CHAPTER LXVI.

BANK OF THE UNITED STATES--BILL FOR THE RECHARTER REPORTED IN THE

SENATE--AND PASSED THAT BODY.

The first bank of the United States, chartered in 1791,

was a federal measure, conducted under the lead of General

Hamilton--opposed by Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison and the republican

party; and became a great landmark of party, not merely for the

bank itself, but for the latitudinarian construction of the

constitution in which it was founded, and the great door which it

opened to the discretion of Congress to do what it pleased, under

the plea of being "_necessary_" to carry into effect some granted

power. The non-renewal of the charter in 1811, was the act of

the republican party, then in possession of the government, and

taking the opportunity to terminate, upon its own limitation, the

existence of an institution, whose creation they had not been able

to prevent. The charter of the second bank, in 1816, was the act

of the republican party, and to aid them in the administration of

the government, and, as such, was opposed by the federal party--not

seeming then to understand that, by its instincts, a great moneyed

corporation was in sympathy with their own party, and would soon

be with it in action--which this bank soon was--and now struggled

for a continuation of its existence under the lead of those who

had opposed its birth, and against the party which created it. Mr.

Webster was a federal leader on both occasions--against the charter,

in 1816; for the recharter, in 1832--and in his opening speech in

favor of the renewal, according to the bill reported by the Senate's

select committee, and in allusion to these reversals of positions,

and in justification of his own, he spoke thus, addressing him self

to the Vice-President, Mr. Calhoun:

"A considerable portion of the active part of life has elapsed,

said Mr. W., since you and I, Mr. President, and three or

four other gentlemen, now in the Senate, acted our respective

parts in the passage of the bill creating the present Bank of

the United States. We have lived to little purpose, as public

men, if the experience of this period has not enlightened our

judgments, and enabled us to revise our opinions; and to correct

any errors into which we may have fallen, if such errors there

were, either in regard to the general utility of a national

bank, or the details of its constitution. I trust it will not

be unbecoming the occasion, if I allude to your own important

agency in that transaction. The bill incorporating the bank,

and giving it a constitution, proceeded from a committee of the

House of Representatives, of which you were chairman, and was

conducted through that House under your distinguished lead.

Having recently looked back to the proceedings of that day, I

must be permitted to say that I have perused the speech by which

the subject was introduced to the consideration of the House,

with a revival of the feeling of approbation and pleasure with

which I heard it; and I will add, that it would not, perhaps,

now, be easy to find a better brief synopsis of those principles

of currency and of banking, which, since they spring from the

nature of money and of commerce, must be essentially the same,

at all times, in all commercial communities, than that speech

contains. The other gentlemen now with us in the Senate, all of

them, I believe, concurred with the chairman of the committee,

and voted for the bill. My own vote was against it. This is a

matter of little importance; but it is connected with other

circumstances, to which I will, for a moment, advert. The

gentlemen with whom I acted on that occasion, had no doubts of

the constitutional power of Congress to establish a national

bank; nor had we any doubts of the general utility of an

institution of that kind. We had, indeed, most of us, voted for

a bank, at a preceding session. But the object of our regard was

not whatever might be called a bank. We required that it should

be established on certain principles, which alone we deemed safe

and useful, made subject to curtain fixed liabilities, and so

guarded that it could neither move voluntarily, nor be moved by

others out of its proper sphere of action. The bill, when first

introduced, contained features, to which we should never have

assented, and we set ourselves accordingly to work with a good

deal of zeal, in order to effect sundry amendments. In some of

those proposed amendments, the chairman, and those who acted

with him, finally concurred. Others they opposed. The result

was, that several most important amendments, as I thought,

prevailed. But there still remained, in my opinion, objections

to the bill, which justified a persevering opposition till they

should be removed."

