MR. CALHOUN'S NULLIFICATION RESOLUTIONS.
Simultaneously with the commencement of the discussions on the
South Carolina proceedings, was the introduction in the Senate of a
set of resolutions by Mr. Calhoun, entitled by him, "_Resolutions
on the powers of the government_;" but all involving the doctrine
of nullification; and the debate upon them deriving its point and
character from the discussion of that doctrine. The following were
the resolutions:
"_Resolved_, That the people of the several States composing
these United States are united as parties to a constitutional
compact, to which the people of each State acceded as a separate
sovereign community, each binding itself by its own particular
ratification; and that the Union, of which the said compact is
the bond, is a union between the States ratifying the same.
"_Resolved_, That the people of the several States, thus united
by the constitutional compact, in forming that instrument,
and in creating a general government to carry into effect
the objects for which they were formed, delegated to that
government, for that purpose, certain definite powers, to be
exercised jointly, reserving at the same time, each State to
itself, the residuary mass of powers, to be exercised by its own
separate government; and that whenever the general government
assumes the exercise of powers not delegated by the compact,
its acts are unauthorized, and are of no effect; and that the
same government is not made the final judge of the powers
delegated to it, since that would make its discretion, and not
the constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in
all other cases of compact among sovereign parties, without any
common judge, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as
well as of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress.
"_Resolved_, That the assertions that the people of these United
States, taken collectively as individualss, are now, or ever
have been, united on the principle of the social compact, and
as such are now formed into one nation or people, or that they
have ever been so united in any one stage of their political
existence; that the people of the several States composing the
Union have not, as members thereof, retained their sovereignty;
that the allegiance of their citizens has been transferred to
the general government; that they have parted with the right of
punishing treason through their respective State governments;
and that they have not the right of judging in the last resort
as to the extent of the powers reserved, and, of consequence,
of those delegated; are not only without foundation in truth,
but are contrary to the most certain and plain historical facts,
and the dearest deductions of reason; and that all exercise
of power on the part of the general government, or any of its
departments, claiming authority from so erroneous assumptions,
must of necessity be unconstitutional, must tend directly and
inevitably to subvert the sovereignty of the States, to destroy
the federal character of the Union, and to rear on its ruins
a consolidated government, without constitutional check or
limitation, and which must necessarily terminate in the loss of
liberty itself."
To which Mr. Grundy offered a counter set, as follows:
"1. _Resolved_, That by the constitution of the United States,
certain powers are delegated to the general government, and
those not delegated, or prohibited to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.
"2. _Resolved_, That one of the powers expressly granted by the
constitution to the general government, and prohibited to the
States, is that of laying duties on imports.
"3. _Resolved_, That the power to lay imposts is by the
constitution wholly transferred from the State authorities to
the general government, without any reservation of power or
right on the part of the State.
"4. _Resolved_, That the tariff laws of 1828 and 1832 are
exercises of the constitutional power possessed by the Congress
of the United States, whatever various opinions may exist as to
their policy and justice.
"5. _Resolved_, That an attempt on the part of a State to annul
an act of Congress passed upon any subject exclusively confided
by the constitution to Congress, is an encroachment on the
rights of the general government.
"6. _Resolved_, That attempts to obstruct or prevent the
execution of the several acts of Congress imposing duties on
imports, whether by ordinances of conventions or legislative
enactments, are not warranted by the constitution and are
dangerous to the political institutions of the country."
It was in the discussion of these resolutions, and the kindred
subjects of the "force bill" and the "revenue collection bill,"
that Mr. Calhoun first publicly revealed the source from which
he obtained the seminal idea of nullification as a remedy in a
government. The Virginia resolutions of '98-'99, were the assumed
source of the power itself as applicable to our federal and State
governments; but the essential idea of nullification as a peaceful
and lawful mode of arresting a measure of the general government
by the action of one of the States, was derived from the _veto_
power of the tribunes of the people in the Roman government. I had
often heard him talk of that tribunitian power, and celebrate it
as the perfection of good government--as being for the benefit of
the weaker part, and operating negatively to prevent oppression,
and not positively to do injustice--but I never saw him carry that
idea into a public speech but once, and that was on the discussion
of his resolutions of this session; for though actually delivered
while the "force bill" was before the Senate, yet all his doctrinal
argument on that bill was the amplification of his nullification
resolutions. On that occasion he traced the Roman tribunitian power,
and considered it a cure for all the disorders to which the Roman
state had been subject, and the cause to which all her subsequent
greatness was to be attributed. This remarkable speech was delivered
February 15th, 1833, and after depicting a government of the
majority--a majority unchecked by a right in the minority of staying
their measures--to be unmitigated despotism, he then proceeded to
argue in favor of the excellence of the _veto_ and the _secession_
power; and thus delivered himself:
"He might appeal to history for the truth of these remarks, of
which the Roman furnished the most familiar and striking. It was
a well-known fact, that, from the expulsion of the Tarquins,
to the time of the establishment of the tribunitian power,
the government fell into a state of the greatest disorder and
distraction, and, he might add, corruption. How did this happen?
