RUPTURE BETWEEN PRESIDENT JACKSON, AND VICE-PRESIDENT CALHOUN.
With the quarrels of public men history has no concern, except as
they enter into public conduct, and influence public events. In
such case, and as the cause of such events, these quarrels belong
to history, which would be an empty tale, devoid of interest or
instruction, without the development of the causes, and consequences
of the acts which it narrates. Division among chiefs has always been
a cause of mischief to their country; and when so, it is the duty of
history to show it. That mischief points the moral of much history,
and has been made the subject of the greatest of poems:
"Achille's wrath, to Greece the direful spring
Of woes unnumbered----"
About the beginning of March, in the year 1831, a pamphlet
appeared in Washington City, issued by Mr. Calhoun, and addressed
to the people of the United States, to explain the cause of a
difference which had taken place between himself and General
Jackson, instigated as the pamphlet alleged by Mr. Van Buren, and
intended to make mischief between the first and second officers
of the government, and to effect the political destruction of
himself (Mr. Calhoun) for the benefit of the contriver of the
quarrel--the then Secretary of State; and indicated as a candidate
for the presidential succession upon the termination of General
Jackson's service. It was the same pamphlet of which Mr. Duncanson,
as heretofore related, had received previous notice from Mr.
Duff Green, as being in print in his office, but the publication
delayed for the maturing of the measures which were to attend its
appearance; namely: the change in the course of the _Telegraph_; its
attacks upon General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren; the defence of Mr.
Calhoun; and the chorus of the affiliated presses, to be engaged "in
getting up the storm which even the popularity of General Jackson
could not stand."
The pamphlet was entitled, "Correspondence between General Andrew
Jackson and John C. Calhoun, President and Vice-President of the
United States, on the subject of the course of the latter in the
deliberations of the cabinet of Mr. Monroe on the occurrences
of the Seminole war;" and its contents consisted of a prefatory
address, and a number of letters, chiefly from Mr. Calhoun himself,
and his friends--the General's share of the correspondence being
a few brief notes to ascertain if Mr. Crawford's statement was
true and, being informed that, substantially, it was, to decline
any further correspondence with Mr. Calhoun, and to promise a full
public reply when he had the leisure for the purpose and access to
the proofs. His words were: "In your and Mr. Crawford's dispute
I have no interest whatever; but it may become necessary for me
hereafter, when I shall have more leisure and the documents at hand,
to place the subject in its proper light--to notice the historical
facts and references in your communication--which will give a very
different view to the subject.... Understanding you now, no further
communication with you on this subject is necessary."... And none
further appears from General Jackson.
But the general did what he had intimated he would--drew up a
sustained reply, showing the subject in a different light from
that in which Mr. Calhoun's letters had presented it; and quoting
vouchers for all that he said. The case, as made out in the
published pamphlet, stood before the public as that of an intrigue
on the part of Mr. Van Buren to supplant a rival--of which the
President was the dupe--Mr. Calhoun the victim--and the country the
sufferer: and the _modus operandi_ of the intrigue was, to dig up
the buried proceedings in Mr. Monroe's cabinet, in relation to a
proposed court of inquiry on the general (at the instance of Mr.
Calhoun), for his alleged, unauthorized, and illegal operations in
Florida during the Seminole war. It was this case which the general
felt himself bound to confront--and did; and in confronting which
he showed that Mr. Calhoun himself was the sole cause of breaking
their friendship; and, consequently, the sole cause of all the
consequences which resulted from that breach. Up to that time--up to
the date of the discovery of Mr. Calhoun's now admitted part in the
proposed measure of the court of inquiry--that gentleman had been
the general's _beau ideal_ of a statesman and a man--"the noblest
work of God," as he publicly expressed it in a toast: against whom
he would believe nothing, to whose friends he gave an equal voice in
the cabinet, whom he consulted as if a member of his administration;
and whom he actually preferred for his successor. This reply to the
pamphlet, entitled "_An exposition of Mr. Calhoun's course towards
General Jackson_," though written above twenty years ago, and
intended for publication, has never before been given to the public.
Its publication becomes essential now. It belongs to a dissension
between chiefs which has disturbed the harmony, and loosened the
foundations of the Union; and of which the view, on one side, was
published in pamphlet at the time, registered in the weeklies and
annuals, printed in many papers, carried into the Congress debates,
especially on the nomination of Mr. Van Buren; and so made a part of
the public history of the times--to be used as historical material
in after time. The introductory paragraph to the "Exposition"
shows that it was intended for immediate publication, but with a
feeling of repugnance to the exhibition of the chief magistrate
as a newspaper writer: which feeling in the end predominated, and
delayed the publication until the expiration of his office--and
afterwards, until his death. But it was preserved to fulfil its
original purpose, and went in its manuscript form to Mr. Francis
P. Blair, the literary legatee of General Jackson; and by him was
turned over to me (with trunks full of other papers) to be used
in this Thirty Years' View. It had been previously in the hands
of Mr. Amos Kendall, as material for a life of Jackson, which he
had begun to write, and was by him made known to Mr. Calhoun, who
declined "_furnishing any further information on the subject_."[3]
It is in the fair round-hand writing of a clerk, slightly interlined
in the general's hand, the narrative sometimes in the first and
sometimes in the third person; vouchers referred to and shown for
every allegation; and signed by the general in his own well-known
hand. Its matter consists of three parts: 1. The justification of
himself, under the law of nations and the treaty with Spain of 1795,
for taking military possession of Florida in 1818. 2. The same
justification, under the orders of Mr. Monroe and his Secretary
at War (Mr. Calhoun). 3. The Statement of Mr. Calhoun's conduct
towards him (the general) in all that affair of the Seminole war,
and in the movements in the cabinet, and in the two Houses of
Congress, to which it gave rise. All these parts belong to a life of
Jackson, or a history of the Seminole war; but only the two latter
come within the scope of this View. To these two parts, then, this
publication of the Exposition is confined--omitting the references
to the vouchers in the appendix--which having been examined (the
essential ones) are found in every particular to sustain the text;
and also omitting a separate head of complaint against Mr. Calhoun
on account of his representations in relation to South Carolina
claims.
[3] Mr. Kendall's letter to the author is in these words:
"December 29, 1853.--In reply to your note just received, I have to
state that, wishing to do exact justice to all men in my Life of
General Jackson, I addressed a note to Mr. Calhoun stating to him in
substance, that I was in possession of the evidences on which the
general based his imputation of duplicity touching his course in
Mr. Monroe's cabinet upon the Florida war question, and inquiring
whether it was his desire to furnish any further information on the
subject, or rest upon that which was already before the public (in
his publication). A few days afterwards, the Hon. Dixon H. Lewis
told me that Mr. Calhoun had received my letter, and had requested
him to ask me what was the nature of the evidences among General
Jackson's papers to which I alluded. I stated them to him, as
embodied in General Jackson's 'Exposition,' to which you refer. Mr.
Lewis afterwards informed me that Mr. Calhoun had concluded to let
the matter rest as it was. This is all the answer I ever received
from Mr. Calhoun."
"EXPOSITION.
"It will be recollected that in my correspondence with Mr.
Calhoun which he has published, I engaged, when the documents
should be at hand, to give a statement of facts respecting my
conduct in the Seminole campaign, which would present it in a
very different light from the one in which that gentleman has
placed it.
"Although the time I am able to devote to the subject, engrossed
as I am in the discharge of my public duties, is entirely
inadequate to do it justice, yet from the course pursued by Mr.
Calhoun, from the frequent misrepresentations of my conduct
on that occasion, from the misapprehension of my motives for
entering upon that correspondence, from the solicitations of
numerous friends in different parts of the country, and in
compliance with that engagement, I present to my fellow-citizens
the following statement, with the documents on which it rests.
