CHAPTER XI

The year 1796 found the Republic in sorry plight. The treasury was

empty, labor unemployed, business at a standstill. So much paper

money, genuine and counterfeit, had been issued, that it almost took a

cord of assignats to pay for a cord of wood. Landlords who had leased

houses before the Revolution, and who had now to accept pay in paper,

could hardly buy a pullet with a year’s rental of a house. There was

famine, stagnation, maladministration. The hope of the Republic was its

armies. Drawn from the bosom of the aroused people at the time when

revolutionary ardor was at its height, the soldiers, after three years

of service, were veterans who were still devoted to republican ideals.

Great victories had given them confidence, and they only needed proper

equipment and proper direction to accomplish still greater results. At

the end of 1795, Moreau commanded the army of the Rhine, Jourdan that

of the Sambre and Meuse, Hoche that of the West. Schérer commanded the

Army of Italy, where, on November 24, 1795, he beat the Austrians and

Sardinians in the battle of Loano. He did not follow up his victory,

however, and the Directory complained of him. On his part he complained

of the Directory. They sent him no money with which to pay his troops,

no clothing for them, and only bread to feed them on. The commissary

was corrupt; and the Directory, which was corrupt, winked at the

robbery of the troops by thievish contractors. Schérer, discouraged,

wished to resign. It was to this ill-fed, scantily clothed, unpaid, and

discouraged army that Napoleon was sent; and it was this army which he

thrilled with a trumpet-like proclamation.

“Soldiers! You are naked, badly fed. The government owes you much; it

can give you nothing. Your endurance, and the courage you have shown,

do you credit, but gain you no advantage, get you no glory. I will lead

you into the most fertile plains in the world. Rich provinces, great

cities, will be in your power; and there you will find honor, glory,

and riches. Soldiers of Italy, can you be found wanting in courage?”

The army was electrified by this brief address, which touched

masterfully the chords most likely to respond. Courage, pride,

patriotism, and cupidity were all invoked and aroused. For the first

time the soldiers of the Revolution were tempted with the promise of

the loot of the vanquished. “Italy is the richest land in the world;

let us go and despoil it.” Here, indeed, was the beginning of a new

chapter in the history of republican France.

[Illustration: NAPOLEON

From a print in the collection of Mr. W. C. Crane. The

original engraving by G. Fiesinger, after a miniature by

Jean-Baptiste-Paulin Guérin. Deposited in the National Library,

Paris, 1799.]

Not without a purpose did Napoleon so word his proclamation. There had

been an understanding between himself and the Directory that his army

must be self-sustaining; he must forage on the enemy as did Wallenstein

in the Thirty Years’ War. The government had exerted itself to the

utmost for Napoleon, and had supplied him with a small sum of specie

and good bills; but, this done, he understood that the Directors could

do no more. As rapidly as possible he put his army in marching order,

and then marched. From the defensive attitude in which Schérer had

left it, he passed at once to the offensive. The plan of campaign

which Napoleon, the year before, had drawn up for the revolutionary

committee, and which, when forwarded to the army, Kellermann had

pronounced “the dream of a madman,” was about to be inaugurated by the

lunatic himself.

The generals of division in the Army of Italy were older men, older

officers than Napoleon, and they resented his appointment. Masséna,

Augereau, Sérurier, Laharpe, Kilmaine, Cervoni, but especially the two

first, murmured discontentedly, calling Napoleon, “one of Barras’s

favorites,” a “mere street general,” a “dreamer” who had “never been in

action.”

Napoleon, aware of this feeling, adopted the wisest course. He drew

around himself the line of ceremony, repelled with steady look all

inclination toward familiarity, abruptly cut short those who ventured

to give advice, adopted a stern, imperative, distant manner, took the

earliest opportunity of showing his absolute self-confidence and his

superiority, indulged in no levity or dissipation, and issued his

orders in a tone so laconic and authoritative that, after his first

formal interview with his division commanders at Albenga, his power

over them was established. On leaving the tent of the new chief,

Augereau remarked to Masséna, “That little ---- of a general frightened

me,” and Masséna confessed to the same experience.

The military plans of the Directory, emanating from such men as

Carnot and Bonaparte, were bold and practical. Austria, which had

invaded France from the Rhine, was to be held in check there by

Moreau and Jourdan at the same time that she was assailed by way of

Italy. The three armies of the republic, operating far apart, were to

coöperate in general design, and were finally to converge upon Vienna.

Incidentally to this plan of campaign, Genoa was to be brought to terms

for violations of neutrality; the Pope was to be punished for his

constant encouragement to La Vendée and the royalists generally; and

also because he had screened the assassins of the French ambassador,

Basseville. Sardinia (whose king was father-in-law to the Counts of

Provence and Artois, afterward respectively Louis XVIII. and Charles

X.) was to be humbled for its alliance with Austria against France.

