_Reign of Phraates II. Expedition of Antiochus Sidetes against Parthia.
Release of Demetrius. Defeat and Death of Sidetes. War of Phraates with
the Northern Nomads. His death and character._
Mithridates was succeeded by his son, Phraates, the second monarch of
the name, and the seventh Arsaces. This prince, entertaining, like his
father, the design of invading Syria, and expecting to find some
advantage from having in his camp the rightful occupant of the Syrian
throne, treated the captive Demetrius with even greater kindness than
his father had done, not only maintaining him handsomely, but even
giving him his sister Ehodogune, in marriage. Demetrius, however, was
not to be reconciled to his captivity by any such blandishments, and
employed his thoughts chiefly in devising plans by which he might
escape. By the help of a friend he twice managed to evade the vigilance
of his guards, and to make his way from Hyrcania towards the frontiers
of his own kingdom; but each time he was pursued and caught without
effecting his purpose. The Parthian monarch was no doubt vexed at his
pertinacity, and on the second occasion thought it prudent to feign, if
he did not even really feel, offence: he banished his ungrateful
brother-in-law from his presence, but otherwise visited his crime with
no severer penalty than ridicule. Choosing to see in his attempts to
change the place of his abode no serious design, but only the wayward
conduct of a child, he sent him a present of some golden dice, implying
thereby that it was only for lack of amusement he had grown discontented
with his Hyrcanian residence.
Antiochus Sidetes, the brother of Demetrius, had been generally accepted
by the Syrians as their monarch, at the time when the news reached them
of that prince’s defeat and capture by Mithridates. He was an active and
enterprising sovereign, though fond of luxury and display. For some
years (B.C. 140-137) the pretensions of Tryphon to the throne gave him
full occupation; but, having finally established his authority after a
short war, and punished the pretender with death, he found himself, in
B.C. 137, at liberty to turn his arms against foreign enemies. He would
probably have at once attacked Parthia, but for the attitude of a nearer
neighbor, which he regarded as menacing, and as requiring his immediate
attention. Demetrius, before his departure for the East, had rewarded
the Jews for services rendered him in his war with Tryphon by an open,
acknowledgment of their independence. Sidetes, though indebted to the
Jewish High Priest, Simon, for offers of aid against the same adversary,
could not bring himself to pay the price for it which Demetrius had
thought reasonable--an independent Palestine appeared to him a danger
close to his doors, and one that imperilled the very existence of the
Syrian State. Accordingly, he had no sooner put down Tryphon than he
resolved to pick a quarrel with the Jews, and to force them to resume
their old position of vassalage to Syria. His general, Cendebseus,
invaded their country, but was defeated near Azotus. Antiochus had to
take the field in person. During two years, John Hyrcanus, who had
succeeded his father, Simon (B.C. 135), baffled all his efforts; but at
last, in B.C. 133, he was forced to submit, to acknowledge the authority
of Syria, to dismantle Jerusalem, and to resume the payment of tribute.
Sidetes then considered the time come for a Parthian expedition, and,
having made great preparations, he set out for the East in the spring
of B.C. 129.
It is impossible to accept without considerable reserve the accounts
that have come down to us of the force which Antiochus collected.
According to Justin, it consisted of no more than 80,000 fighting men,
to which was attached the incredible number of 300,000 camp-followers,
the majority being composed of cooks, bakers, and actors. As in other
extreme cases the camp-followers do but equal or a little exceed the
number of men fit for service, this estimate, which makes them nearly
four times as numerous, is entitled to but little credit. The late
writer, Orosius, corrects the error here indicated; but his account
seems to err in rating the supernumeraries too low. According to him,
the armed force amounted to 300,000, while the camp-followers, including
grooms, sutlers, courtesans, and actors, were no more than a third
of the number. From the two accounts, taken together, we are perhaps
entitled to conclude that the entire host did not fall much short of
400,000 men. This estimate receives confirmation from an independent
statement made by Diodorus, with respect to the number who fell in the
campaign--a statement of which we shall have to speak later.
The army of Phraates, according to two accounts of it (which, however,
seem to represent a single original authority), numbered no more than
120,000. An attempt which he made to enlist in his service a body of
Scythian mercenaries failed, the Scyths being willing to lend their aid,
but arriving too late to be of any use. At the same time a defection of
the subject princes deprived the Parthian monarch of contingents which
usually swelled his numbers, and threw him upon the support of his own
countrymen, chiefly or solely. Under these circumstances it is more
surprising that he was able to collect 120,000 men than that he did not
bring into the field a larger number.