He spoke forcibly and justly against the evils of paper money,

and a depreciated currency, meaning the debased issues of the

local banks, for the cure of which the national bank was to be the

instrument--not foreseeing that this great bank was itself to be the

most striking exemplification of all the evils which he depicted. He

said:

"A disordered currency is one of the greatest of political

evils. It undermines the virtues necessary for the support

of the social system, and encourages propensities destructive

of its happiness. It wars against industry, frugality, and

economy; and it fosters the evil spirits of extravagance and

speculation. Of all the contrivances for cheating the laboring

classes of mankind, none has been more effectual than that which

deludes them with paper money. This is the most effectual of

inventions to fertilize the rich man's field, by the sweat of

the poor man's brow. Ordinary tyranny, oppression, excessive

taxation, these bear lightly on the happiness of the mass of

the community, compared with fraudulent currencies, and the

robberies committed by depreciated paper. Our own history has

recorded for our instruction enough, and more than enough, of

the demoralizing tendency, the injustice, and the intolerable

oppression on the virtuous and well disposed, of a degraded

paper currency, authorized by law, or any way countenanced by

government."

He also spoke truly on the subject of the small quantity of silver

currency in the United States--only some twenty-two millions--and

not a particle of gold; and deprecated the small bank note currency

as the cause of that evil. He said:

"The paper circulation of the country is, at this time, probably

seventy-five or eighty millions of dollars. Of specie we may

have twenty or twenty-two millions: and this, principally, in

masses in the vaults of the banks. Now, sir, this is a state of

things which, in my judgment, leads constantly to overtrading,

and to the consequent excesses and revulsions which so often

disturb the regular course of commercial affairs.

"Why have we so small an amount of specie in circulation?

Certainly the only reason is, because we do not require more.

We have but to ask its presence, and it would return. But

we voluntarily banish it by the great amount of small bank

notes. In most of the States the banks issue notes of all low

denominations, down even to a single dollar. How is it possible,

under such circumstances, to retain specie in circulation? All

experience shows it to be impossible. The paper will take the

place of the gold and silver. When Mr. Pitt, in the year 1797,

proposed in Parliament to authorize the Bank of England to issue

one pound notes, Mr. Burke lay sick at Bath of an illness from

which he never recovered; and he is said to have written to the

late Mr. Canning, 'Tell Mr. Pitt that if he consents to the

issuing of one pound notes, he must never expect to see guinea

again.'"

The bill provided that a bonus of $500,000 in three equal annual

instalments should be paid by the bank to the United States for its

exclusive privileges: Mr. Webster moved to modify the section, so as

to spread the payment over the entire term of the bank's proposed

existence--$150,000 a year for fifteen years. I was opposed both to

the bonus, and the exclusive privilege, and said:

"The proper compensation for the bank to make, provided this

exclusive privilege was sold to it, would be to reduce the rate

of interest on loans and discounts. A reduction of interest

would be felt by the people; the payment of a bonus would not be

felt by them. It would come into the treasury, and probably be

lavished immediately on some scheme, possibly unconstitutional

in its nature, and sectional in its application. He was not

in favor of any scheme for getting money into the treasury at

present. The difficulty lay the other way. The struggle now was

to keep money out of the treasury,--to prevent the accumulation

of a surplus; and the reception of this bonus would go to

aggravate that difficulty, by increasing that surplus. Kings

might receive bonuses for selling exclusive privileges to

monopolizing companies. In that case his subjects would bear the

loss, and he would receive the profit; but, in a republic, it

was incomprehensible that the people should sell to a company

the privilege of making money out of themselves. He was opposed

to the grant of an exclusive privilege; he was opposed to the

sale of privileges; but if granted, or sold, he was in favor of

receiving the price in the way that would be most beneficial to

the whole body of the people; and, in this case, a reduction of

interest would best accomplish that object. A bank, which had

the benefit of the credit and revenue of the United States to

bank upon, could well afford to make loans and discounts for

less than six per centum. Five per centum would be high interest

for such a bank; and he had no doubt, if time was allowed for

the application, that applications enough would be made to take

the charter upon these terms."

