributed to the impulse of emigration, but all in a very slight

degree. Judge Cloete, in his 'Five Lectures,' mentions the severe

punishment inflicted upon the frontier insurgents of 1815 as one of

them; and there is no doubt that it was so with some families, though

no trace of it can be found in the correspondence of the emigrants.

The substitution in 1827 of the English for the Dutch language in the

colonial courts of law was certainly generally felt as a grievance.

The alteration in 1813 of the system of land tenure, the redemption

in 1825 of the paper currency at only thirty-six hundredths of its

nominal value, and the abolition in 1827 of the courts of landdrost

and heemraden, unquestionably caused much dissatisfaction, though all

of these measures are now admitted by everyone to have been

beneficial. The long delay in issuing titles to farms, the cost of

which has been paid to Government years before, is mentioned as a

grievance in some of the declarations.

Two parties--men, women, and children--numbering ninety-eight in all,

pioneered the great trek; of these twenty-six survived fever and

fighting, loss of provisions, waggons, and cattle, and a long weary

tramp from Zoutpansberg to Delagoa Bay, and were rescued and taken

thence to Natal, and two children were carried off by the natives.

The survivors were three women with their twelve children--seven

orphan children and four youths. Not a single grown man escaped.

During the winter of 1836 preparations for emigration were being made

over the eastern and midland districts. The Governor was perfectly

helpless in the matter. The Attorney-General, Mr. A. Oliphant, was

consulted by the Governor, and gave his opinion that 'it seemed next

to an impossibility to prevent persons passing out of the colony by

laws in force, or by any which could be framed.' On August 19 Sir

Benjamin D'Urban wrote to the Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Andries

Stockenstrom, that 'he could see no means of stopping the emigration,

except by persuasion, and attention to the wants and necessities of

the farmers.' In that direction the Governor had done all that was in

his power, but he could not act in opposition to the instructions of

the Secretary of State. Sir Andries Stockenstrom himself, in replying

to an address from the inhabitants of Uitenhage, stated that 'he

was not aware of any law which prevented any of his Majesty's

subjects from leaving his dominions and settling in another country;

and such a law, if it did exist, would be tyrannical and

oppressive.'

The story of the trekkers is one of surpassing interest, and must

enlist for them the sympathy and unbounded admiration of all.

By the middle of the year 1837 there were over one thousand waggons

between the Caledon and Vaal rivers--truly a notable and alarming

exodus; and the Boers then began the work of carving out new

countries for themselves. Their history surpasses all fiction in its

vicissitudes, successes, and tragedies. They fought and worked and

trekked, onward, always onward--never returning--on beyond the

furthermost outposts of civilization.

And so the story rolls on, gaining pathos, but losing no whit of

interest from its eternal sameness. They fought, and worked, and

starved, and died for their land of promise, where they might hope to

be alone, like the simple people of their one Book; where they might

never know the hated British rule; where they might never experience

the forms and trammels, the restlessness and changes, the worries,

the necessities or benefits, of progressing civilization. Their

quarrel had been with the abuses and blunders of one Government; but

a narrow experience moved them to mistrust all but their own pastoral

patriarchal way, moulded on the records of the Bible, and to regard

the evidences of progress as warnings of coming oppression and

curtailment of liberty, and a departure from the simple and ideal

way. The abuses from which they suffered are no more; the methods

which were unjust have been abandoned; the ignorance of the ruler has

been dispelled; in place of despotism there is autonomy; justice

rules where ignorance and bias sat; liberty where there was

interference; protection for oppression; progress and civilization

have increased as in no other epoch; and the nation and Government

from which they severed themselves have taken their place in the very

forefront of all. But the Boer sees with the eyes of sixty years ago!

The ideal was impossible, the struggle hopeless, the end certain.

They trekked, and trekked and trekked again; but the flag of

England--emblem of all they hated--was close by; behind, beside,

in front, or over them; and the something which they could not

fight--the ever-advancing tide of civilization--lapped at their

feet, and slowly, silently, and for ever blotted out the line where

they had written, 'Thus far and no further.'

The South African Republic had been in existence as an independent

State for twelve years when it reached that condition of insolvency

which appeared to invite, or at least justify, annexation, as the

only alternative to complete ruin and chaos. And there are very few,

even among the most uncompromising supporters of the Boers, who

seriously attempt to show that the Transvaal had any prospect of

prolonging its existence as an independent State for more than a few

months when Sir Theophilus Shepstone annexed it in 1877. The

following picture is from a book published by the late Alfred

Aylward, the Fenian, more anti-British than the Boer himself, who was

present at the time, and wrote his book in order to enlist sympathy

for the movement then (1878) organized to obtain a cancellation of

the annexation. The value of Aylward's testimony would not be fairly

appreciated without some explanation.

Sir Bartle Frere describes him (and quotes Scotland Yard authorities

who knew him well) as one of the party who murdered the policeman at

Manchester, and one of the worst and most active of the dynamiting

Irishmen--a professional agitator, who boasted of his purpose to

promote the Transvaal rebellion. Major Le Caron, too, stated on oath

before the Parnell Commission that money was sent by the Irish Rebel

Societies, through Aylward, to stir up the Transvaal rebellion. This

is what Aylward says:

All South Africa was for the moment at rest, with the exception of

the district of Utrecht, where an old-standing grievance with

Cetewayo was the cause of some little alarm and excitement (_i.e._,

Cetewayo's threatened invasion). Still, the Transvaal was disturbed

throughout its whole extent by the expectation of some pending

change--a change coming from the outside, which had been invited by

an active, discontented party, chiefly foreigners, dwellers in towns,

non-producers, place-hunters, deserters, refugees, land-speculators,

'development-men,' and pests of Transvaal society generally, who

openly preached resistance to the law, refusal to pay taxes, and

contempt of the natural and guaranteed owners of the country in

which they lived, in the distinctly expressed hope that foreign

intervention would fill the country with British gold, and conduce

to their own material prosperity. The Boers, spread over a country

larger than France, were stunned into stupor by the demonstrative

loudness of the party of discontent. In some districts they (the

Boers) were poor, and could not readily pay the taxes imposed upon

them by the wars and railway projects of the Government. Their

Volksraad was in Session, but its every action was paralyzed by the

gloom of impending dissolution.

The Republic owed £215,000, which it had no immediate means of

paying. Its creditors were clamorous; whilst the Executive, turn to

which side it would, found itself confronted by threats, reproaches,

accusations of slavery and cruelty based upon hearsay, and which,

like the annexation that steadily approached, could not be met,

because neither of them had yet assumed the evidenced consistency of

actual fact. There was no public opinion to support the Government or

to save the Republic. The Boers lived far apart from each other,

whilst the annexationists and the party of disorder dwelt, in compact

communities, in towns and mining villages. Into the midst of this

confusion--into the capital of this bewildered State--entered Sir

Theophilus Shepstone and his staff. He had not come to seize the

country--he had come as 'an adviser, as a helper, and as a friend';

but his advent was a blight--an incubus which rendered additionally

powerless the unfortunate President and his Council. The coming of

Sir Theophilus Shepstone was, to the minds of nearly all, but too

clearly the forerunner of change. In the face of this additional

whet to the anticipations of the party of disturbance, something

that has been described as anarchy prevailed. Everyone waited; all

fell into a state of expectation; no one attempted to save the State,

or repel the danger. At the same time, there was no anarchy in the

proper sense of the word. Justice sat on her seat; criminals were

arrested and brought to trial; actions at law were heard and

determined; and in no one place, save the goldfields, was authority,

even for a moment, defied. There the law vindicated itself without

having used violence or shed one drop of blood. Not one single

public outrage, not one unpunished crime, marked this period of

suspense, which is described by partizan writers as a time of

chaos and anarchy.

Peace was granted to Secocoeni, and the quietness and gloom of the

country became even more profound.

Now, had a commission, royal or joint, been opened in Pretoria to

inquire into the truth of the allegations made against the

Government, history might perhaps be able to record that judgment,

followed by justice, had overtaken the Transvaal. No commission was

opened. There was a banquet and a ball. The suspense increased in

intensity. Understrappers, and agents of the discontented faction,

filled the country with rumours of impending annexation, and

sometimes of impending conquest. The Boers, the inhabitants of the

country, asked day after day what was the mission of the English

Commissioner. They visited him in hundreds; but he knew the wonderful

advantage to be gathered from the heightening of the mystery, and the

intensifying of the excitement. He listened to everyone; but he

maintained a gloomy and impassive silence, neither checking the

aspirations of the annexationists, nor dissipating the forebodings of

the farmers.

News arrived that troops were marching towards, and massing on,

Theophilus sought not to alleviate the anxieties of the Government,

nor to quell the now rising alarm amongst the people; he simply sat

still and listened, watching the writhings and stragglings of the

doomed Volksraad, and awaiting a favourable moment to end its

existence.

