The testimony of Perdue William Lawrence was taken at 9:15 p.m., on
July 24, 1964, in the office of the U.S. attorney, 301 Post Office
Building, Bryan and Ervay Streets, Dallas. Tex., by Mr. Burt W.
Griffin, assistant counsel of the President's Commission.
Mr. GRIFFIN. My name is Burt Griffin, and I am a member of the general
counsel's staff of the President's Commission on the Assassination of
President Kennedy, and the Commission has been set up by Executive
order of President Johnson and a joint resolution of Congress. These
two official acts have directed the Commission to investigate into the
assassination of President Kennedy and the death of Lee Harvey Oswald,
to evaluate all the facts we find and report back to President Johnson
upon them. We have asked you to come here in particular this evening,
Captain Lawrence, because we are interested in the security precautions
that were taken both in connection with the protection of President
Kennedy and in the prospective transfer of Lee Harvey Oswald to the
county jail. I might say that there are a set of rules and regulations
that have been promulgated by the Commission and under these rules
and regulations I have been designated to take your deposition. You
are entitled to receive a written notice 3 days in advance from the
Commission. It has been the practice with all of the police officers
who have testified that we have simply written a letter to Chief Curry
and he has been good enough to make you people available. I assume that
you haven't received proper notice, and I will ask you at this time if
you are willing to waive that notice?
Captain LAWRENCE. Certainly.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Since you are willing to waive the notice, if you will
raise your right hand I will administer the oath to you. Do you
solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Captain LAWRENCE. I do.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Would you state your full name for the record, please?
Captain LAWRENCE. Not my initials--my full name?
Mr. GRIFFIN. Your full name.
Captain LAWRENCE. Perdue [spelling]. P-e-r-d-u-e William Lawrence
[spelling], L-a-w-r-e-n-c-e.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Where do you live, Mr. Lawrence?
Captain LAWRENCE. 1623 South Clinton.
Mr. GRIFFIN. When were you born?
Captain LAWRENCE. In August--1911--August 18.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Are you employed with the Dallas Police Department?
Captain LAWRENCE. I am.
Mr. GRIFFIN. And what is your rank?
Captain LAWRENCE. Captain of police.
Mr. GRIFFIN. And how long have you been with the police department?
Captain LAWRENCE. Nineteen years.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Were you captain of police on November 22, 1963?
Captain LAWRENCE. I was.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Were you in charge of any particular department?
Captain LAWRENCE. Traffic at this particular time. I am in charge of
the accident prevention bureau of the Dallas Police Department, but my
specific assignment was traffic control for the Presidential motorcade.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Was this a special 1-day assignment that you had?
Captain LAWRENCE. Well, in this particular case--it was for this
particular occasion.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Was there any other person in the department who regularly
was concerned with what you call traffic control?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; Capt. R. A. Thompson.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Is there any reason why you handled the traffic control
responsibilities for the Presidential motorcade rather than Captain
Thompson?
Captain LAWRENCE. None that I know of; none that I can think of except
that Chief Batchelor saw me and said, "I want you to get together
with Lieutenant Southard." Lieutenant Southard works for Captain
Thompson and we were to use my motorcycle officers and his corner
men, so, because of the motorcade part of it, I assume that this was
the reason that it was turned over to me. Normally on parade or a
special assignment and such, this is under the jurisdiction of Captain
Thompson, but because of the escort part of it, I am assuming that
this was why it was given to me. I would like to also add that Captain
Thompson and I work evenings on alternate Friday and Saturday nights,
and I was scheduled to work daytime hours on Friday, November 22, and
this may also be a reason I was given this particular assignment.
Captain Thompson did work evenings on Friday, November 22, 1963, and
Saturday, November 23, 1963.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Had you participated in other traffic control projects in
the past?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; I had.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Had you ever been involved in one that involved the
President of the United States or any other important official who
required special protection?
Captain LAWRENCE. No; I had not.
Mr. GRIFFIN. In your experience in the Dallas Police Department, had
there ever been a time when there had been a President or an important
person who had come through who required special protection?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; but not in which I was directly assigned to any
duties. When President Kennedy came to town to visit Mr. Rayburn at
Baylor Hospital, Lieutenant Curtis was in charge of that detail and
I don't know if I was on a day off or what it was, but I was not in
charge of that detail at all. I made none of those arrangements.
Mr. GRIFFIN. From whom did you receive your instructions in connection
with the duties that you were to carry out?
Captain LAWRENCE. My immediate superior was Deputy Chief R. H. Lunday,
and I received my instructions from Chief Lunday and Asst. Chief
Batchelor; both of them.
Mr. GRIFFIN. When were you first told that you were to be in charge of
this traffic control?
Captain LAWRENCE. The first day was on a Tuesday--November 19.
Mr. GRIFFIN. And who told you at that time?
Captain LAWRENCE. Chief Batchelor.
Mr. GRIFFIN. And what did Chief Batchelor tell you at that time that
your responsibilities would be?
Captain LAWRENCE. He told me he wanted me to go over this route and
to start working with the assignments of men to the intersections on
the motorcade route, and he said that he had gone over this route and
handed me a list of intersections that he wanted covered and the amount
of men he wanted on each intersection and the reason he wanted more
than one or two at certain intersections was because of the turning
movements of the motorcade, but he also wanted assignments made to
certain overpasses and told me the number of men that he would like to
have stationed on the overpasses.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did he tell you the names of the particular men he wanted
on the overpass?
