E-text prepared by Brian Coe, Wayne Hammond, and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made
available by Internet Archive (https://archive.org)
Note: Project Gutenberg also has an HTML version of this
file which includes the original maps.
See 58174-h.htm or 58174-h.zip:
(https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/58174/pg58174-images.html)
or
(https://www.gutenberg.org/files/58174/58174-h.zip)
Images of the original pages are available through
Internet Archive. See
https://archive.org/details/battleofwavregr00kell
Transcriber’s note:
Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).
Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=).
THE BATTLE OF WAVRE AND
GROUCHY’S RETREAT
THE BATTLE OF WAVRE
AND GROUCHY’S RETREAT
A Study of an Obscure Part of
the Waterloo Campaign
by
W. HYDE KELLY, R.E.
With Maps and Plans
London
John Murray, Albemarle Street, W.
1905
AUTHOR’S PREFACE
So much has been written on the Waterloo Campaign that, even in the
smallest details, nothing new can be revealed; but the dazzling
magnitude of the great battle itself has obscured a part of the campaign
which is seldom studied--the battle against Thielemann, and Grouchy’s
skilful retreat from Wavre.
I have chosen this tail-end of the campaign because little is known
about it; because it serves useful lessons even for to-day; because the
operations leading up to the battle round Wavre are of great interest;
and because a campaign full of mistakes should be studied as carefully
as a campaign free from error. From history we obtain experience, and
experience teaches us how to act for the future. We learn how great men
of old time fought their battles and managed their retreats; we see the
reasons of their successes and their failures; and we should endeavour
to make use of our lessons when our own time comes. Not that Grouchy
can be deemed a great soldier; nor can his part of the 1815 campaign be
regarded as of prime importance in itself; but as showing the small
trifles that mar great plans in their execution, as showing how little a
thing will sometimes destroy the grandest conceptions, his operations
from 16th June to the end of the month are well worthy of attention.
I might have employed my time more profitably had I chosen to work upon
some more illustrious name than Grouchy’s, or upon some more modern
campaign of greater advantage to the war student of to-day; but I chose
to bring forward an obscure page in the history of the most famous
campaign, for in that history there is much that may still be laid to
heart.
Great deeds deserve great critics, but, as Colonel Henderson wrote in
his Preface to “Stonewall Jackson,” “if we were to wait for those who
are really qualified to deal with the achievements of famous captains,
we should, as a rule, remain in ignorance of the lessons of their lives,
for men of the requisite capacity are few in a generation.” Man is not
so fortunate that he can live in every period; and for knowledge he
must go backwards to search in history. The statesman will read of the
great quarrels between Charles I. and his Parliament, not because he
would imitate either the one side or the other, but because he will
desire to mould future action upon the experience of the past. Napoleon
himself prepared all his ambitious schemes from the pages of Tacitus,
Plutarch and Livy, and the histories of the deeds of Hannibal,
Alexander, and Cæsar. Wellington “made it a rule to study for some hours
every day”; and since these two great men advocate study of history, who
is there who shall gainsay the advantages of learning? But the true
method of reading history requires something far deeper than mere
perusal: it must be accompanied by careful and continuous thought. A
true history will encourage the reader to bury himself in the very
atmosphere of the time, and will bring him to see with his eyes the
comings and goings of great men, the rights and wrongs of their deeds,
and their impress upon contemporary people.
This small volume attempts nothing of this kind: it is a sketch, a mere
outline, of a minor portion of a remarkable campaign. In it I have made
no mention of the tactical formations employed; I have given no details
of armaments, equipments, or means of transport; for these are now of no
value to the soldier-student. The comments or remarks are to be taken or
left, as it shall please the reader: they are my own views; possibly
they may coincide with the views of others; in that case they will be
interesting.
I may admit that these pages were at first written for my own use--mere
notes taken down while I read a dozen authorities on the subject. I
afterwards persuaded myself that my studies might prove of use to those
who had little time to search the volumes in the libraries.
I trust I shall not offend German susceptibilities by omitting the
prefix “von” in the Prussian names and titles. I only do so to save
space.
I have to add my gratitude to the numerous writers and historians who
have told the splendid story of Waterloo, and from whom I have drawn my
facts.
W. HYDE KELLY.
_August 1905._
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I. BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE EARLIER OPERATIONS--UP TO LIGNY 1
II. THE THIRD PRUSSIAN CORPS AND GROUCHY’S FORCES 52
III. THE RETREAT OF THIELEMANN’S CORPS FROM SOMBREFFE 66
IV. GROUCHY’S PURSUIT OF THE PRUSSIANS 80
V. BLUCHER MARCHES TOWARDS MONT ST JEAN WITH THE FIRST, SECOND,
AND FOURTH CORPS 100
VI. THIELEMANN’S INSTRUCTIONS AND HIS DISPOSITIONS AT WAVRE 108
VII. THE BATTLE OF WAVRE 115
VIII. GROUCHY’S RETREAT 133
IX. NOTES AND COMMENTS 153
INDEX 165
MAPS
PAGE
1. ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS OF 15TH-20TH JUNE 1
2. THE BATTLE OF WAVRE--POSITIONS AT DAYBREAK, 19TH JUNE 115
3. ILLUSTRATING GROUCHY’S RETREAT FROM NAMUR 133
[Illustration: MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE 15^{ṬḤ} TO
20^{ṬḤ} 1815.
_William Stanford & Company, Ltd._, _The Oxford Geographical Institute._
John Murray, Albemarle St., W.]
THE BATTLE OF WAVRE AND GROUCHY’S RETREAT
CHAPTER I
BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE EARLIER OPERATIONS--UP TO LIGNY
The Allied troops in the Netherlands had begun to concentrate as early
as the 15th of March. They were cantoned from Trèves and Coblentz to
Courtrai. But their commanders were away in Vienna--both Wellington and
Blucher. The largest number that could be concentrated to meet a sudden
attack on Belgium in April was 80,000 men. Of these, 23,000 were
Anglo-Hanoverian troops, 30,000 were Prussians, 14,000 were Saxons, and
the remainder Dutch-Belgians. The spirit of discipline was almost wholly
wanting among the Saxons and Dutch-Belgians; the greater part of them
had, at one time or another, served Napoleon, and were not to be
trusted. Kleist, commanding the Prussians on the Rhine, had arranged
with the Prince of Orange, who commanded the troops in the Netherlands,
that, in the event of a French attack, they would retire together on
Tirlemont; thus leaving Brussels exposed, and giving the enemy a firm
footing in Belgium.
By the 1st of April, Napoleon could have mustered a force of 50,000 men
on the frontier near Charleroi. He could have marched direct on Brussels
(as the Prince of Orange and Kleist had agreed to fall back). With
Brussels in his hands, he could have turned and repeated his favourite
strategy by falling upon the allied armies in turn. Wellington was
dreading such an attack.
But the project, although it may have entered Napoleon’s thoughts, was
never seriously contemplated by him. His army, although rapidly being
raised, organised, and equipped in hundreds of thousands of men, was not
yet in a condition to enter upon a prolonged campaign. He might gain a
slight temporary success with these 50,000 men; he might be reinforced
by another 100,000 in the North; but, meantime, how should he check the
other great invading armies of the Allies? For their preparations were
forging ahead. Barclay de Tolly was marching with 167,000 Russians in
three columns through Germany. Marshal Schwarzenberg, commanding an
Austrian army of 50,000 men, and the Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of
40,000 men, were hastening to reach the Rhine. One hundred and twenty
thousand men were being collected in Lombardy, after Murat’s decisive
overthrow. Prince Wrede, commanding a Bavarian army 80,000 strong, was
assembling his forces behind the Upper Rhine. Truly a formidable array!
