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KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., Ltd.
ARABIC THOUGHT AND
ITS PLACE IN HISTORY
BY
DE LACY O’LEARY, D.D.
_Lecturer in Aramaic and Syriac, Bristol University_
London:
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD.
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO.
1922
FOREWORD
History traces the evolution of the social structure in which the
community exists to-day. There are three chief factors at work in this
evolution; racial descent, culture drift, and transmission of language:
the first of these physiological and not necessarily connected with
the other two, whilst those two are not always associated with each
other. In the evolution of the social structure the factor of first
importance is the transmission of culture, which is not a matter of
heredity but due to contact, for culture is learned and reproduced
by imitation and not inherited. Culture must be taken in the widest
sense to include political, social, and legal institutions, the arts
and crafts, religion, and the various forms of intellectual life which
show their presence in literature, philosophy, and otherwise, all more
or less connected, and all having the common characteristic that they
cannot be passed on by physical descent but must be learned in after
life. But race, culture, and language resemble one another in so far
as it is true that all are multiplex and perpetually interwoven, so
that in each the lines of transmission seem rather like a tangled skein
than an ordered pattern; results proceed from a conflicting group of
causes amongst which it is often difficult to apportion the relative
influences.
The culture of modern Europe derives from that of the Roman Empire,
itself the multiple resultant of many forces, amongst which the
intellectual life of Hellenism was most effective, but worked into a
coherent system by the wonderful power of organization, which was one
of the most salient characteristics of that Empire. The whole cultural
life of mediæval Europe shows this Hellenistic-Roman culture passed on,
developed, and modified by circumstances. As the Empire fell to pieces
the body of culture became subject to varying conditions in different
localities, of which the divergence between the Greek-speaking East and
the Latin-speaking West is the most striking example. The introduction
of Muslim influence through Spain is the one instance in which we
seem to get an alien culture entering into this Roman tradition and
exercising a disturbing influence. In fact, this Muslim culture was
at bottom essentially a part of the Hellenistic-Roman material, even
the theology of Islam being formulated and developed from Hellenistic
sources, but Islam had so long lived apart from Christendom and its
development had taken place in surroundings so different that it seems
a strange and alien thing. Its greatest power lay in the fact that it
presented the old material in an entirely fresh form.
* * * * *
It is the effort of the following pages to trace the transmission
of Hellenistic thought through the medium of Muslim philosophers and
Jewish thinkers who lived in Muslim surroundings, to show how this
thought, modified as it passed through a period of development in the
Muslim community and itself modifying Islamic ideas, was brought to
bear upon the culture of mediæval Latin Christendom. So greatly had
it altered in external form during the centuries of its life apart,
that it seemed a new type of intellectual life and became a disturbing
factor which diverted Christian philosophy into new lines and tended to
disintegrate the traditional theology of the Church, directly leading
up to the Renascence which gave the death-blow to mediæval culture:
so little had it altered in real substance that it used the same
text-books and treated very much the same problems already current in
the earlier scholasticism which had developed independently in Latin
Christendom. It will be our effort so to trace the history of mediæval
Muslim thought as to show the elements which it had in common with
Christian teaching and to account for the points of divergence.
De L. O’L.
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I THE SYRIAC VERSION OF HELLENISM 1
II THE ARAB PERIOD 56
III THE COMING OF THE `ABBASIDS 89
IV THE TRANSLATORS 105
V THE MU`TAZILITES 123
VI THE EASTERN PHILOSOPHERS 135
VII SUFISM 181
VIII ORTHODOX SCHOLASTICISM 208
IX THE WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 226
X THE JEWISH TRANSMITTORS 261
XI INFLUENCE OF THE ARABIC PHILOSOPHERS ON LATIN SCHOLASTICISM 275
CONCLUDING PARAGRAPH 295
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 296
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
CHAPTER I
THE SYRIAC VERSION OF HELLENISM
The subject proposed in the following pages is the history of the
cultural transmission by which Greek philosophy and science were passed
from Hellenistic surroundings to the Syriac speaking community, thence
to the Arabic speaking world of Islam, and so finally to the Latin
Schoolmen of Western Europe. That such a transmission did take place is
known even to the beginner in mediæval history, but how it happened,
and the influences which promoted it, and the modifications which took
place _en route_, appear to be less generally known, and it does not
seem that the details, scattered through works of very diverse types,
are easily accessible to the English reader. Many historians seem
content to give only a casual reference to its course, sometimes even
with strange chronological confusions which show that the sources used
are still the mediæval writers who had very imperfect information about
the development of intellectual life amongst the Muslims. Following
mediæval usage we sometimes find the Arabic writers referred to as
“Arabs” or “Moors,” although in fact there was only one philosopher
of any importance who was an Arab by race, and comparatively little
is known about his work. These writers belonged to an Arabic speaking
community, but very few of them were actually Arabs.
After the later Hellenistic development Greek culture spread outward
into the oriental fringe of people who used Syriac, Coptic, Aramaic,
or Persian as their vernacular speech, and in these alien surroundings
it took a somewhat narrower development and even what we may describe
as a provincial tone. There is no question of race in this. Culture
is not inherited as a part of the physiological heritage transmitted
from parent to child; it is learned by contact due to intercourse,
imitation, education, and such like things, and such contact between
social groups as well as between individuals is much helped by the
use of a common language and hindered by difference of language. As
soon as Hellenism overflowed into the vernacular speaking communities
outside the Greek speaking world it began to suffer some modification.
It so happened also that these vernacular speaking communities wanted
to be cut off from close contact with the Greek world because very
bitter theological divisions had arisen and had produced feelings of
great hostility on the part of those who were officially described as
heretics against the state church in the Byzantine Empire.
In this present chapter we have to consider three points; in the first
place the particular stage of development reached by Greek thought at
the time when these divisions took place; secondly the cause of these
divisions and their tendencies; and thirdly the particular line of
development taken by Hellenistic culture in its oriental atmosphere.
First stands the question of the stage of development reached by
Hellenism, and we may test this by its intellectual life as represented
by science and philosophy, at the time when the oriental off-shoot
shows a definite line of separation. English education, largely
dominated by the principles learned at the renascence, is inclined to
treat philosophy as coming to an end with Aristotle and beginning again
with Descartes after a long blank during which there lived and worked
some degenerate descendants of the ancients who hardly need serious
consideration. But this position violates the primary canon of history
which postulates that all life is continuous, the life of the social
community as well as the physical life of an organic body: and life
must be a perpetual series of causes and results, so that each event
can only be explained by the cause which went before, and can only be
fully understood in the light of the result which follows after. What
we call the “middle ages” had an important place in the evolution of
our own cultural condition, and owed much to the transmitted culture
which came round from ancient Hellenism through Syriac, Arabic, and
Hebrew media. But this culture came as a living thing with an unbroken
and continuous development from what we call the “classic” age. As the
philosophy of the great classic schools passes down to these later
periods it shows great modifications, but this alteration is itself a
proof of life. Philosophy, like religion, in so far as it has a real
vitality, must change and adapt itself to altered conditions and new
requirements: it can remain pure and true to its past only in so far as
its life is artificial and unreal, lived in an academic atmosphere far
removed from the life of the community at large. In such an unnatural
atmosphere no doubt, it is possible for a religion or a philosophy to
live perfectly pure and uncorrupt, but it is certainly not an ideal
life: in real life there are bound to be introduced many unworthy
elements and some which can only be described as actually corrupt. So
it is inevitable that as a religion or a philosophy lives and really
fulfils its proper functions it has to pass through many changes. Of
course the same holds good for all other forms of culture: it may be
true that a country is happy if it has no history, but it is the placid
happiness of vegetable life, not the enjoyment of the higher functions
of rational being.
In considering the transmission of Greek philosophy to the Arabs we
see that philosophy still as a living force, adapting itself to changed
conditions but without a break in the continuity of its life. It was
not, as now, an academic study sought only by a group of specialists,
but a living influence which guided men in their ideas about the
universe in which they lived and dominated all theology, law, and
social ideas. For many centuries it pervaded the atmosphere in which
Western Asia was educated and in which it lived. Men became Christians,
for a time the new religious interest filled their minds, but later on
it was inevitable that philosophy should re-assert its power, and then
Christian doctrine had to be re-cast to conform to it: the descendants
of these people became Muslims and then again, after an interval,
religion had to conform itself to current philosophy. We have no such
dominant philosophical system in force to-day, but we have a certain
mass of scientific facts and theories which form an intellectual
background to modern European life and the defenders of traditional
religion find it necessary to adjust their teaching to the principles
implied in those facts and theories.
But the important point is that then Christian teachers began to put
themselves into touch with current philosophy, and so when the Muslims
later on did the same, they had to reckon with philosophy as they found
it actually living in their own days: they did not become Platonists or
Aristotelians in the sense in which we should understand the terms. The
current philosophy had changed from the older standards, not because
the degenerate people of those days could not understand the pure
doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, but because they took philosophy so
seriously and earnestly as an explanation of the universe and of man’s
place in it that they were bound to re-adjust their views in the light
of what they regarded as later information, and the views had altered
to adjust themselves with the course of human experience.
