testudine_, impenetrabilem cuneum faciunt.[70]
“It is a pleasure,” as I wrote, “to find myself here in complete
agreement with Mr. Freeman.”[71] Mr. Freeman saw in this passage “the
array of the shield wall,”[72] and aptly compared Abbot Æthelred’s
description of the English array at the Battle of the Standard:
“Scutis scuta junguntur, lateribus latera conseruntur.”[73] With Mr.
Oman also I was no less pleased to find myself in perfect agreement.
I myself should speak, as he does, of the “tactics of the phalanx of
axemen.”[74] It is particularly interesting to read in his latest work
(p. 57), that at Zülpich (A.D. 612), according to Fredegarius:
So great was the press when the hostile masses [_phalanges_]
met and strove against each other, that the bodies of the slain
could not fall to the ground, but the dead stood upright wedged
among the living.
For precisely the same phenomenon is described at the Battle of
Hastings. William of Poitiers says of the English:
Ob nimiam densitatem eorum labi vix potuerunt interfecti.
And Bishop Guy:
Spiritibus nequeunt frustrata cadavera sterni,
Nec cedunt vivis corpora militibus.
Omne cadaver enim, vita licet evacuatum,
Stat velut illæsum, possidet atque locum.[75]
There is nothing strange in this parallel between Zülpich and Hastings,
for Mr. Oman observes that:
In their weapons and their manner of fighting, the bands of
Angles, Jutes, and Saxons who overran Britain were more nearly
similar to the Franks than to the German tribes who wandered
south.[76]
At Poictiers “the Franks fought, as they had done two hundred years
before at Casilinum, in one solid mass,”[77] for their tactics were “to
advance in a deep column or wedge.”[78] We have seen that the “column”
of English axemen similarly fought, according to Mr. Oman, “arranged in
a compact mass.”
Where the agreement is so complete, I need not labour the point
further. In my ‘Feudal England’ (pp. 354–8), I showed that Mr.
Archer’s views on the subject could not stand for a moment against
those of Mr. Freeman and Mr. Oman, to which they were directly opposed.
In ‘Social England’--just as Mr. Freeman had written that both the
English and the Danes stood as a “wedge of infantry forming a wall with
their shields”[79]--Mr. Oman writes of their “wedge or column.” It is
only in his later work that he suddenly shifts his ground, and flatly
contradicts his own words:
1894. 1898.
When Dane had fought Englishman, The Danes ... formed their
the battle had always shield wall.... The shield
been between _serried bodies_ wall (testudo, as Asser
[80] of foot soldiery, meeting pedantically calls it) is _of
fairly face to face _in the course not a wedged mass_,[80]
wedge_ or column, with its but only a line of shielded
shield wall of warriors warriors[81] (History of the
standing elbow to elbow, etc. Art of War,’ p. 99).
(‘Social England,’ p. 299).
The writer’s “of course” is delightful.
* * * * *
This contradiction of himself, however, is as nothing compared with
that to which we are now coming.
In his first work Mr. Oman wrote under Mr. Freeman’s influence. The
Normans, he held, at the Battle of Hastings, were confronted by
“impregnable palisades.” Nine years later, in his second description
of the battle, he substituted for these “impregnable palisades” an
“impenetrable shield wall.”
1885. 1894.
The Norman knights, if unsupported His archers, if unsupported by
by their light infantry, cavalry, might have been driven
_might have surged for ever around off the field by a single
the_ IMPREGNABLE PALISADES. charge; his cavalry, if
The archers, if unsupported by unsupported by archers, _might
the knights, could easily have have surged for ever around
been DRIVEN OFF THE FIELD BY A the_ IMPENETRABLE SHIELD WALL
GENERAL charge. United, however, of the English. But by
by the skilled tactics of William, combining the two armies
the two divisions of the invading (_sic_) with perfect skill, he
army won the day (‘Art of War,’ won his crowning victory
p. 25). (‘Social England,’p. 299).
The faithful _réchauffé_ of his former narrative only renders the
more significant Mr. Oman’s change of “impregnable palisades” to
“impenetrable shield wall.” For what had happened in the meanwhile to
account for this change being made? In July, 1892, there had appeared
in the ‘Quarterly Review’ my well-known article on “Professor Freeman,”
in which I had maintained that the English defence consisted, _not_ of
impregnable “palisades,” but only of an impenetrable “shield wall.” On
the furious and famous controversy upon this topic which followed, it
is quite unnecessary to dwell. Mr. Oman, we have seen himself adopted
the view I had advanced, and not, I hasten to add, on this point alone,
for with his whole description of the battle, as given in ‘Social
England,’ I am in complete agreement. The “shield wall” he mentions
twice.[82] Of “palisades,” intrenchments, or breastworks there is not a
word.
