ORTHODOX SCHOLASTICISM
The formation of an orthodox scholasticism within the Muslim church
appears as a development spread over the 4th-5th centuries of the Hijra
(10-11 cent. A.D.), and is in three strata associated with the three
leaders, al-Ash`ari, al-Baqilani, and al-Ghazali. Such a development,
of course, is principally of interest for the internal history of Islam
and the evolution of Muslim theology, but it had its influence also on
the transmission of Arabic thought to Latin Christendom in two ways:
(i.) directly, in that al-Ghazali was established as one of the great
Arabic authorities when the Latins began to study the interpreters of
Aristotle, and his teaching is quoted by St. Thomas Aquinas and other
scholastic writers; and (ii.) indirectly, because a considerable part
of the work of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) takes the form of controversy
against the followers of al-Ghazali; his _Destruction of the
Destruction_, for example, is a refutation of al-Ghazali’s _Destruction
of the Philosophers_. It thus becomes imperative to know something
about the position and teaching of al-Ghazali and the influences which
prepared the way for his work.
Such a movement as orthodox scholasticism was inevitable. The position
at the end of the third century was quite impossible. The orthodox
Muslim adhered strictly to tradition, and entirely refused to admit
“innovation” (_bid`a_): he had been forced into this position as a
reaction against his earlier ready acceptance of Plato and Aristotle
as inspired teachers, for the later errors of the Mu`tazilites showed
what extremely dangerous conclusions could be drawn by those who
came under Hellenistic influence, and the more accurately the Greek
philosophers were studied the worse the heresies gathered from them.
Orthodox thought held itself carefully aloof from the Mu`tazilites
and philosophers on the one side, and from the Shi`ites and Sufis on
the other, confining itself to the safe studies of Qur´an exegesis,
tradition, and the canon law in which at Baghdad the reactionary
influence of Ibn Hanbal was predominant. The whole of the third century
had been a time of reaction on the part of the orthodox, very largely
due to the unfortunate attempt of al-Ma´mun to force rationalism on
his subjects. Al-Ghazali tells us in his “Confessions” that some
sincere Muslims felt themselves bound to reject all the exact sciences
as of dangerous tendency, and so repudiated scientific theories as
to eclipses of the sun and moon. All speculation lay under a ban,
because it led to “innovation” in belief or in practice; it was
contrary to orthodoxy to use the methods of Greek philosophy to prove
revealed doctrine as much as it was to impugn it, for both alike were
innovations on the traditional usage; nothing was known of spiritual
matters save what is actually stated in the Qur´an and tradition, and
from this nothing could be deduced by the use of argument, for logic
itself was a Greek innovation, at least as applied to theology: only
that was known which was actually stated, and no explanation of the
statement was lawful. Thus, when Ahmad ibn Hanbal was examined by
the inquisitors of al-Ma´mun he replied only by quoting the words of
the Qur´an or tradition, refusing to draw any conclusions from these
statements and admitting no conclusions drawn, keeping silence when
arguments were proposed to him, and protesting that such examination as
to religious belief was itself an innovation.
This position was hardly satisfactory to those who had inherited any
part of the Hellenic tradition, and it ultimately became impossible. An
organic body which cannot adapt itself to its surroundings is doomed
to decay. The Islamic state had sufficient vitality to meet the new
conditions introduced by its expansion to Syria and Persia, and now the
time had come for Islamic theology to adapt itself to the new thought
that was invading it. As we have seen, the philosophers al-Kindi
and al-Farabi were loyal Muslims, and had no suspicion that their
investigations were leading to heretical conclusions, and such was
undoubtedly the case with the earlier Mu`tazilites also, but results
had justified the orthodox in a suspicious attitude towards “argument”
(_kalam_). Now, towards the close of the third century the attempt to
find an orthodox _kalam_ appears as a movement which originates with
the Mu`tazilites, of whom a section of the more conservative sought to
return to an orthodox stand-point, and to use _kalam_ in theology in
defence of the traditional beliefs as against the heretical conclusions
which were in circulation. Following a somewhat later usage we may
employ this term _kalam_ to denote an orthodox philosophical theology,
that is to say, one in which the methods of philosophy were used, but
the primary material was obtained from revelation, and thus one which
was closely parallel with the scholastic theology of Latin Christendom.
