the French war, he only asked for 500 foot from Northumberland (as
against 2,500), and 1,000 from Yorkshire, but from Warwickshire with
Leicestershire he exacted 480. These figures speak for themselves.
Any one of ordinary intelligence can see that the forces on these two
occasions were raised on entirely different principles, Northumberland
being called on for five times as many men in 1314 as in 1339, while
Warwickshire and Leicester supplied almost as many in the latter as
in the former year. And yet Mr. Oman actually makes the comparison
himself (p. 593), and prints the numbers in detail for both occasions
without any comprehension that this was so. Indeed, he bases on his
misapprehension a theory that as, at the later date (1339), the quotas
were never more than a third of those demanded for Bannockburn (1314),
a comparatively picked force was secured.
We note that the Commissions of Array in the latter year were
directed to levy only from about one-third to one-fifth of
the numbers which the sheriffs had been told to provide in
the former year. They were, of course, individually better in
proportion to the greater care which could be taken in selecting
them.[593]
We have seen that, on the contrary, in Warwickshire and Leicestershire,
the number summoned was almost the same, and that the above theory is,
therefore, another delusion. In 1339 the proportion varied from 20
per cent. to 96 per cent. of the numbers summoned in 1314, and did so,
as we have seen, on a geographical system. Mr. Oman bases his above
assertion on a note in which four lines contain four direct mistakes.
It asserts that Yorkshire sent “six thousand,” Lincolnshire “four
thousand,” Warwick “five hundred,” and Leicester “five hundred,” in
1314, when the right numbers, as given by himself on page 573 of the
same volume, were: Yorkshire _four_ thousand, Lincolnshire _three_
thousand, and Warwick and Leicester _together_ five hundred. The result
of this astounding inaccuracy is that he fails to understand the system
of these levies in the least.
It is, no doubt, surprising that, after years of study, a writer should
produce a work intended to constitute a standard authority on mediæval
warfare, in which he has not even grasped so elementary a fact as
the raising of English armies, in the 14th century, on geographical
principles, and should consequently invent an imaginary host of nearly
30,000 men. Precisely as in 1314, the bulk of the foot for the Scottish
expedition were raised from the Northern counties, so in 1345, for the
contemplated French expedition, it was from the counties south of the
Trent that the infantry (archers) was raised.[594] But it is even more
surprising that he should substitute for this system a theory, based on
the misquotation of his own figures alone, that, in 1339, we meet with
a new system of summoning a comparatively small quota of picked men.
It is but a further instance of his grievous lack of accuracy that on
page 599 he renders the “homines armati”[595] summoned from the towns
as “seventeen hundred archers,” although he prints from Rymer, a few
pages earlier, the numbers of the foot summoned in 1339, of whom half
are distinguished as archers and half as “armati.”
One would have imagined that the fact of the host being drawn from
the northern half of England alone would have been obvious from the
dates. The orders from which Mr. Oman takes the numbers demanded were
only issued from Newminster on May 27,[596] and ordered a rendezvous
of the force at Wark (Northumberland) on June 10. The troops were to
be there on that day “armis competentibus bene muniti, ac prompti et
parati ad proficiscendum” to the immediate relief of Stirling. The time
was desperately short, and haste was enjoined (“exasperes, festines”).
Moreover, the English leaders were clearly not such fools as Mr. Oman
imagines. The “orders” state that foot are wanted because the Scots
nituntur, quantum possint, ... in locis fortibus et morosis (ubi
equitibus difficilis patebit accessus) adinvicem congregare.
Common sense tells one that 60,000 foot could not be manœuvred in such
country, and would only prove an encumbrance. Edward, therefore, only
summoned less than 22,000. As to his horse, Mr. Oman writes: if the
English “had, as is said, three thousand _equites coperti_, men-at-arms
on barded horses, the whole cavalry was probably ten thousand” (p.