The Syrian troops, magnificently appointed and supported by a body of
Jews under John Hyrcanus, advanced upon Babylon, receiving on their
way the adhesion of many of the Parthian tributaries, who professed
themselves disgusted by the arrogance and pride of their masters.
Phraates, on his part, advanced to meet his enemies, and in person or
by his generals engaged Antiochus in three battles, but without success.
Antiochus was three times a conqueror. In a battle fought upon the
river Lycus (Zab) in further Assyria he defeated the Parthian general,
Indates, and raised a trophy in honor of his victory. The exact scene
of the other combats is unknown, but they were probably in the same
neighborhood. The result of them was the conquest of Babylonia, and the
general revolt of the remaining Parthian provinces, which followed the
common practice of deserting a falling house, and drew off or declared
for the enemy.
Under these circumstances Phraates, considering that the time was come
when it was necessary for him to submit or to create a diversion by
raising troubles in the enemy’s territory, released Demetrius from his
confinement, and sent him, supported by a body of Parthian troops, to
reclaim his kingdom. He thought it probable that Antiochus, when the
intelligence reached him, would retrace his steps, and return from
Babylon to his own capital. At any rate his efforts would be distracted;
he would be able to draw fewer reinforcements from home; and he would be
less inclined to proceed to any great distance from his own country.
Antiochus, however, was either uninformed of the impending danger or did
not regard it as very pressing. The winter was approaching; and, instead
of withdrawing his troops from the occupied provinces and marching
them back into Syria, he resolved to keep them where they were, merely
dividing them, on account of their numbers, among the various cities
which he had taken, and making them go into winter quarters. It was,
no doubt, his intention to remain quiet during the two or three winter
months, after which he would have resumed the war, and have endeavored
to penetrate through Media into Parthia Proper, where he might expect
his adversary to make his last stand.
But Phraates saw that the position of affairs was favorable for striking
a blow before the spring came. The dispersion of his enemy’s troops
deprived him of all advantage from the superiority of their numbers.
The circumstance of their being quartered in towns newly reduced,
and unaccustomed to the rudeness and rapacity of soldiers and
camp-followers, made it almost certain that complications would arise,
and that it would not be long before in some places the Parthians,
so lately declared to be oppressors, would be hailed as liberators.
Moreover, the Parthians were, probably, better able than their
adversaries to endure the hardships and severities of a campaign in the
cold season. Parthia is a cold country, and the winters, both of the
great plateau of Iran and of all the mountain tracts adjoining it, are
severe. The climate of Syria is far milder. Moreover, the troops
of Antiochus had, we are informed, been enervated by an excessive
indulgence on the part of their leader during the marches and halts of
the preceding summer. Their appetites had been pampered; their habits
had become unmanly; their general tone was relaxed; and they were likely
to deteriorate still more in the wealthy and luxurious cities where they
were bidden to pass the winter.
These various circumstances raised the spirits of Phraates, and made him
hold himself in readiness to resume hostilities at a moment’s notice.
Nor was it long before the complications which he had foreseen began to
occur. The insolence of the soldiers quartered upon them exasperated the
inhabitants of the Mesopotamian towns, and caused them to look back with
regret to the time when they were Parthian subjects. The requisitions
made on them for stores of all kinds was a further grievance. After a
while they opened communications with Phraates, and offered to return
to their allegiance if he would assist them against their oppressors.
Phraates gladly listened to these overtures. At his instigation a plot
was formed like that which has given so terrible a significance to the
phrase “Sicilian vespers.” It was agreed that on an appointed day all
the cities should break out in revolt: the natives should take arms,
rise against the soldiers quartered upon them, and kill all, or as many
as possible. Phraates promised to be at hand with his army, to prevent,
the scattered detachments from giving help to each other. It was
calculated that in this way the invaders might be cut off almost to a
man without the trouble of even fighting a battle.