"I am aware that there are some among us who deem it unfit
that the chief magistrate of this nation should, under any
circumstances, appear before the public in this manner, to
vindicate his conduct. These opinions or feelings may result
from too great fastidiousness, or from a supposed analogy
between his station and that of the first magistrate of other
countries, of whom it is said they can do no wrong, or they
may be well founded. I, however, entertain different opinions
on this subject. It seems to me that the course I now take of
appealing to the judgment of my fellow-citizens, if not in exact
conformity with past usage, at least springs from the spirit
of our popular institutions, which requires that the conduct
and character of every man, how elevated soever may be his
station should be fairly and freely submitted to the discussion
and decision of the people. Under this conviction I have acted
heretofore, and now act, not wishing this or any other part of
my public life to be concealed. I present my whole conduct in
connection with the subject of that correspondence in this form
to the indulgent but firm and enlightened consideration of my
fellow citizens.
[Here follows a justification of Gen. Jackson's conduct under the
law of nations, and under the orders to Gen. Gaines, his predecessor
in the command.]
"Such was the gradation of orders issued by the government. At
first they instructed their general '_not to pass the line_.'
He is next instructed to '_exercise a sound discretion as to
the necessity of crossing the line_.' He is then directed to
_consider himself 'at liberty to march across the Florida
line_,' but to halt, and report to the department in case the
Indians '_should shelter themselves under a Spanish fort_.'
Finally, after being informed of the atrocious massacre of the
men, women and children constituting the party of Lieutenant
Scott, they order a new general into the field, and direct
him to '_adopt the necessary measures to put an end to the
conflict_, without regard to territorial "_lines_," or "_Spanish
forts_."' Mr. Calhoun's own understanding of the order issued
by him, is forcibly and clearly explained in a letter written
by him in reply to the inquiries of Governor Bibb, of Alabama,
dated the 13th of May, 1818, in which he says:--'_General
Jackson is vested with full power to conduct the war as he may
think best._'
"These orders were received by General Jackson at Nashville,
on the night of the 12th January, 1818, and he instantly took
measures to carry them into effect.
"In the mean time, however, he had received copies of the orders
to General Gaines, to take possession of Amelia Island, and to
enter Florida, but halt and report to the department, in case
the Indians sheltered themselves under a Spanish fort. Approving
the policy of the former, and perceiving in the latter, dangers
to the army, and injury to the country, on the 6th of January
he addressed a confidential letter to the President, frankly
disclosing his views on both subjects. The following is a copy
of that letter, viz.:--
"NASHVILLE, _6th Jan._, 1818.
"SIR:--a few days since, i received a letter from the Secretary
of War, of the 17th ult., with inclosures. Your order of the
19th ult. through him to Brevet Major General Gaines to enter
the territory of Spain, and chastise the ruthless savages who
have been depredating on the property and lives of our citizens,
will meet not only the approbation of your country, but the
approbation of heaven. Will you however permit me to suggest
the catastrophe that might arise by General Gaines's compliance
with the last clause of your order? Suppose the case that the
Indians are beaten: they take refuge either in Pensacola or
St. Augustine, which open their gates to them: to profit by
his victory, General Gaines pursues the fugitives, and has to
halt before the garrison until he can communicate with his
government. In the mean time the militia grow restless, and he
is left to defend himself by the regulars. The enemy, with the
aid of their Spanish friends, and Woodbine's British partisans,
or, if you please with Aurey's force, attacks him. What may not
be the result? Defeat and massacre. Permit me to remark that the
arms of the United States must be carried to any point within
the limits of East Florida, where an enemy is permitted and
protected, or disgrace attends.
"The Executive Government have ordered, and, as I conceive,
very properly, Amelia Island to be taken possession of. This
order ought to be carried into execution at all hazards, and
simultaneously the whole of East Florida seized, and held as an
indemnity for the outrages of Spain upon the property of our
citizens. This done, it puts all opposition down, secures our
citizens a complete indemnity, and saves us from a war with
Great Britain, or some of the continental powers combined with
Spain. This can be done without implicating the government. _Let
it be signified to me through any channel (say Mr. J. Rhea),
that the possession of the Floridas would be desirable to the
United States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished._
"The order being given for the possession of Amelia Island, it
ought to be executed, or our enemies, internal and external,
will use it to the disadvantage of the government. If our troops
enter the territory of Spain in pursuit of our Indian enemy, all
opposition that they meet with must be put down, or we will be
involved in danger and disgrace.
"I have the honor, &c.
"ANDREW JACKSON.
"JAMES MONROE, _President U. S._
"The course recommended by General Jackson in this letter relative
to the occupation of the Floridas accords with the policy which
dictated the secret act of Congress. He recommended no more than
the President had a right to do. In consequence of the occupation
of Amelia Island by the officers of the Colombian and Mexican
governments, and the attempt to occupy the whole province, the
President had a right, under the act of Congress, to order General
Jackson to take possession of it in the name of the United States.
He would have been the more justifiable in doing so, because the
inhabitants of the province, the Indian subjects of the King of
Spain, whom he was bound not only by the laws of nations, but by
treaty to restrain, were in open war with the United States.
"Mr. Calhoun, the Secretary of War, was the first man who read this
letter after its reception at Washington. In a letter from Mr.
Monroe to General Jackson, dated 21st December, 1818, published in
the Calhoun correspondence, page 44, is the following account of the
reception, opening and perusal of this letter, viz.: 'Your letter
of January 6th, was received while I was seriously indisposed.
Observing that it was from you, I handed it to Mr. Calhoun to read,
after reading one or two lines only myself. The order to you to take
command in that quarter had before been issued. He remarked after
perusing the letter, that it was a confidential one relating to
Florida, _which I must answer_.'
"In accordance with the advice of Mr. Calhoun, and availing himself
of the suggestion contained in the letter, Mr. Monroe sent for Mr.
John Rhea (then a member of Congress), showed him the confidential
letter, and requested him to answer it. In conformity with this
request Mr. Rhea did answer the letter, and informed General Jackson
that the President had shown him the confidential letter, and
requested him to state that he approved of its suggestions. This
answer was received by the general on the second night he remained
at Big Creek, which is four miles in advance of Hartford, Georgia,
and before his arrival at Fort Scott, to take command of the troops
in that quarter.
"General Jackson had already received orders, vesting him with
discretionary powers in relation to the measures necessary to put an
end to the war. He had informed the President in his confidential
letter, that in his judgment it was necessary to seize and occupy
the whole of Florida. This suggestion had been considered by Mr.
Calhoun and the President, and approved. From this confidential
correspondence before he entered Florida, it was understood on _both
sides_, that under the order received by him he would occupy the
whole province, if an occasion to do so should present itself; as
Mr. Calhoun wrote to Governor Bibb, he was 'authorized to conduct
the war as he thought best;' and how he 'thought best' to conduct it
was then made known to the Executive, and approved, before he struck
a blow.
"In the approval given by Mr. Monroe upon the advice of Mr. Calhoun
to the suggestions of General Jackson, he acted in strict obedience
to the laws of his country. By the secret act of Congress, the
President was authorized, under circumstances then existing, to
seize and occupy all Florida. Orders had been given which were
sufficiently general in their terms to cover that object. The
confidential correspondence, and private understanding, made them,
so far as regarded the parties, as effectually orders _to take and
occupy the Province of Florida as if that object had been declared
on their face_.
"Under these circumstances General Jackson entered Florida with
a _perfect right_, according to international law, and the
constitution and laws of his country, to take possession of the
whole territory. He was clothed with all the power of the President,
and authorized 'to conduct the war as he thought best.' He had
orders as general and comprehensive as words could make them: he had
the confidential approbation of the President to his confidential
recommendation to seize Florida: and he entered the province with
the full knowledge that not only justice and policy but the laws
of his country, and the orders of the President as publicly and
privately explained and understood, would justify him in expelling
every Spanish garrison, and extending the jurisdiction of the United
States over every inch of its territory.