To strike a premature blow at Belgium with 50,000 men did not therefore
commend itself to Napoleon as a possible opening. By waiting, he not
only increased his army and reserve forces; he made it appear that the
war was being forced upon him by the threatened invasion of France. His
apparent reluctance to open hostilities would be a great point in his
favour. Then, again, the plans of the Allies would unfold themselves
presently, and he could strike at will.
While the Allies were planning and re-planning, discussing and arguing
their plans of campaign, their brilliant adversary was growing daily
stronger. But the position was an intricate one. A too-hasty invasion of
France with ill-concentrated forces would have brought about a
repetition of the 1814 campaign outside Paris. There were to be no
half-measures with Napoleon this time.
Many plans were put forward by the Allied generals; and after lengthy
discussion, it was finally decided to adopt a modified scheme proposed
by Schwarzenberg, which was to come into operation towards the end of
July. This plan provided for the simultaneous invasion of France by six
armies. Wellington, with 92,000 British, Dutch-Belgians, Hanoverians,
Nassauers and Brunswickers, was to cross the frontier between Beaumont
and Maubeuge; Blucher, with 116,000 Prussians, between Beaumont and
Givet; Barclay de Tolly, with 150,000 Russians, _viâ_ Saarlouis and
Saarbruck; and Schwarzenberg, with 205,000 men--Austrians, Wurtembergers
and Bavarians--by Basle; Frimont, with 50,000 Austrians and Piedmontese,
was to advance on Lyons from Lombardy, while Bianchi, at the head of
25,000 Austrians, was to make for Provence. The first four armies were
to converge on Paris, by Peronne, Laon, Nancy and Langres respectively;
and the two last were to create a diversion in the South and support the
Royalists.
This was the final plan of the Allies; but long before the date fixed
for the first moves, Napoleon was fully acquainted with their designs.
Newspaper reports and secret letters had kept him informed throughout
the preparations. He tells us that he worked out two alternative plans
of campaign. His first idea was to concentrate a force of 200,000 men
outside Paris, and await the approach of the Allied armies. He proposed
to gather the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Corps, the
Imperial Guard, and Grouchy’s Cavalry Reserve, round the Capital, which
would be garrisoned by 80,000 regular troops, mobilised guards and
sharpshooters, strongly entrenched and governed by Davoût: and to
concentrate round Lyons Suchet’s army of the Alps, 23,000 men, and
Lecourbe’s Corps of the Jura, 8,000 men. All the great fortresses were
strongly garrisoned; and Napoleon intended to let the Allies advance
until they were surrounded with these powerful garrisons and faced by
himself with 200,000 men. The date fixed by the Allies for the crossing
of the frontier was 1st July. It would take them three weeks to draw
near Paris. By that time the entrenchments round the Capital would be
completed. But the Allies, operating on six different lines, would be
obliged to detach large forces to watch Suchet and Lecourbe, and to mask
the great strongholds in their way. When they had approached Paris,
their great armies would have been thus reduced to 400,000 men, far from
their bases, and faced by the greatest soldier of modern time. The
campaign of 1814 would be repeated, but Napoleon would have 200,000 men
at his back, and a powerful entrenched camp at Paris. Thus the Allies
would in all probability be crushed in detail; whether they would
recover and overwhelm Napoleon by sheer weight of numbers seemed
doubtful.
But to allow France to be over-run in the meantime by the invaders would
enrage the Parisians; and Parisians had always to be reckoned in any
plan of Napoleon’s. A more splendid scheme soon presented itself to him.
He had a great idea of the importance of winning Brussels: and defensive
warfare was unworthy of his genius. He resolved to attack before the
Allies should be concentrated. By the middle of June his available
forces on the Northern frontier would amount to 125,000 men.
“He would enter Belgium: he would beat in turn, or separately,
the English and the Prussians; then, as soon as new
reinforcements had arrived from the depôts, he would effect a
junction with the 23,000 men under Rapp, and would bear down
upon the Austro-Russians.”[1]
Here was a plan after his own heart. To establish himself once more at
the head of the nation he must win a glorious victory for France. The
minds of Frenchmen were peculiarly susceptible to the inspiriting
effects of military glory. Therefore he would strike at Belgium: he
would separate Blucher from Wellington and beat each army in turn. And
here is revealed the nicety of his calculations. He must attack and beat
either Wellington or Blucher before they could join their forces.
“If he directed his line of operations against Brussels through
Ath, and debouched from Lille or Condé against Wellington’s
right, he would merely drive the English army towards the
Prussian army, and two days later he would find himself face to
face with their united forces. If, on the contrary, he marched
against Blucher’s left, through Givet and the valley of the
Meuse, in the same way he would still hasten the union of the
hostile forces by driving the Prussians to the English. Inspired
by one of his finest strategical conceptions, the Emperor
resolved to break boldly into the very centre of the enemy’s
cantonments, at the very point where the English and Prussians
would probably concentrate. The road from Charleroi to Brussels
forming the line of contact between the two armies, Napoleon,
passing through Beaumont and Phillippeville, resolved, by this
road, to fall like a thunderbolt on his foe.”[2]
Wellington’s troops were scattered in cantonments stretching over an arc
from Oudenarde to Quatre-Bras. The Second Corps, under Lord Hill,
formed the extreme right, and occupied Ghent, Oudenarde, Ath and Leuze.
The Corps was 27,000 strong, of whom scarcely 7,000 were British troops.
The First Corps, under the Prince of Orange, occupied Mons, Rouelx,
Soignies, Genappe, Seneffe, Frasnes, Braine-le-Comte, and Enghien. This
Corps was 30,000 strong, of whom only 6,300 were British. Its left
rested on Genappe, Quatre-Bras, and Frasnes, and was in touch with the
right of the First Corps, of the Prussian army, under Zieten, whose
headquarters were at Charleroi. Wellington’s Reserve, 25,500 men, was
posted in the neighbourhood of Brussels, under the Duke’s personal
command. The Cavalry, under Lord Uxbridge, was comprised in seven
brigades, British and King’s German Legion; with one Hanoverian brigade,
five squadrons of Brunswick Cavalry, and three brigades of Dutch-Belgian
Cavalry. The Brunswickers were stationed near Brussels; the three
Dutch-Belgian brigades were allotted to the First Corps, and the
remainder of the cavalry were stationed at Ninove, Grammont, and in the
villages scattered along the Dender.
Wellington was expecting an attack by way of Lille and Courtrai, and
always regarded this direction as Napoleon’s best move. For his army was
based on Ostend, Antwerp, and the sea; hence, had Napoleon attacked by
way of Mons, he would have cut Wellington’s communications, and forced
him to evacuate Brussels. On the other hand, he would have driven the
English army towards the Prussians.
Wellington’s dispositions were eminently suited to rapid concentration
on threatened points, while, at the same time, they were sufficiently
scattered to make the subsistence of the troops possible. He had
selected Oudenarde, Ath, Enghien, Soignies, Nivelles, and Quatre-Bras as
points of interior concentration; and in this way, by whichever route
Napoleon chose to attack, Wellington could bring his Reserve to the
threatened point, and at the same time bring the remainder of his forces
into concentration, enabling him to throw at least two-thirds of his
whole force in front of the enemy within twenty-four hours.
Blucher’s army, 116,000 strong, was divided into four Corps. The First
Corps, under Zieten, had its headquarters at Charleroi; and its outposts
stretched from Bonne Espérance through Lobbes, Thuin and Gerpinnes to
Sossoye. Its right was in touch with the left of the Prince of Orange’s
Corps of Wellington’s army. The Second Corps, under Pirch I., had its
headquarters at Namur. Its Divisions were stationed in Thorembey les
Beguignes, Heron, Huy and Hannut. Its outposts stretched from Sossoye
to Dinant. The Third Corps, under Thielemann, whose headquarters were at
Ciney, had its Divisions stationed at Asserre, Ciney, Dinant and Huy.
Its outposts extended from Dinant to Rochefort. The Fourth Corps,
Bulow’s, had its headquarters at Liège: its Divisions were stationed at
Warème, Hologne, Liers, Tongres and Lootz.