The explanation will throw important light on the subject under
consideration. The community was divided into two parts, the
patricians and the plebeians, with the powers of the state
principally in the hands of the former, without adequate check
to protect the rights of the latter. The result was as might be
expected. The patricians converted the powers of the government
into the means of making money, to enrich themselves and their
dependants. They, in a word, had their American system, growing
out of the peculiar character of the government and condition
of the country. This requires explanation. At that period,
according to the laws of nations, when one nation conquered
another, the lands of the vanquished belonged to the victors;
and, according to the Roman law the lands thus acquired were
divided into parts, one allotted to the poorer class of the
people, and the other assigned to the use of the treasury, of
which the patricians had the distribution and administration.
The patricians abused their power, by withholding from the
people that which ought to have been allotted to them, and by
converting to their own use that which ought to have gone to
the treasury. In a word, they took to themselves the entire
spoils of victory, and they had thus the most powerful motive
to keep the state perpetually involved in war, to the utter
impoverishment and oppression of the people. After resisting
the abuse of power, by all peaceable means, and the oppression
becoming intolerable, the people at last withdrew from the city;
they, in a word, seceded; and, to induce them to reunite, the
patricians conceded to the plebeians, as the means of protecting
their separate interests, the very power which he contended is
necessary to protect the rights of the States, but which is now
represented as necessarily leading to disunion. They granted
to the people the right of choosing three tribunes from among
themselves, whose persons should be sacred, and who should
have the right of interposing their veto, not only against the
passage of laws, but even against their execution; a power
which those who take a shallow insight into human nature would
pronounce inconsistent with the strength and unity of the state,
if not utterly impracticable. Yet, so far from that being the
effect, from that day the genius of Rome became ascendant, and
victory followed her steps till she had established an almost
universal dominion.
"How can a result so contrary to all anticipation be explained?
The explanation appeared to him to be simple. No measure or
movement could be adopted without the concurring consent of both
the patricians and plebeians, and each thus became dependent
on the other, and, of consequence, the desire and objects of
neither could be effected without the concurrence of the other.
To obtain this concurrence, each was compelled to consult the
good will of the other, and to elevate to office not simply
those who might have the confidence of the order to which he
belonged, but also that of the other. The result was, that
men possessing those qualities which would naturally command
confidence, moderation, wisdom, justice, and patriotism, were
elevated to office; and these, by the weight of their authority
and the prudence of their counsel, together with that spirit of
unanimity necessarily resulting from the concurring assent of
the two orders, furnishes the real explanation of the power of
the Roman state, and of that extraordinary wisdom, moderation,
and firmness, which in so remarkable a degree characterized
her public men. He might illustrate the truth of the position
which he had laid down, by a reference to the history of all
free states, ancient and modern, distinguished for their power
and patriotism; and conclusively show not only that there was
not one which had not some contrivance, under some form, by
which the concurring assent of the different portions of the
community was made necessary in the action of government, but
also that the virtue, patriotism, and strength of the state were
in direct proportion to the strength of the means of securing
such assent. In estimating the operation of this principle in
our system, which depends, as he had stated, on the right of
interposition on the part of the State, we must not omit to
take into consideration the amending power, by which new powers
may be granted, or any derangement of the system be corrected,
by the concurring assent of three-fourths of the States; and
thus, in the same degree, strengthening the power of repairing
any derangement occasioned by the executive action of a State.
In fact, the power of interposition, fairly understood, may be
considered in the light of an appeal against the usurpations
of the general government, the joint agent of all the States,
to the States themselves, to be decided, under the amending
power, affirmatively, in favor of the government, by the voice
of three-fourths of the States, as the highest power known under
the system.
