NOMINATION OF GOVERNMENT DIRECTORS, AND THEIR REJECTION.
By the charter of the bank, the government was entitled to five
directors, to be nominated annually by the President, and confirmed
by the Senate. At the commencement of the session of 1833-'34,
the President nominated the five, four of them being the same who
had served during the current year, and who had made the report
on which the order for the removal of the deposits was chiefly
founded. This drew upon them the resentment of the bank, and caused
them to receive a large share of reproach and condemnation in the
report which the committee of the bank drew up, and which the
board of directors adopted and published. When these nominations
came into the Senate it was soon perceived that there was to be
opposition to these four; and for the purpose of testing the truth
of the objections, Mr. Kane, of Illinois, submitted the following
resolution:
"_Resolved_, That the nominations of H. D. Gilpin, John T.
Sullivan, Peter Wager, and Hugh McEldery, be recommitted to the
Committee on Finance, with instructions to inquire into their
several qualifications and fitness for the stations to which
they have been nominated; also into the truth of all charges
preferred by them against the board of directors of the Bank
of the United States, and into the conduct of each of the said
nominees during the time he may have acted as director of the
said bank; and that the said nominees have notice of the times
and places of meetings of said committee, and have leave to
attend the same."
Which was immediately rejected by the following vote:
"YEAS.--Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks,
Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Linn, McKean, Moor, Morris,
Rives, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins,
Wright.--20.
"NAYS.--Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Chambers, Clay,
Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Kent, King of Georgia, Knight,
Mangum, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Robbins, Silsbee,
Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman,
Webster.--27."
And this resolution being rejected, requiring a two-fold
examination--one into the character and qualifications of the
nominees, the other into the truth of their representations against
the bank, it was deemed proper to submit another, limited to an
inquiry into the character and fitness of the nominees; which was
rejected by the same vote. The nominations were then voted upon
separately, and each of the four was rejected by the same vote which
applied to the first one, to wit, Mr. Gilpin: and which was as
follows:
"YEAS.--Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy,
Hendricks, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Linn, McKean, Moore,
Morris, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins,
Wright.--20.
"NAYS.--Messrs. Bell, Bibb, Calhoun, Chambers, Clay, Ewing,
Frelinghuysen, Kent, Knight, Mangum, Naudain, Poindexter,
Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Sprague,
Swift, Tomlinson, Tyler, Waggaman, Webster.--24."
These rejections being communicated to the President, he immediately
felt that it presented a new case for his energy and decision of
conduct. The whole of the rejected gentlemen had been confirmed
the year before--had all acted as directors for the current
year--and there was no complaint against them except from the Bank
of the United States; and that limited to their conduct in giving
information of transactions in the bank to President Jackson at his
written request. Their characters and fitness were above question.
That was admitted by the Senate, both by its previous confirmation
for the same places, and its present refusal to inquire into those
points. The information which they had given to the President had
been copied from the books of the bank, and the transactions which
they communicated had been objected to by them at the time as
illegal and improper; and its truth, unimpeachable in itself, was
unimpeached by the Senate in their refusal to inquire into their
conduct while directors. It was evident then that they had been
rejected for the report which they made to the President; and this
brought up the question, whether it was right to punish them for
that act? and whether the bank should have the virtual nomination
of the government directors by causing those to be rejected which
the government nominated? and permitting none to serve but those
whose conduct should be subordinate to the views and policy of the
bank? These were questions, first, for the Senate, and then for the
country; and the President determined to bring it before both in a
formal message of re-nomination. He accordingly sent back the names
of the four rejected nominations in a message which contained, among
others, these passages:
"I disclaim all pretension of right on the part of the President
officially to inquire into, or call in question, the reasons
of the Senate for rejecting any nomination whatsoever. As the
President is not responsible to them for the reasons which
induce him to make a nomination, so they are not responsible to
him for the reasons which induce them to reject it. In these
respects, each is independent of the other and both responsible
to their respective constituents. Nevertheless, the attitude
in which certain vital interests of the country are placed by
the rejection of the gentlemen now re-nominated require of me,
frankly, to communicate my views of the consequences which
must necessarily follow this act of the Senate, if it be not
reconsidered.
