"THE SEVEN DAYS AROUND RICHMOND."
Leaving Gordonsville, we proceeded in a southeasterly direction, passing
Louisa Court House and Frederickshall, and camped at Ashland on the
Fredericksburg Railway, twelve miles north of Richmond, on the evening
of the 25th of June. To deceive the enemy, General Lee had sent to the
Valley a considerable force under Generals Whiting, Hood, and Lawton.
The movement was openly made and speedily known at Washington, where it
produced the desired impression, that Jackson would invade Maryland from
the Valley. These troops reached Staunton by rail on the 17th, and,
without leaving the train, turned back to Gordonsville, where they
united with Jackson. The line from Gordonsville to Frederickshall, south
of which point it had been interrupted, was used to facilitate our
movement, but this was slow and uncertain. The advance frequently halted
or changed direction. We were pushing between McDowell and McClellan's
right, over ground recently occupied by the enemy. Bridges had been
destroyed, and, to conceal the movement, no guides were trusted--an
over-caution occasioning delay.
During the day and night of the 25th I suffered from severe pains in the
head and loins, and on the morning of the 26th found it impossible to
mount my horse; so the brigade marched under the senior colonel,
Seymour, 6th regiment. A small ambulance was left with me, and my staff
was directed to accompany Seymour and send back word if an engagement
was imminent. Several messages came during the day, the last after
nightfall, reporting the command to be camped near Pole Green Church,
beyond the Chickahominy; so far, no fighting. Lying on the floor of a
vacant house at Ashland, I had scarce consciousness to comprehend these
messages. Pains in head and back continued, with loss of power to move
my limbs.
Toward daylight of the 27th sleep came from exhaustion, and lasted some
hours. From this I was aroused by sounds of artillery, loud and
constant, brought by the easterly wind. Tom raised me into a sitting
posture, and administered a cup of strong coffee. The sound of battle
continued until it became unendurable, and I was put into the ambulance
by Tom and the driver, the former following with the horses. We took the
route by which the troops had marched, the din of conflict increasing
with every mile, the rattle of small arms mingling with the thud of
guns. After weary hours of rough road, every jolt on which threatened to
destroy my remaining vitality, we approached Cold Harbor and met numbers
of wounded. Among these was General Elzey, with a dreadful wound in the
head and face. His aide was taking him to the rear in an ambulance, and,
recognizing Tom, stopped a moment to tell of the fight. Ewell's
division, to which Elzey and I belonged, had just been engaged with
heavy loss. This was too much for any illness, and I managed somehow to
struggle on to my horse and get into the action.
It was a wild scene. Battle was raging furiously. Shot, shell, and ball
exploded and whistled. Hundreds of wounded were being carried off, while
the ground was strewn with dead. Dense thickets of small pines covered
much of the field, further obscured by clouds of smoke. The first troops
encountered were D.H. Hill's, and, making way through these, I came upon
Winder's, moving across the front from right to left. Then succeeded
Elzey's of Ewell's division, and, across the road leading to Gaines's
Mill, my own. Mangled and bleeding, as were all of Ewell's, it was
holding the ground it had won close to the enemy's line, but unable to
advance. The sun was setting as I joined, and at the moment cheers came
up from our left, raised by Winder's command, which had turned and was
sweeping the Federal right, while Lawton's Georgians, fresh and eager,
attacked in our front. The enemy gave way, and, under cover of the
night, retired over the Chickahominy. Firing continued for two hours,
though darkness concealed everything.
The loss in my command was distressing. Wheat, of whom I have written,
was gone, and Seymour, and many others. I had a wretched feeling of
guilt, especially about Seymour, who led the brigade and died in my
place. Colonel Seymour was born in Georgia, but had long resided in New
Orleans, where he edited the leading commercial paper--a man of culture,
respected of all. In early life he had served in Indian and Mexican
wars, and his high spirit brought him to this, though past middle age.
Brave old Seymour! I can see him now, mounting the hill at Winchester,
on foot, with sword and cap in hand, his thin gray locks streaming,
turning to his sturdy Irishmen with "Steady, men! dress to the right!"