From Plato onwards philosophy had been very largely concerned with
theories which more or less directly concerned the structure of
society: it was perceived that a very large part of man’s life, duties,
and general welfare, was intimately concerned with his relations
to the community in which he lived. But soon after the time of
Aristotle the general conditions of the social order were seen to be
undergoing a profound modification: great empires with highly organised
administrations replaced the self-governing city states of the older
period, and social life had to adjust itself to the new conditions.
A man who was a citizen of the Roman Empire was a citizen in quite a
different sense from that in which one was a citizen of the Athenian
Republic. The Stoic philosophy, which is of this later age, already
presupposes these new conditions and in course of time the other
schools orientated themselves similarly. One of the first results is
a tendency to eclecticism and to combination of the tenets of several
schools. The new outlook, broader in its horizon, perhaps shallower in
other respects, impelled men to take what was an imperialist attitude
instead of a local or national one. Precisely similar changes were
forced upon the Jewish religion. Hellenistic Judaism, at the beginning
of the Christian era, is concerned with the human species and the race
of Israel is considered chiefly as a means of bringing illumination to
mankind at large. It was this Hellenistic Judaism which culminated in
St. Paul and the expansion of the Christian Church, whilst orthodox
Judaism, that is to say the provincial Jewery of Palestine reverted
to its racial attitude under the pressure of circumstances partly
reactionary against the too rapid progress of Hellenism and partly
political in character.
The old pagan religions showed many local varieties, and from those a
world-wide religion could only be evolved by some speculative doctrines
which reconciled their divergences. Never has a religion of any
extension been formed from local cults otherwise than by the ministry
of some kind of speculative theology: sometimes the fusion of cults has
spontaneously provided such a theology, as was the case in the Nile
valley and in Mesopotamia in early times, and when the theology was
produced it brought its solvent power to bear rapidly and effectively
on other surrounding cults. As many races and states were associated
together in the Greek Empire which, though apparently separated into
several kingdoms, yet had an intellectual coherence and a common
civilization, and this was still more definitely the case when the
closer federation of the Roman Empire followed, philosophy was forced
more and more in the direction of speculative theology: it assumed
those ethical and doctrinal functions which we generally associate
with religion, the contemporary local cults concerning themselves
only with ritual duties. Thus in the early centuries of the Christian
era Hellenistic philosophy was evolving a kind of religion, of a high
moral tone and definitely monotheistic in doctrine. This theological
philosophy was eclectic, but rested upon a basis of Platonism.
Whilst the philosophers were developing a monotheistic and moral
system which they hoped to make a world religion, the Christians
were attempting a similar task on somewhat different lines. The
earlier converts to the Christian religion were not as a rule drawn
from the educated classes and shewed a marked suspicion and dislike
towards those superior persons, such as the Gnostics, or at least
the pre-Marcionite Gnostics, who were disposed to patronise them.
Gradually however this attitude changed and we begin to find men
like Justin Martyr who had received a philosophical education and
yet found it quite possible to co-ordinate contemporary science and
Christian doctrine. In Rome, in Africa, and in Greece the Christians
were a despised minority, chiefly drawn from the unlettered class,
and ostentatiously ignored by the writers of the day. Like the Jew of
the Ghetto they were forced to live an isolated life and thrown back
upon their internal resources. But in Alexandria and, to a lesser
degree in Syria, they were more in the position of the modern Jew in
Anglo Saxon lands, though bitterly hated and occasionally persecuted,
and were brought under the intellectual influences of the surrounding
community and thus experienced a solvent force in their own ideas.
When at last Christianity appears in the ascendant it has been largely
re-cast by Hellenistic influences, its theology is re-stated in
philosophical terms, and thus in the guise of theology a large amount
of philosophical material was transmitted to the vernacular speaking
hinterland of Western Asia.
The Arabic writer Masûdi informs us that Greek philosophy originally
flourished at Athens, but the Emperor Augustus transferred it from
Athens to Alexandria and Rome, and Theodosius afterwards closed the
schools at Rome and made Alexandria the educational centre of the Greek
world (Masûdi: _Livre de l’avertissement_, trad. B. Carra de Vaux,
Paris, 1896, p. 170). Although grotesquely expressed this statement
contains an element of truth in so far as it represents Alexandria
as gradually becoming the principal home of Greek philosophy. It had
begun to take a leading place even in the days of the Ptolemies,
and in scientific, as distinguished from purely literary work, it
had assumed a position of primary importance early in the Christian
era. The schools of Athens remained open until A.D. 529, but had
long been out of touch with progressive scholarship. Rome also shows
great philosophers, most often of oriental birth, down to a late age,
but although these were given a kindly welcome and a hearing, Roman
education was more interested in jurisprudence, indeed the purely Roman
philosophical speculation is that embedded in Justinian’s code. Antioch
also had its philosophy, but this was never of more than secondary
importance.
In the course of what we may term the Alexandrian period the
Platonic school had steadily taken the first place. It was indeed
considerably changed from the ancient Academic standards, chiefly by
the introduction of semi-mystical elements which were attributed to
Pythagoras, and later by fusion with the neo-Aristotelian school. The
Pythagorean elements probably can be traced ultimately to an Indian
source, at least in such instances as the doctrine of the unreality
of matter and phenomena which appears in Indian philosophy as _māyā_,
and the re-incarnation of souls which is _avatar_. The tendency of
native Greek thought, as seen in Democritus and other genuinely
Greek thinkers, was distinctly materialistic, but Plato apparently
incorporates some alien matter, probably Indian, perhaps some Egyptian
ideas as well. We know there was a transmission of oriental thought
influencing Hellenism, but very little is known of the details.
Certainly Plotinus and the neo-Platonists were eclectic thinkers and
drew freely from oriental sources, some disguised as Pythagorean, by a
long sojourn in Greek lands.
In the 3rd century A.D. we find the beginnings of what is known
as neo-Platonism. A very typical passage in Gibbon’s _Decline and
Fall_ (ch. xiii.) refers to the neo-Platonists as “men of profound
thought and intense application; but, by mistaking the true object
of philosophy, their labours contributed much less to improve than
to corrupt the human understanding. The knowledge that is suited to
our situation and powers, the whole compass of moral, natural, and
mathematical science, was neglected by the new Platonists; whilst
they exhausted their strength in the verbal disputes of metaphysics,
attempted to explore the secrets of the invisible world, and studied
to reconcile Aristotle with Plato, on subjects of which both these
philosophers were as ignorant as the rest of mankind.” Although this
passage is coloured by some of the peculiar prejudices of Gibbon it
fairly represents a common attitude towards neo-Platonism and might
equally apply to every religious movement the world has ever seen.
The neo-Platonists were the result, we may say the inevitable result,
of tendencies which had been at work ever since the age of Alexander
and the widening of the mental horizon and the decay of interest in
the old civic life. The older philosophers had endeavoured to produce
efficient citizens; but under imperialist conditions efficient citizens
were not so much wanted as obedient subjects. Through all this period
there are very clear indications of the new trend of thought which
assumes a more theological and philanthropic character, aiming at
producing good men rather than useful citizens. The speculations of
Philo the Jewish Platonist give very plain indications of these new
tendencies as they appeared in Alexandria. He shows the monotheistic
tendency which was indeed present in the older philosophers but now
begins to be more strongly emphasized as philosophy becomes more
theological in its speculations, though no doubt in his case this was
largely due to the religion he professed. He expressed the doctrine
of a One God, eternal, unchanging, and passionless, far removed above
the world of phenomena, as the First Cause of all that exists, a
philosophical monotheism which can be fitted in with the Old Testament
but does not naturally proceed from it. The doctrine of an Absolute
Reality as the necessary cause of all that is variable, something like
the fulcrum which Archimedes needed to move the world, was one to which
all philosophy, and especially the Platonic school, was tending. But,
as causation to some extent implies change, this First Cause could not
be regarded as directly creating the world, but only as the eternal
source of an eternally proceeding emanation by means of which the power
of the First Cause is projected so as to produce the universe and all
it contains. The essential features of this teaching are, the absolute
unity of the First Cause, its absolute reality, its eternity, and its
invariability, all of which necessarily removes it above the plane
of things knowable to man; and the operative emanation ceaselessly
issuing forth, eternal like its source, yet acting in time and space,
an emanation which Philo terms the _Logos_ or “Word.” Although
these theories are to a large extent only an expression of logical
conclusions towards which the Platonists were then advancing, Philo had
curiously little influence. No doubt there was a tendency to regard his
teaching as mainly an attempt to read a Platonic meaning into Jewish
doctrine, and certainly the large amount of attention he devoted to
exegesis of the Old Testament and to Jewish apologetics would prevent
his works from receiving serious attention from non-Jewish readers.