We have cited the name of al-Ash`ari as representative of the
first stage of this movement, but it is equally represented by the
contemporary al-Mataradi in Samarqand and by at-Tahawi in Egypt. Of
these, however, at-Tahawi has quite passed into oblivion. For long
the Ash`arites and the Mataridites formed rival orthodox schools of
_kalam_, and al-Mataridi’s system still has a certain vogue amongst
Turkish Muslims, but the Ash`arite system is that which commands the
widest assent. Theologians reckon thirteen points of difference between
the two schools, all of purely theoretical importance.
Al-Ash`ari was born at Basra in 260 or 270, and died at Baghdad about
330 or 340. At first he was an adherent of the Mu`tazilites, but one
Friday in A.H. 300 he made a public renunciation of the views of that
party, and took up a definitely orthodox position; in the pulpit of
the great mosque at Basra he said, “They who know me know who I am;
as for those who do not know me, I am `Ali b. Isma`il al-Ash`ari,
and I used to hold that the Qur´an was created, that the eyes of men
shall not see God, and that we ourselves are the authors of our evil
deeds; now I have returned to the truth; I renounce these opinions,
and I take the engagement to refute the Mu`tazilites and expose their
infamy and turpitude” (Ibn Khallikan, ii. 228). From this it will be
perceived that the doctrines then regarded as characteristic of the
Mu`tazilites were (i.) that the Qur´an was created, (ii.) the denial of
the possibility of the beatific vision, and (iii.) the freedom of the
will.
In the period after this change al-Ash`ari wrote a controversial
work against the Mu`tazilites, which bears the name _Kitab ash-Sharh
wa-t-Tafsil_, “the book of explanation and exposition”; he was the
author also of religious treatises called _Luma_ “flashes,” _Mujaz_
“abridgment,” _Idah al-Burhan_ “elucidation of the Burhan,” and
_Tabiyin_ “illustrations.” His real importance, however, lay in
founding a school of orthodox scholasticism, afterwards more fully
developed by al-Baqilani, and gradually spreading through the Muslim
world, although strongly opposed on the one side by the _falasifah_,
who saw in its teaching the introduction of traditional beliefs
limiting and restricting the Aristotelian doctrine, and on the other
side by the more reactionary orthodox, who disapproved the use of
philosophical methods as applied to theological subjects. This use of
philosophy in the explanation and defence of religion came to be known
as _kalam_, and those who employed it were called _mutakallamin_.
In dealing with the old problems of Muslim theology, such as the
eternity of the Qur´an, the freedom of the will, etc., the Ash`arites
do seem to have produced a reasonable statement of doctrine, which yet
safeguarded the main demands of orthodoxy.
(_a_) As to the Qur´an they held that it was eternal in God, but its
expression in words and syllables was created in time. This does not
of course mean that the expression was due to the Prophet to whom it
was revealed, but to God, so that the doctrine of literal inspiration
was asserted in the strictest form. Nor was it thus created when it
was revealed, but long before in remote ages when it was first uttered
to the angels and “august beings,” and was afterwards disclosed by the
angel Gabriel to the Prophet Muhammad. This, which is now the orthodox
belief, has furnished an opportunity for controversy to Christians and
modern rationalists, who have fixed upon the use of particular words,
introduced into Arabic as loan words from Syriac, Persian, and Greek,
and appear in the Qur´an: how, they ask, can it be explained that words
revealed at a remote period of past eternity, long before the creation
of the world, as it is commonly asserted, show the influence of foreign
languages which were brought to bear upon Arabic in the 7th cent. A.D.?
and Muslim apologists, who have always maintained the absolute purity
of Qur´anic Arabic as one of the evidences of Divine origin, seem
to regard this as a serious difficulty. The view that the Qur´an is
eternal in substance, and thus in substance revealed to the Prophet,
who was left to express it in his own words, which would thereby show
the limitations of his time, is not admitted by the orthodox. It will
be noted also that the Ash`arite teaching evades and does not answer
an old difficulty: if the substance of the Qur´an is the wisdom of God
and is co-eternal with Him, even though emanating from Him, we have
something other than God, namely, His wisdom, eternally existing with
Him, and this can be represented as parallel with the persons of the
Christian Trinity, so as to be inconsistent with the absolute unity of
God.
(_b_) This brings us to the attributes of God generally. The
Ash`arites in this controversy side with the traditional school
against the philosophers. Of the ten Aristotelian categories they
regard only two--existence, i.e., _ens_, and quality as objectively
real; the other eight are merely relative characteristics (_i´tibar_)
subjective in the mind of the knower, and having no objective reality.