Georgia has been fertile of worthies, but will produce none more
deserving than Colonel Seymour.
The following morning, while looking to the burial of the dead and care
of the wounded, I had an opportunity of examining the field of battle.
The campaign around Richmond is too well known to justify me in entering
into details, and I shall confine myself to events within my own
experience, only enlarging on such general features as are necessary to
explain criticism.
The Chickahominy, a sluggish stream and subject to floods, flows through
a low, marshy bottom, draining the country between the Pamunky or York
and James Rivers, into which last it discharges many miles below
Richmond. The upper portion of its course from the crossing of the
Central Railroad, six miles north of Richmond, to Long Bridge, some
three times that distance to the southeast, is parallel with both the
above-mentioned rivers. The bridges with which we were concerned at and
after Cold Harbor were the Federal military bridges, Grapevine, York
River Railroad, Bottom's, and Long, the lowermost; after which the
stream, affected by tide, spread over a marshy country. The upper or
Grapevine Bridge was on the road leading due south from Cold Harbor,
and, passing Savage's Station on York River Railroad, united with the
Williamsburg road, which ran east from Richmond to Bottom's Bridge. A
branch from this Williamsburg road continued on the south bank of the
Chickahominy to Long Bridge, where it joined the Charles City,
Darbytown, and Newmarket roads coming south-southeast from Richmond.
Many other roads, with no names or confusing ones, crossed this region,
which was densely wooded and intersected by sluggish streams, draining
the marshes into both the Chickahominy and James. We came upon two of
these country roads leading in quite different directions, but bearing
the same name, Grapevine; and it will astound advocates of phonics to
learn that the name of _Darby_ (whence Darbytown) was thus pronounced,
while it was spelt and written _Enroughty_. A German philologist might
have discovered, unaided, the connection between the sound and the
letters; but it would hardly have occurred to mortals of less erudition.
At the beginning of operations in this Richmond campaign, Lee had
seventy-five thousand men, McClellan one hundred thousand. Round numbers
are here given, but they are taken from official sources. A high opinion
has been expressed of the strategy of Lee, by which Jackson's forces
from the Valley were suddenly thrust between McDowell and McClellan's
right, and it deserves all praise; but the tactics on the field were
vastly inferior to the strategy. Indeed, it may be confidently asserted
that from Cold Harbor to Malvern Hill, inclusive, there was nothing but
a series of blunders, one after another, and all huge. The Confederate
commanders knew no more about the topography of the country than they
did about Central Africa. Here was a limited district, the whole of it
within a day's march of the city of Richmond, capital of Virginia and
the Confederacy, almost the first spot on the continent occupied by the
British race, the Chickahominy itself classic by legends of Captain John
Smith and Pocahontas; and yet we were profoundly ignorant of the
country, were without maps, sketches, or proper guides, and nearly as
helpless as if we had been suddenly transferred to the banks of the
Lualaba. The day before the battle of Malvern Hill, President Davis
could not find a guide with intelligence enough to show him the way
from one of our columns to another; and this fact I have from him.
People find a small cable in the middle of the ocean, a thousand fathoms
below the surface. For two days we lost McClellan's great army in a few
miles of woodland, and never had any definite knowledge of its
movements. Let it be remembered, too, that McClellan had opened the
peninsular campaign weeks before, indicating this very region to be the
necessary theatre of conflict; that the Confederate commander (up to the
time of his wound at Fair Oaks), General Johnston, had been a
topographical engineer in the United States army; while his successor,
General Lee--another engineer--had been on duty at the war office in
Richmond and in constant intercourse with President Davis, who was
educated at West Point and served seven years; and then think of our
ignorance in a military sense of the ground over which we were called to
fight. Every one must agree that it was amazing. Even now, I can
scarcely realize it. McClellan was as superior to us in knowledge of our
own land as were the Germans to the French in their late war, and owed
the success of his retreat to it, although credit must be given to his
ability. We had much praying at various headquarters, and large reliance
on special providences; but none were vouchsafed, by pillar of cloud or
fire, to supplement our ignorance; so we blundered on like people trying
to read without knowledge of their letters.