At length someone determined to ask: 'Was it not possible to avert

this annexation which loomed before every mind, brooding like a

shadow upon the country?' He went to Sir Theophilus; he asked his

question; and at length the oracle spoke. Without moving a muscle of

his wonderfully impassive countenance, without even raising his eyes

to look at the interlocutor, Sir Theophilus calmly murmured: 'It is

too late!--too late!' And so, without the authorization of the home

Government, without the consent of her Majesty's High Commissioner,

without the concurrence of the Volksraad, against the will of

thirty-nine-fortieths of the people, and in defiance of the protest

of their Executive, as Mr. Anthony Trollope puts it, Sir Theophilus

said: 'Then and from thenceforth the Transvaal shall be British

property!' So he put up the Queen's flag.

Now, it is impossible to conceive anything more admirable for its

discretion, more wisely calculated as to the moment of its

occurrence, or more suavely and yet firmly done than this act. There

was not a blow struck, not a shot fired; and the first impulse of

nearly every person in the country, whether in principle opposed to

annexation or not, was to congratulate Sir Theophilus Shepstone on

the skill, tact, and good fortune with which he had put an end to the

excessive anxiety, the mental strain, the fears, hopes, and

expectations by which the whole country was paralyzed. Whether the

annexation be now held to be right or wrong, its execution, so far as

regards the act itself, was an unparalleled triumph of tact, modesty,

and firmness.

It was not discovered at the moment, and it never entered into any

man's mind to consider, that it was the presence in Pretoria of Sir

Theophilus himself that had created the anxiety, and caused the

paralysis; and that it was his arts and presence that had tightened

and strung up into quivering intensity the mind of the country. He

had broken the spell; he had introduced certainty in place of

uncertainty; and he was congratulated, and very properly so, for the

manner in which he had brought to a conclusion his hazardous mission.

Sir Theophilus Shepstone's despatches record his negotiations with

President Burgers, and the arrangement which allowed him to make a

formal protest against the annexation, so as to satisfy his

Irreconcilables, whilst he in reality not only assented to the

measure, but even assisted the completion of it, and discussed the

details with Shepstone, who in turn had revised President Burgers'

'protest.'

On April 3, 1877, Shepstone had written to Frere:

Mr. Burgers, who had been all along, as far as his conversation and

professions to me went, in full accord with me, had suddenly taken

alarm; he made impossible proposals, all of which involved infinite

delay, and, of course, dangerous agitation. As far as I am concerned,

leave the country, civil war would at once take place, as the natives

would consider it the sunshine in which they could make hay in the

Transvaal; the goldfields are in a state of rebellion against the

Transvaal Government, and they are kept from overt acts only by my

warnings and entreaties.

And eight days later he wrote to Mr. Robert Herbert enclosing his

letter under 'flying seal' to Frere:

There will be a protest against my act of annexation issued by the

Government, but they will at the same time call upon the people to

submit quietly, pending the issue; you need not be disquieted by such

action, because it is taken merely to save appearances, and the

members of the Government from the violence of a faction that seems

for years to have held Pretoria in terror when any act of the

Government displeased it.

You will better understand this when I tell you privately that the

President has from the first fully acquiesced in the necessity for

the change, and that most of the members of the Government have

expressed themselves anxious for it; but none of them have had the

courage openly to express their opinions, so I have had to act

apparently against them; and this I have felt bound to do, knowing

the state and danger of the country, and that three-fourths of the

people will be thankful for the change when once it is made.

Yesterday morning Mr. Burgers came to me to arrange how the matter

should be done. I read to him the draft of my Proclamation, and he

proposed the alteration of two words only, to which I agreed. He

brought to me a number of conditions which he wished me to insert,

which I have accepted, and have embodied in my Proclamation. He told

me that he could not help issuing a protest, to keep the noisy

portion of the people quiet--and you will see grounds for this

precaution when I tell you that there are only half a dozen native

constables to represent the power of the State in Pretoria, and a

considerable number of the Boers in the neighbourhood are of the

lowest and most ignorant class. Mr. Burgers read me, too, the draft

of his protest, and asked me if I saw any objection to it, or thought

it too strong. I said that it appeared to me to pledge the people to

resist by-and-by; to which he replied that it was to tide over the

difficulty of the moment, seeing that my support, the troops, were a

fortnight's march distant, and that by the time the answer to the

protest came, all desire of opposition would have died out. I

therefore did not persuade him from his protest.

You will see, when the proclamation reaches you, that I have taken

high ground. Nothing but annexation will or can save the State, and

nothing else can save South Africa from the direst consequences. All

the thinking and intelligent people know this, and will be thankful

to be delivered from the thraldom of petty factions, by which they

are perpetually kept in a state of excitement and unrest, because the

Government, and everything connected with it, is a thorough sham.

This arrangement with President Burgers was a most improper

compromise on both sides. Moreover, Shepstone received the protests

of the Executive Council and of the Volksraad before he issued his

proclamation. He had plenty of evidence to show that even if his

action was approved by the majority, the Boers were sufficiently

divided to demand some delay. He knew that the members of the

Government and of the Raad would not face the responsibility of

relinquishing the State's independence, although he received

private assurances and entreaties encouraging him to act. He had

representations and deputations from the Boers themselves,

sufficient in weight and number to warrant his belief that a large

proportion of the people desired annexation. He should not have

allowed the 'hedging' that was practised at his expense. The Boer

leaders were 'between the devil and the deep sea.' There can be no

doubt whatever that they dearly loved and prized their independence,

and would have fought even then for it had they been in a position

to preserve and profit by it; but they were not. They dared neither

ask for relief at the price of annexation, nor reject the proffered

relief at the price of continuing the hopeless struggle. So they

compromised. They took the relief, they accepted pay of the new

Government, and entered a protest, so as to put themselves right

with the records and stand well with untamed ones of the party.

The Act of Annexation is so generally condemned by the friends and

sympathizers of the Boers, and is so persistently quoted by them as

the cause of the Boer War, that it is only right to show clearly what

the opinion was at that time; and if it be deemed that overmuch space

is given to this matter, the answer is, that it is quoted now as the

crime which gave rise to the present hatred and mistrust of England,

and it is all-important that the truth should be clear.

This is what Mr. J.F. Celliers, the patriotic editor of the Boer

newspaper, _De Volksstem_, wrote in reviewing the work of the special

session of the Volksraad, convened to deal with the questions of Lord

Carnarvon's Federation Bill, and the rescuing of the country from

ruin and chaos:--'During the session we have repeatedly had occasion

to comment on the doings of the Raad. These comments have not been

favourable, and we regret to say that we have found in the closing

scenes of our Legislature no reason to alter our opinions.' Then

follows a scathing account of the 'work done,' in which occur such

references as:--'With the exception of a couple of members,

no one had the sense or manliness to go into the question of

confederation'; and 'The most surprising feature of the whole

affair was this--that most of the speakers seemed not to have the

faintest conception of the desperate condition in which the country

stood....' And again, under date of March 28: 'About three months

ago we said we would prefer confederation under the British flag if

the state of anarchy then threatening were to continue. We know that

a good and stable Government is better than anarchy any day.'

It is noteworthy that the writer of the above is the same Mr.

Celliers who, two years later, was put in gaol by Colonel Lanyon on a

charge of sedition, because he attacked the Administration for its

failure to keep the promises made at the time of annexation.

Three thousand out of eight thousand voters actually signed petitions

in favour of annexation. In the Raad, President Burgers openly

reproached members for proclaiming in public, and for improper

reasons, views diametrically opposed to those privately expressed on

the confederation and annexation questions; and refused to consult

with three out of four members appointed as a deputation to confer

with him on these subjects, because they had not paid their taxes,

and had so helped by example, not less than by the actual offence, to

cause the ruin of the country and the loss of independence. And on

March 3 President Burgers read an address to the Raad, in which the

following words occur:

'I would rather be a policeman under a strong Government than the

President of such a State. It is you--you members of the Raad and the

Boers--who have lost the country, who have sold your independence for

a _soupe_ (a drink). You have ill-treated the natives, you have shot

them down, you have sold them into slavery, and now you have to pay

the penalty.'

* * * * * * *

'We should delude ourselves by entertaining the hope that matters

would mend by-and-by. It would only be self-deceit. I tell you

openly, matters are as bad as they ever can be; they cannot be worse.

These are bitter truths, and people may perhaps turn their backs on

me; but then I shall have the consolation of having done my duty.'

* * * * * * *

'It is said here this or that man must be released from taxes,

because the Kaffirs have driven them off their farms, and occupy the

latter. By this you proclaim to the world that the strongest man is

master here, that the right of the strongest obtains here.' [Mr.

Mare: 'This is not true.'] 'Then it is not true what the honourable

member, Mr. Breytenbach, has told us about the state of the Lydenburg

district; then it is not true either what another member has said

about the farms in Zoutpansberg, which are occupied by Kaffirs.

Neither is it true, then, what I saw with my own eyes at Lydenburg,

where the burghers had been driven off their farms by the Kaffirs,

and where Johannes was ploughing and sowing on the land of a burgher.

These are facts, and they show that the strongest man is the master

here. The fourth point which we have to take into account affects our

relations with our English neighbours. It is asked, What have they

got to do with our position? I tell you, as much as we have to do

with that of our Kaffir neighbours. As little as we can allow

barbarities among the Kaffirs on our borders, as little can they

allow that in a state on their borders anarchy and rebellion should

prevail.'