Again, although his ideas about monotheism and the nature of God were
those to which Platonism was tending, they represent also a Jewish
attitude which, starting from a monotheistic stand-point was then,
under Hellenistic influence, making towards a supra-sensual idea of
God, explaining away the anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament and
postulating an emanation, the _Hochma_ or “wisdom” of God as the
intermediary in creation and revelation. Undoubtedly Philo, or the
Philonic school of Hellenistic Judaism, was responsible for the Logos
doctrine which appears in the portions of the New Testament bearing the
name of St. John. He had an influence also on Jewish thought as appears
in the Targums where the operative emanation which proceeds from the
First Cause is no longer the “wisdom” of God but the “Word.” He seems
to have had no influence at all on the course of Alexandrian philosophy
generally.
The tendencies which were at work in Philo were also leavening
Greek thought outside Jewish circles and all schools of philosophy
show a growing definiteness in their assertion of One God eternal
and invariable, as the source and First Cause of the universe. It is
a recognition of the principal of uniformity in nature and of the
necessity of accounting for the cause of this uniformity. The Gnostic
sects, which were of philosophical origin, simply show the definite
acceptance of this First Cause and, having accepted it as on a plane
far removed above imperfection and variation, suggest intermediary
emanations as explaining the production of an imperfect and variable
universe from a primary source which is itself perfect and unchanging.
The descriptive accounts of the successive emanations, each less
perfect than that from which it proceeds, which ultimately produced
the world in which we perceive phenomena, are different in different
Gnostic systems, often crude enough and grotesque in our eyes, and
frequently drawing from Christianity or Judaism or some other of the
oriental religions which were then attracting the attention of the
Roman world. But these details are of minor importance. All Gnostic
theories bear witness to the belief that there is a First Cause,
absolutely real, perfect, eternal, and far removed above this world
of time and space, and that some emanation or emanations must have
intervened to connect the resultant world, such as we know it, with
this sublime Cause: and such belief indicates in crude form a general
conviction which was getting hold of all current thought in the early
centuries of the Christian era.
Complementary to this was the psychological teaching represented by
the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias who taught at
Athens, A.D. 198-211. His extant works include commentaries on the
first book of the Analytica Priora, on the Topica, Meteorology, _de
sensu_, the first five books of the Metaphysics and an abridgment of
the other books of the Metaphysics, as well as treatises on the soul,
etc. Over and over again his treatise on the soul and his commentaries
are translated into Arabic, paraphrased, and made the subject of
further commentaries, until it seems that his psychology is the very
nucleus of all Arabic philosophy, and it is this which forms the main
point of the Arabic influence on Latin scholasticism. It becomes indeed
absolutely essential that we understand the Alexandrian interpretation
of the Aristotelian psychology if we are to follow the oriental
development of Greek science.
The first point is to understand what is to be implied in the term
“soul.” Plato was really a dualist in that he regards the soul as a
separate entity which animates the body and compares it to a rider
directing and controlling the horse he rides. But Aristotle makes a
more careful analysis of psychological phenomena. In the treatise _de
anima_ he says “there is no need to enquire whether soul and body are
one, any more than whether the wax and the imprint are one; or, in
general, whether the matter of a thing is the same with that of which
it is the matter.” (Aristot: _de anima_. II. i. 412. b. 6.) Aristotle
defines the soul as “the first actuality of a natural body having in
it the capacity of life” (id. 412. b. 5), in which “first” denotes
that the soul is the primary form by which the substance of the body
is actualized, and “actuality” refers to the actualizing principle
by which form is given to the body which otherwise would be only a
collection of separate parts each having its own form but the aggregate
being without corporate unity until the soul gives it form; in this
sense the soul is the realization of the body (cf. Aristot: _Metaph._
iii. 1043. a. 35). A dead body lacks this actualizing and centralizing
force and is only a collection of limbs and organs, yet even so it is
not an artificial collection such as a man might put together, but “a
natural body having in it the capacity of life,” that is to say, an
organic structure designed for a soul which is the cause or reason of
its existence and which alone enables the body to realize its object.
The soul contains four different faculties or powers which are not
strictly to be taken as “parts” though in the passage cited above
Aristotle uses the term “parts.” These are, (i) the nutritive, the
power of life whereby the body performs such functions as absorbing
nourishment, propagating its species, and other functions common to
all living beings, whether animal or vegetable: (ii) the sensible, by
which the body obtains knowledge through the medium of the special
senses of sight, hearing, touch, etc., and also the “common sense” by
means of which these perceptions are combined, compared, and contrasted
so that general ideas are obtained which ultimately rest on the
sense perceptions: (iii) the locomotive, which prompts to action, as
desire, appetite, will, etc., also based, though indirectly, on sense
perception, being suggested by memories of senses already in action:
(iv) the intellect or pure reason, which is concerned with abstract
thought and is not based on sense perception. All these, embracing life
in its widest application, are classed together as soul, but the last,
the intellect, _nous_, or rational soul, is peculiar to man alone. It
does not depend on the senses, directly or indirectly, and so, whilst
the other three faculties necessarily cease to function when the
bodily organs of sense cease, it does not necessarily follow that this
rational soul will cease as it is apparently independent of the organ
sense. This _nous_ or “spirit” is reduced by Aristotle to a much more
restricted range than is usual in the older philosophers and is taken
to mean that which has the capacity of abstract knowledge, independent
of the information due, directly or indirectly, to sense perception. It
would seem, however, to be a distinct species of faculty for Aristotle
says: “As regards intellect and the speculative faculty the case is not
yet clear. It would seem, however, to be a distinct species of soul,
and it alone is capable of separation from the body, as that which is
eternal from that which is perishable. The remaining parts of the soul
are, as the foregoing consideration shows, not separable in the way
that some allege them to be: at the same time it is clear that they
are logically distinct.” (Arist. _de anima._ II. ii. 413. b. 9). It is
suggested that (i) the rational soul is of a distinct species and so
presumably derived from a different source than the other faculties
of the soul, but nothing is said as to whence it is derived: (ii) it
is capable of existence independently of the body, that is to say its
activity does not depend on the operation of the bodily organs, but it
is not stated that it does so exist; (iii) it is eternal on the ground
that it can exist apart from the perishable.
The obscurity of this statement has led to a great divergence in its
treatment by commentators. Theophrastus offers cautious suggestions
and evidently regards the rational soul as differing only in degree of
evolution from the lower forms of soul faculty. It was Alexander of
Aphrodisias who opened up new fields of speculation, distinguishing
between a material intellect and an active intellect. The former is a
faculty of the individual soul and this it is which is the form of the
body, but it means no more than the capacity for thinking and is of
the same source as the other faculties of the human soul. The active
intellect is not a part of the soul but is a power which enters it
from outside and arouses the material intellect to activity; it is
not only different in source from the material soul, but different
in character in that it is eternal and so always has been and always
will be, its rational power existing quite apart from the soul in
which the thinking takes place; there is but one such substance and
this must be identified with the deity who is the First Cause of all
motion and activity, so that the active intellect is pictured as an
emanation from the deity entering the human soul, arousing it to the
exercise of its higher functions, and then returning to its divine
source. This theistic interpretation of Aristotle was strongly opposed
by the commentator Themistius who considers that Alexander forces
the statement of the text out of its natural meaning and draws an
unwarrantable deduction from the two sentences “these differences must
be present in the soul,” and “this alone is immortal and eternal.” It
seems, however, that Alexander’s interpretation played an important
part in the formation of neo-Platonic theory, and it certainly is
the key to the history of Muslim philosophy, and is not without its
importance in the development of Christian mysticism.
The neo-Platonic school was founded by Ammonius Saccas, but really
takes its definite form under _Plotinus_ (d. 269 A.D.). In sketching in
brief outline the leading principles of this system we shall confine
ourselves to the last three books of the _Enneads_ (iv-vi) as these,
in the abridged form known as the “Theology of Aristotle” formed the
main statement of neo-Platonic doctrine known to the Muslim world.
In the teaching of Plotinus God is the Absolute, the First Potency
(_Enn._ 5. 4. 1.), beyond the sphere of existence (id. 5. 4. 2.), and
beyond reality, that is to say, all that we know as existence and being
is inapplicable to him, and he is therefore unknowable, because on
a plane which is altogether beyond our thought. He is unlimited and
infinite (id. 6. 5. 9.) and consequently One, as infinity excludes
the possibility of any other than himself on the same plane of being.
Yet Plotinus does not allow the numeral “one” to be applied to God
as numerals are understandable and refer to the plane of existence
in which we have our being, so that “one” as a mere number is not
attributed to God, but rather singularity in the sense of an exclusion
of all comparison or of any other than himself. As Absolute God
implies a compelling necessity so that all which proceeds from him
is not enforced but is necessarily so in the sense that nothing else
is possible; thus, for example, it results from him that two sides
of a triangle are greater than the third side, they are not forced
into greater length, but in the nature of things must be so, and this
necessary nature has its compelling source in the First Cause. Yet
Plotinus will not allow us to say that God “wills” anything, for will
implies a desire for what is not possessed or is not yet present (id.
