32. Spinoza, seeing that 'jus naturae' = 'potentia,' and not seeing
that it is not really 'jus' at all, identifies all 'jus' with
'potentia,' both in the state and in the individual
33. From which it follows that the 'right' of the state against its
individual members is only limited by its 'power'
34. And the same principle applies to the relations of one state to
other states
35. But, according to Spinoza, though everything is 'lawful' for the
state, everything is not 'best,' and the 'best' state is that which
secures a life of 'peace,' i.e. rational virtue or perfection
36. This conclusion does not seem consistent with his starting-point,
according to which men are 'naturally enemies'
37. From such a 'status naturalis' there is no possible transition to
the 'status civilis,' and the phrase '_jus_ naturae' remains unmeaning
38. Spinoza's error of regarding 'rights' as possible apart from
society was confirmed by his denial of final causes
39. It was just because Plato and Aristotle regarded man as finding
his end in the end of the state, that they founded a true theory of
rights
40. Spinoza, however, while insisting that man is 'part of nature,'
yet places his 'good' in understanding nature and so acquiring a new
character
41. In thus recognising the idea of perfection as a determinant of
life, he really recognises an operative final cause, though without
seeing its bearing on the theory of right.