"Mr. C. said that he knew the difficulty, in our country,
of establishing the truth of the principle for which he
contended, though resting upon the clearest reason, and tested
by the universal experience of free nations. He knew that the
governments of the several States would be cited as an argument
against the conclusion to which he had arrived, and which, for
the most part, were constructed on the principle of the absolute
majority; but, in his opinion, a satisfactory answer could be
given; that the objects of expenditure which fell within the
sphere of a State government were few and inconsiderable; so
that, be their action ever so irregular, it could occasion
but little derangement. If, instead of being members of this
great confederacy, they formed distinct communities, and
were compelled to raise armies, and incur other expenses
necessary for their defence, the laws which he had laid down as
necessarily controlling the action of a State, where the will
of an absolute and unchecked majority prevailed, would speedily
disclose themselves in faction, anarchy, and corruption.
Even as the case is, the operation of the causes to which he
had referred were perceptible in some of the larger and more
populous members of the Union, whose governments had a powerful
central action, and which already showed a strong tendency
to that moneyed action which is the invariable forerunner of
corruption and convulsions.
"But to return to the general government; we have now sufficient
experience to ascertain that the tendency to conflict in this
action is between Southern and other sections. The latter,
having a decided majority, must habitually be possessed of
the powers of the government, both in this and in the other
House; and, being governed by that instinctive love of power
so natural to the human breast, they must become the advocates
of the power of government, and in the same degree opposed
to the limitations; while the other and weaker section is as
necessarily thrown on the side of the limitations. In one
word, the one section is the natural guardian of the delegated
powers, and the other of the reserved; and the struggle on the
side of the former will be to enlarge the powers, while that
on the opposite side will be to restrain them within their
constitutional limits. The contest will, in fact, be a contest
between power and liberty, and such he considered the present;
a contest in which the weaker section, with its peculiar labor,
productions, and situation, has at stake all that can be dear
to freemen. Should they be able to maintain in their full vigor
their reserved rights, liberty and prosperity will be their
portion; but if they yield, and permit the stronger interest to
consolidate within itself all the powers of the government, then
will its fate be more wretched than that of the aborigines whom
they have expelled, or of their slaves. In this great struggle
between the delegated and reserved powers, so far from repining
that his lot and that of those whom he represented is cast on
the side of the latter, he rejoiced that such is the fact;
for though we participate in but few of the advantages of the
government, we are compensated, and more than compensated, in
not being so much exposed to its corruption. Nor did he repine
that the duty, so difficult to be discharged, as the defence
of the reserved powers against, apparently, such fearful odds,
had been assigned to them. To discharge successfully this high
duty requires the highest qualities, moral and intellectual;
and, should you perform it with a zeal and ability in proportion
to its magnitude, instead of being mere planters, our section
will become distinguished for its patriots and statesmen. But,
on the other hand, if we prove unworthy of this high destiny,
if we yield to the steady encroachment of power, the severest
and most debasing calamity and corruption will overspread the
land. Every Southern man, true to the interests of his section,
and faithful to the duties which Providence has allotted him,
will be for ever excluded from the honors and emoluments of
this government, which will be reserved for those only who have
qualified themselves, by political prostitution, for admission
into the Magdalen Asylum."
In this extract from that remarkable speech, the first one in which
Mr. Calhoun defended nullification and secession in the Senate, and
in which every word bears the impress of intense thought, there is
distinctly to be seen his opinion of the defects of our duplicate
form of government (State and federal), and of the remedy for
those defects. I say, in our form of government; for his speech
had a practical application to ourselves, and was a defence, or
justification of the actual measures of the State he represented.
