It is said we can build no superstructure without a foundation of
unshakable principles. There are no such principles. Or, if there be
any, they are beyond our reach—we cannot fathom them; therefore, _qua_
us, they have no existence, for there is no other “is not” than
inconceivableness by ourselves. There is one thing certain, namely, that
we can have nothing certain; therefore it is not certain that we can have
nothing certain. We are as men who will insist on looking over the brink
of a precipice; some few can gaze into the abyss below without losing
their heads, but most men will grow dizzy and fall. The only thing to do
is to glance at the chaos on which our thoughts are founded, recognise
that it is a chaos and that, in the nature of things, no theoretically
firm ground is even conceivable, and then to turn aside with the disgust,
fear and horror of one who has been looking into his own entrails.
Even Euclid cannot lay a demonstrable premise, he requires postulates and
axioms which transcend demonstration and without which he can do nothing.
His superstructure is demonstration, his ground is faith. And so his
_ultima ratio_ is to tell a man that he is a fool by saying “Which is
absurd.” If his opponent chooses to hold out in spite of this, Euclid
can do no more. Faith and authority are as necessary for him as for any
one else. True, he does not want us to believe very much; his yoke is
tolerably easy, and he will not call a man a fool until he will have
public opinion generally on his side; but none the less does he begin
with dogmatism and end with persecution.
There is nothing one cannot wrangle about. Sensible people will agree to
a middle course founded upon a few general axioms and propositions about
which, right or wrong, they will not think it worth while to wrangle for
some time, and those who reject these can be put into mad-houses. The
middle way may be as full of hidden rocks as the other ways are of
manifest ones, but it is the pleasantest while we can keep to it and the
dangers, being hidden, are less alarming.
In practice it is seldom very hard to do one’s duty when one knows what
it is, but it is sometimes exceedingly difficult to find this out. The
difficulty is, however, often reducible into that of knowing what gives
one pleasure, and this, though difficult, is a safer guide and more
easily distinguished. In all cases of doubt, the promptings of a kindly
disposition are more trustworthy than the conclusions of logic, and sense
is better than science.
Why I should have been at the pains to write such truisms I know not.
XXI
Rebelliousness