32. Spinoza is aware of this. In the _Tractatus Politici_, IT. 4,
he says, 'Per _jus_ itaque _naturae_ intelligo ... ipsam naturae
potentiam.' [1] ... 'Quicquid unusquisque homo ex legibus suae
naturae agit, id summo naturae jure agit, tantumque in naturam
habet juris, quantum potentia valet.' If only, seeing that the
'jus naturae' was mere 'potentia,' he had denied that it was 'jus'
at all, he would have been on the right track. Instead of that,
however, he treats it as properly 'jus,' and consistently with this
regards all 'jus' as mere 'potentia': nor is any 'jus humanum'
according to him guided by or the product of reason. It arises, in
modern phrase, out of the 'struggle for existence.' As Spinoza says,
'homines magis caeca cupiditate quam ratione ducuntur; ac proinde
hominum naturalis potentia sive jus non ratione, sed quocumque
appetitu quo ad agendum determinantur, quoque se conservare conantur,
definiri debet' (II. 5). The 'jus civile' is simply the result of
the conflict of natural powers, which = natural rights, which arises
from the effort of every man to gratify his passions and 'suum esse
conservare.' Man is simply a 'pars naturae,' the most crafty of the
animals. 'Quatenus homines ira, invidia aut aliquo odii affectu
conflictantur, eatenus diverse trahuntur et invicem contrarii sunt,
et propterea eo plus timendi, quo plus possunt, magisque callidi
et astuti sunt, quam reliqua animalia; et quia homines ut plurimum
his affectibus natura sunt obnoxii, sunt ergo homines ex natura
hostes' (II. 14). Universal hostility means universal fear, and fear
means weakness. It follows that in the state of nature there is
nothing fit to be called 'potentia' or consequently 'jus'; 'atque
adeo concludimus jus naturae vix posse concipi nisi ubi homines
jura habent communia, qui simul terras, quas habitare et colere
possunt, sibi vindicare, seseque munire, vimque omnem repellere et
ex communi omnium sententia vivere possunt. Nam (per art. 13 hujus
cap.) quo plures in unum sic conveniunt, eo omnes simul plus juris
habent' (15). The collective body, i.e., has more 'jus in naturam,'
i.e. 'potentiam,' than any individual could have singly (13). In the
advantage of this increased 'jus in naturam' the individual shares.
On the other hand (16), 'Ubi homines jura communia habent omnesque
una veluti mente ducuntur, certum est (per art. 13 hujus cap.)
eorum unumquemque tanto minus habere juris, quanto reliqui simul
ipso potentiores sunt, hoc est, ilium revera jus nullum in naturam
habere praeter id, quod ipsi commune concedit jus. Ceterum quicquid
ex communi consensu ipsi imperatur, teneri exsequi vel (per art. 4
hujus cap.) jure ad id cogi.' This 'jus' by which the individual's
actions are now to be regulated, is still simply 'potentia.' 'Hoc
jus, quod multitudinis potentia definitur, imperium appellari solet'
(17). It is not to be considered anything different from the 'jus
naturae.' It is simply the 'naturalis potentia' of a certain number
of men combined; 'multitudinis quae una veluti mente ducitur' (III.
2). Thus in the 'status civilis' the 'jus naturae' of the individual
in one sense disappears, in another does not. It disappears in the
sense that the individual member of the state has no mind to act or
power to act against the mind of the state. Anyone who had such mind
or power would not be a member of the state. He would be an enemy
against whose 'potentia' the state must measure its own. On the other
hand, 'in statu civili,' just as much as 'in statu naturali,' 'homo
ex legibus suae naturae agit suaeque utilitati consulit' (3). He
exercises his 'naturalis potentia' for some natural end of satisfying
his wants and preserving his life as he did or would do outside the
'status civilis.' Only in the 'status civilis' these motives on the
part of individuals so far coincide as to form the 'una veluti mens'
which directs the 'multitudinis potentia.' According to this view,
any member of a state will have just so much 'jus,' i.e. 'potentia,'
against other members as the state allows him. If he can exercise
any 'jus' or 'potentia' against another 'ex suo ingenio,' he is so
far not a member of the state and the state is so far imperfect. If
he could exercise any 'jus' or 'potentia' against the state itself,
there would be no state, or, which is the same, the state would not
be 'sui juris.'