575). But why? At Falkirk, sixteen years before, Edward I., he writes
(p. 565), had
the whole feudal levy of England at his back. He brought three
thousand knights on barded horses, and four thousand other
men-at-arms.
If 3,000 “barded horses” implied 4,000 other horsemen in 1298, why
should they imply 7,000 in 1314? More especially, why should they do so
when, as we have seen, the king, in summoning his foot forces, himself
described the scene of the campaign as “ubi equitibus difficilis
patebit accessus,” so that he was most unlikely to take a large force
of cavalry?[597] Estimating the horse on the Falkirk basis, the English
host cannot have amounted to more than 30,000 men instead of the 60,000
or 70,000, horse and foot, at which Mr. Oman reckons it.[598]
And what of the Scotch? Let us compare these passages:
The front between the wood There was only something
and the marsh was not much slightly more than a mile of
more than a mile broad, a space slope between the wood and the
not too great to be defended by marshes.... This was well
the _forty_[599] thousand men enough for the main line of the
whom Bruce had brought Scottish host, formed in three
together p. 571). lines of perhaps _twenty-five_
[600] thousand men in all
(p. 575).
It is true that the Scottish king had a fourth battle in reserve, but,
according to Mr. Oman’s plan, it was no larger than the others, if
so large. It would only, therefore, add some 8,000 men to the above
25,000. Where then are the 40,000?
From the numbers of the forces I now pass to their disposition on
the field. With each of his successive narratives of the battle Mr.
Oman has given us a special--and different--ground plan. In all three
of these the English ‘battles’ are shown as composed of horse and
foot,--the horse in the front of each, the foot behind. But in the
earliest of these (1885) _three_ such ‘battles’ are shown, in the
second (1895) _five_, and in the third (1898) _ten_.[601] Will the
number increase indefinitely? Again, as to the famous “pottes,” dug
as traps for the English horse. In the earliest narrative these are
described as covering the Scottish flank “to the left,” and in the
second, as dug by the Scots “on their flanks,” though in both the
ground plans they are shown in a cluster on the left flank alone. When
we turn, however, to the latest account (1898), we find them shown, no
longer on the flanks, but as a single line along the Scottish front,
and described as dug by Bruce “in front of his line,” so that they
“practically covered the whole assailable front of the Scottish host”
(p. 572).
Lastly, on that all-important point, the disposition of the English
archers, we are shown in the first ground plan the “English archers
considerably in advance of the main body,” and, indeed, almost all on
the Scottish side of the burn. In his second they are still in front
of the host, but no longer across the burn. In his third there are no
“archers” shown, and the English ‘battles’ themselves are depicted
as close up to the burn. But to realize the completeness of the
contradiction, one must place side by side these two passages:
His [Edward II.’s] most fatal The worst point of all was
mistake, however, was to place that in each corps the archers
all his archers _in the front had been placed _behind_[603] the
line_,[602] without any horsemen ... condemned from the
protecting body of horsemen first to almost entire
(‘Art of War in the Middle uselessness (‘History of the Art
Ages,’ p. 101). of War,’ p. 575).
Poor Edward! He is first made to place his archers in front of his
horsemen, and blamed for his folly in doing so; and then he is made to
place them behind, and again blamed for his folly.
It is the same with the battle of Creçy (1346). Let any one compare the
four narratives given in succession by Mr. Oman,[604] together with the
three ground plans, and he will be fairly bewildered. The only thing of
which we can be sure is that when Mr. Oman has adopted a view, he will
himself afterwards abandon it. It is the same, again, with the numbers
also. Mr. Oman, in his second narrative (as apparently in his first),
reckons the English host at some 9,300 men (6,000 archers, 2,300
men-at-arms, 1,000 Welsh). In his fourth they exceed 20,000 (11,000
archers, 3,900 men-at-arms, 5,000 or 5,500 Welsh).