I opposed action on the subject at this session. The bank charter

had yet four years to run, and two years after that to remain in

force for winding up its affairs; in all, six years before the

dissolution of the corporation: and this would remit the final

decision to the Congress which would sit between 1836 and 1838, and

there was not only to be a new Congress elected before that time,

but a new Congress under a new apportionment of the representation,

in which there would be a great augmentation of members, and

especially in the West, where the operation of the present bank was

most injurious. The stockholders had not applied for the recharter

at this session: that was the act of the directors and politicians,

or rather of the politicians and directors; for the former governed

the decision. The stockholders in their meeting last September only

authorized the president and directors to apply at any time before

the next triennial meeting--at any time within three years; and

that would carry the application to the right time. I, therefore,

inveighed against the present application, and insisted that:

"Many reasons oppose the final action of Congress upon this

subject at the present time. We are exhausted with the tedium,

if not with the labors of a six months' session. Our hearts and

minds must be at home, though our bodies are here. Mentally and

bodily we are unable to give the attention and consideration to

this question, which the magnitude of its principles, the extent

and variety of its details, demand from us. Other subjects of

more immediate and pressing interest must be thrown aside, to

make way for it. The reduction of the price of the public lands,

for which the new States have been petitioning for so many

years, and the modification of the tariff, the continuance of

which seems to be weakening the cement which binds this Union

together, must be postponed, and possibly lost for the session,

if we go on with the bank question. Why has the tariff been

dropped in the Senate? Every one recollects the haste with which

that subject was taken up in this chamber; how it was pushed to

a certain point; and how suddenly and gently it has given way to

the bank bill! Is there any union of interest--any conjunction

of forces--any combined plan of action--any alliance, offensive

or defensive, between the United States Bank and the American

system? Certainly they enter the field together, one here, the

other yonder (pointing to the House of Representatives), and

leaving a clear stage to each other, they press at once upon

both wings, and announce a perfect non-interference, if not

mutual aid, in the double victory which is to be achieved. Why

have the two bills reported by the Committee on Manufactures,

and for taking up which notices have been given: why are they

so suddenly, so easily, so gently, abandoned? Why is the land

bill, reported by the same committee, and a pledge given to

call it up when the Committee on Public Lands had made their

counter report, also suffered to sleep on the table? The counter

report is made; it is printed; it lies on every table; why not

go on with the lands, when the settlement of the question of the

amount of revenue to be derived from that source precedes the

tariff question, and must be settled before we can know how much

revenue should be raised from imports.

"An unfinished investigation presented another reason for

delaying the final action of Congress on this subject. The House

of Representatives had appointed a committee to investigate

the affairs of the bank; they had proceeded to the limit of the

time allotted them--had reported adversely to the bank--and

especially against the renewal of the charter at this session;

and had argued the necessity of further examinations. Would the

Senate proceed while this unfinished investigation was depending

in the other end of the building? Would they act so as to limit

the investigation to the few weeks which were allowed to the

committee, when we have from four to six years on hand within

which to make it? The reports of this committee, to the amount

of some 15,000 copies had been ordered to be printed by the two

Houses, to be distributed among the people. For what purpose?

Certainly that the people might read them--make up their minds

upon their contents--and communicate their sentiments to their

representatives. But these reports are not yet distributed; they

are not yet read by the people; and why order this distribution

without waiting for its effect, when there is so much time on

hand? Why treat the people with this mockery of a pretended

consultation--this illusive reference to their judgment--while

proceeding to act before they can read what we have sent to

them? Nay, more; the very documents upon which the reports are

founded are yet unprinted! The Senate is actually pushed into

this discussion without having seen the evidence which has been

collected by the investigating committee, and which the Senate

itself has ordered to be printed for the information of its

members.

"The decision of this question does not belong to this Congress,

but to the Congress to be elected under the new census of 1830.

It looked to him like usurpation for this Congress to seize upon

a question of this magnitude, which required no decision until

the new and full representation of the people shall come in; and

which, if decided now, though prematurely and by usurpation, is

irrevocable, although it cannot take effect until 1836;--that is

to say, until three years after the new and full representation

would be in power. What Congress is this? It is the

apportionment of 1820, formed on a population of ten millions.