And this defect was, _the unchecked authority of a majority_;
and the remedy was, _an authority in the minority to check that
majority, and to secede_. This clearly was an absolute condemnation
of the fundamental principle upon which the administration of the
federal constitution, and of the State constitutions rested. But
he did not limit himself to the benefits of the _veto_ and of
_secession_, as shown in Roman history; he had recourse to the
Jewish for the same purpose--and found it--not in a _veto_ in each
of the twelve tribes, but in the right of secession; and found it,
not in the minority, but the majority, in the reign of Jeroboam,
when ten tribes seceded. That example is thus introduced:
"Among the few exceptions in the Asiatic nations, the government
of the twelve tribes of Israel, in its early period, was
the most striking. Their government, at first, was a mere
confederation, without any central power, till a military
chieftain, with the title of king, was placed at its head,
without, however, merging the original organization of the
twelve distinct tribes. This was the commencement of that
central action among that peculiar people, which, in three
generations, terminated in a permanent division of their
tribes. It is impossible even for a careless reader to peruse
the history of that event without being forcibly struck with
the analogy in the causes which led to their separation, and
those which now threaten us with a similar calamity. With the
establishment of the central power in the king commenced a
system of taxation, which, under king Solomon, was greatly
increased, to defray the expense of rearing the temple,
of enlarging and embellishing Jerusalem, the seat of the
central government, and the other profuse expenditures of his
magnificent reign. Increased taxation was followed by its
natural consequences--discontent and complaint, which before
his death began to excite resistance. On the succession of his
son, Rehoboam, the ten tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demanded
a reduction of the taxes; the temple being finished, and the
embellishment of Jerusalem completed, and the money which had
been raised for that purpose being no longer required, or, in
other words, the debt being paid, they demanded a reduction
of the duties--a repeal of the tariff. The demand was taken
under consideration, and, after consulting the old men (the
counsellors of '98), who advised a reduction, he then took the
opinion of the younger politicians, who had since grown up, and
knew not the doctrines of their fathers. He hearkened unto their
counsel, and refused to make the reduction; and the secession
of the ten tribes, under Jeroboam, followed. The tribes of
Judah and Benjamin, which had received the disbursements, alone
remained to the house of David."
This example also had a practical application, and a squint at the
Virginia resolutions of '98-'99, and at the military chieftain then
at the head of our government, with a broad intimation of what was
to happen if the taxes were not reduced; and that happened to be
_secession_. And all this, and the elaborate speech from which it is
taken, and many others of the same character at the same time, was
delivered at a time when the elections had decided for a reduction
of the taxes--when a bill in the House was under consideration for
that purpose--and when his own "compromise" bill was in a state of
concoction, and advanced to a stage to assure its final passing.
Strong must have been Mr. Calhoun's desire for his favorite remedy,
when he could contend for it under such circumstances--under
circumstances which showed that it could not be wanted for the
purpose which he then avowed. Satisfied of the excellence, and
even necessity in our system, of this remedy, the next question
was to create it, or to find it; create it, by an amendment to the
constitution; or find it already existing there; and this latter was
done by a new reading of the famous Virginia resolutions of '98-'99.
The right in any State to arrest an act of Congress, and to stay it
until three fourths of the States ordered it to proceed, and with a
right forcibly to resist if any attempt was made in the mean time to
enforce it, with the correlative right of secession and permanent
separation, were all found by him in these resolutions--the third
especially, which was read, and commented upon for the purpose. Mr.
Rives, of Virginia, repulsed that interpretation of the act of his
State, and showed that an appeal to public opinion was all that was
intended; and quoted the message of Governor Monroe to show that the
judgment of the federal court, under one of the acts declared to be
unconstitutional, was carried into effect in the capital of Virginia
with the order and tranquillity of any other judgment. He said:
"But, sir, the proceedings of my State, on another occasion of
far higher importance, have been so frequently referred to, in
the course of this debate, as an example to justify the present
proceedings of South Carolina, that I may be excused for saying
something of them. What, then, was the conduct of Virginia,
in the memorable era of '98 and '99? She solemnly protested
against the alien and sedition acts, as 'palpable and alarming
infractions of the constitution;' she communicated that protest
to the other States of the Union, and earnestly appealed to them
to unite with her in a like declaration, that this deliberate
and solemn expression of the opinion of the States, as parties
to the constitutional compact, should have its proper effect on
the councils of the nation, in procuring a revision and repeal
of the obnoxious acts. This was 'the head and front of her
offending'--no more. The whole object of the proceedings was,
by the peaceful force of public opinion, embodied through the
organ of the State legislatures, to obtain a repeal of the laws
in question, not to oppose or arrest their execution, while
they remained unrepealed. That this was the true spirit and
real purpose of the proceeding, is abundantly manifested by the
whole of the able debate which took place in the legislature of
the State, on the occasion. All the speakers, who advocated the
resolutions which were finally adopted, distinctly placed them
on that legitimate, constitutional ground. I need only refer
to the emphatic declaration of John Taylor, of Caroline, the
distinguished mover and able champion of the resolutions. He
said 'the appeal was to public opinion; if that is against us,
we must yield.' The same sentiment was avowed and maintained by
every friend of the resolutions, throughout the debate.