To return to the field of Cold Harbor, the morning (Saturday) after the
battle. McClellan had chosen an excellent position, covering his
military bridges over the Chickahominy. His left, resting on the river,
and his center were covered by a small stream, one of its affluents,
boggy and of difficult passage. His right was on high ground, near Cold
Harbor, in a dense thicket of pine-scrub, with artillery massed. This
position, three miles in extent, and enfiladed in front by heavy guns on
the south bank of the Chickahominy, was held by three lines of infantry,
one above the other on the rising ground, which was crowned with
numerous batteries, concealed by timber. McClellan reported thirty-six
thousand men present, including Sykes's and Porter's regulars; but
reenforcements brought over during the action probably increased this
number to fifty thousand. Lee had forty thousand on the field.
Longstreet attacked on our right, near the river, A.P. Hill on his left.
Jackson approached Cold Harbor from the north, his divisions in column
on one road as follows: Ewell's, Whiting's, Lawton's (Georgians), and
Winder's. At Cold Harbor Jackson united with the division of D.H. Hill,
in advance of him, and directed it to _find_ and attack the enemy's
right. His own divisions, in the order above named, were to come up on
D.H. Hill's right and connect it with A.P. Hill's left. Artillery was
only employed by the Confederates late in the day, and on their extreme
left.
D.H. Hill and Ewell were speedily engaged, and suffered heavily, as did
A.P. Hill and Longstreet, all attacking in front. Ignorance of the
ground, densely wooded, and want of guides occasioned confusion and
delay in the divisions to Ewell's rear. Lawton came to Ewell's support,
Whiting to A.P. Hill's; while of the three brigades of the last
division, the second went to Longstreet's right, the third to A.P.
Hill's center, and the first was taken by Winder, with a fine soldierly
instinct, from right to left, across the battle, to reenforce D.H. Hill
and turn the Federal position. This movement was decisive, and if
executed earlier would have saved loss of men and time. So much for
fighting on unknown ground.
During the day of Saturday, McClellan remained on the south bank of the
Chickahominy with guns in position guarding his bridges; and the only
movement made by Lee was to send Stuart's cavalry east to the river
terminus of the York Railway, and Ewell's division to the bridge of that
line over the Chickahominy and to Bottom's, a short distance below. Late
in the evening General Lee informed me that I would remain the following
day to guard Bottom's and the railway bridges, while Stuart's cavalry
watched the river below to Long Bridge and beyond. From all indications,
he thought that McClellan would withdraw during the night, and expected
to cross the river in the morning to unite with Magruder and Huger in
pursuit. Holmes's division was to be brought from the south side of the
James to bar the enemy's road; and he expressed some confidence that his
dispositions would inflict serious loss on McClellan's army, if he could
receive prompt and accurate information of that General's movements.
Meantime, I would remain until the following (Sunday) evening, unless
sooner convinced of the enemy's designs, when I would cross Grapevine
Bridge and follow Jackson. It is to be presumed that General Lee
disclosed so much of his plans to his subordinates as he deemed
necessary to insure their intelligent execution.
The morning light showed that the Federals had destroyed a part of the
railway bridge near the center of the stream. We were opposite to
Savage's Station (on the line toward Richmond), from which distinct
sounds reached us, but dense forest limited vision to the margin of the
river. Smoke rising above the trees, and explosions, indicated the
destruction of stores. In the afternoon, a great noise of battle
came--artillery, small arms, shouts. This, as we afterward learned, was
Magruder's engagement at Savage's Station, but this din of combat was
silenced to our ears by the following incident: A train was heard
approaching from Savage's. Gathering speed, it came rushing on, and
quickly emerged from the forest, two engines drawing a long string of
carriages. Reaching the bridge, the engines exploded with terrific
noise, followed in succession by explosions of the carriages, laden with
ammunition. Shells burst in all directions, the river was lashed into
foam, trees were torn for acres around, and several of my men were
wounded. The enemy had taken this means of destroying surplus
ammunition.