It is just going out of existence. A new Congress, apportioned

upon a representation of thirteen millions, is already provided

for by law; and after the 4th of March next--within nine months

from this day--will be in power, and entitled to the seats in

which we sit. That Congress will contain thirty members more

than the present one. Three millions of people--a number equal

to that which made the revolution--are now unrepresented,

who will be then represented. The West alone--that section

of the Union which suffers most from the depredations of the

bank--loses twenty votes! In that section alone a million of

people lose their voice in the decision of this great question.

And why? What excuse? What necessity? What plea for this sudden

haste which interrupts an unfinished investigation--sets aside

the immediate business of the people--and usurps the rights of

our successors? No plea in the world, except that a gigantic

moneyed institution refuses to wait, and must have her imperial

wishes immediately gratified. If a charter was to be granted,

it should be done with as little invasion of the rights of

posterity--with as little encroachment upon the privileges of

our successors--as possible. Once in ten years, and that at the

commencement of each full representation under a new census,

would be the most appropriate time; and then charters should be

for ten, and not twenty years.

"Mr. B. had nothing to do with motives. He neither preferred

accusations, nor pronounced absolutions: but it was impossible

to shut his eyes upon facts, and to close up his reason against

the induction of inevitable inferences. The presidental

election was at hand;--it would come in four months;--and here

was a question which, in the opinion of all, must affect that

election--in the opinion of some, may decide it--which is

pressed on for decision four years before it is necessary to

decide it, and six years before it ought to be decided. Why this

sudden pressure? Is it to throw the bank bill into the hands of

the President, to solve, by a practical reference, the disputed

problem of the executive veto, and to place the President under

a cross fire from the opposite banks of the Potomac River? He

[Mr. B.] knew nothing about that veto, but he knew something

of human nature, and something of the rights of the people

under our representative form of government; and he would be

free to say that a veto which would stop the encroachment of a

minority of Congress upon the rights of its successors--which

would arrest a frightful act of legislative usurpation--which

would retrieve for the people the right of deliberation,

and of action--which would arrest the overwhelming progress

of a gigantic moneyed institution--which would prevent Ohio

from being deprived of five votes, Indiana from losing four,

Tennessee four, Illinois two, Alabama two, Kentucky, Mississippi

and Missouri one each--which would lose six votes to New-York

and two to Pennsylvania; a veto, in short, which would protect

the rights of three millions of people, now unrepresented in

Congress, would be an act of constitutional justice to the

people, which ought to raise the President, and certainly would

raise him, to a higher degree of favor in the estimation of

every republican citizen of the community than he now enjoyed.

By passing on the charter now, Congress would lose all check and

control over the institution for the four years it had yet to

run. The pendency of the question was a rod over its head for

these four years; to decide the question now, is to free it from

all restraint, and turn it loose to play what part it pleased in

all our affairs--elections, State, federal, presidential.

"Mr. B. turned to the example of England, and begged the

republican Senate of the United States to take a lesson from the

monarchial parliament of Great Britain. We copied their evil

ways; why not their good ones? We copied our bank charter from

theirs; why not imitate them in their improvements upon their

own work? At first the bank had a monopoly resulting from an

exclusive privilege: that is now denied. Formerly the charter

was renewed several years before it was out: it now has less

than a year to run, and is not yet rechartered."

A motion was made by Mr. Moore of Alabama, declaratory of the

right of the States to admit, or deny the establishment of

branches of the mother bank within their limits, and to tax

their loans and issues, if she chose to admit them: and in

support of that motion Mr. Benton made this speech:

"The amendment offered by the senator from Alabama [Mr. Moore]

was declaratory of the rights of the States, both to refuse

admission of these branch banks into their limits, and to tax

them, like other property, if admitted: if this amendment was

struck out, it was tantamount to a legislative declaration that

no such rights existed, and would operate as a confirmation of

the decision of the Supreme Court to that effect. It is to no

purpose to say that the rejection of the amendment will leave

the charter silent upon the subject; and the rights of the

States, whatsoever they may be, will remain in full force. That

is the state of the existing charter. It is silent upon the

subject of State taxation; and in that silence the Supreme Court

has spoken, and nullified the rights of the States. That court

has decided that the Bank of the United States is independent

of State legislation! consequently, that she may send branches

into the States in defiance of their laws, and keep them

there without the payment of tax. This is the decision; and

the decision of the court is the law of the land; so that, if

no declaratory clause is put into the charter, it cannot be

said that the new charter will be silent, as the old one was.