5. 3. 12); will operates in time and space, but necessity has for
ever proceeded from the Eternal One who does not act in time. Nor can
we conceive God as knowing, conscious, or thinking, all terms which
describe our mental activities in the world of variable phenomena; he
is all-knowing by immediate apprehension ([Greek: athroa epibolê] ἀθρόα
ἐπιβολή) which in no way resembles the operation of thought but is
superconscious, a condition which Plotinus describes as “wakefulness”
([Greek: egrêgorsis] ἐγρήγορσις), a perpetual being aware without the
need of obtaining information.
From the true God, the eternal Absolute, proceeds the _nous_, a term
which has been variously rendered as Reason, Intellect, Intelligence,
or Spirit, this last being the term which Dr. Inge regards as the best
expression (Inge: _Plotinus._ ii. p. 38), and this _nous_ is fairly
equivalent to the Philonic and Christian _Logos_. An external emanation
is necessitated in order that the First Cause may remain unchanged
which would not be the case if it had once not been a source and then
had become the source of emanation; there can be no “becoming” in the
First Cause. The emanation is of the same nature as its cause, but is
projected into the world of phenomena. It is self-existent, eternal,
and perfect, and comprehends within itself the “spirit world,” the
objects of abstract reason, the whole of the reality which lies behind
the world of phenomena; the things perceived are only the shadows of
these real ones. It perceives, not as seeking and finding, but as
already possessing (id. 5. 1. 4.), and the things perceived are not
separate or external but as included and apprehended by immediate
intuition (id. 5. 2. 2.)
From the _nous_ proceeds the _psyche_, the principle of life and
motion, the world soul which is in the universe and which is shared by
every living creature. It also knows, but only through the processes of
reasoning, by means of separating, distributing, and combining the data
obtained by sense perception, so that it corresponds in function to
the “common sense” of Aristotle, whilst the _nous_ shows the functions
which are attributed to it by Aristotle and has the character which
Alexander reads into Aristotle.
The work of Plotinus was continued by his pupil Porphyry (d. 300 A.D.)
who taught at Rome, and is chiefly noteworthy as the one who completed
the fusion of Platonic and Aristotelian elements in the neo-Platonic
system, and especially as introducing the scientific methods of
Aristotle. Plotinus had criticized adversely the Aristotelian
categories (_Enn._ vi.), but Porphyry and all the later neo-Platonists
returned to Aristotle. Indeed, he is best known to posterity as the
author of the _Isagoge_, long current as the regular introduction to
the logical Organon of Aristotle. Then came _Jamblichus_ (d. 330),
the pupil of Porphyry who used neo-Platonism as the basis of a pagan
theology; and finally Proklus (d. 485) its last great pagan adherent
who was even more definitely a theologian.
Neo-Platonism was the system just coming to the forefront when the
Christians of Alexandria began to be in contact with philosophy. The
first prominent Alexandrian Christian who endeavoured to reconcile
philosophy and Christian theology was _Clement of Alexandria_ who,
like Justin Martyr, was a Platonist of the older type. Clement’s
_Stromateis_ is a very striking work which shows the general body of
Christian doctrine adapted to the theories of Platonic philosophy.
It does not tamper with the traditional Christian doctrine, but it
is evidently the work of one who sincerely believed that Plato had
partially foreseen what the Gospels taught, and that he had used a
clear and efficient terminology which was in all respects suitable
for the expression of profound truths, and so Clement uses this
terminology, incidentally assuming the Platonic metaphysics, and so
unconsciously modifies the contents of Christianity. If we ask whether
this results in a fair presentation of Christian teaching we shall
perhaps be inclined to admit that, in spite of modification and in view
of the scientific attitude of the times it substantially does so: when
truths already expressed by those who have not received a scientific
training are repeated by those who have and who are careful to cast
their expression into logical and consistent form, some modification is
inevitable. Whether the scientific assumptions and philosophy generally
of Clement were correct is, of course, another matter; modern opinion
would say it was incorrect. But, so far as contemporary science went,
it was obviously an honest effort. It has not been appreciated by all
Clement’s successors and he is one of the few Christian leaders who
has been formally deprived of the honorific title of “saint” which
was at one time prefixed to his name. Within the next few centuries
the re-formulation of Christianity proceeded steadily until at last
it appears as essentially Hellenistic, but with the Platonic element
now modified by the more spiritualistic influences of neo-Platonism.
Undoubtedly this was a gain for Christianity, for when we read the
_Didache_ and other early non-Hellenistic Christian material we cannot
help feeling that it shows a narrower and more cramped outlook and one
far less suited to satisfy the needs and aspirations of humanity at
large. It is curious to compare Clement of Alexandria with Tertullian,
one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of the literary lights of
Latin Christianity, but severe, puritanically rigid, and suspicious
and hostile in his attitude towards philosophy which he regards as
essentially pagan.
The next great leader of Alexandrian Christian thought was Origen
himself a pupil of Plotinus, and one who found little difficulty in
adapting contemporary philosophy to Christian doctrine, although this
adaptation was by no means received with approval in all parts of
the Christian community. Under Clement and Origen the catechetical
instruction which was regularly given in all churches to candidates
for baptism was expanded and developed on the lines of the lectures
given by the philosophers in the Museum, and so a Christian school of
philosophical theology was formed. This development was not regarded
favourably by the older fashioned churches nor by the philosophers of
the Museum, and even amongst the Alexandrian Christians there was a
section which viewed it with disapproval, especially evident when the
school became so prominent that it tended to overshadow the ordinary
diocesan organization.
This is not the place to consider the various intrigues which
ultimately compelled Origen to leave Alexandria and retire to
Palestine. There, at Caesarea, he founded a school on the model of
that at Alexandria. This second foundation did not attain the same
eminence as its proto-type, perhaps because Origen’s influence turned
its activities into a direction too highly specialised in textual
criticism, but it prompted a development which ultimately played an
important part in the history of the Syrian church where, for some time
to come, theological activity mainly centered in these schools which
had their imitators amongst the Zoroastrians and the Muslims. The first
such school in Syria was founded at Antioch by Malchion about 270 A.D.
and deliberately copied the pattern set at Alexandria and ultimately
became its rival.
About fifty years later a school was established at Nisibis, the
modern Nasibin on the Mygdonius river, in the midst of a Syriac
speaking community. The church had spread inland from the Mediterranean
shores and had by this time many converts in the hinterland who were
accustomed to use Syriac and not Greek. For the benefit of these the
work at Nisibis was done in Syriac, Syriac versions were prepared of
the theological works studied at Antioch, and the Greek language was
taught so that the Syriac speaking Christians were brought into closer
touch with the life of the Church at large.
The acquiescence of the Church in the Alexandrian philosophy had
far-reaching consequences. The Church did not officially adopt the
neo-Platonic philosophy in its entirety, but it had to adjust itself
to an atmosphere in which the neo-Platonic system was accepted as the
last word in scientific enquiry and where the Aristotelian metaphysics
and psychology were assumed as an established and unquestionable
basis of knowledge. It was impossible for churchmen, educated in this
atmosphere, to do otherwise than accept these principles, just as it
is impossible for us to admit that the body of a saint can be in two
places at once, our whole education training us to assume certain
limitations of time and space, although a devout Muslim of Morocco can
believe it and honours two shrines as each containing the body of the
same saint who, he believes, in his life time had power of over-passing
the limitations of space. The general postulates of the later Platonic
and Aristotelian philosophy were firmly established in the fourth
century in Alexandria and its circle, and were no more open to question
than the law of gravity or the rotundity of the earth would be to us.
It was known that there were people who questioned these things, but
it could only be accounted for by blind ignorance in those who had
not received the benefits of an enlightened education. The Christians
were no more able to dispute these principles than anyone else. They
were perfectly sincere in their religion, many articles of faith
which present considerable difficulty to the modern mind presented no
difficulty to them; but it was perfectly obvious that the statements of
Christian doctrine must be brought into line with the current theory of
philosophy, or with self evident truth as they would have termed it. It
shows a strange lack of historical imagination when we talk slightingly
about how Christians quarrelled over words, forgetting what these words
represented and how they stood for the established conclusions of
philosophy as then understood.