* * * * * * *

'Do you know what has recently happened in Turkey? Because no

civilized government was carried on there, the Great Powers

interfered and said, "Thus far, and no further." And if this is done

to an empire, will a little republic be excused when it misbehaves?

* * * * * * *

'Complain to other Powers, and seek justice there? Yes, thank God!

justice is still to be found, even for the most insignificant; but it

is precisely the justice which will convict us. If we want justice,

we must be in a position to ask it with unsullied hands.'

* * * * * * *

'Whence has arisen that urgency to make an appeal for interference

elsewhere? Has that appeal been made only by enemies of the State? Oh

no, gentlemen; it has arisen from real grievances. Our people have

degenerated from their former position; they have become demoralised;

they are not what they ought to be.'

* * * * * * *

'To-day a bill for £1,100 was laid before me for signature; but I

would sooner have cut off my right hand than sign that paper, for I

have not the slightest ground to expect that when that bill becomes

due there will be a penny to pay it with.'

* * * * * * *

The President added, and his statements remained uncontradicted:

The principal thing which had brought them to their present position

was that to which they would not give attention. It was not this or

that thing which impeded their way, but they themselves stopped the

way; and if they asked him what prevented the people from remaining

obstruction, owing to the inherent incapacity and weakness of the

people. But whence this weakness? Was it because they were deformed?

because they were worse than other people? because they were too few

and too insignificant to occupy the country? Those arguments did not

weigh with him. They were not true; he did not consider them of any

importance. The people were as good as any other people, but they

were completely demoralized; they had lost faith in God, reliance

upon themselves, or trust in each other. Hence he believed they were

inherently weak.

* * * * * * *

He did not believe that a new constitution would save them; for as

little as the old constitution had brought them to ruin, so little

would a new constitution bring them salvation.

* * * * * * *

The Great Powers, with all their greatness, all their thousands of

soldiers, would fall as quickly as this State had fallen, and even

more quickly, if their citizens were to do what the citizens of this

State had done; if the citizens of England had behaved towards the

Crown as the burghers of this State had behaved to their Government,

England would never have stood as long as she had, not even as long

as this State had stood. This State owed obligations to other

countries; they knew that the fire which had nearly consumed this

State would, if felt by them, very soon consume them also.

* * * * * * *

In several of the cities of Holland there were people who had

subscribed for only one debenture, because they thought men of their

own blood were living in South Africa. What was the consequence? The

interest up to July last had been paid; in January of this year

£2,250 was due for interest, and there was not a penny to meet it.

* * * * * * *

To take up arms and fight was nonsense; to draw the sword would be to

draw the sword against God, for it was God's judgment that the State

was in the condition it was to-day; and it was their duty to inquire

whether they should immerse in blood the thousands of innocent

inhabitants of this country, and if so, what for? For an idea--for

something they had in their heads, but not in their hearts; for an

independence which was not prized. Let them make the best of the

situation, and get the best terms they possibly could; let them agree

to join their hands to those of their brethren in the south, and then

from the Cape to the Zambesi there would be one great people. Yes,

there was something grand in that--grander even than their idea of a

Republic--something which ministered to their national feeling. And

would this be so miserable? Yes; this would be miserable for those

who would not be under the law, for the rebel and revolutionist, but

welfare and prosperity for the men of law and order.

* * * * * * *

They must not underrate their real and many difficulties. He could

point to the south-western border, the Zulu, the goldfields, and

other questions, and show them that it was their duty to come to an

arrangement with the British Government, and to do so in a bold and

manly manner. An hon. member on Saturday last had spoken with a

fervent patriotism; but he had failed to appreciate the reference,

because it amounted to this--that they must shut their eyes to

everything, so as to keep their independence.

President Burgers, who left the Transvaal broken-hearted, more by the

cruel and mean intriguing and dissensions among, and disloyalty of,

his own people, which made the annexation possible, than by the Act

itself, when dying left a statement of the case. It is too long to

reproduce in its entirety. He shows how the English faction worked

for annexation, and how the Dopper party, headed by Kruger, allied

themselves with the former in intrigue against the Government,

thwarting all effort at reform and organization, and encouraging the

refusal to pay taxes. He states plainly that this course was pursued

by Kruger in order to oust him from power, and secure the Presidency

for himself. He shows how he opposed 'that other element which had

formerly worked in secret, viz., British interference, which got a

strong support from the Boers themselves, and one of their chief

leaders, P. Kruger, who had betrayed me, after promising me his and

his party's support.' He gives the final scene as follows:

The Volksraad had gone away, having done nothing but harm. The

members of the Executive had gone home, as if all were safe, and I

sat with a half-new Cabinet and part of an old one, half discharged.

Yet I made one attempt more, and drafted a letter to Shepstone,

intimating that I would oppose the annexation by force of arms, etc.;

and showed this to two members of the Executive. The response to my

appeal, however, was so weak (one of them being in league with the

English) that I had to abandon the project, and try to prepare for

the worst. When, therefore, Shepstone's announcement came--that he

could wait no longer, that he had given us time enough to reform, and

that he must issue his proclamation--I could do no more than advise a

protest, and an appeal to foreign powers. This having been agreed to

by my Government, I met Shepstone in presence of the Executive, and

what could be saved for the country, such as its language, its

legislature, the position of its officials, etc., was arranged.

Before issuing his proclamation, Shepstone desired to see copies of

both mine and the Government protest. This I promised, on condition

he showed me his proclamation before publication: to which he agreed.

To one clause I greatly objected, and protested--namely, the threat

of confiscation of property for disobeying the proclamation. I

pointed out that this was barbarous, and would be punishing a man's

innocent family for his actions. The clause was omitted. This is

the origin of the lie that I helped Shepstone in drawing up this

proclamation. In justice to Shepstone, I must say that I would not

consider an officer of my Government to have acted faithfully if he

had not done what Shepstone did; and if the act was wrong (which

undoubtedly it was), not he, but his Government, is to blame for it.

Messrs. Kruger and Jorissen left within a month to protest in England

against the annexation.

Sir T. Shepstone wrote (May 9): 'Mr. Paul Kruger and his colleague,

Dr. Jorissen, D.D., the Commission to Europe, leave to-day. I do not

think that either of them wishes the Act of Annexation to be

cancelled; Dr. Jorissen certainly does not.' And Mr. J.D. Barry,

Recorder of Kimberley, wrote to Frere (May 15): 'The delegates, Paul

Kruger and Dr. Jorissen, left Pretoria on the 8th, and even they do

not seem to have much faith in their mission. Dr. Jorissen thinks

that the reversal of Sir Theophilus's Act would not only be

impossible, but a great injury to the country.'

It is not necessary to seek hostile testimony to establish the fact

that the Boers as a whole acquiesced in the annexation; the

foregoing quotation from Aylward's book supplies all that is

needed--unintentionally, perhaps. The Zulu menace, which Aylward so

lightly dismisses, was a very serious matter; the danger a very real

one. It has frequently been asserted by the Boers and their friends

that the Zulu trouble was fomented by a section of the Natal people,

and that Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself, if he did not openly

encourage the Zulu King in his threats and encroachments on the

Transvaal, at any rate refrained from using his unique influence and

power with the Zulus in the direction of peace, and that he made a

none too scrupulous use of the Zulu question when he forced the

annexation of the Transvaal. It is stated that, in the first place,

there was no real danger, and in the next place, if there were, such

was Sir Theophilus's power with the Zulus that he could have averted

it; and in support of the first point, and in demolition of Sir T.

Shepstone's pro-annexation arguments, the following extract from the

latter's despatches is quoted by Aylward and others:

EXTRACT FROM DESPATCH, DATED UTRECHT, TRANSVAAL, JANUARY 29, 1878.

_Sir T. Shepstone to Sir H. Bulwer_.

Par. 12. 'Although this question has existed for many years, and the

settlement of it has been long postponed, yet on no former occasion

has it assumed so serious an aspect, or included so wide an area of

territory; never before has there existed any bar to the farmers

occupying their farms after an absence more or less temporary, caused

by a temporary and local scare. Practically, the line of occupied

farms has not been heretofore affected by the dispute about the

beaconed boundary, but now the prohibition to these has become

absolute by Zulu claims and action. Ruin is staring the farmers in

the face, and their position is, _for the time, worse under Her

Majesty's Government than ever it was under the Republic_.'

Had Sir T. Shepstone's power been as great as represented, it is fair

to suppose that it would have been exerted, and would have prevailed

in support of his own administration; but it seems clear that he

could do nothing; and as to the reality of the danger, nothing could

better establish that than the unpleasant admissions in the foregoing

extract and the initial disasters in the Zulu War a year later. The

Boers' protective power was not lessened by the annexation--quite

otherwise. It was supplemented by British money, arms, and soldiers,

and the prestige of the British flag, and yet things happened as

above described. What would they have been under the old conditions?

