_Reign of Volagases I. His first attempt on Armenia fails. His quarrel
with Izates. Invasion of Parthia Proper by the Dahce and Sacce. Second
attack of Volagases on Armenia. Tiridates established as King. First
expedition of Corbulo. Half submission of Volagases. Revolt of Vardanes.
Second expedition of Corbulo. Armenia given to Tigranes. Revolt of
Hyrcania. Third attack of Volagases on Armenia. Defeat of Paitus,
and re-establishment of Tiridates. Last expedition of Corbulo, and
arrangement of Terms of Peace. Tiridates at Rome. Probable time of the
Death of Volagases._
Vonones the Second left behind him three sons, Volagases, Tiridates, and
Paeorus. It is doubtful which of them was the eldest, but, on the whole,
most probable that that position belonged to Paeorus. We are told that
Volagases obtained the crown by his brothers yielding up their claim to
him, from which we must draw the conclusion that both of them were his
elders. These circumstances of his accession will account for much of
his subsequent conduct. It happened that he was able at once to bestow
a principality upon Paeorus, to whom he felt specially indebted; but in
order adequately to reward his other benefactor, he found it necessary
to conquer a province and then make its government over to him. Hence
his frequent attacks upon Armenia, and his numerous wars with Rome for
its possession, which led ultimately to an arrangement by which the
quiet enjoyment of the Armenian throne was secured to Tiridates.
The circumstances under which Volagases made his first attack upon
Armenia were the following. Pharasmanes of Iberia, whose brother,
Mithridates, the Romans had (in A.D. 47) replaced upon the Armenian
throne, had a son named Rhadamistus, whose lust of power was so great
that to prevent his making an attempt on his own crown Pharasmanes found
it necessary to divert his thoughts to another quarter.
Armenia, he suggested, lay near, and was a prize worth winning;
Rhadamistus had only to ingratiate himself with the people, and then
craftily remove his uncle, and he would probably step with ease into
the vacant place. The son took the advice of his father, and in a little
time succeeded in getting Mithridates into his power, when he ruthlessly
put him to death, together with his wife and children. Rhadamistus then,
supported by his father, obtained the object of his ambition, and became
king. It was known, however, that a considerable number of the Armenians
were adverse to a rule which had been brought about by treachery and
murder; and it was suspected that, if an attack were made upon him,
he would not be supported with much zeal by his subjects. This was the
condition of things when Volagases ascended the Parthian throne, and
found himself in want of a principality with which he might reward the
services of Tiridates, his brother. It at once occurred to him that, a
happy chance presented him with an excellent opportunity of acquiring
Armenia, and he accordingly proceeded, in the very year of his
accession, to make an expedition against it. At first he carried all
before him. The Iberian supporters of Rhadamistus fled without risking a
battle; his Armenian subjects resisted weakly; Artaxata and Tigranocerta
opened their gates; and the country generally submitted. Tiridates
enjoyed his kingdom for a few months; but a terrible pestilence, brought
about by a severe winter and a want of proper provisions, decimated the
Parthian force left in garrison; and Volagases found himself obliged,
after a short occupation, to relinquish his conquest. Rhadamistus
returned, and, although the Armenians opposed him in arms, contrived to
re-establish himself. The Parthians did not renew their efforts, and
for three years--from A.D. 51 to A.D. 54--Rhadamistus was left in quiet
possession of the Armenian kingdom.’
It appears to have been in this interval that the arms of Volagases
were directed against one of his great feudatories, Izatos. As in
Europe during the prevalence of the feudal system, so under the Parthian
government, it was always possible that the sovereign might be forced to
contend with one of the princes who owed him fealty. Volagases seems to
have thought that the position of the Adiabenian monarch was becoming
too independent, and that it was necessary to recall him, by a
sharp mandate, to his proper position of subordinate and tributary.