God has qualities--indeed, no less than twenty are enumerated, but
amongst these is _mukhalafa_, which is the quality of uniqueness in
qualification, so that the qualities and attributes ascribed to God
must either be such as cannot be applied to men, or else, if the terms
can be used of created beings, they must have quite different meanings
when applied to God, and these qualities thus signified must be such
as could not be predicated of men or of any other created being. Thus,
that God has power and wisdom means that He is almighty and omniscient
in a way which could not possibly be stated of any men. In practice
this works so that no attribute can be applied to God unless it is
expressly so applied in the text of the Qur´an; if it occurs there it
may be used, but must be understood as having a meaning other than such
a term would have when used in the normal way of men. It cannot be that
God’s attributes differ from those of men only in degree, as that He
is wiser and more powerful than man, but they differ in their whole
nature. It is noted also that God is _qiyam bi-n-nafs_, or “subsisting
in Himself,” that is to say, independent of any other than Himself, and
so God’s knowledge does not depend on the existence or nature of the
thing known.
(_c_) As to freedom of the will. God creates power in the man and
creates also the choice, and He then creates the act corresponding to
this power and choice. Thus the action is “acquired” by the creature.
Of the categories existence is the first substratum, and to this the
other predicables are added: none of these others are separable or
_per se_, they can only exist in the essence. It is admitted that such
qualities exist in the _ens_, but they are only adjuncts which come
into being with the _ens_ and go out of existence with it. Therefore
the world consists of _entia_ or substances on which the mind reflects
the qualities which are not in the thing itself but only in the mind.
Against the Aristotelian theory that matter suffers the impress of
form, he argues that all impress is subjective in the mind: if all
qualities fall out substance itself ceases to exist, and so substance
is not permanent but transitory, which opposes the Aristotelian
doctrine of the eternity of matter.
The substances perceived by us are atoms which come into existence
from vacuity and drop out of existence again. Thus, when a body moves
from one position to another the atoms in the first position cease to
be, and a group of new similar atoms come into existence in the second
position, so that movement involves a series of annihilations and
creations.
The cause of these changes is God, the only permanent and absolute
reality. There is no secondary cause, as there are no laws of nature;
in every case God acts directly upon each atom. Thus, fire does not
cause burning, but God creates a being burned when fire touches a
body, and the burning is directly His work. So in the freedom of the
will, as, for example, when a man writes, God gives the will to write
and causes the apparent motion of the pen and of the hand, and also
directly creates the writing which seems to proceed from the pen.
Existence is the very self of the thing. This is peculiar to
al-Ash`ari and his followers: all others hold existence to be the state
(_hāl_) necessary to the essence, but in al-Ash`ari it is the essence.
So God exists, and His existence is the self (_`ayn_) of His essence.
Such a system involves ethical difficulties; it appears that there can
be no responsibility if there is no connection between action and the
act done. Al-Ash`ari replied that there is a unity in the will of God,
so that cause and effect are not isolated as though independent atoms,
but all is disposed according to a Divine plan. This answer, however,
can hardly be regarded as adequate.
This system is an attempt to deal with the difficulties raised
by philosophy, but al-Ash`ari considers it preferable that the
difficulties should never be raised, and so strongly urges that the
mysteries of philosophy should never be discussed with the multitude.
We shall see the same conclusion set forth by the later philosopher
of the West, but on a somewhat different ground; they regarded the
mysteries of philosophy as containing the supreme truth, for which the
multitude was not ripe, and so they should not be discussed publicly,
as the people were not able to understand; but al-Ash`ari seems rather
to regard these mysteries as likely to be not edifying, as introducing
questions which are of small importance compared with the great truths
of revelation.
The Ash`arite system thus described was completed by al-Baqilani
(d. 403), but it did not become general until it was popularised by
al-Ghazali in the East and by Ibn Tumart in the West.
Al-Mataridi, of Samarqand was a contemporary of al-Ash`ari, and reached
very similar results. Amongst the points peculiar to al-Mataridi we
may note (_a_) the attribute of _creating_ has been an attribute of
God from all eternity, but this attribute is distinct from the thing
created; (_b_) Creatures have certain choice of action, and for the
things done by this choice they are rewarded or punished; good actions
are only done by the pleasure (_rida_) of God, but bad actions are not
always by His pleasure; (_c_) Ability to do the action goes with the
will and the act, so that the creature cannot have an action imposed on
him as a task which is not in his power.