"But, sir, the real intentions and policy of Virginia were
proved, not by declarations and speeches merely, but by facts.
If there ever was a law odious to a whole people, by its daring
violation of the fundamental guaranties of public liberty, the
freedom of speech and freedom of the press, it was the sedition
law to the people of Virginia. Yet, amid all this indignant
dissatisfaction, after the solemn protest of the legislature,
in '98, and the renewal of that protest, in '99, this most
odious and arbitrary law was peaceably carried into execution,
in the capital of the State, by the prosecution and punishment
of Callender, who was fined and imprisoned for daring to
canvass the conduct of our public men (as Lyon and Cooper had
been elsewhere), and was still actually imprisoned, when the
legislature assembled, in December, 1800. Notwithstanding the
excited sensibility of the public mind, no popular tumult, no
legislative interference, disturbed, in any manner, the full and
peaceable execution of the law. The Senate will excuse me, I
trust, for calling their attention to a most forcible commentary
on the true character of the Virginia proceedings of '98 and
'99 (as illustrated in this transaction), which was contained
in the official communication of Mr. Monroe, then Governor of
the State, to the legislature, at its assembling, in December,
1800. After referring to the distribution which had been ordered
to be made among the people, of Mr. Madison's celebrated report,
of '99, he says 'In connection with this subject, it is proper
to add, that, since your last session, the sedition law, one
of the acts complained of, has been carried into effect, in
this commonwealth, by the decision of a federal court. I notice
this event, not with a view of censuring or criticising it. The
transaction has gone to the world, and the impartial will judge
of it as it deserves. I notice it for the purpose of remarking
that the decision was executed with the same order and tranquil
submission, on the part of the people, as could have been shown
by them, on a similar occasion, to any the most necessary,
constitutional and popular acts of the government.'"
Mr. Webster, in denying the derivation of nullification and
secession from the constitution, said:
"The constitution does not provide for events which must be
preceded by its own destruction. Secession, therefore, since it
must bring these consequences with it, is revolutionary. And
nullification is equally revolutionary. What is revolution?
Why, sir, that is revolution which overturns, or controls, or
successfully resists the existing public authority; that which
arrests the exercise of the supreme power; that which introduces
a new paramount authority into the rule of the state. Now, sir,
this is the precise object of nullification. It attempts to
supersede the supreme legislative authority. It arrests the arm
of the Executive Magistrate. It interrupts the exercise of the
accustomed judicial power. Under the name of an ordinance, it
declares null and void, within the State, all the revenue laws
of the United States. Is not this revolutionary? Sir, so soon as
this ordinance shall be carried into effect, a revolution will
have commenced in South Carolina. She will have thrown off the
authority to which her citizens have, heretofore, been subject.
She will have declared her own opinions and her own will to be
above the laws, and above the power of those who are intrusted
with their administration. If she makes good these declarations,
she is revolutionized. As to her, it is as distinctly a change
of the supreme power as the American Revolution, of 1776. That
revolution did not subvert government, in all its forms. It
did not subvert local laws and municipal administrations. It
only threw off the dominion of a power claiming to be superior,
and to have a right, in many important respects, to exercise
legislative authority. Thinking this authority to have been
usurped or abused, the American colonies, now the United States,
bade it defiance, and freed themselves from it, by means of
a revolution. But that revolution left them with their own
municipal laws still, and the forms of local government. If
Carolina now shall effectually resist the laws of Congress--if
she shall be her own judge, take her remedy into her own hands,
obey the laws of the Union when she pleases, and disobey them
when she pleases--she will relieve herself from a paramount
power, as distinctly as did the American colonies, in 1776. In
other words, she will achieve, as to herself, a revolution."
The speaker then proceeded to show what nullification was, as
reduced to practice in the ordinance, and other proceedings of South
Carolina; and said:
"But, sir, while practical nullification in South Carolina would
be, as to herself, actual and distinct revolution, its necessary
tendency must also be to spread revolution, and to break up the
constitution, as to all the other States. It strikes a deadly
blow at the vital principle of the whole Union. To allow State
resistance to the laws of Congress to be rightful and proper,
to admit nullification in some States, and yet not expect
to see a dismemberment of the entire government, appears to
me the wildest illusion and the most extravagant folly. The
gentleman seems not conscious of the direction or the rapidity
of his own course. The current of his opinions sweeps him
along, he knows not whither. To begin with nullification, with
the avowed intent, nevertheless, not to proceed to secession,
dismemberment, and general revolution, is as if one were to take
the plunge of Niagara, and cry out that he would stop half-way
down. In the one case, as in the other, the rash adventurer must
go to the bottom of the dark abyss below, were it not that that
abyss has no discovered bottom.