And yet Mr. Oman, now, is not ashamed to write:
I fear that I must plead that I was never converted. This being
so, Mr. Round cannot prove that I was.[83]
What is the explanation of Mr. Oman’s statement? Simply that he has
again changed his view; and having first adopted that of Mr. Freeman,
and then abandoned it to adopt my own, he now, in turn, abandons
both, and advances a third (or fourth) at variance with both alike!
His Norman knights are still “surging”; but they “surge” against an
obstacle which has once more changed its character:
The knights, if unsupported by the bowmen, might have surged for
ever against the _impregnable breastworks_. The archers,
unsupported by the knights, could easily have been driven off
the field by a general charge. United by the skilful hand of
William, they were invincible (‘History of the Art of War,’ p.
164).
What then were these “impregnable breastworks” which now make their
appearance in our old familiar passage? They are described on page 154,
where we read that “we must not think ... of massive palisading:[84]
they were merely
wattled hurdles ... intended, perhaps, more as a cover against
missiles than as a solid protection against the horsemen, for
they can have been but hastily constructed things, put together
in a few hours by wearied men.”
Let us place, side by side, Mr. Oman’s own words in this his latest
work:
The knights, if unsupported by [The English defences]
the bowmen, might have constituted no impregnable
surged for ever against the fortress, but a slight
impregnable breastworks (p. 164). earthwork, not wholly impassable
to horsemen (p. 154).
That they were, to say the least, “not wholly impassable” is evident
from the writer’s own description (p. 159) of the Norman knights’ first
charge “against the long front of the breastworks, which, in many
places, they must have swept down by their mere impetus.” Nay, “before
the two armies met hand to hand,” as Mr. Freeman observes,[85] a single
horseman--“a minstrel named Taillefer,” as Mr. Oman terms him--“burst
right through the breastwork and into the English line” (p. 158).[86]
Such, on Mr. Oman’s own showing, were his so-called “impregnable
breastworks” (p. 164). A single horseman could ride through them!
We see then that, in this his latest work, he not only adopts yet
another view, but cannot adopt it consistently even when he does.
To me there is nothing strange in all this shift and shuffle. It has
distinguished each of my opponents on this subject from the first.
Not only are they all at variance with one another: they are also
at variance with themselves. Alone my own theory remains unchanged
throughout. The English faced their foes that day in “the close array
of the shield wall.” Other defences they had none.
Mr. Oman has actually advanced four theories in succession:
(1) “The impregnable palisades.”[87]
(2) “The impenetrable shield wall.”[88]
(3) “An _abattis_ of some sort.”[89]
(4) “Wattled hurdles.”[90]
The third of these made its appearance after his description in ‘Social
England.’ “I still hold,” Mr. Oman wrote, “to the belief that there was
an _abattis_ of some sort in front of Harold’s line.”
But how can he “still” hold to a belief which he has never expressed
before or since? For neither the first, second, or fourth of the
defences he gives above can by any possibility describe an _abattis_.
The New English Dictionary describes an _abattis_ as
a defence constructed by placing felled trees lengthwise, one
over the other, with their branches towards the enemy’s line.
The ‘Encyclopædia Britannica’ gives us a similar description, speaking
of this defence as constructed of “felled trees lengthwise ... the
stems inwards.”[91] One is driven to suppose that Mr. Oman is quite
unable to understand what an _abattis_ really is.
We have now seen that the writer has actually given in succession four
entirely different descriptions of the defences of the English front,
while he has not the candour to confess that he has ever changed his
mind.
At this I am not in the least surprised. As I have observed in ‘Feudal
England,’ p. 342:
As for the defenders of the ‘palisade,’ they cannot even agree
among themselves as to what it really was. Mr. Archer produces
a new explanation only to throw it over almost as soon as it is
produced. One seeks to know for certain what one is expected to
deal with; but, so far as it is possible to learn, nobody can
tell one. There is only a succession of dissolving views, and
one is left to deal with a nebulous hypothesis.
