AMPLIFICATION AND EXTENUATION ARE NOT COMMON PLACES. ENTHYMEMES, BY
WHICH ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED, ARE THE SAME WITH THOSE BY WHICH THE
MATTER IN QUESTION IS PROVED OR DISPROVED. OBJECTIONS ARE NOT
ENTHYMEMES.
The first, that _amplification_ and _extenuation_ are not _common
places_, appears by this, that amplification and extenuation do prove a
fact to be _great_ or _little_; and are therefore enthymemes to be
_drawn from_ common places, and therefore are not the _places_
themselves.
The second, that enthymemes, by which arguments are answered, are of the
same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is
manifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was proved by
the other.
The third, that an _objection_ is no _enthymeme_, is apparent by this,
that an _objection_ is no more but an _opinion_, _example_, or other
_instance_, produced to make appear that the adversary’s argument does
not conclude.
Thus much of _examples_, _sentences_, _enthymemes_, and generally of all
things that belong to _argumentation_; from what _places_ they may be
drawn or answered.
There remain _elocution_ and _disposition_ to be spoken of in the next
book.
BOOK III.
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CHAPTER I.
OF THE ORIGINAL OF ELOCUTION AND PRONUNCIATION.
Three things being necessary to an oration, namely _proof_, _elocution_,
and _disposition_; we have done with the first, and shall speak of the
other two in that which follows.
As for _action_ or _pronunciation_, so much as is necessary for an
orator may be fetched out of the book of the _Art of Poetry_, in which
we have treated of the _action_ of the _stage_. For _tragedians_ were
the first that invented such _action_, and that but of late; and it
consisteth in governing well the _magnitude_, _tone_, and _measure_ of
the _voice_; a thing less subject to _art_, than is either _proof_ or
_elocution_.
And yet there have been rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as
serve for _poetry_. But _oratorical action_ has not been hitherto
reduced to _art_. And _orators_ in the beginning, when they saw that the
_poets_ in barren and feigned arguments nevertheless attained great
reputation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice or connexion of
words, fell into a style, by imitation of them, approaching to verse,
and made choice of words. But when the _poets_ changed their style, and
laid by all words that were not in common use, the _orators_ did the
same, and lighted at last upon words and a government of the voice and
measures proper to themselves.
Seeing therefore _pronunciation_ or _action_ are in some degree
necessary also for an _orator_, the precepts thereof are to be fetched
from the _Art of Poetry_.
In the meantime this may be one general rule. If the _words_, _tone_,
_greatness_ of the voice, _gesture_ of the body and countenance, seem to
proceed all from one passion, then it is well pronounced. Otherwise not.
For when there appear more passions than one at once, the mind of the
speaker appears unnatural and distracted. Otherwise, as the mind of the
speaker, so the mind of the hearer always.
==========
CHAPTER II.
OF THE CHOICE OF WORDS AND EPITHETS.
The virtues of a _word_ are two; the first, that it be _perspicuous_;
the second, that it be _decent_, that is, neither _above_ nor _below_
the thing signified, or, neither too humble nor too fine.
_Perspicuous_ are all words that be _proper_.
_Fine_ words are those, that are _borrowed_, or _translated_ from other
significations; of which in the _Art of Poetry_.
The reason why _borrowed_ words please, is this. Men are affected with
_words_, as they are with _men_; admiring in both that which is
_foreign_ and _new_.
To make a _poem_ graceful, many things help; but few an _oration_. For
to a _poet_ it sufficeth, with what _words_ he can, to set out his
_poem_. But an _orator_ must not only do that, but also seem not to do
it: for else he will be thought to speak unnaturally, and not as he
thinks; and thereby be the less believed; whereas _belief_ is the scope
of his oration.
The _words_ that an _orator_ ought to use are of three sorts; _proper_,
such as are _received_, and _metaphors_.
_Words_ taken from foreign languages, words compounded, and words new
coined, are seldom to be used.
_Synonymes_ belong to _poets_, and _equivocal_ words to _sophisters_.
An orator if he use _proper_ words, and _received_ and _good metaphors_,
shall both make his oration _beautiful_, and not seem to intend it; and
shall speak _perspicuously_. For in a _metaphor_ alone there is
_perspicuity_, _novity_, and _sweetness_.
Concerning _metaphors_ the rules are these:
1. He that will make the best of a thing, let him draw his _metaphor_
from somewhat that is better. As for example, let him call a _crime_ an
_error_. On the other side, when he would make the worst of it, let him
draw his _metaphor_ from somewhat worse; as, calling _error_, _crime_.
2. A _metaphor_ ought not to be so far-fetched, as that the similitude
may not easily appear.
3. A _metaphor_ ought to be drawn from the noblest things; as the
_poets_ do, that choose rather to say _rosy-fingered_, than
_red-fingered Aurora_.
In like manner the rule of _epithets_ is, that he that will adorn,
should use those of the better sort; and he that will disgrace, should
use those of the worse. As Simonides being to write an _ode_ in honour
of the victory gotten in a course by certain mules, being not well paid,
called them by their name, Ἡμιόνους, that signifies their propinquity to
asses: but having received a greater reward, styles them the _sons of
swift-footed coursers_.
==========
CHAPTER III.
OF THE THINGS THAT MAKE AN ORATION FLAT.
The things that make an oration _flat_ or _insipid_, are four:
1. _Words compounded._ And yet a man may compound a word, when the
composition is necessary for want of a simple word, and easy, and seldom
used.
2. _Foreign words._ As for example, such as are newly derived from the
Latin; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are
foreign in another language: and yet these may be used, so it be
moderately.
3. _Long_, _impertinent_, and _often epithets_.
4. _Metaphors indecent_ and _obscure_. _Obscure_ they are, when they are
far-fetched. _Indecent_, when they are _ridiculous_, as in _comedies_;
or _too grave_, as in _tragedies_.
==========
CHAPTER IV.
OF A SIMILITUDE.
A _similitude_ differs from a _metaphor_ only by such particles of
comparison as these; _as_; _even_ _as_; _so_; _even so_, &c.
A _similitude_ therefore is a _metaphor dilated_; and a _metaphor_ is a
_similitude contracted_ into one word.
A _similitude_ does well in an oration, so it be not too frequent; for
it is poetical.
An example of the _similitude_, is this of Pericles, that said in his
oration, _that the Bœotians were like so many oaks in a wood, that did
nothing but beat one another_.
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CHAPTER V.
OF THE PURITY OF LANGUAGE.
Four things are necessary to make language pure.
1. The right rendering of those _particles_, which some antecedent
_particle_ does require; as to a _not only_, a _not also_; and then they
are rendered right, when they are not suspended too long.
2. _The use of proper words_, rather than _circumlocutions_; unless
there be motive to make one do it of purpose.
3. That there be nothing of _double construction_, unless there be cause
to do it of purpose; as the prophets of the heathen, who speak in
general terms, to the end they may the better maintain the truth of
their prophecies; which is easier maintained in _generals_, than in
_particulars_. For it is easier to divine whether a number be _even_ or
_odd_, than _how many_; and that a thing _will be_, than _what_ it will
be.
4. Concordance of gender, number, and person; as not to say _him_ for
_her_, _man_ for _men_, _hath_ for _have_.
In sum, a man’s language ought to be easy for another to read,
pronounce, and point.
Besides, to divers _antecedents_, let divers _relatives_, or one common
to them all, be correspondent; as, he _saw_ the colour, he _heard_ the
sound; or he _perceived_ both colour and sound: but by no means, _he
heard or saw_ both.
Lastly, that which is to be interposed by _parenthesis_, let it be done
quickly: as, _I purposed, having spoken to him_ (_to this, and to this
purpose_), _afterward to be gone_. For to put it off thus; _I resolved,
after I had spoken to him, to be gone; but the subject of my speech was
to this and this purpose_; is vicious.
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CHAPTER VI.
OF THE AMPLITUDE AND TENUITY OF LANGUAGE.
A man shall add _amplitude_ or _dignity_ to his language, but by such
means as these.
1. By changing the _name_ with the _definition_, as occasion shall
serve. As, when the _name_ shall be indecent, by using the _definition_;
or contrary.
2. By _metaphors_.
3. By using the _plural_ number for the _singular_.
4. By _privative epithets_.
==========
CHAPTER VII.