After this queer action had ceased, as sunset was approaching, and all
quiet at Bottom's Bridge, we moved up stream and crossed Grapevine
Bridge, repaired by Jackson earlier in the day. Darkness fell as we
bivouacked on the low ground south of the river. A heavy rain came down,
converting the ground into a lake, in the midst of which a half-drowned
courier, with a dispatch, was brought to me. With difficulty, underneath
an ambulance, a light was struck to read the dispatch, which proved to
be from Magruder, asking for reenforcements in front of Savage's
Station, where he was then engaged. Several hours had elapsed since the
courier left Magruder, and he could tell nothing beyond the fact of the
engagement, the noise of which we had heard. It must be borne in mind
that, during the operations north of the Chickahominy, the divisions of
Magruder and Huger had remained in position between McClellan's left and
Richmond.
In the night the enemy disappeared from Savage's, near which we passed
the following (Monday) morning, in march to rejoin Jackson. We
encountered troops of Magruder's, Huger's, and other divisions, seeking
to find their proper routes. Countless questions about roads were asked
in vain. At length, we discovered that Jackson had followed the one
nearest the Chickahominy, and about noon overtook the rear of his
column, halted in the road. Artillery could be heard in front, and a
staff officer was sent to find out the meaning of it.
Enfeebled by pain, I used an ambulance to husband my little strength for
emergencies; and I think it was here that General Wade Hampton,
accompanied by Senator Wigfall, came up to me. Hampton had been promoted
to brigadier for gallantry at Manassas, where he was wounded, but not
yet assigned to a command. Wigfall had left the army to take a seat in
the Confederate Congress as Senator from Texas, and from him I learned
that he was in hopes some brigadier would be killed to make a place for
Hampton, to whom, as volunteer aide, he proposed to attach himself and
see the fun. Finding me extended in an ambulance, he doubtless thought
he had met his opportunity, and felt aggrieved that I was not _in
extremis_. Hampton took command of a brigade in Jackson's old division
the next day, and perhaps his friend Wigfall enjoyed himself at Malvern
Hill.
The staff officer returned from the front and reported the situation.
D.H. Hill's division was at White Oak Swamp Creek, a slough, and one of
"despond" to us, draining to the Chickahominy. The enemy held the high
ground beyond, and artillery fire was continuous, but no infantry was
engaged. There was no change until nightfall, when we bivouacked where
we were. Our loss, _one_ artilleryman mortally wounded, proved that no
serious effort to pass the slough was made; yet a prize was in reach
worth the loss of thousands. While we were idly shelling the wood,
behind which lay Franklin's corps--the right of McClellan's army--scarce
a rifle shot to the southwest, but concealed by intervening forest,
Longstreet and A.P. Hill were fighting the bloody engagement of
Frazier's Farm with Heintzelman and McCall, the Federal center and left.
Again, fractions against masses; for of the two divisions expected to
support them, Magruder's and Huger's, the latter did not get up, and the
former was taken off by a misleading message from Holmes, who, from the
south bank of the James, had reached the Newmarket road a day later than
was intended. Longstreet and Hill fought into the night, held a large
part of the field, and captured many prisoners (including General
McCall) and guns, but their own loss was severe. After the action,
Franklin quietly passed within a few yards of them, joined Heintzelman,
and with him gained Malvern Hill, which McClellan had fortified during
the day, employing for the purpose the commands of Keyes and Porter.
On the succeeding morning (July 1), Jackson followed the enemy's track
from White Oak Swamp Creek toward Malvern Hill, passing the field of
Frazier's Farm, and Magruder's division, which had arrived in the night
and relieved the exhausted commands of Longstreet and Hill.
Malvern Hill was a desperate position to attack in front, though, like
Cold Harbor, it could be turned on the right. Here McClellan was posted
with his whole force. His right was covered by Turkey Creek, an affluent
of the James; his left was near that river and protected by gunboats,
which, though hidden by timber, threw shells across his entire front.