"The characters and standing of these gentlemen are well known
to the community, and eminently qualify them for the offices
to which I propose to appoint them. Their confirmation by the
Senate at its last session to the same offices is proof that
such was the opinion of them entertained by the Senate at that
time; and unless some thing has occurred since to change it,
this act may now be referred to as evidence that their talents
and pursuits justified their selection.
"The refusal, however, to confirm their nominations to the
same offices, shows that there is something in the conduct of
these gentlemen during the last year which, in the opinion of
the Senate, disqualifies them; and as no charge has been made
against them as men or citizens, nothing which impeaches the
fair private character they possessed when the Senate gave
them their sanction at its last session, and as it moreover
appears from the journal of the Senate recently transmitted for
my inspection, that it was deemed unnecessary to inquire into
their qualifications or character, it is to be inferred that the
change in the opinion of the Senate has arisen from the official
conduct of these gentlemen. The only circumstances in their
official conduct which have been deemed of sufficient importance
to attract public attention are the two reports made by them
to the executive department of the government, the one bearing
date the 22d day of April, and the other the 19th day of August
last; both of which reports were communicated to the Senate by
the Secretary of the Treasury with his reasons for removing the
deposits.
"The truth of the facts stated in these reports, is not, I
presume, questioned by any one. The high character and standing
of the citizens by whom they were made prevent any doubt upon
the subject. Indeed the statements have not been denied by the
president of the bank, and the other directors. On the contrary,
they have insisted that they were authorized to use the money of
the bank in the manner stated in the two reports, and have not
denied that the charges there made against the corporation are
substantially true.
"It must be taken, therefore, as admitted that the statements
of the public directors, in the reports above mentioned, are
correct: and they disclose the most alarming abuses on the part
of the corporation, and the most strenuous exertions on their
part to put an end to them. They prove that enormous sums were
secretly lavished in a manner, and for purposes that cannot be
justified; and that the whole of the immense capital of the
bank has been virtually placed at the disposal of a single
individual, to be used, if he thinks proper, to corrupt the
press, and to control the proceedings of the government by
exercising an undue influence over elections.
"The reports were made in obedience to my official directions;
and I herewith transmit copies of my letter calling for
information of the proceedings of the bank. Were they bound to
disregard the call? Was it their duty to remain silent while
abuses of the most injurious and dangerous character were daily
practised? Were they bound to conceal from the constituted
authorities a course of measures destructive to the best
interests of the country, and intended, gradually and secretly,
to subvert the foundations of our government, and to transfer
its powers from the hands of the people to a great moneyed
corporation? Was it their duty to sit in silence at the board,
and witness all these abuses without an attempt to correct them;
or, in case of failure there, not to appeal to higher authority?
The eighth fundamental rule authorizes any one of the directors,
whether elected or appointed, who may have been absent when an
excess of debt was created, or who may have dissented from the
act, to exonerate himself from personal responsibility by giving
notice of the fact to the President of the United States; thus
recognizing the propriety of communicating to that officer the
proceedings of the board in such cases. But, independently of
any argument to be derived from the principle recognized in the
rule referred to, I cannot doubt for a moment that it is the
right and the duty of every director at the board to attempt
to correct all illegal proceedings, and in case of failure,
to disclose them; and that every one of them, whether elected
by the stockholders or appointed by the government, who had
knowledge of the facts, and concealed them, would be justly
amenable to the severest censure.
"But, in the case of the public directors, it was their peculiar
and official duty to make the disclosures; and the call upon
them for information could not have been disregarded without a
flagrant breach of their trust. The directors appointed by the
United States cannot be regarded in the light of the ordinary
directors of a bank appointed by the stockholders, and charged
with the care of their pecuniary interests in the corporation.
They have higher and more important duties. They are public
officers. They are placed at the board not merely to represent
the stock held by the United States, but to observe the conduct
of the corporation, and to watch over the public interests.
It was foreseen that this great moneyed monopoly might be so
managed as to endanger the interests of the country; and it
was therefore deemed necessary, as a measure of precaution, to
place at the board watchful sentinels, who should observe its
conduct, and stand ready to report to the proper officers of the
government every act of the board which might affect injuriously
the interests of the people.