Captain LAWRENCE. He gave me the names of no men. He told me to make
the assignments, and when he handed me this list, he was either with
Chief Lunday or I went immediately to Chief Lunday and asked for the
assistance of Lt. W. F. Southard because he--his men would be directly
involved also in these assignments.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I notice you have a list in your hand. Is that the list
Chief Batchelor gave you?
Captain LAWRENCE. That's the list that Chief Batchelor gave me.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Would you mind if we marked this and returned this for our
file?
Captain LAWRENCE. No; not a bit. I would like to add that it was not
requested that I bring any papers with me. I did bring with me some
original personnel assignment notes for the purpose of refreshing
my memory, and I see no reason why my superiors would object to any
requests made by this Committee.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Let me now turn this over and I will state for the record
that it consists of five small white sheets of paper, roughly 2-1/2 by
5 inches in size, and there are a number of handwritten notations on
it and I'm going to mark this on the back.
Captain LAWRENCE. I believe this to be the handwriting of Chief
Batchelor.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I'm going to mark this Capt. P. W. Lawrence Deposition,
July 24, 1964, Exhibit No. 1. In handing this memo to you, did Chief
Batchelor say anything to you about what the men on the overpass were
supposed to do?
Captain LAWRENCE. He was stationing the men on the overpass to see that
no one else came onto the overpass so that no one would be over the
motorcade when the President passed under it.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Other than stationing people at intersections, were you
given any instructions as to stationing men in between blocks?
Captain LAWRENCE. Not at that time.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Now, after the 18th of November did you later receive
further instructions from your superiors?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. GRIFFIN. When did you next receive instructions?
Captain LAWRENCE. I next received instructions well, during the week we
discussed this with Chief Lunday and Assistant Chief Batchelor--certain
assignments as far as the motorcycle escorts were concerned, and not
directly at that time regarding stationing of any men on any particular
corner.
I might add that when Lieutenant Southard and I went over this route,
we found one intersection open and which was on Record Street, which
raised our total--this is my writing here [indicating].
Mr. GRIFFIN. Yes, this is at the bottom of the second page and you have
written in the word "Record."
Captain LAWRENCE. That's right--that's my handwriting and during that
week I was next told, of course, to contact other people regarding
the route connected with the motorcade to see that no trains would be
coming across at the time that the Presidential motorcade was passing
through.
Mr. GRIFFIN. These were grade crossings that you are talking about?
Captain LAWRENCE. Grade crossing--yes.
Mr. GRIFFIN. At the time of your first meeting with Chief Batchelor
were you given any special instructions about the protection of the
President?
Captain LAWRENCE. None.
Mr. GRIFFIN. When was the next time you received some instructions from
one of your superiors?
Captain LAWRENCE. The next time was, to the best of my knowledge, the
motorcade assignments--possibly 2 days before the President arrived--I
asked how we would escort this motorcade.
Mr. GRIFFIN. And with whom did you discuss that?
Captain LAWRENCE. Chief Lunday and Chief Batchelor.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Was anybody from the Secret Service present at that time?
Captain LAWRENCE. Not at that time--no.
Mr. GRIFFIN. What were you told about the purpose of the officers that
were being provided, if anything?
Captain LAWRENCE. I was told that there would be these lead motorcycle
officers, and that we would also have these other officers alongside
the President's car and the Vice President's car, and some of the
others that would be in the motorcade, and approximately how many
officers would be needed for the escort, and at that time I had
prepared a list of 18 solo motorcycle officers, this included three
solo sergeants.
I was also instructed that about this motorcade--that when it reached
Stemmons Expressway, Chief Batchelor told me that he wanted a solo
motorcycle officer in each traffic lane, each of the five traffic lanes
waiting for the motorcade, so that no vehicles, on Stemmons Expressway
would pass the motorcade at all and he wanted these solo motorcycle
officers to pull away from the escort and get up there on Stemmons
Freeway and block the traffic, and some of these officers, he stated,
would pull past the Presidential car.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Would this include blocking oncoming traffic?
Captain LAWRENCE. This would stop all oncoming traffic on Stemmons
Freeway.
Mr. GRIFFIN. All the way to the Trade Mart?
Captain LAWRENCE. No, sir--this would stop all traffic that would
be northbound on Stemmons, on--all northbound traffic on Stemmons
Expressway, in the five lanes of traffic, so when the motorcade came
onto the freeway, that no cars would be able to pass it, that the
motorcycle officers would stop the traffic, and then the motorcycle
officers after all the motorcade was headed for the Trade Mart, that
then these motorcycle officers would slowly move up, but they would
keep all the traffic behind--all the northbound traffic.
Mr. GRIFFIN. But, the southbound traffic would be permitted to run in
the southbound lanes?
Captain LAWRENCE. That's right.
Mr. GRIFFIN. When did that conversation take place?