OF THE CONVENIENCE OR DECENCY OF ELOCUTION.
_Elocutions_ are made _decent_:
1. By speaking _feelingly_; that is, with such passion as is fit for the
matter he is in; as, _angerly_ in matter of _injury_.
2. By speaking as becomes the _person_ of the _speaker_; as for a
_gentleman_ to speak _eruditely_.
3. By speaking _proportionably_ to the matter; as of _great affairs_ to
speak in a _high_, and of _mean_, in a _low_ style.
4. By abstaining from _compounded_, and from _out-landish words_: unless
a man speak _passionately_, and have already moved, and, as it were,
inebriated his hearers; or _ironically_.
It confers also to persuasion very much, to use these ordinary forms of
speaking; _all men know_, _it is confessed by all_, _no man will deny_,
and the like. For the hearer consents, surprised with the fear to be
esteemed the only ignorant man.
It is good also, having used a word that signifies more than the matter
requires, to abstain from the _pronunciation_ and _countenance_ that to
such a word belongs; that the disproportion between it and the matter
may the less appear. And when a man has said too much, it will show well
to correct himself: for he will get belief by seeming to consider what
he says. But in this a man must have a care not to be too precise in
showing of this consideration. For the ostentation of carefulness is an
argument oftentimes of lying; as may be observed in such as tell
particularities not easily observed, when they would be thought to speak
more precise truth than is required.
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CHAPTER VIII.
OF TWO SORTS OF STYLES.
There be two sorts of _styles_. The one _continued_, or to be
_comprehended at once_; the other _divided_, or _distinguished_ by
periods.
The first sort was in use with ancient writers; but is now out of date.
An example of this _style_ is in the history of Herodotus; wherein there
is no period till the end of the whole history.
In the other kind of _style_, that is distinguished by periods, a
_period_ is such a part as is perfect in itself; and has such length, as
may easily be comprehended by the understanding.
This latter kind is pleasant, the former unpleasant; because this
appears finite, the other infinite. In this the hearer has always
somewhat set out, and terminated to him; in the other he foresees no
end, and has nothing finished to him. This may easily be committed to
memory, because of the measure and cadence; which is the cause that
verses be easily remembered: the other not.
Every sentence ought to end with the _period_, and nothing to be
interposed.
_Period_ is either _simple_, or _divided into parts_.
_Simple_, is that which is _indivisible_; as, _I wonder you fear not
their ends, whose actions you imitate_.
A _period divided_, is that which not only has perfection and length
convenient for respiration, but also _parts_. As, _I wonder you are not
afraid of their ends; seeing you imitate their actions_: where in these
words, _I wonder you are not afraid of their ends_, is one _colon_ or
_part_; and in these, _seeing you imitate their actions_, another: and
both together make the period.
The _parts or members_, and _periods_, of speech, ought neither be _too
long_, nor _too short_.
_Too long_, are they which are produced beyond the expectation of the
hearer. _Too short_, are they that end before he expects it.
Those that be _too long_, leave the hearer behind; like him that walking
goes beyond the usual end of the walk, and thereby out-goes him that
walks with him.
They that be _too short_, make the hearer stumble; for when he looks far
before him, the end stops him before he be aware.
A _period_ that is _divided_ into parts, is either _divided only_; or
has also an _opposition_ of the _parts_ one to another.
_Divided only_ is such as this; _This the senate knows, the consul sees;
and yet the man lives_.
A _period_ with _opposition of parts_, called also _antithesis_, and the
parts _antitheta_, is when _contrary parts_ are put together, or also
joined by a third.
Contrary parts are put together as here; _The one has obtained glory,
the other riches; both by my benefit_.
_Antitheta_ are therefore acceptable, because not only the _parts_
appear the better for the _opposition_, but also for that they carry
with them a certain appearance of that kind of enthymeme, which leads to
_impossibility_.
_Parts_ or _members_ of a _period_, are said to be _equal_, when they
have altogether, or almost, equal number of syllables.
_Parts_ or _members_ of a _period_, are said to be _like_, when they
_begin_ or _end_ alike: and the more _similitudes_, and the greater
_equality_ there is of syllables, the more graceful is the period.
==========
CHAPTER IX.
OF THOSE THINGS THAT GRACE AN ORATION, AND MAKE IT DELIGHTFUL.
Forasmuch as there is nothing more delightful to a man, than to find
that he apprehends and learns easily; it necessarily follows, that those
_words_ are most _grateful_ to the ear, that make a man seem to see
before his eyes the things signified.
And therefore _foreign_ words are unpleasant, because _obscure_; and
_plain_ words, because _too manifest_, making us learn nothing new. But
_metaphors_ please; for they beget in us, by the _genus_, or by some
_common_ thing to that with another, a kind of _science_. As when an
_old man_ is called _stubble_; a man suddenly learns that he grows up,
flourisheth, and withers like grass, being put in mind of it by the
qualities common to _stubble_ and to _old men_.
That which a _metaphor_ does, a _similitude_ does the same; but with
less _grace_, because with more _prolixity_.
Such enthymemes are the most _graceful_, which neither are presently
very manifest, nor yet very hard to be understood; but are comprehended
while they are uttering, or presently after, though not understood
before.
The things that make a speech _graceful_, are these; _antitheta_,
_metaphors_, and _animation_.
Of _antitheta_ and _antithesis_ hath been spoken in the precedent
chapter.
Of _metaphors_, the most _graceful_ is that which is drawn from
_proportion_.
Aristotle, in the twelfth chapter of his _Poetry_, defines a _metaphor_
to be the translation of a name from one signification to another;
whereof he makes four kinds, 1. From the _general_ to the _particular_.
2. From the _particular_ to the _general_. 3. From one _particular_ to
another. 4. From _proportion_.
A metaphor from proportion is such as this; _A state without youth, is a
year without a spring_.
_Animation_ is that expression which makes us seem to see the thing
before our eyes. As he that said, _The Athenians poured out their city
into Sicily_; meaning, they sent thither the greatest army they could
make. And this is the greatest grace of an oration.
If therefore in the same sentence there concur both _metaphor_ and this
_animation_, and also _antithesis_, it cannot choose but be very
_graceful_.
That an oration is _graced_ by metaphor, animation, and antithesis, hath
been said: but _how_ it is graced, is to be said in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER X.
IN WHAT MANNER AN ORATION IS GRACED BY THE THINGS AFORESAID.
It is graced by _animation_, when the actions of living creatures are
attributed to things without life; as when the _sword_ is said to
_devour_.
Such _metaphors_ as these come into a man’s mind by the observation of
things that have similitude and proportion one to another. And the more
unlike and unproportionable the things be otherwise, the more _grace_
hath the _metaphor_.
A _metaphor_ without _animation_, adds _grace_ then, when the hearer
finds he learns somewhat by such use of the word.
Also _paradoxes_ are _graceful_, so men inwardly do believe them. For
they have in them somewhat like to those jests that are grounded upon
the similitude of words, which have usually one sense, and in the
present another; and somewhat like to those jests which are grounded
upon the deceiving of a man’s expectation.
And _paragrams_, that is, allusions of words, are graceful, if they be
well placed, and in periods not too long, and with _antithesis_. For by
these means the ambiguity is taken away.
And the more of these, namely, _metaphor_, _animation_, _antithesis_,
_equality of members_, a period hath, the more graceful it is.
_Similitudes_ grace an oration, when they contain also a _metaphor_.
And _proverbs_ are graceful, because they are _metaphors_, or
translations of words from one species to another.
And _hyperboles_, because they also are _metaphors_. But they are
youthful, and bewray vehemence; and are used with most grace by them
that be angry; and for that cause are not comely in old men.
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CHAPTER XI.
OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STYLE TO BE USED IN WRITING, AND THE STYLE
TO BE USED IN PLEADING.
The _style_ that should be _read_, ought to be more exact and accurate.
But the _style_ of a _pleader_, ought to be suited to action and
pronunciation.
Orations of them that _plead_, pass away with the hearing. But those
that are _written_, men carry about them, and are considered at leisure;
and consequently must endure to be sifted and examined.
_Written_ orations appear flat in _pleading_. And orations made for the
_bar_, when the action is away, appear in _reading_ insipid.