Bluchers scheme of concentration enabled him to collect his four Corps
together at their respective points of assembly--Fleurus, Namur, Ciney
and Liège, within twelve hours. If the French crossed the Sambre at
Charleroi, Blucher intended to concentrate his army in front of
Sombreffe, on the Namur-Nivelles road, where he would be within 8 miles
of Quatre-Bras, Wellington’s point of concentration under those
circumstances. If Napoleon moved along the Meuse towards Namur, the
First, Second and Fourth Corps were to concentrate on Namur, while
Thielemann’s Corps, the Third, acting from Ciney, would attack the
enemy’s right flank. If, again, Napoleon advanced on Ciney, Zieten,
Pirch I. and Thielemann were to concentrate their Corps on Ciney, and
the Fourth Corps was to remain at Liège as a Reserve.
These were the dispositions of the Allies; but they were not
strategically in a sound position. Wellington’s line of supply lay
through Ostend and Antwerp to the sea; Bluchers lay by Liège and
Maestricht to the Rhine. Therefore, in the event of a disaster to
either, or both, their lines of retreat would carry them further apart.
It was this weakness on which Napoleon based his whole plan. The
Prussian army, being the nearer to Napoleon, would be the first met
with, and therefore the first to concentrate. By a rapid crossing of the
Sambre at Charleroi, Napoleon would force the First Corps back on
Fleurus, where the Prussian army was to concentrate, and throw himself
on the point of junction of the Allied armies when concentrated; namely,
the Quatre-Bras-Sombreffe road. He knew that the Prussians, by reason of
their dispositions, would be concentrated first, and he therefore hoped,
by possessing himself of the point of junction, to beat their
concentrated army before Wellington, who, he decided, would be much
slower in assembling his troops, could come up to Quatre-Bras. It was of
vital importance to Napoleon to beat the Prussian army, entirely and
completely, in its position at Sombreffe, before Wellington could come
to Blucher’s assistance. The retreat of the Prussians on Wavre without
such a decisive defeat, would have upset the whole plan: for Wellington
would then have retired and united with Blucher, either in front of
Brussels or behind it. But, if thoroughly beaten, the Prussians would
retreat on Liège: and only in this way could Napoleon effectually
separate the two armies and crush them in turn. Such was Napoleon’s
argument. In conception, the plan was brilliant; but its execution was
unworthy of him.
_Composition of the French Army._
Napoleon’s Grand army for the invasion of Belgium was made up of the
First, Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth Corps d’Armée; four Corps of
Reserve Cavalry; and the Imperial Guard; a total of 116,124 men. The
First Corps, under d’Erlon, consisted of the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Infantry Divisions, and the First Light Cavalry Division. In the
early part of June, the Corps was stationed at Lille. The Second Corps,
under Reille, consisted of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Infantry
Divisions, and the Second Light Cavalry Division. This Corps was
quartered at Valenciennes. The Third Corps, Vandamme’s, comprised the
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Infantry Divisions, and the Third Light
Cavalry Division, and was stationed at Mézières. The Fourth Corps,
Gérard’s, was composed of the Twelfth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Infantry Divisions, and the Seventh Light Cavalry Division. The Corps
was stationed in Metz, Longwy, and Thionville. The Sixth Corps, Lobau’s,
was made up of the Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Infantry
Divisions; it was stationed at Laon. Grouchy commanded the four Corps of
Reserve cavalry; these First, Second, Third, and Fourth Cavalry Corps
were commanded by Pajol, Excelmans, Kellermann, and Milhaud
respectively; they were mostly stationed between the river Aisne and the
frontier. The Imperial Guard consisted of twelve regiments of infantry,
two regiments of heavy cavalry, three of light cavalry, and thirteen
batteries of artillery. The Guard left Paris for Avesnes early in June.
To the First and Second Corps d’Armée were attached six batteries; to
the Third and Fourth, five batteries; and to the Sixth, four batteries
of artillery.
This army was the best, in point of courage, warlike spirit, and
devotion to himself, that Napoleon ever led. But the men were without
discipline, and distrusted their leaders. Napoleon’s generals were not
the best that had ever served under him. Ney was a tried veteran, the
“bravest of the brave,” but he had just come over to Napoleon from Louis
XVIII. Grouchy had never held an independent command. It is remarkable
that _both_ Ney and Grouchy should have failed Napoleon in this, his
last, campaign; but neither were fitted to the great trusts committed to
them. Napoleon himself was not the same man who had beaten back the
Allies a year previously at Montmirail, Montereau, and Champaubert, but
he was still a master of strategy and the strongest man of France.
_The First Movements of the French._
Napoleon began his concentration early in June. He moved the First Corps
from Lille to Avesnes; the Second from Valenciennes to Maubeuge; the
Third from Mézières to Chimay; the Fourth from Thionville to Rocroi; the
Sixth from Laon to Avesnes; and the Guard from Paris to Avesnes.
The concentration was in full swing, with the exception of Grouchy’s
Reserve Cavalry, when Napoleon left Paris on the night of 11th June.
Grouchy had not received his orders for concentration from Soult, the
Chief of the Staff, who had neglected to send them until the 12th. Here
was an omission at the outset which might well have had serious results.
But Grouchy lost no time in setting his Corps on their roads, and by
rapid marching he had all his cavalry beyond Avesnes on the night of the
13th.
On the evening of the 14th Napoleon moved his headquarters to Beaumont.
The First Corps was on the extreme left, between Maubeuge and
Solre-sur-Sambre; the Second Corps between Solre-sur-Sambre and Leers;
the Third and Sixth Corps between Beaumont and the Sambre; the Fourth
Corps between Phillippeville and Florenne; Grouchy’s Reserve Cavalry
between Beaumont and Phillippeville; the Imperial Guard at Beaumont.
This concentration was brilliantly planned, and skilfully executed:
worthy of Napoleon’s best days.
The French army crossed the frontier early in the morning of the 15th of
June, in three columns. The left column (d’Erlon’s and Reille’s Corps)
crossed by Thuin and Marchienne; the centre column (Vandamme’s, Lobau’s
Corps, Imperial Guard, and Grouchy’s Reserve Cavalry), at whose head was
the Emperor himself, crossed by Ham-sur-Heure, Jamioux, and Marcinelle;
the right column, Gérard’s Corps, by Florennes and Gerpinnes. The front
was covered by twelve regiments of cavalry.
The arrangements for relieving the troops of a fatiguing march by
avoiding the crossing of columns in front of each other, and for the
communication between each column, were admirable. The baggage and
ammunition waggons, except those of the latter which were required for
immediate use, were kept 9 miles in rear of the army. The advanced
guards of the different columns communicated constantly with each other,
so that no column should get ahead of the others. A screen of scouts was
sent out in all directions to obtain every scrap of information as to
the enemy’s position, and report direct to the Emperor. Everything was
to be done to ensure the rapid march of a well-concentrated army on the
point where it was expected that the Prussians would be met with. But
three of the Corps commanders failed to carry out their instructions.
D’Erlon started from his camp at half-past four instead of at three
o’clock, as ordered. Vandamme never knew of the march of the army until
Lobau’s Corps pushed on his rear: the orders sent to him from
headquarters had not reached him, owing to an accident to the officer
sent by Soult. And Gérard, who should have marched at three, did not
reach Florennes until 7 A.M. All this was carelessness. Soult should
have sent such important orders in duplicate. It is interesting to
observe how these delays affected the subsequent movements of the
columns on the 15th.
But, first of all, the centre column shall be followed, as being that
led by the Emperor himself. In the advance on Charleroi, Pajol’s cavalry
led the way. Zieten’s outposts were everywhere driven in, and when Pajol
entered Charleroi at midday (the 15th) the Prussians had withdrawn, and
taken up a strong position at Gilly, 2 miles north-east of Charleroi.
