MR. WEBSTER'S PLAN OF RELIEF.
It has already been seen that Mr. Webster took no direct part in
promoting the adoption of the resolutions against General Jackson.
He had no private grief to incite him against the President; and,
as first drawn up, it would have been impossible for him, honored
with the titles of "expounder and defender of the constitution," to
have supported the resolve: bearing plainly on its face impeachable
matter. After several modifications, he voted for it; but, from the
beginning, he had his own plan in view, which was entirely different
from an attack on the President; and solely looked to the advantage
of the bank, and the relief of the distress, in a practical and
parliamentary mode of legislation. He looked to a renewal of the
bank charter for a short term, and with such modifications as
would tend to disarm opposition, and to conciliate favor for it.
The term of the renewal was only to be for six years: a length of
time well chosen; because, from the shortness of the period, it
would have an attraction for all that class of members--always
more or less numerous in every assembly--who, in every difficulty,
are disposed to temporize and compromise; while, to the bank, in
carrying its existence beyond the presidential term of General
Jackson, it felt secure in the future acquisition of a full term.
Besides the attraction in the short period, Mr. Webster proposed
another amelioration, calculated to have serious effect; it was to
give up the exclusive or monopoly feature in the charter--leaving
to Congress to grant any other charter, in the mean time, to a new
company, if it pleased. The objectionable branch bank currency
of petty drafts was also given up. Besides this, and as an
understanding that the corporation would not attempt to obtain a
further existence beyond the six years, the directors were to be
at liberty to begin to return the capital to the stockholders at
any time within the period of three years, before the expiration of
the six renewed years. The deposits were not to be restored until
after the first day of July; and, as an agreeable concession to
the enemies of small paper currency the bank was to issue, or use,
no note under the amount of twenty dollars. He had drawn up a bill
with these provisions, and asked leave to bring it in; and, asking
the leave, made a very plausible business speech in its favor: the
best perhaps that could have been devised. In addition to his own
weight, and the recommendations in the bill, it was understood to
be the preference of Mr. Biddle himself--his own choice of remedies
in the difficulties which surrounded his institution. But he met
opposition from quarters not to be expected: from Mr. Clay, who
went for the full term of twenty years; and Mr. Calhoun, who went
for twelve. It was difficult to comprehend why these two gentlemen
should wish to procure for the bank more than it asked, and which
it was manifestly impossible for it to gain. Mr. Webster's bill was
the only one that stood the least chance of getting through the two
Houses; and on that point he had private assurances of support from
friends of the administration, if all the friends of the bank stood
firm. In favoring this charter for twelve years, Mr. Calhoun felt
that an explanation of his conduct was due to the public, as he was
well known to have been opposed to the renewed charter, when so
vehemently attempted, in 1832; and also against banks generally. His
explanation was, that he considered it a currency question, and a
question between the national and local banks; and that the renewed
charter was to operate against them; and, in winding itself up, was
to cease for ever, having first established a safe currency. His
frequent expression was, that his plan was to "unbank the banks:" a
process not very intelligibly explained at the time, and on which
he should be allowed to speak for himself. Some passages are,
therefore, given from his speech:
"After a full survey of the whole subject, I can see no means of
extricating the country from its present danger, and to arrest
its further increase, but a bank, the agency of which, in some
form; or under some authority, is indispensable. The country has
been brought into the present diseased state of the currency
by banks, and must be extricated by their agency. We must, in
a word, use a bank to unbank the banks, to the extent that may
be necessary to restore a safe and stable currency--just as
we apply snow to a frozen limb, in order to restore vitality
and circulation, or hold up a burn to the flame to extract the
inflammation. All must see that it is impossible to suppress
the banking system at once. It must continue for a time. Its
greatest enemies, and the advocates of an exclusive specie
circulation, must make it a part of their system to tolerate
the banks for a longer or a shorter period. To suppress them at
once, would, if it were possible, work a greater revolution: a
greater change in the relative condition of the various classes
of the community than would the conquest of the country by a
savage enemy. What, then, must be done? I answer, a new and
safe system must gradually grow up under, and replace, the old;
imitating, in this respect, the beautiful process which we
sometimes see, of a wounded or diseased part in a living organic
body, gradually superseded by the healing process of nature.