In _written_ orations repetition is justly condemned. But in
_pleadings_, by the help of action, and by some change in the _pleader_,
repetition becomes amplification.
In _written_ orations disjunctives do ill; as, _I came_, _I found him_,
_I asked him_: for they seem superfluous, and but one thing, because
they are not distinguished by action. But in _pleadings_ it is
amplification; because that which is but one thing, is made to seem
many.
Of _pleadings_, that which is _judicial_ ought to be more accurate than
that which is _before the people_.
And an oration _to the people_ ought to be more accommodate to action,
than a _judicial_.
And of _judicial_ orations, that ought to be more accurate, which is
uttered to _few_ judges; and that ought to be more accommodate to
action, which is uttered to _many_. As in a _picture_, the further he
stands off that beholds it, the less need there is that the colours be
fine; so in _orations_, the further the hearer stands off, the less need
there is for his oration to be elegant.
Therefore _demonstrative_ orations are most proper for _writing_, the
end whereof is to be _read_.
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CHAPTER XII.
OF THE PARTS OF AN ORATION, AND THEIR ORDER.
The _necessary_ parts of an oration are but two; _propositions_ and
_proof_; which are, as it were, the _problem_ and _demonstration_.
The _proposition_ is the explication or opening of the matter to be
_proved_. And _proof_ is the _demonstration_ of the matter _propounded_.
To these _necessary parts_ are sometimes added two other, the _proem_
and the _epilogue_; neither of which is any _proof_.
So that in some there be _four parts_ of an oration; the _proem_; the
_proposition_, or as others call it, the _narration_; the _proofs_,
which contain _confirmation_, _confutation_, _amplification_, and
_diminution_; and the _epilogue_.
==========
CHAPTER XIII.
OF THE PROEM.
The _proem_ is the beginning of an oration, and, as it were, the
preparing of the way before one enter into it.
In some kinds of orations it resembles the _prelude_ of _musicians_, who
first play what they list, and afterwards the tune they intended. In
other kinds it resembles the _prologue_ of a _play_, that contains the
argument.
Proems of the first sort, are most proper for _demonstrative_ orations;
in which a man is free to foretell, or not, what points he will insist
upon. And for the most part it is better not; because when a man has not
obliged himself to a certain matter, _digression_ will seem _variety_;
but if he have engaged himself, _variety_ will be accounted
_digression_.
In _demonstratives_, the matter of the _proem_ consisteth in the
_praise_ or _dispraise_ of some _law_ or _custom_, or in _exhortation_
or _dehortation_, or in something that serves to incline the hearer to
the purpose.
Proems of the second kind are most proper for _judicial_ orations. For
as the _prologue_ in a _dramatic_, and the _exordium_ in an _epic_ poem,
setteth forth in few words the argument of the poem; so in a _judicial
oration_, the orator ought to exhibit a model of his oration, that the
mind of the hearer may not be suspended, and for want of foresight err
or wander.
Whatsoever else belongs to a _proem_, is drawn from one of these four:
from the _speaker_, from the _adversary_, from the _hearer_, or from the
_matter_.
From the _speaker_ and _adversary_, are drawn into proems such
criminations and purgations as belong not to the cause.
To the _defendant_, it is necessary in the proem to answer to the
accusations of his _adversary_; that those being cleared, he may have a
more favourable entrance to the rest of his oration.
But to the _plaintiff_, it is better to cast his criminations all into
the _epilogue_; that the judge may the more easily remember them.
From the _hearer_ and from the _matter_, are drawn into the proem such
things as serve to make the _hearer_ favourable or angry, attentive or
not attentive, as need shall require.
And _hearers_ use to be attentive to _persons_ that are reputed _good_;
to _things_ that are of _great consequence_, or that _concern
themselves_, or that are _strange_, or that _delight_.
But to make the _hearer_ attentive, is not the part of the _proem_ only,
but of any other part of the oration, and rather of any other part than
of the proem. For the _hearer_ is everywhere more remiss than in the
beginning. And therefore wheresoever there is need, the orator must make
appear both the _probity_ of his own _person_, and that the _matter_ in
hand is of _great consequence_; or that it concerns the _hearer_, or
that it is _new_, or that it is _delightful_.
He that will have the hearer attentive to _him_, but not to the _cause_,
must on the other side make it seem that the _matter_ is a _trifle_
without relation to the _hearer_, _common_ and _tedious_.
That the _hearer_ may be favourable to the _speaker_, one of two things
is required: that he _love_ him, or that he _pity_ him.
In _demonstrative_ orations, he that _praises_ shall have the _hearer_
favourable, if he think himself or his own manners, or course of life,
or anything he loves, comprehended in the same _praise_.
On the contrary, he that _dispraises_ shall be heard favourably, if the
_hearer_ find his _enemies_, or _their courses_, or anything he _hates_,
involved in the same _dispraise_.
The _proem_ of a _deliberative_ oration is taken from the same things
from which are taken the _proems_ of _judicial_ orations. For the matter
of a _deliberative_ oration needeth not that natural _proem_, by which
is shown what we are to speak of, for that is already known; the _proem_
in these being made only for the _speaker’s_ or _adversary’s_ sake, or
to make the _matter_ appear _great_ or _little_, as one would have it;
and is therefore to be taken from the _persons_ of the _plaintiff_ or
_defendant_, or from the _hearer_, or from the _matter_, as in orations
_judicial_.
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CHAPTER XIV.
PLACES OF CRIMINATION AND PURGATION.
One, from the _removal of ill opinion_ in the hearer, imprinted in him
by the adversary or otherwise.
Another from this: that the thing done is _not hurtful_, or _not to
him_, or _not so much_, or _not unjust_, or _not great_, or _not
dishonourable_.
A third from the _recompense_: as, _I did him harm, but withal I did him
honour_.
A fourth from the _excuse_; as, _It was error_, _mischance_, or
_constraint_.
A fifth from the _intention_; as, _One thing was done, another meant_.
A sixth from the _comprehension_ of the accuser; as, _What I have done,
the accuser has done the same_, or _his father_, _kinsman_, or _friend_.
A seventh from the _comprehension_ of those that are in reputation; as,
_What I did, such and such have done the same, who nevertheless are good
men_.
An eighth from _comparison_ with such as have been falsely accused or
wrongfully suspected, and nevertheless found upright.
A ninth from _recrimination_; as, _The accuser is a man of ill life, and
therefore not to be believed_.
A tenth from that the _judgment_ belongs to another place, or time; as,
_I have already answered_, or _am to answer elsewhere to this matter_.
An eleventh from _crimination_ of the crimination: as, _It serves only
to pervert judgment_.
A twelfth, which is common both to crimination and purgation, and is
taken from _some sign_; as, _Teucer is not to be believed, because his
mother was Priam’s sister_. On the other side, _Teucer is to be
believed, because his father was Priam’s enemy_.
A thirteenth, proper to crimination only, from _praise and dispraise
mixed_; as, to praise small things, and blame great ones; or to praise
in many words, and blame with effectual ones; or to praise many things
that are good, and then add one evil, but a great one.
A fourteenth, common both to _crimination_ and _purgation_, is taken
from the _interpretation of the fact_. For he that _purgeth_ himself,
_interpreteth the fact_ always in the best sense; and he that
_criminates_, always in the worst; as when Ulysses said, _Diomedes chose
him for his companion, as the most able of the Grecians, to aid him in
his exploit_: but his adversary said, _he chose him for his cowardice,
as the most unlikely to share with him in the honour_.
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CHAPTER XV.
OF THE NARRATION.
The _narration_ is not always continued, and of one piece; but
sometimes, as in _demonstratives_, interrupted, and dispersed through
the whole oration.
For there being in a _narration_, something that falls not under art; as
namely, the actions themselves, which the orator inventeth not; he must
therefore bring in the _narration_ of them where he best may. As for
example, if being to praise a man, you would make a _narration_ of all
his acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you
will find it necessary afterwards to repeat the same acts again, while
from some of them you praise his valour, and from others his wisdom;
whereby your oration shall have less variety, and shall less please.
It is not necessary always that the _narration_ be short. The true
measure of it must be taken from the _matter_ that is to be laid open.
