---- "cum ratione insanire."
And there is a third species of it, which Dryden himself speaks of in
the well-known line adopted from Seneca:
"Great wits are sure to madness near allied."
Now, it is obvious that, in the passages above quoted from Dryden, he
does not refer to any of these three kinds of madness. As a man, he
could say in regard to the first:
"Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto."
As a man of the world his whole life was an exemplification of the
second; for no one knew better than he how to be mad by rule. And as one
of our greatest wits he was entitled to claim a near alliance to that
madness which is characteristic of men of genius. It is clear,
therefore, that, in the lines quoted above, he speaks of that total
deprivation of reason, which is emphatically described as stark, staring
madness; and hence the blunder. In point of fact, Dryden either knew the
pleasure and happiness of which he speaks, as belonging to that sort of
madness, or he did not know them. If he knew them, then by his own
showing he was a madman. If he did not know them, how could he affirm
that none but madmen knew them?
Should my view of this matter be incorrect, I shall be thankful to any
of your readers who will take the trouble to set me right.