The voice of the Supreme Court is now heard in that silence,

proclaiming the supremacy of the bank, and the degradation of

the States; and, unless we interpose now to countervail that

voice by a legislative declaration, it will be impossible for

the States to resit it, except by measures which no one wishes

to contemplate.

"Mr. B. regretted that he had not seen in the papers any report

of the argument of the senator from Virginia [Mr. Tazewell] in

vindication of the right of the States to tax these branches.

It was an argument brief, powerful, and conclusive--lucid as a

sunbeam, direct as an arrow, and mortal as the stroke of fate

to the adversary speakers. Since the delivery of that argument,

they had sat in dumb show, silent as the grave, mute as the

dead, and presenting to our imaginations the realization of

the Abbé Sieyes's famous conception of a dumb legislature.

Before the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignity

to create this federal government, they possessed the unlimited

power of taxation; in the act of the surrender, which is the

constitution, they abridged this unlimited right but in two

particulars--exports and imports--which they agreed no longer

to tax, and therefore retained the taxing power entire over

all other subjects. This was the substance of the argument

which dumbfounded the adversary; and the distinction which was

attempted to be set up between tangible and intangible, visible

and invisible, objects of taxation; between franchises and

privileges on one side, and material substances on the other,

was so completely blasted and annihilated by one additional

stroke of lightning, that the fathers of the distinction really

believed that they had never made it! and sung their palinodes

in the face of the House.

"The argument that these branches are necessary to enable the

federal government to carry on its fiscal operations, and,

therefore, ought to be independent of State legislation, is

answered and expunged by a matter of fact, namely, that Congress

itself has determined otherwise, and that in the very charter of

the bank. The charter limits the right of the federal government

to the establishment of a single branch, and that one in the

District of Columbia! The branch at this place, and the parent

bank at Philadelphia, are all that the federal government has

stipulated for. All beyond that, is left to the bank itself;

to establish branches in the States or not, as it suited its

own interest; or to employ State banks, with the approbation

of the Secretary of the Treasury, to do the business of the

branches for the United States. Congress is contented with State

banks to do the business of the branches in the States; and,

therefore, authorizes the very case which gentlemen apprehend

and so loudly deprecate, that New-York may refuse her assent to

the continuance of the branches within her limits, and send the

public deposits to the State banks. This is what the charter

contemplates. Look at the charter; see the fourteenth article

of the constitution of the bank; it makes it optionary with the

directors of the bank to establish branches in such States as

they shall think fit, with the alternative of using State banks

as their substitutes in States in which they do not choose to

establish branches. This brings the establishment of branches

to a private affair, a mere question of profit and loss to the

bank itself; and cuts up by the roots the whole argument of the

necessity of these branches to the fiscal operations of the

federal government. The establishment of branches in the States

is, then, a private concern, and presents this question: Shall

non-residents and aliens--even alien enemies, for such they may

be--have a right to carry on the trade of banking within the

limits of the States, without their consent, without liability

to taxation, and without amenability to State legislation? The

suggestion that the United States owns an interest in this bank,

is of no avail. If she owned it all, it would still be subject

to taxation, like all other property is which she holds in the

States. The lands which she had obtained from individuals in

satisfaction of debts, were all subject to taxation; the public

lands which she held by grants from the States, or purchases

from foreign powers, were only exempted from taxation by virtue

of compacts, and the payment of five per centum on the proceeds

of the sales for that exemption."