"Nullification, if successful, arrests the power of the law,
absolves citizens from their duty, subverts the foundation
both of protection and obedience, dispenses with oaths and
obligations of allegiance, and elevates another authority to
supreme command. Is not this revolution? And it raises to
supreme command four-and-twenty distinct powers, each professing
to be under a general government, and yet each setting its
laws at defiance at pleasure. Is not this anarchy, as well as
revolution? Sir, the constitution of the United States was
received as a whole, and for the whole country. If it cannot
stand altogether, it cannot stand in parts; and, if the laws
cannot be executed every where, they cannot long be executed
any where. The gentleman very well knows that all duties and
imposts must be uniform throughout the country. He knows that
we cannot have one rule or one law for South Carolina, and
another for other States. He must see, therefore, and does
see--every man sees--that the only alternative is a repeal of
the laws throughout the whole Union, or their execution in
Carolina as well as elsewhere. And this repeal is demanded,
because a single State interposes her veto, and threatens
resistance! The result of the gentleman's opinions, or rather
the very text of his doctrine, is, that no act of Congress can
bind all the States, the constitutionality of which is not
admitted by all; or, in other words, that no single State is
bound, against its own dissent, by a law of imposts. This was
precisely the evil experienced under the old confederation, and
for remedy of which this constitution was adopted. The leading
object in establishing this government, an object forced on
the country by the condition of the times, and the absolute
necessity of the law, was to give to Congress power to lay and
collect imposts without the consent of particular States. The
revolutionary debt remained unpaid; the national treasury was
bankrupt; the country was destitute of credit; Congress issued
its requisitions on the States, and the States neglected them;
there was no power of coercion but war; Congress could not lay
imposts, or other taxes, by its own authority; the whole general
government, therefore, was little more than a name. The articles
of confederation, as to purposes of revenue and finance, were
nearly a dead letter. The country sought to escape from this
condition, at once feeble and disgraceful, by constituting a
government which should have power of itself to lay duties
and taxes, and to pay the public debt, and provide for the
general welfare; and to lay these duties and taxes in all the
States, without asking the consent of the State governments.
This was the very power on which the new constitution was to
depend for all its ability to do good; and, without it, it
can be no government, now or at any time. Yet, sir, it is
precisely against this power, so absolutely indispensable to
the very being of the government, that South Carolina directs
her ordinance. She attacks the government in its authority to
raise revenue, the very mainspring of the whole system; and,
if she succeed, every movement of that system must inevitably
cease. It is of no avail that she declares that she does not
resist the law as a revenue law, but as a law for protecting
manufactures. It is a revenue law; it is the very law by force
of which the revenue is collected; if it be arrested in any
State, the revenue ceases in that State; it is, in a word, the
sole reliance of the government for the means of maintaining
itself and performing its duties."
Mr. Webster condensed into four brief and pointed propositions his
opinion of the nature of our federal government, as being a UNION
in contradistinction to a LEAGUE, and as acting upon INDIVIDUALS
in contradistinction to STATES, and as being, in these features
discriminated from the old confederation.
"1. That the constitution of the United States is not a league,
confederacy, or compact, between the people of the several
States in their sovereign capacities; but a government proper,
founded on the adoption of the people, and creating direct
relations between itself and individuals.
"2. That no State authority has power to dissolve these
relations; that nothing can dissolve them but revolution; and
that, consequently, there can be no such thing as secession
without revolution.
"3. That there is a supreme law, consisting of the constitution
of the United States, acts of Congress passed in pursuance of
it, and treaties; and that, in cases not capable of assuming
the character of a suit in law or equity, Congress must judge
of, and finally interpret, this supreme law, so often as it has
occasion to pass acts of legislation; and, in cases capable of
assuming, and actually assuming, the character of a suit, the
Supreme Court of the United States is the final interpreter.
