211. As to property two questions have to be kept distinct, _(a)_
how there has come to be property, _(b)_ how there has come to be
a _right_ of property. Each of those again may be treated either
historically or metaphysically
212. The confusion of those questions and methods has given rise
either to truisms or to irrelevant researches as to the nature of
property
213. Property implies _(a)_ appropriation, i.e. an act of will, of a
permanent self demanding satisfaction and expression
214. _(b)_ Recognition of the appropriation by others. This
recognition cannot be derived from contract (Grotius), or from a
supreme force (Hobbes)
215. Locke rightly bases the right of property on the same ground as
the right to one's own person; but he does not ask what that ground is
216. The ground is the same as that of the right of life, of which
property is the instrument, viz. the consciousness of a common
interest to which each man recognises every other man as contributing
217. Thus the act of appropriation and the recognition of it
constitute one act of _will_, as that in which man seeks a good at
once common and personal
218. The condition of the family or clan, in which e.g. land is held
in common, is not the negation, but on the contrary the earliest
expression of the right of property
219. Its defect lies _(a)_ in the limited scope for free moral
development which it allows the associates, _(b)_ in the limited
range of moral relations into which it brings them
220. But the expansion of the clan into the state has not brought
with it a corresponding emancipation of the individual. Is then the
existence of a practically propertyless class in modern states a
necessity, or an abuse?
221. In theory, everyone who is capable of living for a common good
(whether he actually does so or not) ought to have the means for so
doing: these means are property
222. But does not this theory of property imply freedom of
appropriation and disposition, and yet is it not just this freedom
which leads to the existence of a propertyless proletariate?
223. Property, whether regarded as the appropriation of nature by men
of different powers, or as the means required for the fulfilment of
different social functions, _must_ be unequal
224. Freedom of trade, another source of inequality, follows
necessarily from the same view of property: freedom of bequest is
more open to doubt
225. It seems to follow from the general right of a man to provide
for his future, and (with certain exceptions) to be likely to secure
the best distribution; but it does _not_ imply the right of entail
226. Returning to the question raised in sec. 220, observe _(a)_ that
accumulation by one man does not itself naturally imply deprivation
of other men, but rather the contrary
227. Nor is the prevalence of great capitals and hired labour in
itself the cause of the bad condition of so many of the working
classes
228. The cause is to be found, not in the right of property and
accumulation, but (partly at least) in the fact that the land has
been originally appropriated by conquest
229. Hence _(a)_ the present proletariate inherit the traditions
of serfdom, and _(b)_ under landowning governments land has been
appropriated unjustifiably, i.e. in various ways prejudicial to the
common interest
230. And further the masses crowded through these causes into large
towns have till lately had little done to improve their condition
231. Whether, if the state did its duty, it would still be advisable
to limit bequest of land, is a question which must be differently
answered according to circumstances
232. The objection to the appropriation by the state of 'unearned
increment' is that it is so hard to distinguish between 'earned' and
'unearned'.