The motion of Mr. Moore was rejected, and by the usual majority.

Mr. Benton then moved to strike out so much of the bill as gave to

the bank exclusive privileges, and to insert a provision making the

stockholders liable for the debts of the institution; and in support

of his motion quoted the case of the three Scottish banks which had

no exclusive privilege, and in which the stockholders were liable,

and the superior excellence of which over the Bank of England was

admitted and declared by English statesmen. He said:

"The three Scottish banks had held each other in check, had

proceeded moderately in all their operations, conducted their

business regularly and prudently, and always kept themselves in

a condition to face their creditors; while the single English

bank, having no check from rival institutions, ran riot in the

wantonness of its own unbridled power, deluging the country,

when it pleased, with paper, and filling it with speculation and

extravagance; drawing in again when it pleased, and filling it

with bankruptcy and pauperism; often transcending its limits,

and twice stopping payment, and once for a period of twenty

years. There can be no question of the incomparable superiority

of the Scottish banking system over the English banking system,

even in a monarchy; and this has been officially announced to

the Bank of England by the British ministry, as far back as

the year 1826, with the authentic declaration that the English

system of banking must be assimilated to the Scottish system,

and that her exclusive privilege could never be renewed. This

was done in a correspondence between the Earl of Liverpool,

first Lord of the Treasury, and Mr. Robinson, Chancellor of the

Exchequer, on one side, and the Governor and Deputy Governor of

the Bank of England on the other. In their letter of the 18th

January, 1826, the two ministers, adverting to the fact of the

stoppage of payment, and repeated convulsions of the Bank of

England, while the Scottish banks had been wholly free from

such calamities, declared their conviction that there existed

an unsound and delusive system of banking in England, and a

sound and solid system in Scotland! And they gave the official

assurance of the British government, that neither His Majesty's

ministers, nor parliament, would ever agree to renew the

charter of the Bank of England with their exclusive privileges!

Exclusive privileges, they said, were out of fashion! Nor is it

renewed to this day, though the charter is within nine months of

its expiration!

"In the peculiar excellence of the Scottish plan, lies a few

plain and obvious principles, closely related to republican

ideas. First. No exclusive privileges. Secondly. Three

independent banks to check and control each other, and diffuse

their benefits, instead of one to do as it pleased, and

monopolize the moneyed power. Thirdly. The liability of each

stockholder for the amount of his stock, on the failure of

the bank to redeem its notes in specie. Fourthly. The payment

of a moderate interest to depositors. Upon these few plain

principles, all of them founded in republican notions, equal

rights, and equal justice, the Scottish banks have advanced

themselves to the first rank in Europe, have eclipsed the Bank

of England, and caused it to be condemned in its own country,

and have made themselves the model of all future banking

institutions in Great Britain. And now, it would be a curious

political phenomenon, and might give rise to some interesting

speculations on the advance of free principles in England, and

their decline in America, if the Scottish republican plan of

banking should be rejected here, while preferred there; and

the British monarchial plan, which is condemned there, should

be perpetuated here! and this double incongruity committed

without necessity, without excuse, without giving the people

time to consider, and to communicate their sentiments to their

constituents, when there is four, if not six years, for them to

consider the subject before final decision is required!"

The clause for continuing the exclusive privilege of the bank, was

warmly contested in the Senate, and arguments against it drawn from

the nature of our government, as well as from the example of the

British parliament, which had granted the monopoly to the Bank of

England in her previous charters, and denied it on the last renewal.

It owed its origin in England to the high tory times of Queen Anne,

and its extinction to the liberal spirit of the present century. Mr.