This comes out very plainly in the Arian controversy. Both sides
agreed that Christ was the Son of God, the relation of Father and
Son being, of course, not that of human parentage but rather by way
of emanation: both agreed that Christ was God, as the emanation
necessarily had the same nature as the source from which it proceeded:
both agreed that the Son proceeded from the Father in eternity and
before the worlds were created, the Son or Logos being the intermediary
of creation. But some, and these, it would seem, mainly associated with
the school of Antioch, so spoke of the Son proceeding from the Father
as an event which had taken place far before all time in the remoteness
of eternity, it is true, but so that there was when the Father had not
yet begotten the Son, for, they argued, the Father must have preceded
the Son as the cause precedes the effect, and so the Son was, as it
were, less eternal than the Father. At once the Alexandrians corrected
them. To begin with there are no degrees in eternity: but, most serious
error of all, this idea made God liable to variation, at one period of
eternity he had been alone, and then he had become a father: philosophy
taught that the First Cause, the True God, is liable to no change,
if he is Father now, he must have been so from all eternity: we must
understand the Son as the Logos for ever eternally issuing forth from
the Father as source. The actual merits of the controversy do not at
present concern us: we simply notice the fact that the current Greek
philosophy entirely dominated the theology of the Church and it was
imperative for that theology to be expressed in terms which fitted in
with the philosophy. The result of the Arian struggle was that the
Eastern church came to recognise the Alexandrian philosophy as the
exponent of orthodoxy, and in this it was followed by the greater part
of the Western Church, though the West Goths still remained attached to
the Arian views which they had learned from their first teachers.
By the fifth century Arian doctrine had been completely eliminated
from the state church and Alexandrian philosophy which had been the
chief means of bringing about this result, was dominant, although there
are indications that it was viewed with suspicion in some quarters.
Amongst the controversies which took place in the post-Nicene age the
most prominent are those which concerned the person of the incarnate
Christ, and these are largely questions of psychology. It was generally
admitted that man has a _psyche_ or animal soul which he shares with
the rest of the sentient creatures, and in addition to this a spirit
or rational soul which, under the influence of the neo-Platonists
or of Alexander of Aphrodisias, was regarded as an emanation from
the creative spirit, the Logos or “Agent Intellect,” a belief which
Christian theologians supported by the statement in Genesis that God
breathed into man the breath of life and so man became a living soul.
In fact St. Paul had already distinguished between the two elements,
the animal soul and the immortal spirit, in accordance with the
psychology which had been developed in his time. But Christian theology
supposed that in Christ was also present the eternal Logos which had
been the creative Spirit and of which the spirit or rational soul was
itself an emanation. What, therefore, would be the relation between the
Logos and its own emanation when they came together in the same person?
If the Alexandrian philosophy and the Christian religion were both true
the problem was capable of reasonable solution: if its only answer
was a manifest absurdity then either the psychology or Christianity
was in error, and then, as always, it was assumed that contemporary
science was sure and religion had to be tested by its standard. To this
particular problem two solutions were proposed. The one, especially
maintained at Alexandria, was that the Logos and the rational soul or
spirit, being in the relation of source and emanation, necessarily
fused together when simultaneously present in the same body, the point
being of course that the Logos was the agent of creation, the True
God not acting therein as it was an activity in time, but through the
intermediary of the Logos, whilst the animal soul dispersed through
creation was ultimately derived from the Logos, but the spirit was
directly proceeding from it, all of which represents the philosophical
theory formulated by Alexander of Aphrodisias and the neo-Platonists
and then accepted as unassailable. The other solution, which found
its chief advocates at Antioch, laid stress on the completeness of
the humanity of Christ so that the body, animal soul, and spirit were
necessarily complete in the humanity and the Logos dwelt in the human
frame without subtracting the spirit which was one of the essentials
of humanity, and so there could have been no fusion because this would
have implied the return of the spirit to its source and consequently
its subtraction from the humanity of Christ. This solution, it will be
observed, postulates the same psychology as the other, and whichever
view prevailed the Church would be irrevocably committed to the current
psychology by this definition of its doctrine.
Both solutions offered perfectly logical deductions from the
postulates assumed and it only wanted the advocates of one or the other
to over-state the case so as to transgress against the teachings of
philosophy or of traditional religion. The first false move came from
Antioch. Laying great stress on the completeness of the humanity of
Christ so that body, soul, and spirit were necessarily connected in
the human frame, the view was so expressed as to describe the Virgin
Mary as the mother of the human Christ, body, soul, and spirit alone,
which implied, or seemed to imply, that at birth Christ was man only
and afterwards became God by the Logos entering into the human body, a
conclusion possibly not intended by those who expressed their views but
pressed by their opponents. This had been the teaching of Diodorus and
of Theodore of Mopseustia both associated with the school of Antioch,
and defended in its extremer form by Nestorius, a monk of Antioch, who
was made bishop of Constantinople in A.D. 428. Violent controversies
ensued which resulted in a general council at Ephesus in 431, where
the Alexandrian party succeeded in getting Nestorius and his followers
condemned as heretics. Two years later the Nestorians, absolutely
confident that their opponents were utterly illogical in supposing
that the rational soul and the Logos in Christ were fused or united
together, repudiated the official church and organised themselves as
the Church which had no part with the heretics of Ephesus. The state
Church, however, had the weight of the temporal authority behind it,
and the heavy hand of persecution fell severely upon the Nestorians. In
Antioch and Greek speaking Syria persecution did its work effectually
and the Nestorians were reduced to the position of a fugitive sect, in
Egypt, as might be expected, they had no footing, and the westerns as
usual agreed with the dominant state church: only amongst the Syriac
speaking Christians the Nestorian teaching had a free course, and that
section for the most part adhered to it.
Some time before this the school at Nisibis had been closed, or rather
removed to Edessa. In A.D. 363 the city of Nisibis had been handed over
to the Persians as one of the conditions of the peace which closed the
unfortunate war commenced by Julian, and the members of the school,
retiring into Christian territory, had re-assembled at Edessa, where a
school was opened in 373, and thus Edessa in a Syriac speaking district
but within the Byzantine Empire, became the centre of the vernacular
speaking Syriac church.
At the Nestorian schism the school at Edessa was the rallying place
of those who did not accept the decisions of Ephesus, but in 439 it
was closed by the Emperor Zeno on account of its strong Nestorian
character, and the ejected members led by Barsuma, a pupil of Ibas (d.
457), who had been the great luminary of Edessa, migrated across the
Persian border. Barsuma was able to persuade the Persian king Piruz
that the orthodox, that is to say the state, Church was pro-Greek, but
that the Nestorians were entirely alienated from the Byzantine Empire
by the harsh treatment they had received. On this understanding they
were favourably received and remained loyal to the Persian monarchy
in the subsequent wars with the Empire. The Nestorians re-opened the
school at Nisibis and this became the focus of Nestorian activity by
which an orientalised phase of Christianity was produced. Gradually
the Nestorian missionaries spread through all central Asia and
down into Arabia so that the races outside the Greek Empire came
to know Christianity first in a Nestorian form. It seems probable
that Muhammad had contact with Nestorian teachers (Hirschfeld: _New
Researches._ p. 23), and certainly Nestorian monks and missionaries
had much intercourse with the earlier Muslims. These Nestorians were
not only anxious to teach Christianity but very naturally attached the
utmost importance to their own explanations of the person of Christ.
This could only be made clear by the help of theories drawn from
Greek philosophy, and so every Nestorian missionary became to some
extent a propagandist of that philosophy: they translated into Syriac
not only the great theologians such as Theodore of Mopseustia who
explained their views, but also Greek authorities such as Aristotle
and his commentators because some knowledge of these was necessary to
understand the theology. Much of this work of translation shows a real
desire to explain their teaching, but it shows also a strong resentment
against the Emperor and his state church; as that church used the Greek
language in its liturgy and teaching, the Nestorians were anxious to
discard Greek, they celebrated the sacraments only in Syriac and set
themselves to promote a distinctly native theology and philosophy by
means of translated material and Syriac commentaries. These became
the medium by which Aristotle and the neo-Platonic commentators were
transmitted to Asia outside the Empire, and so later on as we shall
see it was a group of Nestorian translators who, by making Arabic
versions from the Syriac, first brought Hellenistic philosophy to
the Arabic world. But there was also a weak side, for the Nestorian
Church, cut off from the wider life of Hellenism, became distinctly
provincial. Its philosophy plays round and round that prevalent at the
schism, it spreads this philosophy to new countries, it produces an
extensive educational system, and elaborates its material, but it shows
no development. If we regard the main test of educational efficiency
as being in its research product and not simply the promulgation of
material already attained, then Nestorianism was not an educational
success: and it seems that this should be the supreme test, for
knowledge is progressive, and so the smallest contribution towards
further progress must be of more real value than the most efficient
teaching of results already achieved. Yet it would be difficult to
over-estimate the importance of Nestorianism in preparing an oriental
version of Hellenistic culture in the pre-Muslim world. Its main
importance lies in its being preparatory to Islam which brought forward
Arabic as a cosmopolitan medium for the interchange of thought and so
enabled the Syriac material to be used in a wider and more fruitful
field.