Captain LAWRENCE. That conversation took place about the 20th of
November--2 days before.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Now, did you receive another set of instructions or orders
after that?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; on the evening of November 21, this was the
first time that I had attended any security meeting at all in regards
to this motorcade. At approximately 5 p.m. I was told to report to
the conference room on the third floor, and when I arrived at the
conference room the deputy chiefs were in there, there were members of
the Secret Service--Mr. Sorrels, Captain Gannaway, Captain Souter of
radio patrol, and Capt. Glen King, deputy chiefs, assistant chiefs,
and Chief Curry, and one gentleman, who I assume was in charge of
the security for the Secret Service. This was the first time I had
attended any conferences in regard to the security of this escort, and
I listened in on most of the discussion and I heard one of the Secret
Service men say that President Kennedy did not desire any motorcycle
officer directly on each side of him, between him and the crowd, but he
would want the officers to the rear. This conversation I overheard as
Chief Batchelor was using a blackboard showing how he planned to handle
this--how plans had been made to cover the escort.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Was anything said in that meeting about any special
precautions that should be taken in connection with protecting the
President?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; there was some discussion that centered more
around the security down at the Trade Mart than any other place and
Captain Gannaway was in charge of the security in that area, and then
chief Stevenson, I believe, was there, and they mentioned that they
would have detectives stationed along the route--along the motorcade
route, especially in the downtown area.
Mr. GRIFFIN. And what were they to be looking for?
Captain LAWRENCE. They were taking care of security, all right, but
they did not go into any discussion in my presence. I assume that this
had all been, discussed earlier, in fact, when I was called up there,
these people were already meeting.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you ever receive any instructions as to what the
men were to do whom you stationed at the various intersections and
elsewhere along the route?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; I discussed this with Chief Lunday two or three
times and Chief Batchelor two or three times before this meeting ever
took place and we discussed the fact that maybe some demonstrators with
placards might show up and that the officers stationed along the route
should be instructed to be on the alert for any persons that might
throw anything or make any movement that might endanger the President
at all, and if there were any incident of that nature, that the person
would be arrested immediately.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Was there any discussion between you and your superior
officers about watching the buildings and windows in the buildings or
the tops of the buildings?
Captain LAWRENCE. No, no instructions were given to me about my
men watching the buildings--no, so, mine were more crowd control
instructions--to watch the crowds, to keep them back, and to block
off the traffic and to block off the streets on the approach of the
motorcade and not to let them by--and to keep the crowds back.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Were there other men who were going to have other
responsibilities?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes, it was my understanding that the other
responsibilities in regard to security were to be handled by the
special service bureau and the members of the criminal investigation
division.
Mr. GRIFFIN. And were they going to be stationed along the routes?
Captain LAWRENCE. It was my understanding that they would be.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Were you ever informed as to how many men would be in each
particular location?
Captain LAWRENCE. I was not.
Mr. GRIFFIN. With specific reference to Dealey Plaza and the area of
Elm and Houston and the School Book Depository, did you have any idea
of how many Secret Service or detective bureau people or CID people
would be in that area?
Captain LAWRENCE. I did not.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you ever receive any advice or instructions from any
member of the Secret Service about watching buildings or performing
other functions other than the normal crowd controls which you have
just mentioned?
Captain LAWRENCE. I did not.
Mr. GRIFFIN. When you met with the Secret Service, what do you recall
that the Secret Service did discuss?
Captain LAWRENCE. I sat in on the discussion and I did not participate
in any at all, and from what I heard there would be sufficient
personnel inside the Trade Mart--they were discussing this, and these
detectives' assignments were not the ones that I was at that time
primarily instructed in, so--I know that they had made some elaborate
precautions, which no one discussed with me, but I don't remember all
of the conversation that went on regarding that. I was particularly
interested in traffic assignments and these were the ones that I was
listening for.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Was there ever any discussion that you heard about taking
precautions designed to prevent some sort of assault on the President
that would be more severe than simply placards, picketing, and people
throwing rotten eggs and vegetables, and things like that?
Captain LAWRENCE. Not to my knowledge, other than the fact that
the Secret Service man in there--when it was mentioned about these
motorcycle officers alongside the President's car, he said, "No,
these officers should be back and if any people started a rush toward
the car, if there was any movement at all where the President was
endangered in any way, these officers would be in a position to gun
their motors and get between them and the Presidential car," and he
mentioned, of course, the security and safety of the President and
those words were mentioned.
Mr. GRIFFIN. But was that concept of the security and the safety of the
President spelled out in any certain details?
Captain LAWRENCE. Not to my knowledge. Now, you see, I'm not familiar
with some of the things that were discussed with the other bureau
commanders. Now, I didn't know until that time who was going to be in
charge at the Trade Mart.
Mr. GRIFFIN. What time is that that you have reference to?
Captain LAWRENCE. Sometime between 5 and 6 p.m. on November 21. I knew
at that time that Captain Souter would be in charge, and when I was so
advised, after this meeting I asked Souter if I could meet him down at
the Trade Mart, and discuss how the motorcade would come into the Trade
Mart, and they had discussed also about keeping an area open down there
and it had also been discussed with me--I might add one thing that I
had forgotten to say before--that there would be two officers remain
with the Presidential car while he was in the Trade Mart. This was told
to me by Assistant Chief Batchelor--to the best of my knowledge.