"'Nevertheless, General Jackson, from his knowledge of the situation
of affairs in Florida, expected to find a justification for himself
in the conduct of the Spanish authorities. On the contrary, had
he found on entering the province that the agents and officers
of Spain, instead of instigating, encouraging and supplying the
Indians, had used all the means in their power to prevent and put an
end to hostilities, he would not have incurred the responsibility of
seizing their fortresses and expelling them from the country. But
he wrote to the President, and entered upon the campaign with other
expectations, and in these he was not disappointed.
"As he approached St. Marks it was ascertained that it was a place
of rendezvous and a source of supply for the Indians. Their councils
had been held within its walls: its storehouses were appropriated
to their use: they had there obtained supplies of ammunition: there
they had found a market for their plunder: and in the commandant's
family resided Alexander Arbuthnot, the chief instigator of the
war. Moreover, the negroes and Indians under Ambrister threatened
to drive out the feeble Spanish garrison and take entire possession
of the fort, as a means of protection for themselves and annoyance
to the United States. In these circumstances General Jackson found
enough to justify him in assuming the responsibility of seizing and
occupying that post with an American garrison.
"The Indians had been dispersed, and St. Marks occupied. No facts
had as yet appeared which would justify General Jackson in assuming
the responsibility of occupying the other Spanish posts in Florida.
He considered the war as at an end, and was about to discharge a
considerable portion of his force, when he was informed that a
portion of the hostile Indians had been received, fed and supplied
by the Spanish authorities in Pensacola. He therefore directed his
march upon that point. On his advance he received a letter from the
governor, denouncing his entry into Florida as a violent outrage
on the rights of Spain, requiring his immediate retreat from the
Territory, and threatening in case of refusal to use force to expel
him. This declaration of hostilities on the part of the Spanish
authorities, instead of removing, tended to increase the necessity
for the General's advance, because it was manifest to both parties
that if the American army then left Florida, the Indians, under
the belief that there they would always find a safe retreat, would
commence their bloody incursions upon our frontiers with redoubled
fury; and General Jackson was warned that if he left any portion of
his army to restrain the Indians, and retired with his main force,
the Spaniards would be openly united with the Indians to expel the
whole, and thus it became as necessary in order to terminate the war
to destroy or capture the Spanish force at Pensacola as the Indians
themselves. In this attitude of the Spanish governor, and in the
fact that the hostile Indians were received, fed, clothed, furnished
with munitions of war, and that their plunder was purchased in
Pensacola, General Jackson found a justification for seizing that
post also, and holding it in the name of the United States.
"St. Augustine was still in the hands of the Spaniards, and no act
of the authorities or people of that place was known to General
Jackson previous to his return to Tennessee, which would sustain
him in assuming the responsibility of occupying that city. However,
about the 7th of August, 1818, he received information that the
Indians were there also received and supplied. On that day,
therefore, he issued an order to General Gaines, directing him to
collect the evidences of these facts, and if they were well founded,
to take possession of that place. The following is an extract from
that order:
"'I have noted with attention Major Twiggs' letter marked No. 5.
I contemplated that the agents of Spain or the officers of Fort
St. Augustine would excite the Indians to hostility and furnish
them with the means. It will be necessary to obtain evidence
substantiating this fact, and that the hostile Indians have been
fed and furnished from the garrison of St. Augustine. This being
obtained, should you deem your force sufficient, you will proceed
to take and garrison with American troops, Fort St. Augustine, and
hold the garrison prisoners until you hear from the President of the
United States, or transport them to Cuba, as in your judgment under
existing circumstances you may think best.'
"An order had some time before been given to the officer of ordnance
at Charleston, to have in readiness a battery train, and to him
General Gaines was referred.
"The order to take St. Augustine has often been adduced as evidence
of General Jackson's determination to do as he pleased, without
regard to the orders or wishes of his government. Though justifiable
on the ground of self-defence, it would never have been issued but
for the confidential orders given to General Gaines and Colonel
Bankhead, to take possession of Amelia Island forcibly, if not
yielded peaceably, and when possessed, to retain and fortify it;
and the secret understanding which existed between him and the
government, in consequence of which he never doubted that he was
acting in compliance with the wishes, and in accordance with the
orders and expectations of the President and Secretary of War.
"To show more conclusively the impressions under which General
Jackson acted, reference should be had to the fact that, after the
capture of the Spanish forts, he instructed Captain Gadsden to
prepare and report a plan for the permanent defence of Florida,
which was agreeable to the confidential orders to General Gaines and
Col. Bankhead before referred to. Of this he informed the Secretary
of War in a dispatch dated 2d June, 1818, of which the following is
an extract:--
"'Captain Gadsden is instructed to prepare and report on the
necessary defences as far as the military reconnoissances he has
taken will permit, accompanied with plans of existing works; what
additions or improvements are necessary, and what new works should,
in his opinion, be erected to _give permanent security to this
important territorial addition to our republic_. As soon as the
report is prepared, Captain Gadsden will receive orders to repair
to Washington City with some other documents which I may wish to
confide to his charge.'
"This plan was completed and forwarded to Mr. Calhoun on the 10th
of the succeeding August, by Captain Gadsden himself, with a letter
from General Jackson, urging the necessity not only of retaining
possession of St. Marks, but Pensacola. The following is a part of
that letter:
"'Captain Gadsden will also deliver you his report made in pursuance
of my order, accompanied with the plans of the fortifications
thought necessary for the defence of the Floridas, in connection
with the line of defence on our Southern frontier.
"'This was done under the belief that the government will never
jeopardize the safety of the Union, or the security of our frontier,
by surrendering those posts, and the possession of the Floridas,
unless upon a sure guaranty agreeable to the stipulations of
the articles of capitulation, that will insure permanent peace,
tranquillity and security to our Southern frontier. It is believed
that Spain can never furnish this guaranty. As long as there are
Indians in Florida, and it is possessed by Spain, they will be
excited to war, and the indiscriminate murder of our citizens, by
foreign agents combined with the officers of Spain. The duplicity
and conduct of Spain for the last six years fully prove this. It was
on a belief that the Floridas would be held that my order was given
to Captain Gadsden to make the report he has done.'
"Again: 'By Captain Gadsden you will receive some letters lately
inclosed to me, detailing the information that the Spaniards at Fort
St. Augustine are again exciting the Indians to war against us, and
a copy of my order to General Gaines on this subject. It is what
I expected, and proves the justice and sound policy of not only
holding the posts we are now in possession of, but of possessing
ourselves of St. Augustine. This, and this alone can give us peace
and security on "our Southern frontier."'
"It is thus clearly shown that in taking possession of St. Marks and
Pensacola, and giving orders to take St. Augustine, I was acting
within the letter as well as spirit of my orders, and in accordance
with the secret understanding between the government and myself,
and under a full persuasion that these fortresses would never
again be permitted by our government to pass under the dominion of
Spain. From the time of writing my confidential letter of the 6th
of January to the date of this dispatch, the 10th of August, 1818,
I never had an intimation that the wishes of the government had
changed, or that less was expected of me, if the occasion should
prove favorable, than the occupation of the whole of Florida. On the
contrary, either by their direct approval of my measures, or their
silence, the President and Mr. Calhoun gave me reason to suppose
that I was to be sustained, and that the Floridas after being
occupied were to be held for the benefit of the United States. Upon
receiving my orders on the 11th of January, I took instant measures
to bring into the field a sufficient force to accomplish all the
objects suggested in my confidential letter of the 6th, of which I
informed the War Department, and Mr. Calhoun in his reply dated 29th
January, 1818, after the receipt of my confidential letter, and a
full knowledge and approbation of my views says:--
"'The measures you have taken to bring an efficient force into the
field are approbated, and a confident hope is entertained that a
speedy and successful termination of the Indian war will follow your
exertions.'
"Having received further details of my preparations, not only to
terminate the Seminole war, but, as the President and his Secretary
well knew, _to occupy Florida also_, Mr. Calhoun on the 6th
February, writes as follows:--
"'I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the
20th ult., and to acquaint you with the entire approbation of the
President of all the measures you have adopted to terminate the
rupture with the Indians.'