[1] [Many of the Latin passages quoted in this chapter are translated
in Bosanquet's Supplement. Tr]
33. Is there then no limit to the 'jus' which the state may exercise?
With Spinoza this is equivalent to the question, is there no limit to
the 'potentia' which it can exercise? As to this, he suggests three
considerations.
(1). Its power is weakened by any action against right reason,
because this must weaken the 'animorum unio' on which it is founded.
'Civitatis jus potentia multitudinis, quae una veluti mente ducitur,
determinatur. At haec animorum unio concipi nulla ratione posset,
nisi civitas id ipsum maxime intendat, quod sana ratio omnibus
hominibus utile esse docet' (III. 7).
(2). The 'right' or 'power' of the state depends on its power of
affecting the hopes and fears of individual citizens.... 'Subditi
eatenus non sui, sed civitatis juris sint, quatenus ejus potentiam
seu minas metuunt, vel quatenus statum civilem amant (per art. 10
praeced. cap.). Ex quo sequitur, quod ea omnia, ad quse agenda nemo
praemiis aut minis induci potest, ad jura civitatis non pertineant'
(III. 8). Whatever cannot be achieved by rewards and threats, is
beyond the power and therefore beyond the 'right' of the state.
Examples are given in the same section.
(3). 'Ad civitatis jus ea minus pertinere, quae plurimi indignantur'
(III. 9). Severities of a certain kind lead to conspiracies against
the state, and thus weaken it. 'Sicut unusquisque civis sive homo
in statu naturali, sic civitas eo minus sui juris est, quo majorem
timendi causam habet.'
Just so far then as there are certain things which the state cannot
do, or by doing which it lessens its power, so far there are things
which it has no 'right' to do.
34. Spinoza proceeds to consider the relation of states or sovereign
powers to each other. Here the principle is simple. They are to each
other as individuals in the state of nature, except that they will
not be subject to the same weaknesses. 'Nam quandoquidem (per art.
2 hujus cap.) jus summae potestatis nihil est praeter ipsum naturae
jus, sequitur duo imperia ad invicem sese habere, ut duo homines in
statu naturali, excepto hoc, quod civitas sibi cavere potest, ne ab
alia opprimatur, quod homo in statu naturali non potest, nimirum
qui quotidie somno, saepe morbo aut animi aegritudine, et tandem
senectute gravatur, et prater haec aliis incommodis est obnoxius,
a quibus civitas securam se reddere potest' (III. 11). In other
words, '... duae civitates natura hostes sunt. Homines enim in
statu naturali hostes sunt. Qui igitur jus naturae extra civitatem
retinent, hostes manent' (III. 13). The 'jura belli' are simply the
powers of any one state to attack or defend itself against another.
The 'jura pacis,' on the other hand, do not appertain to any single
state, but arise out of the agreement of two at least. They last as
long as the agreement, the 'foedus,' lasts; and this lasts as long as
the fear or hope, which led to its being made, continues to be shared
by the states which made it. As soon as this ceases to be the case,
the agreement is necessarily at an end, 'nec dici potest, quod dolo
vel perfidia agat, propterea quod fidem solvit, simulatque metus vel
spei causa sublata est, quia haec conditio unicuique contrahentium
aequalis fuit, ut scilicet quae prima extra metum esse potest, sui
juris esset, eoque ex sui animi sententia uteretur, et praeterea quia
nemo in futurum contrahit nisi positis prsecedentibus circumstantiis'
(III. 14).
35. It would seem to follow from the above that a state can do no
wrong, in the sense that there are no rights that it can violate.