Accordingly, he sent him a demand that he should surrender the special
privileges which had been conferred upon him by Artabanus III., and
resume the ordinary status of a Parthian feudatory. Izates, who feared
that if he yielded he would find that this demand was only a prelude to
others more intolerable, replied by a positive refusal, and immediately
prepared to resist an invasion. He sent his wives and children to the
strongest fortress within his dominions, collected all the grain that
his subjects possessed into fortified places, and laid waste the whole
of the open country, so that it should afford no sustenance to an
invading army. He then took up a position on the lower Zab, or Caprius,
and stood prepared to resist an attack upon his territory. Volagases
advanced to the opposite bank of the river, and was preparing to invade
Adiabene, when news reached him of an important attack upon his
eastern provinces. A horde of barbarians, consisting of Dahse and other
Scythians, had poured into Parthia Proper, knowing that he was engaged
elsewhere, and threatened to carry fire and sword through the entire
province. The Parthian monarch considered that it was his first duty to
meet these aggressors; and leaving Izates unchastised, he marched away
to the north-east to repel the external enemy.
Volagases, after defeating this foe, would no doubt have returned to
Adiabene, and resumed the war with Izates, but in his absence that
prince died. Monobazus, his brother, who inherited his crown, could
have no claim to the privileges which had been conferred for personal
services upon Izates; and consequently there was no necessity for the
war to be renewed. The bones of Izates were conveyed to the holy soil
of Palestine and buried in the vicinity of Jerusalem. Monobazus was
accepted by Volagases as his brother’s successor without any apparent
reluctance, and proved a faithful tributary, on whom his suzerain could
place complete dependence.
The quarrel with Izates, and the war with the Dahee and Sacse, may have
occupied the years A.D. 52 and 53. At any rate it was not till A.D. 54,
his fourth year, that Volagases resumed his designs against Armenia.
Rhadamistus, though he had more than once had to fly the country, was
found in possession as king, and for some time he opposed the progress
of the Parthian arms; but, before the year was out, despairing of
success, he again fled, and left Volagases to arrange the affairs of
Armenia at his pleasure. Tiridates was at once established as king, and
Armenia brought into the position of a regular Parthian dependency.
The claims of Rome were ignored. Volagases was probably aware that the
Imperial throne was occupied by a mere youth, not eighteen years old,
one destitute of all warlike tastes, a lover of music and of the arts,
who might be expected to submit to the loss of a remote province without
much difficulty. He therefore acted as if Rome had no rights in this
part of Asia, established his brother at Artaxata, and did not so
much as send an embassy to Nero to excuse or explain his acts. These
proceedings caused much uneasiness in Italy. If Nero himself cannot
be regarded as likely to have felt very keenly the blow struck at the
prestige of the Empire, yet there were those among his advisers who
could well understand and appreciate the situation. The ministers of the
young prince resolved that efforts on the largest scale should be made.
Orders were at once issued for recruiting the Oriental legions, and
moving them nearer to Armenia; preparations were set on foot for
bridging the Euphrates; Antiochus of Commagene, and Herod Agrippa II.,
were required to collect troops and hold themselves in readiness to
invade Parthia; the Roman provinces bordering upon Armenia were placed
under new governors; above all, Corbulo, regarded as the best general
of the time, was summoned from Germany, and assigned the provinces of
Cappadocia and Galatia, together with the general superintendence of the
war for retaining possession of Armenia. At the same time instructions
were sent out to Ummidius, proconsul of Syria, requiring him to
co-operate with Corbulo; and arrangements were made to obviate
the clashing of authority which was to be feared between two equal
commanders. In the spring of A.D. 55 the Roman armies were ready to take
the field, and a struggle seemed impending which would recall the times
of Antony and Phraates.