The day before he issued the proclamation Sir T. Shepstone sent a

messenger to Cetewayo, telling him that the Transvaal would be under

British sovereignty, and warning him against aggression in that

direction. Cetewayo replied: 'I thank my father Somtseu (Shepstone)

for his message. I am glad that he has sent it, because the Dutch

have tired me out, and I intended to fight with them once, only once,

and to drive them over the Vaal. Kabana, you see my impis are

gathered. It was to fight the Dutch I called them together. Now I

will send them back to their houses.' (C. 1883, p. 19.)

Colonel A.W. Durnford; R.E., in a memorandum of July 5, 1877, wrote:

About this time (April 10) Cetewayo had massed his forces in three

corps on the borders, and would undoubtedly have swept the Transvaal,

country not been taken over by the English. In my opinion, he would

have cleared the country to Pretoria.

'I am convinced,' wrote Sir A. Cunynghame, June 12, from Pretoria,

'that had this country not been annexed, it would have been ravaged

by the native tribes. Forty square miles of country had been overrun

by natives, and every house burned, just before the annexation.' And

he wrote again, July 6: 'Every day convinces me that unless this

country had been annexed it would have been a prey to plunder and

rapine from the natives on its border, joined by Secocoeni, Mapok,

and other tribes in the Transvaal. Feeling the influence of the

British Government, they are now tranquil.'

So much for the reality of the danger. As to the causes of it and the

alleged responsibility of Natal, Sir Bartle Frere, in a letter to

General Ponsonby, made the following remarks:

The fact is, that while the Boer Republic was a rival and

semi-hostile power, it was a Natal weakness rather to pet the Zulus

as one might a tame wolf, who only devoured one's neighbour's sheep.

We always remonstrated, but rather feebly; and now that both flocks

belong to us, we are rather embarrassed in stopping the wolf's

ravages.

Sir B. Frere realized fully the dangers, and gave his testimony as to

Boer opinion. On December 15, 1877, he wrote, concerning his policy

towards the Zulus:

My great anxiety is, of course, to avoid collision, and I am

satisfied that the only chance I have of keeping clear of it is to

show that I do not fear it. The Boers are, of course, in a state of

great apprehension, and I have ordered those of the two frontier

districts of Utrecht and Wakkerstroom to hold themselves in

readiness, should I find it necessary to call upon them for active

service.

Sir T. Shepstone also wrote, concerning the reality of the danger,

under date December 25:

The Boers are still flying, and I think by this time there must be a

belt of more than a hundred miles long and thirty broad, in which,

with three insignificant exceptions, there is nothing but absolute

desolation. This will give your Excellency some idea of the mischief

which Cetewayo's conduct has caused.

And again (April 30, 1878):

I find that Secocoeni acts as a kind of lieutenant to Cetewayo. He

received directions from the Zulu King, and these directions are by

Secocoeni issued to the various Basuto tribes in the Transvaal.

Sir T. Shepstone rushed the annexation. He plucked the fruit that

would have fallen. He himself has said that he might have waited

until the Zulus actually made their threatened murderous raid. That

might have been Macchiavelian statecraft, but it would not have been

humanity; and there was nothing in the attitude of the Boer leaders

at the time of the annexation which foreshadowed the fierce and

determined opposition which afterwards developed. The fact seems to

be that the people of the Transvaal were either in favour of the

annexation, or were overpowered and dazed by the hopelessness of the

Republic's outlook; and they passively assented to the action of Sir

Theophilus Shepstone and his twenty-five policemen. The Boers were

quite unable to pay the taxes necessary to self-government and the

prosecution of the Kaffir wars. The Treasury was empty--save for the

much-quoted 12s. 6d. The Government £1 bluebacks were selling at 1s.

Civil servants' salaries were months in arrear. The President

himself--the excitable, unstable, visionary, but truly enlightened

and patriotic Burgers--had not only drawn no salary, but had expended

his private fortune, and incurred a very heavy liability, in the

prosecution of the unsuccessful Secocoeni war. No amount of _ex post

facto_ evidence as to the supposed feelings and opinions of the Boers

can alter a single one of the very serious facts which, taken

together, seemed to Sir Theophilus to justify the annexation. But it

all comes down to this: If the passive acquiescence in the annexation

coincided strangely with the Republic's failure to defeat its enemies

and pay its debts, it is no whit less odd that Lord Carnarvon's

anxiety for the Republic's safety synchronized with his attempt to

confederate South Africa.

The real mistakes of the British Government began _after_ the

annexation. The failure to fulfil promises; the deviation from old

ways of government; the appointment of unsuitable officials, who did

not understand the people or their language; the neglect to convene

the Volksraad or to hold fresh elections, as definitely promised;

the establishment of personal rule by military men, who treated the

Boers with harshness and contempt, and would make no allowance for

their simple, old-fashioned ways, their deep-seated prejudices, and,

if you like, their stupid opposition to modern ideas: these things

and others caused great dissatisfaction, and gave ample material for

the nucleus of irreconcilables to work with.

During the occupation period Mr. Kruger took office under the British

Government, as also did Dr. Jorissen and Chief Justice (then Judge)

Kotzé, and indeed all the officials who had protested against the

annexation, except Mr. Piet Joubert, who declined to do so, and who,

if actions be the test and not words, was the only honest protestant.

Mr. Kruger retained his office for some time after he had concerned

himself in the Repeal agitation, but finally resigned his post on

being refused an increased remuneration, for which he had repeatedly

applied. There can be but little doubt that had this inducement been

forthcoming, he would have remained a loyal British subject.

The effect of the annexation was to start the wells of plenty

bubbling--with British gold. The country's debts were paid. Secocoeni

and Cetewayo would be dealt with, and the responsibility for all

things was on other and broader shoulders. With the revival of trade,

and the removal of responsibilities and burdens, came time to think

and to talk. The wave of the magician's wand looked so very simple

that the price began to seem heavy. The eaten bread was forgotten.

The dangers and difficulties that were past were of small account now

that they _were_ past; and so the men who had remained passive, and

recorded formal protests when they should have resisted, and taken

steps to show that they were in earnest, began their Repeal

agitation. All the benefits which the Boers hoped from the annexation

had now been reaped. Their pressing needs were relieved. Their debts

had been paid; their trade and credit restored; their enemies were

being dealt with. Repeal would rob them of none of these; they would,

in fact, eat their cake and still have it. The Zulu question had been

taken up, and could not now be left by the Imperial Government to

settle itself. The debts discharged for them and the outlays incurred

might, it is true, be charged to them. They could not be repaid, of

course, for the same reason that you cannot get blood from stone;

and the amount would, therefore, be a National Debt, which was

exactly what they had been trying for years to incur, and the

condition of their credit had made it impossible to do.

The causes of discontent before given were serious, but the failure

to fulfil promises was not deliberate. Circumstances combined to

prevent Sir Bartle Frere from visiting the Transvaal, as intended and

promised. Native wars (Gaika and Galeka), disagreements between the

Colonial and Imperial authorities, the obstructions and eventual

dismissal of the Molteno-Merriman Ministry--the first under

Responsible Government--Natal and Diamond-fields affairs, and, above

all, the Zulu War, all combined to prevent Sir Bartle Frere from

fulfilling his obligations to settle Transvaal matters.

In the meantime two deputations had been sent to England,

representing the Boers' case against annexation. The active party

among the Boers, _i.e._, the Voortrekker party, the most anti-British

and Republican, though small in itself, had now succeeded in

completely dominating the rest of the Boers, and galvanizing them

into something like national life and cohesion again--a result

achieved partly by earnest persuasion, but largely also by a kind of

terrorism.

Sir Bartle Frere, who managed at last to visit the Transvaal, in

April, 1879, had evidence of this on his journey up, and in a

despatch to Sir M. Hicks Beach from Standerton on the 6th of that

month he wrote:

I was particularly impressed by the replies of a very fine specimen

of a Boer of the old school. He had been six weeks in an English

prison, daily expecting execution as a rebel, and had been wounded by

all the enemies against whom his countrymen had fought--English,

Zulus, Basutos, Griquas, and Bushmen.

'But,' he said, 'that was in the days of my youth and inexperience.

Had I known then what I know now, I would never have fought against

the English, and I will never fight them again. Old as I am, I would

now gladly turn out against the Zulus, and take fifty friends of my

own, who would follow me anywhere; but I dare not leave my home till

assured it will not be destroyed and my property carried off in my

absence, by the men who call me "rebel" because I will not join them

against the Government. My wife, brought up like a civilized woman in

the Cape Colony, has had five times in her life to run from the house

and sleep in the veld when attacked by Zulus and Basutos. One of our

twelve sons was assegaied in sight of our house, within the last ten

it was surrounded by Basutos, my wife had to fly in the night by

herself, leading one child and carrying another on her back. She

walked nearly fifty miles through the Lion Veld, seeing three lions

on the way, before she reached a place of safety. It is not likely

that we should forget such things, nor wish them to recur; but how

can I leave her on my farm and go to Zululand, when the malcontent

leaders threaten me that if I go they will burn my house and drive

off all my stock? Assure me that we are not to be deserted by the

English Government, and left to the mercy of these malcontent

adventurers, and I and my people will gladly turn out to assist

Colonel Wood.'