The same principle is applicable to it as to the individual. 'In
statu naturali non dari peccatum, vel si quis peccat, is sibi, non
alteri peccat: ... nihil absolute naturae jure prohibetur, nisi quod
nemo potest' (II. 18). A state is to any other state, and to its
subjects, as one individual to another 'in statu naturali.' A wrong,
a 'peccatum,' consists in a violation by individuals of the 'commune
decretum.' There can be no 'peccare' on the part of the 'commune
decretum' itself. But 'non id omne, quod jure fieri dicimus, optime
fieri affirmamus. Aliud namque est agrum jure colere, aliud agrum
optime colere; aliud, inquam, est sese jure defendere, conservare,
judicium ferre, &c, aliud sese optime defendere, conservare, atque
optimum judicium ferre; et consequenter aliud est jure imperare
et reipublicae curam habere, aliud optime imperare et rempublicam
optime gubernare. Postquam itaque de jure cujuscumque civitatis in
genere egimus, tempus est, ut de optimo cujuscumque imperii statu
agamus' (V. 1). Hence a further consideration 'de optimo cujusque
imperii statu.' This is guided by reference to the 'finis status
civilis,' which is 'pax vitaeque securitas.' Accordingly that is the
best government under which men live in harmony, and of which the
rights are kept inviolate. Where this is not the case, the fault lies
with the government, not with any 'subditorum malitia.' 'Homines
enim civiles non nascuntur, sed fiunt. Hominum praeterea naturales
affectus ubique iidem sunt' (V. 2).
The end is not fully attained where men are merely kept in order
by fear. Such a state of things is not peace but merely absence of
war. 'Pax enim non belli privatio, sed virtus est, quae ex animi
fortitudine oritur;[1] est namque obsequium constans voluntas id
exsequendi, quod ex communi civitatis decreto fieri debet' (V. 4).
The 'peace,' then, which it is the end of the state to obtain,
consists in rational virtue; in a common mind, governed by desire on
the part of each individual for perfection of being in himself and
others. The harmony of life, too, which is another way of expressing
its object, is to be understood in an equally high sense. The life
spoken of is one 'quae maxime ratione, vera mentis virtute et vita,
definitur.'
The 'imperium' which is to contribute to this end must clearly be one
'quod multitudo libera instituit, non autem id, quod in multitudinem
jure belli acquiritur.' Between the two forms of 'imperium' there
may be no essential difference in respect of the 'jus' which belongs
to each, but there is the greatest in respect of the ends which they
serve as well as in the means by which they have to be maintained (V.
6).
[1] For the definition of 'fortitudo,' see _Ethics_, III. 59,
Schol. 'Omnes actiones quae sequuntur ex affectibus qui ad mentem
referuntur, quatenus intelligit, ad fortitudinem refero, quam in
animositatem et generositatem distinguo. Nam per animositatem
intelligo cupiditatem, qua unusquisque conatur suum esse ex solo
rationis dictamine conservare. Per generositatem ... cupiditatem
qua unusquisque ex solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos homines
juvare et sibi amicitia jungere.'
36. This conclusion of Spinoza's doctrine of the state does not seem
really consistent with the beginning. At the outset, no motives are
recognised in men but such as render them 'natura hostes.' From the
operation of these motives the state is supposed to result. Each
individual finds that the war of all against all is weakness for all.
Consequently the desire on the part of each to strengthen himself,
which is a form of the universal effort 'suum esse conservare,'
leads to combination, it being discovered that 'homini nihil homine
utilius' (_Eth_. IV. 18. Schol.). But we are expressly told that the
civil state does not bring with it other motives than those operative
'in statu naturali.' 'Homo namque tam in statu naturali quam civili
ex legibus suae naturae agit, suaeque utilitati consulit.' But then
it appears that there supervenes or may supervene on such motives
'constans voluntas id exsequendi quod ex communi civitatis decreto
fieri debet,' and that not of a kind which seeks to carry out the
'commune decretum' as a means of escaping pain or obtaining pleasure,
for it is said to arise from the 'animi fortitudo' which rests on
reason ('ad mentem refertur quatenus intelligit') and includes
'generositas' defined as above. It is also said that the true object
of 'imperium' is 'vitam concorditer transigere' or 'vitam colere' in
a sense of 'vita' in which it 'maxime ratione ... definitur.' And
as the 'imperium' established for this end is one which 'multitudo
libera instituit,' it seems [1] to be implied that there is a desire
for such an end on the part of the people. It is not explained
how such desires should arise out of the conflict of 'naturales
potentiae' or out of the impulses which render men 'natura hostes.'