In the _narration_, as oft as may be, it is good to insert somewhat
commendable in one’s self, and blameable in one’s adversary: as, _I
advised him, but he would take no counsel_.
In _narrations_, a man is to leave out whatsoever breeds compassion,
indignation, &c. in the hearer beside the purpose; as Ulysses in Homer,
relating his travels to Alcinous, to move compassion in him, is so long
in it that it consists of divers books: but when he comes home, tells
the same to his wife in thirty verses, leaving out what might make her
sad.
The _narration_ ought also to be in such words as argue the _manners_,
that is some virtuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although
it be not expressed; as, _setting his arms a-kimbo, he answered, &c._;
by which is insinuated the pride of him that so answered.
In an _oration_ a man does better to shew his affection than his
judgment; that is, it is better to say, _I like this_, than to say,
_this is better_. For by the one you would seem _wise_, by the other
_good_. But _favour_ follows _goodness_; whereas _wisdom_ procures
_envy_.
But if this affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be
rendered, as did Antigone. For when she had said, _she loved her brother
better than her husband or children_; she added, _for husband and
children I may have more; but another brother I cannot, my parents being
both dead_. Or else a man must use this form of speaking; _I know this
affection of mine seems strange to you; but nevertheless it is such_.
For it is not easily believed that any man has a mind to do any thing
that is not for his own good.
Besides in a _narration_, not only the actions themselves, but the
passions and signs that accompany them, are to be discovered.
And in his _narration_ a man should make himself and his adversary be
considered for such and such, as soon and as covertly as he can.
A _narration_ may have need sometimes not to be in the beginning. In
_deliberative_ orations, that is, wheresoever the question is of things
to come, a _narration_, which is always of things past, has no place.
And yet things past may be recounted, that men may _deliberate_ better
of the future. But that is not as _narration_, but _proof_; for it is
_example_.
There may also be _narration_ in _deliberatives_, in that part where
crimination and praise come in. But that part is not _deliberative_, but
_demonstrative_.
==========
CHAPTER XVI.
OF PROOF OR CONFIRMATION, AND REFUTATION.
_Proofs_ are to be applied to something controverted.
The controversy in _judicial_ orations is, whether it has been _done_;
whether it has been _hurtful_; whether the matter be _so great_; and
whether it be _just, or no_.
In a question of _fact_, one of the parties of necessity is faulty; for
ignorance of the _fact_ is no excuse; and therefore the _fact_ is
chiefly to be insisted on.
In _demonstratives_, the _fact_ for the most part is supposed: but the
_honour_ and _profit_ of the fact are to be _proved_.
In _deliberatives_, the question is, whether the thing _be like to be,
or likely to be so great_; or whether it be _just_; or whether it be
_profitable_.
Besides the application of the _proof_ to the question, a man ought to
observe whether his adversary have lied in any point without the cause.
For it is a sign he does the same in the cause.
The _proofs_ themselves are either _examples_, or _enthymemes_.
A _deliberative_ oration, because it is of things to come, requireth
rather _examples_ than _enthymemes_.
But a _judicial_ oration, being of things past, which have a necessity
in them, and may be concluded syllogistically, requireth rather
_enthymemes_.
_Enthymemes_ ought not to come too thick together: for they hinder one
another’s force by confounding the hearer.
Nor ought a man to endeavour to prove everything by enthymeme, lest like
some philosophers he collect what is _known_, from what is _less known_.
Nor ought a man to use enthymemes, when he would move the hearer to some
affection. For seeing divers motions do mutually destroy or weaken one
another, he will lose either the _enthymeme_, or the _affection_ that he
would move.
For the same reason, a man ought not to use enthymemes when he would
express _manners_.
But whether he would move _affection_, or insinuate his _manners_, he
may withal use _sentences_.
A _deliberative_ oration is more difficult than a _judicial_, because it
is of the _future_; whereas a _judicial_ is of that which is _past_, and
that consequently may be known; and because it has _principles_, namely,
the _law_; and it is easier to _prove_ from _principles_, than without.
Besides, a _deliberative_ oration wants those helps of _turning to the
adversary_, of _speaking of himself_, of _raising passion_.
He therefore that wants matter in a deliberative oration, let him bring
in some person to praise or dispraise. And in demonstratives, he that
has nothing to say in _commendation_ or _discommendation_ of the
_principal party_, let him _praise_ or _dispraise_ somebody else, as his
_father_ or _kinsman_, or the very _virtues_ or _vices_ themselves.
He that wants not _proofs_, let him not only _prove_ strongly, but also
insinuate his _manners_: but he that has no _proof_, let him
nevertheless insinuate his _manners_. For a _good man_ is as acceptable
as an _exact oration_.
Of _proofs_, those that _lead to an absurdity_, please better than those
that are _direct_ or _ostensive_; because from the comparison of
contraries, namely, _truth_ and _falsity_, the force of the syllogism
does the better appear.
_Confutation_ is also a part of _proof_. And he that speaks first, puts
it _after_ his own proofs; unless the controversy contain many and
different matters. And he that speaks last, puts it _before_. For it is
necessary to make way for his own oration, by removing the objections of
him that spake before. For the mind abhors both the man and his oration,
that is damned beforehand.
If a man desire his _manners_ should appear well, lest speaking of
himself, he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation;
or speaking of another, he seem contumelious or scurrilous; let him
introduce another person.
Last of all, lest he cloy his hearer with _enthymemes_, let him vary
them sometimes with _sentences_, but such as have the same force. As
here is an _enthymeme_: _If it be then the best time to make peace, when
the best conditions of peace may be had; then the time is now, while our
fortune is entire_. And this is a _sentence_ of equal force to it: _Wise
men make peace, while their fortune is entire_.
==========
CHAPTER XVII.
OF INTERROGATIONS, ANSWERS, AND JESTS.
The times when it is fit to ask one’s adversary a _question_, are
chiefly four.
The first is, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, he
has already uttered one; and we would by _interrogation_ draw him to
confess the other.
The second, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, one is
manifest of itself, and the other likely to be fetched out by a
_question_; then the _interrogation_ will be seasonable; and the absurd
conclusion is presently to be inferred without adding that proposition
which is manifest.
The third, when a man would make appear that his adversary does
contradict himself.
The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as
these: _In some sort, it is so; in some sort, it is not so_.
Out of these cases, it is not fit to _interrogate_. For he whose
question succeeds not, is thought vanquished.
To equivocal _questions_ a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too
brief.
To _interrogations_, which we foresee tend to draw from us an _answer_
contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our _answer_, presently
give an _answer_ to the objection which is implied in the _question_.
And where the question exacteth an answer that concludeth against us, we
must, together with our _answer_, presently _distinguish_.
_Jests_ are dissolved by serious and grave discourse; and grave
discourse is deluded by _jests_.
The several kinds of _jests_ are set down in the _Art of Poetry_.
Whereof one kind is _ironia_, and tends to please one’s self. The other
is _scurrility_, and tends to please others.
The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness: the former may become
a man of good breeding.
==========
CHAPTER XVIII.
OF THE EPILOGUE.
The _epilogue_ must consist of one of these four things.
Either of _inclining the judge to favour his own_, or _disfavour the
adversary’s side_. For then, when all is said in the cause, is the best
season to _praise_ or _dispraise_ the parties.
Or of _amplification_ or _diminution_. For when it appears what is good
or evil, then is the time to show _how great_ or _how little_ that good
or evil is.
Or in _moving the judge to anger, love_, or other passion. For when it
is manifest of what kind, and how great the good or evil is, then it
will be opportune to _excite_ the judge.
Or of _repetition_, that the judge may remember what has been said.
_Repetition_ consisteth in the _matter_ and the _manner_. For the orator
must show that he has performed what he promised in the beginning of his
oration; and _how_, namely, by comparing his arguments one by one with
his adversary’s, repeating them in the same order they were spoken.
==========
THE
ART OF RHETORIC
PLAINLY SET FORTH.
WITH PERTINENT EXAMPLES
FOR THE MORE EASY UNDERSTANDING AND
PRACTICE OF THE SAME.
BY
THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMSBURY.
THE
ART OF RHETORIC.
==========
CHAPTER I.