"On the 13th of May following, with a full knowledge that I intended
if a favorable occasion presented itself to occupy Florida, and
that the design had the approbation of the President, Mr. Calhoun
wrote to Governor Bibb, of Alabama, the letter already alluded to,
concluding as follows:--
"'General Jackson is vested with full powers to conduct the war in
the manner he may deem best.'
"On the 25th of March, 1818, I informed Mr. Calhoun that I intended
to occupy St. Marks, and on the 8th of April I informed him that it
was done.
"Not a whisper of disapprobation or of doubt reached me from the
government.
"On the 5th May I wrote to Mr. Calhoun that I was about to move upon
Pensacola with a view of occupying that place.
"Again, no reply was ever given disapproving or discountenancing
this movement.
"On the 2d of June I informed Mr. Calhoun that I had on the 24th May
entered Pensacola, and on the 28th had received the surrender of the
Barrancas.
"Again no reply was given to this letter expressing any disapproval
of these acts.
"In fine, from the receipt of the President's reply to my
confidential letter of 6th January, 1818, through Mr. Rhea, until
the receipt of the President's private letter, dated 19th July,
1818, I received no instructions or intimations from the government
public or private that my operations in Florida were other than such
as the President and Secretary of War expected and approved. I had
not a doubt that I had acted in every respect in strict accordance
with their views, and that without publicly avowing that they had
authorized my measures they were ready at all times and under all
circumstances to sustain me; and that as there were sound reasons
and justifiable cause for taking possession of Florida, they would
in pursuance of their private understanding with me retain it as
indemnity for the spoliations committed by Spanish subjects on our
citizens, and as security for the peace of our Southern frontier.
I was willing to rest my vindication for taking the posts on the
hostile conduct of their officers and garrisons, bearing all the
responsibility myself: but I expected my government would find in
their claims upon Spain, and the danger to which our frontier would
again be exposed, sufficient reasons for not again delivering them
into the possession of Spain.
"It was late in August before I received official information of
the decision of the government to restore the posts, and about the
same time I saw it stated in the Georgia Journal that the cabinet
had been divided in relation to the course pursued by me in Florida;
and also an extract of a letter in a Nashville paper, alleging
that a movement had been made in the cabinet against me which was
attributed to Mr. Crawford, in which extract it is expressly stated
that I had been triumphantly vindicated by _Mr. Calhoun_ and Mr.
Adams. Being convinced that the course I had pursued was justified
by considerations of public policy, by the laws of nations, by the
state of things to which I have referred, and by the instructions,
intimations, and acquiescence of the government, and believing that
the latter had been communicated to all the members of the cabinet,
I considered that such a movement by Mr. Crawford was founded on
considerations foreign to the public interests, and personally
inimical to me; and therefore, after these public and explicit
intimations of what had occurred in the cabinet, I was prepared
to, and did believe that Mr. Crawford was bent on my destruction,
and was the author of the movement in the cabinet to which they
referred. I the more readily entertained this belief in relation to
him (in which I am rejoiced to avail myself of this public occasion
to say I did him injustice) because it was impossible that I should
suspect that any proposition to punish or censure me could come
from either the President or Mr. Calhoun, as I well knew that I
had expressed to the President my opinion that Florida ought to be
taken, and had offered to take it if he would give me an intimation
through Mr. Rhea that it was desirable to do so, which intimation
was given; that they had given me orders broad enough to sanction
all that was done; that Mr. Calhoun had expressly interpreted
those orders vesting me 'with full power to conduct the war as he
(I) might think best;' that they had expressly approved of all my
preparations, and in silence witnessed all my operations. Under
these circumstances it was impossible for me to believe, whatever
change might have taken place in their views of public policy,
that either the President or Mr. Calhoun could have originated or
countenanced any proposition tending to cast censure upon me, much
less to produce my arrest, trial, and punishment.
"If these facts and statements could have left room for a doubt
in relation to Mr. Calhoun's approval of my conduct and of his
friendship for me, I had other evidence of a nature perfectly
conclusive. In August, 1818, Colonel A. P. Hayne, Inspector General
of the Southern Division, who had served in this campaign, came to
Washington to settle his accounts, and resign his staff appointment
in the army. He was the fellow-citizen and friend of Mr. Calhoun
and held constant personal interviews with him for some weeks in
settling his accounts. On the 24th September he addressed a letter
to me, stating that he had closed his public accounts entirely to
his satisfaction, and in relation to public affairs among other
things remarks:--
"'The course the administration has thought proper to adopt is to
me _inexplicable_. They _retain St. Marks_, and in the same breath
_give up_ Pensacola. Who can comprehend this? The American nation
possesses discernment, and will judge for themselves. Indeed, sir,
I fear that Mr. Monroe has on the present occasion yielded to the
opinion of those about him. I cannot believe that it is the result
of his own honest convictions. Mr. Calhoun certainly thinks with you
altogether, although after the decision of the cabinet, he must of
course nominally support what has been done.' And in another letter,
dated 21st January, 1819, he says: 'Since I last saw you I have
travelled through West and East Tennessee, through Kentucky, through
Ohio, through the western and eastern part of Pennsylvania, and the
whole of Virginia--have been much in Baltimore and Philadelphia, and
the united voice of the people of those States and towns (and I have
taken great pains to inform myself) approve of your conduct in every
respect. And the people of the United States at large entertain
precisely the same opinion with the people of those States. So does
the administration, to wit: Mr. Monroe, _Mr. Calhoun_, and Mr.
Adams. Mr. Monroe is your _friend_. He has _identified_ you with
himself. After the most mature reflection and deliberation upon all
of your operations, he has covered your conduct. But I am candid
to confess that he did not adopt this line of conduct (in my mind)
as soon as he ought to have done. Mr. Adams has done honor to his
country and himself.'
"Colonel Hayne is a man of honor, and did not intend to deceive; I
had no doubt, and have none now, that he derived his impressions
from conversations with Mr. Calhoun himself; nor have I any
doubt that Mr. Calhoun purposely conveyed those impressions that
they might be communicated to me. Without other evidence than
this letter, how could I have understood Mr. Calhoun otherwise
than as approving my whole conduct, and as having defended me in
the cabinet? How could I have understood any seeming dissent in
his official communications otherwise than as arising from his
obligation to give a 'nominal support' to the decision of the
cabinet which in reality he disapproved?
"The reply to my confidential letter, the approval of my
preparations, the silence of Mr. Calhoun during the campaign, the
enmity of Mr. Crawford, the language of the newspapers, the letters
of Colonel Hayne, and other letters of similar import from other
gentlemen who were on familiar terms with the Secretary of War,
left no doubt on my mind that Mr. Calhoun approved of my conduct in
the Seminole war 'altogether;' had defended me against an attack
of Mr. Crawford in the cabinet, and was, throughout the struggle
in Congress so deeply involving my character and fame, my devoted
and zealous friend. This impression was confirmed by the personal
kindness of Mr. Calhoun towards me, during my visit to this city,
pending the proceedings of Congress relative to the Seminole war,
and on every after occasion. Nor was such conduct confined to me
alone, for however inconsistent with his proposition in the cabinet,
that I should 'be punished in some form,' or in the language of
Mr. Adams, as to what passed there 'that General Jackson should be
brought to trial,' in several conversations with Colonel Richard M.
Johnson, while he was preparing the counter report of the Military
Committee of the House of Representatives, Mr. Calhoun always spoke
of me with respect and kindness, _and approved of my course_.
"So strong was my faith in Mr. Calhoun's friendship that the
appointment of Mr. Lacock, shortly after he had made his report upon
the Seminole war in the Senate, to an important office, although
inexplicable to me, did not shake it.