"How is this to be effected? How is a bank to be used as the
means of correcting the excess of the banking system? And what
bank is to be selected as the agent to effect this salutary
change? I know, said Mr. C., that a diversity of opinion will
be found to exist, as to the agent to be selected, among those
who agree on every other point, and who, in particular, agree
on the necessity of using some bank as the means of effecting
the object intended; one preferring a simple recharter of
the existing bank--another, the charter of a new bank of the
United States--a third, a new bank ingrafted upon the old--and
a fourth, the use of the State banks, as the agent. I wish,
said Mr. C., to leave all these as open questions, to be
carefully surveyed and compared with each other, calmly and
dispassionately, without prejudice or party feeling; and that to
be selected which, on the whole, shall appear to be best--the
most safe; the most efficient; the most prompt in application,
and the least liable to constitutional objection. It would,
however, be wanting in candor on my part, not to declare that my
impression is, that a new Bank of the United States, ingrafted
upon the old, will be found, under all the circumstances of
the case, to combine the greatest advantages, and to be liable
to the fewest objections; but this impression is not so firmly
fixed as to be inconsistent with a calm review of the whole
ground, or to prevent my yielding to the conviction of reason,
should the result of such review prove that any other is
preferable. Among its peculiar recommendations, may be ranked
the consideration, that, while it would afford the means of a
prompt and effectual application for mitigating and finally
removing the existing distress, it would, at the same time, open
to the whole community a fair opportunity of participation in
the advantages of the institution, be they what they may.
"Let us then suppose (in order to illustrate and not to indicate
a preference) that the present bank be selected as the agent to
effect the intended object. What provisions will be necessary?
I will suggest those that have occurred to me, mainly, however,
with a view of exciting the reflection of those much more
familiar with banking operations than myself, and who, of
course, are more competent to form a correct judgment on their
practical effect.
"Let, then, the bank charter be renewed for twelve years after
the expiration of the present term, with such modifications and
limitations as may be judged proper, and that after that period,
it shall issue no notes under ten dollars; that government
shall not receive in its dues any sum less than ten dollars,
except in the legal coins of the United States; that it shall
not receive in its dues the notes of any bank that issues notes
of a denomination less than five dollars; and that the United
States Bank shall not receive in payment, or on deposit, the
notes of any bank whose notes are not receivable in dues of
the government; nor the notes of any bank which may receive
the notes of any bank whose notes are not receivable by the
government. At the expiration of six years from the commencement
of the renewed charter, let the bank be prohibited from issuing
any note under twenty dollars, and let no sum under that amount
be received in the dues of the government, except in specie;
and let the value of gold be raised at least equal to that of
silver, to take effect immediately, so that the country may be
replenished with the coin, the lightest and the most portable
in proportion to its value, to take the place of the receding
bank notes. It is unnecessary for me to state, that at present,
the standard value of gold is several per cent. less than that
of silver, the necessary effect of which has been to expel gold
entirely from our circulation, and thus to deprive us of a coin
so well calculated for the circulation of a country so great in
extent, and having so vast an intercourse, commercial, social,
and political, between all its parts, as ours. As an additional
recommendation to raise its relative value, gold has, of late,
become an important product of three considerable States of the
Union, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia--to the industry
of which, the measure proposed would give a strong impulse, and
which in turn would greatly increase the quantity produced.