Rhetoric is an art of speaking finely. It hath two parts:
1. Garnishing of speech, called _elocution_;
2. Garnishing of the manner of utterance, called _pronunciation_.
Garnishing of speech is the first part of rhetoric; whereby the speech
itself is beautified and made fine. It is either the fine manner of
words, called a trope; or the fine shape or frame of speech, called a
figure.
The fine manner of words is a garnishing of speech, whereby one word is
drawn from its first proper signification to another; as in this
sentence: _sin lieth at the door_: where _sin_ is put for the punishment
of sin adjoined unto it: _lieth at the door_, signifieth at hand; as
that which lieth at the door, is ready to be brought in.
This changing of words was first found out by necessity, for the want of
words; afterwards confirmed by delight, because such words are pleasant
and gracious to the ear. Therefore this change of signification must be
shamefaced, and, as it were, maidenly, that it may seem rather to be led
by the hand to another signification, than to be driven by force unto
the same.
Yet sometimes this fine manner of speech swerveth from this perfection;
and then it is, either the abuse of this fine speech, called
_katachresis_, or the excess of this fineness, called _hyperbole_.
_Be not too just nor too wicked_; which speech, although it seem very
hard, yet it doth, not without some fineness of speech, utter thus much;
_That one seek not a righteousness beyond the law of God; and that when
none can live without all sin, yet that they take heed that sin bear not
dominion over them_.
As, _My tears are my meat day and night. Those that hate me are more in
number than the hairs of my head_. Both which do utter by an express of
speech, a great sorrow, and a great number of enemies.
The abuse of speech is, when the change of speech is hard, strange, and
unwonted, as in the first example.
The excess of speech is, when the change of signification is very high
and lofty, as in the second example, and Psalms vi. vii.
But the excellency or fineness of words or tropes, is most excellent,
when divers are _shut up in one_, or _continued in many_.
An example of the first sort is in 2 Kings ii. 9: _I pray thee, let me
have a double portion of thy Spirit_: where by _Spirit_ is meant the
gift of the Spirit; and by _thy Spirit_, the gift of the spirit like to
thine.
The _continuance_ of tropes, called an allegory, is, when one kind of
trope is so continued, as, look with what kind of matter it be begun,
with the same it be ended. So in Psalm xxiii. _the care of God towards
his church_ is set forth in the words proper to _a shepherd_. So in the
whole book of Canticles, _the sweet conference of Christ and his
church_, is set down by the words proper to _the husband and the wife_.
So old age is set down by this garnishing of speech, in Ecclesiastes
xii. 5, 6.
Hitherto of the properties of a fine manner of words, called a trope.
Now the divers sorts do follow. They are those which note out, 1, no
comparison, or are with some comparison; or, 2, no respect of division,
or some respect.
The first is double: 1. The change of name, called a _metonymy_. 2. The
mocking speech, called an _irony_.
The change of name is where the name of a thing is put for the name of a
thing agreeing with it. It is double: 1. When the cause is put for the
thing caused; and contrarywise. 2. When the thing to which anything is
adjoined, is put for the thing adjoined; and contrarywise.
The change of name of the cause is when either the name of the _maker_,
or the name of the _matter_, is put for the _thing made_.
Of the _maker_, when the finder out, or the author of the thing, or the
instrument whereby the thing is done, is put for the _thing made_. So
Moses is put for his writings: so love is put for liberality, or
bestowing benefits, the fruit of love; so (Rom. i. 8): faith, the cause,
is put for religious serving of God, the thing caused. So (James iii.)
the tongue, the instrument of speech, is put for the speech itself.
_Rule thy tongue._
Of the _matter_: _Thou art dust, and to dust shalt thou return_; that
is, _one made of dust_.
Now, on the other side, when the thing caused, or the effect, is put for
any of these causes. So _the Gospel of God_ is called _the power of God
to salvation_; that is, the instrument of the power of God. So _love_ is
said to be _bountiful_, because it causeth one to be bountiful. St. Paul
saith, _The bread that we break, is it not in the communion of the body
and blood of Christ?_ That is, an instrument of the communion of the
body of Christ. So _the body_ is said to be an _earthly tabernacle_;
that is, a tabernacle made of earth.
The change of name, or _metonymy_, where the subject, or that which hath
anything adjoined, is put for the thing adjoined, or adjunct. So the
place is put for those, or that in the place: _set thine house in
order_; that is, thy household matters. _It shall be easier for Sodom
and Gomorrha_; that is, the people in Sodom and Gomorrha. So _Moses'
chair_ is put for the _doctrine_ taught in _Moses' chair_. So _all
Jericho and Jerusalem came out_; that is, all the men in Jericho and
Jerusalem. So before, _sin_ was put for the _punishment of sin_. _Let
his blood rest upon us and our children_; that is, the punishment which
shall follow his death. So Christ said, _This is my body_; that is, a
sign or sacrament of my body. _This wine is the new testament in my
blood_; that is, a sign or seal of the new testament in my blood. So
John saith, _I saw the Spirit descending in the likeness of a dove_;
that is, the sign of the Spirit.
On the other side, the adjunct is put for the thing to which it is
adjoined. As Christ (1 Tim. i. 1) is called _our hope_; that is, on whom
our hope did depend. So, _we are justified by faith_; that is, by Christ
applied by faith. So, _love is the fulfilling of the law_; that is,
those things to which it is adjoined. _Hope_ for the _things hoped for_;
as Rom. viii. 24. So in the Epistle to the Ephesians, v. 16: _The days
are evil_; that is, the manner, conversation, and deeds of men in the
days.
Hitherto the _metonymy_, or change of name. Now followeth the mocking
speech, or _irony_.
==========
CHAPTER II.
The _mocking_ trope is, when one contrary is signified by another; as
God said, _Man is like to one of us_. So Christ saith, _Sleep on_; and
yet by-and-by, _Arise, let us go_. So Paul saith, _You are wise, and I
am a fool_.
This trope is conceived either by the contrariety of the matter, or the
manner of utterance, or both. So Elijah said to the prophets of Baal,
_Cry aloud_, &c. So the Jews said unto Christ, _Hail, King of the Jews!_
Hitherto appertaineth the passing by a thing, which yet with a certain
elegance noteth it. So Philemon 19: _That I say not, thou owest thyself
unto me_.
Hitherto of the fineness of words which respect no division. Now
followeth that which respecteth division, called _synechdoche_.
A _synechdoche_ is when the name of the whole is given to the part; or
the name of the part to the whole. And it is double. 1. When the whole
is put for the member, and contrarily. 2. When the general, or whole
kind, is put for the special; or contrarily.
So St. John: _Not only for our sins, but for the sins of the whole
world_. So righteousness, a member of goodness, is put for all goodness;
so unrighteousness is put for all manner of sins.
Examples of the second sort, as these: So _Israel_ is put for _those of
Juda_ sometimes. So _nations_ for _the heathen_. _A minister_ of Christ
for _an apostle_ of Christ, as Rom. xv. 16. _A minister_ put for _a
distributer_, as Rom. xii. 7.
On the other side, one sort or special is put for the whole sort or
general, in the examples following. In the Lord’s prayer, _bread_, _one_
help of life, is put for _all_ helps; _this day_, _one_ time for _all_
times. So Solomon saith, _the thing of the day in his day_; that is, the
thing of the time in his time.
So sometimes less is spoken, and yet more is understood; which is called
diminution, or _meiosis_. As James saith to him _that knoweth how to do
well and doth it not, it is sin_; that is a great sin. So our Saviour
Christ saith, _If they had not known, they had had no sin_; that is, no
such great sin as they have now. Likewise the denial by comparison.
So Solomon saith, _Receive my words, and not silver_; that is, my words
rather than silver. So Paul saith, _I was sent to preach, and not to
baptize_; that is, not so much to baptize as to preach.
Hitherto of the fineness of words, which note out no comparison. Now
followeth the fineness of words which noteth out comparison, called a
_metaphor_.
==========
CHAPTER III.
A _metaphor_ is when the like is signified by the like: as (1 Cor. iii.
13) the Apostle saith, _doctrine must be tried by fire_; that is, the
evidence of the word, spirit, _trying doctrine_, as fire doth metals. So
Christ is said to _baptize with fire_; where _fire_ is put for the power
of the Holy Ghost, purging as fire. So Christ saith, _none shall enter
into the kingdom of God but he that is born of the Holy Ghost and
water_. So Paul calleth himself the _father_ of the Corinthians, and
said, _that he begat them in Christ_. So he calleth Timothy and Titus
his natural _sons in the faith_.