"I was informed by Mr. Rankin (member of the House of
Representatives from Mississippi), and others in 1823 and 1824,
once in the presence of Colonel Thomas H. Williams (of Mississippi)
of the Senate, that I had blamed Mr. Crawford unjustly and that
Mr. Calhoun was the instigator of the attacks made upon me: yet in
consequence of the facts and circumstances already recapitulated
tending to prove Mr. Calhoun's approval of my course, I could not
give the assertion the least credit.
"Again in 1825 Mr. Cobb told me that I blamed Mr. Crawford
wrongfully both for the attempt to injure me in the cabinet, and
for having an agency in framing the resolutions which he (Mr.
Cobb) offered in Congress censuring my conduct in the Seminole
war. He stated on the contrary that Mr. Crawford was opposed to
those resolutions and always asserted that '_General Jackson had
a sufficient defence whenever he chose to make it, and that the
attempt to censure him would do him good, and recoil upon its
authors_;' yet it was impossible for me to believe that Mr. Calhoun
had been my enemy; on the contrary I did not doubt that he had been
my devoted friend, not only through all those difficulties, but in
the contest for the Presidency which ended in the election of Mr.
Adams.
"In the Spring of 1828 the impression of Mr. Calhoun's rectitude
and fidelity towards me was confirmed by an incident which occurred
during the progress of an effort to reconcile all misunderstanding
between him and Mr. Crawford and myself. Colonel James A. Hamilton
of New-York inquired of Mr. Calhoun himself, at Washington,
'whether at any meeting of Mr. Monroe's cabinet the propriety of
arresting General Jackson for any thing done during the Seminole
war had been at any time discussed?' Mr. Calhoun replied, 'Never:
such a measure was not thought of, much less discussed. The only
point before the cabinet was the answer to be given to the Spanish
government.' In consequence of this conversation Colonel Hamilton
wrote to Major Lewis, a member of the Nashville committee, that
'the Vice-President, who you know was the member of the cabinet
best acquainted with the subject, told me General Jackson's arrest
was never thought of, much less discussed.' Information of this
statement renewed and strengthened the impression relative to the
friendship of Mr. Calhoun, which I had entertained from the time of
the Seminole war.
"In a private letter to Mr. Calhoun dated 25th May, 1828, written
after the conversation with Colonel Hamilton had been communicated
to me, I say in relation to the Seminole war:
"'I can have no wish at this day to obtain an explanation of the
orders under which I acted whilst charged with the campaign against
the Seminole Indians in Florida. I viewed them when received as
plain and explicit, and called for by the situation of the country.
I executed them faithfully, and was happy in reply to my reports to
the Department of War to receive your approbation for it.'
"Again: 'The fact is, I never had the least ground to believe
(previous to the reception of Mr. Monroe's letter of 19th July,
1818) that any difference of opinion between the government and
myself existed on the subject of my powers. So far from this, to the
communications which I made showing the construction which I placed
upon them, there was not only no difference of opinion indicated in
the replies of the Executive but as far as I received replies, an
entire approval of the measures which I had adopted.'
"This was addressed directly from me to Mr. Calhoun, in May, 1828.
In his reply Mr. Calhoun does not inform me that I was in error.
He does not tell me that he disapproved my conduct, and thought I
ought to have been punished for a violation of orders. He does not
inform me that he or any other had proposed in the cabinet council a
court of inquiry, or any other court. He says nothing inconsistent
with the impression already made upon my mind--nothing which might
not have been expected from one who had been obliged to give a
'nominal support' to a decision which he disapproved. His reply,
dated 10th July, 1828, is in these words:
"'Any discussion of them' (the orders) 'now, I agree with you,
would be unnecessary. They are matters of history, and must be
left to the historian as they stand. In fact I never did suppose
that the justification of yourself or the government depended on a
critical construction of them. It is sufficient for both that they
were honestly issued, and honestly executed, without involving the
question whether they were executed strictly in accordance with the
intention that they were issued. Honest and patriotic motives are
all that can be required, and I never doubted that they existed on
both sides.'
"It was certainly impossible for me to conceive that Mr. Calhoun
had urged in cabinet council a court of inquiry with a view to my
ultimate punishment for violation of orders which he admitted were
'_honestly executed_,' especially as he _never doubted_ that my
'motives' were '_honest and patriotic_.' After this letter I could
not have doubted, if I had before, that Mr. Calhoun had zealously
vindicated my 'honest and patriotic' acts in Mr. Monroe's cabinet
against the supposed attacks of Mr. Crawford, as had long before
been announced. I could not have doubted that Mr. Calhoun 'thought
with me altogether,' as I had been informed by Colonel Hayne. I
could not have conceived that Mr. Calhoun had _ever_ called in
question my compliance with my orders, when he says he '_never
did suppose_' that my '_justification_ depended on a critical
construction of them,' and 'that it was sufficient that they were
honestly executed.'
"By the unlimited authority conferred on me by my orders; by the
writing and reception of my confidential letter and the answer
thereto advised by Mr. Calhoun; by the positive approval of all my
preparatory measures and the silence of the government during my
operations; by uncontradicted publications in the newspapers; by
positive assurances received through the friends of Mr. Calhoun; by
Mr. Calhoun's declaration to Colonel Hamilton; and finally by his
own assurance that he never doubted the honesty or patriotism with
which I executed my orders, which he '_deemed sufficient_' without
inquiring '_whether they were executed strictly in accordance with
the intention that they were issued_,' I was authorized to believe
and did believe that Mr. Calhoun had been my devoted friend,
defending on all occasions, public and private, my whole conduct
in the Seminole war. With these impressions I entered upon the
discharge of the duties of President, in March, 1829.
"Recent disclosures prove that these impressions were entirely
erroneous, and that Mr. Calhoun himself was the author of the
proposition made in the cabinet to subject me to a court of inquiry
with a view to my ultimate punishment for a violation of orders.
"My feelings towards Mr. Calhoun continued of the most friendly
character until my suspicions of his fairness were awakened by the
following incident. The late Marshal of the District of Columbia
(Mr. Tench Ringold), conversing with a friend of mine in relation to
the Seminole war, spoke in strong terms of Mr. Monroe's support of
me; and upon being informed that I had always regarded Mr. Calhoun
as my firm and undeviating friend and supporter, and particularly
on that occasion, Mr. Ringold replied that _Mr. Calhoun was the
first man to move in the cabinet for my punishment, and that he
was against me on that subject_. Informed of this conversation,
and recurring to the repeated declarations that had been made to
me by different persons and at different times, that Mr. Calhoun,
and not Mr. Crawford, was the person who had made that movement
against me in the cabinet, and observing the mysterious opposition
that had shown itself, particularly among those who were known to
be the friends and partisans of Mr. Calhoun, and that the measures
which I had recommended to the consideration of Congress, and
which appeared to have received the approbation of the people,
were neglected or opposed in that quarter whence I had a right to
believe they would have been brought forward and sustained, I felt
a desire to see the written statement which I had been informed Mr.
Crawford had made, in relation to the proceedings of the cabinet,
that I might ascertain its true character. I sought and obtained
it, in the manner heretofore stated, and immediately sent it to
Mr. Calhoun, and asked him frankly whether it was possible that
the information given in it was correct? His answer, which he has
given to the world, indeed, as I have before stated, surprised, nay,
astonished me. I had always refused to believe, notwithstanding
the various assurances I had received, that Mr. Calhoun could be
so far regardless of that duty which the plainest principles of
justice and honor imposed upon him, as to propose the punishment
of a subordinate officer for the violation of orders which were so
evidently discretionary as to permit me as he (Mr. Calhoun) informed
Governor Bibb, 'to conduct the war as he may think best.' But the
fact that he so acted has been affirmed by all who were present on
the occasion, and admitted by himself.[4]
[4] Mr. Calhoun in his conversation with Colonel Hamilton,
substantially denied that such a proposition as that which he now
admits he made, was ever submitted to the cabinet. He is asked
"whether at any meeting of Mr. Monroe's cabinet the propriety of
arresting General Jackson for any thing done during the Seminole
war had been at any time discussed." He replies "Never; such a
measure was not thought of, much less discussed: _the only point
before the cabinet was the answer to be given to the Spanish
government._" By the last branch of the answer the denial is made
to embrace the whole subject in any form it might have assumed,
and therefore deprives Mr. Calhoun of all grounds of cavil or
escape by alleging that he only proposed a military inquiry, and
not an arrest, and that he did not therefore answer the inquiry
in the negative. But again when Colonel Hamilton submitted to Mr.
