De Minimis non Curat Lex

i

Yes, but what is a minimum? Sometimes a maximum is a minimum, and

sometimes the other way about. If you know you know, and if you don’t

you don’t.

ii

Yes, but what is a minimum? So increased material weight involves

increased moral weight, but where does there begin to be any weight at

all? There is a miracle somewhere. At the point where two very large

nothings have united to form a very little something.

iii

There is no such complete assimilation as assimilation of rhythm. In

fact it is in assimilation of rhythm that what we see as assimilation

consists.

When two liquid bodies come together with nearly the same rhythms, as,

say, two tumblers of water, differing but very slightly, the two

assimilate rapidly—becoming homogeneous throughout. So with wine and

water which assimilate, or at any rate form a new homogeneous substance,

very rapidly. Not so with oil and water. Still, I should like to know

whether it would not be possible to have so much water and so little oil

that the water would in time absorb the oil.

I have not thought about it, but it seems as though the maxim _de minimis

non curat lex_—the fact that a wrong, a contradiction in terms, a

violation of all our ordinary canons does not matter and should be

brushed aside—it seems as though this maxim went very low down in the

scale of nature, as though it were the one principle rendering

combination (integration) and, I suppose, dissolution (disintegration)

also, possible. For combination of any kind involves contradiction in

terms; it involves a self-stultification on the part of one or more

things, more or less complete in both of them. For one or both cease to

be, and to cease to be is to contradict all one’s fundamental axioms or

terms.

And this is always going on in the mental world as much as in the

material; everything is always changing and stultifying itself more or

less completely. There is no permanence of identity so absolute, either

in the physical world, or in our conception of the word “identity,” that

it is not crossed with the notion of perpetual change which, _pro tanto_,

destroys identity. Perfect, absolute identity is like perfect, absolute

anything—as near an approach to nothing, or nonsense, as our minds can

grasp. It is, then, in the essence of our conception of identity that

nothing should maintain a perfect identity; there is an element of

disintegration in the only conception of integration that we can form.

What is it, then, that makes this conflict not only possible and bearable

but even pleasant? What is it that so oils the machinery of our thoughts

that things which would otherwise cause intolerable friction and heat

produce no jar?

Surely it is the principle that a very overwhelming majority rides

rough-shod with impunity over a very small minority; that a drop of

brandy in a gallon of water is practically no brandy; that a dozen

maniacs among a hundred thousand people produce no unsettling effect upon

our minds; that a well-written i will go as an i even though the dot be

omitted—it seems to me that it is this principle, which is embodied in

_de minimis non curat lex_, that makes it possible that there should be

_majora_ and a _lex_ to care about them. This is saying in another form

that association does not stick to the letter of its bond.

The Note-Books of Samuel Butler · 第 317 / 602 题