The centre column halted to await Vandamme’s arrival; for Grouchy, who
did not like the appearance of the Prussian position, would not attack
until he had Excelmans’ Cavalry and Vandamme’s Corps with him. Napoleon,
impatient at the delay, took command in person at 5 P.M., and pushed
home a vigorous attack; and the Prussians retired at dusk to Fleurus.
Vandamme and the Cavalry bivouacked within 2 miles of the Prussians. The
Guard bivouacked between Gilly and Charleroi; Lobau’s Corps south of the
river, near Charleroi; and Gérard’s Corps on the right, crossing the
Sambre at Châtelet, bivouacked on the road to Fleurus. Napoleon thus had
the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Corps, the Imperial Guard, and Grouchy’s
Cavalry concentrated between Fleurus and Charleroi, intending to attack
the Prussians in strength next day, either at Fleurus or at Sombreffe.
The Emperor passed the night at Charleroi.
Had it not been for Vandamme’s delay, and had Grouchy attacked the
Prussians at once at Gilly, the latter could have pushed his enemy as
far as Sombreffe that night, which it was Napoleon’s intention that he
should have done. But Vandamme’s slowness prevented Grouchy from
advancing further than Fleurus that evening.
On the Left, matters had not, by nightfall, progressed as far as
Napoleon wished. Reille, in accordance with his instructions, had
marched with his Corps, the Second, from Leers at 3 A.M., and pushed on
to Marchienne, everywhere driving back the enemy’s outposts. He was then
ordered to march on Gosselies, where it was reported that a body of
Prussians were in position. He therefore pushed on his troops along the
Charleroi-Brussels road; and finding Jumet occupied by a Prussian
rearguard, he drove out the enemy, and reached Gosselies at about 5 P.M.
Marshal Ney now arrived on the scene, and, having just come from the
Emperor, from whom he received his orders, took over the command of the
Left Wing. Ney pushed on to Frasnes with Piré’s Cavalry and Bachelu’s
Infantry Division: Girard’s Division was sent to pursue the Prussians,
who had retreated from Gosselies towards Fleurus: the remaining
divisions of Reille’s Corps--Jerome’s and Foy’s--stayed at Gosselies.
Ney drove back Saxe-Weimar’s Brigade from Frasnes at 6.30 P.M.; the
brigade retiring on Quatre-Bras. Lefebvre-Desnouette’s Division of Light
Cavalry of the Guard had arrived with Ney, and was now moved in support
of his infantry at Frasnes.
Thus Ney, at 6.30 P.M., while there were still nearly three hours of
daylight left, had with him two light cavalry divisions, and one
infantry division, at Frasnes. The distance to Quatre-Bras was 2½ miles.
In less than an hour he could have reached the cross-roads and attacked
Saxe-Weimar’s Brigade. But he merely pushed his cavalry forward,
reconnoitred the position, and then withdrew his men to Frasnes, himself
returning to Gosselies at about 8.30 P.M.
Now it has been fiercely contested that Ney received verbal orders from
Napoleon to occupy Quatre-Bras on the night of the 15th. Whether he did
or did not is a point still undecided by the authorities on the
campaign, but it matters little, for Napoleon, in his written orders to
Ney on the 16th, expressed his satisfaction with the progress of the
night before, and did not blame Ney for his failure to occupy the
cross-roads. As a matter of fact, Saxe-Weimar made such a bold show of
resistance to the reconnaissance sent by Ney, that the latter was
entirely deceived as to his enemy’s numbers: he believed that the
English were in great force there. Had Ney attacked Quatre-Bras that
night, he would have driven back Saxe-Weimar’s Brigade of Nassauers, the
only troops in occupation, and seized the most important point in the
theatre of war. But, viewing the question from what must have been Ney’s
own point of view, he was acting on sound strategical principles by not
pushing ahead too far. He had only just arrived on the ground, and was
not acquainted with any of his Staff, or his divisional generals, or
even with the strength of his troops. He believed that a strong English
force held Quatre-Bras, and that, by attacking, he would be overwhelmed
by the whole of Wellington’s army; that Napoleon’s Left Wing would be
crushed. He therefore adopted more cautious methods, and awaited the
arrival of d’Erlon’s Corps, and news of the progress of the Centre and
Right Wing.
Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar may be credited with having saved the
situation for the Allies. Had he adhered rigidly to the principles of
strategy, he would have fallen back from Quatre-Bras; but instead, his
fine courage prompted him to hold on until supports should arrive, and
his boldness triumphed over Ney’s prudence. If Ney had seized
Quatre-Bras that night, and if the succeeding events had taken place as
they did take place, the battle of Waterloo would never have been
fought, for Wellington could not have risked a battle without hope of
Prussian assistance. But there were many little risks and chances which
might have changed the whole result of the campaign!
To return to d’Erlon. By starting an hour and a half later than he was
ordered to do, he lost most valuable time; and throughout the day he
took no pains to make up for the delay, although he actually received an
order from Soult, late in the afternoon, to the effect that he was to
join Reille at Gosselies that evening. Instead of this, by nightfall his
leading division, Durutte’s, was at Jumet, 1½ miles in rear of
Gosselies, and his Headquarters at Marchienne, 6 miles in rear! Matters
had not progressed at all satisfactorily on the Left Wing.
_The 15th of June on the side of the Allies._
Blucher had decided upon a concentration of his whole army at Sombreffe,
in the event of Napoleon attacking by Charleroi. Therefore, on the
evening of the 14th, he ordered the Second, Third, and Fourth Corps to
concentrate on Sombreffe, while the First Corps was to make a stout
resistance, and fall back slowly on Fleurus, which Zieten was to hold,
in order to gain time for the concentration. These arrangements were
made without any definite agreement between Wellington and Blucher, as
to the Duke’s movements under these circumstances. It was understood
that each should give the other all the assistance in his power, in the
event of a French attack; but no formal undertaking for definite action
was entered into. Besides, Blucher, when he ordered his concentration,
believed that Wellington’s troops were too scattered to allow of their
concentration within two days. He could not therefore have expected much
actual support from Wellington. There was also the possibility that
Wellington himself was confronted with a strong force.
In the concentration of the Prussian Corps, another defect in the
transmission and execution of orders from Headquarters must be
mentioned. Gneisenau, the chief of Blucher’s Staff, sent instructions to
Bulow, commanding the Fourth Corps, on the 14th, to the effect that he
was so to dispose his Corps that his troops might reach Hannut in one
march. The order was indefinite, and contained no statement that
Napoleon was about to attack; there was no mention of the disposition of
the other Prussian Corps; no mention of Blucher’s intentions, or of the
general situation. This was culpable negligence on the part of the
chief of the Staff. It was his duty under the circumstances to transmit
all such important information to all the Corps commanders; and because
Bulow’s Corps was some distance in rear, is no reason why such a
necessary step should have been omitted. The result was a serious delay
on the part of the Fourth Corps. At midnight on the 14th, a second
despatch from Gneisenau was sent to Bulow, ordering a concentration of
his Corps on Hannut. The first despatch reached Bulow at 5 A.M. on the
15th, when he was at Liège. The instructions contained in it were at
once acted upon, and Bulow sent a report to this effect to Headquarters.
While these instructions were being carried out, the second despatch
arrived towards midday (on the 15th). Its contents seemed to Bulow to be
impossible to act upon until the next day, for most of his troops were
by this time so far in their movement that the new order could not reach
them in time to be carried out that night; also there would be no
quarters prepared for those troops which were still within reach of the
new instructions. Furthermore, this second despatch was also indefinite.