Hitherto of a trope or garnishing of speech in one word, where the
metaphor is most usual; then the change of name; then the _synechdoche_;
and last of all, the _irony_. Now followeth the fine frame or shape of
speech, called a figure.
A figure is a garnishing of speech wherein the course of the same is
changed, from the more simple and plain manner of speaking unto that
which is more full of excellency and grace. For as in the fineness of
words, or a trope, words are considered asunder by themselves; so in the
fine shape or frame of speech, or a figure, the apt and pleasant joining
together of many words is noted.
The garnishing of the shape of speech, or a figure, is garnishing of
speech in words, or in a sentence.
The garnishing of speech in words, called _figura dictionis_, is wherein
the speech is garnished by the pleasant and sweet sound of words joined
together.
This is either in the _measure_ of sounds; or in the _repetition_ of
sounds.
The _measure_ of sounds is belonging either to poets, with us called
rhymers; or orators, with us called eloquent pleaders.
The first is the measure of sounds by certain and continual spaces; and
it is either rhyme or verse.
Rhyme is the first sort, containing a certain measure of syllables
ending alike; and these in the mother tongues are most fit for psalms,
songs, or sonnets.
Verses are the second sort, containing certain feet fitly placed.
A foot is a measure framed by the length and shortness of syllables; for
the several sorts whereof, as also of the verses of them, because we
have no worthy examples in our English tongue, we judge the large
handling of them should be more curious than necessary.
The measure of sounds belonging to orators, is that which, as it is not
uncertain, so it differeth altogether from rhyme and verse, and is very
changeable with itself. Therefore in that eloquent speech you must
altogether leave rhyme and verse, unless you allege it for authority and
pleasure.
In the beginning of the sentence little care is to be had, in the middle
least of all, and in the end chiefest regard is to be had; because the
fall of the sentence is most marked, and therefore lest it fall out to
be harsh and unpleasant both to the mind and ear, there must be most
variety and change.
Now this change must not be above six syllables from the end, and that
must be set down in feet of two syllables.
And thus much of garnishing of speech by the _measure_ of sounds, rather
to give some taste of the same to the readers, than to draw any to the
curious and unnecessary practice of it.
Now followeth the _repeating_ of sounds.
==========
CHAPTER IV.
_Repetition_ of sounds is either of the _like_, or the _unlike_ sound.
Of the _like_, is either _continued_ to the end of, or _broken_ off
from, the _same_, or a _diverse_ sentence.
_Continued_ to the end of the _same_ sentence is, when the same sound is
repeated without anything coming between, except a parenthesis; that is,
something put in, without the which, notwithstanding, the sentence is
full. And it is a joining of the same sound, as Rom. i. 29: _All
unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness_. And in the prayer of Christ,
_My God, my God_. _From men by thine hand, O Lord, from men_, &c. (Psalm
xvii. 14.)
_Continued_ in a _diverse_ sentence is, either a redoubling, called
_anadyplosis_; or a pleasant climbing, called _climax_.
Redoubling is when the same sound is repeated in the end of the former
sentence, and the beginning of the sentence following. As Psalm ix. 9:
_The Lord also will be a refuge to the poor, a refuge, I say, in due
time_. Psalm xlviii. 14: _For this God is our God_. But more plain in
Psalm xlviii. 8: _As we have heard, so have we seen in the city of our
God: God will establish it for ever_.
A pleasant climbing, is a redoubling continued by divers degrees or
steps of the same sounds; as Rom. viii. 17: _If we be children, we be
heirs, even heirs of God, annexed with Christ_. Rom. viii. 30: _Whom he
predestinated, them also he called; and whom he called, them also he
justified; and whom he justified, them also he glorified_. Also Rom. ix.
14, 15.
And hitherto of the same sound _continued to the end_. Now followeth the
same sound _broken off_.
==========
CHAPTER V.
The same sound _broken off_, is a repetition of the same in the
_beginning_ or in the _end_.
In the _beginning_, it is called _anaphora_, a bringing of the same
again; as Rom. viii. 38, 39: _Nor death, nor life, nor angels, &c. nor
any other creature, shall be able to separate us, &c._ So likewise
Ephes. iv. 11: _Some to be apostles, some preachers, &c._ So Galatians
ii. 14: _Nor Jew, Gentile, &c._ So likewise Hebrews xi. 1, 2.
Repetition of the same sound _in the end_, is called _epistrophe_, a
turning to the same sound in the end. So Ezekiel viii. 15: _Behold
greater abominations than these_. Lament. iii. 41, &c.: _Let us lift up
our hearts with our hands unto God in the heavens; we have sinned and
have rebelled; therefore thou hast not spared_.
When both of these are joined together, it is called a coupling or
symplote. As 2 Cor. vi. 4-11: _But in all things we approve ourselves as
the ministers of God, in much patience, in afflictions, &c._ See also 2
Cor. xi. 23.
Hitherto of the repetitions in the _same place_. Now of those that do
interchange their place.
They are either _epanalepsis_, which signifieth to take back; or
_epanados_, which signifies the turning to the same tune.
The first is when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the
ending; as, 2 Sam. xviii. 33: _My son Absolom, my son_.
_Epanados_ is when the same sound is repeated in the beginning and the
middle, in the middle and the end. Ezekiel xxxv, 6: _I will prepare thee
unto blood, and blood shall pursue thee: except thou hate blood, even
blood shall pursue thee_. And 2 Thes. ii. 4: _So that he that doth sit
as God, in the temple of God, sheweth himself that he is God_.
Hitherto of the repetition of those sounds which are _like_. Now of
those that are _unlike_.
==========
CHAPTER VI.
_Unlike_; a small changing of the name, as παρονομασια; a small changing
of the end or case, as πολυπτωτον.
A small change of name is, when a word, by the change of one letter or
syllable, the signification also is changed; as, Rom. v. 4: _Patience,
experience; and experience, hope_. 2 Cor. x. 3: _We walk after the
flesh, not war in the flesh_. 2 Cor. vi. 8-9: _So by honour and
dishonour, as unknown and yet known_.
A small changing of the end or case, is when words of the same beginning
rebound by divers ends: _Christ being raised from the dead, dieth no
more, death hath no more power over him. He that doth righteousness, is
righteous. If ye know that he is righteous, know ye that he that doeth
righteously, is born of him._ And of both these there are many in the
Scripture; but the translations cannot reach them.
Hitherto of the garnishing of the shape of speech, in _words_. Now
followeth the garnishing of the shape of speech, in a _sentence_.
==========
CHAPTER VII.
Garnishing of the frame of speech in a _sentence_, is a garnishing of
the shape of speech, or a figure; which for the forcible moving of
affections, doth after a sort beautify the sense and very meaning of a
sentence. Because it hath in it a certain manly majesty, which far
surpasseth the soft delicacy or dainties of the former figures.
It is either the garnishing of speech _alone_, or _with others_.
The garnishing of speech _alone_, is when as the sentence is garnished
without speech had to other. And it is either in regard of the _matter_;
or of the _person_.
In regard of the _matter_; it is either a crying out, called
_exclamation_; or a pulling or calling back of himself, called
_revocation_.
A crying out, or _exclamation_, is the first, which is set forth by a
word of calling out. Sometimes of wonder, as, Rom. xi. 33: _O the depth
of the judgments of God!_ Psal. viii. 1: _O Lord, how excellent is thy
name!_ Sometimes of pity; also these words, _Behold_, _Alas_, _Oh_, be
signs of this figure, as, _O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which stonest the
prophets_. Sometimes of desperation; as, _My sin is greater than can be
forgiven. Behold, thou drivest me out, &c._ Sometimes of wishing: as,
Psalm lxxxiv. 1: _O Lord of hosts, how amiable are thy tabernacles!_
Sometimes of disdaining: as, Rom. vii. 24: _O miserable wretch that I
am, who shall deliver me from this body of sin!_ Sometimes of mocking:
as they which said to our Saviour Christ, _Ah, thou that, &c._ Sometimes
of cursing and detestation; as in David, _Let their table be made a
snare, and bow down their back always_.