The armies opposed to Napoleon were commanded by old men, excellent

officers so long as war was conducted with a sword in one hand and a

book of etiquette in the other. Opposed to a man like Napoleon, who

set all rules at naught, and put into practice a new system, they were

sadly outclassed and bewildered.

Napoleon intended to force his way into Italy at the point where the

Alps and the Apennines join. From Savona on the Mediterranean to Cairo

it is about nine miles by a road practicable for artillery. From Cairo

carriage roads led into Italy. At no other point could the country be

entered save by crossing lofty mountains. Therefore Napoleon’s plan

was to turn the Alps instead of crossing them, and to enter Piedmont

through the pass of Cadibona.

Putting his troops in motion, he threw forward toward Genoa a

detachment under Laharpe. The Austrian commander, thinking that

Bonaparte’s plan was to seize Genoa, divided his forces into three

bodies,--the Sardinians on the right at Ceva, the centre under

D’Argenteau marching toward Montenotte, and the right under Beaulieu

himself moved from Novi upon Voltri, a town within ten miles of Genoa.

Between these three divisions there was no connection; and, on account

of the mountainous country, it was difficult for them to communicate

with each other, or be concentrated.

On April 10, 1796, Beaulieu attacked Cervoni, leading the van of the

French in their march toward Genoa, and drove him.

But D’Argenteau, who had advanced on Montenotte, was less fortunate.

Colonel Rampon, who commanded twelve hundred Frenchmen at this point,

realized the immense importance of checking the Austrian advance,

to prevent it from falling upon the flank of Napoleon’s army as it

moved along the Corniche road. Throwing himself into the redoubt

of Montelegino, Rampon barred the way of the Austrians with heroic

gallantry. Three times he threw back the assault of the entire

Austrian-Sardinian division. During the combat he called upon his

little band to swear that they would die in the redoubt rather than

give it up, and the oath was taken with the greatest enthusiasm.

Had D’Argenteau continued his efforts, the oath-bound defenders would

probably have been exterminated, but he did not persevere. He drew off

his forces in the evening, to wait till next morning, and then renew

the attack. Morning came, but so did Napoleon. D’Argenteau looked

around him, and lo! he was a lost man. Three French divisions enveloped

the one division of their foe, and to the discomfited Austrians was

left the dismal alternative of surrender or a desperate fight against

overwhelming odds. The battle was fought, and Napoleon won his first

individual and undivided triumph, the victory of Montenotte. The enemy

lost colors and cannon, a thousand slain, and two thousand prisoners.

Napoleon had kept the divisions of his army so skilfully placed

that each could support the other, and all could concentrate. Thus

he crushed the Austrian centre, which could get no support from its

two wings, and with his small force triumphed over the larger armies

opposed to him.

But in this his first campaign, Napoleon’s tactics presented that weak

point which was in the end to be his ruin; he risked so much that one

slip in his combination was too likely to bring about a Waterloo.

Had Rampon been merely an average officer, or had D’Argenteau been a

Rampon, or had the gallant twelve hundred been merely average soldiers,

the road through the pass at Montenotte would have been cleared, the

Austrians would have been on Napoleon’s flank, and only a miracle could

have saved him from disaster. But Napoleon was young, and luck was with

him: the time was far distant when he himself was to be angrily amazed

at seeing Fortune mock his best combinations, and trivial accidents

ruin his campaigns.

Swiftly following up his advantage, Napoleon pushed forward to Cairo,

to wedge his army in between the separated wings of the enemy. At Dego,

lower down the valley of the Bormida, in which the French were now

operating, were the rallying Austrians, guarding the road from Acqui

into Lombardy. To the left of the French were the Sardinians in the

gorges of Millesimo, blocking the route from Ceva into Piedmont. It was

necessary for Napoleon to strike the enemy at both points, drive them

farther apart, so that he might combat each in detail.

On April 13 the French moved forward, Augereau to the attack of the

Sardinians, Masséna and Laharpe against the Austrians. The Sardinians

were strongly posted on high ground, but the onset of the French

carried all before it. So impetuous had been the rush of Augereau, that

one of the divisions of the enemy under General Provera was cut off.

That brave soldier threw himself into the old castle of Cossario, and

could not be dislodged. Napoleon in person came up and directed three

separate assaults, which were heavily repulsed. Provera was then left

in possession, the castle blockaded, and the strength of the French

reserved for the remaining divisions of the Sardinian army. On the

next day (April 14) General Colli, commander-in-chief of the Sardinian

army, made every effort to relieve Provera, but was repulsed and driven

back upon Ceva, farther than ever from the Austrians. Provera then

surrendered.