Distance and uncertainty of aim saved us from much loss by these
projectiles, but their shriek and elongated form astonished our landward
men, who called them lamp posts. By its height, Malvern Hill dominated
the ground to the north, the James River, and the Newmarket road on
which we approached, and was crowned with a numerous and heavy
artillery. On our side, from inferior elevation, artillery labored under
a great disadvantage, and was brought into action in detail to be
overpowered.
The left attack was assigned to Jackson, the right to Magruder,
supported by Huger and Holmes--Longstreet and A.P. Hill in reserve.
Jackson's dispositions were as follows: On the extreme left, the
division of Whiting, then artillery supported by a brigade under Wade
Hampton, my brigade, and on my right the division of D.H. Hill. In
reserve were the remainder of Ewell's division and the brigades of
Winder, Lawton, and Cunningham. It was perhaps 3 o'clock of the
afternoon before these dispositions were completed.
As it was General Lee's intention to open from his right, Magruder was
waited for, who, following Jackson on the road, was necessarily later in
getting into position. Orders were for Hill to attack with the bayonet
as soon as he heard the cheers of Magruder's charge. To be ready, Hill
advanced over open ground to some timber within four hundred yards of
the enemy's line, but suffered in doing so. Artillery sent to his
support was crippled and driven off. It was 5 o'clock or after when a
loud shout and some firing were heard on the right, and, supposing this
to be Magruder's attack, Hill led his men to the charge. He carried the
first line of the enemy, who, unoccupied elsewhere, reenforced at once,
and Hill was beaten off with severe loss. The brigades of Trimble,
Lawton, Winder, and Cunningham were sent to his assistance, but could
accomplish nothing beyond holding the ground. About sunset, after Hill's
attack had failed, Magruder got into position and led on his men with
similar fortune. Like Hill, he and his troops displayed superb courage
and suffered enormously; but it was not to be; such partial attacks were
without the first element of success. My brigade was not moved from its
position, but experienced some loss by artillery.
After the action, Stuart arrived from the north side of the
Chickahominy, where he had been since Cold Harbor. Had he been brought
over the Long Bridge two days earlier, McClellan's huge trains on the
Charles City road would have fallen an easy prey to his cavalry, and he
could have blocked the roads through the forest.
McClellan's guns continued firing long after nightfall, but the ensuing
morning found him and his army at Harrison's Landing, in an impregnable
position. Here ended the campaign around Richmond.
The strategy displayed on the Confederate side was magnificent, and gave
opportunity for resplendent success; but this opportunity was lost by
tactical mistakes, occasioned by want of knowledge of the theatre of
action, and it is to be feared that Time, when he renders his verdict,
will declare the gallant dead who fell at Gaines's Mill, Cold Harbor,
Frazier's Farm, and Malvern Hill, to have been sacrificed on the altar
of the bloodiest of all Molochs--Ignorance.
The crisis of my illness now came in a paralysis of the lower limbs, and
I was taken to Richmond, where I learned of my promotion to
major-general, on the recommendation of Jackson, for services in the
Valley, and assignment to a distant field.
* * * * *
Having expressed an opinion of McClellan as an organizer of armies, I
will now treat of his conduct as a commander in this and his subsequent
campaign. His first operations on the peninsula were marked by a
slowness and hesitancy to be expected of an engineer, with small
experience in handling troops. His opponent, General Magruder, was a man
of singular versatility. Of a boiling, headlong courage, he was too
excitable for high command. Widely known for social attractions, he had
a histrionic vein, and indeed was fond of private theatricals. Few
managers could have surpassed him in imposing on an audience a score of
supernumeraries for a grand army. Accordingly, with scarce a tenth the
force, he made McClellan reconnoiter and deploy with all the caution of
old Melas, till Johnston came up. It is true that McClellan steadily
improved, and gained confidence in himself and his army; yet he seemed
to regard the latter as a parent does a child, and, like the first
Frederick William's gigantic grenadiers, too precious for gunpowder.