_I find that this idea that the English Government will give up the

Transvaal, as it formerly did the Orange Free State, has been

industriously propagated, and has taken a great hold on the minds of

the well-disposed Boers, and is, I believe, one main cause of

reluctance to support the Government actively_.

_They argue that what has been done before may be done again, and

they have no feeling of assurance that if they stand by the English

Government to-day they will not be left to bear the brunt of the

malcontents' vengeance when a Republic is established_.

And again on the 9th, from Heidelberg:

_The idea that we should somehow be compelled or induced to abandon

the country had taken great hold on the minds of some of the more

intelligent men that I met_. It has been seduously written up by a

portion of the South African press, English as well as Dutch. I

marked its effect particularly on men who said they had come from the

old Colony since the annexation, but would never have done so had

they believed that English rule would be withdrawn, and the country

left to its former state of anarchy....

_But there is great practical difficulty in conveying to the mass of

the people any idea of the real power of Government_.

It is not possible to pen a more severe and pregnant comment on the

after-policy of England than that suggested by the italicized lines,

written as they were by England's Plenipotentiary--an idea reported

to headquarters, not as a feeler, but as a suggestion so absurd that

it called for no expression of opinion. But he lived to find that it

was not too absurd to be realized; and perhaps, after all, it was

written as a warning, and the wise and cool-headed old statesman in

his inmost soul had a premonition of what eventually occurred.

Sir Bartle Frere met the Boers in their camp, and discussed with them

their grievances. He informed them that he had no power to revoke the

annexation, nor would he recommend it, as, in his judgment, such a

course would be a reversion to chaos and ruin. The Boers pressed

steadily for nothing less than repeal. Sir Bartle Frere reported

the historical meeting at Erasmus Farm to Sir M. Hicks Beach:

_April 14, 1879._

They were evidently much disappointed.... Our meeting separated with

no more definite decision than that they must report to the 'people,'

and be guided by their decision as to what was to be done.

If I may judge from the gentlemen composing the deputation, and

others of their class, whom I have had the honour of meeting since

coming to the Transvaal, the leaders are, with few exceptions, men

who deserve respect and regard for many valuable and amiable

qualities as citizens and subjects....

Of the results of our meeting it is impossible at present to say more

than that it must have cleared away misconceptions on all sides If

they have learnt anything as to the finality of the act of

annexation--that I have no power to undo it, and do not believe that

it will ever be undone, in the only sense in which they will ask

it--I have, on the other hand, been shown the stubbornness of a

determination to be content with nothing else, for which I was not

prepared by the general testimony of officials who had been longer in

the country, and who professed to believe that the opposition of the

Boers was mere bluster, and that they had not the courage of their

professed opinions.... I feel assured that the majority of the

Committee felt very deeply what they believed to be a great national

wrong.... But my conviction is that the real malcontents are far from

being a majority of the whole white population, or even of their own

class of Boer farmers.

I have no doubt whatever that if the Executive were in a position to

assert the supremacy of the law, to put an effectual stop to the

reign of terrorism which exists at present, the discontented minority

would cease to agitate, and would soon cease to feel grievances which

a very brief discussion shows to be in the main sentimental; not the

less keenly felt on that account, but not likely to survive

the prosperity and good government, with a fair measure of

self-government in its train, which are within their reach under

British rule.

And, again, he wrote to Lady Frere:

PRETORIA, _April 20, 1879._

My last letter had not been gone many hours by the mail express when

Lanyon ran into my room, to tell me that the Boer camp was actually

broken up and the Boers dispersing.

I need not tell you how thankful I was. The one thing I dreaded was

civil war and bloodshed, and had a single malcontent been shot, I

should have considered it a greater misfortune than the death of a

dozen Piet Retiefs, or Uys, dying like heroes in the field of battle

for their country and brethren. So you may imagine how thankful I

felt to the Giver of all good, who has guided and protected us

through life.

I am to see a deputation from the Boers' Committee again to-morrow,

and then I hope we shall have done with meetings and grievances--for

the present a phrase which they carefully put into all references to

their breaking up, and which they evidently mean. _It was clear to me

that it was not the annexation, so much as the neglect to fulfil the

promises and the expectations held out by Shepstone when he took

over the Government, that has stirred up the great mass of the

Boers, and given a handle to agitators._{02}

There it is in a single sentence! It was not the annexation which

caused the war; for nine men in every ten admitted that it was

welcomed and justified by considerations of general South African

policy, or else simply inevitable. No! It was the failure to fulfil

the conditions of annexation!

In 'A Narrative of the Boer War,' Mr. Thomas Fortescue Carter has

given with admirable skill and impartiality a full account of the

causes which led to the outbreak. His history is, indeed, so

determinedly just as to have met with considerable disapproval in

quarters where feelings are hot on either side, and where plain

truths are not palatable. Mr. Carter resided in the country for years

before the annexation, and went through the war as correspondent of a

well-known London daily, and this is his opinion:

Anyone who knows the acquaintance Sir T. Shepstone had with the Boers

of the Transvaal, years prior to the annexation, cannot doubt that,

regarded as a friend and almost as one of themselves, no one better

than he could have been selected for the task of ascertaining the

desires of the people; and no one who knows Sir T. Shepstone will

believe that he did not take sufficient evidence to prove to any man

that the Boers were anxious to be extricated from the dilemma they

were in, and really willing at that time that their country should be

annexed. Men who during the late war were our foes were at the time

of the annexation clamouring for it, welcoming Sir Theophilus

Shepstone as the deliverer and saviour of the country. I mention

Swart Dirk Uys, an eminent Boer, who fought against the English in

1880-81, as one amongst the hundreds and thousands who went out to

meet Sir Theophilus Shepstone with palm branches in their hands.

The natural aversion of the people to English rule was overcome for

the moment by their greater aversion to being wiped off the face of

the Transvaal by the blacks; that was a contingency staring them in

the face, and yet not even that imminent common danger availed to

secure unity amongst them, or would rouse men individually to take

upon their shoulders the responsibility which rests upon every member

of a State.

The Boer Volksraad, after promising to appeal to their constituents

on the subject of the new constitution proposed, almost immediately

passed a measure, which was familiarly styled by the people the 'Hou

jou smoel law.' The literal translation of this term is 'Hold your

to discuss the question of either confederation or annexation.

I come to the conclusion, then, that the cause of the annexation was

England's historical greed of territory, especially rich territory;

and that, however unworthy the motive on the part of the visiting

power, the Boers did not at that time receive the visitor with other

feelings than those of satisfaction, and practically surrendered

their country voluntarily and gladly to the ruler of a greater power,

under the impression that Sir Theophilus Shepstone would be permitted

to carry out, and that he therefore would carry out, the promises he

made them. As the programme was open before them, they had everything

to gain and nothing to lose, except the loss entailed by nominal

government by the British. No man, whether Boer or Britisher, who was

living in the Transvaal, or knew the feelings of the Boers at the

time of annexation, would in 1877 have given any other account of the

feeling of the nation; and if I have formed too low an opinion of the

motives of English statesmen at that time, and am not justified in

attributing the annexation to greed instead of to the purer and

nobler desire to protect England's colonies, or even the Transvaal

itself, from the inroads of savages, then my excuse must be that the

failure of England to send out at that time a force equal to the task

of restraining those savages and maintaining peace, has helped

materially to lead me to the unwarrantable conclusion.{03}

And so came the war. The history of it is written that all may read;

and it is not necessary here to refer at length to the details of it.

The utterly unjust treatment of Bezuidenhout at Potchefstroom was the

immediate cause of the outbreak. The armed interference of the

Potchefstroom burghers with the Imperial officials followed on

December 16, to be in turn succeeded by the battle of Bronkhorst

Spruit on the 20th.

The following account of the affair is taken from Mr. Carter's book:

All went well on this day till about 2.30 p.m., when the following

was about the order of march: One mounted infantryman in advance of

the main body next the band; of F company, forty men; of A company,

forty men; then followed the quarter-guard, thirteen men; and

provost-escort and prisoners, twenty-three men. The remainder of the

force was posted along the string of waggons, with the exception of

the rear-guard of about twenty men, which were some distance behind.

Colonel Anstruther, Captains Nairne and Elliott, Lieutenant Hume,

and Adjutant Harrison were riding just in front of the band, when

suddenly Boers appeared all round. The locality that the regiment had

reached at the time was one where stood several farms, and the trees

surrounding these homesteads afforded cover under which a hostile

force could assemble without being perceived from a distance. On the

right was a ravine with wood in it, and amongst that the Boers were

lying in ambush. How unexpected was the appearance of a force of

Boers to the English may be judged from the fact that the band

of the regiment was playing at the time. Colonel Anstruther,

immediately he caught sight of the enemy on the crest of a slight

rise to the front, called a halt, and the order was passed to the

rear for the waggons to close up. Before this could be done a

messenger from the enemy, carrying a white flag, came forward and

handed the Colonel a note signed by Piet Joubert, and countersigned

by other Boer leaders, desiring him to halt where he was until a

reply had been received from Sir Owen Lanyon to the ultimatum the

Boers had addressed to him. The message also contained the warning

that if the soldiers advanced beyond a small stream in front of

them, it would be taken as a declaration of war. Colonel Anstruther,

with Conductor Egerton, had ridden out in front of the advanced

guard to meet this flag of truce; after he had read the message, the

bearer of it informed him verbally that two minutes were allowed for

his decision. Colonel Anstruther verbally replied that he should

march on to Pretoria, and, to use his own words, as published in his

despatch written just before he died, the Boer messenger 'said that

he would take my message to the Commandant-General; and I asked him

to let me know the result, to which he nodded assent. Almost

immediately, however, the enemy's line advanced.'