Even since these words were published, Mr. Oman has produced his fourth
explanation, and has produced it in conjunction with Mr. Archer, who
had previously enriched this series of explanations by two further
ones of his own. In one of them the “fenestres,” which Wace makes
the principal ingredient of the palisade, are rendered by Mr. Archer
“windows.”[92] In another he describes the English defence as “a
structure of interwoven shields and stakes,” “shields set in the ground
and supported by a palisade of stakes,” a defence into which “actual
shields have been built.”[93] It is only necessary to add that Mr.
Oman, who acknowledges here his “indebtedness to Mr. T. A. Archer,”[94]
tacitly, but absolutely, rejects both these phantasies, together with
Mr. Archer’s great theory that the English axemen were “shieldless” at
the battle,[95] and “could not or did not form the shield wall.”[96]
All this Mr. Oman rejects, though, of course, he is careful not to say
so; just as Mr. Archer, before him, had rejected views of Mr. Freeman,
while professing to defend his account of the battle against me.[97]
* * * * *
I have now shown that my opponents are still as unable as ever to agree
among themselves on the subject of the alleged English defence, and
that as to Mr. Oman, he contradicts himself, not only in successive
works, but even in a single chapter. A little _clique_ of Oxford
historians, mortified at my crushing _exposé_ of Mr. Freeman’s
vaunted accuracy, have endeavoured, without scruple, and with almost
unconcealed anger, to silence me at any cost. And they cannot even wait
until they have agreed among themselves.
How entirely impotent they are to stay the progress of the truth
is shown by the fact that a German writer, Dr. Spatz, who has
independently examined the authorities and the ground, goes even
farther than myself in rejecting Mr. Freeman’s narrative, and
especially the palisade.[98] Sir James Ramsay also, on similarly
independent investigation, has been driven to the same conclusion,
which his recently published work embodies. Does Mr. Oman refer to Dr.
Spatz, whose work is a well-known one? No, he coolly states that “the
whole balance of learned opinion” is against me on this matter,[99]
although, as we have seen, neither he nor Mr. Archer accepts Mr.
Freeman’s narrative,[100] while their own recorded views hopelessly
differ (see pp. 43, 49).
Again, Mr. Oman writes:
I do not see what should have induced him [Wace] to bring the
wattled barrier into his narrative, unless it existed in the
tale of the fight as it had been told him, etc. (p. 153).
And yet he made use of my ‘Feudal England,’ in which I set forth
prominently (pp. 409–416), as I had previously done in the ‘English
Historical Review’ (viii. 677 _et seq._; ix. 237), my theory that the
passage in Wace “is nothing but a metrical, elaborate, and somewhat
confused paraphrase of the words of William of Malmesbury,” and that
he was clearly misled by the words “conserta ... testudine,” which
he did not understand. Mr. Archer discussed this theory, but did not
venture to reject it (Ibid.). Mr. Oman finds it safer to ignore it, and
to profess that he cannot imagine where Wace got the idea from, except
from oral tradition.
It is the same with the arrangement of the English host. In his latest
work, Mr. Oman states, as a matter of fact, that the “house carles”
formed the centre, and that
the fyrd, divided no doubt according to its shires, was ranged
on either flank (p. 155).
There is no authority whatever for this view in any account of the
battle, and it is wholly at variance with Mr. Oman’s own view, as
stated in his earlier works.
Backed (_sic_) by the disorderly There the house carles of King
masses of the fyrd, and by the Harold, backed (_sic_) by the
thegns of the home counties, thegnhood of all southern
the house carles of King Harold England and the disorderly
stood (‘Art of War,’ p. 24). masses of the fyrd of the home
counties, drew themselves out
(‘Social England,’ p. 229).
In perfect agreement with these passages, I hold that “the well-armed
house carles,” as Mr. Oman terms them, formed the English front, and
were “backed” by the rest of the host.[101] Mr. Oman’s later view
involves a tactical absurdity, as I have maintained throughout.[102]
But here again Mr. Oman finds it the safest plan to ignore an argument
he cannot face.
Let me, however, part from his narrative of the great struggle with
an expression of honest satisfaction that, even in his latest work,
he treats “the English host” as ranged “in one great solid mass”
(p. 154). This is the essential point on which I have insisted
throughout.[103] “No feature of the great battle is more absolutely
beyond dispute”;[104] and it absolutely cuts the ground from under Mr.
