CHAPTER XCIII.

BANK PROCEEDINGS, ON SEEING THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENT, IN

RELATION TO THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITS.

Immediately on the publication in the _Globe_ of the "Paper read

to the Cabinet," the bank took it into consideration in all

the forms of a co-ordinate body. It summoned a meeting of the

directors--appointed a committee--referred the President's "Paper"

to it--ordered it to report--held another meeting to receive the

report--adopted it (the government directors, Gilpin, Wager, and

Sullivan voting against it)--and ordered five thousand copies of

the report to be printed. A few extracts from the report, entitled

a Memorial to Congress, are here given, for the purpose of showing,

_First_, The temper and style in which this moneyed corporation,

deriving its existence from the national Congress, indulged itself,

and that in its corporate capacity, in speaking of the President of

the United States and his cabinet; and, _next_, to show the lead

which it gave to the proceedings which were to be had in Congress.

Under the first head, the following passages are given:

"The committee to whom was referred on the 24th of September,

a paper signed 'Andrew Jackson,' purporting to have been read

to a cabinet on the 18th, and also another paper signed 'H.

D. Gilpin, John T. Sullivan, Peter Wager, and Hugh McEldery,'

bearing date August 19th, 1833--with instructions to consider

the same, and report to the board 'whether any, and what steps

may be deemed necessary on the part of the board in consequence

of the publication of said letter and report,' beg leave to

state--

"To justify this measure is the purpose of the paper signed

'Andrew Jackson.' Of the paper itself, and of the individual who

has signed it, the committee find it difficult to speak with the

plainness by which alone such a document, from such a source,

should be described, without wounding their own self-respect,

and violating the consideration which all American citizens

must feel for the chief magistracy of their country. Subduing,

however, their feelings and their language down to that

respectful tone which is due to the office, they will proceed

to examine the history of this measure, its character and the

pretexts offered in palliation of it.

"1st. It would appear from its contents and from other sources

of information, that the President had a meeting of what is

called the cabinet, on Wednesday, the 18th September, and there

read this paper. Finding that it made no impression on the

majority of persons assembled, the subject was postponed, and

in the mean time this document was put into the newspapers.

It was obviously published for two reasons. The first was to

influence the members of the cabinet by bringing to bear upon

their immediate decision the first public impression excited by

misrepresentations, which the objects of them could not refute

in time--the second was, by the same excitement, to affect the

approaching elections in Pennsylvania, Maryland and New Jersey.

Its assailants are what are called politicians (i.e., the

assailants of the bank)."

Such is the temper and style in which the President of the United

States is spoken of by this great moneyed corporation, in a memorial

addressed to Congress. Erecting itself into a co-ordinate body,

and assuming in its corporate capacity an authority over the

President's act, it does not even condescend to call him President.

It is "Andrew Jackson," and the name always placed between inverted

commas to mark the higher degree of contempt. Then the corporation

shrinks from remarking on the "paper" itself, and the "individual"

who signed it, as a thing injurious to their own self-respect,

and only to be done in consideration of the "office" which he

fills, and that after "subduing" their feelings--and this was the

insolence of the moneyed power in defeat, when its champion had

received but forty-nine votes for the Presidency out of two hundred

and eighty-eight given in! What would it have been in victory? The

lead which it gave to the intended proceedings in Congress, is well

indicated in these two paragraphs, and the specifications under them:

"The indelicacy of the form of those proceedings corresponds

well with the substance of them, which is equally in violation

of the rights of the bank and the laws of the country.

"The committee willingly leave to the Congress of the United

States, the assertion of their own constitutional power, and the

vindication of the principles of our government, against the

most violent assault they have ever yet encountered; and will

now confine themselves to the more limited purpose of showing

that the reasons assigned for this measure are as unfounded as

the object itself is illegal."

The illegality of the proceeding, and the vindication of the

constitution, and the principles of the government, from a most

violent assault, are the main objects left by the bank to the

Congress; the invalidity of the reasons assigned for the removal,

are more limited, and lest the Congress might not discover these

violations of law and constitution, the corporation proceeds to

enumerate and establish them. It says:

"Certainly since the foundation of this government, nothing

has ever been done which more deeply wounds the spirit of

our free institutions. It, in fact, resolves itself into

this--that whenever the laws prescribe certain duties to an

officer, if that officer, acting under the sanctions of his

official oath and his private character, refuses to violate

that law, the President of the United States may dismiss

him and appoint another; and if he too should prove to be a

'refractory subordinate,' to continue his removals until he

at last discovers in the descending scale of degradation some

irresponsible individual fit to be the tool of his designs.