After this conference, I asked Captain Souter if I could meet him down
at the Trade Mart and he said he would be down there and then I called
Sgt. S. Q. Bellah [spelling] B-e-l-l-a-h. I called him on the phone at
home and asked him if he could meet me down there because he was going
to be the leading solo motorcycle sergeant. He met me at the Trade Mart
with Stavis Ellis, another solo motorcycle sergeant, who was going to
be leading the Presidential motorcade and I met with both of them down
there on the evening of the 21st, so that I would know how they would
come in the area and how they were to be escorted around in the area.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I take it from what you said, that your principal concern
then was keeping the motorcade moving smoothly?
Captain LAWRENCE. That's right.
Mr. GRIFFIN. And there was no special attention brought on your part to
the question of actually protecting the President other than from some
impediment to the actual movement of the automobile.
Captain LAWRENCE. Mainly--my understanding was mainly that my
assignment was for crowd control and, of course, security would be
involved in it, as far as anyone making any movements in the crowd.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Now, did you prepare a list of the assignments that you
gave in stationing your men along the route?
Captain LAWRENCE. I did and I might add another thing that I have
overlooked here, that Chief Batchelor had also instructed me to have
one man on a three-wheel motorcycle--to station this one man over the
Stemmons overpass at Industrial, to make sure that no car stopped and
no people stopped there who would be in a position to throw anything
down when the motorcade came off of Stemmons Freeway to make its turn
onto Industrial, and there would be a three-wheeler up there and he had
specifically instructed me on that, which to me was security as well
too.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Were you given any general instructions to go out and look
along the route for special security problems that might arise along
the route?
Captain LAWRENCE. No; I was not, but I did do this.
Mr. GRIFFIN. What did you do in that regard?
Captain LAWRENCE. This is getting ahead, but after the detail was put
out in the detail room and I had talked to the motorcycle officers
and the motorcade officers and had given them their instructions, I
then went out to Love Field with Maj. George Tropolis of the police
reserves who is in charge of the police reserves and awaited the
arrival of the President and to see that all the motorcycle officers
were at the proper location, I had already given a copy of the detail
to each one of the sergeants and their instructions and when we were
out there at the airport, the weather cleared up and the officers put
their raincoats, of course, in the motorcycle saddlebags and when the
Presidential plane arrived and President Kennedy got off of the plane,
I saw that there was going to be a brief ceremony there, and I knew
that Chief Lumpkin was going to--I had been told was going to be ahead
of this motorcade--I got in my car and tried to be a few blocks ahead
of him to make sure that everybody was on their assignments, and, of
course, the crowd, the huge crowd en route surprised me, especially
in the residential area, that all the people had turned out to see
the President. I didn't expect a crowd this big, and, of course, we
had officers stationed at many intersections along the route, but not
at every intersection until we got to the downtown area. Not every
intersection was covered, but as I went along the route, this didn't
look like it was necessary because the crowds already had blocked the
streets, and no motor vehicle could have crossed some of these streets.
As I came up to many of these intersections--I slowed my car down and
I was in uniform, but I was driving a plain car which I drive, and I
told the officers to keep the traffic in back of me moving and not
let any vehicles cross because I could hear Chief Curry on channel 2
giving the location of the motorcade from time to time, and I knew a
few blocks ahead of him would be Chief Lumpkin, and I knew that I would
have to stay considerably ahead of him. Although I was not given this
assignment--I proceeded on this route, and I followed it on down to the
Trade Mart.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Let's go back a little bit and let me ask you--when did
you first give instructions to the men who were actually stationed
along the route as to what they should do?
Captain LAWRENCE. I gave them those instructions on the morning of
November 22 and I had with me at the time--I had the detail with me and
some notes that I had written. I first told the men the approximate
time of the arrival of the President's plane at Love Field. Then, I
went over the route that the motorcade would take to the Trade Mart and
then the approximate time they were scheduled to be at the Trade Mart
and then to leave for Love Field.
I stated that there would be some assignments which we would call
assignment No. 1, assignment No. 2 and assignment No. 3. Some officers
would only have one assignment and some would have two and some would
have three, and that these assignments would be given to them by
Lieutenant Southard, that there would be supervisors stationed along
the route, cruising the route, and would be able to assist them. I then
covered the supervisory assignments, telling them where these sergeants
would be stationed along the route, and if anything came up they were
to contact them.
Mr. GRIFFIN. The men you assigned, from the instructions that you gave
them, what would you expect that these men would do besides simply keep
people from running out into the motorcade of cars?
Captain LAWRENCE. They are crowd control--for the motorcade to move and
I also gave the men instructions that it would be no violation--for
persons to carry placards, that we expected very little of this, but
that they were to be alert to any unusual movements in the crowd so
that no one threw anything at the President, that there would be no
repetition of the Ambassador Stevenson incident, that President Kennedy
was the President of the United States and entitled to the courtesy and
protection of this office, and it was their duty to see that this was
done, and if there were any violations of the law of any type, that
they would arrest individuals immediately, and these were the specific
instructions.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Now, if a man, captain, one of your men was placed at
a station--was actually standing out there and acting pursuant to
these orders, first of all, let me ask you what direction would he be
looking; would he be looking toward the street or would he be turned
around and facing the crowd?
Captain LAWRENCE. He would either be facing the crowd or facing the
street, depending on the necessity at that time. He was given no
specific instructions except that he was not told specifically that he
would face the crowd on the traffic assignments, but he was told that
he was to watch the crowd, so I wouldn't say that the man--that all of
the men on the route were specifically instructed to face the crowd. I
gave them no such instructions.