It contained no positive order that Bulow was to move his headquarters
to Hannut; it merely suggested that Hannut appeared suitable. There was
no mention of the commencement of hostilities. Bulow therefore decided
to postpone the execution of this order until the 16th, and he sent a
report to this effect to Blucher, promising to be in Hannut by noon next
day (16th). The officer sent with this report reached Namur at 9 P.M.,
expecting to find Blucher there, but he discovered that Headquarters had
been removed to Sombreffe. Meanwhile, a third despatch was sent off at
11 A.M. on the 15th from Namur, instructing Bulow to move the Fourth
Corps, after a rest at Hannut, on Gembloux, starting at daybreak on the
16th. The orderly carrying this message naturally went to Hannut, where
he expected to find Bulow. At Hannut he found Gneisenau’s second
despatch lying unopened, awaiting Bulow’s arrival. He then started off
at all speed with both despatches to Liège, where he arrived at daybreak
on the 16th. But by this time Gneisenau’s instructions were
impracticable. Thus Bulow, through no fault of his own, was prevented
from reaching the field of Ligny with his Corps, when his arrival on the
right flank of the French might have had the same effect that the
arrival of the Prussian army had at the great battle two days later.
While the concentration of the Second and Third Corps was rapidly
progressing behind him, Zieten was occupied with his retreat on
Fleurus. At half-past three in the morning of the 15th, the Prussian
picquets in front of Lobbes, a village on the Sambre, were driven in by
the advanced guard of the French Left Column (this was the head of
Reille’s Corps advancing). An hour later, the French opened with
artillery on Maladrie, a hamlet about a mile in front of Thuin. It was
this cannonade which was heard by the troops of Steinmetz’s Division in
Fontaine l’Evêque, and even Zieten at Charleroi heard it. He therefore
lost no time in sending reports to both Blucher and Wellington that
fighting had actually commenced. His report to Wellington gave the Duke
definite news that an attack on Charleroi was imminent, but it did not
induce him to alter his plans in any way. For Wellington was still
apprehensive of an attack by way of Mons, and he judged that his army
was in the best position to meet such an attack. He was unwilling to
engage himself in a move eastwards while there was a chance of the
French attacking from the westwards. With such a belief, it is clear
that Wellington, by concentrating prematurely at Quatre-Bras, which it
was his intention to do if Napoleon’s attack should eventually be by the
Charleroi-Brussels road, would merely carry out the very move which his
enemy would wish. Therefore he awaited more definite news of the French
attack on Zieten.
But Zieten’s report to Blucher made the Marshal more than ever assured
of the wisdom of concentrating at Sombreffe.
The retreat of Zieten’s Corps was very ably carried out. The Prussians
at Maladrie, after maintaining a stubborn resistance, were finally
overpowered, but they retreated in good order on Thuin. Here they joined
a battalion of Westphalian Landwehr, and resistance was made until 7
A.M., when, after suffering very heavy losses, the Prussians fell back
to Montigny. Here, again, they joined two squadrons of Dragoons, who
covered the rest of their retreat to Marchienne. But the French cavalry,
under Pajol, pushed on so vigorously, and the small retreating column
suffered such severe losses, that, upon arrival at Marchienne, a mere
skeleton was left. By this time also the outposts at Lobbes had effected
their retreat on Marchienne. General Steinmetz, commanding the First
Division of Zieten’s Corps, was now fully aware of the French attack. He
therefore sent a staff officer to warn Van Merlen, who commanded the
Dutch-Belgian outposts at St. Symphorien between Binche and Mons, and to
inform him that he was falling back with his Division upon Charleroi.
The manner in which the outposts fell back, and the readiness with which
reports as to the enemy’s movements and those of the several Prussian
picquets and supports were passed from one part of the retreating
Division to the other, and from the right of Zieten’s corps to the left
of Wellington’s army, are worthy of the closest attention. The Prussian
commanders thoroughly understood the value of rapid and accurate
information, distributed to all parts of their commands. The long
Napoleonic wars had taught them something of their profession.
Zieten’s management of his retreat marks him as a very capable soldier.
Towards 8 A.M. he satisfied himself that the whole French army was
making for Charleroi. He therefore sent out the following orders for
retreat: the First Division (Steinmetz’s) to retire by Courcelles to
Gosselies, and take up a position behind the village; the Second
Division to gain time for the retreat of the First by defending the
bridges over the Sambre at Châtelet, Charleroi, and Marchienne; it was
then to fall back behind Gilly. The Third and Fourth Divisions, with the
cavalry and artillery reserves, were to take up position at Fleurus.
Meanwhile, Napoleon was pushing rapidly on Charleroi with the Imperial
Guard and Pajol’s Cavalry Corps. The Prussian detachment holding the
bridge connecting Marcinelle and Charleroi made a stout defence, but was
soon overpowered, and by noon the French had obtained possession of the
town. The Third and Fourth Divisions of Zieten’s Corps were by this time
well on the road to Fleurus, but Steinmetz’s Division was in great
jeopardy. For the French were already masters of the Sambre, even below
Charleroi, and the First Division was in danger of being cut off from
its retreat on Gosselies. Accordingly Zieten, with great resolution,
detached three battalions of infantry from the Third Division, and sent
them to Colonel Lutzow, who was holding Gosselies with a regiment of
Lancers from Roder’s Reserve Cavalry. Lutzow placed one battalion in
Gosselies, and took up a position in reserve with the remainder. As soon
as the French had taken Charleroi, Napoleon ordered Pajol to send a
brigade of Light Cavalry towards Gosselies, and to take the remainder of
his Corps towards Gilly. The Brigade actually reached Jumet ahead of
Steinmetz’s Division, which had not yet crossed a small stream called
the Piéton, which ran between Fontaine l’Evêque and Gosselies. But
Colonel Lutzow went out with his regiment of Lancers from Gosselies, met
the French Hussars, and drove them back with loss, enabling Steinmetz
to reach the village in safety.
In the meantime reinforcements, consisting of the advanced guard of
Reille’s Corps, were being pushed along the Gosselies road, with a view
to cutting off Steinmetz’s retreat, and separating Zieten’s Corps from
Wellington’s army. This move of the French was very skilful, but
Steinmetz, perceiving that his position was one of great danger, made a
feint against the French left flank, and, covering his retreat with a
regiment of Lancers and one of Hussars, withdrew to Heppignies, a
village half-way between Gosselies and Fleurus. Had Steinmetz been
caught and surrounded at Gosselies, Blucher would have been weaker by
one Division in the great struggle at Ligny next day; and he could ill
afford to reduce his numbers.
Ney, who had taken over the command of the French Left Wing, and who was
at this time pushing on with Piré’s Cavalry and Bachelu’s Infantry to
Frasnes, sent Girard’s Division of Reille’s Corps to pursue Steinmetz.
Girard occupied Ransart, and made an attack upon Heppignies, but the
Prussians drove him back, and retired in good order to Fleurus, thus
rejoining the main body of their Corps, and effecting their retreat in a
very skilful manner.
In the Prussian centre, meanwhile, Pirch II.‘s Second Division, which
had been ordered to gain time for the retreat of the First, retired to
Gilly, on the road to Fleurus, when the French entered Charleroi. At
Gilly the Prussians took up a strong position and prepared to delay the
French advance as much as possible. Pirch’s line of defence stretched
from Soleilmont on his right, to Châtelineau on his left; and a small
stream ran in his front at the foot of the ridge on which his position
stood. His left flank was further strengthened by a detachment holding
the bridge over the Sambre at Châtelet. Cavalry patrols watched the
valley of the Sambre for the approach of Gérard’s Corps, which was
already marching on Châtelet. Had Gerard marched earlier from
Phillippeville, he would have prevented, by his occupation of Châtelet
earlier in the day, Pirch’s stand at Gilly.