"4. That an attempt by a State to abrogate, annul, or nullify
an act of Congress, or to arrest its operation within her
limits, on the ground that, in her opinion, such law is
unconstitutional, is a direct usurpation on the just powers
of the general government, and on the equal rights of other
States; a plain violation of the constitution, and a proceeding
essentially revolutionary in its character and tendency."
Mr. Webster concluded his speech, an elaborate and able one, in
which he appeared in the high character of patriot still more than
that of orator, in which he intimated that some other cause, besides
the alleged one, must be at the bottom of this desire for secession.
He was explicit that the world could hardly believe in such a
reason, and that we ourselves who hear and see all that is said and
done, could not believe it. He concluded thus:
"Sir, the world will scarcely believe that this whole
controversy, and all the desperate measures which its support
requires, have no other foundation than a difference of opinion,
upon a provision of the constitution, between a majority of the
people of South Carolina, on one side, and a vast majority of
the whole people of the United States on the other. It will not
credit the fact, it will not admit the possibility, that, in an
enlightened age, in a free, popular republic, under a government
where the people govern, as they must always govern, under such
systems, by majorities, at a time of unprecedented happiness,
without practical oppression, without evils, such as may not
only be pretended, but felt and experienced; evils not slight
or temporary, but deep, permanent, and intolerable; a single
State should rush into conflict with all the rest, attempt to
put down the power of the Union by her own laws, and to support
those laws by her military power, and thus break up and destroy
the world's last hope. And well the world may be incredulous.
We, who hear and see it, can ourselves hardly yet believe it.
Even after all that had preceded it, this ordinance struck the
country with amazement. It was incredible and inconceivable,
that South Carolina should thus plunge headlong into resistance
to the laws, on a matter of opinion, and on a question in which
the preponderance of opinion, both of the present day and of
all past time, was so overwhelmingly against her. The ordinance
declares that Congress has exceeded its just power, by laying
duties on imports, intended for the protection of manufactures.
This is the opinion of South Carolina; and on the strength of
that opinion she nullifies the laws. Yet has the rest of the
country no right to its opinions also? Is one State to sit sole
arbitress? She maintains that those laws are plain, deliberate,
and palpable violations of the constitution; that she has a
sovereign right to decide this matter; and, that, having so
decided, she is authorized to resist their execution, by her
own sovereign power; and she declares that she will resist it,
though such resistance should shatter the Union into atoms."
Mr. Davis, of Massachusetts, had been still more explicit, in
the expression of the belief already given (in the extract from
his speech contained in this work), that the discontent in South
Carolina had a root deeper than that of the tariff; and General
Jackson intimated the same thing in his message to the two Houses
on the South Carolina proceedings, and in which he alluded to the
ambitious and personal feelings which might be involved in them.
Certainly it was absolutely incomprehensible that this doctrine of
nullification and secession, prefigured in the Roman secession to
the sacred mount, and the Jewish disruption of the twelve tribes,
should be thus enforced, and impressed, for that cause of the tariff
alone; when, to say nothing of the intention of the President, the
Congress and the country to reduce it, Mr. Calhoun himself had
provided for its reduction, satisfactorily to himself, in the act
called a "compromise;" to which he was a full contracting party.