Mr. GRIFFIN. As you drove down the route preceding the motorcade, did
you observe just exactly what these men were doing?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; most of the men were watching the oncoming
traffic and keeping it moving. They were keeping this oncoming traffic
moving. Some of the men were trying to push the crowd back, especially
in the downtown area. There were many of them facing the crowds there
and trying to push the crowds back, and this was, I imagine, about a
mile ahead of the motorcade.
Mr. GRIFFIN. As a practical matter--stationing as you did two men at
each intersection generally--could two men have effectively prevented
anyone who was bent upon attacking the President, could they have
effectively prevented him from rushing out and doing something?
Captain LAWRENCE. If they saw them in time, but two men, in as large
a crowd as that--these men had all they could handle, with as large a
crowd as we had turn out for that motorcade. It was a full-time job
keeping the crowd back, and this was what the officers were trying to
do.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Have you given any thought, or do you have any suggestions
as to how a police department the size of the Dallas Police Department
could have stationed more men along the route so that they could
have effectively--not only kept the crowd back but could have been
effectively on the lookout for people who might want to rush out and do
something?
Captain LAWRENCE. Well, looking back on it, I would say, with the
manpower that we had for this particular job and the crowd that turned
out, that without the use of precautions, these men would have a very
difficult time keeping a crowd back like that. This crowd was an
enthusiastic crowd, as you know, as you probably have heard many times,
and it was a bigger crowd than I expected.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Is it practical for a city the size of Dallas to use
barricades or ropes along the motorcade, the length of the one that the
President traveled?
Captain LAWRENCE. Well, with the length of this motorcade, I don't
believe that we could have on this short a notice, and this is my
opinion. We would have to go to another source to get sufficient
barricades to handle it, because I don't think we have that many
barricades--I don't think that many barricades would be available for a
motorcade as long as this one.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Does the police department maintain barricades?
Captain LAWRENCE. No; the barricades are obtained from the public works
department. We have been able to request barricades to barricade off
streets at certain events on holidays and parks. We have asked for
barricades and we have always received barricades.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you give any specific instructions to your men with
respect to watching windows?
Captain LAWRENCE. No.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you give any specific instructions to the people
who were stationed along Elm and Houston at the intersection of Elm
and Houston, the man at Houston in particular, did you direct any
particular attention to those men who were stationed there?
Captain LAWRENCE. No; I did not make the individual assignments, but
as I said, the only thing I did was make these remarks as to these
particular assignments in stating that they would be made by these
officers, and, of course, there were some assignments made in this area
and there were also some assignments made to the overpass.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Was there anything that would be in the general orders or
the general background and training of the police officers who were
stationed along this route which would make the individual police
officer believe that it was his responsibility to watch the windows of
buildings?
Captain LAWRENCE. I don't recall any specific instructions of that kind
ever being given on an assignment of this type, because--again--as I
said, with the manpower that was assigned and the crowd they had to
control, that the officer had all he could take care of in maintaining
crowd control of the people on the streets and watching the crowd there.
I am talking about the men that were assigned for these specific
assignments here. I assume that some instructions have been given to
some members of the CID, the criminal investigation division, and to
the men from the special service bureau, and the men specifically
assigned to security duties instead of traffic duties. It would be my
assumption that this was a part of the assignments given.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Would the duties of the men at the intersections be so
burdensome prior to the time that the motorcade actually arrived that
they couldn't keep their eyes on the windows and other places such as
that? In other words, did they have anything to do of substance until
shortly before the motorcade arrived?
Captain LAWRENCE. They had everything they could do to take care
of the crowds when I came through there before the President's
motorcade--keeping the crowds back, in fact, when I was listening
on channel 2 I heard Inspector Sawyer asking for more help for men
downtown to try to keep the crowds back so the motorcade could get
through there.
Mr. GRIFFIN. When an officer is at an intersection for the purpose
of crowd control, do his problems begin as soon as the crowd begins
to form, regardless of how long it is before the President is going
to arrive, or does the problem only become a substantial one when he
realizes the President is 5 minutes away?
Captain LAWRENCE. I think when he first goes on assignment, that's when
he's prepared to handle the crowd.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, is there a danger that the crowd is going to move
out into the street at any point as soon as it gets large enough where
the people start to push and shove?
Captain LAWRENCE. This did happen in the downtown area and this was
substantially before the President's car actually arrived. This is why,
I believe, and I am assuming, because I was ahead of this motorcade,
but I heard Chief Curry ask these motorcycle officers that were way up
ahead to drop back, and some of them that were alongside and to the
rear of the President, to pull up alongside his car, and Chief Curry
had some of these motorcycle officers that were supposed to be about a
couple of blocks ahead of this motorcade, he asked them to drop back.
He asked the lead motorcycles that were supposed to be a half block
ahead of the escort--he asked them to drop back.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Well, is it fair to say that without specific
instructions, that an officer would not watch the windows of buildings?
He would not do it as a result of routine orders that prevail in the
police department and his general training.
