CXXI.--ALL RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES BEAR THE SEAL OF STUPIDITY OR BARBARITY.

In all times the ferocity, the stupidity, the folly of savage men were

shown in religious customs which were often cruel and extravagant. A

spirit of barbarity has come down to our days; it intrudes itself into

the religions which are followed by the most civilized nations. Do we

not still see human victims offered to Divinity? In order to appease the

wrath of a God whom we suppose as ferocious, as jealous, as vindictive,

as a savage, do not sanguinary laws cause the destruction of those who

are believed to have displeased Him by their way of thinking?

Modern nations, at the instigation of their priests, have even excelled

the atrocious folly of the most barbarous nations; at least do we not

find that it never entered into a savage's mind to torment for the sake

of opinions, to meddle in thought, to trouble men for the invisible

actions of their brains? When we see polished and wise nations, such as

the English, French, German, etc., notwithstanding all their

enlightenment, continue to kneel before the barbarous God of the Jews,

that is to say, of the most stupid, the most credulous, the most savage,

the most unsocial nation which ever was on the earth; when we see these

enlightened nations divide themselves into sects, tear one another, hate

and despise each other for opinions, equally ridiculous, upon the

conduct and the intentions of this irrational God; when we see

intelligent persons occupy themselves foolishly in meditating on the

wishes of this capricious and foolish God; we are tempted to exclaim,

"Oh, men! you are still savages! Oh, men! you are but children in the

matter of religion!"

CXXII.--THE MORE ANCIENT AND GENERAL A RELIGIOUS OPINION IS, THE GREATER

THE REASON FOR SUSPECTING IT.

Whoever has formed true ideas of the ignorance, credulity, negligence,

and sottishness of common people, will always regard their religious

opinions with the greater suspicion for their being generally

established. The majority of men examine nothing; they allow themselves

to be blindly led by custom and authority; their religious opinions are

specially those which they have the least courage and capacity to

examine; as they do not understand anything about them, they are

compelled to be silent or put an end to their reasoning. Ask the common

man if he believes in God. He will be surprised that you could doubt it.

Then ask him what he understands by the word God. You will confuse him;

you will perceive at once that he is incapable of forming any real idea

of this word which he so often repeats; he will tell you that God is

God, and you will find that he knows neither what he thinks of Him, nor

the motives which he has for believing in Him.

All nations speak of a God; but do they agree upon this God? No! Well,

difference of opinion does not serve as evidence, but is a sign of

uncertainty and obscurity. Does the same man always agree with himself

in his ideas of God? No! This idea varies with the vicissitudes of his

life. This is another sign of uncertainty. Men always agree with other

men and with themselves upon demonstrated truths, regardless of the

position in which they find themselves; except the insane, all agree

that two and two make four, that the sun shines, that the whole is

greater than any one of its parts, that Justice is a benefaction, that

we must be benevolent to deserve the love of men, that injustice and

cruelty are incompatible with goodness. Do they agree in the same way if

they speak of God? All that they think or say of Him is immediately

contradicted by the effects which they wish to attribute to Him. Tell

several artists to paint a chimera, each of them will form different

ideas of it, and will paint it differently; you will find no resemblance

in the features each of them will have given to a portrait whose model

exists nowhere. In painting God, do any of the theologians of the world

represent Him otherwise than as a great chimera, upon whose features

they never agree, each one arranging it according to his style, which

has its origin but in his own brain? There are no two individuals in the

world who have or can have the same ideas of their God.

CXXIII.--SKEPTICISM IN THE MATTER OF RELIGION, CAN BE THE EFFECT OF BUT A

SUPERFICIAL EXAMINATION OF THEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.

Perhaps it would be more truthful to say, that all men are either

skeptics or atheists, than to pretend that they are firmly convinced of

the existence of a God. How can we be assured of the existence of a

being whom we never have been able to examine, of whom it is impossible

to form any permanent idea, whose different effects upon ourselves

prevent us from forming an invariable judgment, of whom no idea can be

uniform in two different brains? How can we claim to be completely

persuaded of the existence of a being to whom we are constantly obliged

to attribute a conduct opposed co the ideas which we had tried to form

of it? Is it possible firmly to believe what we can not conceive? In

believing thus, are we not adhering to the opinions of others without

having one of our own? The priests regulate the belief of the vulgar;

but do not these priests themselves acknowledge that God is

incomprehensible to them? Let us conclude, then, that the conviction of

the existence of a God is not as general as it is affirmed to be.

To be a skeptic, is to lack the motives necessary to establish a

judgment. In view of the proofs which seem to establish, and of the

arguments which combat the existence of a God, some persons prefer to

doubt and to suspend their judgment; but at the bottom, this uncertainty

is the result of an insufficient examination. Is it, then, possible to

doubt evidence? Sensible people deride, and with reason, an absolute

pyrrhonism, and even consider it impossible. A man who could doubt his

own existence, or that of the sun, would appear very ridiculous, or

would be suspected of reasoning in bad faith. Is it less extravagant to

have uncertainties about the non-existence of an evidently impossible

being? Is it more absurd to doubt of one's own existence, than to

hesitate upon the impossibility of a being whose qualities destroy each

other? Do we find more probabilities for believing in a spiritual being

than for believing in the existence of a stick without two ends? Is the

notion of an infinitely good and powerful being who permits an infinity

of evils, less absurd or less impossible than that of a square triangle?

Let us conclude, then, that religious skepticism can be but the effect

of a superficial examination of theological principles, which are in a

perpetual contradiction of the clearest and best demonstrated

principles! To doubt is to deliberate upon the judgment which we should

pass. Skepticism is but a state of indecision which results from a

superficial examination of subjects. Is it possible to be skeptical in

the matter of religion when we design to return to its principles, and

look closely into the idea of the God who serves as its foundation?

Doubt arises ordinarily from laziness, weakness, indifference, or

incapacity. To doubt, for many people, is to dread the trouble of

examining things to which one attaches but little interest. Although

religion is presented to men as the most important thing for them in

this world as well as in the other, skepticism and doubt on this subject

can be for the mind but a disagreeable state, and offers but a

comfortable cushion. No man who has not the courage to contemplate

without prejudice the God upon whom every religion is founded, can know

what religion to accept; he does not know what to believe and what not

to believe, to accept or to reject, what to hope or fear; finally, he is

incompetent to judge for himself.

Indifference upon religion can not be confounded with skepticism; this

indifference itself is founded upon the assurance or upon the

probability which we find in believing that religion is not made to

interest us. The persuasion which we have that a thing which is

presented to us as very important, is not so, or is but indifferent,

supposes a sufficient examination of the thing, without which it would

be impossible to have this persuasion. Those who call themselves

skeptics in regard to the fundamental points of religion, are generally

but idle and lazy men, who are incapable of examining them.

Superstition in all ages · 第 73 / 145 题