Archer’s feet.[105]
I may add that the denseness of the English host is similarly grasped
by Sir James Ramsay, who has made an independent examination of the
battle, and has set forth his interesting and original conclusions in
his recently-published ‘Foundations of England.’ The ground plan of
the battle in his work should be carefully compared with that which is
found in Mr. Freeman’s History. For the two differ so hopelessly that
the wholly conjectural character of Mr. Freeman’s views on the matter
will at once be vividly shown. The bold conclusion of Sir James Ramsay
that the English host held only the little plateau at the summit of the
Battle hill, is at least in harmony with their dense array, and is very
possibly correct.[106]
* * * * *
I now turn from battles to castles--those castles which played so
prominent a part in Anglo-Norman warfare.
Let us first glance at the moated mound, and then at the rectangular
keep. I do not desire, on the moated mound, to commit myself to all
Mr. Clark’s views; but practical archæologists, I need scarcely say,
are aware that the outer works of these most interesting strongholds
were normally of horseshoe or crescent form, the mound being “placed
on one side of an appended area.”[107] Mr. Oman, while acknowledging
in his book, and in the columns of the ‘Athenæum,’ his indebtedness
to Mr. Clark’s “admirable account of the topographical details of
English castles,” describes the old English burhs as “stake and foss
in concentric rings enclosing water-girt mounds” (p. 111). I pointed
out in the ‘Athenæum’[108] that “Mr. Clark, who did more than any one
for our knowledge of these burhs, was careful to explain,” in his
plans,[109] that their outer defences were not concentric, as Mr. Oman
asserts.
Determined never to admit a mistake, Mr. Oman retorted:
Of course, I am quite aware that in many burhs the outer works
are not purely concentric; but the concentric form is the more
typical. An admirable example of such a stronghold may be
seen on p. 21 of Mr. Clark’s book, where he gives the plan of
Edward’s burh of Towcester built in 921.[110]
Yet, in dealing with the Norman shell keeps on these “old palisaded
mounds,” Mr. Oman actually, in his own book, admits, of their “outer
defences,” that
as a general rule, the keep lies _not in the middle of the
space_, but at one end of it, or set in the walls ... as a
general rule the keep stands at one end of the enclosed space,
_not in its midst_.[111]
This is the feature of these striking works for which I myself
contended, and which, on that account, Mr. Oman at once denied.
As to the Towcester burh, I will place side by side my criticism and
Mr. Oman’s reply:
MR. ROUND. MR. OMAN.
A comparison of the plan on p. 21 He states that Towcester
with those on pp. 24, 25 will show burh, as drawn on p. 21 of Mr.
at once that the former is that of Clark’s Mediæval Military
the “water-girt mound” (as Mr. Architecture, is ‘a water-girt
Oman terms it) alone, and contains mound alone, with no outer
no “outer works,” concentric or works, concentric or other.’...
other.[112] Apparently Mr. Round cannot
read the simplest military
sketch; in this map there are
clear indications of outer
lines other than the mere
water.... In short, Mr. Round
is writing nonsense, and I
strongly suspect that he
knows it.[113]
Any archæologist comparing the plans will see at once that my statement
is correct, and that the plan (compare the section) shows absolutely
nothing beyond the actual ditch of the mound. I offered to submit the
question to Mr. St. John Hope’s decision,[114] but Mr. Oman would
submit it to no one but his friend and coadjutor, Mr. York Powell, who
is not known as an authority on these works, and who is hostile to
myself because I exposed Mr. Freeman![115]
Having now shown that, in his own words, Mr. Oman “cannot read the
simplest military sketch,” I pass to the siege of Rochester Castle,
famous for its rectangular keep, in 1264. This was an event that
deserves attention in a ‘History of the Art of War,’ for John had
breached the keep by mining half a century before, and the stately
structure had now to stand an energetic siege at the hands of Simon de
Montfort. A striking passage in Rishanger’s Chronicle tells us that,
advancing from London,
comes autem de Leycestria, vir in omnibus circumspectus,
machinas et alia ad expugnationem castri necessaria secum a
civitate Londoniarum per aquam et per terram transvehi præcepit,
quibus inclusos vehementer impugnavit, nec eos indulgere quieti
permisit; exemplum relinquens Anglicis qualiter circa castrorum
assultationes agendum sit qui penitus hujusmodi diebus illis
fuerant ignari.[116]
The barons promptly stormed the ‘outer bailey’ of the castle (April
19),[117] and strove desperately to gain the keep, till, a week later,
they fled suddenly at the news of the king’s advance on London.[118]
But so vigorous were the siege operations by attack, battery, and
mining, that they were on the point of succeeding when they had to
raise the siege.[119]
Surely a ‘History of the Art of War’ should mention the above
remarkable allusion to Simon’s mastery of siege operations, and to his
teaching the English, who were then ignorant of the subject. But all
that Mr. Oman tells us is that--
the massive strength of Gundulf’s Norman keep was too much for
such siege appliances as the earl could employ. The garrison
under John de Warenne, the Earl of Surrey, held their own
without difficulty (p. 416).