Captain LAWRENCE. I would say in a case like this that an officer
should do this and this should be part of his responsibility on the
job, but I also have to say he was not given any specific instructions
to do that as far as buildings were concerned, but I'm talking about
the men assigned to this traffic assignment.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Are there any other specific instructions besides watching
the windows of buildings that, as a result of your experience on
November 22, you think should be given to police officers who have
traffic assignments?
Captain LAWRENCE. As a result of what happened on November 22, I
believe that where a Head of State, the President of the United States,
comes to Dallas and is in a motorcade or a parade, that the streets
should be barricaded or roped off and that officers--more officers than
were stationed be stationed along the route to control the crowd. I
mean, of course, this is looking back--as I told you before--there were
more people along the route--in fact, I was surprised--they had even
stopped their cars all along Stemmons Freeway.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Of course, we are trying to benefit from hindsight, when
I asked you if in looking back you could make some suggestions for the
future.
Captain LAWRENCE. That's right.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Could a police force the size of the Dallas police force
have found more officers to man the route?
Captain LAWRENCE. With a route as long as this, I doubt that they
could have, because some of these officers were given second and third
assignments and this motorcade route, as long as it was, was in my
opinion--this was too long of a motorcade route to give the proper
security, and our department wasn't big enough to handle an event--of
course, this is hindsight again--and an event like this with a route as
long as this to cover all of the cross streets, because we certainly
didn't cover all of the cross streets along the route except the
downtown area. We covered some of the main ones and there were other
streets that were not covered and the people themselves block the
streets for the motorcade.
Mr. GRIFFIN. You have with you here a list of the assignments you made
on November 22?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; I do.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Could you give that to us so we can mark it for
identification?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes, sir; would you mind me explaining a couple of
them?
Mr. GRIFFIN. No; not at all, if you think it is necessary.
Captain LAWRENCE. There were some changes made.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I am going to mark this as Capt. W. P. Lawrence
Deposition, July 24, 1964, Exhibit No. 2. Do you want to indicate what
clarification you would make in the assignments that are shown on
Exhibit No. 2?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; on the morning of November 22, the streets were
still wet and it was raining that morning and I talked to Asst. Chief
Batchelor about some of the motorcade assignments and he agreed with me
that no car, no motorcycle officer, should pass the President's car,
so we reassigned some officers indicated by asterisks on this detail
to cover the Stemmons Freeway traffic lanes to the rear of the escort
to prevent any vehicles from passing the presidental party, and that's
shown on the detail. Also, as I say--you can see the asterisks here
beside these officers and they were changed. Also, I felt that because
of the curvature of Stemmons Freeway and these people coming over a
crest and around a curve--that they would be on top of these motorcycle
officers and would not have warning enough. I discussed placing a
couple of the three-wheel motorcycle officers up further on Stemmons
Expressway, which would be back farther south, so that when they saw
from the top of Stemmons Expressway this motorcade approaching, they
could start stopping the traffic before it came around the curve and
down the hill because of the speed. For this reason, two officers were
stationed--their assignment was changed and they were placed--they were
stationed up on Stemmons Freeway for the purpose of starting to stop
this traffic themselves.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Is there anything else on there that you think should be
clarified?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; on the evening--I'm going back a day, but on the
evening of November 21, I was handed a list of additional men from the
Third Patrol Platoon to work traffic assignments. Here is the list--you
can have this list.
Mr. GRIFFIN. All right.
Captain LAWRENCE. This necessitated me making some changes so that
the three-wheel motorcycle officers could be taken off of corner
assignments and placed on patrol assignments in the downtown area, and
those assignments, or some of those patrol assignments are shown on the
last page of this.
Mr. GRIFFIN. All right.
Captain LAWRENCE. The changes you can see were made in ink. There was
one particular assignment, on page 3, that we had eliminated because we
understood that the Highland Park Police would cover Lemmon and Loma
Alto and then when these additional men were given to us, two officers
were placed back on this assignment.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I have marked the additional list of 19 men, which list
you received on November 22, as Capt. P. W. Lawrence, July 24, 1964,
Exhibit No. 3. Let me ask you some specific questions about it--about
the men who were stationed in the area of Dealey Plaza. Did you
question any of these men after the President was shot to determine
whether or not they had seen anyone in the windows of the Texas School
Book Depository Building?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; however, when I questioned the men--the men had
already been--one man that I questioned had already been questioned
by Mr. Sorrels and this would be Officer J. E. Murphy and two other
men that I questioned were Officers J. W. Foster and J. C. White. I
questioned J. W. Foster regarding the men that were alongside him on
the overpass, on the triple underpass where the President was to go.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you question Sergeant Harkness?
Captain LAWRENCE. No; I didn't question Sergeant Harkness.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you question Officer King--W. K. King?
Captain LAWRENCE. No.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you question Officer J. B. Allen?
Captain LAWRENCE. No.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you question Officer W. H. Denham?
Captain LAWRENCE. No.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Or Officer W. E. Barnett?
Captain LAWRENCE. No.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Officer J. M. Smith?
Captain LAWRENCE. No; I did not.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Officer E. L. Smith?
Captain LAWRENCE. No; I did not.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Do you know of anyone in the police department who
questioned those men after the assassination to determine whether
or not they had been observing the windows of the Texas School Book
Depository Building and had seen anybody in those buildings?