It was impossible to believe in the soleness of that reason, in
the presence of circumstances which annulled it; and Mr. Calhoun
himself, in a part of his speech which had been quoted, seemed to
reveal a glimpse of two others--slavery, about which there was at
that time no agitation--and the presidency, to which patriotic
Southern men could not be elected. The glimpse exhibited of the
first of these causes, was in this sentence: "_The contest_ (between
the North and the South) _will, in fact, be a contest between
power and liberty, and such he considered the present; a contest
in which the weaker section, with its peculiar labor, productions
and situation, has at stake all that is dear to freemen._" Here is a
distinct declaration that there was then a contest between the two
sections of the Union, and that that contest was between power and
liberty, in which the freedom and the slave property of the South
were at stake. This declaration at the time attracted but little
attention, there being then no sign of a slavery agitation; but to
close observers it was an ominous revelation of something to come,
and an apparent laying an anchor to windward for a new agitation on
a new subject, after the tariff was done with. The second intimation
which he gave out, and which referred to the exclusion of the
patriotic men of the South from the presidency was in this sentence:
"_Every Southern man, true to the interests of his section, and
faithful to the duties which Providence has allotted him, will be
forever excluded from the honors and emoluments of this government,
which will be reserved for those only who have qualified themselves,
by political prostitution, for admission into the Magdalen asylum._"
This was bitter; and while revealing his own feelings at the
prospect of his own failure for the presidency (which from the
brightness of the noon-day sun was dimming down to the obscurity of
dark night), was, at the same time, unjust, and contradicted by all
history, previous and subsequent, of our national elections; and by
his own history in connection with them. The North had supported
Southern men for President--a long succession of them--and even
twice concurred in dropping a Northern President at the end of a
single term, and taking a Southern in his place. He himself had had
signal proofs of good will from the North in his two elections to
the vice-presidency; in which he had been better supported in the
North than in the South, getting the whole party vote in the former
while losing part of it in the latter. It was evident then, that
the protective tariff was not the sole, or the main cause of the
South Carolina discontent; that nullification and secession were to
continue, though their ostensible cause ceased; that resistance was
to continue on a new ground, upon the same principle, until a new
and impossible point was attained. This was declared by Mr. Calhoun
in his place, on the day of the passage of the "compromise" bill,
and on hearing that the "force bill" had finally passed the House of
Representatives. He then stood up, and spoke thus:
"He had said, that as far as this subject was concerned, he
believed that peace and harmony would follow. But there is
another connected with it, which had passed this House, and
which had just been reported as having passed the other, which
would prevent the return of quiet. He considered the measure to
which he referred as a virtual repeal of the constitution; and,
in fact, worse than a positive and direct repeal; as it would
leave the majority without any shackles on its power, while the
minority, hoping to shelter itself under its protection, and
having still some respect left for the instrument, would be
trammelled without being protected by its provisions. It would
be idle to attempt to disguise that the bill will be a practical
assertion of one theory of the constitution against another--the
theory advocated by the supporters of the bill, that ours is a
consolidated government, in which the States have no rights,
and in which, in fact, they bear the same relation to the whole
community as the counties do to the States; and against that
view of the constitution which considers it as a compact formed
by the States as separate communities, and binding between the
States, and not between the individual citizens. No man of
candor, who admitted that our constitution is a compact, and was
formed and is binding in the manner he had just stated, but must
acknowledge that this bill utterly overthrows and prostrates
the constitution; and that it leaves the government under the
control of the will of an absolute majority.
"If the measure be acquiesced in, it will be the termination of
that long controversy which began in the convention, and which
has been continued under various fortunes until the present
day. But it ought not--it will not--it cannot be acquiesced
in--unless the South is dead to the sense of her liberty, and
blind to those dangers which surround and menace them; she never
will cease resistance until the act is erased from the statute
book. To suppose that the entire power of the Union may be
placed in the hands of this government, and that all the various
interests in this widely extended country may be safely placed
under the will of an unchecked majority, is the extreme of folly
and madness. The result would be inevitable, that power would
be exclusively centered in the dominant interest north of this
river, and that all the south of it would be held as subjected
provinces, to be controlled for the exclusive benefit of the
stronger section. Such a state of things could not endure; and
the constitution and liberty of the country would fall in the
contest, if permitted to continue.
"He trusted that that would not be the case, but that the
advocates of liberty every where, as well in the North as in
the South; that those who maintained the doctrines of '98, and
the sovereignties of the States; that the republican party
throughout the country would rally against this attempt to
establish, by law, doctrines which must subvert the principles
on which free institutions could be maintained."
Here was a new departure, upon a new point, as violent as the former
complaint, looking to the same remedy, and unfounded and impossible.
This force bill, which was a repeal of the constitution, in the eyes
of Mr. Calhoun, was a mere revival of formerly existing statutes,
and could have no operation, if resistance to the tariff laws
ceased. Yet, nullification and secession were to proceed until it
was erased from the statute book; and all the morbid views of the
constitution, and of the Virginia resolutions of '98 and '99, were
to hold their places in Mr. Calhoun's imagination, and dominate his
conduct in all his political action, until this statute was erased.
But it is due to many of his friends and followers, to say that,
while concurring in his complaints against the federal government,
and in his remedies, they dissented from his source of derivation
of these remedies. He found them in the constitution, shown to
be there by the '98-'99 Virginia resolutions; the manly sense of
McDuffie, and some others, rejected that sophistry, and found their
justification wholly in the revolutionary right of self-defence from
intolerable oppression.