"Such are the means which have occurred to me. There are members
of this body far more competent to judge of their practical
operation than myself, and as my object is simply to suggest
them for their reflection, and for that of others who are more
familiar with this part of the subject, I will not at present
enter into an inquiry as to their efficiency, with a view of
determining whether they are fully adequate to effect the
object in view or not. There are doubtless others of a similar
description, and perhaps more efficacious, that may occur to
the experienced, which I would freely embrace, as my object
is to adopt the best and most efficient. And it may be hoped
that, if on experience it should be found that neither these
provisions nor any other in the power of Congress, are fully
adequate to effect the important reform which I have proposed,
the co-operation of the States may be afforded, at least to
the extent of suppressing the circulation of notes under five
dollars, where such are permitted to be issued under their
authority."
The ultimate object proposed to be accomplished by Mr. Calhoun in
this process of "unbanking the banks," was to arrive eventually
and by slow degrees, at a metallic currency, and the revival of
gold. This had been my object, and so declared in the Senate, from
the time of the first opposition to the United States Bank. He had
talked his plan over to myself and others: we had talked over ours
to him. There was a point at which we all agreed--the restoration
of a metallic currency; but differed about the means--he expecting
to attain it slowly and eventually, through the process which he
mentioned; and we immediately, through the revival of the gold
currency, the extinction of the Bank of the United States, the
establishment of an independent treasury, and the exclusion of all
paper money from the federal receipts and payments. Laying hold of
the point on which we agreed, (and which was also the known policy
of the President), Mr. Calhoun appealed to Mr. Silas Wright and
myself and other friends of the administration, to support his plan.
He said:
"If I understand their views, as expressed by the senator from
Missouri, behind me (Mr. Benton)--the senator from New-York (Mr.
Wright); and other distinguished members of the party, and the
views of the President, as expressed in reported conversations,
I see not how they can reject the measure (_to wit_: his plan).
They profess to be the advocates of a metallic currency. I
propose to restore it by the most effectual measures that can be
devised, gradually and slowly, and to the extent that experience
may show that it can be done consistently with due regard to the
public interest. Further, no one can desire to go."
The reference here made by Mr. Calhoun to the views of the senator
from Missouri was to conversations held between them; in which each
freely communicated his own plan. Mr. Benton had not then brought
forward his proposition for the revival of the gold currency; but
did so, (in a speech which he had studied), the moment Mr. Calhoun
concluded. That was a thing understood between them. Mr. Calhoun
had signified his wish to speak first; to which Mr. Benton readily
assented: and both took the opportunity presented by Mr. Webster's
motion, and the presentation of his plan, to present their own
respectively. Mr. Benton presented his the moment Mr. Calhoun sat
down, in a much considered speech, which will be given in the next
chapter; and which was the first of his formal speeches in favor of
reviving the gold currency. In the mean time, Mr. Webster's plan
lingered on the motion for leave to bring in his bill. That leave
was not granted. Things took a strange turn. The friends of the bank
refused in a body to give Mr. Webster the leave asked: the enemies
of the bank were in favor of giving him the leave--chiefly, perhaps,
because his friends refused it. In this state of contrariety among
his friends, Mr. Webster moved to lay his own motion on the table;
and Mr. Forsyth, to show that this balk came from his own side of
the chamber, asked the yeas and nays; which were granted and were as
follows:
"YEAS.--Messrs Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing,
Frelinghuysen, Hendricks, King of Georgia, Mangum, Moore,
Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins,
Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Waggaman,
Webster.
"NAYS.--Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King
of Alabama, Morris, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White,
Wilkins, Wright."
The excuse for the movement--for this unexpected termination to Mr.
Webster's motion--was that the Senate might proceed with Mr. Clay's
resolution against General Jackson, and come to a conclusion upon
it. It was now time for that conclusion. It was near the last of
March, and the Virginia elections came on in April: but the real
cause for Mr. Webster's motion was the settled opposition of his
political friends to his plan; and that was proved by its subsequent
fate. In his motion to lay his application on the table, he treated
it as a temporary disposition of it--the application to be renewed
it some future time: which it never was.