Need I pursue further this endless contradiction? It has been my object
to warn the reader of Mr. Oman’s works on the Art of War to compare
his successive views before adopting a single one of them. Whether on
the field of Bannockburn or of Hastings we need a guide who knows, at
least, his own mind, and whose “cocksureness” is not proportionate to
the mutability of his views.
XV
The Marshalship of England
In his valuable essay on a document of which the origin has long been
discussed, the ‘Modus tenendi Parliamentum,’[605] M. Bémont has drawn
attention to the close association of this treatise, in the MSS. which
contain it, with the coronation of Richard II. and with a treatise on
the Marshal’s office. So close, indeed, is this association that
Coke affirme avoir vu de ce traité [the _Modus_] un exemplaire
“écrit au temps de Henri II. qui contient la manière, la forme
et l’usage de Gilbert de Scrogel, maréchal d’Angleterre, et qui
indique comment il s’acquittait alors de son office.”
M. Bémont explains that Coke confused the ‘Modus’ with the treatise on
the Marshal’s office, but this is not, we shall find, quite the right
explanation; nor is it the case that the Gilbert in question “vivait au
temps de Richard II., non de Henri II.” As Coke’s error as to Gilbert
has been very widely followed, it may be well to dispose of it once for
all by tracing it to the source of his error.
We must turn for this to two MSS., the Cottonian Nero D. vi., and the
MS. lat. 6,049 in the Bibliothèque Nationale (from which is taken
Hardy’s, and consequently Dr. Stubbs’, text of the ‘Modus.’) Although
M. Bémont has given us a brief analysis of both, he seems not to have
observed that, for all purposes, they are duplicates, giving the same
documents, as they do, in the same order. Now, the very fine Cottonian
MS., which is of the time of Richard II., contains the claims to do
service at his coronation (1377) as made before John of Gaunt sitting
as High Steward.[606] Among them was that of Margaret, daughter and
heiress of Thomas “of Brotherton,” marshal of England, who claimed to
discharge that office by her deputy. I have italicised the important
words:
Item quoad officium marescalli Anglie Margareta Marschall
Comitissa Norff’ porrexit peticionem suam coram prefato
Domino Senescallo in hec verba “A tres honure seignur le Roy
de Castille et de Leon, Duc de Lancastre, et Seneschall’
Dengleterre supplie Margarete file et heir Thomas Brotherton’
nadgaires Conte de Norff’ et mareschall dengleterre destre
accepte a loffice de mareschalcie ore al coronement nostre s^r
le Roy come a son droit heritage apres la mort le dit Thomas son
piere fesante loffice par son depute _come Gilbert Mareschall
Conte de Strogoil fist as coronement le Roy Henri second_,
cestassavoir de paiser debatz en meson le Roy au iour de son
coronement et faire liveree des herbergages et de garder les
hoesses du chambre le Roy, pernant de chescun Baron et Conte
faitz Chivaler au cel iour un palfrey ove une sele.” Supra quo
audita peticione predicta, dictum fuit pro domino Rege ibidem
quod officium illud in persona domini Regis in feodo remansit
ad assignandum et contulendum cuicumque ipsi Regi placeret. Et
supra hoc auditis tam pro domino quam pro prefata Comitissa
pluribus racionibus et allegacionibus in hac parte pro eo quod
curie quod finalis discussio negocii predicti propter temporis
brevitatem ante coronacionem predictam fieri non potuit Henricus
de Percy ex assensu et precepto ipsius Regis assignatus fuit ad
officium predictum faciendum, etc., etc. (fo. 65_d_).
We have clearly here the origin of Coke’s error, when he writes:
Many very ancient copies you may find of this Modus, one whereof
we have seen in the reign of H. 2, which contains the manner,
forme, and usage of Gilbert de Scrogel, marshall of England, in
what manner he occupied and used the said roome and office in
all his time, and how he was admitted etc. at the coronation of
H. 2 (‘Institutes,’ 4, xxi.).
For the error is only found in the above petition.