Whilst this short parley was going on, every effort was being made in

the rear to get the waggons up, but without much good result, because

when the Boers opened fire the rear-guard would be at least half a

mile behind the head of the column. Even those who were guarding the

waggons had not time to join the main body. When Colonel Anstruther

saw the Boers advancing, he gave the order to his men to extend in

skirmishing order, but before they could open out to more than loose

files they were met with a murderous volley, and at the same time

Boers on the right and left flank and in the rear, who had previously

measured and marked off the distances, picked off every man within

sight. Our men returned the fire as best they could, but in less than

ten minutes 120 were either killed or wounded, besides a large

proportion of the oxen in the waggons shot. The officers who exposed

themselves were picked off almost immediately by the Boer marksmen.

Captain Nairne, Lieutenant M'Sweeney, Lieutenant and Adjutant

Harrison, Lieutenant Hume, Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General

Barter, Conductor Egerton, Surgeon Ward, were all wounded, besides

Colonel Anstruther himself, who was shot in two or three places.

It was useless to contend against such odds, and the 'cease fire' was

sounded, and handkerchiefs waved to denote submission. During this

unequal struggle, Mrs. Smith, the widow of the bandmaster of the

regiment, who, with the wife of Sergeant-Major Fox and some children,

were riding in one of the foremost waggons, came fearlessly up to

where the wounded lay, and, tearing strips from her clothing, helped

the surgeon to bandage the wounds. The sergeant-major's wife was

severely wounded, as was also Fox himself. There was no lack of

heroism during those awful ten minutes, whilst men were being shot

down like dogs. Lieutenant Harrison was shot through the head while

cheering on his men; Lieutenant Hume was equally conspicuous

for his coolness. An orderly-room clerk named Maistre and the

Sergeant-Master-Tailor Pears quietly concealed the regimental colours

in a waggon-box when they saw the danger of them falling into the

hands of the enemy; and their work was not in vain, as Conductor

Egerton managed subsequently to wrap them round his body under his

tunic, and having obtained permission after the fight was over to walk

to Pretoria for medical assistance, he carried them safely to the

capital, as well as the disastrous news of the engagement. Forty-two

miles traversed by a wounded man on foot in eleven hours is in itself

a feat worth mentioning, and one the value of which can only be

really estimated by those who know what South African roads are in

the rainy seasons.

As soon as our force surrendered, Franz Joubert, who had been in

command of the Boers, and who, it is said, fired the first shot, with

the exclamation, 'What is the use of waiting?' came forward with some

of his men, and on finding poor Colonel Anstruther severely wounded

expressed sorrow.

Whether the affair of Bronkhorst Spruit can be called an act of

treachery on the part of the Boers is rather a nice question. Colonel

Anstruther's words--the words of a dying man--rather go to prove that

he was unfairly treated, though he does not say so directly. He was

given to understand by the messenger who came with the flag of truce

that another communication would be made to him as soon as his reply

to the request to halt had been reported to the Boer Commandant. The

only reply given him was 'a murderous volley.' The Boers cannot lay

claim to much bravery or superiority (except in numbers) over our

soldiers in this fight. Theirs was a deliberately-planned ambush to

entrap men who had no idea that they were marching in an enemy's

country. Bronkhorst Spruit engagement is the one during the whole of

the war which does not redound to the credit of the Dutch, even if it

does not reflect great discredit upon them. If a reasonable time had

been allowed Colonel Anstruther to give his reply, the 94th could not

then say, as they do say and will say, that they were treacherously

surprised. 'Two minutes' looks, under the circumstances, very much

like an idle pretence of fair dealing to cover an intentional act of

cowardice which subsequent conduct could hardly palliate. The Boers

say that they had not more men than were marching with the 94th on

that occasion; that statement is worth very little, considering the

evidence of our officers, and, above all, the harsh evidence of the

facts that the 94th was from advance-guard to rear-guard practically

surrounded and outnumbered in every direction.

The preparedness of the Boers and the precision of their fire may be

gathered from the testimony of Dr. Crow, of Pretoria, who attended

the wounded, and vouched for an average of five wounds per man. Dr.

Crow also wrote:

But as disastrous as the late war in the Transvaal had been to

British prestige, thank God those at Bronkhorst Spruit did their duty

and died like men, a noble example to any army. If any stain has been

cast on the British flag in the Transvaal, the gallant 94th did all

that was possible by their deeds at Bronkhorst Spruit to obliterate

it.

The news of this affair was received with horror, and the feelings

roused by the details of it have never been allayed. Race-hatred may

have its origin in a hundred little incidents, but in the Transvaal

there were two which undoubtedly, whether justly or otherwise, gave

a character to the Boers that has embittered feeling against them

more than any which had occurred in generations previous. The

second affair followed very closely on the Bronkhorst Spruit

engagement--_i.e.,_ the infamous murder of Captain Elliott, the only

surviving unwounded officer from Bronkhorst Spruit. Captains Elliott

and Lambert were taken prisoners, and were offered the choice of

two alternatives--either to remain prisoners of war during the

hostilities in the Transvaal, or to be released on _parole

d'honneur_ on condition that they should leave the Transvaal at

once, cross into the Free State under escort, and not bear arms

against the Republican Government during the war. The second

alternative was chosen. They received an escort and free pass from

Commandant-General Piet Joubert. The following is extracted from

Captain Lambert's Report to Sir George Colley on January 5:

We started about 1 p.m. from the Boer camp, passing through the town

of Heidelberg. After going about six to eight miles, I noticed we

were not going the right road, and mentioned the fact to the escort,

who said it was all right. Having been 'look-out' officer in the

Transvaal, I knew the district well. I was certain we were going

wrong, but we had to obey orders. At nightfall we found ourselves

nowhere near the river drift, and were ordered to outspan for the

night, and next morning the escort told us they would look for the

drift. Inspanning at daybreak, we again started, but after driving

about for some hours across country, I told the escort we would stop

where we were while they went to search for the drift. Shortly after

they returned and said they had found it, and we must come, which we

did, eventually arriving at the junction of two rivers (Vaal and

Klip), where we found the Vaal impassable, but a small punt, capable

of holding only two passengers at most, by which they said we must

cross. I pointed out that it was impossible to get my carriage or

horses over by it, and that it was not the punt the General said we

were to cross. The escort replied it was Pretorius's punt that the

General told them to take us, and we must cross; that we must leave

the carriage behind and swim the horses, which we refused to do, as

we then should have had no means of getting on. I asked them to show

me their written instructions, which they did (written in Dutch), and

I pointed out that the name of Pretorius was not in it. I then told

them they must either take us back to the Boer camp again or on to

the proper drift. We turned back, and after going a few miles the

escort disappeared. Not knowing where we were, I proposed to Captain

Elliott we should go to the banks of the Vaal, and follow the river

till we came to the proper punt. After travelling all Monday,

Tuesday, and up till Wednesday about 1 p.m., when we found ourselves

four hours, or twenty-five miles, from Spencer's punt, we were

suddenly stopped by two armed Boers, who handed us an official

letter, which was opened, and found to be from the Secretary to the

Republican Government, stating that the members were surprised that,

as officers and gentlemen, we had broken our _parole d'honneur_, and

refused to leave the Transvaal; that if we did not do so immediately

by the nearest drift, which the bearers would show us, we must

return as prisoners of war; that as through our ignorance of the

language of the country there might be some misunderstanding, they

were loth to think we had willingly broken our promise. We explained

that we should reply to the letter, and request them to take it to

their Government, and were prepared to go with them at once. They

took us back to a farmhouse, where we were told to wait until they

fetched their commandant, who arrived about 6 p.m., and repeated to

us the same that was contained in our letter of that day. We told

him we were ready to explain matters, and requested him to take our

answer back to camp. He then ordered us to start at once for the

drift. I asked him, as it was then getting dark, if we could start

early next morning, but he refused. So we started, he having said we

should cross at Spencer's, being closest. As we left the farmhouse,

I pointed out to him that we were going in the wrong direction; but

he said, 'Never mind; come on across a drift close at hand.' When we

got opposite it, he kept straight on; I called to him, and said that

this was where we were to cross. His reply was, 'Come on!' I then

said to Captain Elliott, 'They intend taking us back to Pretoria,'

distant some forty miles. Suddenly the escort (which had all at once

increased from two to eight men, which Captain Elliott pointed out

to me; and I replied, 'I suppose they are determined we shall not

escape, which they need not be afraid of, as we are too keen to get

over the border') wheeled sharp down to the river, stopped, and,

pointing to the banks, said, 'There is the drift--cross!' I drove my

horses into the river, when they immediately fell; lifted them, and

drove on about five or six yards, when we fell into a hole. Got them

out with difficulty, and advanced another yard, when we got stuck

against a rock. The current was now so strong and drift deep, my

cart was turned over on to its side, and water rushed over the seat.