On the other hand, if the elements of them already exist in the
impulses which lead to the formation of the 'status civilis,' the
reasons for saying that men are 'natura hostes' disappear, and we get
a different view of 'jus,' whether 'naturale' or 'civile,' from that
which identifies it simply with 'potentia.' Some power of conceiving
and being interested in a good _as common_, some identification of
the 'esse' of others with the 'suum esse' which every man, as Spinoza
says, seeks to preserve and promote, must be supposed in those who
form the most primitive social combinations, if these are to issue
in a state directed to such ends and maintained by such a 'constans
voluntas' as Spinoza describes. And it is the interest of men in a
common good, the desire on the part of each which he thinks of others
as sharing, for a good which he conceives to be equally good for
them, that transforms mere 'potentia' into what may fitly be called
'jus,' i.e. a power claiming recognition as exercised or capable of
being exercised for the common good.
[1] Certainly this is so, if we apply to the 'libera multitudo' the
definition of freedom applied to the 'liber homo.' 'Hominem eatenus
_liberum_ omnino voco, quatenus ratione ducitur, quia eatenus ex
causis, quae per solam eius naturam possunt adaequate intelligi,
ad agendum determinatur, tametsi ex iis necessario ad agendum
determinetur. Nam libertas agendi necessitatem non tollit, sed
ponit'(II. 11).
37. If this qualification of 'potentia' which alone renders it 'jus'
had been apprehended by Spinoza, he would have been entitled to speak
of a 'jus naturale' as preceding the 'jus civile,' i.e. of claims to
the recognition of powers and the actual customary recognition of
such, as exercised for a common good, preceding the establishment of
any regular institutions or general laws for securing their exercise.
As it is, the term 'jus naturale' is with him really unmeaning. If it
means no more than 'potentia,' why call it 'jus'? 'Jus' might have
a meaning distinct from that of 'potentia' in the sense of a power
which a certain 'imperium' enables one man to exercise as against
another. This is what Spinoza understands by 'jus civile.' But there
is no need to qualify it as 'civile,' unless 'jus' may be employed
with some other qualification and with a distinctive meaning. But
the 'jus naturale,' as he understands it, has no meaning other than
that of 'potentia,' and his theory as it stands would have been more
clearly expressed if instead of 'jus naturale' and 'jus civile' he
had spoken of 'potentia' and 'jus,' explaining that the latter was a
power on the part of one man against others, maintained by means of
an 'imperium' which itself results from a combination of 'powers.'
He himself in one passage shows a consciousness of the impropriety
of speaking of 'jus' except with reference to a community; 'jus
naturae, quod humani generis proprium est, vix posse concipi, nisi
ubi homines jura habent communia, qui simul terras, quas habitare
et colere possunt, sibi vindicare, seseque munire, vimque omnem
repellere et ex communi omnium sententia vivere possunt' (II. 15). He
takes no notice, however, of any forms of community more primitive
than that of the state. The division into the 'status naturalis'
and the 'status civilis' he seems to treat as exhaustive, and the
'status naturalis' he regards, after the manner of his time, as one
of pure individualism, of simple detachment of man from man, or of
detachment only modified by conflict. From such a 'status naturalis,'
lacking both the natural and the rational principles of social
development (the natural principle, i.e. the interest in others
arising primarily from family ties, and the rational principle, i.e.
the power of conceiving a good consisting in the more perfect being
of the individual and of those in whom he is interested), no process
could be traced to the 'status civilis.' The two 'status' stand over
against each other with an impassable gulf between. 'Homines civiles
non nascuntur, sed fiunt.' They are so made, he seems to hold, by
the action of the 'imperium' upon them. But how is the 'imperium'
to be made? Men must first be, if not 'civiles,' yet something very
different from what they are in the 'status naturalis,' between which
and the 'status civilis' Spinoza recognises no middle term, before
any 'imperium' which could render them 'civiles' could be possible.
