5. It is true in so far as society does supply to the individual
concrete interests which tend to satisfy the desire for perfection
6. Though (like the corresponding conception in St. Paul) it is not
and could not be realised in any actual human society
7. In all these uses 'freedom' means, not mere self-determination or
acting on preference, but a particular kind of this
8. The extension of the term from the outer to the inner relations of
life, though a natural result of reflection, is apt to be misleading
9. Thus the question, Is a man free? which may be properly asked in
regard to his _actions_, cannot be asked in the same sense in regard
to his _will_
10. The failure to see this has led to the errors (1) of regarding
motive as something apart from and acting on will, (2) of regarding
will as independent of motive
11. Thus the fact that a man, _being what he is, must_ act in a
certain way, is construed into the negation of freedom
12. And to escape this negation recourse is had to the notion of an
unmotived will, which is really no will at all
13. The truth is that the will is the man, and that the will cannot
be rightly spoken of as 'acting on' its objects or _vice versa_,
because they are neither anything without the other
14. If however the question be persisted in, Has a man power over his
will? the answer must be both 'yes' and 'no'
15. 'Freedom' has been taken above (as by English psychologists
generally) as applying to will, whatever the character of the object
willed
16. If taken (as by the Stoics, St. Paul, Kant (generally), and
Hegel) as applying only to _good_ will, it must still be recognised
that this particular sense implies the generic
17. Whatever the propriety of the term in the particular sense,
both 'juristic' and 'spiritual' freedom spring from the same
self-asserting principle in man
18. And though the former is only the beginning of full freedom, this
identity of source will always justify the use of the word in the
latter sense
19. But does not the conception of 'freedom' as = the moral ideal
imply an untenable distinction like that of Kant between the 'pure'
and 'empirical' ego?
20. The 'pure' and 'empirical' ego are one ego, regarded (1) in its
possibility, (2) as at any given time it actually is
21. In man the self-realising principle is never realised; i.e. the
objects of reason and will only _tend_ to coincide
22. So far as they do coincide, man may be said to be 'free' and his
will to be 'autonomous'
23. The growing organisation of human life provides a medium for the
embodiment, and disciplines the natural impulses for the reception,
of the idea of perfection
24. The reconciliation of reason and will takes place as the
individual more and more finds his own self-satisfaction in meeting
the requirements of established morality
25. Until these come to be entirely superseded by the desire of
perfection for its own sake, and his will becomes really free.