Calhoun his recollection of the conversation that Mr. Calhoun might
correct it if erroneous, and informed him that he did so because
he intended to communicate in to Major Lewis, Mr. Calhoun did not
question the correctness of Colonel Hamilton's recollection of the
conversation; he does not qualify or alter it; he does not say, as
in frankness he was bound to do--"It is true, the proposition to
arrest General Jackson was not discussed, but an inquiry into his
conduct in that war was discussed on a proposition to that end made
by me." He does not say that the answer to the Spanish government
was not the only point before the cabinet, but he endeavors, without
denying as was alleged by Colonel Hamilton that this part of the
conversation was understood between them to be confidential, to
prevent him from making it public, and to that end and that alone
he writes a letter of ten pages on the sacredness of cabinet
deliberations. Why, let us ask, did Mr. Calhoun upon reflection feel
so much solicitude to prevent a disclosure of his answer to Colonel
Hamilton, which if true could not injure him? At first, although put
upon his guard, he admits that this part of the conversation was
not confidential, although it referred to what was, as well as what
was not done in cabinet council. The reason is to be found in his
former involutions, and in the fact that the answer was not true,
and in his apprehension that if that answer was made public, Mr.
Crawford, who entertained the worst opinions of Mr. Calhoun, and who
had suffered in General Jackson's opinion on this subject, would
immediately disclose the whole truth, as he has since done; and that
thus the veil worn out, of the sacredness of cabinet deliberations
under which Mr. Calhoun upon second thought had endeavored to
conceal himself, would be raised, and he would be exposed to public
indignation and scorn. This could alone be the motive for his
extreme anxiety to prevent Colonel Hamilton from communicating the
result of an inquiry made by him from the best and purest motives,
to the persons who had prompted that inquiry from like motives.
"That Mr. Calhoun, with his knowledge of facts and
circumstances, should have dared to make such a proposition, can
only be accounted for from the sacredly confidential character
which he attaches to the proceedings of a cabinet council. His
views of this subject are strongly expressed in his printed
correspondence, page 15. 'I am not at all surprised,' says he,
'that Mr. Crawford should feel that he stands in need of an
apology for betraying the deliberations of the cabinet. It is,
I believe, not only the first instance in our country, but one
of a very few instances in any country, or any age, that an
individual has felt himself absolved from the high obligations
which honor and duty impose on one situated as he was.' It was
under this veil, which he supposed to be for ever impenetrable,
that Mr. Calhoun came forward and denounced those measures which
he knew were not only impliedly, but positively authorized by
the President himself. He proposed to take preparatory steps for
the punishment of General Jackson, whose '_honest and patriotic
motives he never doubted_,' for the violation of orders which he
admits were '_honestly executed_.' That he expected to succeed
with his proposition so long as there was a particle of honor,
honesty, or prudence left to President Monroe, is not to be
imagined. The movement was intended for some future contingency,
which perhaps Mr. Calhoun himself only can certainly explain.
"The shape in which this proposition was made is variously
stated. Mr. Calhoun, in the printed correspondence, page 15,
says: 'I was of the impression that you had exceeded your
orders, and acted on your own responsibility, but I neither
questioned your patriotism nor your motives. Believing that
where orders were transcended, investigation as a matter of
course ought to follow, as due in justice to the government and
the officer, unless there be strong reasons to the contrary,
I came to the [cabinet] meeting under the impression that the
usual course ought to be pursued in this case, which I supported
by presenting fully and freely all the arguments that occurred
to me.'
"Mr. Crawford, in his letter to Mr. Forsyth, published in the
same correspondence, page 9, says: 'Mr. Calhoun's proposition in
the cabinet was, that General Jackson should be punished in some
form, or reprehended in some form, I am not positively certain
which.'
"Mr. Adams, in a letter to Mr. Crawford, dated 30th July, 1830,
says: 'The main point upon which it was urged that General
Jackson should be _brought to trial_, was, that he had violated
his orders by taking St. Marks and Pensacola.'
"Mr. Crowninshield, in a letter to Mr. Crawford, dated 25th
July, 1830, says: 'I remember too, that Mr. Calhoun was severe
upon the conduct of General Jackson, but the words particularly
spoken have slipped my memory.'
"From the united testimony it appears that Mr. Calhoun made a
proposition for a court of inquiry upon the conduct of General
Jackson, upon the charge of having violated his orders in
taking St. Marks and Pensacola, with a view to his ultimate
trial and punishment, and that he was severe in his remarks
upon that conduct. But the President would listen to no such
proposition. Mr. Crawford, in his letter to Mr. Calhoun, dated
2d October, 1830, says: 'You remembered the excitement which
your proposition produced in the mind and on the feelings of the
President, and did not dare to ask him any question tending to
revive his recollection of that proposition.' This excitement
was very natural. Hearing the very member of his cabinet whom he
had consulted upon the subject of General Jackson's confidential
letter, and who had advised the answer which had approved
beforehand the capture of St. Marks and Pensacola and who on the
8th September, 1818, wrote to General Jackson, that 'St. Marks
will be retained till Spain shall be ready to garrison it with
a sufficient force, and Fort Gadsden, and any other position
in East or West Florida within the Indian country, which may
be deemed eligible, will be retained so long as there is any
danger, which, it is hoped, will afford the desired security,'
make a proposition which went to stamp his character with
treachery, by the punishment of General Jackson for those very
acts, it was impossible that Mr. Monroe should not be excited.
He must have been more than human, or less, to have beheld Mr.
Calhoun uttering violent philippics against General Jackson for
those acts, without the strongest emotion.
"Mr. Calhoun's proposition was rejected, as he knew it would be,
and he came from behind the veil of cabinet secrecy all smiles
and professions of regard and friendship for General Jackson!
It was then that by his deceitful conversations he induced
Colonel Hayne and others to inform General Jackson, that so
far from thinking that he had violated his orders and ought to
be punished, he disapproved and only nominally supported the
more friendly decision of the cabinet, and thought with him
altogether! There was no half-way feeling in his friendship!
So complete and entire was the deception, that while General
Jackson was passing through Virginia the next winter on his way
to Washington, he toasted '_John C. Calhoun_,' as '_an honest
man, the noblest work of God._' Who can paint the workings of
the guilty Calhoun's soul when he read that toast!!
"But Mr. Calhoun was not content with the attack made by him
upon General Jackson's character and fame in the dark recesses
of Mr. Monroe's cabinet. At the next session of Congress
the same subject was taken in hand in both houses. Mr. Cobb
came forward with his resolutions of censure in the House of
Representatives, where, after a long discussion, the assailants
were signally defeated. Mr. Lacock headed a committee in the
Senate which was engaged in the affair from the 18th December,
1818, to the 24th February, 1819, when they made a report
full of bitterness against General Jackson. It charged him
with a violation of the laws and constitution of his country;
disobedience of orders; disregard of the principles of humanity,
and almost every crime which a military man can commit.
"It was not suspected at the time that this report owed any of
its bitterness to Mr. Calhoun, yet that such was the fact is now
susceptible of the strongest proof!
"While the attacks upon General Jackson were in progress in
Congress his presence in the city was thought to be necessary by
his friends. Colonel Robert Butler, then in Washington, wrote to
him to that effect. A few days afterwards Mr. Calhoun accosted
him, and asked him in an abrupt manner why he had written to
General Jackson to come to the city. Colonel Butler answered,
'that he might see that justice was done him in person.' Mr.