I called out to the commandant on the bank that we were stuck and to

send assistance, or might we return, to which he replied, 'If you

do, we will shoot you.' I then tried, but failed, to get the horses

to move. Turning to Captain Elliott, who was sitting beside me, I

said, 'We must swim for it'; and asked could he swim, to which he

replied, 'Yes.' I said, 'If you can't, I will stick to you, for I

can.' While we were holding this conversation, a volley from the

bank, ten or fifteen yards off, was fired into us, the bullets

passing through the tent of my cart, one of which must have mortally

wounded poor Elliott, who only uttered the single word 'Oh!' and

fell headlong into the river from the carriage. I immediately sprang

in after him, but was swept down the river under the current some

yards. On gaining the surface of the water, I could see nothing of

Elliott, but I called out his name twice, but received no reply.

Immediately another volley was fired at me, making the water hiss

around where the bullets struck. I now struck out for the opposite

bank, which I reached with difficulty in about ten minutes; but as

it was deep, black mud, on landing I stuck fast, but eventually

reached the top of the bank, and ran for about two hundred yards

under a heavy fire the whole while.

The Boers then invaded Natal and took up a position on Laing's Nek,

four miles inside the Natal border, from which, on January 28, Sir

George Colley endeavoured to oust them with a mounted force of 70 men

and some 500 men of the 58th Regiment. The position is one difficult

enough to climb unencumbered by military accoutrements, but the

disposition of the little mounted force covered the approach. By some

unexplained mistake, however, half of the mounted infantry charged

and carried the Boer position before the 58th had climbed the hill,

but were too weak to hold it and retired, leaving the 58th uncovered

in a terrible ascent. But few of the exhausted men reached the top of

the hill, and those, led by Colonel Deane, only to be shot down. Of

the mounted men, 17 were killed and wounded; of the 58th, 73 were

killed and 100 wounded. The result was absolute defeat of the British

forces. The number of Boers engaged is not known, but the force

behind the Nek consisted of several thousands, and no doubt a fair

proportion engaged in the fight.

On February 8 General Colley made a demonstration in force on the

Ingogo Heights. The force consisted of under 300 men, with 4 guns and

38 mounted men. On the Boer side there were about 1,000 men, and the

fight lasted from morning until after dark. It was a drawn fight, in

which both parties left the battlefield at night. There cannot be any

doubt, however, that the balance of advantage was with the Boers,

since the loss on the British side was very severe: 76 men were

killed and 69 wounded.

On February 27 came Majuba, when Sir George Colley designed to

retrieve his fortunes and strike an effective blow without the aid of

his second-in-command, Sir Evelyn Wood, whom he had sent to hurry up

reinforcements. The scaling of the mountain at night was a fine

performance. The neglect to take the rocket apparatus or mountain

guns, or to fortify the position in any way, or even to acquaint the

members of the force with the nature of the position which they had

taken up in the dark, and the failure to use the bayonets, were the

principal causes of disaster. The Boers attacked in force a position

which should have been absolutely impregnable, held as it was by a

force of 554 soldiers. The Boer force is not known, but probably

consisted of upwards of 1,000 men, since Christian Joubert after the

fight offered to take a portion of the men, numbering, as he said,

some 500, to attack a small British laager on one of the spurs of

the mountain. The splendid feat of taking the hill-top, however, was

accomplished by a small storming party of less than 200 men, the

balance of the Boer forces covering the approach of their comrades

by an accurate and incessant long-range fire. The result, as is

known, was terrible disaster: 92 killed and 134 wounded, and a

number taken prisoners, represented the British loss, whilst the

Boers lost 1 killed and 5 wounded. No attempt had been made to

occupy positions below the crown of the hill which commanded the

approaches, and the Boers were able to creep up under good cover

from place to place by the exercise of their admirable tactics. It

is impossible to detract from the performance of the Boers, and a

glance at the position leaves one more astonished than ever that a

successful attack could ever have been made upon it. The Boers

displayed on this day the finest fighting qualities. The generalship

of their fighting Commandant, Nikolas Smit, was of the highest

order. The cleverness of the attack, and the personal bravery and

audacity of the storming party are beyond praise.

By the time Sir Evelyn Wood had ranged his forces for an effective

and extended attack on the Boers, and by the time Sir Frederick

Roberts with the command of about 10,000 men had reached South

Africa, the administration of Mr. Gladstone had awakened to the fact

that the war was an unjust--not to say costly--one. An armistice was

arranged and peace made without another blow.

The terms of the settlement proposed by the Liberal Government fitly

illustrate the generosity of their motives. They proposed doing

'simple justice' to the Boers, but at the same time retaining the

districts of Lydenburg, Middelburg, Wakkerstroom, and Utrecht, not to

mention handing back Zoutpansberg to the original native occupants.

So anxious were the Boer leaders to effect a peaceful settlement, so

fearful were they of the actions of their followers, that when they

arranged the long armistice they did not announce to their party the

intentions of the British Government regarding the above districts.

General Joubert did not communicate to his army the terms of peace,

but simply stated that a Royal Commission was to settle everything.

A month later, when some inkling of the terms reached the Boers, a

solemn protest and warning was issued, and when the Royal Commission

actually sat, the British representatives were informed that any

such curtailment of the territories would be followed by a

resumption of hostilities. Needless to say the proposals were

abandoned and the Boers got their way. So ended the war.

Ingogo has been called a drawn battle. Bronkhorst Spruit was--such as

it was. At Laing's Nek and Majuba the Boers beat us, as Mr. Carter

fairly puts it, 'when they were on the top of the hill and we were at

the bottom, and when we were on the top of the hill and they were at

the bottom.' The narrative of these events is about as humiliating a

one as an Englishman can read. Here and there it is redeemed by the

heroic conduct of individuals in the midst of general disaster. In

the smaller affairs, such as the particularly gallant defences of

Standerton, Potchefstroom, and Rustenberg, where little garrisons

held their own with conspicuous ability and courage, there is

something to cheer the disheartened reader. The defence of

Potchefstroom by Colonel Winslow should be read in full for several

reasons. The siege of Standerton witnessed several acts of valour,

but, above all, that of Hall the volunteer, who single handed

deliberately engaged a force of over 300 Boers, drawing their fire on

himself in order to warn his comrades of the danger of being cut off

and to give them a chance of escape--a noble act in which the gallant

fellow achieved his object but lost his life. It was in Rustenberg

where Captain Auchinleck, with about seventy men armed only with

rifles, held his laager against hundreds of the enemy, fighting day

and night for weeks; and eventually drove off the Boers who were

trenching towards his position by charging at night with from nine to

fourteen of his men and clearing the enemy out of the trenches with

the bayonet. This performance he repeated three times, himself badly

wounded on each occasion. The impression created on the enemy by

these tactics was such that they overcame their desire to get at

close quarters with him, and left him severely alone.

It is not necessary to refer in great detail to the settlement In

effect it was that the Boers gained nearly all that they required,

but not until the haggling and threatening had robbed concessions of

all appearance of grace and justice. The natives were referred to in

the conventional spirit. The unfortunate loyalists were left to take

care of themselves. The men who had entered the Transvaal, and

invested their capital and expended their energies there upon the

most positive and sacred assurances of the British Government that

the Queen's authority would never be withdrawn,--assurances given in

public by the Conservative Government and confirmed by Mr.

Gladstone's Government, assurances published by Sir Bartle Frere and

Sir Garnet Wolseley, who said that 'as long as the sun would shine

the British flag would fly over the Transvaal,'--were heartlessly

abandoned, their protests were unheeded, the compensation allotted to

them, namely, £1,400,000, was amended by the elimination of the

million, their representations to Mr. Gladstone's Government were

finally left unanswered--unless it be that the sneering reference

made by that right honourable gentleman in the House of Commons to

'interested contractors and landjobbers' may be considered an

adequate answer to a protest as moderate, as able, as truthful, and

as necessary as Mr. Gladstone's remark was the reverse. In very

truth, the position in which the British Premier had placed himself

through his intemperate speeches in the Midlothian campaign, and his

subsequent 'explaining away,' was an extremely unpleasant one. In

Opposition Mr. Gladstone had denounced the annexation and demanded a

repeal. On accession to power he adopted the policy of his

predecessors, and affirmed that the annexation could never be

revoked. On June 8, 1880, he had written to this effect to Messrs.