Grouchy had orders to take Vandamme’s Corps and Excelmans’ Cavalry, and
pursue the Prussians along the Charleroi-Fleurus road; but he was
deceived as to the strength of the enemy at Gilly. Fearing to attack
without further reinforcements, he rode back to Napoleon for
instructions. This was at about 5 P.M. Napoleon, fretting at the delay,
which he regarded as needless, himself rode out with four squadrons of
Cavalry of the Guard, and reconnoitred Pirch’s position. He soon
satisfied himself as to Pirch’s real strength, and gave Grouchy orders
to attack at once. Accordingly, at 6 P.M., artillery fire opened on the
Prussians from two batteries; three infantry columns from Vandamme’s
Corps were ordered to assault in front, and two cavalry brigades to
menace the Prussian flanks. Pirch was preparing to reply to the French
artillery fire, when he received orders from Zieten to retire on Fleurus
_viâ_ Lambusart. As soon as he began to withdraw his battalions, the
French cavalry, under Letort, made a vigorous attack. The Prussian
infantry resisted stoutly, and a regiment of dragoons, with great
boldness, charged the French squadrons with such effect that they were
for the moment checked, and the Prussians were able to gain the cover of
the wood of Fleurus. A battalion of the Sixth Regiment of the Line, by
forming square repeatedly, bravely kept the enemy’s cavalry at a
distance, and gained very valuable time for the retreat of the rest of
Pirch’s Division. In front of Lambusart, where Pirch joined some
battalions of the Third Division and Roder’s Reserve Cavalry, a fresh
position was taken up, and a regiment of Brandenburg Dragoons, sent by
Zieten to support Pirch II., did excellent service by charging the
French horsemen and checking their pursuit. Towards eight o’clock three
batteries of French Horse Artillery, which accompanied the cavalry,
opened fire on Lambusart; but night was coming on, and the attack died
out very shortly afterwards. Pirch II. then withdrew to Fleurus, where
he joined the remainder of Zieten’s Divisions, and the whole Corps
retreated to Ligny. Steinmetz had reached Fleurus from Heppignies at
about 10 P.M.
Zieten’s retreat in the face of almost the whole French army is worthy
of close attention. His men had been marching and fighting from three
o’clock in the morning until ten o’clock at night, and had engaged the
enemy in one or two very sharp conflicts. The skilful manner in which
each Division was withdrawn without getting too closely engaged with the
enemy, and in which the Divisions supported each other, is illustrative
of the best methods of war. That he was able to concentrate his Corps at
Fleurus with a loss of only 1,200 men, after having checked the rapid
onset of the French, speaks very highly for Zieten’s skill in
generalship. The campaign of Waterloo still affords useful lessons and
examples to modern students.
The Prussian Second Corps, under Pirch I., reached Sombreffe by ten
o’clock at night; the Third Corps passed the night at Namur; while the
Fourth Corps was still near Liège.
On Wellington’s side, Van Merlen, commanding the outposts between Mons
and Binche, received the report from General Steinmetz at 8 A.M., to the
effect that the French had attacked and driven in his outposts, and that
he was falling back on Charleroi with his Division. Early in the morning
the troops of Perponcher’s Dutch-Belgian Division, which was stationed
at Hautain-le-Val, Frasnes, and Villers Perruin, heard firing from the
direction of Charleroi. In the afternoon, definite news reached them of
the enemy’s attack on Charleroi, and Perponcher at once assembled his
First Brigade (Bylandt’s) at Nivelles. A picquet of the Second Nassau
battalion was posted in front of Frasnes to give warning of the French
advance. In the meantime, Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar, with his
Brigade of Nassau troops, belonging to Perponcher’s Division, on his own
initiative moved forward from Genappe to Frasnes, reporting his action
to the headquarters of his division at Hautain-le-Val; and Perponcher
approved. When Ney advanced on Frasnes in the evening, with Piré’s
cavalry and Bachelu’s infantry, Saxe Weimar, after making a determined
show of resistance, skilfully withdrew behind Quatre-Bras, and Ney, as
before-mentioned, was quite deceived as to his actual strength, and
forebore to attack that night.
Zieten’s report to Wellington, sent off from Charleroi at 5 A.M.,
reached the Duke’s headquarters at Brussels at 9 A.M. Wellington did not
consider the news sufficiently definite to cause him to make any
immediate alteration in his dispositions. But at three o’clock in the
afternoon, the Prince of Orange, coming from the outposts near Mons,
where he had seen Van Merlen, and obtained information of the attack on
the Prussians and of their retreat, reported his intelligence to the
Duke. Wellington was now satisfied of the true direction of the French
attack, but he sent orders to General Dornberg at Mons to report at once
any movement of the French in that direction. He then ordered his troops
to concentrate at their respective headquarters. On the left,
Perponcher’s and Chassé’s Divisions were to assemble at Nivelles; the
Third British Division (Alten’s) was to concentrate at Braine-le-Comte
and march on Nivelles in the night; the First British Division (Cooke’s)
was to assemble at Enghien. In the centre, Clinton’s Division (the
Second British) was to collect at Ath, and Colville’s (the Fourth
British) at Grammont. On the right, Steedman’s Division and Anthing’s
Brigade of Dutch-Belgians were to march on Sotteghem. Uxbridge’s
cavalry was to assemble at Ninove, except Dornberg’s Brigade, which was
to march on Vilvorde; (still Wellington had apprehensions for his
right). The Reserve was kept in readiness in and around Brussels; with
orders to be prepared to march at once.
Late that night (the 15th), towards ten o’clock, news of Ney’s attack at
Frasnes was received by the Prince of Orange at Braine-le-Comte. The
latter forwarded the report to Wellington, adding that Saxe Weimar had
fallen back to Quatre-Bras, and that the French advance had been checked
there. A despatch from Blucher at Namur also reached Wellington about
this time, and the Duke decided to march his troops more to their
left--_i.e._ towards the Prussians. He therefore issued a second batch
of orders that night, directing Cooke’s Division from Enghien to
Braine-le-Comte; Clinton’s and Colville’s Divisions from Ath and
Grammont to Enghien; and the cavalry from Ninove to Enghien. The other
dispositions were to remain as they were.
At the close of the 15th, Napoleon’s position promised success for his
efforts next day. Blucher had only Zieten’s Corps concentrated at Ligny;
Pirch’s Corps was still some miles back. Wellington’s army was still far
from Quatre-Bras. Surely, if Napoleon advanced to the attack of the
Prussians at daybreak on the 16th, he must, with his overwhelming
forces, crush half of Blucher’s army and force the remainder to fall
back on Liège? And Ney, if he attacked with Reille’s and d’Erlon’s Corps
(for the latter might have pushed on during the night)--or even with
Reille’s Corps and Piré’s Cavalry--could have driven back the English
force at Quatre-Bras, which, by daybreak on the 16th, had only been
reinforced by the remainder of Perponcher’s Dutch-Belgian Division? Ney
had ridden to Charleroi in the night, and had had an interview with
Napoleon. He must, therefore, have known the state of affairs in the
centre and on the right; he must have told Napoleon how matters stood on
his wing. Why did not Napoleon order him to attack Quatre-Bras at
daybreak on the 16th? There is no satisfactory answer. It is
inconceivable that Napoleon, than whom no general has ever been bolder
and more decisive in his moves or quicker to take action at critical
moments, should have neglected to spend the night of the 15th in
bringing up the troops in rear--Lobau’s Corps, d’Erlon’s Corps, Gérard’s
Corps. What if the columns had straggled out and become doubled in
length? Had Napoleon’s troops never made a greater effort in his earlier
campaigns? There is no doubt existing that Napoleon, great warrior as
he was, let his opportunity slip on the night of the 15th. His advanced
troops were within 2 miles of Ligny, and 3 of the Quatre-Bras-Sombreffe
road. Was not this the very point he had aimed at so carefully in his
plan of campaign? He was already almost master of the line of junction
of Wellington’s and Blucher’s armies. He had, in fact, almost, but not
quite, attained the main objective of his scheme. It was within his
grasp on the night of the 15th. How could Wellington prevent Ney from
capturing Quatre-Bras at daybreak on the 16th? And how could Blucher
save Ligny and Sombreffe, if Napoleon chose to bring up his two Corps
from Charleroi and Châtelet, and attack at dawn with these overwhelming
numbers? Both these attacks would have called for great efforts from the
French troops, who had been marching and fighting since 3 A.M. on the
15th; but the attacks would have been finished in three or four hours,
and _then_ Napoleon could have thought of giving rest to his tired
infantry, while his cavalry pursued the Prussians back towards Liège. A
day spent in resting and in concentrating, and Napoleon could have
turned to deal with Wellington. The Napoleon of Jena and Austerlitz
would have won the campaign on the 15th.