Also when this figure is used in the end of a sentence, it is called a
shooting out of the voice or επιφωνημα; as when the sins of Jezebel were
spoken against, this is added at the end, _Seemed it a little to her to
do thus and thus_.
So after the high setting forth of the name of God, David shutteth up
his praise with this: _Blessed be his glorious name, and let all the
earth be filled with his glory_. Sometimes here is used a certain
liberty of speech, wherein is a kind of secret crying out: as Peter
(Acts iii. 12,) saith: _Ye men of Israel, hear these words_. And Paul,
(2 Cor. xi. 1): _Would to God you could suffer a little my foolishness,
and indeed ye suffer me_.
Thus much of crying out. Now followeth the figure of calling back, or
_revocation_.
_Revocation_ is when any thing is called back; and it is as it were a
cooling and quenching of the heat of the exclamation that went before.
And this is either a _correction_ of one’s self, called επανορθωσις; or
a _holding_ of one’s _peace_, called αποσιωπησις.
Επανορθωσις is correction, when something is called back that went
before: as Paul correcteth his doubtfulness of Agrippa’s belief, when he
saith, _Believest thou, King Agrippa? I know thou believest._ So, 1 Cor.
xv. 10: _I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I_, &c.
A _keeping of silence_, or αποσιωπησις, is when the course of the
sentence bygone is so stayed, as thereby some part of the sentence, not
being uttered, may be understood. So our Saviour Christ (John xii. 27)
saith, _My soul is heavy: what shall I say?_
Thus much of a figure garnishing the speech alone, in regard of the
_matter_. Now followeth the garnishing of the speech alone, in regard of
the _person_.
==========
CHAPTER VIII.
Garnishing of the speech alone in regard of the _person_, is double:
either in turning to the person called _apostrophe_; or feigning of the
person, called _prosopopœia_.
_Apostrophe_, or turning to the person, is when the speech is turned to
another person than the speech appointed did intend or require. And this
_apostrophe_ or turning is diversely seen, according to the diversity of
persons. Sometimes it turneth to a man’s person; as David in the sixth
Psalm, where having gathered arguments of his safety, turneth hastily to
the wicked, saying, _Away from me, all ye workers of iniquity; for the
Lord hath heard the voice of my petition_.
Sometimes from a man to God, as Psalm iii. 3. David being dismayed with
the number of his enemies, turneth himself to God, saying: _But thou art
my buckler_, &c.
Sometimes to unreasonable creatures without sense; as Isaiah i. and
Isaiah xxi.
_Prosopopœia_, or a feigning of the person, is whereby we do feign
another person speaking in our speech. And it is double; _imperfect_ and
_perfect_.
_Imperfect_ is when the speech of another person is set down lightly and
indirectly. As in Psalm. xi. 1. David bringeth in the wicked, _Who say
unto my soul, fly as the bird unto yonder hill_.
A perfect _prosopopœia_, is when the whole feigning of the person is set
down in our speech, with a fit entering into the same, and a leaving it
off. So Wisdom, (Prov. viii.); where the entrance is in the first
verses, her speech in the rest of the chapter.
Hitherto of the figures of sentences concerning one speaking alone. Now
follow the other, which concern the speeches of two.
==========
CHAPTER IX.
They which concern the speeches of two, are either in _asking_, or in
_answering_.
That of _asking_, is either in _deliberation_; or in _preventing an
objection_.
_Deliberation_ is when we do every now and then ask, as it were, reasons
of our consultation, whereby the mind of the hearers wavering in doubt,
doth set down some great thing.
This deliberation is either in _doubting_, or in _communication_.
A _doubting_ is a deliberating with ourselves, as Paul (1 Philipp. i.
23, 24), doubting whether it were better to die than to live, he
garnisheth his speech in this manner: _For I am greatly in doubt on both
sides, desiring to be loosed, and to be with Christ, which is best of
all: nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you_.
_Communication_ is a deliberation with others. As, Galatians iii. 1, 2:
_O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, &c._
And hitherto of the figure of speech between two, called _deliberation_.
Now followeth the figure of speech between two, called the _preventing
of an objection_, or _occupation_.
_Occupation_ is, when we do bring an objection, and yield an answer unto
it. Therefore this speech between two, in the first part, is called the
setting down of the objection or occupation: in the latter part, an
answering of the objection or the subjection: as Rom. vi. 1: _What shall
we say then? Shall we continue still in sin, that grace may abound?_ In
which words is set down the objection: the answering in these words,
_God forbid_. And here this must be marked, that the objection is many
times wanting, which must be wisely supplied by considering the occasion
and answer of it: as 1 Tim. v. 11, 12: _They will marry, having
condemnation_. Now lest any might say, what, _for marrying?_ He
answereth: _No, for denying their first faith_.
Hitherto of the figures of _asking_. Now followeth the figures of
_answering_. They are either in _suffering_ of a deed, called
_permission_; or, _granting_ of an argument, called _concession_.
_Suffering_ of a deed or permission is, when mockingly we give liberty
to any deed, being never so filthy; as Rev. xxii. 11: _Let him that is
filthy, be filthy still_. And 1 Cor. xiv. 38: _If any be ignorant, let
him be ignorant_.
Concession or granting of an argument is, when an argument is mockingly
yielded unto, as Ecclesiastes xi. 9: _Rejoice, O young man, in thy
youth, and let thy heart cheer thee, &c._
THE ART OF SOPHISTRY.
==========
Although the rules of Sophistry be needless for them that be perfect in
logic; yet because the knowledge of them bringeth some profit to the
young beginners, both for the ready answering of the subtle
arguments, and the better practising of logic and rhetoric, we have
thought good to turn it into the English tongue.
_Sophistry_ is the feigned art of _elenches_, or coloured reasons.
A coloured reason, or _elench_, is a show of reason to deceive withal.
It is either when the deceit lieth in the _words_; or in the default of
logic, called a _sophism_.
In _words_, is either when the deceit lieth in _one word_; or in _words
joined together_. _If it were, it should be, whosoever._
In _one word_, is either the _darkness_ of a word; or, the
_doubtfulness_ of a word.
The _darkness_ of a word, or an insolence, deceiveth, when by a reason
the meaning is not understood, whether the strangeness be through the
oldness, newness, or swelling vanity of the words; and of the last sort
is that spoken of in 2 Peter ii. 18.
By this fallacy the Papists conclude, the Fathers to be on their side
for deserving by good works.
_Whosoever saith man’s merits are crowned, they say man’s works do
deserve._
_But the Fathers say, man’s merits are crowned._
_Therefore the Fathers say, man’s works do deserve._
Where _merits_ is an old word, put for any works done under the hope of
reward, whether it come by desert or freedom of promise.
_Doubtfulness_ of a word, _likeness_ of name, is either called
_homonymia_; or by a trope or fineness of speech.
The _likeness_ of name, or _homonymia_, is when one word is given to
signify divers things: as,
_He that believeth shall be saved._
_The hypocrites to whom our Saviour Christ would not commit himself,
believed,_
_Therefore they shall be saved._
Where faith doth note out both a justifying faith, and a dead faith.
Doubtfulness by a trope, is when a word is taken properly, which is
meant figuratively or contrarily: As, _That which Christ saith is true_.
_Christ saith that bread is his body._
_Therefore it is true._
Where by _body_ is meant the sign or sacrament of his body.
Unto the first, a perfect logician would answer, that the proposition is
not an axiom necessarily true, according to the rule of truth, because
of the doubtfulness of the old and new signification of _merit_. And if
the word be far worn out of use, that it be not understood, then the
answer must be, I understand it not, or put your axiom in plain words.
To the second he would answer, that the proposition or first part is not
according to the rule of righteousness, because the proper subject and
adjunct are not joined together: which _hath justifying faith, or
believing sincerely, shall be saved_; and then the assumption being in
the same sense inferred is false.
Unto the third he would answer, that the assumption is not necessarily
true; because if the word _body_ be taken properly, it is not then true
that is set down; but if it be taken figuratively, it is true, and
therefore would bid him make the assumption necessarily true, and then
say, Christ saith in proper words, _it is my body_; and then it is
false.
Hitherto of the fallacies in single words. Now of those that are joined
together.
It is either _amphibolia_, or the doubtfulness of speech: or
_exposition_, or unapt setting down of the reason.