But, at the moment when expectation was at its height, and the clang
of arms appeared about to resound throughout Western Asia, suddenly a
disposition for peace manifested itself. Both Corbulo and Ummidius
sent embassies to Volagases, exhorting him to make concessions, and
apparently giving him to understand that something less was required of
him than the restoration of Armenia to the Romans. Volagases listened
favorably to the overtures, and agreed to put into the hands of the
Roman commanders the most distinguished members of the royal family as
hostages. At the same time he withdrew his troops from Armenia; which
the Romans, however, did not occupy, and which continued, as it would
seem, to be governed by Tiridates. The motive of the Parthian king in
acting as he did is obvious. A revolt against his authority had broken
out in Parthia, headed by his son, Vardanes; and, until this internal
trouble should be suppressed, he could not engage with advantage in a
foreign war. [PLATE III. Fig. 1.] The reasons which actuated the Roman
generals are far more obscure. It is difficult to understand their
omission to press upon Volagases in his difficulties, or their readiness
to accept the persons of a few hostages, however high their rank, as an
equivalent for the Roman claim to a province. Perhaps the jealousy which
subsequently showed itself in regard to the custody of the hostages may
have previously existed between the two commanders, and they may have
each consented to a peace disadvantageous to Rome through fear of the
other’s obtaining the chief laurels if war were entered on.
[Illustration: PLATE 3.]
The struggle for power between Volagases and his son Vardanes seems to
have lasted for three years--from A.D. 55 to A.D. 58. Its details are
unknown to us; but Volagases must have been successful; and we may
assume that the pretender, of whom we hear no more, was put to death.
No sooner was the contest terminated than Volagases, feeling that he was
now free to act, took a high tone in his communications with Corbulo
and Ummidius, and declared that not only must his brother, Tiridates, be
left in the undisturbed possession of Armenia but it must be distinctly
understood that he held it as a Parthian, and not as a Roman, feudatory.
At the same time Tiridates began to exercise his authority over the
Armenians with severity, and especially to persecute those whom he
suspected of inclining towards the Romans. Oorbulo appears to have felt
that it was necessary to atone for his three years of inaction by at
length prosecuting the war in earnest. He tightened the discipline of
the legions, while he recruited them to their full strength, made fresh
friends among the hardy races of the neighborhood, renewed the Roman
alliance with Pharasmanes of Iberia, urged Antiochus of Commagene to
cross the Armenian frontier, and taking the field himself, carried fire
and sword over a large portion of the Armenian territory. Volagases
sent a contingent of troops to the assistance of his feudatory, but was
unable to proceed to his relief in person, owing to the occurrence of a
revolt in Hyrcania, which broke out, fortunately for the Romans, in the
very year that the rebellion of Vardanes was suppressed. Under these
circumstances it is not surprising that Tiridates had recourse to
treachery, or that on his treachery failing he continually lost
ground, and was at last compelled to evacuate the country and yield the
possession of it to the Romans. It is more remarkable that he prolonged
his resistance into the third year than that he was unable to continue
the straggle to a later date. He lost his capital, Artaxata, in A.D. 58,
and Tigranocerta, the second city of Armenia, in A.D. 60. After this
he made one further effort from the side of Media, but the attempt was
unavailing; and on suffering a fresh defeat he withdrew altogether from
the struggle, whereupon Armenia reverted to the Romans. They entrusted
the government to a certain Tigranes, a grandson of Archelaus, king of
Cappadocia, but at the same time greatly diminished the extent of the
kingdom by granting portions of it to neighboring princes. Pharasmanes
of Iberia, Polemo of Pontus, Aristobulus of the Lesser Armenia, and
Antiochus of Commagene, received an augmentation of their territories
at the expense of the rebel state, which had shown itself incapable of
appreciating the blessings of Roman rule and had manifested a decided
preference for the Parthians.
But the fate of Armenia, and the position which she was to hold in
respect of the two great rivals, Rome and Parthia, were not yet decided.