While the battle raged at Millesimo, Laharpe had crossed the Bormida,

his troops wading up to their waists, and attacked the Austrian

flank and rear at Dego; at the same time Masséna struck the line of

communication between the two armies on the heights of Biastro. Both

attacks succeeded; and as Colli retreated on Turin, Beaulieu drew off

toward Milan.

On the morning after these victories a fresh Austrian division, which

had come from Voltri on the seacoast to join the main army, reached

Dego, and drove out the few French they found there. The appearance

of this force in his rear gave Napoleon a surprise, and a feeling of

alarm ran through his army. He immediately marched upon the town, and

gave battle. The French were twice beaten off. A third charge led by

Lanusse, waving his hat on the point of his sword, carried all before

it.

For his gallantry in this action, Lanusse was made brigadier general on

the recommendation of Napoleon, under whose eyes the splendid charge

had been made. Lieutenant Colonel Lannes distinguished himself greatly

also, and Napoleon made him colonel on the field.

The result of these battles were nine thousand of the enemy taken

prisoners, other thousands killed, besides thirty cannon taken, and

a great quantity of baggage. Napoleon was now master of the valley

of the Bormida, and of all the roads into Italy. It was his duty,

for Carnot had so ordered, to leave the Sardinians and pursue the

Austrians. He took just the opposite course. Turning to his left, he

entered the gorges of Millesimo, and followed the road to Piedmont.

Laharpe’s division was left to watch the Austrians. On April 28 the

French were in full march upon Mondovi. When they reached the height of

Mount Lemota, “the richest provinces in the world” lay beneath them,

stretching from the foot of the height as far as eye could reach. The

troops, so wonderfully led and so daringly fought, were in raptures

with themselves and their chief.

As they looked down upon the lovely Italian plains, dotted with towns

and silvered with rivers, they broke into enthusiastic cheers for the

young Napoleon. For him and for them it was a proud moment. “Hannibal

forced the Alps; we have turned them.”

Passing the Tanaro, the French entered the plains, and for the first

time cavalry was in demand. On April 22 the Sardinians made a stubborn

fight at Mondovi. They had repulsed Sérurier with heavy loss on the

day before; but now Sérurier was joined by Masséna and the Sardinians

routed. The Piedmontese cavalry, however, turned upon the French

horse, which had pursued too far, and General Stengel, its commander,

was killed. Murat, at the head of three regiments, dashed against

the Sardinian cavalry with such reckless courage that they broke.

The Sardinians, defeated at all points, lost three thousand, slain

or prisoners, eight cannon, ten stand of colors. Colli requested an

armistice which Napoleon refused to grant. The French continued their

advance upon Turin. The king of Sardinia, Amadeus, wished to prolong

the struggle; but his courtiers clamored for peace, and prevailed.

Overtures were made, Napoleon gladly accepted. Such terror had Napoleon

inspired by his rapid and brilliant victories that he practically

dictated his own terms to the king. The “Keys of the Alps,” Coni and

Tortona, besides Alessandria and other fortresses, were surrendered to

him pending negotiations, and the immense magazines they contained were

appropriated to the use of the French army. The Sardinian army was to

be retired from the field, and the roads of Piedmont were to be opened

to the French. The Austrian alliance should cease, and the royalist

émigrés from France should be expelled. This armistice was signed April

29, 1796. As to a definitive peace, plenipotentiaries were to be sent

at once to Paris to conclude it.

Napoleon had violated both the letter and the spirit of his

instructions in virtually making peace with the king of Sardinia. The

Directory, many republicans in France, and many in the army maintained

that Amadeus, a kinsman of the Bourbons, should have been dethroned,

and his country revolutionized. Augereau and others boldly declared

their disapproval of Napoleon’s course. He himself was serenely certain

that he had done the proper thing, and he gave himself no concern about

the grumblers.

To Paris he sent his brilliant cavalry-officer, Murat, with twenty-one

flags taken from the enemy. To his troops he issued a stirring address,

recounting their great achievements, and inspiring them to still

greater efforts.

With hands freed, Napoleon turned upon the Austrians. Deceiving them as

to the point at which he would cross the Po, they prepared for him at

one place while he dashed at another. While Beaulieu waited at Valenza,

Napoleon was crossing at Placenza, May 7, 1796. On the next day an

Austrian division arrived at Fombio, a league from Placenza. Napoleon

attacked and routed it, taking two thousand prisoners and all their

cannon. Beaulieu put his troops in motion, hoping to catch the French

in the act of crossing the river.