Calhoun turned from him without speaking another word with an
air of anger and vexation which made an indelible impression
on the colonel's mind. It was obvious enough that he did not
desire, but rather feared General Jackson's presence in the
city. Colonel Butler's letter to General Jackson, dated the 9th
June, 1831, is in these words:
"'When in Washington in the winter of 1818-'19, finding the
course which Congress appeared to be taking on the Seminole
question, I wrote you that I esteemed it necessary that you
should be present at Washington. Having done so, I communicated
this fact to our friend Bronaugh, who held the then Secretary
of War in high estimation. The succeeding evening, while at
the French Minister's, he came to me and inquired in a tone
somewhat abrupt, what could induce me to write for General
Jackson to come to the city--(Bronaugh having informed him that
I had done so)--to which I replied, perhaps as sternly, "_that
he may in person have justice done him_." The Secretary turned
on his heel, and so ended the conversation; but there was a
something inexplicable in the countenance that subsequent events
have given meaning to. After your arrival at Washington, we
were on a visit at the Secretary's, and examining a map--(the
Yellow Stone expedition of the Secretary's being the subject of
conversation)--Mr. Lacock, of the Senate, was announced to the
Secretary, who remarked--"Do not let him come in now, General
Jackson is here, but will soon be gone, when I can see him."
There was nothing strange in all this; but the whispered manner
and apparent agitation fastened on my mind the idea that Mr.
Calhoun and Lacock understood each other on the Seminole matter.
Such were my impressions at the time.'
"On my arrival, however, in January, 1819, Mr. Calhoun treated
me with marked kindness. The latter part of Colonel Butler's
letter, as to Mr. Lacock, is confirmed by my own recollection
that one day when Mr. Calhoun and myself were together in the
War Department, the messenger announced Mr. Lacock at the door:
Mr. Calhoun, in a hurried manner, pronounced the name of General
Jackson, and Mr. Lacock did not come in. This circumstance
indicated an intimacy between them, but I inferred nothing from
it unfavorable to Mr. Calhoun.
"In speaking of my confidential letter to Mr. Monroe (printed
correspondence, page 19), Mr. Calhoun states, that after
reading it when received, 'I thought no more of it. Long after,
I think it was at the commencement of the next session of
Congress, I heard some allusion which brought that letter to my
recollection. It was from a quarter which induced me to believe
that it came from Mr. Crawford. I called and mentioned it to Mr.
Monroe, and found that he had entirely forgotten the letter.
After searching some time he found it among some other papers,
and read it, as he told me, for the first time.'
"The particular '_quarter_' whence the '_allusion_' which
called up the recollection of this confidential letter came,
Mr. Calhoun has not thought proper to state. Probably it was
Mr. Lacock, who was the friend of Mr. Crawford. Probably he
applied to Mr. Calhoun for information, and Mr. Calhoun went
to the President, and requested a sight of that letter that he
might communicate its contents to Mr. Lacock. Mr. Lacock was
appointed upon the committee on the Seminole war, on the 18th
December. On the 21st of that month the recollection of the
confidential letter was first in the mind of Mr. Monroe, for on
that day, in a letter to General Jackson, he gives an account
of its reception, and the disposition made of it. Probably,
therefore, it was about the time that Mr. Lacock undertook the
investigation of this affair in the Senate, and that it was for
his information that Mr. Calhoun called on Mr. Monroe to inquire
about this letter.
"Nay, it is _certain_ that the existence and contents of this
letter _were_ about that time _communicated to Mr. Lacock: that
he conversed freely and repeatedly with Mr. Calhoun upon the
whole subject: that he was informed of all that had passed: the
views of the President, of Mr. Calhoun, and the cabinet, and
that Mr. Calhoun coincided with Mr. Lacock in all his views_.
"These facts are stated _upon the authority of Mr. Lacock
himself_.
"The motives of these secret communications to Mr. Lacock by Mr.
Calhoun cannot be mistaken. By communicating the contents of the
confidential letter, and withholding the fact that an approving
answer had been returned, he wished to impress Mr. Lacock with
the belief that General Jackson had predetermined before he
entered Florida, to seize the Spanish posts, right or wrong,
with orders or without. Acting under this impression, he would
be prepared to discredit and disbelieve all General Jackson's
explanations and defences, and put the worst construction upon
every circumstance disclosed in the investigation. By this
perfidy General Jackson was deprived of all opportunity to make
an effectual defence. To him Mr. Calhoun was all smiles and
kindness. He believed him his friend, seeking by all proper
means, in public and private, to shield him from the attacks
of his enemies. Having implicit confidence in Mr. Calhoun and
the President, he would sooner have endured the tortures of
the inquisition than have disclosed their answer to his letter
through Mr. Rhea. The tie which he felt, Mr. Calhoun felt
not. He did not scruple to use one side of a correspondence
to destroy a man, his friend, who confided in him with the
faith and affection of a brother--when he knew that man felt
bound by obligations from which no considerations short of a
knowledge of his own perfidy could absolve him, to hold the
other side in eternal silence. General Jackson had no objection
to a disclosure of the whole correspondence. There was nothing
in it of which he was ashamed, or which on his own account he
wished to conceal. Public policy made it inexpedient that the
world should know at that time how far the government had
approved beforehand of his proceedings. But had he known that
Mr. Calhoun was attempting to destroy him by secretly using
one side of the correspondence, he would have been justified
by the laws of self-defence in making known the other. He saw
not, heard not, imagined not, that means so perfidious and
dishonorable were in use to destroy him. It never entered his
confiding heart that the hand he shook with the cordiality of a
warm friend was secretly pointing out to his enemies the path by
which they might ambuscade and destroy him. He was incapable of
conceiving that the honeyed tongue, which to him spake nothing
but kindness, was secretly conveying poison into the ears of Mr.
Lacock, and other members of Congress. It could not enter his
mind that his confidential letters, the secrets of the cabinet,
and the opinions of its members, were all secretly arrayed
against him by the friend in whom he implicitly confided,
misinterpreted and distorted, without giving him an opportunity
for self-defence or explanation.
"Mr. Calhoun's object was accomplished. Mr. Lacock made a
report far transcending in bitterness any thing which even in
the opinion of General Jackson's enemies the evidence seemed
to justify. This extraordinary and unaccountable severity is
now explained. It proceeded from the secret and perfidious
representations of Mr. Calhoun, based on General Jackson's
confidential letter. Mr. Lacock ought to be partially excused,
and stand before the world comparatively justified. For most of
the injustice done by his report to the soldier who had risked
all for his country, Mr. Calhoun _is the responsible man_.
"As dark as this transaction is, a shade is yet to be added.
It was not enough that General Jackson had been deceived and
betrayed by a professing friend; that the contents of his
confidential correspondence had been secretly communicated
to his open enemies, while all information of the reply was
withheld: it was not enough that an official report overflowing
with bitterness had gone out to the world to blast his fame,
which must stand for ever recorded in the history of his
country. Lest some accident might expose the evidences of the
understanding under which he acted, and the duplicity of his
secret accuser, means must be taken to procure the destruction
of the answer to the confidential letter through Mr. Rhea. They
were these. About the time Mr. Lacock made his report General
Jackson and Mr. Rhea were both in the city of Washington. Mr.
Rhea called on General Jackson, as he said, at the request
of Mr. Monroe, and begged him on his return home to burn his
reply. He said the President feared that by the death of General
Jackson, or some other accident, it might fall into the hands
of those who would make an improper use of it. He therefore
conjured him by the friendship which had always existed between
them (and by his obligations as a brother mason) to destroy it
on his return to Nashville. Believing Mr. Monroe and Mr. Calhoun
to be his devoted friends, and not deeming it _possible_ that
any incident could occur which would require or justify its use,
he gave Mr. Rhea the promise he solicited, and accordingly after
his return to Nashville he burnt Mr. Rhea's letter, and on his
letter-book opposite the copy of his confidential letter to Mr.