Kruger and Joubert, the Transvaal deputation. Later on, in answer to

an appeal that he should allay the apprehensions of the loyalists,

who feared the results of the Boer agitation, he referred them to

this very letter as a final expression of opinion, and authorized the

publication of this message. When, however, peace had been concluded,

and the loyalists, amazed and heartbroken at their threatened

desertion, reminded him of his pledges and implored him to respect

them, he answered them in a letter which is surely without parallel

in the record of self-respecting Governments. The wriggling, the

equivocation, the distortion of phrases, the shameless 'explaining

away,' are of a character that would again justify the remark of

Lord Salisbury (then Lord Robert Cecil) in another matter many years

before, that they were 'tactics worthy of a pettifogging attorney,'

and even the subsequent apology--to the attorney. But what answer

could be made to a protest which reminded the right honourable

gentlemen of the following deliberate and official expression of his

Government's policy?--

In your letter to me (wrote Mr. White for the loyalists) you claim

that the language of your letter does not justify the description

given. With the greatest respect I submit that it does, and I will

quote the words on which I and also my colleagues base the opinion

that it does unequivocally pledge the Government to the

non-relinquishment of the Transvaal.

The actual words of your letter are:

'Looking at all the circumstances, both of the Transvaal and the rest

of South Africa, and to the necessity of preventing a renewal of the

disorders, which might lead to disastrous consequences, not only to

the Transvaal, but to the whole of South Africa, _our judgment is

that the Queen cannot be advised to relinquish the Transvaal_; but,

consistently with the maintenance of that sovereignty, we desire that

the white inhabitants of the Transvaal should, without prejudice to

the rest of the population, enjoy the fullest liberty to manage their

local affairs.'

But your letter of the 8th of June not only contained this final and

absolute announcement of the policy of England, but it gave the

reasons for arriving at it in words which so aptly express the case

of the loyalists that I quote them _in extenso_. They are as follows:

'It is undoubtedly matter for much regret that it should, since the

annexation, have appeared that so large a number of the population of

Dutch origin in the Transvaal are opposed to the annexation of that

territory, _but it is impossible now to consider that question as if

it were presented for the first time_. We have to do with a state of

things which has existed for a considerable period, _during which

obligations have been contracted_, especially, though not

exclusively, towards the native population, _which cannot be set

aside_.'

In your speech in the House of Commons, on the debate on Mr. Peter

Rylands' motion condemning the annexation of the country and the

enforcement of British supremacy in it, which was defeated by a

majority of ninety-six, on the 21st of January in the current year,

you used words of similar import. You are reported in the _Times_ of

the 22nd of January as saying:

'To disapprove the annexation of a country is one thing; to abandon

that annexation is another. Whatever we do, we must not blind

ourselves to the legitimate consequences of facts. By the annexation

obligations entailed by the annexation, and if in my opinion, and in

the opinion of many on this side of the House, wrong was done by the

annexation itself, _that would not warrant us in doing fresh,

distinct, and separate wrong by a disregard of the obligation which

that annexation entailed_. These obligations have been referred to in

this debate, and have been mentioned in the compass of a single

sentence. First, there was the obligation entailed towards the

English and other settlers in the Transvaal, perhaps including a

minority, though a very small minority, of the Dutch Boers

themselves; secondly, there was the obligation to the native races;

and thirdly, there was the obligation we entailed upon ourselves in

respect of the responsibility which was already incumbent upon us,

and which we, by the annexation, largely extended, for the future

peace and tranquillity of South Africa.'

Nor was this all. The loyalists proceeded to remind him that Lord

Kimberley, his Secretary of State for the Colonies, had telegraphed

in May, 1880, 'Under no circumstances can the Queen's authority in

the Transvaal be relinquished,' and had confirmed the telegram in a

despatch following; and that his lordship had also stated in the

House of Lords on May 24 that '... after a careful consideration of

the position, we have come to the conclusion that we could not

relinquish the Transvaal. Nothing could be more unfortunate than

uncertainty in respect to such a matter.' (Hansard, cclii., p. 208.)

The effects of the settlement, and the exposures in connection with

it, and the attitude of the Imperial Government were most deplorable.

No credit was given by the Boers to a Government which was clearly

moved by the meanest considerations. No feeling but contempt,

disgust, and even hatred, could be entertained by the loyalists for

the Government which had so shamelessly deserted them. The settlement

has left its indelible mark upon the sentiment of South Africa. The

war, it will generally be admitted, was a most unfortunate

occurrence. Only one thing could have been more unfortunate, and that

was such a settlement as actually was effected--a settlement which

satisfied no one, which outraged all, which threw South Africa into a

state of boiling discontent. In some quarters the defeats of Majuba

and Laing's Nek rankled deeply; yet they were fair fights, and Time

can be trusted to allay the feelings of those who are worsted in a

fair fight; but there were other matters which roused a spirit in

the English-speaking people of South Africa that had never been

known before.

The former records of the Boers, favourable and unfavourable, are

consistent with the records established in the War of Independence.

None dare belittle the spirit which moved them to take up arms

against the greatest Power in the world. Their ignorance may have

been great, but not so great as to blind them to the fact that they

were undertaking an unequal contest. It is not possible to say, with

due regard to their records, that they are not a courageous people.

Individual bravery, of the kind which takes no heed of personal risk,

reckless heroic dash, they have not, nor do they pretend to have.

Their system is entirely otherwise. They do not seek fighting for

fighting's sake. They do not like exposing themselves to risk and

danger. Their caution and their care for personal safety are such

that, judged by the standard of other people's conduct in similar

positions, they are frequently considered to be wanting in personal

courage. It seems a hard thing to say of a people who have produced

men like the first Bezuidenhout, who fought and died single-handed

against the British troops; men like Piet Retief, as gallant a man as

ever walked; men like Piet Uys, an example to all men for all time,

and only one of many generations in one family of equally gallant

Dutchmen; but it would truly seem that such examples do not occur

with such frequency among the Boers as among nations with whom they

have been compared. Where they have been able to choose their own

positions, or where they have been stimulated by previous successes,

they have done all that could possibly be asked of them; but their

particular military system does not conduce to success under

circumstances where men are suddenly and unexpectedly called upon to

exhibit the virtues of discipline, to make what to the individual may

appear a useless sacrifice of life, or, in cold blood and in the face

of previous defeat, to attempt to retrieve a lost position.

The Boer military power has been called the biggest unpricked bubble

in the world. Whether this be so or not--whether the early conflicts

between the British troops and the Boers in the Cape Colony and Natal

justify the view that the Boers cannot take a beating and come up

again--is a matter for those to decide who will give their impartial

attention to the records.

Whilst conspicuous personal daring among the Boers may not be

proverbial, it must be remembered to their everlasting credit that

they, as did the Southerners in the American Civil War, robbed the

cradle and the grave to defend their country. Boys who were mere

children bore rifles very nearly as long as themselves; old men, who

had surely earned by a life of hardship and exposure an immunity from

such calls, jumped on their horses and rode without hesitation and

without provision to fight for their independence.

There were, however, unfortunately, matters connected with the war

which gave birth to a bitter and aching desire for revenge.

Bronkhorst Spruit and the murder of Captain Elliott were among the

earliest. Another was the shooting of Dr. Barbour (who was killed

instantly) and Mr. Walter Dyas (wounded) by their escort under

circumstances similar to those of the Elliott murder, with the

exception that in this case the prisoners had been released on foot

and in daylight, and were then shot down.

But there were others too. There was the murder of Green in

Lydenburg, who was called to the Boer camp, where he went unarmed and

in good faith, only to have his brains blown out by the Boer with

whom he was conversing; there was the public flogging of another

Englishman by the notorious Abel Erasmus because he was an Englishman

and had British sympathies; and there were the various white flag

incidents. At Ingogo the Boers raised the white flag, and when in

response to this General Colley ordered the hoisting of a similar

flag to indicate that it was seen, a perfect hail of lead was poured

on the position where the General stood; and it was obvious that the

hoisting of the flag was merely a ruse to ascertain where the General

and his staff were. There was the ambulance affair on Majuba, when

the Boers came upon an unarmed party bearing the wounded with the red

cross flying over them, and after asking who they were and getting a

reply, fired a volley into the group, killing Surgeon-Major Cornish.

under Commandant Cronjé were guilty of actions contrary to the usages

of civilized warfare. They are matters of history, and can easily be

verified. Reference is made to them elsewhere in this volume in

connection with Commandant Cronjé's action on another occasion.

And so the war left the country, as wars will, divided into two

parties, with feelings towards each other that are deplorable enough

in themselves, and not easily allayed. The curtain was rung down, and

the scene was lost to the view of the world, but the play went on all

the same behind the curtain. And this is what the new Government said

to the world on August 8, 1881, when they took over the

administration of the country:

To all inhabitants, without exception, we promise the protection of

the law, and all the privileges attendant thereon.

To inhabitants who are not burghers, and do not wish to become such,

we notify that they have the right to report themselves to the

Resident as British subjects, according to Article 28 of the now

settled Convention. But be it known to all, that all ordinary rights

of property, trade, and usages will still be accorded to everyone,

burgher or not.

We repeat solemnly that our motto is, 'Unity and reconciliation.'

Footnotes for Chapter I

{01} Written in 1896.

{02} Several of the letters and despatches given in this volume are

quoted from Mr. Martineau's excellent 'Life of Sir Bartle Frere,' a

portion of which book was lately published in cheaper form, under

the title of 'The Transvaal Trouble and How it Arose.'

{03} It is only fair to state that _at that time_ the Home Government

believed the prestige of the Imperial authority to be sufficient for

all purposes.