Hitherto Volagases, engaged in a contest with the Hyrcanians and with
other neighboring nations, whereto the flames of war had spread, had
found himself unable to take any personal part in the struggle in which
his brother and vassal had been engaged in the west. Now matters in
Hyrcania admitted of arrangement, and he was at liberty to give his
main attention to Armenian affairs. His presence in the West had become
absolutely necessary. Not only was Armenia lost to him, but it had been
made a centre from which his other provinces in this quarter might
be attacked and harassed. Tigranes, proud of his newly-won crown, and
anxious to show himself worthy of it, made constant incursions into
Adiabene, ravaging and harrying the fertile country far and wide.
Monobazus, unable to resist him in the field, was beginning to
contemplate the transfer of his allegiance to Rome, as the only means
of escaping from the evils of a perpetual border war. Tiridates,
discontented with the position whereto he found himself reduced, and
angry that his brother had not given him more effective support, was
loud in his complaints, and openly taxed Volagases with an inertness
that bordered on cowardice. Public opinion was inclined to accept and
approve the charge; and in Parthia public opinion could not be safely
contemned. Volagases found it necessary to win back his subjects’
good-will by calling a council of the nobility, and making them a formal
address: “Parthians,” he said, “when I obtained the first place among
you by my brothers ceding their claims, I endeavored to substitute for
the old system of fraternal hatred and contention a new one of domestic
affection and agreement; my brother Pacorus received Media from my hands
at once; Tiridates, whom you see now before you, I inducted shortly
afterwards into the sovereignty of Armenia, a dignity reckoned the third
in the Parthian kingdom. Thus I put my family matters on a peaceful and
satisfactory footing. But these arrangements are now disturbed by the
Romans, who have never hitherto broken their treaties with us to their
profit, and who will now find that they have done so to their ruin. I
will not deny that hitherto I have preferred to maintain my right to the
territories, which have come to me from my ancestors, by fair dealing
rather than by shedding of blood--by negotiation rather than by arms;
if, however, I have erred in this and have been weak to delay so long, I
will now correct my fault by showing the more zeal. You at any rate
have lost nothing by my abstinence; your strength is intact, your glory
undiminished; you have added, moreover, to your reputation for valor the
credit of moderation--a virtue which not even the highest among men can
afford to despise, and which the Gods view with special favor.” Having
concluded his speech, he placed a diadem on the brow of Tiridates,
proclaiming by this significant act his determination to restore him to
the Armenian throne. At the same time he ordered Monseses, a Parthian
general, and Monobazus, the Adiabenian monarch, to take the field and
enter Armenia, while he himself with the main strength of the empire
advanced towards the Euphrates and threatened Syria with invasion.
The results of the campaign which followed (A.D. 62) scarcely answered
to this magnificent opening. Monseses indeed, in conjunction with
Monobazus, invaded Armenia, and, advancing to Tigranocerta, besieged
Tigranes in that city, which, upon the destruction of Artaxata by
Corbulo, had become the seat of government. Volagases himself proceeded
as far as Nisibis, whence he could threaten at the same time Armenia
and Syria. The Parthian arms proved, however, powerless to effect
any serious impression upon Tigranocerta; and Volagases, being met at
Nisibis by envoys from Corbulo, who threatened an invasion of Parthia
in retaliation of the Parthian attack upon Armenia, consented to
an arrangement. A plague of locusts had spread itself over Upper
Mesopotamia, and the consequent scarcity of forage completely paralyzed
a force which consisted almost entirely of cavalry. Volagases was
glad under the circumstances to delay the conflict which had seemed
impending, and readily agreed that his troops should suspend the siege
of Tigranocerta and withdraw from Armenia on condition that the Roman
should at the same time evacuate the province. He would send, he said,
ambassadors to Rome who should arrange with Nero the footing upon which
Armenia was to be placed. Meanwhile, until the embassy returned, there
should be peace--the Armenians should be left to themselves--neither
Rome nor Parthia should maintain a soldier within the limits of the
province, and any collision between the armies of the two countries
should be avoided.