His position in front of Richmond, necessitated by the establishment of
his base on York River, was vicious, because his army was separated by
the Chickahominy, a stream subject to heavy floods, which swept away
bridges and made the adjacent lowlands impassable. Attacked at Fair Oaks
while the river was in flood, he displayed energy, but owed the escape
of his two exposed corps to Johnston's wound and the subsequent blunders
of the Confederates. To operate against Richmond on the north bank of
the James, his proper plan was to clear that river and rest his left
upon it, or to make the Potomac and Rappahannock his base, as the line
of rail from Aquia and Fredericksburg was but little longer than the
York River line. This, keeping him more directly between the Confederate
army and Washington, would have given him McDowell's corps, the
withdrawal of which from his direction he earnestly objected to. The
true line of attack was on the south of the James, where Grant was
subsequently forced by the ability of Lee; but it should be observed
that after he took the field, McClellan had not the liberty of action
accorded to Grant. That Lee caught his right "in the air" at Hanover and
Cold Harbor, McClellan ascribes to his Government's interference with
and withdrawal of McDowell's corps. Reserving this, he fought well at
Gaines's Mill, Cold Harbor, and Frazier's Farm. Always protecting his
selected line of retreat, bringing off his movable stores, and
preserving the organization of his army, he restored its spirit and
_morale_ by turning at Malvern Hill to inflict a bloody repulse on his
enemy. In his official report he speaks of his movement from the
Chickahominy to Harrison's Landing on the James as a change of base,
previously determined. This his detractors sneer at as an afterthought,
thereby unwittingly enhancing his merit. Regarded as a change of base,
carefully considered and provided for, it was most creditable; but if
suddenly and unexpectedly forced upon him, he exhibited a courage,
vigor, and presence of mind worthy of the greatest commanders.
Safe at Harrison's Landing, in communication with the fleet, the army
was transferred from McClellan to the command of General Pope; and the
influence of McClellan on his troops can not be correctly estimated
without some allusion to this officer, under whose command the Federal
Army of the Potomac suffered such mortifying defeat. Of an effrontery
while danger was remote equaled by helplessness when it was present, and
mendacity after it had passed, the annals of despotism scarce afford an
example of the elevation of such a favorite. It has been said that his
talent for the relation of obscene stories engaged the attention and
confidence of President Lincoln. However this may be, great was the
consternation at Washington produced by his incapacity. The bitterness
of official rancor was sweetened, and in honeyed phrase McClellan was
implored to save the capital. He displayed an unselfish patriotism by
accepting the task without conditions for himself, but it may be doubted
if he was right in leaving devoted friends under the scalping-knife,
speedily applied, as might have been foreseen.
With vigor he restored order and spirit to the army, and led it, through
the passes of South Mountain, to face Lee, who was stretched from
Chambersburg to Harper's Ferry. Having unaccountably permitted his
cavalry to separate from him, and deprived himself of adequate means of
information, Lee was to some extent taken unawares. His thin lines at
Antietam, slowly fed with men jaded by heavy marching, were sorely
pressed. There was a moment, as Hooker's advance was stayed by the wound
of its leader, when McClellan, with _storge_ of battle, might have led
on his reserves and swept the field. Hard would it have been for the
Confederates, with the river in rear; but this seemed beyond McClellan
or outside of his nature. Antietam was a drawn battle, and Lee recrossed
into Virginia at his leisure.
While it may be confidently believed that McClellan would have continued
to improve by experience in the field, it is doubtful if he possessed
that divine spark which impels a commander, at the accepted moment, to
throw every man on the enemy and grasp complete victory. But his
Government gave him no further opportunity. He disappeared from the war,
to be succeeded by mediocrity, too well recognized to disturb the
susceptibility of a War Secretary who, like Louvois, was able, but
jealous of merit and lustful of power.