Although Nestorius had been condemned, the Church was left with a
problem. The objection was true that, if the Logos and the rational
soul in Christ were fused together so that the rational soul or spirit
lost itself in its source, the Logos dwelt in an animal body and the
full humanity of Christ disappeared. The Nestorian view of a temporary
“connection” was now condemned as heretical, but was it necessary to
go to the other extreme of “fusion” which was the logical result of
the Alexandrian teaching? The Church wished to be philosophically
correct and yet to avoid the conclusions which might be drawn from
either view in its extreme form. In fact philosophy ruthlessly pressed
home was the danger of which the Church was most afraid, feeling in
some dim realm of sub-consciousness that the deposit of faith did
not quite fall into line with science, or at least with the science
then in fashion; and the Church’s real enemies were the enthusiasts
who were confident that doctrine and philosophy were both absolutely
true. Nor have we, even in these days, altogether learned the lesson
that both are still partial and progressive. Islam had to go through
exactly the same experience in her day and came out of it with very
similar results, that is to say both the Christian and Muslim churches
finally chose the _via media_ adopting the philosophical statement of
doctrine but condemning as heretical the logical conclusions which
might be deduced. The Alexandrian school, elated perhaps at its victory
over Nestorius, became rather intemperate in the statement of its
views and pressed them home to an extreme conclusion. At once the
warning prediction of the Nestorians was justified: the teaching of a
“fusion” between the Logos and the rational soul in Christ entirely
undermined his humanity. Another controversy ensued and in this, as in
the former one, neither side suggested any doubt as to the psychology
or metaphysics borrowed from the Aristotelian and neo-Platonic
philosophies, that was throughout assumed as certain, the problem was
to make Christian doctrine fit in with it. Now those who opposed the
Alexandrian conclusions maintained the theory of a “union” between the
Logos and the rational soul in Christ, so that the complete humanity
was preserved as well as the deity, and the union was such as to be
inseparable and so safeguarded from the Nestorian theory. In fact this
was simply admitting the philosophical statement and forbidding its
being pressed home to its possible conclusions. This is described as
“orthodox” doctrine and rightly so in the sense that it expresses,
though in philosophical terms, a doctrine as it was held before the
Church had learned any philosophy, and excluded possible deductions
which came within range as soon as a philosophical statement was made.
This is the normal result when doctrine originally expressed by those
ignorant of philosophy has to be put into logical and scientific terms:
the only orthodox representation of the traditional belief must be a
compromise.
* * * * *
This second controversy resulted in the Council of Chalcedon in A.D.
448, at which the advocates of the theory of “fusion” were expelled
from the state church, and thus a third body was formed, each of the
three claiming to represent the true faith. Practically the whole
of the Egyptian Church followed the “fusionists” or Monophysites or
Jacobites, as they were called after Jacob of Serugh, who was mainly
instrumental in organizing them as a church: in Syria also they had
a strong following. Like the Nestorians they were persecuted by the
Emperor and the state church, but unlike them they did not migrate
outside the Byzantine Empire, but remained an important though strongly
disaffected body within its limits, though later on they sent out
off-shoots into other lands. Like the Nestorians they tended to discard
the language of their persecutors and to use the vernacular Coptic and
Syriac: it is rightly claimed that the golden age of Syriac literature
and philosophy begins with the Monophysite schism. A curious line of
demarcation however, is observed in Syriac between the Jacobites in
the West and the Nestorians in the East: they used different dialects,
which is probably the result of their geographical distribution,
and they used different scripts in writing which was partly due to
deliberate intension, though partly also to the use of slightly
different implements for writing.
When we consider the results of the Monophysite and Nestorian schisms
we begin to understand why so much Greek philosophical material was
translated into Syriac, whilst the Nestorian movement was the effective
reason why Syriac gradually became the medium for transmitting
Hellenistic culture into the parts of Asia which lay beyond the
confines of the Byzantine Empire during the centuries immediately
preceding the outspread of Islam. It is obvious that the late
Aristotelian and neo-Platonic philosophers were of vital importance to
everyone engaged in the theological controversies of the day, and the
Aristotelian logic was of equal importance as on it depended the way
in which terms were used. After their separation from the Greek Church
the Nestorians and Monophysites turned to the vernacular speaking
Christians, and so a large body of philosophical as well as theological
matter was translated into Syriac; very much less into Coptic, for the
Egyptian Monophysites were not called upon to face so much controversy
as their brethren in Syria.
The period between the schisms and the beginning of Muslim interest in
philosophy was one of prolific translation, commenting, and exposition.
Whilst there is much interest in tracing the literary history of a
nation, there is comparatively little in following the history of
a literature which is confined to activities of this sort, for it
cannot be much more than a list of names. Commentary and essay might
indeed open up a field of originality, but nothing of the sort appears
in this type of Syriac work: it seems as though the provincialism
which followed severance from the Greek world brought in narrowing
restrictions so that, although we get able and diligent workers, they
never seem able to advance beyond re-statement, more or less accurate,
of results already achieved.
Besides philosophy and theology we find a considerable interest in
medicine and the two sciences of chemistry and astronomy which were
treated as allied to it, for astronomy, regarded from the astrological
point of view, was supposed to be closely associated with the
conditions of life and death, of health and disease. Medical studies
were especially attached to the school of Alexandria. Philosophy
proper had been so largely taken over by theology that the secular
investigators were rather impelled to turn to the natural sciences
and as a centre of medical and allied studies the ancient school of
Alexandria continued its development without loss of continuity, but
under changed conditions. John Philoponus, or John the Grammarian,
as he was called, was one of the later commentators on Aristotle and
also one of the early lights of this medical school. The date of his
death is not known, but he was teaching at Alexandria at the time
when Justinian closed the schools at Athens in A.D. 529. The next
great leader of this school was Paul of Aegina who flourished at the
time of the Muslim conquest, and whose works long served as popular
manuals of medicine. The founders of the medical school at Alexandria
established a regular course of education for the training of medical
practitioners, and for this purpose selected sixteen works of Galen,
some of which were re-edited in an abridged form, and were made the
subject of regular explanatory lectures. At the same time the school
became a centre of original research, not only in medicine, but also in
chemistry and other branches of natural science. Thus, on the eve of
the Muslim conquest Alexandria had become a great home of scientific
enquiry. To some extent this was unfortunate as the existing traditions
in Egypt directed those investigations very much into obscurantist
lines and tended to the use of magical forms, talismans, etc., and
to introduce an astrological bias. This afterwards became the great
defect of Arabic medicine as appears later even in mediæval Padua, but
it was not the fault of Islam, it was an inheritance from Alexandria.
Such material as remains of Syriac research shows us a saner and
sounder method in vogue there, but Alexandria had eclipsed the Syrian
scientists at the time of the Muslim invasion, at least in popular
esteem, and this was a determining factor in directing Arabic research
into these astrological by-paths.
Amongst the famous products of this school was Paul of Aegina, whose
medical works formed the basis of much of the mediæval Arabic and
Latin teaching, and the priest Ahrun (Aaron) who composed a manual
of medicine which was afterwards translated into Syriac and became a
popular authority. Alexandria was the centre also of chemical science,
and as such was the parent of later Arabic alchemy. It appears from M.
Berthelot’s exhaustive study of Arabic chemistry (_La chimie au moyen
age_: Paris, 1893) that the Arabic material may be divided into two
classes, the one based upon, and mainly translated from, the Greek
writers current in Alexandria, the other representing a later school
of independent investigation. Of the former class Berthelot gives
three specimens, the Books of Crates, of al-Habid, and of Ostanes, all
representing the Greek tradition which flourished at Alexandria on the
eve of the Muslim invasion.
Whilst the Alexandrians kept alive an interest in medical and the
allied sciences the separated branches of the vernacular speaking
churches of Asia were more interested in logic and speculative
philosophy. It was perhaps natural that the Monophysites with their
strong Egyptian connection should adopt the commentaries of John
Philoponus, himself a Monophysite of a type, but both they and the
Nestorians invariably used Porphyry’s _Isagoge_ as an introductory
manual. In the general treatment of metaphysics and psychology as
applied to theology, and in the treatment of theology itself, the
Monophysites inclined more towards neo-Platonism and mysticism than the
Nestorians, and their life centered more in the monasteries, whilst
the Nestorians adhered rather to the older system of local schools,
although they too had monasteries, and in course of time the schools
adopted the discipline and methods of the convent.
The oldest and greatest of the Nestorian schools was that of Nisibis,
but in A.D. 550 Mar Ahba, a convert from Zoroastrianism, who had become
_catholicos_ or patriarch of the Nestorians, established a school at
Seleucia on the model of Nisibis. A little later the Persian king,
Kusraw Anushirwan (Nushirwan, flor. 531-578 A.D.) who had been greatly
impressed by the view of Hellenistic culture which he had obtained
during his war with Syria, and had offered hospitality to the ejected
Greek philosophers when Justinian closed the schools at Athens,
founded a Zoroastrian school at Junde-Shapur, in Khuzistan, where not
only Greek and Syriac works, but also philosophical and scientific
writings brought from India, were translated into Pahlawi, or Old
Persian, and there the study of medicine taught by Greek and Indian
physicians was developed more fully than in the theological atmosphere
of the Christian schools, although some of the most distinguished
medical teachers in this school were themselves Nestorian Christians.