A pause, apparently of some months’ duration, followed. Towards the
close of autumn, however, a new general came upon the scene; and a new
factor was introduced into the political and military combinations of
the period. L. Caesennius Paetus, a favorite of the Roman Emperor, but a
man of no capacity, was appointed by Nero to take the main direction of
affairs in Armenia, while Corbulo confined himself to the care of Syria,
his special province. Corbulo had requested a coadjutor, probably not
so much from an opinion that the war would be better conducted by two
commanders than by one, as from fear of provoking the jealousy of Nero,
if he continued any longer to administer the whole of the East. On
the arrival of Paetus, who brought one legion with him, an equitable
division of the Roman forces was made between the generals. Each had
three legions; and while Corbulo retained the Syrian auxiliaries, those
of Pontus, Galatia, and Cappadocia were attached to the army of Paetus.
But no friendly feeling united the leaders. Corbulo was jealous of the
rival whom he knew to have been sent out as a check upon him rather than
as a help; and Paetus was inclined to despise the slow and temporizing
policy of the elder chief. The war, according to his views, required to
be carried on with more dash and vigor than had hitherto appeared in
its conduct--cities should be stormed, he said--the whole country
plundered--severe examples made of the guilty. The object of the war
also should be changed--instead of setting up shadowy kings, his own aim
would be to reduce Armenia into the form of a province.
The truce established in the early summer, when Volagases sent his
envoys to Nero, expired in the autumn, on their return without a
definite reply; and the Roman commanders at once took the offensive and
entered upon an autumn campaign, the second within the space of a year.
Corbulo crossed the Euphrates in the face of a large Parthian army,
which he forced to retire from the eastern bank of the river by means
of military engines worked from ships anchored in mid-stream. He
then advanced and occupied a strong position in the hills at a little
distance from the river, where he caused his legions to construct an
entrenched camp. Paetus, on his part, entered Armenia from Cappadocia
with two legions, and, passing the Taurus range, ravaged a large
extent of country; winter, however, approaching, and the enemy nowhere
appearing in force, he led back his troops across the mountains, and,
regarding the campaign as finished, wrote a despatch to Nero boasting
of his successes, sent one of his three legions to winter in Pontus, and
placed the other two in quarters between the Taurus and the Euphrates,
at the same time granting furloughs to as many of the soldiers as chose
to apply for them. A large number took advantage of his liberality,
preferring no doubt the pleasures and amusements of the Syrian and
Cappadocian cities to the hardships of a winter in the Armenian
highlands. While matters were in this position Paetus suddenly heard
that Volagases was advancing against him. As once before at an important
crisis, so now with the prospect of Armenia as the prize of victory, the
Parthians defied the severities of winter and commenced a campaign when
their enemy regarded the season for war as over. In this crisis Paetus
exhibited an entire unfitness for command. First, he resolved to remain
on the defensive in his camp; then, affecting to despise the protection
of ramparts and ditches, he gave the order to advance and meet the
enemy; finally, after losing a few scouts whom he had sent forward, he
hastily retreated and resumed his old position, but at the same time
unwisely detached three thousand of his best foot to block the pass of
Taurus, through which Volagases was advancing. After some hesitation
he was induced to make Corbulo acquainted with his position; but
the message which he sent merely stated that he was expecting to be
attacked. Corbulo was in no hurry to proceed to his relief, preferring
to appear upon the scene at the last moment, when he would be hailed as
a savior.
Volagases, meanwhile, continued his march. The small force left by
Paetus to block his progress was easily overpowered, and for the most
part destroyed. The castle of Arsamosata, where Paetus had placed his
wife and child, and the fortified camp of the legions, were besieged.