Benton was the chief speaker on this point; and--

"Pointed out the clauses in the charter which granted the

exclusive privilege, and imposed the restriction, which it

was the object of his motion to abolish; and read a part of

the 21st section, which enacted that no other bank should be

established by any future law of the United States, during the

continuance of that charter, and which pledged the faith of

the United States to the observance of the monopoly thereby

created. He said the privilege of banking, here granted, was

an exclusive privilege, a monopoly, and an invasion of the

rights of all future Congresses, as well as of the rights of

all citizens of the Union, for the term the charter had to

run, and which might be considered perpetual; as this was the

last time that the people could ever make head against the new

political power which raised itself in the form of the bank to

overbalance every other power in the government. This exclusive

privilege is contrary to the genius of our government, which is

a government of equal rights, and not of exclusive privileges;

and it is clearly unauthorized by the constitution, which only

admits of exclusive privileges in two solitary, specified cases,

and each of these founded upon a natural right, the case of

authors and inventors; to whom Congress is authorized to grant,

for a limited time, the exclusive privilege of selling their

own writings and discoveries. But in the case of this charter

there is no natural right, and it may be well said there is

no limited time; and the monopoly is far more glaring and

indefensible now than when first granted; for then the charter

was not granted to any particular set of individuals, but lay

open to all to subscribe to it; but now it is to be continued to

a particular set, and many of them foreigners, and all of whom,

or their assignees, had already enjoyed the privilege for twenty

years. If this company succeeds now in getting their monopoly

continued for fifteen years, they will so intrench themselves

in wealth and power, that they will be enabled to perpetuate

their charter, and transmit it as a private inheritance to their

posterity. Our government delights in rotation of office; all

officers, from the highest to the lowest, are amenable to that

principle; no one is suffered to remain in power thirty-five

years; and why should one company have the command of the

moneyed power of America for that long period? Can it be the

wish of any person to establish an oligarchy with unbounded

wealth and perpetual existence, to lay the foundation for a

nobility and monarchy in this America!

"The restriction upon future Congresses is at war with every

principle of constitutional right and legislative equality. If

the constitution has given to one Congress the right to charter

banks, it has given it to every one. If this Congress has a

right to establish a bank, every other Congress has. The power

to tie the hands of our successors is nowhere given to us; what

we can do our successors can; a legislative body is always

equal to itself. To make, and to amend; to do, and to undo; is

the prerogative of each. But here the attempt is to do what we

ourselves cannot amend--what our successors cannot amend--and

what our successors are forbidden to imitate, or to do in any

form. This shows the danger of assuming implied powers. If the

power to establish a national bank had been expressly granted,

then the exercise of that power, being once exerted, would

be exhausted, and no further legislation would remain to be

done; but this power is now assumed upon construction, after

having been twice rejected, in the convention which framed

the constitution, and is, therefore, without limitation as to

number or character. Mr. Madison was express in his opinions

in the year 1791, that, if there was one bank chartered, there

ought to be several! The genius of the British monarchy, he

said, favored the concentration of wealth and power. In America

the genius of the government required the diffusion of wealth

and power. The establishment of branches did not satisfy the

principle of diffusion. Several independent banks alone could

do it. The branches, instead of lessening the wealth and power

of the single institution, greatly increased both, by giving to

the great central parent bank an organization and ramification

which pervaded the whole Union, drawing wealth from every part,

and subjecting every part to the operations, political and

pecuniary, of the central institution. But this restriction ties

up the hands of Congress from granting other charters. Behave

as it may--plunge into all elections--convulse the country with

expansions and contractions of paper currency--fail in its

ability to help the merchants to pay their bonds--stop payment,

and leave the government no option but to receive its dishonored

notes in revenue payments--and still it would be secure of its

monopoly; the hands of all future Congresses would be tied up;

and no rival or additional banks could be established, to hold

it in check, or to supply its place.