"It was, perhaps, scarcely necessary to present to the Senate
these views of the powers of the Executive, and of the duties
of the five directors appointed by the United States. But the
bank is believed to be now striving to obtain for itself the
government of the country, and is seeking, by new and strained
constructions, to wrest from the hands of the constituted
authorities the salutary control reserved by the charter. And as
misrepresentation is one of its most usual weapons of attack, I
have deemed it my duty to put before the Senate, in a manner not
to be misunderstood, the principles on which I have acted.
"Entertaining, as I do, a solemn conviction of the truth of
these principles, I must adhere to them, and act upon them, with
constancy and firmness.
"Aware, as I now am, of the dangerous machinations of the bank,
it is more than ever my duty to be vigilant in guarding the
rights of the people from the impending danger. And I should
feel that I ought to forfeit the confidence with which my
countrymen have honored me, if I did not require regular and
full reports of every thing in the proceedings of the bank
calculated to affect injuriously the public interests, from
the public directors, and if the directors should fail to give
the information called for, it would be my imperious duty to
exercise the power conferred on me by the law of removing them
from office, and of appointing others who would discharge their
duties with more fidelity to the public. I can never suffer any
one to hold office under me, who would connive at corruption,
or who should fail to give the alarm when he saw the enemies
of liberty endeavoring to sap the foundations of our free
institutions, and to subject the free people of the United
States to the dominion of a great moneyed corporation.
"Any directors of the bank, therefore, who might be appointed
by the government, would be required to report to the Executive
as fully as the late directors have done, and more frequently,
because the danger is more imminent; and it would be my duty to
require of them a full detail of every part of the proceedings
of the corporation, or any of its officers, in order that I
might be enabled to decide whether I should exercise the power
of ordering a _scire facias_, which is reserved to the President
by the charter, or adopt such other lawful measures as the
interests of the country might require. It is too obvious to be
doubted, that the misconduct of the corporation would never have
been brought to light by the aid of a public proceeding at the
board of directors.
"The board, when called on by the government directors, refused
to institute an inquiry or require an account, and the mode
adopted by the latter was the only one by which the object
could be attained. It would be absurd to admit the right of the
government directors to give information, and at the same time
deny the means of obtaining it. It would be but another mode
of enabling the bank to conceal its proceedings, and practice
with impunity its corruptions. In the mode of obtaining the
information, therefore, and in their efforts to put an end to
the abuses disclosed, as well as in reporting them, the conduct
of the late directors was judicious and praiseworthy, and the
honesty, firmness, and intelligence, which they have displayed,
entitle them, in my opinion, to the gratitude of the country.
"If the views of the Senate be such as I have supposed, the
difficulty of sending to the Senate any other names than those
of the late directors will be at once apparent. I cannot consent
to place before the Senate the name of any one who is not
prepared, with firmness and honesty, to discharge the duties of
a public director in the manner they were fulfilled by those
whom the Senate have refused to confirm. If, for performing a
duty lawfully required of them by the Executive, they are to be
punished by the subsequent rejection of the Senate, it would not
only be useless but cruel to place men of character and honor in
that situation, if even such men could be found to accept it. If
they failed to give the required information, or to take proper
measures to obtain it, they would be removed by the Executive.
If they gave the information, and took proper measures to obtain
it, they would, upon the next nomination, be rejected by the
Senate. It would be unjust in me to place any other citizens
in the predicament in which this unlooked for decision of the
Senate has placed the estimable and honorable men who were
directors during the last year.
"If I am not in error in relation to the principles upon which
these gentlemen have been rejected, the necessary consequence
will be that the bank will hereafter be without government
directors and the people of the United States must be deprived
of their chief means of protection against its abuses; for,
whatever conflicting opinions may exist as to the right of the
directors appointed in January, 1833, to hold over until new
appointments shall be made, it is very obvious that, whilst
their rejection by the Senate remains in force, they cannot,
with propriety, attempt to exercise such a power. In the
present state of things, therefore, the corporation will be
enabled effectually to accomplish the object it has been so
long endeavoring to attain. Its exchange committees, and its
delegated powers to its president, may hereafter be dispensed
with, without incurring the danger of exposing its proceedings
to the public view. The sentinels which the law had placed at
its board can no longer appear there.