The Romans were challenged to a battle, but dared not show themselves
outside their entrenchments. Having no confidence in their leader, the
legionaries despaired and began openly to talk of a surrender. As the
danger drew nearer, fresh messengers had been despatched to Corbulo, and
he had been implored to come at his best speed in order to save the poor
remnant of a defeated army. That commander was on his march, by way
of Commagene and Cappadocia; it could not be very long before he would
arrive; and the supplies in the camp of Paetus were sufficient to have
enabled him to hold out for weeks and months. But an unworthy terror had
seized both Paetus and his soldiers. Instead of holding out to the last,
the alarmed chief proposed negotiations, and the result was that he
consented to capitulate. His troops were to be allowed to quit their
entrenchments and withdraw from the country, but were to surrender their
strongholds and their stores. Armenia was to be completely evacuated
by the Romans; and a truce was to be observed and Armenia not again
invaded, until a fresh embassy, which Volagases proposed to send to
Rome, returned. Moreover, a bridge was to be made by the Romans over the
Arsanias, a tributary of the Euphrates, which, as it was of no immediate
service to the Parthians, could only be intended as a monument of the
Roman defeat. Paetus assented to these terms, and they were carried out;
not, however, without some further ignominy to the Romans. The Parthians
entered the Roman entrenchments before the legionaries had left them,
and laid their hands on anything which they recognized as Armenian
spoil. They even seized the soldiers’ clothes and arms, which were
relinquished to them without a struggle, lest resistance should provoke
an outbreak. Paetus, once more at liberty; proceeded with unseemly haste
to the Euphrates, deserting his wounded and his stragglers, whom he left
to the tender mercies of the Armenians. At the Euphrates he effected a
junction with Corbulo, who was but three days’ march distant when Paetus
so gracefully capitulated.
The chiefs, when they met, exchanged no cordial greeting. Corbulo
complained that he had been induced to make a useless journey, and
to weary his troops to no purpose, since without any aid from him the
legions might have escaped from their difficulties by simply waiting
until the Parthians had exhausted their stores, when they must have
retired. Paetus, anxious to obliterate the memory of his failure,
proposed that the combined armies should at once enter Armenia and
overrun it, since Volagases and his Parthians had withdrawn. Corbulo
replied coldly--that “he had no such orders from the Emperor. He had
quitted his province to rescue the threatened legions from their peril;
now that the peril was past, he must return to Syria, since it was quite
uncertain what the enemy might next attempt. It would be hard work for
his infantry, tired with the long marches it had made, to keep pace with
the Parthian cavalry, which was fresh and would pass rapidly through the
plains.” The generals upon this parted. Paetus wintered in Cappadocia;
Corbulo returned into Syria, where a demand reached him from Volagases
that he would evacuate Mesopotamia. He agreed to do so on the condition
that Armenia should be evacuated by the Parthians. To this Volagases
consented; since he had re-established Tiridates as king, and the
Armenians might be trusted, if left to themselves, to prefer Parthian to
Roman ascendancy.
There was now, again, a pause in the war for some months. The envoys
sent by Volagases after the capitulation of Paetus reached Rome at the
commencement of spring (A.D. 63), and were there at once admitted to
an audience. They proposed peace on the terms that Tiridates should be
recognized as king of Armenia, but that he should go either to Rome,
or to the head-quarters of the Roman legions in the East, in order to
receive investiture, either from the Emperor or his representative. It
was with some difficulty that Nero was brought to believe in the success
of Volagases, so entirely had he trusted the despatches of Paetus, which
represented the Romans as triumphant. When the state of affairs was
fully understood from the letters of Corbulo and the accounts given by
a Roman officer who had accompanied the Parthian envoys, there was
no doubt or hesitation as to the course which should be pursued.
The Parthian proposals must be rejected. Rome must not make peace
immediately upon a disaster, or until she had retrieved her reputation
and shown her power by again taking the offensive. Paetus was at once
recalled, and the whole direction of the war given to Corbulo, who
was intrusted with a wide-spreading and extraordinary authority. The
Parthian envoys were dismissed, but with gifts, which seemed to show
that it was not so much their proposals as the circumstances under which
they had been made that were unpalatable. Another legion was sent to
the East; and the semi-independent princes and dynasts were exhorted to
support Corbulo with zeal. That commander used his extraordinary powers
to draw together, not so much a very large force, as one that could be
thoroughly trusted; and, collecting his troops at Melitene (Malatiyeh),
made his arrangements for a fresh invasion.