"Is this the Congress to do these things? Is this the Congress

to impose restrictions upon the power of their successors? Is

this the Congress to tie the hands of all Congresses till the

year 1851? In nine months this Congress is defunct! A new and

full representation of the people will come into power. Thirty

additional members will be in the House of Representatives;

three millions of additional people will be represented. The

renewed charter is not to take effect till three years after

this full representation is in power! And are we to forestall

and anticipate them? Take their proper business out of their

hands--snatch the sceptre of legislation from them--do an

act which we cannot amend--which they cannot amend--which

is irrevocable and intangible; and, to crown this act of

usurpation, deliberately set about tying the hands, and imposing

a restriction upon a Congress equal to us in constitutional

power, superior to us in representative numbers, and better

entitled to act upon the subject, because the present charter is

not to expire, nor the new one to take effect, until three years

after the new Congress shall be in power! It is in vain to say

that this reasoning would apply to other legislative measures,

and require the postponement of the land bill and the tariff

bill. Both these bills require immediate decision, and therein

differ from the bank bill, which requires no decision for

three years to come. But the difference is greater still; for

the land bill and tariff bill are ordinary acts of legislation,

open to amendment, or repeal, by ourselves and successors; but

the charter is to be irrevocable, unamendable, binding upon all

Congresses till the year 1851. This is rank usurpation; and if

perpetrated by Congress, and afterwards arrested by an Executive

veto, the President will become the true representative of the

people, the faithful defender of their rights, and the defender

of the rights of the new Congress which will assemble under the

new census.

"Mr. B. concluded his remarks by showing the origin, and also

the extinction, of the doctrine in England. A tory parliament in

the reign of Queen Anne had first granted an exclusive privilege

to the Bank of England, and imposed a restriction upon the

right of future parliaments to establish another bank; and the

ministry of 1826 had condemned this doctrine, and proscribed

its continuance in England. The charter granted to the old Bank

of the United States and to the existing bank had copied those

obnoxious clauses; but now that they were condemned in England

as too unjust and odious for that monarchial country, they

ought certainly to be discarded in this republic, where equal

rights was the vital principle and ruling feature of all our

institutions."

All the amendments proposed by the opponents of the bank being

inexorably voted down, after a debate which, with some cessations,

continued from January to June, the final vote was taken, several

senators first taking occasion to show they had no interest in the

institution. Mr. Benton had seen the names of some members in the

list of stockholders; and early in the debate had required that

the rule of parliamentary law should be read; which excludes the

interested member from voting, and expunges his vote if he does,

and his interest is afterwards discovered. Mr. Dallas said that he

had sold his stock in the institution as soon as it was known that

the question of the recharter would come before him: Mr. Silsbee

said that he had disposed of his interest before the question came

before Congress: Mr. Webster said that the insertion of his name in

the list of stockholders was a mistake in a clerk of the bank. The

vote was then taken on the passage of the bill, and Stood: YEAS:

Messrs. Bell, of New Hampshire; Buckner, of Missouri; Chambers,

of Maryland; Clay, of Kentucky; Clayton, of Delaware; Dallas of

Pennsylvania; Ewing, of Ohio; Foot, of Connecticut; Frelinghuysen,

of New Jersey; Hendricks, of Indiana; Holmes, of Maine; Josiah

S. Johnston, of Louisiana; Knight, of Rhode Island; Naudain, of

Delaware; Poindexter, of Mississippi; Prentiss, of Vermont; Robbins,

of Rhode Island; Robinson, of Illinois; Ruggles, of Ohio; Seymour,

of Vermont; Silsbee, of Massachusetts; Smith (Gen. Samuel), of

Maryland; Sprague, of Maine; Tipton, of Indiana; Tomlinson, of

Connecticut; Waggaman, of Louisiana; Webster, of Massachusetts; and

Wilkins, of Pennsylvania: 28. Nays: Messrs. Benton, of Missouri;

Bibb, of Kentucky; Brown, of North Carolina; Dickerson, of New

Jersey; Dudley, of New-York; Ellis, of Mississippi; Forsyth, of

Georgia; Grundy, of Tennessee; Hayne, of South Carolina; Hill, of

New Hampshire; Kane, of Illinois; King, of Alabama; Mangum, of North

Carolina; Marcy, of New-York; Miller, of South Carolina; Moore,

of Alabama; Tazewell, of Virginia; Troup, of Georgia; Tyler, of

Virginia; Hugh L. White, of Tennessee: 20.

Thirty Years' View (Vol. 1 of 2) or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850 · 第 66 / 166 章