"Justice to myself, and to the faithful officers by whom the
public has been so well and so honorably served, without
compensation or reward, during the last year, has required of
me this full and frank exposition of my motives for nominating
them again after their rejection by the Senate. I repeat, that
I do not question the right of the Senate to confirm or reject
at their pleasure; and if there had been any reason to suppose
that the rejection, in this case, had not been produced by the
causes to which I have attributed it, or of my views of their
duties, and the present importance of their rigid performance,
were other than they are, I should have cheerfully acquiesced,
and attempted to find others who would accept the unenviable
trust. But I cannot consent to appoint directors of the bank to
be the subservient instruments, or silent spectators, of its
abuses and corruptions; nor can I ask honorable men to undertake
the thankless duty, with the certain prospect of being rebuked
by the Senate for its faithful performance, in pursuance of the
lawful directions of the Executive."
This message brought up the question, virtually, Which was the
nominating power, in the case of the government directors of the
bank? was it the President and Senate? or the bank and the Senate?
for it was evident that the four now nominated were rejected
to gratify the bank, and for reasons that would apply to every
director that would discharge his duties in the way these four had
done--namely, as government directors, representing its stock,
guarding its interest, and acting for the government in all cases
which concerned the welfare of an institution whose notes were a
national currency, whose coffers were the depository of the public
moneys, and in which it had a direct interest of seven millions
of dollars in its stock. It brought up this question: and if
negatived, virtually decided that the nominating power should be
in the bank; and that the government directors should no more give
such information to the President as these four had given. And
this question it was determined to try, and that definitively, in
the persons of these four nominated directors, with the declared
determination to nominate no others if they were rejected; and
so leave the government without representation in the bank. This
message of re-nomination was referred to the Senate's Committee of
Finance, of which Mr. Tyler was chairman, and who made a report
adverse to the re-nominations, and in favor of again rejecting
the nominees. The points made in the report were, _first_, the
absolute right of the Senate to reject nominations; _secondly_,
their privilege to give no reasons for their rejections (which
the President had not asked); and, _thirdly_, against the general
impolicy of making re-nominations, while admitting both the right
and the practice in extraordinary occasions. Some extracts will show
its character: thus:
"The President disclaims, indeed, in terms, all right to inquire
into the reasons of the Senate for rejecting any nomination;
and yet the message immediately undertakes to infer, from facts
and circumstances, what those reasons, which influenced the
Senate in this case, must have been; and goes on to argue, much
at large, against the validity of such supposed reasons. The
committee are of opinion that, if, as the President admits, he
cannot inquire into the reasons of the Senate for refusing its
assent to nominations, it is still more clear that these reasons
cannot, with propriety, be assumed, and made subjects of comment.
"In cases in which nominations are rejected for reasons
affecting the character of the persons nominated, the committee
think that no inference is to be drawn except what the vote
shows; that is to say, that the Senate withholds its advice
and consent from the nominations. And the Senate, not being
bound to give reasons for its votes in these cases, it is not
bound, nor would it be proper for it, as the committee think,
to give any answer to remarks founded on the presumption of
what such reasons must have been in the present case. They feel
themselves, therefore, compelled to forego any response whatever
to the message of the President, in this particular, as well
by the reasons before assigned, as out of respect to that high
officer.
"The President acts upon his own views of public policy, in
making nominations to the Senate; and the Senate does no more,
when it confirms or rejects such nominations.
"For either of these co-ordinate departments to enter into the
consideration of the motives of the other, would not, and could
not, fail, in the end, to break up all harmonious intercourse
between them. This your committee would deplore as highly
injurious to the best interests of the country. The President,
doubtless, asks himself, in the case of every nomination for
office, whether the person be fit for the office; whether he
be actuated by correct views and motives; and whether he be
likely to be influenced by those considerations which should
alone govern him in the discharge of his duties--is he honest,
capable, and faithful? Being satisfied in these particulars,
the President submits his name to the Senate, where the same
inquiries arise, and its decision should be presumed to be
dictated by the same high considerations as those which govern
the President in originating the nomination.
"For these reasons, the committee have altogether refrained from
entering into any discussion of the legal duties and obligations
of directors of the bank, appointed by the President and Senate,
which forms the main topic of the message.
"The committee would not feel that it had fully acquitted itself
of its obligations, if it did not avail itself of this occasion
to call the attention of the Senate to the general subject of
renomination.