* * * * *
Although in the last months of the war, after he had assumed command of
the armies of the Confederacy, I had some correspondence with General
Lee, I never met him again, and indeed was widely separated from him,
and it now behooves me to set forth an opinion of his place in Southern
history. Of all the men I have seen, he was best entitled to the epithet
of distinguished; and so marked was his appearance in this particular,
that he would not have passed unnoticed through the streets of any
capital. Reserved almost to coldness, his calm dignity repelled
familiarity: not that he seemed without sympathies, but that he had so
conquered his own weaknesses as to prevent the confession of others
before him. At the outbreak of the war his reputation was exclusively
that of an engineer, in which branch of the military service of the
United States he had, with a short exception, passed his career. He was
early sent to Western Virginia on a forlorn hope against Rosecrans,
where he had no success; for success was impossible. Yet his lofty
character was respected of all and compelled public confidence. Indeed,
his character seemed perfect, his bath in Stygian waters complete; not a
vulnerable spot remained: _totus teres atque rotundus_. His soldiers
reverenced him and had unbounded confidence in him, for he shared all
their privations, and they saw him ever unshaken of fortune. Tender and
protecting love he did not inspire: such love is given to weakness, not
to strength. Not only was he destitute of a vulgar greed for fame, he
would not extend a hand to welcome it when it came unbidden. He was
without ambition, and, like Washington, into whose family connection he
had married, kept duty as his guide.
The strategy by which he openly, to attract attention, reenforced
Jackson in the Valley, to thrust him between McDowell and McClellan at
Cold Harbor, deserves to rank with Marlborough's cross march in Germany
and Napoleon's rapid concentration around Ulm; though his tactical
manoeuvres on the field were inferior to the strategy. His wonderful
defensive campaign in 1864 stands with that of Napoleon in 1813; and the
comparison only fails by an absence of sharp returns to the offensive.
The historian of the Federal Army of the Potomac states (and, as far as
I have seen, uncontradicted) that Grant's army, at second Cold Harbor,
refused to obey the order to attack, so distressed was it by constant
butchery. In such a condition of _morale_ an advance upon it might have
changed history. In truth, the genius of Lee for offensive war had
suffered by a too long service as an engineer. Like Erskine in the House
of Commons, it was not his forte. In both the Antietam and Gettysburg
campaigns he allowed his cavalry to separate from him, and was left
without intelligence of the enemy's movements until he was upon him. In
both, too, his army was widely scattered, and had to be brought into
action by piecemeal. There was an abundance of supplies in the country
immediately around Harper's Ferry, and had he remained concentrated
there, the surrender of Miles would have been advanced, and McClellan
met under favorable conditions. His own report of Gettysburg confesses
his mistakes; for he was of too lofty a nature to seek scapegoats, and
all the rambling accounts of that action I have seen published add but
little to his report. These criticisms are written with unaffected
diffidence; but it is only by studying the campaigns of great commanders
that the art of war can be illustrated.
Nevertheless, from the moment Lee succeeded to the command of the army
in Virginia, he was _facile princeps_ in the war, towering above all on
both sides, as the pyramid of Ghizeh above the desert. Steadfast to the
end, he upheld the waning fortunes of the Confederacy as did Hector
those of Troy. Last scene of all, at his surrender, his greatness and
dignity made of his adversary but a humble accessory; and if departed
intelligences be permitted to take ken of the affairs of this world, the
soul of Light Horse Harry rejoices that his own eulogy of Washington,
"First in war, first in peace, first in the hearts of his countrymen,"
is now, by the united voice of the South, applied to his noble son.
Foregoing criticisms have indicated the tendency of engineer service to
unfit men for command. It was once said of a certain colonel that he was
an admirable officer when absent from soldiers. No amount of theoretical
training can supply the knowledge gained by direct and immediate
association with troops. The ablest and most promising graduates from
West Point are annually assigned to the engineer and ordnance corps.
After some years they become scientists, perhaps pedants, but not
soldiers. Whatever may be the ultimate destination of such young men,
they should be placed on duty for at least one year with each arm of the
service, and all officers of the general staff below the highest grades
should be returned to the line for limited periods. In no other way can
a healthy connection between line and staff be preserved. The United
States will doubtless continue to maintain an army, however small, as a
model, if for no other purpose, for volunteers, the reliance of the
country in the event of a serious war. It ought to have the best
possible article for the money, and, to secure this, should establish a
camp of instruction, composed of all arms, where officers could study
the actual movements of troops.