But, before he proceeded to extremities, the Parthian prince determined
to give his adversary a chance of escaping the fate prepared for him by
timely concessions. The winter was not over; but the snow was beginning
to melt through the increasing warmth of the sun’s rays, and the day
appointed for the general rising was probably drawing near. Phraates
felt that no time was to be lost. Accordingly, he sent ambassadors to
Antiochus to propose peace, and to inquire on what conditions it would
be granted him. The reply of Antiochus, according to Diodotus, was
as follows: “If Phraates would release his prisoner, Demetrius, from
captivity, and deliver him up without ransom, at the same time restoring
all the provinces which had been taken from Syria, and consenting to pay
a tribute for Parthia itself, peace might be had; but not otherwise.”
To such terms it was, of course, impossible that Phraates should listen;
and his ambassadors, therefore, returned without further parley.
Soon afterwards the day appointed for the outbreak arrived. Apparently,
no suspicion had been excited. The Syrian troops were everywhere quietly
enjoying themselves in their winter quarters, when, suddenly and
without warning, they found themselves attacked by the natives. Taken
at disadvantage, it was impossible for them to make a successful
resistance; and it would seem that the great bulk of them were massacred
in their quarters. Antiochus, and the detachment stationed with him,
alone, so far as we hear, escaped into an open field and contended for
their lives in just warfare. It had been the intention of the Syrian
monarch, when he took the field, to hasten to the protection of the
troops quartered nearest to him; but he no sooner commenced his march
than he found himself confronted by Phraates, who was at the head of
his entire army, having, no doubt, anticipated Antiochus’s design and
resolved to frustrate it. The Parthian prince was anxious to engage at
once, as his force far outnumbered that commanded by his adversary;
but the latter might have declined the battle, if he had so willed, and
have, at any rate, greatly protracted the struggle. He had a mountain
region--Mount Zagros, probably--within a short distance of him, and
might have fallen back upon it, so placing the Parthian horse at great
disadvantage; but he was still at an age when caution is apt to be
considered cowardice, and temerity to pass for true courage. Despite the
advice of one of his captains, he determined to accept the battle which
the enemy offered, and not to fly before a foe whom he had three times
defeated. But the determination of the commander was ill seconded by his
army. Though Antiochus fought strenuously, he was defeated, since his
troops were without heart and offered but a poor resistance. Antiochus
himself perished, either slain by the enemy or by his own hand. His son,
Seleucus, a boy of tender age, and his niece, a daughter of Demetrius,
who had accompanied him in his expedition, were captured. His troops
were either cut to pieces or made prisoners. The entire number of those
slain in the battle, and in the previous massacre, was reckoned at
300,000.
Such was the issue of this great expedition. It was the last which any
Seleucid monarch conducted into these countries--the final attempt made
by Syria to repossess herself of her lost Eastern provinces. Henceforth
Parthia was no further troubled by the power that had hitherto been her
most dangerous enemy, but was allowed to enjoy without molestation from
Syria the conquests which she had effected. Syria, in fact, had from
this time a difficulty in preserving her own existence. The immediate
result of the destruction of Antiochus and his host was the revolt of
Judaea, which henceforth maintained its independence uninterruptedly.
The dominions of the Seleucidae were reduced to Cilicia and Syria
Proper, or the tract west of the Euphrates, between Amanus and
Palestine. Internally, the state was agitated by constant commotions
from the claims of various pretenders to the sovereignty: externally,
it was kept in continual alarm by the Egyptians, Arabians, or Romans.
During the sixty years which elapsed between the return of Demetrius
to his kingdom and the conversion of Syria into a Roman province, she
ceased wholly to be formidable to her neighbors. Her flourishing
period was gone by, and a rapid decline set in, from which there was no
recovery. It is surprising that the Romans did not step in earlier and
terminate a rule which was but a little removed from anarchy. Rome,
however, had other work on her hands; and the Syrian kingdom continued
to exist till B.C. 65, though in a feeble and moribund condition.