"The committee do not deny that a right of renomination
exists; but they are of opinion that, in very clear and strong
cases only should the Senate reverse decisions which it has
deliberately formed, and officially communicated to the
President.
"The committee perceive, with regret, an intimation in the
message that the President may not see fit to send to the Senate
the names of any other persons to be directors of the bank,
except those whose nominations have been already rejected.
While the Senate will exercise its own rights according to its
own views of its duty, it will leave to other officers of the
government to decide for themselves on the manner they will
perform their duties. The committee know no reasons why these
offices should not be filled; or why, in this case, no further
nomination should be made, after the Senate has exercised its
unquestionable right of rejecting particular persons who have
been nominated, any more than in other cases. The Senate will be
ready at all times to receive and consider any such nominations
as the President may present to it.
"The committee recommend that the Senate do not advise and
consent to the appointment of the persons thus renominated."
While these proceedings were going on in the Senate, the four
rejected gentlemen were paying some attention to their own case;
and, in a "memorial" addressed to the Senate and to the House of
Representatives, answered the charges against them in the Directors'
Report, and vindicated their own conduct in giving the information
which the President requested--reasserted the truth of that
information; and gave further details upon the manner in which they
had been systematically excluded from a participation in conducting
the main business of the bank, and even from a knowledge of what was
done. They said:
"Selected by the President and Senate as government directors
of the Bank of the United States, we have endeavored, during
the present year, faithfully to discharge the duties of that
responsible trust. Appointed without solicitation, deriving from
the office no emolument, we have been guided in our conduct by
no views but a determination to uphold, so far as was in our
power, those principles which we believe actuated the people
of the United States in establishing a national bank, and in
providing by its charter that they should be represented at
the board of directors. We have regarded that institution, not
merely as a source of profit to individuals, but as an organ of
the government, established by the nation for its own benefit.
We have regarded ourselves, not as mere agents of those whose
funds have been subscribed towards the capital of the bank, but
as officers appointed on behalf of the American people. We have
endeavored to govern all our conduct as faithful representatives
of them. We have been deterred from this by no preconcerted
system to deprive us of our rights, by no impeachment of our
motives, by no false views of policy, by no course of management
which might be supposed to promote the interests of those
concerned in the institution, at the danger or sacrifice of
the general good. We have left the other directors to govern
themselves as they may think best for the interests of those by
whom they were chosen. For ourselves, we have been determined,
that where any differences have arisen, involving on the one
hand that open and correct course which is beneficial to the
whole community, and, on the other, what are supposed to be
the interests of the bank, our efforts should be steadily
directed to uphold the former, our remonstrances against the
latter should be resolute and constant; and, when they proved
unavailing, our appeal should be made to those who were more
immediately intrusted with the protection of the public welfare.
"In pursuing this course we have been met by an organized system
of opposition, on the part of the majority. Our efforts have
been thwarted, our motives and actions have been misrepresented,
our rights have been denied, and the limits of our duties have
been gratuitously pointed out to us, by those who have sought
to curtail them to meet their own policy, not that which we
believe led to the creation of the offices we hold. Asserting
that injury has been done to them by the late measure of the
Secretary of the Treasury, in removing the public deposits, an
elaborate statement has been prepared and widely circulated;
and taking that as their basis, it has been resolved by the
majority to present a memorial to the Senate and House of
Representatives. We have not, and do not interfere in the
controversy which exists between the majority of the board
and the executive department of the government; but unjustly
assailed as we have been in the statement to which we have
referred, we respectfully claim the same right of submitting
our conduct to the same tribunal, and asking of the assembled
representatives of the American people that impartial hearing,
and that fair protection, which all their officers and all
citizens have a right to demand. We shall endeavor to present
the view we have taken of the relation in which we are placed,
as well towards the institution in question as towards the
government and people of the United States, to prove that from
the moment we took our seats among the directors of the bank,
we have been the objects of a systematic opposition; our rights
trampled upon, our just interference prevented, and our offices
rendered utterly useless, for all the purposes required by the
charter; and to show that the statements by the majority of the
board, in the document to which we refer, convey an account of
their proceedings and conduct altogether illusory and incorrect."