He agrees with al-Ash`ari in holding that the world and all it contains
have been created by God from nothing: it consists of substances and
attributes. The substances exist in themselves, either as compounds,
such as bodies, or as non-compounds, as essences which are indivisible.
Attributes have no separate existence, but depend for their existence
on bodies or essences. God is not essence, nor attribute, nor body, nor
anything formed, bounded, numbered, limited, nor compounded. He cannot
be described by _mahiya_ (quiddity), nor _kayfiya_ (modality); He does
not exist in time or place, and nothing resembles Him or is outside His
knowledge or power. He has qualities from all eternity existing in His
essence; they are not He nor is He other than they.
For some time the Ash`arites had to meet keen opposition and even
persecution, and it was not until the middle of the 5th cent. that
they came to be admitted generally as orthodox Muslims. Their triumph
was assured in 459 A.H., when Nizam al-Mulk, the wazir of Alp Arslan,
founded at Baghdad the Nizamite academy as a theological college of
Ash`arite teaching. Still the Hanbalites raised occasional riots,
and demonstrated against those whom they regarded as free thinkers;
but these were put down by authority, and in 516 the Khalif himself
attended the Ash`arite lectures. The Mu`tazilites were now merely a
survival; as broad church theologians they had fallen into general
disrepute in the eyes of the orthodox, and they were equally disliked
by the philosophers as defective in their adherence to the Aristotelian
system. The educated fell now into three broad groups: on the one
hand were the orthodox, who came under the influence of al-Ash`ari or
al-Mataridi; on the other were those who accepted the doctrines of
the philosophers, and in the third place were those who rejected all
philosophy, and confined their attention solely to Qur´an tradition and
the canon law, and who should not be excluded from the ranks of the
educated, although their studies ran in somewhat narrow lines.
The final triumph of the Ash`arite theology was the work of
_al-Ghazali_ (d. 505). He was born at Tus in 450 (= 1058 A.D.); early
left an orphan he was educated by a Sufi friend, and then attended
the school at Naisabur. As his education progressed he cut loose from
Sufi influence and became an Ash`arite, and in 484 he was appointed
president of the Nazimite Academy at Baghdad. Gradually, however, he
became a prey to spiritual unrest, and in 488 resigned his post and
retired to Syria, where he spent some years in study and the practices
of devotion. In 499 he returned to active work as a teacher in the
Nazimite Academy at Naisabur, where he became the leader of a modified
Ash`arite system strongly leavened by mysticism, which we may regard as
the final evolution of orthodox Muslim theology.
Al-Ghazali, following al-Ash`ari, taught that philosophical theory
cannot form the basis of religious thought, thus opposing the position
of the philosophers. By revelation only can the primary essentials
of truth be attained. Philosophy itself is no equal or rival of
revelation: it is no more than common sense and regulated thinking,
which may be employed by men about religion or any other subject; at
best it acts as a preservative against error in deduction and argument,
the primary material for which, so far as religion is concerned, can
be furnished only by revelation. But against this he appears also as
the transmitter of the teaching already given, by al-Qushayri, which
introduced the mysticism of the Sufis into orthodox Islam. Revelation
indeed is given by means of the Qur´an and tradition, and it is
sufficient to accept what is thus revealed, but the ultimate truth
of revelation can be tested and proved only by the experience of the
individual. So far as men are concerned this is possible by means of
ecstasy whereby one becomes a knower (_`arif_), and receives assurance
and enlightenment by direct communication from God. The soul of man
differs from all other created things; it is essentially spiritual, and
so outside the categories which are applicable only to material things.
The soul has been breathed into man by God (Qur. 15, 29; 38, 72), and
this is comparable to the way in which the sun sends out its rays and
gives warmth to those things on which its rays rest. The soul, which
has no dimension, shape, or locus, rules the body in the same way as
God rules the world, so that the body is a microcosm reproducing the
conditions of the world. The essential element of this soul is not the
intelligence which is concerned with the bodily frame, but the will:
just as God is primarily known not as thought or intelligence, but
as the volition which is the cause of creation. Thus God cannot be
considered as the spirit animating the world, which is the pantheistic
position, but as volition outside the world which has willed it to be.
The aim of scholastic theology is to preserve the purity of
orthodox belief from heretical innovation: “God raised up a school
of theologians and inspired them with the desire to defend orthodoxy
by means of a system of proofs adapted to unveil the devices of the
heretics and to foil the attacks which they made on the doctrines
established by tradition” (Al-Ghazali: _Confessions_). Aristotle
himself was an unbeliever using arguments he should not, but, in spite
of his errors, his teaching as expounded by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina
is the system of thought which comes nearest to Islam (id.). Because
of its unavoidable difficulties and the grave errors contained in
Aristotle and his Arabic commentators men are not to be encouraged to
read philosophy (id.).