Penetrating into Armenia by the road formerly followed by Lucullus,
Corbulo, with three legions, and probably the usual proportion of
allies--an army of about 80,000 men--advanced against the combined
Armenians and Parthians under Tiridates and Volagases, freely offering
battle, and at the same time taking vengeance, as he proceeded, on the
Armenian nobles who had been especially active in opposing Tigranes,
the late Roman puppet-king. His march led him near the spot where the
capitulation of Paetus had occurred in the preceding winter; and it was
while he was in this neighborhood that envoys from the enemy met him
with proposals for an accommodation. Corbulo, who had never shown
himself anxious to push matters to an extremity, readily accepted the
overtures. The site of the camp of Paetus was chosen for the place of
meeting; and there, accompanied by twenty horsemen each, Tiridates and
the Roman general held an interview. The terms proposed and agreed upon
were the same that Nero had rejected; and thus the Parthians could not
but be satisfied, since they obtained all for which they had asked.
Corbulo, on the other hand, was content to have made the arrangement
on Armenian soil, while he was at the head of an intact and unblemished
army, and held possession of an Armenian district; so that the terms
could not seem to have been extorted by fear, but rather to have been
allowed as equitable. He also secured the immediate performance of a
ceremony at which Tiridates divested himself of the regal ensigns and
placed them at the foot of the statue of Nero; and he took security
for the performance of the promise that Tiridates should go to Rome and
receive his crown from the hands of Nero, by requiring and obtaining
one of his daughters as a hostage. In return, he readily undertook that
Tiridates should be treated with all proper honor during his stay at
Rome, and on his journeys to and from Italy, assuring Volagases, who was
anxious on these points, that Rome regarded only the substance, and made
no account of the mere show and trappings of power.
The arrangement thus made was honestly executed. After a delay of about
two years, for which it is difficult to account, Tiridates set out
upon his journey. He was accompanied by his wife, by a number of noble
youths, among whom were sons of Volagases and of Monobazus, and by an
escort of three thousand Parthian cavalry. The long cavalcade passed,
like a magnificent triumphal procession, through two thirds of the
Empire, and was everywhere warmly welcomed and sumptuously entertained.
Each city which lay upon its route was decorated to receive it; and
the loud acclaims of the multitudes expressed their satisfaction at the
novel spectacle. The riders made the whole journey, except the passage
of the Hellespont, by land, proceeding through Thrace and Illyricum
to the head of the Adriatic, and then descending the peninsula. Their
entertainment was furnished at the expense of the state, and is said
to have cost the treasury 800,000 sesterces (about L6250.) a day this
outlay was continued for nine months, and must have amounted in
the aggregate to above a million and a half of our money. The first
interview of the Parthian prince with his nominal sovereign was at
Naples, where Nero happened to be staying. According to the ordinary
etiquette of the Roman court, Tiridates was requested to lay aside his
sword before approaching the Emperor; but this he declined to do; and
the difficulty seemed serious until a compromise was suggested, and
he was allowed to approach wearing his weapon, after it had first been
carefully fastened to the scabbard by nails. He then drew near, bent
one knee to the ground, interlaced his hands, and made obeisance, at the
same time saluting the Emperor as his “lord.”
The ceremony of the investiture was performed afterwards at Rome. On
the night preceding, the whole city was illuminated and decorated
with garlands; the Forum, as morning approached, was filled with “the
people,” arranged in their several tribes, clothed in white robes and
bearing boughs of laurel; the Praetorians, in their splendid arms, were
drawn up in two lines from the further extremity of the Forum to the
Rostra, to maintain the avenue of approach clear; all the roofs of the
buildings on every side were thronged with crowds of spectators; at
break of day Nero arrived in the attire appropriated to triumphs,
accompanied by the members of the Senate and his body-guard, and took
his seat on the Rostra in a curule chair. Tiridates and his suite were
then introduced between the two long lines of soldiers; and the prince,
advancing to the Rostra, made an oration, which (as reported by Dio) was
of a sufficiently abject character. Nero responded proudly; and then
the Armenian prince, ascending the Rostra by a way constructed for the
purpose, and sitting at the feet of the Roman Emperor, received from his
hand, after his speech had been interpreted to the assembled Romans, the
coveted diadem, the symbol of Oriental sovereignty.