Amongst the alumni of Junde-Shapur were the Arab Hares b. Kalada,
who afterwards became famous as a practitioner, and his son Ennadr,
cited in the 5th canon of Ibn Sina (Avicenna), an enemy of the Prophet
Muhammad who was amongst those defeated at the battle of Badr and was
put to death by `Ali. Several Indian medical writers are cited by
Razes and others, notably Sharak and Qolhoman, whilst the treatise on
poisons by the Indian Shanak was, at a later date, translated into
Persian by Manka for Yahya b. Khalid the Barmecide and afterwards
into Arabic for the `Abbasid Khalif al-Ma´mun. Manka, who was medical
attendant to Harunu r-Rashid, translated from Sanskrit various medical
and other works. Besides the Christian and Zoroastrian schools there
was also a pagan school at Harran, of whose foundation we have no
further information. Harran had been a centre of Hellenic influence
from the time of Alexander the Great and remained a refuge for the old
Greek religion when the Greek world at large had become Christian.
Although it would appear that Harran had an inheritance from the
ancient Babylonian religion, which had a late revival during the first
centuries of the Christian era, this had been entirely overlaid with
the developments of paganism as revised by the neo-Platonists. Indeed
Harran shows the last stand of Greek paganism and neo-Platonism as the
two had been formulated by Porphyry and they continued there to live
out a vigorous though secluded life.
There were thus several agencies at work developing and extending
Hellenistic influence in Persia and Mesopotamia which later on became
a Persian province, and besides these established schools there were
many secondary forces. The Persian armies returning from the invasion
of Syria brought back many items of Hellenic culture, amongst them the
Greek system of baths which was copied in Persia and continued by the
Muslims who spread this refinement throughout the Islamic world, so
that what we call the Turkish bath is a lineal descendant of the old
Greek bath passed through the Persians of pre-Muslim times, and then
spread more widely by the Muslims. These armies brought home also a
great admiration for Greek architecture and engineering, and Greek
architects, engineers, and craftsmen being amongst the most valued
plunder brought back from Syria, by their help Persia endeavoured to
start building in the Greek style. Thus the centuries immediately
before the outspread of Islam show a wide and steady extension of
Hellenistic influences in all the different forms of culture, in
science, philosophy, art, architecture, and in the luxuries of life:
and even before this, ever since the days of Alexander the Great, there
had been a percolation of Greek influence, so that Western Asia was
steeped in Hellenistic art, in many cases very crudely represented
and combined with native elements. When the oppressive control of the
Umayyads was lifted and the native population came again to its own, we
can hardly wonder that this meant a revival of Hellenism.
We have already mentioned _Ibas_ (d. 457) as the teacher of Barsuma who
led the Nestorian migration into Persia and re-opened the school of
Nisibis. This Ibas had been the great luminary of the school of Edessa
in its last days and seems to have been the first to make a Syriac
translation of Porphyry’s _Isagoge_, the recognised manual of logic
preparatory to Aristotle’s Organon. This shows that logic had been
taken as the chief material of education amongst the Nestorians and
very much the same seems to have been the case amongst the Monophysites.
About the same time flourished _Probus_, who is said to have been
a presbyter of Antioch, and produced commentaries upon Porphyry’s
_Isagoge_, and on Aristotle’s _Hermeneutica_, _Soph. Elench._, and
_Analytica Priora_, these commentaries becoming favourite manuals
amongst the Syriac speaking students of logic. Hoffman’s _De
Hermeneuticis apud Syros_ (Leipzic, 1873) gives the text of the
commentary on the _Hermeneutica_ followed by a Latin translation. The
method employed here and in all Syriac commentaries is to take a short
passage, often no more than a few words, of the Text of Aristotle
translated into Syriac and then give an explanation of the meaning
sometimes extending to several pages, sometimes only a brief remark,
according to the difficulty of the text, very much as if a teacher
were reading aloud and explaining passages by passage as he read. This
became the usual method of commenting and was afterwards copied by the
Muslims in their commentaries on the Qur´an. The commentary on the
_Isagoge_ has been published by Baumstark (_Aristotles bei den Syrern_,
Leipzic, 1900), and that on the _Analytica Priora_ by the great Louvain
scholar Prof. Hoonacker in the _Journal Asiatique_ for July-August,
1900.
The greatest of the Monophysite scholars was _Sergius_ of Ras
al-`Ayn (d. 536), who was both a translator and the author of original
treatises on philosophy, medicine, and astronomy. His medical work
was his chief interest and he left a permanent mark as a translator
into Syriac of a considerable part of Galen. He spent some time in
Alexandria where he perfected himself in a knowledge of Greek and
learned chemistry and medicine in the Alexandrian medical school
then just beginning its career. Some of his translation of Galen
is preserved in the British Mus. MSS. Addit. 14661 and 17156: in
the latter are fragments of the “Medical art” and “Faculties of the
aliments” which have been edited by Sachau (Inedita Syriaca, Vienna,
1870). Of his philosophical work Sachau has given us the versions which
he made of the _Isagoge_ and _Table_ of Porphyry, and Aristotle’s
_Categories_ and the dubious _de mundo_, as well as a treatise on “the
soul” which is not the _de anima_ of Aristotle. He wrote original
treatises on logic in seven books (incomplete--Brit. Mus. Add. 14660
contains that on the categories), on “negation and affirmation,” on
“genus, species, and individual,” on “the causes of the universe
according to Aristotle” and minor essays. In astronomy he has left a
tract “on the influence of the moon” which is based on the work of
Galen (cf. Sachau, op. cit.) The writings of Sergius circulated amongst
both Nestorians and Monophysites, all regarding him as a leading
authority on medicine and logic, and in medicine it seems that he
was the founder of a Syriac school which became the parent of Arabic
medicine, certainly that school owed its impetus to him. Bar Hebraeus
refers to him as “a man eloquent and greatly skilled in the books of
the Greeks and Syrians and a most learned physician of men’s bodies. He
was indeed orthodox in his opinions, as the ‘Prologue’ bears witness,
but in morals corrupt, depraved, and stained with lust and avarice”
(Bar Hebraeus. ed. Abbeloos et Lamy. i. 205-7).
In the same century lived _Ahudemmeh_ who became bishop of Tagrit in
A.D. 559, and introduced the commentary of John Philoponus as the
regular manual of instruction amongst the Syriac speaking Monophysites.
He is said to have composed treatises on the definitions of logic, on
the freedom of the will, on the soul, on man considered as a microcosm,
and on the composition of man as of soul and body, this last in part
preserved in MS. Brit. Mus. Addit. 14620.
Amongst the Nestorian scholars of the sixth century was _Paul the
Persian_ who produced a treatise on logic which he dedicated to King
Khusraw and has been published in M. Land’s _Analecta Syriaca_ (iv).
This has brought us to the period of the Muslim invasion. In 638 Syria
was conquered, and the conquest of Mesopotamia followed in the course
of the same year, that of Persia four years later. In 661 the Umayyad
dynasty of Arab rulers was established in Damascus; but all this did
not greatly affect the internal life of the Christian communities who
lived on in perfect liberty, subject only to the payment of the poll
tax.
About 650 the Nestorian Henanieshu´ wrote a treatise on logic (cf.
Budge: _Thomas of Marga_. i. 79) and commented on John Philoponus.
The Monophysites had no great schools like the Nestorians, but their
convent at Qensherin, on the left bank of the Euphrates, was a great
centre of Greek studies. Its most famous product was _Severus Sebokt_
who flourished on the eve of the Muslim conquest. He was the author
of a commentary on Aristotle’s _Hermeneutica_ of which only fragments
survive, of a treatise on the syllogisms of the _Analytica Priora_,
and of epistles dealing with terms used in the _Hermeneutica_ and on
the difficult points in Aristotle’s _Rhetoric_ (cf. Brit. Mus. Add.
14660, 17156). In astronomy he wrote on “the Figures of the Zodiac” and
on “the Astrolabe,” the former of these is preserved in Br. Mus. Add.
14538 and has been published by Sachau (op. cit.), the latter in Berlin
MS. Sachau 186 and published by Nau in the _Journal Asiatique_ of 1899.
Athanasius of Balad who became Monophysite patriarch in 684 was a pupil
of Severus Sebokt, and is chiefly known as the translator of a new
Syriac version of Porphyry’s _Isagoge_ (Vatican Ms. Syr. 158. cf. Bar
Hebraeus _Chron. Eccles._ ed. Abbeloos et Lamy. i. 287).