There are three different worlds or planes of existence (i.) the _`alam
al-mulk_ is that in which existence is apparent to the senses, the
world made known by perception, and this is in a state of constant
change; (ii.) the _`alam al-malakut_, the changeless and eternal
world of reality established by God’s decree, of which the world of
perception is but the reflexion; (iii.) and the _`alam al-jarabut_ or
intermediate state, which properly belongs to the world of reality,
but seems to be in the plane of perception. In this intermediate state
is the human soul, which belongs to the plane of reality, though
apparently projected into the perceptible plane to which it does not
belong, and then returns to reality. The pen, tablet, etc., mentioned
in the Qur´an are not mere allegories; they belong to the world of
reality, and so are something other than what we see in this world of
perception. These three worlds or planes are not separate in time or
space, they are rather to be considered as modes of existence.
The theories of the astronomers as to movements of the heavenly bodies
are to be accepted--al-Ghazali adhered, of course, to the Ptolemaic
system--but these deal only with the lowest plane, the world of sense.
Behind all nature is God, who is on the plane of reality. This higher
plane cannot be reached by reason or intellect, whose operations must
rely on the evidence of sense perception. To reach the plane of reality
man must be raised by a spiritual faculty, “by which he perceives
invisible things, the secrets of the future and other concepts as
inaccessible to reason as the concepts of reason are inaccessible to
mere discrimination and what is perceived by discrimination of the
senses” (op. cit.). Inspiration means the disclosing of realities to
the prophets or saints, and these realities can only be known by such
revelation or by the personal experience of ecstasy by which the soul
is raised to the plane of reality. Not only are the religious truths
in the Qur´an revealed, but all ideas of good and evil are similarly
revealed, and could not be attained by the unaided use of reason, a
view which is obviously intended to refute the Mu`tazilite claim that
moral differences can be perceived by reason. The philosophers also
have attained truths by revelation, and the main substance of medicine
and astronomy is based on such revelation (op. cit.).
Unlike Ibn Rushd, al-Ghazali thus emphasizes supra-rational intuition
attained in a state of ecstasy, whereby the soul is raised above the
world of shadow and reflection to the plane of reality. This was pure
mysticism, and thus al-Ghazali introduces a Sufi element into orthodox
Islam. At the same time he reduced Sufism to a scientific form, and
endorsed the Plotinian terminology. Macdonald summarises his work
under four heads: (i.) he established an orthodox mysticism; (ii.)
he popularised the use of philosophy; (iii.) he rendered philosophy
subordinate to theology, and (iv.) he restored the fear of God when the
element of fear was tending to be thrust into the background, at least
by the educated. From this time on the term _kalam_ was usually applied
to philosophy adapted to the use of theologians.
The chief works left by al-Ghazali are the _Ihya `Ulum ad-Din_,
of which it is understood that a translation by H. Bauer is in
preparation, and the _Mi´yar al-`Ilm_, a treatise on logic. To
posterity, however, he is best known by his _Confessions_, an
autobiographical account of his spiritual life and development, which
may not unfitly be placed beside the Confessions of St. Augustine.
Al-Ghazali completes the development of orthodox Muslim theology. From
this time forth it ceased to have any originality, and for the most
part showed signs of decadence. Here and there we find Sufi revivals;
indeed, Sufism is the only phase of Islam which kept free from the
rigid conservatism which has laid its iron hand of repression upon
Muslim life and thought generally. In Yemen the system of al-Ghazali
was kept alive by generations of Sufis, but for the most part Sufism
preferred less orthodox paths. Against these Sufi movements we see
from time to time others of a distinctly reactionary character, such
as that of the Wahabis, who opposed the theology of al-Ghazali when it
was generally recognised as the orthodox teaching at Mecca, and in this
they were followed by the Sanusi.
_Sayyid Murtada_ (d. 1205 A.H. = 1788 A.D.), a native of Zabid in
Yihama, wrote a commentary on al-Ghazali’s _Ihya `Ulum ad-Din_, and
thus revived the study of the great scholastic theologian. From that
time the Islamic community has not lacked neo-Ghazalian students, and
many consider that that school contains the best promise for modern
Islam.