After a stay of some weeks, or possibly months, at Rome, during which he
was entertained by Nero with extreme magnificence, Tiridates returned,
across the Adriatic and through Greece and Asia Minor, to his own land.
The circumstances of his journey and his reception involved a concession
to Rome of all that could be desired in the way of formal and verbal
acknowledgment. The substantial advantage, however, remained with
the Parthians. The Romans, both in the East and at the capital, were
flattered by a show of submission; but the Orientals must have concluded
that the long struggle had terminated in an acknowledgment by Rome of
Parthia as the stronger power. Ever since the time of Lucullus, Armenia
had been the object of contention between the two states, both of
which had sought, as occasion served, to place upon the throne its own
nominees. Recently the rival powers had at one and the same time brought
forward rival claimants; and the very tangible issue had been raised,
Was Tigranes or Tiridates to be king? When the claims of Tigranes were
finally, with the consent of Rome, set aside, and those of Tiridates
allowed, the real point in dispute was yielded by the Romans. A
Parthian, the actual brother of the reigning Parthian king, was
permitted to rule the country which Rome had long deemed her own. It
could not be doubted that he would rule it in accordance with Parthian
interests. His Roman investiture was a form which he had been forced to
go through; what effect could it have on him in the future, except to
create a feeling of soreness? The arms of Volagases had been the real
force which had placed him upon the throne; and to those arms he must
have looked to support him in case of an emergency. Thus Armenia was
in point of fact relinquished to Parthia at the very time when it was
nominally replaced under the sovereignty of the Romans.
There is much doubt as to the time at which Volagases I. ceased to
reign. The classical writers give no indication of the death of any
Parthian king between the year A.D. 51, when they record the demise of
Vonones II., and about the year A.D. 90, when they speak of a certain
Pacorus as occupying the throne. Moreover, during this interval,
whenever they have occasion to mention the reigning Parthian monarch,
they always give him the name of Volagases. Hence it has been customary
among writers on Parthian history to assign to Volagases I. the entire
period between A.D. 51 and A.D. 90--a space of thirty-nine years.
Recently, however, the study of the Parthian coins has shown absolutely
that Pacorus began to reign at least as early as A.D. 78, while it has
raised a suspicion that the space between A.D. 51 and A.D. 78 was shared
between two kings, one of whom reigned from A.D. 51 to about A.D. 62,
and the other from about A.D. 62 to A.D. 78. It has been proposed
to call these kings respectively Volagases I. and Artabanus IV. or
Volagases I. and Volagases II., and Parthian history has been written
on this basis; but it is confessed that the entire absence of any
intimation by the classical writers that there was any change of
monarch in this space, or that the Volagases of whom they speak as a
contemporary of Vespasian was any other than the adversary of Corbulo,
is a very great difficulty in the way of this view being accepted; and
it is suggested that the two kings which the coins indicate may have
been contemporary monarchs reigning in different parts of Parthia. To
such a theory there can be no objection. The Parthian coins distinctly
show the existence under the later Arsacidae of numerous pretenders, or
rivals to the true monarch, of whom we have no other trace. In the time
of Volagases I. there was (we know) a revolt in Hyrcania, which was
certainly not suppressed as late as A.D. 75. The king who has been
called Artabanus IV. or Volagases II. may have maintained himself
in this region, while Volagases I. continued to rule in the Western
provinces and to be the only monarch known to the Romans and the Jews.
If this be the true account of the matter, we may regard Volagases I. as
having most probably reigned from A.D. 51 to about A.D. 78--a space of
twenty-seven years.