But the delays of the 15th were insignificant in comparison with those
of the 16th. And there were not only delays on the 16th, but very
serious mistakes--although of a kind without which no war has ever been
waged. It is not our intention to criticise these mistakes so much as to
discuss their effects on the course of the campaign, and to illustrate
their grievous results.
_Movements on the 16th._
Ney, on his return to Gosselies from his interview with Napoleon,
ordered Reille to move Jerome’s and Foy’s Divisions, with his five
batteries of artillery, to Frasnes, whither he himself went. Ney’s
misgivings as to the wisdom of attacking Quatre-Bras were not unfounded.
He feared a movement against his right flank by a strong force of
Prussians whom he believed to be between Quatre-Bras and Ligny. He was
anxious for his left flank, in case some of Wellington’s troops were
moving against him from the direction of Nivelles. He was ignorant of
the real strength in front of him at Quatre-Bras. He had no staff
officers whom he could send out to gather information on these points.
He was unwilling to risk damaging Napoleon’s plans by inviting defeat
while so far in advance of the centre column. He therefore waited for
d’Erlon’s Corps and Kellermann’s Corps of heavy cavalry, which Napoleon
had promised to send him. He despatched orders to d’Erlon to bring up
the First Corps with the utmost speed to Frasnes.
In the meantime, Wellington’s troops were fast moving on Nivelles and
Quatre-Bras. Lord Uxbridge’s Cavalry and Clinton’s Division were ordered
to move on Braine-le-Comte, and Steedman’s Division with Anthing’s
Brigade from Sotteghem to Enghien at daybreak. Picton’s Division started
from Brussels for Quatre-Bras at 2 A.M. The Duke of Brunswick, with
5,000 Brunswick infantry, left at 3 A.M. At 3 A.M. also Perponcher
reached Quatre-Bras with his First Brigade of Dutch-Belgians, under
Bylandt. The Prince of Orange arrived at Quatre-Bras at 6 A.M.,
reconnoitred Ney’s position, and pushed Perponcher’s troops further
forward. He gave orders that as great a show of strength as possible was
to be made, but a close or premature engagement with the enemy was to be
avoided. Thus at 7 A.M. the Prince had 9 battalions of Dutch-Belgian
troops, and 16 guns, holding Quatre-Bras; Ney opposite, with Piré’s
Division of Lancers, Bachelu’s Division of Infantry, and
Lefebvre-Desnouette’s Cavalry of the Guard, in all 9,700 men, and the
remainder of Reille’s Corps in support at Frasnes!
Wellington himself arrived at Quatre-Bras at 11 A.M., inspected the
position, saw that the French were not preparing an immediate attack,
and complimented the Prince of Orange on his dispositions. He then rode
off to the mill of Bussy, where he met Blucher. It is not necessary to
go into the details of this interview. Suffice it to say that Wellington
agreed with Blucher that he would come to the latter’s assistance at
Ligny, _if he was not himself attacked_.
At 11 A.M. Ney received from Napoleon a letter giving him detailed
instructions as to the movements of the French army. The Emperor told
Ney that he intended attacking the Prussians at Ligny, driving them back
on Gembloux. Ney was then to march on Brussels, and Napoleon, marching
by the Sombreffe-Quatre-Bras road with his Imperial Guard, would support
him. Thus, according to the letter, Ney’s movements were to wait upon
Napoleon’s. This interpretation was some cause of Ney’s delays on the
16th.
Soon after the receipt of Napoleon’s letter, Ney received an order from
Soult, chief of the Staff, directing him to move the First and Second
Corps, and Kellermann’s Cavalry, on Quatre-Bras, drive back the enemy,
and reconnoitre as far as he could towards Nivelles and Brussels; also
to push a division to Genappe, and another towards Marbais, so as to
open communication with Napoleon’s left between Sombreffe and
Quatre-Bras. Napoleon’s intention was to reach Brussels by daybreak on
the 17th, having defeated the Prussians, and Ney having defeated the
English!
In accordance with this order, Ney sent instructions to Reille and
d’Erlon. These were to the following effect:--The First, Second, and
Third Divisions of d’Erlon’s Corps were to move to Frasnes; the Fourth
Division of that Corps, with Piré’s Cavalry, was to move to Marbais;
Kellermann’s Cavalry Corps to Frasnes and Liberchies.
Just at this time, a message from Reille reached Ney, stating that
Girard (not Gérard, who commanded the Fourth Corps) had sent in a report
that strong columns of Prussians were moving along the Namur-Nivelles
road, with heavy masses behind them. (These were Pirch’s I. troops
deploying at St Amand and Ligny.) Reille had seen Napoleon’s letter to
Ney, and read its contents, but he wrote to Ney that he would wait the
latter’s instructions, while he prepared his troops for instant march.
Another order from Napoleon reached Ney at this moment. It stated that
the Marshal was to unite the First and Second Corps with Kellermann’s
Cavalry, and drive the enemy from Quatre-Bras, thus distinctly
emphasising the previous order. The Emperor, who thought that Ney would
then have an ample force to crush any troops which could be in front of
him, stated that Grouchy was about to move on Sombreffe.
Girard’s report as to the Prussian columns on the Namur road made Ney
doubly anxious for his position. He therefore again sent urgent orders
to Reille and d’Erlon to hasten up. At 2 P.M., in the belief that
d’Erlon must be close behind, he moved to the attack of the Anglo-Dutch
position with three infantry divisions (Bachelu’s, Foy’s and Jerome’s,
of Reille’s Corps) and Piré’s Division of Light Cavalry, with 5
batteries--a strength of 18,000 men and 40 guns. Opposed to him were the
7,000 infantry and 16 guns of the Prince of Orange.
It is not proposed to give an account of the battle of Quatre-Bras. It
has been shown what an opportunity Ney had lost by not attacking
earlier, and what his reasons were for not doing so. Picton’s Division
and the Duke of Brunswick’s Division arrived early in the afternoon, and
Wellington took over the command. These reinforcements, to which were
added towards the close of the day, Alten’s Division, Cooke’s Division,
two more Brunswick battalions and a battery of Brunswick artillery, gave
Wellington a superiority in numbers over Ney, who was only reinforced by
Kellermann’s Cavalry Corps during the battle. D’Erlon’s Corps had, in
the meantime, been wandering between Ligny and Frasnes.
In its results the battle of Quatre-Bras was of great importance to both
sides. Although Ney had not obtained possession of Quatre-Bras, and had
not defeated Wellington’s troops, nor driven them back on Brussels, yet
he had effectually prevented Wellington joining with Blucher’s right. He
had not been guilty of disobeying orders, and he himself did not feel
confident of victory when he attacked on the afternoon of the 16th. On
the other hand, Wellington had, by his masterly defence, completely
frustrated Ney’s object. He was now in full possession of Quatre-Bras;
he had gained a brilliant victory, and his divisions were still coming
up from behind. Should he receive news of a Prussian victory at Ligny,
he was prepared to attack Ney next morning, and, if successful, to join
Blucher’s right wing and fall upon Napoleon’s left. If the Prussians
were defeated at Ligny, he was ready to fall back and take up a position
where Blucher could join him, and together they would attack Napoleon’s
combined forces.