The four gentlemen then state their opinions of their rights, and
their duties, as government directors--that they were devised as
instruments for the attainment of public objects--that they were
public directors, not elected by stockholders, but appointed by
the President and Senate--that their duties were not merely to
represent a moneyed interest and promote the largest dividend
for stockholders, but also to guard all the public and political
interest of the government in an institution so largely sharing
its support and so deeply interested in its safe and honorable
management. And in support of this opinion of their duties they
quoted the authority of Gen. Hamilton, founder of the first bank
of the United States; and that of Mr. Alexander Dallas, founder of
the second and present bank; showing that each of them, and at the
time of establishing the two banks respectively, considered the
government directors as public officers, bound to watch over the
operations of the bank, to oppose all malpractices, and to report
them to the government whenever they occurred. And they thus quoted
the opinions of those two gentlemen:
"In the celebrated report of Alexander Hamilton, in 1790, that
eminent statesman and financier, although then impressed with a
persuasion that the government of the country might well leave
the management of a national bank to 'the keen, steady, and, as
it were, magnetic sense of their own interest,' existing among
the private stockholders, yet holds the following remarkable
and pregnant language: 'If the paper of a bank is permitted
to insinuate itself into all the revenues and receipts of
a country; if it is even to be tolerated as the substitute
for gold and silver, in all the transactions of business;
it becomes, in either view, a national concern of the first
magnitude. As such, the ordinary rules of prudence require
that the government should possess the means of ascertaining,
whenever it thinks fit, that so delicate a trust is executed
with fidelity and care. A right of this nature is not only
desirable, as it respects the government, but it ought to be
equally so to all those concerned in the institution, as an
additional title to public and private confidence, and as a
thing which can only be formidable to practices that imply
mismanagement.'
"In the letter addressed by Alexander James Dallas, the author
of the existing bank, to the chairman of the committee on
a national currency, in 1815, the sentiments of that truly
distinguished and patriotic statesman are explicitly conveyed
upon this very point. 'Nor can it be doubted,' he remarks,
'that the department of the government which is invested with
the power of appointment to all the important offices of
the State, is a proper department to exercise the power of
appointment in relation to a national trust of incalculable
magnitude. The national bank ought not to be regarded simply
as a commercial bank. It will not operate on the funds of the
stockholders alone, but much more on the funds of the nation.
Its conduct, good or bad, will not affect the corporate credit
and resources alone, but much more the credit and resources
of the government. In fine, it is not an institution created
for the purposes of commerce and profit alone, but much more
for the purposes of national policy, as an auxiliary in the
exercise of some of the highest powers of the government.
Under such circumstances, the public interests cannot be too
cautiously guarded, and the guards proposed can never be
injurious to the commercial interests of the institution. The
right to inspect the general accounts of the bank, may be
employed to detect the evils of a mal-administration, but an
interior agency in the direction of its affairs will best serve
to prevent them.' This last sentence, extracted from the able
document of Secretary Dallas, developes at a glance what had
been the experience of the American government and people, in
the period which elapsed between the time of Alexander Hamilton
and that immediately preceding the formation of the present
bank. Hamilton conceived that 'a right to inspect the general
accounts of the bank,' would enable government 'to detect the
evils of a mal-administration,' and their detection he thought
sufficient. He was mistaken: at least so thought Congress and
their constituents, in 1815. Hence the inflexible spirit which
prevailed at the organization of a new bank, in establishing
'an interior agency in the direction of its affairs,' by the
appointment of public officers, through whom the evils of a
mal-administration might be carefully watched and prevented."
The four gentlemen also showed, in their memorial, that when the
bill for the charter of the present bank was under consideration in
the Senate, a motion was made to strike out the clause authorizing
the appointment of the government directors; and that that motion
was resisted, and successfully, upon the ground that they were to
be the guardians of the public interests, and to secure a just
and honorable administration of the affairs of the bank; that
they were not mere bank directors, but government officers, bound
to watch over the rights and interests of the government, and to
secure a safe and honest management of an institution which bore
the name of the United States--was created by it--and in which the
United States had so much at stake in its stock, in its deposits,
in its circulation, and in the safety of the community which put
their faith in it. Having vindicated the official quality of
their characters, and shown their duty as well as their right to
inform the government of all mal-practices, they entered upon an
examination of the information actually given, showing the truth of
all that was communicated, and declaring it to be susceptible of
proof, by the inspection of the books of the institution, and by an
examination of its directors and clerks.