The first is, when there is doubtfulness in the frame of speech; as
thus, _if any obey not our word by a letter, note him_: where some refer
_by a letter_, to the first part of the sentence, and some to the
latter; where the signification of the word and right pointing doth show
that it must be referred to the first.
The answer is, that the right and wise placing of the sentence is
perverted.
Unapt setting down of the reason, is when the parts of the question and
the reasons entreated, are not set down in fit words: as,
_All sin is evil._
_Every child of God doth sin._
_Therefore every child of God is evil._
Here the answer according to logic, is that the assumption doth not take
the argument out of the proposition, but putteth in another thing; and
so it is no right frame of concluding, as appeareth by the definition of
the assumption.
Hitherto of the deceits of reason, which lie in _words_. Now of the
default of logic, called _sophism_.
It is either _general_ or _special_. The _general_ are those which
cannot be referred to any _part of logic_. They are either begging of
the question, called the petition of the principle; or bragging of no
proof.
Begging of the question, is when nothing is brought to prove but the
question, or that which is doubtful: as,
_That righteousness, which is both by faith and works, doth justify._
_But this righteousness, is inherent righteousness_: Ergo.
Here the proposition in effect is nothing but a question.
_If together with the blood of Christ, we must make perfect satisfaction
for our sins before we come to heaven; then there must be purgatory for
them that die without perfection._
_But the first is so_: Ergo.
Where the argument they bring is as doubtful, and needeth as much proof,
as the question.
The answer is this, out of the definition of the syllogism; that there
is no new argument invented; therefore it cannot be a certain frame of
concluding.
Bragging of no proof, is when that which is brought is too much, called
_redounding_.
It is either impertinent to another matter, called _heterogenium_; or a
vain repetition, called _tautologia_.
Impertinent, or not to the purpose, is when anything is brought for a
proof, which is nothing near to the matter in hand; whereunto the common
proverb giveth answer, _I ask you of cheese, you answer me of chalk_.
A vain repetition, is when the same thing in effect, though not in
words, is repeated; as they that after a long time of prayer say, _Let
us pray_. And this fallacy our Saviour Christ (Matt. vi. 5) condemneth
in prayer. And this is a fault in method.
_Special_ are those, which may be referred to certain parts of logic,
and they are of two sorts. Such as are referred to the spring of
reasons, called _invention_; or to judgment.
Those referred to invention, are when anything is put for a reason,
which is not; as no cause for a cause, no effect for an effect; and so
of the rest.
In the distribution this is a proper fallacy, when anything simply or
generally granted, thereby is inferred a certain respect or special not
meant nor intended: as,
_He that saith there are not seven sacraments, saith true._
_He that saith there are only three, saith there are not seven._
_Therefore he that saith there are three, saith true._
The right answer is, that the proposition is not necessarily true; for
there may be a way to say there are not seven, and yet affirm an
untruth.
Fallacies of judgment, are those that are referred to the judgment of
one sentence, or of more.
Of one sentence, either to the proprieties of an axiom, or to the sorts.
To the proprieties, as when a true is put for a false, and contrarily:
an affirmative for a negative, and contrarily. So some take the words of
St. John, _I do not say concerning it, that you shall not pray_, for no
denial; when as it doth deny to pray for that sin.
To the sorts, are referred either to the simple or compound.
The first, when the general is taken for the special, and contrarily. So
the Papists, by this fallacy, do answer to that general saying of Paul;
_We are justified with faith without the works of the law_: which they
understand of works done before faith, when that was never called in
doubt.
The fallacies which are referred to a compound axiom, are those which
are referred either to a _disjoined_, or _knitting_ axiom. To a
_disjoined_ axiom, when the parts indeed are not _disjoined_: as,
_Solomon was either a king, or did bear rule_.
To a _knitting_ axiom, is when the parts are not necessarily knit
together; as, _If Rome be on fire, the Pope’s chair is burnt_.
And hitherto of the first sort of fallacies referred to judgment. Now
followeth the second.
And they be either those that are referred to a _syllogism_; or to
_method_. And they again are _general_, and _special_. _General_, which
are referred to the general properties of a syllogism. It is either when
all the parts are _denied_; or are _particular_. All parts denied: as,
_No pope is a devil._
_No man is a devil._
_Therefore no man is a pope._
And this must be answered, that it is not according to the definition of
a negative syllogism, which must always have one affirmative.
All particular: as, _some unlawful thing must be suffered; as, namely,
that which cannot be taken away_,
_The stews is some unlawful thing._
_Therefore the stews must be suffered._
This is answered, by the definition of a special syllogism; which is,
that hath one part general.
The _special_, are those which are simple or compound.
The _simple_ is of two sorts. The first is more plain. The second less
plain.
More plain, is when the assumption is denied, or the question is not
particular: as,
_Every apostle may preach abroad_:
_Some apostle is not a pope_,
_Therefore some pope may not preach abroad_.
Also, _every pope is a lord_:
_Some pope may give an universal license._
_Therefore every lord may give an universal license_.
Less plain, hath one fallacy in common, when the proposition is special:
as,
_Some player is a rogue_:
_Every vagabond is a rogue_,
_Therefore every player is a vagabond_.
Also, _some player is a rogue_:
_Every vagabond is a player_,
_Therefore every player is a rogue_.
The fallacy of the first kind, is when all the parts be affirmative: as,
_All Paul’s bishops were ordained for unity._
_All archbishops be ordained for unity._
_Therefore all archbishops are Paul’s bishops._
The fallacy of the second kind is when the assumption is denied: as,
_Every puritan is a Christian._
_No Lord Bishop is a puritan_,
_Therefore no Lord Bishop is a Christian_.
Hitherto of the fallacies referred to a _simple_ syllogism. Now follow
those which are referred to a _compound_; which are those which are
referred either to the _connexive_, or to the _disjoined_.
Of the first sort, one is when the first part or antecedent is denied,
that the second or consequent may be so likewise: as,
_If any man have two benefices, he may escape unpunished at the bishop’s
hands._
_But he may not have two benefices_,
_Therefore he may not escape unpunished at the bishop’s hands_.
The second part is affirmed, that the first may be so also: as,
_If every ignorant minister were put out of the church, and a preacher
in his place, we should have good order_,
_But we have good order_.
_Therefore every ignorant minister is put out of the church, and a
preacher in his place._
Of those referred to the disjoined, the first is when all the parts of
the disjunction or proposition are not affirmed: as,
_Every ignorant minister is to be allowed, or not._
_But he is not._
_Therefore he is._
The second kind, is when the second part of the copulative negative
axiom is denied, that the first may be so: as,
_A non-resident is either a faithful, or unfaithful minister._
_But he is unfaithful. Ergo, &c._
And thus much of the fallacies in a syllogism.
The fallacy in method is when, to deceive withal, the end is set in the
beginning, the special before the general; good order be gone,
confounded; and finally when darkness, length, and hardness, is laboured
after.
END OF VOL. VI.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transcriber’s Note
In the Table of Contents, the third section of this volume is entitled
“The Whole Art of Rhetoric”. This title also serves as page header at p.
#421. However, at p. 419, the title page contains “The Art of Rhetoric”
(also the title of the following fourth section). To avoid confusion,
the word “WHOLE” has been added to p. 419.
At 70.34 “_[2. ]That the design...”_ The number ‘2’ has no preceding
‘1’.
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and
are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.
22.18 of the spiritual law[.] Added.
40.15 which he wi[./l]l, Replaced.
41.9 as in the Court of Common Pleas[.] Added.
60.20 there was a ne[e/c]essity Replaced.
108.5 was this here[it/ti]c Legat burnt? Transposed.
175.23 It seems therefo[ re,/re, ]if Shifted.
240.26 St[r]ange injustice! Inserted.
270.1 frustrate h[sa/is a]ttempts Replaced.
276.28 _[B./A.]_ But philosophy Replaced.
293.7 _quas vulgus eleger[e/i]t_ Replaced.
321.4 most benefica[i]l to the commonwealth Inserted.
388.33 there was no Parli[r/a]ment Replaced.
419.1 THE [WHOLE ]ART OF RHETORIC. Added.
423.9 to _accuse_ and _ex[s/c]use_ Replaced.