38. The cardinal error of Spinoza's 'Politik' is the admission of the
possibility of a right in the individual apart from life in society,
apart from the recognition by members of a society of a correlative
claim upon and duty to each other, as all interested in one and the
same good. The error was the error of his time, but with Spinoza it
was confirmed by his rejection of final causes. The true conception
of 'right' depends on the conception of the individual as being
what be really is in virtue of a function which he has to fulfil
relatively to a certain end, that end being the common well-being
of a society. A 'right' is an ideal attribute ('ideal' in the sense
of not being sensibly verifiable, not reducible to any perceivable
fact or facts) which the individual possesses so far as this function
is in some measure freely fulfilled by him--i.e. fulfilled with
reference to or for the sake of the end--and so far as the ability
to fulfil it is secured to him through its being recognised by the
society as properly belonging to him. The essence of right lies in
its being not simply a power producing sensible effects, but a power
relative to an insensible function and belonging to individuals only
in so far as each recognises that function in himself and others. It
is not in so far as I _can_ do this or that, that I have a right to
do this or that, but so far as I recognise myself and am recognised
by others as able to do this or that for the sake of a common good,
or so far as in the consciousness of myself and others I have a
function relative to this end. Spinoza, however, objects to regard
anything as determined by relation to a final cause. He was not
disposed therefore to regard individuals as being what they are in
virtue of functions relative to the life of society, still less as
being what they are in virtue of the recognition by each of such
functions in himself and others. He looked upon man, like everything
else in nature, as determined by material and efficient causes, and
as himself a material and efficient cause. But as such he has no
'rights' or 'duties,' but only 'powers.'
39. It was because Plato and Aristotle conceived the life of the
πόλις [1] so clearly as the τέλος of the individual, relation to
which makes him what he is--the relation in the case of the πολίτης
proper being a conscious or recognised relation--that they laid the
foundation for all true theory of 'rights.' It is true that they have
not even a word for 'rights.' The claims which in modern times have
been advanced on behalf of the individual against the state under
the designation 'natural rights' are most alien from their way of
thinking. But in saying that the πόλις was a 'natural' institution
and that man was φύσει πολιτικός, Aristotle, according to the sense
which he attached to πόλις, was asserting the doctrine of 'natural
rights' in the only sense in which it is true. He regards the state
(πόλις) as a society of which the life is maintained by what its
members do for the sake of maintaining it, by functions consciously
fulfilled with reference to that end, and which in that sense imposes
duties; and at the same time as a society from which its members
derive the ability, through education and protection, to fulfil their
several functions, and which in that sense confers rights. It is thus
that the πολίτης μετέχει τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι. Man, being
φύσει πολίτης,--being already in respect of capacities and tendencies
a member of such a society, existing only in κοινωνίαι which contain
its elements,--has 'naturally' the correlative duties and rights
which the state imposes and confers. Practically it is only the Greek
man that Aristotle regards as φύσει πολίτης, but the Greek conception
of citizenship once established was applicable to all men capable of
a common interest. This way of conceiving the case, however, depends
on the 'teleological' view of man and the forms of society in which
he is found to live, i.e. on the view of men as being what they are
in virtue of non-sensible functions, and of certain forms of life
determined by relation to more perfect forms which they have the
capacity or tendency to become.