Now, it ought to be obvious that no such person as Gilbert Marshal,
earl of ‘Strogoil,’ could have existed in 1154, for the Marshals did
not inherit till a later time that Earldom, which was held in 1154 by
the house of Clare. It has indeed been suggested that for “Gilbert”
we should read “Richard,”[607] but this will not help us. For, to
secure consistency, we should have to read “Richard _de Clare_.”
Nevertheless, it has been loosely assumed, on no other evidence, that
Richard de Clare, earl of Pembroke (“Striguil”) acted as Marshal of
England at the coronation of Henry II. in 1154.[608] And on this
foundation antiquaries have raised theories to which we must return.
The real explanation is perfectly simple. On turning to fo. 86_d._
of the MS. we find an entry “de officio marescalcie,” which we can
positively identify as taken from fo. 232 of the ‘Red Book of the
Exchequer’ (p. 759) where it is found among the “services” at Queen
Eleanor’s coronation in 1236. Then turning back to Countess Margaret’s
claim (fo. 65_d_), we find that it enshrines, in Norman French, this
entry word for word. Therefore the whole error has been caused by
the words “as coronement le Roy Henri second” (1154) applied to an
entry which really related to the coronation of Queen Eleanor (1236)!
“Gilbert Mareschall Conte de Strigoil” had no existence at the former
date, but he actually held the marshal’s rod in 1236.[609]
Camden, it seems, is responsible, in the first instance, for the theory
that the office of “Marshal of England” was distinct in origin and
character from that of Marshal of the Household. Strangely enough,
in his earlier essay,[610] he made no such distinction, but, on the
contrary, stated that Roger Bigod “was he which first stiled himselfe
_marescallus Angliæ_, whereas all his predecessors used noe other
stiles than the simple addition of _marescallus_.” In his second essay
(3rd Nov., 1603)[611] he gave a list of the “Marshals of England,”
deducing the office from a grant of Stephen, who “made Gilbert Clare
earl of Pembroke and Marshal of England, with the state of inheritance,
who ... was commonly called earl of Stryghall.” Thus arose the whole
theory which Thoms, following Camden, adopts in his ‘Book of the Court’
(pp. 241, 244), namely, that the two offices were accidentally united
by the marriage of William (the) Marshal (of the Household) with
Isabel, heiress of the earls of Pembroke, “Marshals of England.”
From Thoms this theory has found its way into the ‘Complete Peerage.’
I need not here say more than that I have carefully examined the
evidence, and that, after the alleged union of the offices, there is
no trace of their being granted as more than one. When John confirmed
(20th April, 1200) the marshalship to William Marshall, it was as
magistratum maresc’ curie nostre quam magistratum Gillebertus
Marescallus Henrici Regis avi patris nostri et Johannes filius
ipsius Gilleberti disrationaverat coram predicto Rege Henrico in
curia sua.[612]
And when William’s younger son Gilbert obtained it from Henry III.,
after his brother’s death, we read of the king (11th June, 1234)--
Tradens ei virgam marescalcie curie sue sicut moris est et sicut
eam antecessores ejus melius et liberius habuerunt.[613]
It would not be in place here to discuss the growth of the office with
the growth of the administration, just as the constableship developed
in its descent from Miles of Gloucester through the Bohuns. The one
point to keep in mind is that the office of marshal descended from
Gilbert _temp._ Hen. I., to Roger Bigod, earl of Norfolk, at whose
death in December (1306), the marshalship, by his own arrangement,
reverted to the king.