Captain LAWRENCE. I know that all of these men have been questioned and
that they were calling all of these men to be questioned and that this
investigation was being handled by the Secret Service, and this is one
reason why I did not question these men.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Have you received any information that any of these men
did see anybody at the windows of the Texas School Book Depository
Building, particularly on the sixth floor?
Captain LAWRENCE. I have never received any information from any of
these men that they saw anybody up there.
Mr. GRIFFIN. You have answered that you did not conduct an
investigation of these men and that you thought the Secret Service did;
let me ask the further question--has the police department conducted an
investigation of these men who were at the intersections of Main and
Houston and Elm and Houston?
Captain LAWRENCE. To my knowledge, they were--there was an
investigation requested.
Mr. GRIFFIN. By the police department?
Captain LAWRENCE. By the police department--that reports were requested
from these men, by the supervisory officers, but--and by the inspectors
and the deputy chiefs--but I was not given any such assignment.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Let me turn to the movement of Lee Harvey Oswald and ask
you when did you first receive instructions as to the moving of Lee
Harvey Oswald to the county jail?
Captain LAWRENCE. I received no original instructions on the movement
of Lee Harvey Oswald. I was scheduled to be off on Saturday and Sunday.
These were my days off. On Saturday at approximately 10 a.m., I came
down in civilian clothes and I observed a large crowd of people around
the county courthouse and I had knowledge from what I had heard on
television and I had seen on television and heard on the radio that
charges had already been filed against Lee Harvey Oswald, so it was
my assumption that he would be transferred to the county jail, but I
had no knowledge of it; and seeing this large crowd gathering down at
this part of town, I immediately called the traffic office and started
trying to contact Sergeant Harkness and finally got him down there and
told him to get some other traffic officers down there and I remained
down at this location until approximately 6:30 p.m. when Captain
Thompson came on duty. While down there and during the afternoon, I
noticed there was a large crowd gathered and there seemed to be a need
for barricades or ropes or something to keep these people behind these
ropes and across the street from the county jail, and I called Chief
Batchelor's office, and Officer Art Hammett answered the phone and I
told Art Hammett there was a large crowd down there, and this was early
in the afternoon--I would say about 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon on
Saturday--and there was a large crowd there and I believe that ropes or
barricades were necessary to keep these people out of the streets and
across the street at Dealey Plaza, and Hammett said he would try to get
in touch with Chief Batchelor and let me know.
On Saturday afternoon I got a call on the radio, and, of course, it
was a three-wheel motorcycle with the radio going, and Officer Hammett
asked me and I am assuming he was in the dispatcher's office at the
time, and he asked me if the ropes that I requested were to block off
the street for motor vehicle traffic and I told him it was not, and he
said, "Well, permission is granted." Then, we borrowed some rope from
the sheriff's office and we roped off this block across the street from
the county jail. We also got some barricades from Elm and Houston where
a--where part of the street had been blocked off there anyway, and we
blocked off the sidewalks on the county jail side--at Houston and Elm
Street, and Main Street, and the only persons we allowed in this area
were television, radio, and news media people.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you take any further precautions on Sunday?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes. By the way, when Captain Thompson came on, I
contacted him by radio and asked him to meet me down there and he
relieved me and our solo motorcycle detail was placed down there in
the evening. When I got home I called Chief Lunday at home and I told
him--that's when I heard that the transfer was supposed to be made
the following morning, that there would be a need for some more men
down there and that I would be down there and I would get as many
men as I could on the location. So on Sunday morning I arrived down
there and I'm going to guess at the time as approximately 8 a.m. I
first went by the office and I picked up some police reserves in my
car and took about four of them down there with me, and then I had
some motorcycle officers that were not already stationed--upstairs on
the third floor--and I had them meet me down there too. It was still
roped off and the crowds started gathering and I personally instructed
Sergeant Steigel to go down there and Sergeant Bellah, and most of
the men down there, I personally instructed them that when Oswald was
brought in down there, that they were not to look at Oswald, that
they were to face the crowd and they were not to worry about anything
but keeping their eyes on that crowd, because I estimated there were
approximately 500 people down there at that time, and these officers
were specifically instructed on that. And when Chief Lunday showed
up at approximately--sometime between 9:30 and 10, he showed up--he
arrived in civilian clothes--he saw that there was a large crowd there
too and we were concerned about the security of Oswald, and I expressed
this opinion to Chief Lunday and Lieutenant Southard also. There with
me at the time too was Captain Solomon, who also showed up down there.
The only time that I knew that anything had happened was when Sheriff
Bill Decker came out of his office and came by the cameras there where
the vehicle was supposed to enter the county jail entrance there, and
he waved for me to come over to him. I was across the street at that
time and he told me that Oswald had been shot in the basement of the
city hall. So, after this was confirmed, we then sent some more men to
Parkland Hospital to seal it off.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you have anything to do with the stationing of men
along the route that it was expected that Oswald was to follow?
Captain LAWRENCE. No; I didn't.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did you ever receive any specific instructions from any of
your superiors on stationing your men around Dealey Plaza or the county
jail or did the precautions that you took--were they undertaken on your
own initiative?
Captain LAWRENCE. I would say that I notified Chief Lunday of the
situation down there and then he told me to go ahead and station these
men there.