To turn to events upon the Prussian side, Blucher’s decision to stand at
Ligny was determined by several strategical considerations. Firstly, the
position he chose communicated with Wellington’s left by 6 miles of very
good road, along which co-operation on either hand could be easily
effected. Secondly, he guarded the communications with Aix-la-Chapelle
and the Prussian States. Thirdly, if the Allies should be defeated both
at Quatre-Bras and at Ligny, then two parallel lines of retreat, the one
upon Mont St Jean towards Brussels, and the other upon Wavre towards
Louvain, were available, which would render possible a junction near the
forest of Soignies. Fourthly, if Napoleon had advanced against
Wellington by way of Mons, the Prussians, by concentrating at Sombreffe,
could have marched to the Duke’s assistance, leaving Zieten to watch
Charleroi and the neighbourhood. Fifthly, if Napoleon had advanced on
Namur, the Third Corps (Thielemann’s) could have retreated as did
Zieten’s, and allowed time and protection for the First, Second, and
possibly the Fourth Corps, while Wellington moved to join the Prussian
right.
The situation of the Allied armies was not exactly that of the Austrians
and Sardinians in Italy in 1796-97; there was the possibility of
striking at their point of junction and of beating each army separately,
but the short and excellent line of communication between the points of
concentration of Wellington’s and Blucher’s armies, namely, the
Quatre-Bras-Sombreffe road, afforded each army such easy and rapid means
of effecting a junction, although, in fact, it was not actually used as
a means of co-operation, that there was a “moral” influence in it which
went a long way towards defeating Napoleon’s object. This may sound
somewhat exaggerated; but what was it that made Ney uneasy for his own
right flank on the 15th-16th, before he attacked? The report sent by
Girard that Prussian columns were on that road. What was Napoleon’s fear
during the battle of Ligny? That Wellington would send a force from
Quatre-Bras to join Blucher’s right, along this road. What was the chief
advantage in Wellington’s position at Quatre-Bras? This road again,
which afforded a means of joining the Prussians at Ligny, had the
occasion arisen. And in what way was this road of use to Blucher at
Sombreffe? He could co-operate with Wellington if Napoleon had attacked
_viâ_ Mons.
Blucher had decided to fight at Ligny, even though he had little hope of
the arrival of Bulow’s Corps in time to join the battle. For he
believed that Napoleon’s forces were not superior to his own in
numbers; he had selected the position previously, and had had it
surveyed carefully; he hoped that he would be able to hold his own
either until Bulow arrived, or until night put an end to the fight. In
the event of the Fourth Corps reaching the field in time to take part,
the extra weight in numbers would decide in Blucher’s favour, or else
the Corps would attack Napoleon’s right flank at a time when his troops
would be most fatigued. Or again, if night came on, sufficient time
would have been gained for Bulow’s arrival to be made certain before
daybreak next day, when a successful attack on the French might
confidently be expected. In both cases, any pressure on Wellington would
be relieved, so that the Anglo-Dutch Army might combine with Blucher to
overwhelm the whole of Napoleon’s forces. Thus Blucher reasoned.
To refuse a battle would have meant a retreat along his communications
with the Rhine, and Blucher was most unwilling to abandon his chances of
joining with Wellington.
The battle itself will not be described; but d’Erlon’s wanderings
towards the field and away from it again, and the influence of these
aimless manœuvres on the struggle, may be discussed here.
At eight o’clock that morning (the 16th), Napoleon had sent orders to
Ney to detach one Division of his force to Marbais, so as to support the
Emperor and attack in rear the Prussian right, while the battle of Ligny
was at its height. At 2 P.M., he had ordered Ney to attack and defeat
whatever force might be in front of him (he had ascertained that Ney
must be greatly superior in numbers to the force that opposed him), and
then to move along the Namur road and fall on Blucher’s rear. At 3.15
P.M. this order was reiterated, and in the most emphatic manner was Ney
ordered to bring the whole of his forces to bear on the Prussian right
and rear. When, therefore, at 5.30 P.M., Napoleon was preparing his
greatest blow at Blucher and getting in readiness his Reserves to crush
the Prussian Centre at Ligny, the news that a strong column of infantry,
cavalry, and artillery was making for Fleurus on the French left
arrived, and it might have been guessed that this was a part of Ney’s
forces, acting in accordance with the instructions sent to the Marshal,
but sadly in the wrong direction. Instead of moving against the Prussian
right, this column was making for the left rear of the French. Vandamme,
who forwarded the report to the Emperor, suspended his movements, and
Girard fell back with his Division, until the uncertainty should be
cleared up. For it _was_ possible, perhaps, that Wellington had
overcome Ney and was marching to assist Blucher; Ney had sent no tidings
during the day. Napoleon, at first, believed that the force was the
Division despatched by Ney in accordance with the eight o’clock order;
but he reflected that the numbers were too great for a Division, and
that Ney had been ordered to send the force by Marbais. Then, when
Vandamme’s suspicions were supported by a second report, he became
extremely uneasy; he suspended his projected attack on the Prussian
centre: and sent off an officer of his staff to ascertain the truth. At
7 P.M., nearly two hours after the first appearance of the strange
column, the staff-officer returned, with the tidings that d’Erlon’s
whole Corps was at hand, and was marching to join Napoleon’s left. On
the receipt of this news, the advance of the Imperial Guard was renewed,
and Girard’s Division resumed its former position in line.
How d’Erlon had arrived in this position may be explained with little
difficulty. When Napoleon’s aide-de-camp, Laurent, reached Gosselies
with the morning order, he found that the First Corps was already
marching towards Quatre-Bras, and that d’Erlon himself had gone forward
to Frasnes. Laurent hastened to find him, and on overtaking the columns
of the First Corps on his way, he took upon himself the responsibility
of changing their direction towards St Amand. D’Erlon, on learning what
had been done, rode off at once to join his Corps, sending word to Ney
to inform him what had happened. The road from Frasnes towards St Amand
lay through Villers-Perruin, and it was this direction which brought the
column into such an unexpected position towards the French rear. On
reaching Villers-Perruin, however, d’Erlon sent out a Light Cavalry
Brigade to his left, as a precautionary measure. This Brigade
encountered a Prussian Brigade of Hussars and Lancers under Marwitz, who
withdrew slowly and in good order. Girard’s Division, perceiving the
Prussians retire, became reassured, and moved forward to its original
position. But now, d’Erlon received from Ney a most urgent and
peremptory order to rejoin him at once. D’Erlon, who acted under Ney’s
immediate orders, decided that it was his duty to obey those orders; and
since he had received no definite instructions from the Emperor as to
how he should act when he had brought his Corps on the field, he turned
about and left the ground. Thus he was too late in his return to be of
use to Ney at Quatre-Bras, and the eccentric direction given to his
columns, although the natural outcome of his previous dispositions,
served to postpone Napoleon’s great attack with his Guard for two hours;
and, when the addition of 20,000 men might have entirely overwhelmed the
Prussians, he calmly withdrew his men.
D’Erlon’s error was his inaction when he arrived on the field, and not
so much his diversion from Ney’s orders. He must have known that he
could not return to Quatre-Bras in time to be of any service; but that
by following up Marwitz, and falling on the rear of the Prussian right
wing, he would be most likely to render the very greatest assistance to
Napoleon. How he could have failed to realise the importance of his
presence at such a juncture surpasses all imagination. The very fact
that Marwitz’s Brigade had been able to present some show of compactness
before Jacquinot’s Cavalry might have proved to him that there was still
a stout resistance to be expected on the part of the Prussians. Again,
we think Napoleon should have sent instructions as to how d’Erlon should
act, by his aide-de-camp, in the event of the strange column being
French. Had d’Erlon remained on the left wing to assist Ney, Quatre-Bras
might have been won by the French. Had he realised the uselessness of a
return march to Ney when he was yet at hand to help Napoleon, and
thrown all his weight into the struggle at Ligny, he would have been of
the greatest use in overwhelming the Prussians.
Such mistakes as these are unexpected, and therefore happen, in war.