It was the king’s intention to bestow it on his young son Thomas
“of Brotherton”; but as he was at the time only six years old, it
was given, ‘during pleasure,’ 3rd September, 1307, to Robert de
Clifford,[614] and, a few months later, to Nicholas de Segrave (12th
March, 1308), also ‘during pleasure.’[615] These appointments are
important for their bearing on a note by Dr. Stubbs that
William le Mareschal had served as marshall at the coronation,
but was superseded in 1308 by Nicholas Segrave, with whom he
went to war in 1311. It was probably his dismissal that offended
Lancaster in 1308; see ‘M. Malmesb.,’ p. 103; and he may be
considered as a strong adherent of the earl (of Lancaster).[616]
It is the case that William Marshall had carried the great gilt spurs
at the coronation of Edward II. (Feb., 1308), but we do not find his
name on the Patent Rolls among the appointments to the “Marshalsea
of England.” He can, therefore, only have been chosen to act at the
coronation, and was doubtless selected, in preference to the temporary
Marshal, as being hereditary Marshal of Ireland. Summoned to Parliament
as a baron in 1309, he became one of the ‘Ordainers’ in 1310.
Robert de Clifford, whom Segrave replaced, was afterwards concerned in
Gaveston’s death (or, at least, pardoned as being so),[617] but was
clearly a strong supporter of the king at the beginning of 1308. And as
appointments and favours were bestowed upon him for two or three years
afterwards, one cannot think that he was out of favour, or that he
can be alluded to in the passage cited by Dr. Stubbs from the Monk of
Malmesbury:
(1309) unde magnates terræ cœperunt hæc pro malo habere et
præcipue comes Lancastriæ, quia unus ex familiaribus suis,
procurante Petro, ejectus erat ab officio suo.[618]
It could not in any case apply, as Dr. Stubbs suggests, to William le
Mareschal. Professor Tout not only dates Segrave’s appointment a year
too late, but goes so far as to say that, against him,--
William Marshal, a peer of Parliament and a collateral
representative of the great Marshal family, claimed the office
as devolving on him by hereditary right.[619]
It is obvious that the only person who could make such a claim was the
disinherited brother of the late earl of Norfolk.
On February 10, 1316, the Marshalship of England became once more an
hereditary office, being bestowed on Thomas ‘de Brotherton,’ then earl
of Norfolk, and the heirs male of his body.[620]
Let me here again insist that the fundamental error has been the
anachronism interpolated in Countess Margaret’s coronation claim
(1377). This is really the sole foundation for the statement that the
Clares earls of Pembroke held the office of Marshal of England; and it
can be conclusively shown to arise from mistaking the coronation of
1236 for that of 1154.[621]
Having thus traced to its origin the confusion which made Richard
Strongbow and his father Gilbert marshals of England, I may now deal
with the further confusion which assigns to Richard ‘Strongbow’ a
legitimate son Walter. In Ormerod’s ‘Strigulensia’ (p. 63), in Mr.
Archer’s biography of Richard,[622] and now in the ‘Complete Peerage,’
the fact is accepted as certain. The authority for this statement is a
Tintern Abbey charter, in which William Marshal the younger confirms
certain grants (22nd March, 1223)--
pro animabus bone memorie Walteri filii Ricardi filii Gilberti
Strongbow avi mei, et Willelmi Marescalli patris mei, et
Ysabelle matris mee (‘Mon. Ang.,’ v. 267).
A very able genealogist, Mr. G. W. Watson, holds that this charter
makes the existence of a son Walter “certain.”[623] But as the text
appeared to me obviously corrupt, I referred to the Arundel MS.,[624]
from which it is printed in the ‘Monasticon.’ I there made the
startling discovery that, as I thought possible, the true text is this
(in a 15th century transcript of a 14th century _inspeximus_ of the
13th century charter):
pro animabus bone memorie Walteri filii _Ricardi_, _Gilberti
Strongbowe_, Ricardi filii Gilberti Strongbowe avi mei, et
Willelmi Marescalli patris mei et Ysabelle matris mee[625] (fo.
1).
This makes perfect sense, giving as it does the descent of the Honour
from Walter Fitz Richard (de Clare), founder of Tintern. But a much
later hand (? 17th century) has coolly run a pen through the three
words I have italicised, thus making nonsense of the passage, which was
then, in this mutilated form, printed by Dugdale! It is but a further
instance of the havoc which he and others have wrought in the genealogy
of the famous house of Clare.