Monroe made this entry:--
"_'Mr. Rhea's letter in answer is burnt this 12th April, 1819.'_
"Mr. Calhoun's management was thus far completely triumphant.
He had secretly assailed General Jackson in cabinet council,
and caused it to be publicly announced that he was his friend.
While the confiding soldier was toasting him as 'an honest man,
the noblest work of God,' he was betraying his confidential
correspondence to his enemy, and laying the basis of a document
which was intended to blast his fame and ruin his character in
the estimation of his countrymen. Lest accident should bring the
truth to light, and expose his duplicity, he procures through
the President and Mr. Rhea the destruction of the approving
answer to the confidential letter. Mr. Rhea was an old man and
General Jackson's health feeble. In a few years all who were
supposed to have any knowledge of the reply would be in their
graves. Every trace of the approval given beforehand by the
government to the operations of General Jackson would soon be
obliterated, and the undivided responsibility would forever
rest on his head. At least, should accident or policy bring to
light the duplicity of Mr. Calhoun, he might deny all knowledge
of this reply, and challenge its production. He might defend
his course in the cabinet and extenuate his disclosures to Mr.
Lacock, by maintaining before the public that he had always
believed General Jackson violated his orders and ought to have
been punished. At the worst, the written reply if once destroyed
could never be recalled from the flames; and should General
Jackson still be living, his assertion might not be considered
more conclusive than Mr. Calhoun's denial. In any view it was
desirable to him that this letter should be destroyed, and
through his management, as is verily believed, it was destroyed.
"Happily however for the truth of history and the cause of
public justice, the writer of the reply is still alive; and
from a journal kept at the time, is able to give an accurate
account of this transaction. He testifies directly to the
writing of the letter, to its contents, and the means taken to
secure its destruction. Judge Overton, to whom the letter was
confidentially shown, testifies directly to the existence of the
letter, and to the fact that General Jackson afterwards told him
it was destroyed.
"These, with the statement of General Jackson himself, and the
entry in his letter-book which was seen by several persons many
years ago, fix these facts beyond a doubt.
"Certainly the history of the world scarcely presents a parallel
to this transaction. It has been seen with what severity
Mr. Calhoun denounced Mr. Crawford for revealing the secret
proceedings of the cabinet: with what justice may a retort of
tenfold severity be made upon him, when he not only reveals to
Mr. Lacock the proceedings of the cabinet, but the confidential
letter of a confiding friend, not for the benefit of that
friend, but through misrepresentation of the transaction and
concealment of the reply, to aid his enemies in accomplishing
his destruction. It was doubtless expected that Mr. Lacock would
produce a document which would overwhelm General Jackson and
destroy him in public estimation. In that event the proceedings
of the cabinet would no longer have been held sacred. The
erroneous impression made on the public mind would have been
corrected, and the world have been informed that Mr. Calhoun
not only disapproved the acts of General Jackson, but had in
the cabinet attempted in vain to procure his punishment. As
the matter stood, the responsibility of attacking the General
rested on Mr. Crawford, and had the decision of the people been
different, the responsibility of _defending_ him would have
been thrown exclusively upon Mr. Adams, and Mr. Calhoun would
have claimed the merit of the attack. But until the public
should decide, it was not prudent to lose the friendship of
General Jackson, which might be of more service to Mr. Calhoun
than the truth. It was thus at the sacrifice of every principle
of honor and friendship that Mr. Calhoun managed to throw all
responsibility on his political rivals, and profit by the result
of these movements whatever it might be. It cannot be doubted,
however, that Mr. Calhoun expected the entire prostration of
General Jackson, and managed to procure the destruction of Mr.
Rhea's letter, for the purpose of disarming the friend he had
betrayed, that he might, with impunity when the public should
have pronounced a sentence of condemnation, have come forward
and claimed the merit of having been the first to denounce him.
"The people however sustained General Jackson against the
attacks of all his enemies, public and private, open and secret,
and therefore it became convenient for Mr. Calhoun to retain
his mask, to appear as the friend of one whom the people had
pronounced their friend, and to let Mr. Crawford bear the unjust
imputation of having assailed him in the cabinet.
"It must be confessed that the mask was worn with consummate
skill. Mr. Calhoun was understood by all of General Jackson's
friends to be his warm and able defender. When, in 1824, Mr.
Calhoun was withdrawn from the lists as a candidate for the
Presidency, the impression made on the friends of General
Jackson was that he did it to favor the election of their
favorite, when it is believed to be susceptible of proof that he
secretly flattered the friends of Mr. Adams with the idea that
he was with them. It is certain that for the Vice-Presidency
he continued to secure nearly all the Adams votes, most of the
Jackson votes, and even half of the Clay votes in Kentucky. But
never did the friends of General Jackson doubt his devotion
to their cause in that contest, until the publication of his
correspondence with General Jackson. In a note, page 7, he
undeceives them by saying:
"'When my name was withdrawn from the list of presidential
candidates, I assumed a perfectly neutral position between
General Jackson and Mr. Adams. I was decidedly opposed to a
congressional caucus, as both those gentlemen were also, and as
I bore very friendly personal and political relations to both, I
would have been well satisfied with the election of either.'
"I have now given a faithful detail of the circumstances and
facts which transpired touching my movements in Florida, during
the Seminole campaign.
"When Mr. Calhoun was secretly misinterpreting my views and
conduct through Mr. Speer to the citizens of South Carolina,
I had extended to him my fullest confidence, inasmuch as I
consulted him as if he were one of my cabinet, showed him the
written rules by which my administration was to be governed,
which he apparently approved, received from him the strongest
professions of friendship, so much so that I would have scorned
even a suggestion that he was capable of such unworthy conduct.
"ANDREW JACKSON."
Such is the paper which General Jackson left behind him for
publication, and which is so essential to the understanding of
the events of the time. From the rupture between General Jackson
and Mr. Calhoun (beginning to open in 1830, and breaking out in
1831), dates calamitous events to this country, upon which history
cannot shut her eyes, and which would be a barren relation without
the revelation of their cause. Justice to Mr. Monroe (who seemed
to hesitate in the cabinet about the proposition to censure or
punish Gen. Jackson), requires it to be distinctly brought out
that he had either never read, or had entirely forgotten General
Jackson's confidential letter, to be answered through the venerable
representative from Tennessee (Mr. John Rhea), and the production of
which in the cabinet had such a decided influence on Mr. Calhoun's
proposition--and against it. This is well told in the letter of
Mr. Crawford to Mr. Forsyth--is enforced in the "Exposition," and
referred to in the "correspondence," but deserves to be reproduced
in Mr. Crawford's own words. He says: "Indeed, my own views on the
subject had undergone a material change after the cabinet had been
convened. Mr. Calhoun made some allusion to a letter the General had
written to the President, who had forgotten that he had received
such a letter, but said if he had received such an one, he could
find it; and went directly to his cabinet and brought the letter
out. In it General Jackson approved of the determination of the
government to break up Amelia Island and Galveston; and gave it
also as his opinion that the Floridas should be taken by the United
States. He added it might be a delicate matter for the Executive to
decide; but if the President approved of it, he had only to give a
hint to some confidential member of Congress, say Mr. Johnny Ray
(Rhea), and he would do it, and take the responsibility of it on
himself. I asked the President if the letter had been answered. He
replied, No; for that he had no recollection of having received it.
I then said that I had no doubt that General Jackson, in taking
Pensacola, believed he was doing what the Executive wished. After
that letter was produced unanswered I should have opposed the
infliction of punishment upon the General, who had considered the
silence of the President as a tacit consent. Yet it was after this
letter was produced and read that Mr. Calhoun made his proposition
to the cabinet for punishing the General. You may show this letter
to Mr. Calhoun, if you please." It was shown to him by General
Jackson, as shown in the "correspondence," and in the "Exposition;"
and is only reproduced here for the sake of doing justice to Mr.
Monroe.