But Phraates could not, without prophetic foresight, have counted on
such utter prostration following as the result of a single--albeit a
terrible--blow. Accordingly, we find him still exhibiting a dread of the
Seleucid power even after his great victory. He had released Demetrius
too late to obtain any benefit from the hostile feeling which that
prince probably entertained towards his brother. Had he not released him
too soon for his own safety? Was it not to be feared that the Syrians
might rally under one who was their natural leader, might rapidly
recover their strength, and renew the struggle for the mastery of
Western Asia? The first thought of the dissatisfied monarch was to
hinder the execution of his own project. Demetrius was on his way to
Syria, but had not yet arrived there, or, at any rate, his arrival had
not been as yet reported. Was it not possible to intercept him? The
Parthian king hastily sent out a body of horse, with orders to pursue
the Syrian prince at their best speed, and endeavor to capture him
before he passed the frontier. If they succeeded, they were to bring
him hack to their master, who would probably have then committed his
prisoner to close custody. The pursuit, however, failed. Demetrius
had anticipated, or at least feared, a change of purpose, and, having
prosecuted his journey with the greatest diligence, had reached his own
territory before the emissaries of Phraates could overtake him.
It is uncertain whether policy or inclination dictated the step which
Phraates soon afterwards took of allaying himself by marriage with the
Seleucidae. He had formally given his sister, Ehodogune, as a wife to
Demetrius, and the marriage had been fruitful, Rhodogune having borne
Demetrius several children. The two houses of the Seleucidae and
Arsacidae were thus already allied to some extent. Phraates resolved
to strengthen the bond. The unmarried daughter of Demetrius whom he
had captured after his victory over Antiochus took his fancy; and he
determined to make her his wife. At the same time he adopted other
measures calculated to conciliate the Seleucid prince. He treated his
captive, Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, with the greatest respect. To
the corpse of Antiochus he paid royal honors; and, having placed it in a
silver coffin, he transmitted it to the Syrians for sepulture.
Still, if we may believe Justin, he entertained the design of carrying
his arms across the Euphrates and invading Syria, in order to avenge
the attack of Antiochus upon his territories. But events occurred which
forced him to relinquish this enterprise. The Scythians, whom he had
called to his aid under the pressure of the Syrian invasion, and who had
arrived too late to take part in the war, demanded the pay which they
had been promised, and suggested that their arms should be employed
against some other enemy. Phraates was unwilling either to requite
services not rendered, or to rush needlessly into a fresh war merely
to gratify the avarice of his auxiliaries. He therefore peremptorily
refused to comply with either suggestion. Upon this, the Scythians
determined to take their payment into their own hands, and began to
ravage Parthia and to carry off a rich booty. Phraates, who had removed
the headquarters of his government to Babylonia, felt it necessary to
entrust affairs there to an officer, and to take the field in person
against this new enemy, which was certainly not less formidable than
the Syrians. He selected for his representative at the seat of Empire
a certain Himerus (or Evemerus), a youth with whom he had a disgraceful
connection, and having established him as a sort of viceroy, marched
away to the northeast, and proceeded to encounter the Scythians in that
remote region. Besides his native troops, he took with him a number
of Greeks, whom he had made prisoners in his war with Antiochus. Their
fidelity could not but be doubtful; probably, however, he thought that
at a distance from Syria they would not dare to fail him, and that with
an enemy so barbarous as the Scythians they would have no temptation to
fraternize. But the event proved him mistaken. The Greeks were sullen at
their captivity, and exasperated by some cruel treatment which they
had received when first captured. They bided their time; and when, in a
battle with the Scythians, they saw the Parthian soldiery hard pressed
and in danger of defeat, they decided matters by going over in a body
to the enemy. The Parthian army was completely routed and destroyed, and
Phraates himself was among the slain. We are not told what became of the
victorious Greeks; but it is to be presumed that, like the Ten Thousand,
they fought their way across Asia, and rejoined their own countrymen.
Thus died Phraates I., after a reign of about eight or nine years.
Though not possessing the talents of his father, he was a brave and
warlike prince, active, enterprising, fertile in resources, and bent
on maintaining against all assailants the honor and integrity of the
Empire. In natural temperament he was probably at once soft and cruel.
But, when policy required it, he could throw his softness aside and show
himself a hardy and intrepid warrior. Similarly, he could control his
natural harshness, and act upon occasion with clemency and leniency. He
was not, perhaps, without a grim humor, which led him to threaten more
than he intended, in order to see how men would comport themselves when
greatly alarmed. There is some evidence that he aimed at saying good
things; though it must be confessed that the wit is not of a high order.
Altogether he has more character than most Oriental monarchs; and
the monotony of Arsacid biography is agreeably interrupted by the
idiosyncrasy which his words and conduct indicate.