"We confidently assert that there is in it no statement or
charge that can be invalidated; that every one is substantiated
by the books and records of the bank; that no real error has
been pointed out in this elaborate attack upon us by the
majority. It is by suppressing facts well known to them, by
misrepresenting what we say, by drawing unjust and unfair
inferences from particular sentences, by selecting insulated
phrases, and by exhibiting partial statements; by making
unfounded insinuations, and by unworthily impeaching our
motives, that they endeavor to controvert that which they are
unable to refute. When the expense account shall be truly and
fully exhibited to any tribunal, if it shall be found that the
charges we have stated do not exist; when the minutes of the
board shall be laid open, if it shall be found the resolutions
we have quoted are not recorded; we shall acknowledge that we
have been guilty of injustice and of error, but not till then.
"We have thus endeavored to present to the assembled
representatives of the American people, a view of the course
which, for nearly a year, the majority in a large moneyed
institution, established by them for their benefit, have thought
proper to pursue towards those who have been placed there, to
guard their interests and to watch and control their conduct. We
have briefly stated the systematic series of actions by which
they have endeavored to deprive them of every right that was
conferred on them by the charter, and to assume to themselves a
secret, irresponsible, and unlimited power. We have shown that,
in endeavoring to vindicate or to save themselves, they have
resorted to accusations against us, which they are unable to
sustain, and left unanswered charges which, were they not true,
it would be easy to repel. We have been urged to this from no
desire to enter into the lists with an adversary sustained by
all the resources which boundless wealth affords. We have been
driven to it by the nature and manner of the attack made upon
us, in the document on which the intended memorial to Congress
is founded."
But all their representations were in vain. Their nominations
were immediately rejected, a second time, and the seal of secrecy
preserved inviolate upon the reasons of the rejection. The
"proceedings" of the Senate were allowed to be published; that is to
say, the acts of the Senate, as a body, such as its motions, votes,
reports, &c., but nothing of what was said pending the nominations.
A motion was made by Mr. Wright to authorize the publication of the
debates, which was voted down; and so differently from what was
done in the case of Mr. Van Buren. In that case, the debates on the
nomination were published; the reasons for the rejection were shown;
and the public were enabled to judge of their validity. In this case
no publication of debates was allowed; the report presented by Mr.
Tyler gave no hint of the reasons for the rejection; and the act
remained where that report put it--on the absolute right to reject,
without the exhibition of any reason.
And thus the nomination of the government directors was rejected by
the United States Senate, not for the declared, but for the known
reason of reporting the misconduct of the bank to the President,
and especially as it related to the appointment and the conduct of
the exchange committee. A few years afterwards a committee of the
stockholders, called the "Committee of Investigation," made a report
upon the conduct and condition of the bank, in which this exchange
committee is thus spoken of: "The mode in which the committee of
exchange transacted their business, shows that there really existed
no check whatever upon the officers, and that the funds of the bank
were almost entirely at their disposition. That committee met daily,
and were attended by the cashier, and at times, by the president.
They exercised the power of making the loans and settlements, to
full as great an extent as the board itself. They kept no minutes
of their proceedings--no book in which the loans made, and business
done, were entered; but their decisions and directions were given
verbally to the officers, to be by them carried into execution. The
established course of business seems to have been, for the first
teller to pay on presentation at the counter, all checks, notes,
or due bills having indorsed the order, or the initials, of one of
the cashiers, and to place these as vouchers in his drawer, for
so much cash, where they remained, until just before the regular
periodical counting of the cash by the standing committee of the
board on the state of the bank. These vouchers were then taken out,
and entered as 'bills receivable,' in a small memorandum-book, under
the charge of one of the clerks. These bills were not discounted,
but bore interest semi-annually, and were secured by a pledge of
stock, or some other kind of property. It is evidently impossible
under such circumstances, to ascertain or be assured, in regard
to any particular loan or settlement, that it was authorized by a
majority of the exchange committee. It can be said, however, with
entire certainty, that the very large business transacted in this
way does not appear upon the face of the discount books--was never
submitted to the examination of the members of the board at its
regular meetings, nor is any where entered on the minutes as having
been reported to that body for their information or approbation."