_James of Edessa_ (d. 708 A.D.) also was a pupil of Severus Sebokt
at the same convent, was made bishop of Edessa about 684 and
abandoned this see in 688 as the result of his failure to carry out
the reformation of the monasteries in his diocese: he retired to the
monastery of St. James at Kaishun, between Aleppo and Edessa, but left
this to become lecturer at the monastery of Eusebona, in the diocese of
Antioch where “for eleven years he taught the psalms and the reading
of the scriptures in Greek and revived the Greek language which had
fallen into disuse” (Bar Hebr. _Chron. Eccles._ i. 291). Attacked by
the brethren who disapproved of the study of Greek, he migrated to
the monastery of Tel`eda where he prepared a revised version of the
Peshitta or Syriac Vulgate of the Old Testament, finally returning
to Edessa about four months before his death. His _Enchiridion_, a
treatise on the terms used in philosophy, is preserved in the Brit.
Mus. MS. Addit. 12154.
_George_, who became “bishop of the Arabs” in 686, was himself a pupil
of Athanasius of Balad and translated the whole logical Organon of
Aristotle, of which his versions of the _Catagories_, _Hermeneutica_,
and _Analytica Priora_ appear in Brit. Mus. Addit. 14659, each
furnished with an introduction and commentary.
These names cover the whole period between the two schisms and
the Muslim invasion and suffice to show that the Syriac speaking
community continued diligent in the study of the Aristotelian logic
and metaphysics, and also gave attention to medical and scientific
studies. It is not exactly a brilliant or original form of cultural
activity, for the most part it was only the transmission of received
texts with the preparation of new translations, commentaries, and
explanatory treatises, but this itself fulfilled an important function.
The Muslim invasion made no change in the course of these studies: the
Umayyads did not interfere with the schools and the Syriac students
went their own way living a life quite apart from that of their Arab
rulers. Now and then unscrupulous or angry clergy appealed to the
Khalif against their fellow clergy and this was the commonest cause
of interference which the historians describe as persecution. Such
was the experience of _Henanieshu´_ who became Nestorian Catholicos
in A.D. 686. The bishop of Nisibis made complaints against him to the
Khalif `Abdul-Malik in consequence of which he was deposed, imprisoned,
and then thrown over a cliff. He was not killed by his fall, though
severely lamed; by the kindness of some shepherds he was sheltered and
nursed back to health, and then retired to the monastery of Yannan near
Mosul, resuming his patriarchal office after the death of the bishop of
Nisibis, and holding it until his own death in 701 (Bar Heb. _Chron.
Eccles._ Abbeloos et Lamy. ii. 135-140). Besides sermons, letters, and
a biography of Dewada, he wrote an educational treatise on “the twofold
duty of the school” as a place of religious and moral influence on the
one hand, and of an academy of the humanities on the other (cf. Asseman
BO.) iii. part I. 154 and also an “Explanation of the Analytica” (id).
_Mar Abha III._ became Nestorian Catholicos somewhere about 740 (133
A.H.) and produced a commentary on Aristotle’s logic (cf. Bar Heb. ii.
153).
This brings us down to the period when the Muslim world began to
take an interest in these philosophical and scientific studies, and
translations and commentaries began to appear in Arabic. But Syriac
studies did not at once disappear and it will be convenient to
enumerate briefly some of those who appeared in later times down to
the age of Bar Hebraeus (d. A.D. 1286), with whom the literary history
of Syriac comes to an end. In the latter part of the eighth century we
find _Jeshudena_ bishop of Basra writing an “introduction to logic.”
Shortly afterwards _Jeshubokt_ metropolitan of Persia wrote on the
Categories (cf. _Journ. Asiat._ May-June. 1906). Hunayn b. Ishaq,
his son Ishaq, and his nephew Hubaysh, with some other companions,
formed the college of translators established at Baghdad by the Khalif
al-Ma´mun to render the Greek and other philosophical and scientific
texts into Arabic, a work to which we shall refer again; but Hunayn,
who was a Nestorian Christian, was also occupied in making translations
from the Greek into Syriac: he prepared, or revised, Syriac versions
of Porphyry’s _Isagoge_, Aristotle’s _Hermeneutica_, part of the
_Analytica_, the _de generatione et corruptione_, the _de anima_,
part of the _Metaphysics_, the _Summa_ of Nicolas of Damascus, the
Commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias, and the greater part of the
works of Galen, Dioscorus, Paul of Aegina, and Hippocrates. His son
Ishaq also made a translation of Aristotle’s _de anima_, and it is
significant that this treatise and the commentary of Alexander Aphr.
now begins to take the most prominent place in philosophical study; the
centre of interest is moving from logic to psychology. About the same
time the physician _John Bar Maswai_ (d. A.D. 857) composed various
medical works in Syriac and Arabic. He, like Hunayn, was one of the
intellectual group which the `Abbasids gathered together in their new
capital city of Baghdad. Contemporary also were the Syriac writers
_Denha_ (or _Ibas_) who compiled a commentary on the Aristotelian
logical Organon: _Abzud_, the author of a poetical essay on the
divisions of philosophy, and then, after a series of minor writers on
logic, _Dionysius Bar Salibi_ in the twelfth century A.D., who composed
commentaries on the _Isagoge_, the _Categories_, _Hermeneutica_, and
_Analytica_; and in the early part of the following century _Yaqub Bar
Shakako_, author of a collection of “Dialogues” of which the second
book deals with philosophical questions of logic, physics, mathematics,
and metaphysics.
The series of Syriac philosophical writers closes with _Gregory Bar
Hebraeus_, or _Abu l-Faraj_ in the thirteenth century A.D. whose “Book
of the Pupils of the Eyes” is a compendium of logic summarising and
explaining the Isagoge, and Aristotle’s Categories, Hermeneutica,
Analytica, Topica, and Sophistica Elenchi; his “Book of the Upholding
of Wisdom” being a summary introduction to logic, physics, metaphysics,
and theology. A third work “The Cream of Science” is an encyclopædia of
the Aristotelian philosophy, and this work appears also in an abridged
form as the “Business of Businesses.” He was also the translator into
Syriac of Dioscorus on simples, and author of a treatise on the medical
_Questions_ of Hunayn b. Ishaq, and of a work on geography called “the
Ascent of the Spirit.” Although esteemed as one of the greatest Syriac
authorities and for centuries holding a place of primary importance, he
was in reality no more than a compiler who produced encyclopædic works
dealing with the researches of his predecessors.
The great importance of the Syriac speaking Christian communities
was as the medium whereby Hellenistic philosophy and science was
transmitted to the Arabic world. There was no independent development
in its Syriac atmosphere, and even the choice of material had already
been made by the Hellenists before it passed into Syriac hands. It was
now definitely established that the basis of the “humanities” was the
Aristotelian logic, and that this as well as all other studies in the
work of Aristotle was to be interpreted according to the neo-Platonic
commentators. In medicine and chemistry the curriculum of the school
of Alexandria was recognised as authoritative and this, in so far as
it was based upon Galen and Hippocrates, and upon the teaching of
Paul of Aegina in obstetrical medicine, was to the good: but there
was a mystical side of Alexandrian science mixed up with astrology,
so that particular drugs had to be taken where certain planets were
in the ascendant, and such like ideas, which gave a magical tone to
Alexandrian and Arabic medicine which was not for its advantage,
although it must be remembered that the ready contempt formerly
poured upon Arabic science as mere charlatanism is now expressed more
cautiously: we are prepared to admit that very much real and valuable
work was done in medicine and chemistry, although it is probable
that the Egyptian obscurantism did rather tend to hinder the steady
development of the sounder tradition derived from Galen and the Greek
physicians.
We are thus able to understand that “Muslim theology, philosophy, and
science put forth their first luxuriant shoots on a soil which was
saturated with Hellenistic culture.” (Nicholson: _Mystics of Islam._
London, 1914 p. 9.) The passage of Hellenism took place through five
channels:--
(i) The Nestorians who hold the first place as the earliest teachers of
the Muslims and the most important transmitters of medicine.
(ii) The Jacobites or Monophysites who were the chief influences in
introducing neo-Platonic speculations and mysticism.
(iii) The Zoroastrians of Persia and especially the school of
Junde-Shapur, although this had a strong Nestorian element.
(iv) The Pagans of Harran who came forward at a later stage.
(v) The Jews who, in this connection, occupy a somewhat peculiar
position: they had no contact with the tradition of Aristotelian
philosophy, their academies at Sora and Pumbaditha were concerned with
their own traditional law and Bible exegesis only. Jewish philosophical
studies began later and were themselves derived from the Arabic
philosophers. But they shared with the Nestorians an inclination
towards medical studies so that Jewish physicians appear in the early
days of Baghdad. Yet they come distinctly second to the Nestorians.
Thus amongst the medical writers mentioned by Dr. Leclerc in his
_Histoire de la médecine arabe_ (Paris, 1876) we find amongst the names
cited for the tenth cent. A.D. that there are 29 Christians, 3 Jews,
and 4 pagans of Harran, though in the next century only 3 Christians
appear, as against 7 Jews, the work then passing very largely into
Muslim hands.