As this charter is of independent value for its early (apparently
earliest)[626] mention of the name ‘Strongbow,’ its date is of
importance; Mr. Archer states that it is “dated Strigul, 22nd March,
1206,”[627] an obviously impossible date. Its real date was 22nd March,
1223[628] (7 Hen. III.).
We may now return to the office of Marshal in the 14th century. On June
3, 1317, the king called on the barons of the Exchequer to inform him
from their records, “quæ et cujusmodi feoda marescalli Angliæ qui pro
tempore fuerunt et eorum ministri temporibus progenitorum nostrorum
videlicet de pane, vino, cereolis, et candelis percipere et habere
consueverunt.” For reply they sent him the relative extract from the
“Constitutio domus regis.”[629] In 4 Edward III., “Thomas counte
Norfolk et marshall d’Engleterre” petitioned the king for his fees “qui
appendent a son office de la marechausie dedeinz l’ostell et dehors
auxi, come ses predecesseurs countes mareschauls ount estre servy”;
and he annexed a list of them based on the above return.[630] Again,
on April 13, 1344, the king called on the Exchequer for a return from
its records “de feodis quam de aliis quibuscunque quæ pertinent ad
officium comitis marescalli et mariscalciæ Angliæ,” etc., etc. Again
they sent him the relative extract “in quadam constitutione de domo
regis antiquitus facta”; but they added the passage “in Rubro Libro
Scaccarii” on Queen Eleanor’s coronation (1236), and a ‘Dialogus’
passage on the fees due to the Marshal from those he imprisoned for
default at the Exchequer.[631]
Lastly, we have in the treatise on the Marshal’s office, as given in
Nero D. vi., the following passage at its close (fol. 86_d_):
In rubro libro de scaccario Regis folio xxx^o sic continetur de
marescallo.
Et preter hoc debet magister marescalcie habere dicas de donis
et liberacionibus que fuerint de Thesauro Regis et de sua
camera et debet habere dicas contra omnes officiales Regis ut
testis per omnia. Quatuor marescalli qui serviunt familie Regis
tam clericis quam militibus quam ministris die qua faciunt
herbergeriam vel extra curiam in negocio Regis morantibus, viij
d. in die et galonem vini expens’ et xij frustra candelarum si
extra tres de die in diem homini suo et cand’ plenar’ quod si
aliquis marescallorum missus fuerit in negocio Regis viij d.
ta[ntu]m servientes Marescallorum si fuerint missi in negocio
Regis unusquisque in die iij d. sin autem in domo Regis comedent.
* * * * *
De officio marescalcie servivit Gilbertus comes de Stroghull
cuius est officium tumultus sedare in domo Regis, liberaciones
officiorum[632] facere, hostia aule Regis custodire. Recipit
autem de quolibet Barone facto milite a Rege et quolibet comite
palefridum cum sella.
It is this last extract, as I explained above, which is reproduced in
Norman-French in Countess Margaret’s petition, with the interpolation
of the words which have caused all the confusion.
And here it is necessary to observe that the interesting reference
it contains to the knighting of a ‘Baron’ by the king is reduced to
what Mr. Freeman would have termed “hideous nonsense” in the official
edition of the ‘Red Book of the Exchequer.’ We there read:
Recepit autem de quolibet arma, facto milite a Rege, et [de]
quolibet comite ea die palefridum cum sella (p. 759).
In the ‘Red Book’ itself, indeed, the text is now illegible, but Mr.
Hall tells us that he used the Hargrave MS. for “restoring certain
defaced or missing passages” (p. li.). Now in the Hargrave MS. (fo.
132[633]) the reading is “as clear as a pikestaff”; it could not be
clearer if it were printed. And it is the same reading as we find in
the above extracts:
Recipit autem de quol[ibet] _Barone_ facto milite a rege et
quol[ibet] com[ite] ea die, etc.