Mr. GRIFFIN. But there never was any independent effort made by your
superior officers to contact you prior to the move and say, "Captain
Lawrence, we are going to move Oswald at such and such a time, or in
such and such a way, and take such and such precautions"?
Captain LAWRENCE. No; I believe though that Chief Lunday was in
communication with headquarters because he went immediately after
he talked to Lieutenant Southard and I and saw this crowd too, he
immediately went inside the sheriff's office and it is my assumption
that he had communication with them because he came out a little later
and told me about the plans--how Oswald was to be brought down and that
he would not be brought down in the armored truck, but that the armored
truck would come Elm Street and would make a left turn off of Elm, and
when it did, this car with the detectives in it would come first and
the car with Oswald would turn into the ramp there at the county jail
and they would lower the gates immediately. At that time Chief Lunday
was in charge down there.
Mr. GRIFFIN. How long were you informed of this plan to bring Oswald in
a police car; how long before you actually knew Oswald was shot did you
learn about that plan?
Captain LAWRENCE. I would say approximately 10 minutes--I'm just
guessing--I know it was just shortly after that that I heard he was
shot.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Were you ever informed that the armored car had arrived at
the police station?
Captain LAWRENCE. No; I had no knowledge of an armored car until Chief
Lunday told me about it and at the same time he was telling me about
it, a sergeant arrived down there from the radio patrol and was giving
Chief Lunday some information to the same effect, that the armored car
was going to be used as a decoy.
Mr. GRIFFIN. But maybe I didn't make my question clear--was any
information ever passed on to the people at the county jail that the
decoy car had arrived in the city basement?
Captain LAWRENCE. Not to my knowledge. I was outside all the time.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I think we have pretty well covered everything here. I'm
going to ask you if you will sign Exhibit No. 1 and also Exhibits Nos.
2 and 3.
Captain LAWRENCE. This man did not show up and he was given some other
assignment.
Mr. GRIFFIN. That is the No. 3 man there on that list?
Captain LAWRENCE. Yes; he was given some other assignment.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Let me mark one more paper here--this is a copy of a
letter that you wrote.
Captain LAWRENCE. That's a copy of a letter that I wrote that you
probably have in the file there.
Mr. GRIFFIN. This is a letter you wrote to Chief Curry on July 15
detailing what you did on November 22, and I am going to mark it Capt.
P. W. Lawrence Deposition, July 24, 1964, Exhibit No. 4, and I will
ask you if you will sign that up at the top also. Do you have anything
else, captain, you would like to add?
Captain LAWRENCE. Oh, I guess this probably has been mentioned to you
before--there are some people that were down there--Captain Solomon
and I discussed the fact that we were rather shocked at the crowd that
was down there when they announced that Oswald--when they heard that
Oswald had been shot--about them cheering, but this was an actual fact,
and I thought it was a terrible thing myself, it broke me up too, this
killing of the President, but as I said, this was a real shock that
these people cheered like this. This just showed the attitude of some
of them that were down there. I can't think of anything else.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I want to thank you for coming here and taking this time.
All of the members of your department who have been here have really
given very generously of their time and cooperated and we are all very
appreciative of it.
Captain LAWRENCE. I did learn of some new security measures from
this unfortunate experience. I refer to the manner in which the
Secret Service handled the transfer of President Johnson and his
party from Parkland Hospital, the plans for this transfer in unmarked
cars, the solo escorts and positioning of the vehicles en route to
Love Field. First, the Secret Service personnel made arrangements
for three unmarked cars to be placed in a "ready" position at the
rear of Parkland without the knowledge of the news media or other
persons. Three cars were so arranged. The first car was Chief Curry's
unmarked car, the second car was my unmarked car, and the third car
was Inspector Putnam's unmarked car. I was instructed to have two solo
officers ready to go but not to give them their destination until we
started to leave--these instructions were from the Secret Service.
When President Johnson came out of the hospital with his party he was
immediately taken to Chief Curry's lead vehicle. Other White House
and Secret Service personnel got in my car, as they did in Inspector
Putnam's car. I instructed the solo officers to escort us to Love
Field. As we left Parkland Hospital the solo officers started using
their sirens and shortly thereafter Chief Curry came on the police
radio and requested them to cut the sirens off. Chief Curry repeated
these instructions about three or four times and after several blocks
the officers cut off their sirens. One of the Secret Service men in
my vehicle instructed me as to how to position my vehicle to the
rear of Chief Curry's car and I also noticed in the rear view mirror
that Inspector Putnam's vehicle was positioned in such a way that it
would be difficult for any other car to overtake this escort. After
the solo motorcycle officers cut off their sirens they went ahead and
stopped traffic at various intersections so that it was not necessary
for any of the cars in President Johnson's party to stop. I was quite
impressed with the quick efficient planning of the Secret Service in
getting the President and his party safely to the airport and the
security precautions taken while en route to Love Field. You know--this
thing--something like this, this just really hits you. You are so busy
you don't know it, but it just finally really hits you down deep.
Mr. GRIFFIN. There's not very much I guess really that can be
said--it's one of these events that is so shocking in our lifetime.
Captain LAWRENCE. Too--Chief Curry was really torn up about it--out at
Parkland Hospital he held himself real good--I guess we all were.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Yes; we all were. Thank you very much for coming.
Captain LAWRENCE. Thank you.