We have seen that, on the contrary, the keep was on the point of
being taken. But what are we to say to the words, “_Gundulf’s_ Norman
keep”? “It was long the custom,” as Mr. Clark wrote, “to attribute this
keep to Gundulf, making it contemporaneous, or nearly so, with the
Tower of London”; but, more than thirty years ago, it was shown by Mr.
Hartshorne (in the ‘Archæological Journal’) that it was built in later
days under William of Corbeuil (1126–1136).[120] No one, in the present
state of our knowledge, could suppose that Gundulf was its builder; and
it is obvious that a writer who does must have yet everything to learn
on Norman military architecture.
* * * * *
I must lastly deal as briefly as possible with the subject of knight
service. The view of modern historians has been that this was gradually
evolved during the Norman period out of a pre-conquestual obligation
to provide one armed man for every five hides held. As against this I
have advanced the theory[121] that the whole arrangement was introduced
_de novo_ at the Conquest, when the Conqueror assessed the fiefs he
granted in terms of _the five-knight unit irrespective of hidation_.
Put in a less technical form my theory is that the Conqueror called
on the holder of every considerable fief to furnish a contingent of
five knights, or some multiple of five, to the feudal host.[122] And
this he did arbitrarily, without reckoning the ‘hides’ that might be
contained in the fief. Further, by the _argumentum ad absurdum_, I
showed that if every five hides had to provide a knight, there would be
nothing, or less than nothing, left for the tenant-in-chief.[123] It
was of this new theory that Professors Pollock and Maitland observe, in
their history of English Law (i. 238–9), that they regard it “as having
been proved by Mr. Round’s convincing papers.”
Mr. Oman, however, leans to the now exploded theory, and holds that
under Norman rule “the old notion that the five hides must provide
a fully armed man was remembered;”[124] and that though “some lay
tenants-in-chief” got off easily, “the majority were obliged to supply
their proper contingent.”[125] He then proceeds:
It has been clearly shown of late, by an eminent inquirer into
early English antiquities, that the hidage of the townships was
very roughly assessed, and that the compilers of Domesday Book
incline towards round numbers.
Now apart from the fact that this “eminent inquirer,” my friend
Professor Maitland to wit, gives me full credit for having been first
in the field[126]--a fact which Mr. Oman, with my book before him, of
course carefully ignores--his words show that he cannot understand the
simplest historical theory. Professor Maitland and I have dwelt on the
antiquity of this assessment, with which “the compilers of Domesday
Book” had no more to do than Mr. Oman himself, and which indeed the
compilation of that book has almost utterly obscured.
From the fact of the five-hide unit Mr. Oman argues “that there was
little difficulty in apportioning the military service due from the
tenants-in-chief who owned them,”[127] though such apportionment, as I
have shown, would result in an actual absurdity.[128] Indeed, Mr. Oman
himself observes that the tenant-in-chief, to discharge his obligation,
“might distribute the bulk of his estate in lots roughly averaging five
hides to subtenants, who would discharge the service for him,”[129]
although a moment’s consideration will show that this process would
absorb not “the bulk,” but the whole of his estate.
But all this is insignificant by the side of Mr. Oman’s double error
on the _vetus feoffamentum_. This begins on p. 359, which is headed
“The old enfeoffment,’” and which describes the distribution of fiefs
by William among the tenants-in-chief. On the next page he writes of
“the knights of ‘the old enfeoffment,’ as William’s arrangement was
entitled,” and proceeds to vouch my ‘Feudal England’ as his authority
for this statement! On the same page we read of the landholder’s
“_servitium debitum_ according to the assessment of the _vetus
feoffamentum_ of the Conqueror”; and further learn that Henry II.
demanded a statement as to the number of knights whom each
tenant-in-chief owed as subtenants, how many were under the
‘old enfeoffment’ of William I., and how many of more recent
establishment.
We also read that--