As the Austrians, preceded by a regiment of cavalry, approached,

they struck the advance posts of Laharpe. That general rode forward

to reconnoitre, and, returning by a different road, was fired upon

and killed by his own troops, in almost precisely the same manner

as the great Confederate soldier, Stonewall Jackson, was slain at

Chancellorsville.

The Austrians, realizing that they were too late, drew off toward Lodi.

On May 10, Napoleon overtook them there. The town was on that side of

the river Adda on which were the French, and Napoleon drove out the

small detachment of Austrians which held it.

On the opposite side of the river Beaulieu had stationed twelve

thousand infantry, two thousand horse, and twenty cannon to dispute

the passage. A single wooden bridge, which the retreating Austrians

had not had time to burn, spanned the river. In the face of an army

sixteen thousand strong, and twenty pieces of artillery ready to rain

a torrent of iron on the bridge, Napoleon determined to pass. Behind

the walls of the town of Lodi the French army was sheltered. Napoleon,

under fire, went out to the bank of the river to explore the ground and

form his plan. Returning, he selected six thousand grenadiers, and to

these he spoke brief words of praise and encouragement, holding them

ready, screened behind the houses of the town, to dash for the bridge

at the word. But he had also sent his cavalry up the stream to find a

ford to cross, and to come upon the Austrian flank. Meanwhile his own

artillery rained a hail of deadly missiles upon the Austrian position,

making it impossible for them to approach the bridge. The anxious

eyes of Napoleon at last saw that his cavalry had forded the river,

and were turning the Austrians’ flank. Quick as a flash the word went

to the waiting grenadiers, and with a shout of “Live the Republic,”

they ran for the bridge. A terrific fire from the Austrian batteries

played upon the advancing column, and the effect was so deadly that it

hesitated, wavered, seemed about to break. The French generals sprang

to the front,--Napoleon, Lannes, Masséna, Berthier, Cervoni,--rallied

the column, and carried it over the bridge. Lannes was the first man

across, Napoleon the second. The Austrian gunners were bayoneted before

the infantry could come to their support. In a few minutes the Austrian

army was routed.

The moral effect of this victory, “the terrible passage of the bridge

of Lodi,” as Napoleon himself called it, was tremendous. Beaulieu

afterward told Graham that had Napoleon pushed on, he might have taken

Mantua without difficulty--no preparations for its defence having then

been made. The Austrians lost heart, uncovered Milan in their retreat;

and, five days after the battle, Napoleon entered the Lombard capital,

under a triumphal arch and amid thousands of admiring Italians.

It was after this battle that some of the soldiers got together and

gave Napoleon the name of the “Little Corporal,” an affectionate

nickname which clung to him, in the army, throughout his career. His

personal bravery at Lodi, and his readiness to share the danger, made

a profound impression on his troops, and when he next appeared he was

greeted with shouts of “Live the Little Corporal.”

Napoleon asked a Hungarian prisoner, an old officer, what he now

thought of the war. The prisoner, not knowing that Napoleon himself

was the questioner, replied: “There is no understanding it at all. You

French have a young general who knows nothing about the rules of war.

To-day he is in your front, to-morrow in the rear. Now he is on your

left, and then on your right. One does not know where to place one’s

self. Such violation of the rules is intolerable.”

Upon the victor himself Lodi made a lasting impression; it was the

spark, as he said afterward, “which kindled a great ambition.” Already

Napoleon had begun to levy contributions and to seize precious works

of art. The Duke of Parma, pleading for peace and protection, had been

required to pay $400,000, to furnish sixteen hundred horses and large

quantities of provisions. His gallery was stripped of twenty of its

best paintings, one of which was the “Jerome” of Correggio. The Duke

offered $200,000 to redeem this painting, but Napoleon refused. The

offence which this duke had committed was his adhesion to the coalition

against France, and his contributing three thousand soldiers to aid in

the glorious work of maintaining feudalism.

In France the effect of Napoleon’s victories upon the excitable,

glory-loving people was prodigious. His name was on every tongue.

Crowds gathered around the bulletins, and the streets rang with

acclamations. Murat and Junot, bringing to Paris the captured

colors, were given enthusiastic ovations by government and people.

But the Directors began to be uneasy. They would have been more or

less than human had they relished the autocratic manner in which

Napoleon behaved. He had ignored their plans and their instructions.

He had developed an imperiousness which brooked no control. His fame

was dwarfing all others to an extent which gave rise to unpleasant

forebodings. All things considered, the Directors thought it would be

a good idea to divide the Italian command. To that effect they wrote

Napoleon. In reply he offered to resign. A partner he would not have:

he must be chief, or nothing. The Directors dared not make such an

issue with him at a time when all France was in raptures over his

triumphs; and they yielded.

Napoleon: A Sketch of His Life, Character, Struggles, and Achievements · 第 11 / 51 章