[1] [Greek πόλις (polis) = city, τέλος (telos) = end or purpose,
πολίτης (polites) = citizen, φύσει πολίτης or φύσει πολιτικός (physei
polites or politikos) = social or a citizen by nature, πολίτης
μετέχει τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι (polites metechei tou archein kai
tou archesthai) = a citizen by turns rules and is ruled, κοινωνίαι
(koinoniai) = associations. Tr]
40. Spinoza, like Bacon, found the assumption of ends which things
were meant to fulfil in the way of accurate inquiry into what things
are (materially) and do. He held Plato and Aristotle cheap as
compared with Democritus and Epicurus (_Epist_. LX. 13). Accordingly
he considers the individual apart from his vocation as a member of
society, the state apart from its office as enabling the individual
to fulfil that vocation. Each, so considered, is merely a vehicle of
so much power (natural force). On the other hand, he recognises a
difference between a higher and lower, a better and worse, state of
civil society, and a possibility of seeking the better state because
it is understood to be better. And this is to admit the possibility
of the course of human affairs being affected by the conception of
a final cause. It is characteristic of Spinoza that while he never
departs from the principle 'homo naturae pars,' he ascribes to him
the faculty of understanding the order of nature, and of conforming
to it or obeying it in a new way on account of that understanding.
In other words, he recognised the distinction called by Kant the
distinction between determination according to law and determination
according to the consciousness of law; though in his desire to assert
the necessity of each kind of determination he tends to disguise the
distinction and to ignore the fact that, if rational determination
(or the determination by a conception of a law) is a part of nature,
it is so in quite a different sense from determination merely
according to laws of nature. As he puts it, the clear understanding
that we are parts of nature, and of our position in the universe
of things, will yield a new character. We shall only then desire
what is ordained for us and shall find rest in the truth, in the
knowledge of what is necessary. This he regards as the highest state
of the individual, and the desire to attain it he evidently considers
the supreme motive by which the individual should be governed. The
analogue in political life to this highest state of the individual
is the direction of the 'imperium' by a 'libera multitudo' to the
attainment of 'pax vitaeque securitas' in the high sense which he
attaches to those words in _Tract. Pol_. cap. V. [1]
[1] Cp. _Eth_. IV. _Appendix_, xxxii. 'Ea quae nobis eveniunt contra
id, quod nostrae utilitatis ratio postulat, aequo animo feremus,
si conscii simus nos functos nostro officio fuisse, et potentiam,
quam habemus, non potuisse se eo usque extendere, ut eadem vitare
possemus, nosque partem totius naturae esse, cujus ordinem sequimur.
Quod si clare et distincte intelligamus, pars illa nostri, quae
intelligentia definitur, hoc est, pars melior nostri, in eo plane
acquiescet et in ea acquiescentia perseverare conabitur. Nam quatenus
intelligimus, nihil appetere nisi id, quod necessarium est, nec
absolute nisi in veris acquiescere possumus; adeoque quatenus haec
recte intelligimus, eatenus conatus melioris partis nostri cum ordine
totius naturae convenit.' _Eth_. IV. Preface ... 'Per _bonum_ ...
intelligam id, quod certo scimus medium esse, ut ad exemplar humanae
naturae, quod nobis proponimus, magis magisque accedamus.... Deinde
homines _perfectiores_ aut _imperfectiores_ dicemus, quatenus ad hoc
idem exemplar magis aut minus accedunt.'
41. The conclusion, then, is that Spinoza did really, though not
explicitly, believe in a final cause determining human life. That
is to say, he held that the conception of an end consisting in the
greater perfection of life on the part of the individual and the
community might, and to some extent did, determine the life of the
individual and the community. He would have said no doubt that
this end, like every good, existed only in our consciousness; that
it was 'nihil positivum in rebus in se consideratis' (_Ethics_,
IV. Preface); but an existence of the end in human consciousness,
determining human action, is a sufficiently real existence, without
being 'positivum in rebus.' But he made the mistake of ignoring the
more confused and mixed forms in which the conception of this end
operates; of recognising it only in the forms of the philosophic
'amor Dei,' or in the wisdom of the exceptional citizen, whom alone
he would admit 'ratione duci.' And in particular he failed to notice
that it is the consciousness of such an end to which his powers may
be directed, that constitutes the individual's claim to exercise
them as rights, just as it is the recognition of them by a society
as capable of such direction which renders them actually rights; in
short that, just as according to him nothing is good or evil but
thinking makes it so, so it is only thinking that makes a might a
right,--a certain conception of the might as relative to a social
good on the part at once of the person or persons exercising it, and
of a society which it affects.