Unhappily, there are never wanting men who will think as

their superiors wish them to think--men who regard more the

compensation than the duties of their office--men to whom daily

bread is sufficient consolation for daily shame.

"The present state of this question is a fearful illustration

of the danger of it. At this moment the whole revenue of

this country is at the disposal--the absolute, uncontrolled

disposal--of the President of the United States. The laws

declare that the public funds shall be placed in the Bank of the

United States, unless the Secretary of the Treasury forbids it.

The Secretary of the Treasury will not forbid it. The President

dismisses him, and appoints somebody who will. So the laws

declare that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, except

on warrants for appropriations made by law. If the Treasurer

refuses to draw his warrant for any disbursement, the President

may dismiss him and appoint some more flexible agent, who will

not hesitate to gratify his patron. The text is in the official

gazette, announcing the fate of the dismissed Secretary to

all who follow him. 'The agent cannot conscientiously perform

the service, and refuses to co-operate, and desires to remain

to thwart the President's measures. To put an end to this

difficulty between the head and the hands of the executive

department, the constitution arms the chief magistrate with

authority to remove the refractory subordinate.' The theory thus

avowed, and the recent practice under it, convert the whole free

institutions of this country into the mere absolute will of a

single individual. They break down all the restraints which the

framers of the government hoped they had imposed on arbitrary

power, and place the whole revenue of the United States in the

hands of the President.

"For it is manifest that this removal of the deposits is not

made by the order of the Secretary of the Treasury. It is a

perversion of language so to describe it. On the contrary, the

reverse is openly avowed. The Secretary of the Treasury refused

to remove them, believing, as his published letter declares,

that the removal was 'unnecessary, unwise, vindictive, arbitrary

and unjust.' He was then dismissed because he would not remove

them, and another was appointed because he would remove them.

Now this is a palpable violation of the charter. The bank and

Congress agree upon certain terms, which no one can change but

a particular officer; who, although necessarily nominated to

the Senate by the President, was designated by the bank and by

Congress as the umpire between them. Both Congress and the bank

have a right to the free and honest and impartial judgment of

that officer, whoever he may be--the bank, because the removal

may injure its interests--the Congress, because the removal

may greatly incommode and distress their constituents. In this

case, they are deprived of it by the unlawful interference of

the President, who 'assumes the responsibility,' which, being

interpreted, means, usurps the power of the Secretary.

"The whole structure of the Treasury shows that the design of

Congress was to make the Secretary as independent as possible

of the President. The other Secretaries are merely executive

officers; but the Secretary of the Treasury, the guardian of

the public revenue, comes into more immediate sympathy with

the representatives of the people who pay that revenue; and

although, according to the general scheme of appointment, he is

nominated by the President to the Senate, yet he is in fact the

officer of Congress, not the officer of the President.

"This independence of the Secretary of the Treasury--if it be

true in general--is more especially true in regard to the bank.

It was in fact the leading principle in organizing the bank,

that the President should be excluded from all control of it.

The question which most divided the House of Representatives

was, whether there should be any government directors at all;

and although this was finally adopted, yet its tendency to

create executive influence over the bank was qualified by two

restrictions: first, that no more than three directors should be

appointed from any one State; and, second, that the president

of the bank should not be, as was originally designed by the

Secretary of the Treasury, chosen from among the government

directors. Accordingly, by the charter, the Secretary of the

Treasury is every thing--the President comparatively nothing.

The Secretary has the exclusive supervision of all the relations

of the bank with the government."

These extracts are sufficient to show that the corporation charged

the President with illegal and unconstitutional conduct, subversive

of the principles of our government, and dangerous to our liberties

in causing the deposits to be removed--that they looked upon this

illegal, unconstitutional, and dangerous conduct as the principal

wrong--and left to Congress the assertion of its own constitutional

power, and the vindication of the principles of the government

from the assault which they had received. And this in a memorial

addressed to Congress, of which five thousand copies, in pamphlet

form, were printed, and the members of Congress liberally supplied

with copies. It will be seen, when we come to the proceedings of

Congress, how far the intimations of the memorial in showing what

ought to be done, and leaving Congress to do it, was complied with

by that body.

Thirty Years' View (Vol. 1 of 2) or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850 · 第 93 / 166 章